External Adjustment and the Strong Yen: Recent Japanese Experience

Robert J. Corker

doi:10.5089/9781451947045.024.A006

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External Adjustment and the Strong Yen: Recent Japanese Experience

Author: Mr. Robert J. Corker

Publication Date:: 01 Jan 1989

eISBN:: 9781451947045

Language:: English

Keywords:: SP; export price; price elasticity; U.S. dollar; current account transaction; current account surplus; Exchange rates; Export prices; Imports; Exports; elasticity of import

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The parameters of a conventional model of Japan’s current account were found to be stable in the period of the steeply rising yen, end–1985 to end–1987. Thus, Japan’s current account has been adjusting to the strengthening yen in accordance with established historical relationships—a conclusion substantiated by the model’s reasonably accurate tracking of the current account in this period. Simulations of the model show that the rise in the yen has already made a substantial contribution to correcting Japan’s external imbalance.[JEL 431, 212]

Abstract

Japan’s current account surpluses in the 1980s have been large both in nominal terms and as a percentage of gross national product (GNP). Furthermore, the persistence of large surpluses in the face of the recent sharp appreciation of the yen has called into question whether the process of external adjustment has been proceeding at a satisfactory pace. Specifically, many commentators have argued that sluggish adjustment of Japan’s current account surplus has been due either to a lack of openness of the Japanese market or to abnormal trading practices by Japanese exporters. With these concerns in mind, this paper examines the developments in Japan’s current account in the period following the start of the yen’s rapid rise toward the end of 1985.

The paper concludes that, by and large. Japan’s current account has been adjusting to the higher yen since 1985 according to established historical relationships. Export growth was slightly faster than might have been expected, but the effect of this on the trade surplus was offset by exceptionally strong import growth. Services account transactions are less well-explained than those of the traded-goods sector, but they too could have been broadly predicted on the basis of past behavior. The paper therefore concludes that the yen’s recent appreciation has already exerted a significant corrective influence on the current account. In U.S. dollar terms, however, the current account has not declined appreciably because of the usual J-curve effects.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section I, recent developments in Japan’s current account are described. Section II describes the specification and estimation of a fairly conventional model of current account transactions. This model is used as the vehicle in Sections III and IV to analyze developments in the current account since the yen began its steep ascent. Analysis is conducted in two parts. First, formal and informal evidence is examined for a break in behavior during the period 1985:4–1987:4. Second, simulations are conducted with the model to measure the extent to which exchange rate realignments have affected Japan’s current account in the last two years. Conclusions are presented in Section V.

I. Current Account Developments in the 1980s

Japan’s current account was last in balance in 1980. Over the next five years, the current account recorded steadily increasing surpluses and, by 1985, the surplus amounted to 3½ percent of GNP. The rise was largely accounted for by a growing trade surplus, although the deficit on the services account also narrowed in this period mainly because of a rise in net investment income from the accumulated stock of foreign assets (Figure 1). The already large surplus was given fresh impetus in 1986 by the collapse in oil prices, and the surplus rose to 4¼ percent of GNP. The current account surplus began to decline as a ratio of GNP in 1987, although its value in U.S. dollars remained roughly unchanged at $87 billion.

The buildup of the current account surplus in the first half of the 1980s took place against a background of improving Japanese competitiveness, but this pattern changed markedly toward the end of 1985 when the yen began to appreciate sharply against most currencies. The yen had already been appreciating against the dollar since February of that year—which is when the dollar began to fall in effective terms—but it was only after the Plaza Accord of September 1985 that the yen’s effective value began to move sharply upward. The extent of the appreciation since then has been remarkable. Between the third quarter of 1985 and the end of 1987, the yen rose by 45 percent in nominal effective terms according to weights assigned in the International Monetary Fund’s Multilateral Exchange Rate Model (MERM), and by 76 percent against the dollar. In terms of relative normalized unit labor costs, the appreciation was over 30 percent, pushing the real exchange rate to the heights of its short-lived peak in 1978.

The appreciation of the yen had a powerful effect on real trade flows. The rapid growth in real exports seen in the first half of the 1980s was brought to an abrupt halt, and import growth accelerated sharply. Measured in 1980 prices, the real trade surplus declined by about 3 percent of GNP in two years. However, the nominal trade and current account surpluses remained at high levels because of terms of trade gains.

II. A Model of Japan’s Current Account

In this section a model of current account transactions is developed, and econometric estimates are presented. The framework of analysis reflects the elasticities approach, rather than one that emphasizes savings and investment behavior.¹ The model forms the basis for the empirical analysis, described in Sections III and IV, of current account adjustment to the strong yen.

Model Specification

The structure of the model’s main sectors—exports, imports, and services—is first described. Equation estimates are then presented.

Exports

The demand for and supply of merchandise exports were modeled at the aggregate level because of the comparatively homogeneous composition of Japanese exports.² The market for a typical export good was assumed to be characterized by imperfect competition—Japanese exports are not perfect substitutes for foreign-produced goods—and supply decisions were assumed to be made on the basis of profit maximization. Two equations were specified: an export demand equation and a reduced-form price equation.

The demand for exports is determined by the price of Japanese exports relative to competing goods and on a foreign income variable. This is a fairly conventional treatment (see, for example, ^{Goldstein and Khan (1978)}) although some researchers also have added cyclical terms (for example. ^{Citrin (1985)}). It was assumed that demand does not adjust instantaneously to either changing relative prices or income—for example, because of fixed contracts. The export demand equation is thus

\begin{matrix} x = x [a (L) (p x / p w), b (L) y w], & (1) \end{matrix}

where x is export volume;px, export prices (in dollars); pw, competitors’ prices (also in dollars); and yw, income in Japan’s export markets. The notation a(L) denotes a polynomial function in the lag operator L (that is, $L^{j} Z_{t} = Z_{t - j}$

In recent years, certain Japanese exports have been subject to voluntary export restraints (VERs).³ To the extent that these restraints have been binding, export volume would have been lower than the free market level, whereas average prices would have been higher. Empirical tests were conducted to examine the importance of VERs at the aggregate level.

Under imperfect competition, a downward-sloping demand curve and production technology impose constraints on suppliers’ pricing behavior. The usual first-order conditions for profit maximization lead to export prices being a markup on input costs, where the markup depends on the elasticity of demand for exports. Except in restricted cases,⁴ export prices can then be written as a reduced form of input costs and the arguments of the export demand equation. Furthermore, in an inter-temporal framework, where there are costs associated with changing prices or where exporters rationally take into account the sluggish adjustment of demand, it can be shown that export prices depend on the whole spectrum—past, present, and expected—of input costs, competitor prices, and any other factors that shift supply and demand (see ^{Cuthbertson (1986)}). An important component of the expected variables would be expectations about exchange rate movements that would affect the course of profits denominated in domestic currency. Some researchers (for example ^{Froot (1988)}) have argued that pricing behavior will differ in the face of permanent or transitory exchange rate changes. No attempt was made in the present paper to test this hypothesis, and all expectations were proxied by past values of explanatory variables. The export price equation thus resembles

\begin{matrix} p x = p x [d (L) p w, e (L) p, f (L) y w], & (2) \end{matrix}

where p represents domestic costs (proxied by domestic wholesale prices, in U.S. dollars).⁵

Careful attention was paid to both the equation’s long-run and short- run properties. As regards the equation’s long-run properties, it can be shown that prices depend on, among other things, a weighted average of foreign prices and domestic costs, where the weights reflect the relative size of export supply and demand elasticities (see Appendix I). The implied coefficient restrictions needed to produce this result—which has implications for the degree of long-run exchange rate “pass-through” were tested empirically. As regards the short-run properties, some commentators (for example, ^{Loopesko and Johnson (1987)} and ^{Hooper and Mann (1987)}) have suggested that Japanese exporters react differently to an exchange rate depreciation than to an exchange rate appreciation. Such potential nonlinear behavior was also examined empirically.

Imports

Imports were disaggregated into four categories—mineral fuels, raw materials, food and drink, and manufactures—because demand behavior for each of these components is very different. Demand for each category was assumed to depend, with adjustment lags, on domestic activity variables and on the price of the import relative to domestic wholesale prices (both in U.S. dollars). That is,

\begin{matrix} m_{i} = m_{i} [g (L) y, h (L) (p m_{i} / p)], & (3) \end{matrix}

where m, is the volume of import i, pm_i is its price, and y is domestic activity. Import prices were assumed to be exogenous.

In addition, Japan’s imports are affected by various nontariff barriers. Quotas and domestic pricing policies play a particularly important role in determining agricultural imports, whereas exporters of manufactured goods to Japan frequently claim that they face intangible trade barriers (see ^{Christelow (1985–86)}). Furthermore, demand for mineral fuel imports is strongly influenced by an energy policy that, given Japan’s lack of fuel resources, heavily promotes conservation. Attempts were made to incorporate such factors in the import demand equations.

Services

The services account was divided into four subcategories: transport, travel, investment income flows, and other services.⁶ For all categories except investment income, equations were specified for both payments and receipts. It was assumed that competitiveness is an important determinant of the demand for services, so these equations resembled trade volume equations (1) and (3) in structure. That is, demand for real service flows depends on activity and relative price terms:

\begin{matrix} s r_{i} / p_{i} = s r_{i} [k (L) y w, m (L) z] & (4) \end{matrix}

\begin{matrix} s p_{i} / p_{i}^{*} = s p_{i} [n (L) y, q (L) z], & (5) \end{matrix}

where sr_{_i} and sp_{_i} are, respectively, dollar receipts and payments for service category i; p_{_i}, p_{_i}^* are price deflators (in dollars); and z is a relative price term.

Net investment income was modeled as the average return (assumed to be exogenous) on the net stock of overseas assets. The stock of such assets is determined endogenously in the model, accumulating in line with the current account (compare ^{Dunaway (1988)}). This feature makes the model nonlinear because increases in the current account are compounded by larger inflows (at unchanged rates of return) of investment income from the augmented stock of net foreign assets.

Equation Estimates

All equations were estimated by ordinary least squares with quarterly data for the period 1975–87.⁷ Log-linear specifications with fairly general dynamic structures were used throughout. A full listing of the estimated equations is contained in Appendix II.

Exports

In line with other researchers, this study finds Japanese export demand to be less sensitive to relative prices than to world activity. The long-run relative price elasticity is estimated to be just under –1.1, which is somewhat lower than most estimates based on earlier data periods, but more recent studies have reported broadly comparable results.⁸ However, the long-run elasticity of exports with respect to world activity—a weighted average of trading partners’ GNP—was found to be just over 2.0.⁹ No significant shift in export demand could be found in the period after 1981, which might otherwise have indicated an important role at the aggregate level for VERs. Various constant shift or trend dummies were added to the basic equation, but, although their coefficients in general had the expected (negative) sign. t–statistics were always insignificant.

Dynamic adjustment of demand to a change in world activity or relative prices takes place over a period of about two years, although 80 percent of the adjustment process is completed by the end of the first year. The stickiness of volumes implies that a rise in Japanese export prices is accompanied by a rise in export value in the short run. Because the long-run price elasticity is greater than unity, however, rising prices eventually lead to falling export value.

Export prices were found to depend positively in the short run on domestic costs (proxied by wholesale prices), competitors’ prices, and world GNP (Table 1). In the long run, however, export prices depend only on domestic costs. By implication, long-run export supply is perfectly elastic (see Appendix I).

Table 1.

Dollar Export Price Elasticities

Table 1.

Dollar Export Price Elasticities

Elasticity		Short-Run Impact	Long-Run Impact
With respect to:
	Competitors’ prices	0.36	—
	World GNP	0.99	—
	Domestic wholesale prices (in yen)	0.54	1.00
	Dollar-yen exchange rate	0.54	1.00

Table 1.

Dollar Export Price Elasticities

Elasticity		Short-Run Impact	Long-Run Impact
With respect to:
	Competitors’ prices	0.36	—
	World GNP	0.99	—
	Domestic wholesale prices (in yen)	0.54	1.00
	Dollar-yen exchange rate	0.54	1.00

The particular mix of short- and long-run properties arises from an error-correction specification of the equation dynamics.¹⁰ Changes in export prices depend on changes in competitors’ prices, domestic wholesale prices, and world GNP as well as on the lagged ratio of the level of export prices to wholesale prices. The last of these terms, the “stabilizer,” can be interpreted as past profitability: it ensures that if export prices fall below domestic costs they eventually must rise to restore profitability. A further term in the lagged ratio of export prices to competitors’ prices—past competitiveness—was initially included in the specification but was found to be statistically insignificant. Had it been significant, export prices would have been a weighted average of wholesale and competitors’ prices in the long run. Also statistically insignificant were dummy variables to capture the effects of VERs.

The immediate pass-through of a yen appreciation to export prices is, other things being equal, just over one half, although it eventually rises to unity.¹¹ The other-things-equal qualification is important because observed pass-through (actual percentage change in foreign-currency-denominated export prices divided by the percentage change in the yen) will depend on developments in world prices and world GNP as well as on domestic costs and the level of profitability. For example, in a general equilibrium framework domestic costs in yen would fall with an appreciating exchange rate, and this would limit the long-run increase in export prices.

Some observers have suggested that dollar-denominated Japanese prices are stickier when the yen appreciates than when it depreciates. Tests were carried out to examine the validity of this proposition by measuring the statistical significance of several additional nonlinear terms in the estimated price equation. These terms were products of either changes in competitors’ prices or domestic wholesale prices multiplied by a dummy variable that was unity for an exchange appreciation or zero otherwise. Such nonlinear terms, involving either real or nominal exchange rate changes, were found to be statistically insignificant. This finding provides counterevidence to the proposition that short-run pass-through depends on the direction of exchange rate changes.¹²

Imports

All import categories showed some sensitivity to relative prices and domestic activity, and, for the three primary goods categories, time trends and dummy variables also helped the econometric explanation. Aggregate imports have a relative price elasticity of just under -0.6, which is below the range of estimates reported in ^{Goldstein and Khan (1985)} but slightly higher than recent estimates by Helkie at the Federal Reserve Board.¹³ Two measures of domestic activity were used—real total domestic demand and industrial production—and the long-run elasticity of aggregate imports with respect to each variable was found to be about 0.9. Therefore, if domestic demand and industrial production were to increase together, the long-run elasticity of imports with respect to domestic activity could be as high as 1.8. This would be in excess of most other estimates for Japanese imports but lower than typical estimates of the income sensitivity of U.S. imports.¹⁴ This latter factor is often cited as one of the reasons for the persistence of the present U.S. trade deficit.

The low aggregate price elasticity of imports is due to the low price elasticities of commodity imports (Table 2). Least sensitive to relative price changes are mineral fuel imports, but raw material and food and drink imports were also found to he quite price-inelastic. By contrast, the price elasticity of manufacturing imports (–0.9) is more comparable to recent estimates of the price elasticity of U.S. imports.¹⁵

Table 2.

Long-Run Import Demand Elasticities

^{^a}Excluding nonmonetary gold.

^{^b}Elasticity with respect to the operating ratio in manufacturing.

^{^c}Based on 1987 shares of each category in total imports.

Table 2.

Long-Run Import Demand Elasticities

		Elasticity with Respect to:
Import Category		Relative prices	Domestic demand	Industrial production
Manufacturing^a		–0.91	1.84	0.99^b
Raw materials		–0.27	—	1.24
Mineral fuels		–0.11	—	1.04
Food and drink		–0.55	0.45	—
	Total imports^c	–0.55	0.88	0.89

^{^a}Excluding nonmonetary gold.

^{^b}Elasticity with respect to the operating ratio in manufacturing.

^{^c}Based on 1987 shares of each category in total imports.

Table 2.

Long-Run Import Demand Elasticities

		Elasticity with Respect to:
Import Category		Relative prices	Domestic demand	Industrial production
Manufacturing^a		–0.91	1.84	0.99^b
Raw materials		–0.27	—	1.24
Mineral fuels		–0.11	—	1.04
Food and drink		–0.55	0.45	—
	Total imports^c	–0.55	0.88	0.89

^{^a}Excluding nonmonetary gold.

^{^b}Elasticity with respect to the operating ratio in manufacturing.

^{^c}Based on 1987 shares of each category in total imports.

Typically, each import category was found to be sensitive to one but not both of the activity variables. The exception was manufacturing imports, which, reflecting the amalgamation within the category of consumer and capital goods, were found to he sensitive to both domestic demand and industrial production (proxied by the operating ratio in manufacturing). It was also found that the short-run elasticities with respect to the industrial production variables exceeded the long-run elasticities in both the raw materials and manufacturing goods equations. This suggests that domestic producers build up inventories of imported inputs and intermediate goods when there is an acceleration in demand.

Time-trend variables were also significant in the commodities imports equations. A negative time trend was found to play an important explanatory role in the mineral fuels equation: it most likely reflects long-term energy conservation. The time trend in the food and drink equation (which was assumed to begin in 1982) captures the positive effects of a relaxation of agricultural quotas and other restrictions. A liberalization dummy was not required in the manufacturing equation—although a time trend that started in the second half of 1985, included to capture the effects of the most recent recent market-opening measures (the Action Program, July 1985–March 1988), had a positive sign but was statistically insignificant.

Services

Relative price and income effects were found for most components of the services account (see Table 3). Payments were found to be more price-sensitive than receipts, but the average long-run income elasticities of both payments and receipts were close to unity. The price elasticity on payments is large enough to ensure an eventual deterioration of the services balance (excluding investment income) in the face of a real exchange rate appreciation. In general, the services equations had higher standard errors than the trade equations—perhaps reflecting, in part, a lack of adequate price deflators.

Table 3.

Long-Run Elasticities of Service Transactions

^{^a}Short-run elasticity with respect to export volume of 0.51.

^{^b}1987 component shares, excluding investment income.

^{^c}Short-run elasticity with respect to export volume of 0.54.

Table 3.

Long-Run Elasticities of Service Transactions

		Elasticity with Respect to:
Service Transaction		Relative prices	Domestic real GNP	World GNP
Payments
	Transport^a	–6.09	—	—
	Travel	–1.86	0.97	—
	Other	–0.18	1.53	—
	Weighted average^b	–2.68	0.86	—
Receipts
	Transport^c	—	—	—
	Travel	–0.45	—	2.39
	Other	–0.73	—	1.69
	Weighted average^b	–0.40	—	1.01

^{^a}Short-run elasticity with respect to export volume of 0.51.

^{^b}1987 component shares, excluding investment income.

^{^c}Short-run elasticity with respect to export volume of 0.54.

Table 3.

Long-Run Elasticities of Service Transactions

		Elasticity with Respect to:
Service Transaction		Relative prices	Domestic real GNP	World GNP
Payments
	Transport^a	–6.09	—	—
	Travel	–1.86	0.97	—
	Other	–0.18	1.53	—
	Weighted average^b	–2.68	0.86	—
Receipts
	Transport^c	—	—	—
	Travel	–0.45	—	2.39
	Other	–0.73	—	1.69
	Weighted average^b	–0.40	—	1.01

^{^a}Short-run elasticity with respect to export volume of 0.51.

^{^b}1987 component shares, excluding investment income.

^{^c}Short-run elasticity with respect to export volume of 0.54.

The large long-run price elasticity of the transport payments equation is perhaps a misleading indicator of this category’s sensitivity to changing competitiveness. This equation is dominated by a strong autoregressive term, which implies that adjustment to a change in relative prices is spread out over a very long period. Indeed, after two years, only about one fourth of the adjustment is complete. Long-run activity effects could not be found in either the transport payments or receipts equations, although both were sensitive in the short run to changes in Japanese exports. Japanese overseas travel payments were found to be more sensitive to relative prices than travel receipts, although the latter were more sensitive to income.

III. Current Account Adjustment and the Strong Yen: Was There a Structural Break?

Some commentators have suggested that Japan’s current account has been extraordinarily slow to adjust in the face of the large appreciation of the yen. In particular, interest has focused on whether Japanese exporters went to exceptional lengths to maintain market share and whether Japanese import restrictions have unduly suppressed import demand. If either factor had been important, it should be possible to find evidence of a structural break in the behavior of external transactions during 1986 and 1987. Tests for such a break were conducted at two levels. First, formal econometric tests were carried out on the equations described in the previous section. Second, an informal examination was made of the model’s ability to forecast current account developments in 1986 and 1987.

Parameter Stability Tests

Two tests of parameter stability in the period 1985:4 through 1987:4 were carried out on the model equations. The first, the familiar Chow test, is known to have fairly weak power. Hence, forecast tests of the kind suggested by ^{David Hendry (1980)} were also performed. These are biased toward rejection of the hypothesis of parameter stability and thus provide a much more stringent test for a structural break. Of course, passing a Chow or Hendry test—although a necessary requirement of parameter stability—is not a sufficient condition to rule out a structural break in behavior. But it should also be borne in mind that the turbulent events of 1986–87—which include sharp currency changes and the collapse in international oil prices—provide a tough background for these tests.

Most of the equations pass both these tests (Table 4). All the trade equations pass the tests at the 95 percent confidence level, providing evidence that trade behavior did not deviate significantly from historical relationships during the period. The results for the services account equations, however, are mixed. The equations for travel payments, other service payments, transport receipts, and other service receipts all have stable parameters, but the equations for transport payments and travel receipts fail both the Chow and Hendry tests.¹⁶ Therefore, apart from a few components of the services account, there is no statistical evidence of a break in behavior during the period of the rising yen.

Table 4.

Parameter Stability Tests of Current Account Equations, 1985: 4–1987: 4

^{^a}H indicates a test result for the Hendry forecast test (Hendry (1980)); C indicates a test result for the Chow test (^{Chow (1960)}).

Table 4.

Parameter Stability Tests of Current Account Equations, 1985: 4–1987: 4

	Parameter Stability Tests^a
Equation	Pass at 95 percent confidence level	Pass at 99 percent confidence level	Fail
Export volume	C,H	—	—
Export prices	C,H	—	—
Manufacturing imports	C,H	—	—
Raw materials imports	C,H	—	—
Mineral fuels imports	C,H	—	—
Food and drink imports	C,H	—	—
Transport payments	—	—	C,H
Travel payments	C,H	—	—
Other service payments	C,H	—	—
Transport receipts	CM	—	—
Travel receipts	—	—	C,H
Other service receipts	C	H	—

^{^a}H indicates a test result for the Hendry forecast test (Hendry (1980)); C indicates a test result for the Chow test (^{Chow (1960)}).

Table 4.

Parameter Stability Tests of Current Account Equations, 1985: 4–1987: 4

	Parameter Stability Tests^a
Equation	Pass at 95 percent confidence level	Pass at 99 percent confidence level	Fail
Export volume	C,H	—	—
Export prices	C,H	—	—
Manufacturing imports	C,H	—	—
Raw materials imports	C,H	—	—
Mineral fuels imports	C,H	—	—
Food and drink imports	C,H	—	—
Transport payments	—	—	C,H
Travel payments	C,H	—	—
Other service payments	C,H	—	—
Transport receipts	CM	—	—
Travel receipts	—	—	C,H
Other service receipts	C	H	—

^{^a}H indicates a test result for the Hendry forecast test (Hendry (1980)); C indicates a test result for the Chow test (^{Chow (1960)}).

Forecast Performance

An examination of the forecasting record of the current account model from 1985:4 through 1987:4 provides a less formal analysis of whether there was a break in behavior. All the equations were first estimated by using a data sample that ended in the third quarter of 1985 and then were used to predict events in the subsequent two years. Three types of forecasts were made. The first two looked at the static and dynamic tracking of events in 1986 and 1987 of each individual equation: the third involved full dynamic simulation of the current account model.¹⁷

A key feature of the trade account forecasts is the overprediction of the fall in real exports in 1986 and 1987 while real import growth was stronger than might have been expected (Table 5 and Figure 2). For both real exports and imports, the errors were compounded in the dynamic forecasts by the carrying forward of previous errors in the lagged dependent variables. Nevertheless, the average errors of the trade volume forecasts were all less than two standard errors of the equation—even for the dynamic forecasts.

Table 5.

Current Account Forecast Errors, 1985;4–1987;4

(Predicted minus actual, as percentage of actual)

^{^a}Excluding nonmonetary gold.

^{^b}Excluding investment income.

Table 5.

Current Account Forecast Errors, 1985;4–1987;4

(Predicted minus actual, as percentage of actual)

		Mean Percentage Error
Item		Single equation errors		Model errors
Item		Static forecast	Dynamic forecast	Model errors
Export volume		–2.01	–4.12	–4.91
Export prices		0.65	1.58	1.58
Import volume		—	—	–2.79
	Manufacturing^a	–1.66	–2.03	–2.03
	Mineral fuels	–3.51	–3.51	–3.51
	Raw materials	–2.97	–4.66	–4.66
	Food and drink	–0.67	–0.69	–0.69
Service payments^b		2.15	8.53	7.51
Service receipts^b		4.42	18.74	16.57

^{^a}Excluding nonmonetary gold.

^{^b}Excluding investment income.

Table 5.

Current Account Forecast Errors, 1985;4–1987;4

(Predicted minus actual, as percentage of actual)

		Mean Percentage Error
Item		Single equation errors		Model errors
Item		Static forecast	Dynamic forecast	Model errors
Export volume		–2.01	–4.12	–4.91
Export prices		0.65	1.58	1.58
Import volume		—	—	–2.79
	Manufacturing^a	–1.66	–2.03	–2.03
	Mineral fuels	–3.51	–3.51	–3.51
	Raw materials	–2.97	–4.66	–4.66
	Food and drink	–0.67	–0.69	–0.69
Service payments^b		2.15	8.53	7.51
Service receipts^b		4.42	18.74	16.57

^{^a}Excluding nonmonetary gold.

^{^b}Excluding investment income.

A possible factor behind the higher export growth might have been the consumer loyalty to Japanese goods that was created when Japanese exporters moved into dominant market positions in the early 1980s.¹⁸ In contrast, the exceptional strength of import growth may have been due to the removal of trade restrictions that are not adequately captured in the equations. In this respect, it should be noted that the period of interest coincides with the authorities’ latest Action Program to promote trade liberalization.

The model also predicted faster export price growth than that which occurred, although the average error is small and less than the standard error of the equation. The implied slower pass-through of the yen appreciation to export prices occurred despite export demand being more buoyant than predicted. This might have been expected to have put additional upward pressure on export prices. Notice also that, had export prices risen as much as the model predicted, export volume would have fallen by even more than the single equation predicted (compare the second and third columns of Table 5). Even so, the average error was less than twice the equation standard error.

The overprediction of export prices reduces the underprediction of export value stemming from sticky volume demand. In net trade terms, this error on the export side is, in turn, offset in large part by the underprediction of imports. Overall, the model predicted a slightly smaller trade surplus in 1986 and 1987 than actually occurred (Table 6).

Table 6.

Model Dynamic Forecast Errors

(Predicted minus actual; in billions of U.S. dollars)

Table 6.

Model Dynamic Forecast Errors

(Predicted minus actual; in billions of U.S. dollars)

Item	1985	1986	1987
Trade balance	0.14	–3.45	–5.17
Services balance	0.53	1.58	0.11
Current account balance	0.67	–1.88	–5.07

Table 6.

Model Dynamic Forecast Errors

(Predicted minus actual; in billions of U.S. dollars)

Item	1985	1986	1987
Trade balance	0.14	–3.45	–5.17
Services balance	0.53	1.58	0.11
Current account balance	0.67	–1.88	–5.07

Offsetting errors also occurred in the prediction of the services account. Both payments and receipts were overpredicted, particularly in 1986, with the worst errors being found on the transport components. Overall, the deficit on the services account was forecast to be lower in both 1986 and 1987, although the error is small in comparison with the size of the gross flows. Adding the errors on both services and trade accounts produces a current account prediction error of less than $2 billion in 1986 and only $5 billion in 1987—small errors relative to the size of the current account surpluses in these years.

In summary, it does not appear that current account transactions deviated significantly from historical behavior. On the contrary, the parameter stability tests find no evidence of a structural break—apart from some components of the services account. The model also tracks the large current account surpluses in 1986 and 1987 reasonably well.

IV. Effects of the Yen’s Appreciation

The continuing rise of Japan’s current account surplus during 1986 and 1987, while the yen appreciated sharply, should not be taken to imply that external adjustment was not taking place. Rather, the pertinent question would seem to be what Japan’s external surplus would have been had there been no realignment of exchange rates. To answer this question, the current account model was simulated under the assumption that exchange rates had remained at their third quarter 1985 levels.¹⁹

In what follows, a basic simulation is described, followed by a discussion of the sensitivity of the results to changing one of the more contentious underlying assumptions. Both sets of results are presented as differences from a baseline forecast constructed from the model’s tracking of history. In contrast to the previous section, the model equations used in the simulations were all estimated over the full data sample (1975–87). As a consequence, the tracking errors of the components of the current account are all quite small, especially in relation to the size of the simulated changes.

Basic Simulation: No Exchange Rate Realignment

If there had been no realignment of exchange rates, the world economic environment would have doubtless been very different in 1986 and 1987. In particular, maintenance of unchanged exchange rates would have required a different international economic policy mix that, in turn, would have had important consequences for relative growth and inflation rates. The absence of a full general equilibrium model of the world’s economy precludes a detailed analysis of the world environment under unchanged exchange rates. Instead, some simplifying assumptions were made about those variables that directly affect Japan’s external transactions.

Additional Assumptions

The first assumption was that interest rates, world GNP, Japanese total domestic demand, and Japanese industrial production were unchanged from their historical values. Japan’s real GNP was determined endogenously in the simulations as the sum of domestic demand and (endogenous) external demand. To the extent that changes in world GNP and Japanese domestic demand under no realignment would have been in the same direction, there would be partially offsetting effects on the current account. If both world GNP and domestic demand had been 1 percent higher in 1986–87, it is estimated that the current account would have been about $3 billion higher in these years. Interest rates only affect investment income in the model. If interest rates had been 1 percentage point higher, the current account would have been $1–2 billion higher in 1986–87. The effects of relaxing the assumption regarding industrial production are discussed in the second part of this section.

The second assumption concerned the effect on competitors’ dollar traded-goods prices of the simulated stronger dollar. On the basis of simple regressions, it was assumed that a 10 percent increase in the dollar’s effective value reduces export- and import-weighted dollar prices of competitors^- manufactured traded-goods prices by 5.6 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively, over the course of a year. Furthermore, from the analysis of ^{Sachs (1985)} it was assumed that a 10 percent effective appreciation of the dollar leads to a 7.5 percent fall in dollar commodity prices, with adjustment being spread over one year.

The third assumption was to link Japanese wholesale prices by way of a simple regression equation to imported mineral fuel and raw material prices (measured in yen), and to actual minus potential GNP (see Appendix II for details). In this way, the impact of the yen’s appreciation on the sharp decline in wholesale prices was captured. The long-run elasticity of each of the imported price terms was about 0.1. The effects of the exchange rate realignment on other domestic and world price variables, which play a relatively minor role in the model, were assumed to be of second-order significance.

Effects on Competitiveness

In the simulation, the deterioration of Japan’s export competitiveness in 1986–87 is sharply reduced (Table 7). However, the improvement in competitiveness is considerably smaller than the simulated nominal yen depreciation because of the short-run stickiness of export prices and because competitors’ dollar export prices fall with the assumed stronger dollar. Similarly, the competitiveness of imports worsens, but by less than the simulated nominal yen depreciation, because of the drop in dollar-denominated commodity and world manufactured goods prices.

Table 7.

Basic Simulation: Assumptions and Competitiveness Effects,1985:4–1987:4

(Percentage difference from baseline)

^{^a}Japanese export prices relative to world manufactured traded-goods prices (export-weighted). Japanese export prices are endogenously determined in the model.

^{^b}Japanese wholesale prices relative to import prices.

Table 7.

Basic Simulation: Assumptions and Competitiveness Effects,1985:4–1987:4

(Percentage difference from baseline)

Item		1985	1986	1987
Dollar–yen exchange rate		–3.0	–29.6	–39.9
U.S. dollar effective exchange rate		1.7	20.5	36.7
Yen wholesale prices		0.3	4.6	9.4
U.S. dollar export prices		–1.8	–20.0	–30.6
World manufactured traded-goods prices:
	Export-weighted	–0.4	–7.1	–15.4
	Import-weighted	–0.9	–8.9	–14.1
U.S. dollar commodity prices		–0.2	–8.4	–18.8
Export competitiveness^a		–1.4	–13.8	–17.9
Import competitiveness^b		–2.7	–19.1	–19.4
Japanese real GNP		–0.1	0.4	2.3

^{^a}Japanese export prices relative to world manufactured traded-goods prices (export-weighted). Japanese export prices are endogenously determined in the model.

^{^b}Japanese wholesale prices relative to import prices.

Table 7.

Basic Simulation: Assumptions and Competitiveness Effects,1985:4–1987:4

(Percentage difference from baseline)

Item		1985	1986	1987
Dollar–yen exchange rate		–3.0	–29.6	–39.9
U.S. dollar effective exchange rate		1.7	20.5	36.7
Yen wholesale prices		0.3	4.6	9.4
U.S. dollar export prices		–1.8	–20.0	–30.6
World manufactured traded-goods prices:
	Export-weighted	–0.4	–7.1	–15.4
	Import-weighted	–0.9	–8.9	–14.1
U.S. dollar commodity prices		–0.2	–8.4	–18.8
Export competitiveness^a		–1.4	–13.8	–17.9
Import competitiveness^b		–2.7	–19.1	–19.4
Japanese real GNP		–0.1	0.4	2.3

^{^a}Japanese export prices relative to world manufactured traded-goods prices (export-weighted). Japanese export prices are endogenously determined in the model.

^{^b}Japanese wholesale prices relative to import prices.

The simulation result can be inverted to arrive at a measure of how much the actual increase in Japanese export prices between the fourth quarter of 1985 and the end of 1987 can be attributed to the rising yen. The outcome is summarized in Table 8, where a distinction is made between the direct impact of exchange rate changes and their indirect effects—that is, those attributable to lower domestic wholesale prices and higher competitors’ prices. It was found that more than the actual dollar increase in Japanese export prices in this period could be attributed to the yen’s appreciation, despite the offsetting effect of the yen’s rise on domestic wholesale prices.²⁰

Table 8.

Effect of the Yen’s Appreciation on Japanese Export Prices

(Cumulative percentage change)

Table 8.

Effect of the Yen’s Appreciation on Japanese Export Prices

(Cumulative percentage change)

Item			1985:4–1987:4
Actual U.S. dollar price change			42.4
Total exchange rate effect			50.6
	Direct		57.2
	Indirect		–4.2
		Lower wholesale prices	–8.1
		Higher competitors’ prices	4.0

Table 8.

Effect of the Yen’s Appreciation on Japanese Export Prices

(Cumulative percentage change)

Item			1985:4–1987:4
Actual U.S. dollar price change			42.4
Total exchange rate effect			50.6
	Direct		57.2
	Indirect		–4.2
		Lower wholesale prices	–8.1
		Higher competitors’ prices	4.0

Effects on the Current Account

The implied improvement in competitiveness in the simulation would have had a dramatic impact on real trade flows. Instead of stagnating, export volumes would have grown at a 6 percent annual rate, whereas import growth would have been more than halved (Table 9). Imports of manufactures would have been most affected because of their comparatively high price sensitivity; at the other end of the scale, mineral fuel imports would have been only about 2 percent lower. Overall, the real trade surplus would have continued to grow steadily in 1986 and 1987 instead of declining.

Table 9.

Basic Simulation: Effects of Exchange Rare Realignment on Japan’s Current Account, 1985:4–1987:4

(Predicted minus actual; in billions of U.S. dollars)^a

^{^a}Unless otherwise specified.

^{^b}Percentage difference between predicted and actual levels.

^{^c}Percentage point difference between predicted and actual.

Table 9.

Basic Simulation: Effects of Exchange Rare Realignment on Japan’s Current Account, 1985:4–1987:4

(Predicted minus actual; in billions of U.S. dollars)^a

Item			1985	1986	1987
Exports			–3.23	–29.67	–40.13
	Volume^b		—	7.2	18.6
	U.S. dollar price^b		–1.8	–20.0	–30.6
Imports			–0.53	–17.48	–38.78
	Volume^b		—	–5.0	–9.5
	U.S. dollar price^b		–0.4	–9.2	–18.5
Trade balance			–2.70	–12.19	–1.35
Service balance			–0.86	–3.18	4.47
Current account balance			–3.56	–15.37	3.11
		(in trillions of yen)	(–0.38)	(2.54)	(9.11)
Ratio of current account balance to GNP^c			–0.1	0.7	2.5

^{^a}Unless otherwise specified.

^{^b}Percentage difference between predicted and actual levels.

^{^c}Percentage point difference between predicted and actual.

Table 9.

Basic Simulation: Effects of Exchange Rare Realignment on Japan’s Current Account, 1985:4–1987:4

(Predicted minus actual; in billions of U.S. dollars)^a

Item			1985	1986	1987
Exports			–3.23	–29.67	–40.13
	Volume^b		—	7.2	18.6
	U.S. dollar price^b		–1.8	–20.0	–30.6
Imports			–0.53	–17.48	–38.78
	Volume^b		—	–5.0	–9.5
	U.S. dollar price^b		–0.4	–9.2	–18.5
Trade balance			–2.70	–12.19	–1.35
Service balance			–0.86	–3.18	4.47
Current account balance			–3.56	–15.37	3.11
		(in trillions of yen)	(–0.38)	(2.54)	(9.11)
Ratio of current account balance to GNP^c			–0.1	0.7	2.5

^{^a}Unless otherwise specified.

^{^b}Percentage difference between predicted and actual levels.

^{^c}Percentage point difference between predicted and actual.

The effects of exchange rate realignments on the nominal surplus are confused by the familiar problem of choice of units of measurement. Measured in dollars, the simulated nominal trade surplus was $12 billion lower in 1986 but close to its actual historical level in 1987 (Figure 3). This result can be interpreted as a measure of the J-curve effect; or, if the result is turned on its head, part of Japan’s trade surplus in 1986, measured in dollars, was due to the yen’s appreciation.

A somewhat different picture emerges when the trade surplus is measured in yen. Because of the assumed lower value of the yen in the simulation, a lower dollar trade surplus converts to a higher yen surplus in both years. The extent of the increase in domestic currency terms is substantial: it is equal to some 2½ percentage points of GNP in 1987. This result is in broad agreement with the simulation properties of the EPA World Model (Japan (1988)).²¹

The disappearance of the J-curve in domestic currency can be explained in terms of the familiar Marshall-Lerner conditions. These show that adjustment of the trade balance to an exchange rate change depends not only on the price elasticities of exports and imports but also on the initial value of the trade surplus.²² Correction of a trade surplus by exchange rate appreciation is more difficult in foreign currency terms when exports initially exceed imports—as was the case in Japan in 1985—but the converse is true for correction in terms of domestic currency.

J-curve effects were also found for the simulated services balance. The deficit on the services account widened in 1986 relative to the base forecast before strengthening in 1987. The J-curve effect in 1986 is compounded by lower net investment receipts because of a slower accumulation of net overseas assets. Unlike the trade balance, there is a J-curve effect in both dollars and yen.

When the results for the trade and services accounts are summed, the model predicts that the current account would have been some $15 billion lower in 1986 had there been no exchange rate realignment, but the current account would have been slightly higher in 1987. Stated another way, about one sixth of Japan’s dollar current account surplus in 1986 can be attributed to the stronger yen, and it was not until about mid–1987 that exchange rates began working to reduce this measure of the surplus.

Although for some purposes it is desirable to measure the current account in a foreign currency, the choice of the dollar gives a misleading picture of the extent of external imbalance because of its rapidly declining value. A more relevant measure of the current account surplus is its ratio to GNP. Measured this way, Japan’s current account would have increased appreciably more in the last two years in the absence of exchange rate realignment. This would have meant that any subsequent external adjustment would have been even more protracted and probably would have required substantially greater exchange rate changes. The results here stand in contrast to the views of some researchers (for example, ^{Ueda (1988)}) who have concluded that exchange rate movements have played a relatively minor role in recent current account developments.

No Exchange Rate Realignment and Higher Industrial Production

Stagnant export demand, brought about by the appreciating yen, was a major cause of weak Japanese industrial production in 1986–87. Hence, with no exchange rate realignment, industrial production would almost certainly have been stronger and, in turn, the demand for imports would have been higher. To measure the potential magnitude of this indirect effect of the exchange rate on imports, a variant of the basic simulation was constructed in which, in addition to the assumptions made for the basic simulation, it was assumed that industrial production grew in line with its historical trend. The main results are summarized in Table 10.

Table 10.

Effect of Exchange Rate Realignment and Higher Industrial Production, 1985:4–1987:4

(Predicted minus actual; in billions of U.S. dollars)

Table 10.

Effect of Exchange Rate Realignment and Higher Industrial Production, 1985:4–1987:4

(Predicted minus actual; in billions of U.S. dollars)

Item		1985	1986	1987
Trade balance		–3.2	–17.5	–6.9
Services balance		–0.9	–3.3	4.0
Current account		–4.1	–20.7	–2.9
	(as percentage of GNP)	(–0.2)	(0.4)	(2.1)

Table 10.

Effect of Exchange Rate Realignment and Higher Industrial Production, 1985:4–1987:4

(Predicted minus actual; in billions of U.S. dollars)

Item		1985	1986	1987
Trade balance		–3.2	–17.5	–6.9
Services balance		–0.9	–3.3	4.0
Current account		–4.1	–20.7	–2.9
	(as percentage of GNP)	(–0.2)	(0.4)	(2.1)

Industrial production was assumed to grow by nearly 5 percent in each of 1986 and 1987 instead of declining slightly in 1986 and growing by less than 4 percent in 1987.²³ This stronger growth in industrial production would have further reduced the fall in real imports stemming from the assumed lower real value of the yen by about 4–5 percent. As a consequence, the trade balance would have been a further $5 billion lower in both 1986 and 1987 than in the basic simulation. The effect on the current account would have been slightly greater because of a loss of net investment income from abroad. Altogether, the J-curve effects are thus deeper and more prolonged when the indirect effects of the exchange realignment on Japanese industrial production are taken into account. Nevertheless, the simulation still predicts that Japan’s current account surplus would have been substantially higher—by more than 2 percent of GNP in 1987—had there been no realignment.

V. Conclusions

The first main conclusion of this paper is that recent developments in Japan’s current account balance have broadly followed historical relationships. The conclusion was reached through formal statistical tests that find little evidence of a break in the behavior of the equations of a conventional current account model. Furthermore, these same equations can track, with only a small amount of underestimation, Japan’s current account surpluses in 1986 and 1987.

The second main conclusion is that Japan’s current account surplus would have been considerably larger—as much as 2 percent of GNP—if the yen had not appreciated. Put another way, the recent exchange rate changes have already exerted a significant corrective influence on external imbalances. However, part of the reason that Japan’s current account has not declined much when measured in U.S. dollars is the existence of J-curve effects. These J-curve effects added to the surplus in 1986, and it was not until the second half of 1987 that the current account began to decline because of the yen’s appreciation.

APPENDIX I Long-Run Restrictions on the Export Price Equation

In the text, equation (2) is a reduced-form market-clearing price. The demand and supply functions can be written, assuming log-linear specifications, as

\begin{matrix} x^{d} = - α_{1} (p x - p w) + α_{2} y w & (6) \end{matrix}

\begin{matrix} x^{s} = β_{1} (p x - p), & (7) \end{matrix}

where α₁, is the elasticity of demand and β₁, the elasticity of supply. Equating supply and demand and solving for price yields

\begin{matrix} p x = α p w + (1 - α) p + β y w, & (8) \end{matrix}

where

α = \frac{α_{1}}{α_{1} + β_{1}}, β = \frac{α_{2}}{α_{1} + β_{1}} .

That is, export prices are a weighted average of competitor prices (pw) and factor costs (p), where the weights depend on the relative size of demand and supply elasticities. It is found that α = β = 0 in the long run. Hence, for a finite demand elasticity (α₁), the long-run elasticity of supply must be perfectly elastic (β₁ → ∞).

APPENDIX II Equation Estimates

The full-sample estimates of the trade and services account equations are presented below. All equations were estimated by ordinary least squares with quarterly data over the period 1975–87 and with variables in logarithms. DH is the Durbin h–statistic, DW the ordinary Durbin-Watson statistic, SE the standard error, and R² the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom; t-statistics appear in parentheses. A full set of mnemonics for variables and the main data sources used are given in Appendix III.

Exports

\begin{matrix} X = & \underset{(9.31)}{0.663} X_{- 1} - \underset{(5.33)}{0.367} (P X_{- 1} - P W X_{- 1}) \\ + \underset{(4.71)}{0.689} Y W_{- 1} - \underset{(4.43)}{1.594} & (9) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} = & 0.988 S E = 0.028 D H = 0.44 \end{matrix}

\begin{matrix} Δ P X = & \underset{(2.31)}{0.357} Δ P W X - \underset{(3.84)}{0.155} (P X_{- 1} - W P_{- 1}) \\ + \underset{(9.31)}{0.543} Δ W P + \underset{(2.40)}{0.993} Δ Y W - \underset{(3.95)}{0.233} & (\begin{matrix} 10 \end{matrix}) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} = & 0.765 S E = 0.016 D W = 2.01 \end{matrix}

Imports

\begin{matrix} M R M = & \underset{(5.80)}{0.664} M R M_{- 1} - \underset{(1.83)}{0.092} (P M R M_{- 1} - W P_{- 1}) \\ + \underset{(4.20)}{1.142} I P - \underset{(2.48)}{0.727} I P_{- 1} - \underset{(1.71)}{0.017} T T + \underset{(1.75)}{32.249} & (\begin{matrix} 11 \end{matrix}) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} = & 0.789 S E = 0.035 D H = 0.17 \end{matrix}

\begin{matrix} M M F = & \underset{(8.01)}{- 0.107} (P M M F_{- 1} - W P_{- 1}) + \underset{(8.33)}{1.044} I P \\ - \underset{(8.64)}{0.048} T T + \underset{(9.07)}{94.995} & (12) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} = & 0.693 S E = 0.031 D W = 1.93 \end{matrix}

\begin{matrix} M F D = & \underset{(2.78)}{0.343} M F D_{- 1} - \underset{(4.52)}{0.358} (P M F D_{- 1} - W P_{- 1}) \\ + \underset{(2.12)}{0.293} R T D D_{- 1} + \underset{(3.99)}{0.021} D U M M Y - \underset{(0.82)}{1.106} & (13) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} = & 0.970 S E = 0.034 D H = - 1.03 \end{matrix}

\begin{matrix} M M N = & \underset{(6.41)}{0.562} {M M N}_{- 1} - \underset{(4.37)}{0.397} ({P M M N}_{- 1} - {W P}_{- 1}) \\ + \underset{(4.27)}{0.804} {R T D D}_{- 1} + \underset{(4.81)}{1.078} O R M \\ - \underset{(2.73)}{0.645} {O R M}_{- 1} - \underset{(5.00)}{10.523} & (14) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} = & 0.990 S E = 0.032 D H = 0.56 \end{matrix}

Services

\begin{matrix} (S P T R A N - P Y W) = & \underset{(21.55)}{0.966} {(S P T R A N - P Y W)}_{- 1} + \underset{(4.96)}{0.207} {(P Y - P Y W)}_{- 1} \\ + \underset{(3.31)}{0.517} (X - X_{- 1}) + S E A S (15) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} = 0907 S E = & 0.037 D H = 0.78 \end{matrix}

\begin{matrix} (S P T R L - P W C) = & \underset{(7.23)}{0.620} {(S P T R L - P W C)}_{- 1} - \underset{(4.60)}{0.707} {(P W C - C P)}_{- 1} \\ + \underset{(2.95)}{0.369} G N P_{- 1} + S E A S & (\begin{matrix} 16 \end{matrix}) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} = 0.951 & SE = 080 DE = - 2.01 \end{matrix}

\begin{matrix} (S P O - P Y W) = & \underset{(4.91)}{0.568} {(S P O - P Y W)}_{- 1} + \underset{(3.55)}{0.660} G N P_{- 1} \\ + \underset{(1.47)}{0.078} {(P Y - P Y W)}_{- 1} + S E A S & (17) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} = 0.968 & SE = 0.046 DH = 1.04 \end{matrix}

\begin{matrix} Δ (S R T R A N - P Y) = & \underset{(3.31)}{0.419} Δ {(S R T R A N - P Y)}_{- 1} \\ + \underset{(2.03)}{0.542} Δ X + S E A S & (\begin{matrix} 18 \end{matrix}) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} 0.284 & SE = 0.064 DH = 0.85 \end{matrix}

\begin{matrix} (S R T R L - C P) = & \underset{(2.44)}{0.378} {(S R T R L - C P)}_{- 1} + \underset{(1.69)}{0.280} {(P W C - C P)}_{- 1} \\ + \underset{(3.61)}{1.483} Y W_{- 1} + S E A S & (\begin{matrix} 19 \end{matrix}) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} = 0.904 & SE = 0.106 DW = 2.10 \end{matrix}

\begin{matrix} (S R O - P Y) = & \underset{(1.57)}{0.294} {(S R O - P Y)}_{- 1} + \underset{(3.28)}{1.190} Y W \\ - \underset{(2.61)}{0.518} {(P Y - P Y W)}_{- 1} + S E A S & (\begin{matrix} 20 \end{matrix}) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} = 0.837 & SE = 0.093 DW = 2.05 \end{matrix}

Wholesale Prices (used in simulations)

\begin{matrix} Δ (W P + E) = & \underset{(6.47)}{0.445} Δ {(W P + E)}_{- 1} + \underset{(4.59)}{0.059} Δ (P M M F + E) \\ + \underset{(3.52)}{0.065} Δ (P M R M + E) + \underset{(2.00)}{0.314} (G N P - G N P^{*}) & (21) \\ {\bar{R}}^{2} = 0.851 & SE = 0.008 DH = - 0.63 \end{matrix}

APPENDIX III Data Sources and Mnemonics for Variables

The principal data sources were Economic Statistics Monthly, Bank of Japan (Tokyo): Summary Report on Trade of Japan, Japan Tariff Association (Tokyo); Balance of Payments Monthly, Bank of Japan (Tokyo); and International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund (Washington). Where not available, seasonally adjusted data were created by the author using the X–11 program. Mnemonics for variables were as follows:

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Mr. Corker, an economist in the Asian Department, holds degrees from Oxford University and the University of Warwick, England.

For a discussion of these and other approaches to the determination of Japan’s current account, see ^{Ueda (1988)}.

Practically all Japanese exports are manufactured goods.

The most important VER in value terms has been imposed on exports of automobiles to the United States (since April 1981) and, more recently, to the European Community and Canada. VERs have also been imposed on steel, textiles, certain machine tools, and forklift trucks. For an analysis of the effects of VERs on Japanese auto prices in the U.S. market, see ^{Collyns and Dunaway (1987)}.

For example, if the elasticity of demand and the marginal cost of production were both independent of quantity, export prices would be a constant markup on input costs.

This is a fairly commonly used proxy, although ^{Cuthbertson (1986)} and ^{Citrin (1985)} use a weighted average of labor and energy costs.

The last category was defined residually and is made up in large part by fees and royalties. Unilateral transfers were assumed to be exogenous.

Instrumental-variables estimates of the export volume and price equations were tried in order to avoid potential bias arising from simultaneity. The results were little different from the ordinary least-squares results presented here; for export volumes, only predetermined variables enter the equation.

For example, the average price elasticity of studies on Japanese exports reported in ^{Goldstein and Khan (1985)} is—1.4, although the spread of results is quite wide. More recently, William Helkie at the Federal Reserve Board has estimated theprice elasticity at just over—1.1 (reported in ^{Loopesko and Johnson (1987)}), and ^{Ueda (1988)} has estimated the elasticity at close to—0.9.

Compare this figure with an average of 2.6 reported in ^{Goldstein and Khan (1985)} and with 1.6 estimated by Helkie (reported in ^{Loopesko and Johnson (1987)}).

See ^{Davidson and others (1978)}. The specification of the export price equation in this paper is similar to that in ^{Masson and others (1988)}.

Pass-through is about 70 percent after one year, and 95 percent by the end of three years.

^{Loopesko and Johnson (1987)} reported the opposite finding, using a similar methodology. However, they incorporated in their price equation a nonlinear variable that was a function of the dependent variable. Hence, there is reason to suspect that the coefficient estimate of this variable was heavily biased.

The mean price elasticity reported in ^{Goldstein and Khan (1985)} is –1.0 (range of –0.7 to –1.2). Helkie (reported in ^{Loopesko and Johnson (1987)}) estimated the elasticity at under –0.5.

^{Goldstein and Khan (1985)} reported elasticities for Japanese imports in the range 0.8–1.7; Helkie’s estimate was 1.1. ^{Dunaway (1988)} estimated the income elasticity of U.S. imports at 2.5.

For example, ^{Dunaway (1988)} estimated the price elasticity of U.S. imports to be –1.0.

Travel receipts account for less than 5 percent of total service receipts, but transport payments make up about one fourth of total payments.

The static forecasts assume that lagged dependent variables take on actual historical values. In the dynamic forecasts, lagged dependent variables assume previously predicted values. The principal simultaneous elements of the model are the feedback of predicted export prices onto export demand, the feedback from exports to transport payments and receipts, and the effects of the cumulated current account on investment income.

Support for this proposition is provided by evidence of falling export price elasticity over the course of the data sample period, which implies falling substitutability of Japanese exports for competing goods. For the truncated sample (ending in the third quarter of 1985), the long-run price elasticity was—1.3 compared with—1.1 for the full sample—although the change is not statistically large enough to cause failure of the parameter stability tests.

The “no realignment” assumption of this section is interpreted as no change in both yen and U.S. dollar effective exchange rates.

This result suggests that the yen’s appreciation had a strong effect on export prices during 1986–87. Nevertheless, the observed pass-through of the yen appreciation to export prices was only about 55 percent in this period compared with about 70 percent during the 1977–78 appreciation. One factor limiting the pass-through was the collapse in oil prices. Had oil prices not fallen, the model estimates that the pass-through would have risen to 60 percent. This is a conservative estimate because no account is taken of the effects of oil prices on the price of competitors’ manufactured goods prices.

In the EPA model, a 10 percent improvement in competitiveness leads to a reduction in the current account by about 1 percent of GNP.

If full pass-through of an appreciation to prices is assumed, the Marshall- Lerner condition for a yen appreciation to lower the dollar trade surplus is $M L ($) = 1 - E_{x} - E_{m} / R < 0;$ to lower the yen surplus, the condition is $M L (α) = 1 - R . E_{x} - E_{m} < 0;$ where E_x and E_m are the price elasticities of exports and imports, respectively, and R is the initial ratio of real exports to imports. For Japan, R was about 1.3 at end–1985, E_x was 1.1, and E_m was 0.6. Therefore, ML($)= –0.56 and ML _(V) –1.03, implying that the Marshall-Lerner condition is more comfortably satisfied in yen than in dollars. The ease at which the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied determines the speed of trade surplus reduction after an exchange rate appreciation.

In addition, this assumption was interpreted to imply that there was no fall in the operating ratio in manufacturing from its level in the third quarter of 1985.

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IMF Staff papers: Volume 36 No. 2

Author: International Monetary Fund. Research Dept.

Volume/Issue:: Volume 1989: Issue 002

Publisher:: International Monetary Fund

ISBN:: 9781451947045

ISSN:: 1020-7635

Pages:: 260

DOI:: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451947045.024

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Japanese Current Account and Competitiveness, 1975–87

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Trade Equation Forecast Errors, 1983–87 (1980 = 100)

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Japanese Current Account, 1983–87

CP	The consumer price index (1980 = 100) multiplied by dollar-yen exchange rate
DUMMY	A food imports liberalization dummy; 1982:2 = 0.25, 1982:3 = 0.5, and so on
E	The yen-dollar exchange rate
GNP^*	Potential GNP (constructed)
GNP	Real GNP, in 1980 yen
IP	Industrial production, seasonally adjusted (1980 = 100)
MFD	The volume of food and drink imports, seasonally adjusted (1980=100)
MMF	The volume of mineral fuel imports, seasonally adjusted (1980=100)
MMN	The volume of manufacturing imports, excluding nonmonetary gold, seasonally adjusted (1980 = 100)
MRM	The volume of raw material imports, seasonally adjusted (1980=100)
ORM	The operating ratio in manufacturing (1980 = 100)
PMFD	The implicit dollar deflator for food and drink imports, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
PMMF	The implicit dollar deflator for mineral fuels imports, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
PMMN	The implicit dollar deflator for manufactured imports, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
PMRM	The implicit dollar deflator for raw materials imports, seasonally adjusted (1980=100)
PWC	An import-weighted average of trading partners’ consumer prices in dollars (1980 = 100)
PWX	The weighted average of competitors’ dollar export unit values (1980=100)
PX	The implicit dollar deflator for exports, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
PY	The GNP deflator (1980 = 100)
PYW	The weighted average of competitors’ GNP deflators, in dollars (1980 = 100)
RTDD	Real total domestic demand, in 1980 yen
SEAS	Seasonal dummies
SPO	Service payments, other (excluding investment income), in millions of U.S. dollars
SPTRAN	Service payments, transport, in millions of U.S. dollars
SPTRL	Service payments, travel, in millions of U.S. dollars
SRO	Service receipts, other (excluding investment income), in millions of U.S. dollars
SRTRAN	Service receipts, transport, in millions of U.S. dollars
SRTRL	Service receipts, travel, in millions of U.S. dollars
TT	Time trend (1975:1 = 1975.25, 1975:2 = 1975.50, and so on)
WP	The overall wholesale price index (1980 = 100), multiplied by the dollar-yen exchange rate
X	Export volume, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
YW	An ex port-weighted average of partner countries’ GNP (1980=100).

CP	The consumer price index (1980 = 100) multiplied by dollar-yen exchange rate
DUMMY	A food imports liberalization dummy; 1982:2 = 0.25, 1982:3 = 0.5, and so on
E	The yen-dollar exchange rate
GNP^*	Potential GNP (constructed)
GNP	Real GNP, in 1980 yen
IP	Industrial production, seasonally adjusted (1980 = 100)
MFD	The volume of food and drink imports, seasonally adjusted (1980=100)
MMF	The volume of mineral fuel imports, seasonally adjusted (1980=100)
MMN	The volume of manufacturing imports, excluding nonmonetary gold, seasonally adjusted (1980 = 100)
MRM	The volume of raw material imports, seasonally adjusted (1980=100)
ORM	The operating ratio in manufacturing (1980 = 100)
PMFD	The implicit dollar deflator for food and drink imports, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
PMMF	The implicit dollar deflator for mineral fuels imports, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
PMMN	The implicit dollar deflator for manufactured imports, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
PMRM	The implicit dollar deflator for raw materials imports, seasonally adjusted (1980=100)
PWC	An import-weighted average of trading partners’ consumer prices in dollars (1980 = 100)
PWX	The weighted average of competitors’ dollar export unit values (1980=100)
PX	The implicit dollar deflator for exports, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
PY	The GNP deflator (1980 = 100)
PYW	The weighted average of competitors’ GNP deflators, in dollars (1980 = 100)
RTDD	Real total domestic demand, in 1980 yen
SEAS	Seasonal dummies
SPO	Service payments, other (excluding investment income), in millions of U.S. dollars
SPTRAN	Service payments, transport, in millions of U.S. dollars
SPTRL	Service payments, travel, in millions of U.S. dollars
SRO	Service receipts, other (excluding investment income), in millions of U.S. dollars
SRTRAN	Service receipts, transport, in millions of U.S. dollars
SRTRL	Service receipts, travel, in millions of U.S. dollars
TT	Time trend (1975:1 = 1975.25, 1975:2 = 1975.50, and so on)
WP	The overall wholesale price index (1980 = 100), multiplied by the dollar-yen exchange rate
X	Export volume, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
YW	An ex port-weighted average of partner countries’ GNP (1980=100).

CP	The consumer price index (1980 = 100) multiplied by dollar-yen exchange rate
DUMMY	A food imports liberalization dummy; 1982:2 = 0.25, 1982:3 = 0.5, and so on
E	The yen-dollar exchange rate
GNP^*	Potential GNP (constructed)
GNP	Real GNP, in 1980 yen
IP	Industrial production, seasonally adjusted (1980 = 100)
MFD	The volume of food and drink imports, seasonally adjusted (1980=100)
MMF	The volume of mineral fuel imports, seasonally adjusted (1980=100)
MMN	The volume of manufacturing imports, excluding nonmonetary gold, seasonally adjusted (1980 = 100)
MRM	The volume of raw material imports, seasonally adjusted (1980=100)
ORM	The operating ratio in manufacturing (1980 = 100)
PMFD	The implicit dollar deflator for food and drink imports, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
PMMF	The implicit dollar deflator for mineral fuels imports, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
PMMN	The implicit dollar deflator for manufactured imports, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
PMRM	The implicit dollar deflator for raw materials imports, seasonally adjusted (1980=100)
PWC	An import-weighted average of trading partners’ consumer prices in dollars (1980 = 100)
PWX	The weighted average of competitors’ dollar export unit values (1980=100)
PX	The implicit dollar deflator for exports, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
PY	The GNP deflator (1980 = 100)
PYW	The weighted average of competitors’ GNP deflators, in dollars (1980 = 100)
RTDD	Real total domestic demand, in 1980 yen
SEAS	Seasonal dummies
SPO	Service payments, other (excluding investment income), in millions of U.S. dollars
SPTRAN	Service payments, transport, in millions of U.S. dollars
SPTRL	Service payments, travel, in millions of U.S. dollars
SRO	Service receipts, other (excluding investment income), in millions of U.S. dollars
SRTRAN	Service receipts, transport, in millions of U.S. dollars
SRTRL	Service receipts, travel, in millions of U.S. dollars
TT	Time trend (1975:1 = 1975.25, 1975:2 = 1975.50, and so on)
WP	The overall wholesale price index (1980 = 100), multiplied by the dollar-yen exchange rate
X	Export volume, seasonally adjusted (1980= 100)
YW	An ex port-weighted average of partner countries’ GNP (1980=100).

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Abstract

I. Current Account Developments in the 1980s

II. A Model of Japan’s Current Account

Model Specification

Exports

Imports

Equation Estimates

Exports

Imports

Services

III. Current Account Adjustment and the Strong Yen: Was There a Structural Break?

Parameter Stability Tests

Forecast Performance

IV. Effects of the Yen’s Appreciation

Basic Simulation: No Exchange Rate Realignment

Additional Assumptions

Effects on Competitiveness

Effects on the Current Account

No Exchange Rate Realignment and Higher Industrial Production

V. Conclusions

APPENDIX I Long-Run Restrictions on the Export Price Equation

APPENDIX II Equation Estimates

APPENDIX III Data Sources and Mnemonics for Variables

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