Abstract
Issues raised by the evolution of a rapidly growing small economy from a labor-intensive, low-technology production base to a capital-intensive, high-technology, knowledge-and-skill-intensive emphasis as it approaches the limits of its resource constraints in the labor market are examined. A model of endogenous growth for a small open economy that is driven by increases in labor productivity from learning-by-doing and that allows for the dynamic acquisition of comparative advantage is developed. In this framework the effects of policies and exogenous shocks on the direction and pace of restructuring are investigated.
In an attempt to obtain more satisfactory explanations for sustained differences in growth experiences, both over time and across countries, much attention has been focused recently on endogenous sources or engines of growth. It has been increasingly recognized that models of endogenous growth hold the potential for explaining aspects of growth that the standard neoclassical aggregate growth model of Solow (1956), and its many variants are either directly at odds or ill-equipped to deal with.1
An important prediction of the neoclassical model is that initial conditions or disturbances have no long-run implications for growth. Regardless of an economy’s initial per capita endowment of capital, it will converge to the same steady state per capita capital stock, after which growth in per capita output is determined purely by exogenous technological progress. There is, therefore, no room for an analysis of alternative phases or stages of growth induced by particular initial conditions. Moreover, the role for government intervention in the neoclassical model is limited. The model predicts, for example, that policies that succeed in increasing savings rates will increase the long-run level of per capita output and consumption, but will have no sustained impact on the growth rate of per capita output.
This paper analyzes a particular episode in the growth experience of Singapore—that of economic restructuring, which encompassed changes in both the technique of production and in the composition of output.2 Singapore is a small, highly open economy whose development strategy has passed through several stages. A remarkably successful low-wage, export-led period of industrialization from 1966–79 transformed it from a labor-surplus economy to one where domestic labor constituted an important constraint on growth.3 By the late 1970s, a development strategy based on labor-intensive and relatively low-wage, export-driven growth was proving to be unsustainable for several reasons. First, full employment of the labor force was generating upward pressure on wages. With limited prospects for growth in the domestic supply of labor, a continuation of the strategy would have required a growing reliance on imported foreign labor. This was ruled out as a socially and politically viable option. Second, the Government realized that wage restraint had resulted in excessive investment in, and retention of, labor-intensive activities. The maintenance of low wages, it was felt, had hindered the natural process of economic upgrading and restructuring with technological progress, because it encouraged investment in relatively labor-intensive, low-technology goods. Third, the small wage increases in Singapore had been accompanied by lower growth of labor productivity than in other newly industrializing economies (NIEs), where wage increases had been more rapid. It was felt that preventing wages from rising to higher levels had stunted productivity growth by reducing incentives for labor-saving investment and organizational rationalization.
In 1979 the Government adopted an economic restructuring strategy, designed to shift the structure of production from low-technology, labor-intensive activities to technology-and-skill-intensive, higher value-added activities. This shift was intended to place the economy on a sustainable growth path by allowing it to economize on the use of labor and to enter markets for high-technology and knowledge-and-skill-intensive goods and services. It was perceived that if this restructuring were not brought about, the labor constraint and consequent wage pressure would eventually lead to a deterioration in competitiveness and a declining share in traditional export markets. Moreover, the move toward high-technology goods would increase labor productivity and thus output.
Three complementary policy initiatives were involved in the restructuring strategy. First, significant wage increases were encouraged by the National Wage Council (NWC) to compensate for the previous wage restraint, which may have held wages at an artificially low level.4 This policy of allowing wages and, more generally, labor costs to rise in excess of productivity growth has been referred to as a “high-wage” or “wage-correction” policy.5 It was envisaged that, with an increase in the relative price of labor, capital would be substituted for labor, and consequently, low-wage, labor-intensive activities would be phased out. Concomitantly, to reinforce this shift, labor supply measures were adopted to limit the inflow of foreign workers into lower-paid unskilled occupations, and eventually to phase foreign workers out. The measures recommended by the NWC raised labor costs for all employers, but the form of the recommendations, which comprised a uniform lump-sum increase and a percentage increase, also affected wage relativities by increasing the lowest wages proportionately more than higher wages.6 Thus, firms engaged in low-skill, labor-intensive activities experienced the largest increase in labor costs.
Second, restructuring was perceived to be constrained by an inadequately skilled labor force, and the Government therefore embarked on an ambitious and successful program for increasing labor skills. In addition to various adult education and worker training programs, the Skills Development Fund (SDF) was formed in 1979. Financed by a tax on employers, the SDF was designed to provide incentives to employers to upgrade the skills of their employees and to increase on-the-job training.7 Third, incentives were offered by the Economic Development Board, to encourage investment in technology-and-skill-intensive activities, and to promote automation of existing production facilities.
While some restructuring of output toward knowledge-and-skill-intensive and high-technology activities had already taken place in the 1970s, the pace of restructuring accelerated considerably after the adoption of the wage-correction policy in 1979 (Figure 1). The share of financial and business services, representing relatively skill-intensive activities, which was virtually unchanged during 1971–79, rose from 18 percent in 1979 to almost 29 percent by 1987. The share of electronics, a relatively high-technology activity, also increased sharply. Accompanying the restructuring of output was a shift in the composition of the labor force toward more highly skilled and higher-paid activities.8

Structure of Output
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
Source: Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics, 1987 and 1988.Note: Share of GDP at current market prices.
Structure of Output
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
Source: Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics, 1987 and 1988.Note: Share of GDP at current market prices.Structure of Output
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
Source: Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics, 1987 and 1988.Note: Share of GDP at current market prices.In assessing the economic restructuring policies, one needs to address several key questions. First, if the policies had not been undertaken, would restructuring have come about naturally? Second, while restructuring was expected to raise the level of productivity and, hence, the level of output, is there any reason to believe that it might have also resulted in a permanent increase in the potential rate of growth of the economy? Third, what effects did changes in wage differentials and in the rate of return to capital have on the direction and pace of restructuring?
For a labor-constrained and otherwise naturally resource-poor economy such as Singapore at the end of the 1970s, productivity increases must eventually become the primary source of sustained growth in the supply of output. Productivity of the raw labor force can be increased directly by investment in human capital, as emphasized recently by Otani and Villanueva (1989); or it can result from a process of “learning-by-doing.” The potential importance of learning-by-doing in endogen-ously determining productivity growth was first advanced by Arrow (1982). Subsequently, Bardhan (1970) and Krugman (1987) have emphasized its role in dynamically determining comparative advantage, and it is identified by Lucas (1988) as a potential, endogenously determined, source of growth. In the following, the questions raised above on Singapore’s economic restructuring program will be addressed in a simple model incorporating learning-by-doing.
Section I extends Lucas’s (1988) model of endogenous growth to examine the process of restructuring that took place in Singapore in the 1980s. The model shows that in the absence of exogenous shocks or government intervention, an economy will, over time, tend to one of two long-run equilibrium growth paths—a “high-growth” path and a “low-growth” path—depending on the initial endowment of resources in each sector and, hence, historical comparative advantage. Thus, any government intervention that results in a diversion of resources from one sector to another can affect the pattern of growth and trade over time, indeed even to the extent of putting the economy on a high-growth or low-growth trajectory. The analysis presents an example of a change in the level of aggregate output, resulting from a shift in its composition, inducing a sustained change on the potential growth rate of the economy. Effects of stylized versions of actual policies followed in Singapore and exogenous shocks are analyzed. Section II offers concluding remarks.
I. A Model of Endogenous Growth and Restructuring
The model developed here builds on Lucas (1988). Consider a small open economy producing two (baskets of) traded goods, the outputs of which are denoted by Q1 and Q2, and the prices of which are determined in the rest of the world. Initially, for simplicity, abstract from the presence of physical capital.9 The population, or labor supply, is assumed to be constant. The two goods are produced by a technology of the Cobb-Douglas type, with diminishing returns to labor
Here,
The effect of the skill level or human capital,
and a dot over a variable denotes its derivative with respect to time. The growth of the skill level should be interpreted as occurring due to learning and can be interpreted as learning-by-doing. The rate of growth of skills in equation (2) is a positive function of both the speed of learning, represented by δi, and the effort or resources devoted to producing good i, which is assumed to be related to the proportion of the labor force employed in the production of good i. Good 1 will be referred to as the high-technology good and good 2 as the low-technology good. It is posited further that the speed of learning is greater in the high-technology sector than in the low-technology sector, so that δ1 > δ2.
Equation (2) implies that the economy’s production possibility frontier shifts out over time, with experience gained by the labor force resulting in an increase in the skill level and, hence, productivity of the labor force. Note that the form of these learning equations implies constant returns to experience. This seems counterintuitive, in that one would expect learning-by-doing or the acquiring of skill in any particular activity to occur rapidly at first, then more slowly, and then not at all. The constant returns to learning in (2) should be interpreted as representing an environment in which innovations are constantly occurring and being adopted, so that learning is interpreted not only as permitting things to be done better, but also results in better things being done. Viewing learning as encompassing the adoption of innovations provides a justification for the assumption of a higher speed of learning in the high-technology sector, since innovations are likely to occur at a relatively more rapid rate in the sector.
It is assumed for simplicity that labor is perfectly homogeneous and mobile across sectors, and that wages are perfectly flexible. Full employment therefore implies
For our purposes it is convenient to allow for a subsidy on wages in sector 1, granted at the rate τ1, and a tax on wages in sector 2, levied at the rate τ2. Then combining firms’ first-order conditions for profit maximization, and substituting in the full-employment condition (3), yields
which can then be used to solve for the share of labor in sector 1 as a function of the relative skill level in sector 1 and the exogenous variables of the system, so that
In equation (4b), Ht denotes the ratio of skill levels or human capital; that is,
Figure 2 graphs the possible dynamic paths of the economy represented by equations (4b) and (5). The growth of skills in each activity is determined by both the speed of learning and the effort or resources—that is, proportion of the labor force—devoted to each activity. Since the speeds of learning are posited to be different in the two sectors, there will exist distributions of the labor force between the two sectors such that the ratio of skill levels remains exactly constant over time: where, for example, the effect on the growth of the relative skill level of a smaller share of labor devoted to producing the high-technology good is offset exactly by the higher speed of learning in that activity. In Figure 2 the

Dynamic Path of Economy
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003

Dynamic Path of Economy
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
Dynamic Path of Economy
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
The production possibility frontier (PPF) shifts out, over time, proportionately in favor of the good that the country has an initial comparative advantage in producing—that is, the good it produces relatively more of—since its skill level will grow relatively more in the activity to which it devotes larger resources. Thus, at unchanged relative prices, except by pure chance, in the case where resources are initially apportioned in the production of each good such that relative skill levels remain constant, the economy will end up specializing in the production of one of the two goods over time. Initial comparative advantage is thus magnified over time. Since the speed of learning is posited to be greater in the high-technology good, eventual specialization in that good implies a higher steady-state growth rate.
The analysis presents a manifestation of popular notions of bottle necks to growth.10 There are no forces in the system just discussed that would necessarily place the economy on a path converging to the high-growth path. Whether the economy ends up on the high-growth path or the low-growth path will depend upon its initial relative skill levels and internationally given relative prices. Since the learning effects are assumed to be external, agents do not take them into account, and the high-technology good is thus underproduced, and production and trade are determined by temporal or historical comparative advantage. The market, left to itself, will not necessarily pick the high-growth path, except by historical accident. There is thus a clear role for government intervention. In particular, allocating labor toward the high-technology good, relative to the free market solution, would result over time in the acquisition of comparative advantage in the production of the high-technology good and a higher growth rate.
An alternative reason for the existence of differential potentials for productivity increases that are external to any single firm is different rates of technology transfer from the rest of the world to the two sectors.11 Imagine, for simplicity, that “available” technological progress occurs globally at a faster rate in the high-technology sector. Now suppose that the (relative) speed of adoption of these innovations—that is, the actual transfer of the technology—is a function of the (relative) resources devoted to the production of each good. The analysis of different rates of technology transfer from abroad is then equivalent to that described above for endogenous productivity increases.
The role of skills upgrading is transparent in the framework of Figure 2. An exogenous increase in the relative skill level in the production of the high-technology good would move the economy to the right along the curve OL. Thus, a relatively skill-scarce economy can, by increasing its skill level, cross the threshold value of
Role of Wage Differentials in Economic Restructuring
A simple and convenient way to analyze the effect of an exogenous decline in the relative wages paid in the high-technology sector is to examine the effect of a tax on wages in the labor-intensive, low-technology sector, or the effect of a subsidy on wages in the high-technology sector.12 Consider the effect of an increase in the tax rate on wages in sector 2, τ2. Recalling equation (4b), an increase in τ2 results in an upward shift of the OL curve, as depicted in Figure 3, to OL′, so that, as would be expected, an increasing proportion of the labor force is employed in the high-technology sector at any skill level. It now intersects the

Effect of an Increase in the Tax Rate on Wages in the Low-Technology Sector 2
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003

Effect of an Increase in the Tax Rate on Wages in the Low-Technology Sector 2
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
Effect of an Increase in the Tax Rate on Wages in the Low-Technology Sector 2
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
Effect of a Change in the Terms of Trade
Consider the effect of an exogenous increase in the internationally given relative price of the high-technology good. This corresponds to a decline in P and, given the sign of the partial derivative in equation (4b), results in an upward shift of the OL curve in Figure 3 to OL′, exactly as in the previous exercise. An increase in the relative price of good 1 shifts production in favor of good 1, increasing the proportion of the labor force employed in sector 1, and hence expands the set of initial conditions converging to eventual specialization in the high-technology good. It follows directly that any commercial policy—for example, a tariff—that shifts domestic producer prices in favor of the high-technology good would have the same effect.
Role of Foreign Labor
Consider the effect of an increase in the labor force, N. Note that, from equation (4b),
Role of Investment
The rate of investment in physical capital plays an important role in the restructuring of output.15 An increase in the stock of physical capital would increase by relatively more the output of the capital-intensive sector. Thus, in the above setting, where the capital-intensive good is the high-technology good, an increase in the stock of physical capital will shift the composition of output and employment in favor of the high-technology good. Hence, an increase in the rate of investment can be viewed as an alternative engine for the restructuring of output, while additionally providing an independent source of economic growth.
In introducing physical capital accumulation into the model above, some simplifying assumptions are made to keep the analysis tractable. The case of interest is one where the high-technology sector is relatively capital intensive, and productivity increases at a faster rate because the speed of learning and, hence, the rate of skill accumulation is greater. A simple and tractable way to maintain these assumptions is to take the extreme case: capital is employed only in the high-technology sector; and whereas, as before, in the high-technology sector skills are accumulated by learning, the skill level in the low-technology good is constant and normalized to equal unity. Production functions can then be written as
where Kt represents the stock of physical capital. Note the slight change in notation: the skill level in the high-technology sector is now denoted by Ht. This is to highlight the fact that while formally Ht now represents only the absolute skill level in sector 1, it can still be interpreted as the relative skill level in that sector. As before, it is assumed that the rate of growth of the skill level in sector 1, Ht, increases with the proportion of the labor force,
It is assumed along with Kouri (1979) that for a small open economy, net investment at home is an increasing function of the discrepancy between the actual rate of return to capital, rt, adjusted for any taxes levied at the rate Φ, and the exogenously given rate of return, r*, in the international capital market:16
Assuming a competitive market for capital, the rate of return (rental) to capital at home is given at any point in time by the marginal product of capital in sector 1:
As in the previous subsection, first-order conditions for profit maximization can be combined with the full-employment condition to yield
so that
Substituting (10b) into (7), combining (8) and (9), and again substituting in (10b), yields a pair of dynamic equations in the skills level and the stock of physical capital:
It follows that
and it can be established that
To establish (13b), differentiate (12) with respect to the capital stock, and rearrange, so that
and, therefore,
Now, differentiating (10a) and rearranging
so that
so that a phase diagram describing the possible dynamic paths of the economy can be drawn, as in Figure 4.

Dynamic Path of Economy with Endogenous Capital Accumulation
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003

Dynamic Path of Economy with Endogenous Capital Accumulation
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
Dynamic Path of Economy with Endogenous Capital Accumulation
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
Note that both the skill level, Ht, and the stock of capital, Kt, are predetermined variables given by history at any point in time. As the arrows indicate, there exists a locus of initial H, K combinations, labeled CC in Figure 4, which places the economy on a path converging to a steady-state combination of
This expanded framework allows consideration of the two main components of the wage-correction policy: a change in relative wages and an increase in the overall level of wages. Consider first the relative wage effect. As before, consider the effect of an increase in the rate of tax, τ2, on employment in the labor-intensive, low-technology sector 2. Given the signs of the partial derivatives in equation (10b), it follows that both the

Effect of an Increase in the Tax Rate on Wages in the Low-Technology Sector with Endogenous Capital Accumulation
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003

Effect of an Increase in the Tax Rate on Wages in the Low-Technology Sector with Endogenous Capital Accumulation
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
Effect of an Increase in the Tax Rate on Wages in the Low-Technology Sector with Endogenous Capital Accumulation
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
Consider now the effect of an increase in average real wages in excess of productivity growth. Since such an increase would reduce the rate of return to capital, a convenient way to model it is to examine the effect of an increase in the tax, Φ, on the return to capital.18 In this case there is no effect on the

Effects of an Increase in the Tax Rate on the Return to Capital
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003

Effects of an Increase in the Tax Rate on the Return to Capital
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
Effects of an Increase in the Tax Rate on the Return to Capital
Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1991, 004; 10.5089/9781451956917.024.A003
The questions raised at the end of the last section on restructuring can now be answered. First, in the framework developed above, government intervention can play a pivotal role in providing an initial impetus for restructuring, which market forces may not naturally generate due to the presence of external learning effects. A second question was whether restructuring would simply raise the level of output or could influence long-run growth potential. The framework developed here clearly suggests scope for the latter if the high-technology and knowledge-and-skill-intensive sectors have the inherent potential for higher productivity growth. Finally, on the third issue—the effect of the wage-correction policy on economic restructuring—the analysis suggests that there were probably two opposing influences. The decline of relative wages in the higher-paid occupations, on the one hand, tended to shift employment in favor of these occupations, thus moving the economy onto, or further along, a path to self-sustaining restructuring toward capital-intensive, high-technology and knowledge-and-skill-intensive activities. The rapid increase in real wages across the board, on the other hand, lowered the rate of return to capital and thus lowered investment, which tended to move the economy away from such a path.19
II. Conclusion
This paper has examined a particular phase in the growth experience of Singapore—that of economic restructuring. To examine the process of restructuring in general, a model of endogenous growth and restructuring for a small open economy incorporating learning-by-doing was developed. A broad conclusion from this framework is that impediments to restructuring may exist because of the potential importance of external learning effects, the benefits of which redound not to individual firms but to a sector as a whole. Such externalities present bottlenecks to market-driven restructuring and create a role for government intervention. In particular, it was shown that a diversion of resources, even temporary, can induce an acquisition of comparative advantage and hence permanently affect the pattern of trade and growth. The framework thus suggests that if high-technology and knowledge-and-skill-intensive sectors inherently have the potential for higher productivity growth, economic restructuring would not simply raise the level of output but could permanently raise the rate of long-run growth.
The framework was employed to analyze the effects of, among other things, the wage-correction policy on the direction and pace of economic restructuring in Singapore. The results indicate that there were probably two opposing influences. The decline of relative wages in the higher-paid occupations, on the one hand, tended to shift employment in favor of these occupations, thus moving the economy onto, or further along, a path of self-sustaining restructuring toward higher-technology and knowledge-and-skill-intensive activities. The absolute increase in average real labor costs across the board in excess of productivity growth, on the other hand, lowered the rate of return to capital and thus lowered investment, tending to move the economy away from such a path. However, note that in Singapore restructuring did not hinge on the net effect of these two opposing forces alone, since it was boosted in addition by the upgrading of skills and the promotion of investment in relatively labor-saving and knowledge-and-skill-intensive activities. Indications are that initial bottlenecks to restructuring in Singapore have been overcome—a basic level of skills and trained manpower now exists, and a critical mass of high-technology and knowledge-and-skill-intensive activities has been established—and comparative advantage in these activities is likely to grow naturally.
It is worth emphasizing that the framework developed here for examining alternative growth strategies was for a small and highly open labor-constrained economy. The policy conclusions reached, therefore, may not be applicable for all countries, and it should be noted that a shift toward production of high-technology goods is not sustainable for the world as a whole. Two crucial assumptions were made. First, the analysis was carried out on the assumption of a fully employed and constant labor force. This seems accurate for Singapore at the end of the 1970s. For a labor-surplus economy, however, a shift toward labor-saving means of production may clearly not be appropriate in the presence of a large pool of unemployed labor. Second, for a small open economy, world demand was assumed to be infinite. A global shift in production toward any one good would, in the absence of any change in tastes, undoubtedly shift the terms of trade against the good, making its production less profitable and limit the scope for growth.20
REFERENCES
Arrow, Kenneth J., “The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 29 (June 1982), pp. 155–73.
Bardhan, Pranab K., “Optimum Trade Policy in a Model of Learning by Doing,” Chapter 7 in Economic Growth, Development, and Foreign Trade (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970).
Helpman, Elhanan, “Growth, Technological Progress, and Trade,” Empirica-Austrian Economic Papers, Vol. 15 (1988), pp. 5–26.
Jorgenson, Dale W., “Capital Theory and Investment Behavior,” American Economic Review, Vol. 53 (1963), pp. 247–57.
Kouri, Pentti, “Profitability and Growth in a Small Open Economy,” in Inflation and Employment in Open Economies, ed. by Assar Lindbeck (Amsterdam; New York: North-Holland, 1979).
Krugman, Paul, “The Narrow Moving Band, the Dutch Disease, and the Competitive Consequences of Mrs. Thatcher,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 27 (October 1987), pp. 41–55.
Lim, Chong-Yah, Economic Restructuring in Singapore (Singapore: Federal Publications, 1984).
Lim, Chong-Yah, and others, Policy Options for the Singapore Economy (Singapore; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988).
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 22 (July 1988), pp. 3–42.
Otani, Ichiro, and Cyrus Sassanpour, “Financial, Exchange Rate, and Wage Policies in Singapore, 1979-86,” Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, Vol. 35 (September 1988), pp. 474–95.
Otani, Ichiro, and Delano Villanueva, “Theoretical Aspects of Growth in Developing Countries: External Debt Dynamics and the Role of Human Capital,” Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, Vol. 36 (June 1989), pp. 307–42.
Romer, Paul M., “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94 (October 1986), pp. 1002–37.
Romer, Paul M., (1987a), “Growth Based on Increasing Returns Due to Specialization,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 77 (May 1987), pp. 56–62.
Romer, Paul M., (1987b), “Crazy Explanations for the Productivity Slowdown,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, ed. by Stanley Fischer (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987).
Shleifer, Andrei, “Externalities as an Engine of Growth” (unpublished; Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1989).
Singapore, Department of Statistics, Yearbook of Statistics (various issues).
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Singapore, Report of the Economic Committee, The Singapore Economy: New Directions (Singapore: Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1986).
Solow, Robert M., “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 32 (February 1956), pp. 65–94.
For a discussion of the failure of the neoclassical growth model to explain various stylized facts of growth, and its limitations in general, see, among others, Romer (1986, 1987a, 1987b), Lucas (1988), Helpman (1988), and Shleifer (1989).
With rapid economic growth, which averaged 9.4 percent a year from 1970–79, a large pool of unemployed labor was gradually absorbed into the work force; between 1970 and 1979 the unemployment rate fell from 6.0 percent to 3.4 percent—close to the natural rate of unemployment, which is estimated at 3 percent. During this period real wage increases typically lagged behind growth in labor productivity. It is estimated, for example, that while real product wages in manufacturing increased at an average rate of 2.3 percent a year from 1973–79, labor productivity grew by 4.4 percent a year. See Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics (various issues).
The NWC, a tripartite body comprising representatives from the Government, employers, and trade unions, was formed in 1972 with the mandate of recommending specific quantitative wage guidelines each year. The tripartite nature of the council ensured wide acceptance and implementation of its recommendations.
In June 1979 the NWC recommended a general wage increase amounting to approximately 14 percent of average monthly wages. In accepting the NWC’s recommendations, the Government made it known that similar wage increases were planned for the following two years. The measures to increase wages coincided with systematic increases in employer contribution rates to the Central Provident Fund from 16.5 percent of the wage bill in 1978 to 25 percent by 1984. For an analysis of the short-term effects of the wage-correction policy, see Otani and Sassanpour (1988).
The lump-sum dollar increase in the NWC recommendations for 1979/80 and 1980/81, for example, constituted approximately half of the total 14 percent recommended increase in wages.
At the time of the introduction of the SDF in 1979, the employer’s contribution rate was set at 2 percent of the wage bill; it was subsequently raised to 4 percent in 1980.
From 1979–87 the share of professional, managerial, and administrative workers in the labor force, representing the highest skill and pay occupational category, rose significantly from 11 percent to 17 percent; the share of production, transport, and other manual workers, representing the lowest skill and pay occupational category, fell from 39 percent to 35 percent. See Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics (various issues).
The implications of the presence of physical capital and the role of investment are discussed below in an extended version of the model.
Formally, there is a bottleneck to “high” growth, rather than growth.
This is particularly relevant in the case of Singapore.
Although such a differential tax or subsidy was not actually implemented, it is analytically equivalent to changing wages in the low-wage sector relative to the high-wage sector from employers’ point of view, and considerably more tractable.
This shift is not shown in Figure 3, since the effects are exactly opposite to those depicted for the previous exercise.
To talk meaningfully about relative labor intensities, physical capital needs to be included explicitly in the production functions. It is implicitly assumed that the capital stock in each sector is fixed in this subsection and is therefore suppressed from the notation. The next subsection endogenizes physical capital accumulation.
The effect of changes in the composition of investment is, of course, transparent. An increase in the share of total investment going into the high-technology sector will, by altering relative capital stocks, shift production and employment in favor of the high-technology good.
Kouri (1979) argues that such an investment function can be derived if expectations are static and there are adjustment costs to investment. The traditional neoclassical model of investment, as developed by Jorgenson (1963), posits the flow of investment to be a function of the difference between an optimal capital stock, determined by maximizing the present value of the firm, and the current level of the capital stock. The formulation here is adopted to emphasize that in a highly open economy, investment at home is a function of relative rates of return.
Formally, the Jacobian matrix, with elements defined in equations (13a) and (13b), has a negative determinant, so that the system has one stable and one unstable root and is therefore characterized by saddle-path stability; CC denotes the saddle path in Figure 4.
Sufficient conditions for an exogenous increase in wage or labor costs to reduce the rate of return to capital are that the labor supply curve be positively sloped and that the capital stock be predetermined at a point in time. In the tradition of two-sector trade models, it has been assumed, for simplicity, that labor is inelastically supplied.
If, however, investment at home is unresponsive to differences between domestic and international rates of return—for political risk reasons, for example—but is responsive to differences in rates of return across sectors, then an increasing proportion of the investment that does take place is likely to go into the labor-saving, capital-intensive sector, spurring restructuring.
In this context, see Lucas (1988), who considers a world where, because of an assumed Ricardian technology, each country specializes in the production of one of two goods. His model predicts some interesting cycles in the pattern of production and trade.