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Mr. Teja is an economist in the Asian Department. He holds degrees from Delhi University, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and Columbia University. This paper was written while he was with the Fiscal Affairs Department of the Fund.
An example of a pure public good that is not excludable in consumption is street lighting.
Legislators are not the only class that may resort to earmarking in such a circumstance. Wilkie (1974) and (Premchand 1983) have suggested that, in several Latin American countries, earmarking was motivated by the executive branch of government, which wanted to bypass the problem posed by legislative logrolling and unstable coalitions.