Husain, Aasim M., Anna Ilyina, and Li Zeng. 2014. “Europe’s Russian Connections.” iMFdirect, August 1. http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2014/08/01/europes-russian-connections.
International Monetary Fund. 2014b. “Republic of Poland: 2014 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report.” Washington.
International Monetary Fund. 2014c. “Russian Federation: 2014 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report.” Washington.
Georgia and Turkmenistan are not members of the CIS, but they are included in this group because of their geographic proximity and similarity of economic structure.
While regulatory forbearance could cushion the adverse impact of the shock on banks in the short run, it should be reversed once conditions normalized.
The federal government program has subsequently been reduced to Rub 830 billion, as estimates for capital support have been reduced. Recent CBR stress tests suggest that the government support for all the large eligible banks is sufficient to cover loan-loss provisioning and market losses under an adverse scenario.
The 2015 budget assumes gross financing from the RF, reducing considerably fiscal buffers for the future.
For a discussion of the impact of geopolitical tensions on CESEE countries’ confidence, see the October 2014 Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe Regional Economic Issues Update (IMF 2014a); “Europe’s Russian Connections,” a blog by IMF staff members (Husain, Ilyina, and Zeng 2014); and IMF staff reports for Article IV consultations for the Russian Federation (IMF 2014c), Poland (IMF 2014b), Hungary (IMF 2015b), and the Czech Republic (IMF 2015a).
CCA countries comprise Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Bilateral portfolio flows between Russia and CESEE countries are limited to about 0.1 percent of GDP.
Sberbank has subsidiaries in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Ukraine; VTB bank has subsidiaries in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine, and Gazprombank in Armenia and Belarus.
This is driven by the subsidiary of Hungarian OTP bank in Russia.
In the case of Ukraine, other idiosyncratic factors also played an important role.
The deteriorating quality and weakening profitability of Ukrainian banks’ assets stem from problems that can only to a limited extent be explained by spillovers from Russia.