Appendix: Existing and Proposed Currency Unions Analyzed In Recent IMF Studies
European Monetary Union (EMU): Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
Central and Eastern European Countries potentially joining EMU: some of the countries that have been analyzed as an illustration include Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA): Canada, Mexico, and United States.
Mercosur: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and associate members Bolivia and Chile.
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN): Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Eastern Caribbean Union: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
CFA Franc zone: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’lvoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union; and Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon, members of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community.
West Africa (ECOWAS): a proposed union including The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, and possibly, at a later stage, those other members of ECOWAS currently using the CFA franc (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’lvoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo).
Rand Common Monetary Area: Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland.
John Norregaard and Valerie Reppelin, “Taxes and Tradable Permits as Instruments for Controlling Pollution: Theory and Practice,” IMF Working Paper 00/13, 2000.
Jenny E. Ligthart, “Optimal Fiscal Policy and the Environment,” IMF Working Paper 98/146, 1998a.
Jenny E. Ligthart, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Environmental Taxes: A Closer Look at the Feasibility of ‘Win-Win’ Outcomes,” IMF Working Paper 98/75, 1998b.
Craig Brett and Michael Keen, “Political Uncertainty and the Earmarking of Environmental Taxes,” Journal of Public Economics Vol. 75, pp. 315-40, 2000.
Per G. Fredricksson and Muthukumara Mani, “Trade Integration and Political Turbulence: Environmental Policy Consequences,” IMF Working Paper 01/150, 2001.
Nalin Kishor, Muthukumara Mani, and Louis Constantino, “Economic and Environmental Benefits of Eliminating Log Export Bans: The Case of Costa Rica,” forthcoming IMF Working Paper 01/153, 2001.
Luc Leruth, Remi Paris, and Ivan Ruzicka, “The Complier Pays Principle: The Limits of Fiscal Approaches Towards Sustainable Forest Management,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2001.