I. Unenforceability of Certain Exchange Contracts: Article VIII, Section 2(b)

II. Movements of Capital and Treaty Law

In the Guerrino Casati case,⁹⁵ the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which will be referred to in the rest of this article as the European Court, delivered, on November 11,1981, an important interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome on the free movement of capital. During argument in the proceedings, the Government of France cited Article VI, Sections 1⁹⁶ and 3⁹⁷ of the Fund’s Articles in support of its view on the basic issue before the court, but neither the court nor the Advocate General reacted to the citation.

Casati, an Italian national residing in the Federal Republic of Germany, was arraigned before an Italian criminal court on a charge of having attempted to export from Italy to Austria, without the authorization prescribed by Italian exchange control law, amounts of Italian and German currency. Article 67(1) of the Treaty of Rome provides that:

During the transitional period and to the extent necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the common market, Member States shall progressively abolish between themselves all restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to persons resident in Member States and any discrimination based on the nationality or on the place of residence of the parties or on the place where such capital is invested.

Article 69 authorized the Council to issue the necessary directives for the progressive implementation of Article 67. Article 71 requires members to endeavor to avoid the introduction of new restrictions or an increase in the severity of existing rules. The Council has adopted two directives to give effect to Article 67. Safeguards permitting derogations from the obligations of members are provided by Articles 73, 108, and 109, and a further safeguard appears in a third directive of the Council, issued on March 21, 1972.

The Italian court referred a string of questions to the European Court. The crucial question was whether, after the end of the transitional period, the restrictions on the movement of capital referred to in Article 67 must be deemed to be abolished notwithstanding the provisions of Article 69. The court had already interpreted the provisions on the free movement of persons, goods, and services and the right of establishment to mean that limitations or restrictions on these fundamental freedoms of the Common Market must be regarded as abolished after the transitional period, even though the Treaty authorized directives for the implementation of the provisions on these freedoms during the transitional period.

The court held that Article 67(1) differs from the provisions on the other freedoms, because the obligation on members with respect to capital is not absolute. Even after the end of the transitional period, the obligation is to liberalize capital movements only “to the extent necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the Common Market.” The Council must determine the application of the obligation from time to time according to the current requirements of the Common Market. The Council’s directives were determinations of this character, but the Council had not yet taken the view that the exportation of bank notes should be liberalized. It followed that restrictions on the export of bank notes had not been abrogated. The “standstill” provisions of Article 71 were not peremptory, as was apparent from the verb “shall endeavour,” and did not impose an unconditional obligation that private persons could assert against states.

A number of member governments presented collective and individual arguments in favor of the conclusion eventually reached by the court that Article 67 does not impose a directly applicable rule that confers subjective rights on persons. The Government of France presented the argument that Article VI, Section 3 of the Fund’s Articles authorizes members to control capital movements. Moreover, Article VI, Section 1 even permits the Fund to prevent a member from using the Fund’s resources to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital if the member fails to apply appropriate controls. It is not clear from the report of the case whether this argument was that the Treaty of Rome could not legally deprive members of their privileges under the Fund’s Articles or whether the provisions of the Articles were evidence of the intent of the drafters of Article 67(1) of the Treaty of Rome.

There should be no doubt that when the Fund’s Articles confer on members, or recognize, a privilege, an agreement by members to refrain from exercising the privilege is not a violation of the Articles. Nothing in Article VI has prevented members of the Community from agreeing to refrain from applying restrictions on capital transfers. No inconsistency with the Articles would have been created even if the Treaty had imposed peremptory obligations on members of the Community to forbear from applying such restrictions, or if the Council were to issue a directive under Article 69 that imposed such an obligation.

It might be argued that a clash with the Articles would be provoked if the Fund were to call on a member to exercise controls under Article VI, Section 1(a). Under the provision, however, the Fund can “request” but not require a member to impose capital controls. If there is no obligation, noncompliance with a request is not a breach of obligation, even if the Fund declares the member ineligible to use the Fund’s resources. The declaration of ineligibility under Article VI, Section 1(a) seems to be insulated from the charge of a failure to fulfill obligations, that is to say, a violation. Article VI, Section 1(a) does not refer to Article XXVI, Section 2(a), which authorizes the Fund to declare a member ineligible because of a failure to fulfill obligations,⁹⁸ and Article XXVI, Section 2(a) appears to recognize the autonomous character of declarations of ineligibility under Article VI, Section 1(a).⁹⁹ Both provisions seem to be drafted in a way that respects the fundamental character of a member’s privilege to decide whether or not to impose capital controls, but without placing an undue strain on the Fund’s resources.

The Treaty of Rome contains no definition of capital,¹⁰⁰ but the Fund’s Articles define the concept by providing that “[p]ayments for current transactions means payments which are not for the purpose of transferring capital” and by defining, although without limitation, payments for current transactions.¹⁰¹ The three directives of the Council of the European Community provide guidance, however, in arriving at an understanding of what is considered capital for the purpose of the Treaty of Rome. Nevertheless, it is possible, at least in principle, that a category of payments might be considered payments for current transactions by the Fund but capital transfers by the Community and subject to the softer obligations of Community law on capital. Nothing in Community law on capital resembles Article 4 (“Obligations in existing multilateral international agreements”) of the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements:

Nothing in this Code shall be regarded as altering the obligations undertaken by a Member as a Signatory of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund or other existing multilateral international agreements.¹⁰²

III. Persistence of Par Values

Legal problems involving the par values of currencies did not disappear with the abrogation of the par value system when the Second Amendment of the Articles became effective on April 1, 1978. Moreover, the relevance of former par values is not confined to circumstances that preceded the Second Amendment. Some problems that continued to exist after that date have been disposed of by official action or by the courts, but other problems persist. It is reasonable to suppose that all problems will disappear in time.

The last par value of a currency has been chosen by some courts as the solution when called upon to apply the Poincare franc as the unit of account in which limits on liability are expressed under the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, 1929. The last par value of a currency as the basis for calculating the limits is only one of the numerous solutions that courts have resorted to when confronted with the difficulty of applying a unit of account, such as the Poincare franc, that is defined in terms of gold by a treaty.¹⁰³ The problem arises in present circumstances because gold has been deprived of an official price and is no longer the common denominator for expressing the value of currencies under the Articles.

Some courts in the United States have adopted the last official price for gold, which means the last par value of the U.S. dollar, because it was a direct link between gold and the dollar that received official endorsement.¹⁰⁴ The purpose of the Warsaw Convention, it is held in these cases, was to establish an official monetary value on which to base limits of liability, and it cannot be assumed that the Congress of the United States, when approving the Second Amendment, intended to declare the limits obsolete.¹⁰⁵ Decisions in other countries also have applied the last par value of the currency in which judgments are expressed.¹⁰⁶

Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Gebruder Glunz v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof, decided by the European Court on February 3,1982,¹⁰⁷ is of interest not only because par values were involved at a time when members were not observing them but also because developments in the Articles affected the decision. A common customs tariff for members of the Community in their commercial relations with nonmembers is fundamental for the Common Market, and criteria of valuation that ensure uniform rates of duty at whatever geographical point imports enter the Community are necessary to give effect to the common tariff.¹⁰⁸ The case demonstrates, however, that this principle need not be paramount in all circumstances and that the court may give decisive effect to another relevant principle.

The case involved General Rule C.3, which was adopted on June 28, 1968 as part of the rules applicable to the common customs tariff:

The unit of account (u.a.) by reference to which certain specific customs duties are expressed or the scope of certain headings or subheadings is defined has a value of 0.88867088 grams of fine gold. The exchange rate to be used in converting the unit of account into Belgian francs, Dutch guilders, French francs, German marks, Italian lira or Luxembourg francs shall be that corresponding to the par value communicated to and recognized by the International Monetary Fund in respect of these currencies. ¹⁰⁹

General Rule C.3 was not amended until regulations of November 23 and 27, 1978 substituted the European unit of account (EUA), which was defined by reference to a basket of currencies, for the gold unit, with effect on January 1, 1979.¹¹⁰

In August 1978, the Glunz enterprise imported some ceramic statuettes from outside the Community and had them cleared through customs at Hamburg. The goods were classified under a heading that made them subject to an ad valorem customs duty of 10 percent. In September 1978, the defendant, the customs authority at Hamburg, reclassified the goods, as a result of which they became subject to a duty of 11 percent but subject also to a minimum specific¹¹¹ duty of 70 units of account per 100 kilograms gross. The consequence was that the minimum duty applied, on the basis of DM 3.66 per unit in accordance with the par value for the deutsche mark that had been communicated to the Fund.¹¹² The total amount due was DM 72,045.59.¹¹³

In the proceedings in Hamburg, Glunz objected to the assessment on various grounds. His principal objection was that it was not legitimate to charge a higher customs duty than the one that would be applicable if the goods had been imported into the territory of the member, Italy, whose currency at the date of importation was most depreciated in relation to the par value communicated to the Fund. Glunz argued that unless this norm applied for all imports into the Community, the customs tariff would be discriminatory and not uniform in its application. On the basis of the par value of Lit 625 declared to the Fund by Italy and the exchange rate in the market on the relevant date, the amount payable if the goods had been imported into Italy would have been equivalent to DM 29,342.30. The Hamburg court asked the European Court to decide whether General Rule C.3 could be interpreted to avoid such differences and whether the rule was valid if it could not be interpreted in this way.

Glunz did not complain that the relevant date in August 1978 was subsequent to the effective date of the Second Amendment. Up to March 31, 1978, par values continued to exist under the law of the Fund, even though they were not being observed by members as the basis for exchange transactions in their territories, but par values were abrogated by the Second Amendment. Glunz did argue that it should not be made to suffer as a result of delay by the Council in amending General Rule C.3 to make it reflect actual exchange rates. The Council replied to this charge by recalling that the Community had begun the process for change as early as October 1976, after the outcome of the meeting of the Fund’s Interim Committee in Jamaica in January 1976, and that the Community had accelerated the process when par values were abrogated. The Commission seemed to argue that delay should not be judged by reference to any date earlier than April 1, 1978.

The court reviewed monetary developments from 1968 to April 1, 1978,¹¹⁴ and noted the efforts within the Community to arrive at a new unit of account. The court agreed that uniform rates of duty were fundamental but rejected the interpretation based on the weakest currency. The mention of individual currencies in General Rule C.3 showed that they could not be discarded except for the one that at any given moment yielded the smallest amount of duty. The literal interpretation did more justice to the fiscal and economic objectives of the Community than the interpretation based on the weakest currency. The level of duties had been calculated with particular regard to the necessities of certain economic sectors of the Community, including the protection of competing Community products.¹¹⁵

On the question whether the disparate effects of the court’s interpretation meant that General Rule C.3 was invalid, the court held that:

At the present stage of integration, where Member States essentially retain their powers in monetary matters, recourse to the mechanism of specific duties in the Common Customs Tariff will inevitably lead to certain differences in the incidence of the duties charged.¹¹⁶

The court was probably referring to the fluctuations of exchange rates, which were not eliminated by the margins of the European Monetary System.¹¹⁷

Moving to the allegation of delay, the court thought it conceivable that the Council had acted contrary to the principles invoked by Glunz if it could be established that the Council had deliberately refrained from introducing a solution that was within its power.

It is not clear from the evidence before the Court that such a proposition can be established in respect of the period from 1974 to 1978, a period characterized by uncertainties as to subsequent monetary developments. In those circumstances, the reluctance of the Council to adapt Community provisions to the new situation may be explained by the difficulty in laying down, not only in the sphere of customs but also in other spheres, criteria enabling stable rates of exchange to be fixed.

It should be remembered that nearly seven years were required before it was possible to reform the Bretton Woods monetary system on 1 April 1978, and that in view of the GATT rules any unilateral change by the Community of the monetary parities to be used in converting specific customs duties¹¹⁸ risked creating difficulties with the Community’s trading partners, in the absence of new parities established within the International Monetary Fund.

In those circumstances, it does not appear that, by awaiting the conclusion of the negotiations within the International Monetary Fund in 1978 before amending General Rule C.3, the Council was in breach of the Treaty.¹¹⁹

The court held that the rule, as interpreted, was valid.

In the Glunz case, the issue involved par values under the Articles as of a time, August 1978, when par values had ceased to exist under the Articles. Yet the abrogation of par values on April 1,1978 seems not to have been raised as an objection, and the decision of the European Court confirmed the continued application of them until General Rule C.3 was amended. In Flamm v. Commission,¹²⁰ the applicant contended that under the terms of his contract with the Commission the parity under the Articles between the Belgian franc and the Italian lira as of January 1,1965 had to be applied in April 1979. The reply, among others, was that par values had been abrogated by the Second Amendment, and this argument seems to have had some effect on the decision delivered by the European Court on July 1, 1982. Flamm relied on a parity as of a date when legally it did exist, while Glunz relied on a par value as of a date when legally it did not exist, but neither claimant succeeded.

Flamm, an employee of the Commission and stationed in Italy, entered into a contract with the Commission on December 23, 1971 under which he received a loan from the Commission for the construction of a dwelling in Italy. In accordance with administrative decisions of the Commission, the loans were to be expressed in Belgian francs, but advances were to be made in installments in the currency of the country in which the dwelling was to be constructed, on the basis of the parity ruling at the time of the payment. Interest and installments of repayment were to be deducted each month from the official’s remuneration. Article 15 of the contract provided that:

Any transfers by the borrower to the lender by way of early repayment or in payment of monthly installments shall be made in Belgian francs or in the currency of the country in which the property to be financed is situated in which the funds arising from this loan were advanced. The funds in question shall be converted into Belgian francs on the basis of the parity ruling as at the date of the transfer.

Until March 31, 1979, both advances and repayments were made on the basis of the 1965 parity between the Belgian franc and the lira under the Fund’s Articles. Monthly salary, which was expressed in Belgian francs, was paid in lire on this basis also, but it was adjusted according to a formula, which in March 1979 resulted in a weighting of 157.8 for lire against francs. Deductions for repayment were made on the basis of the 1965 parity. Weightings and adjustments in them were made originally to compensate for differences in the cost of living among places of employment, but later were made to offset fluctuations in rates of exchange. The court considered this technique valid in view of the uncertainties about future exchange arrangements after the breakdown of the par value system.

For April 1979, the deduction from Flamm’s remuneration was increased because of changes in administrative decisions under which, for calculations under contracts, including calculations of remuneration and repayments of loans, the EUA, with certain adjustments for the cost of living, had been substituted for parities under the Articles. The rate of exchange on the basis of which the deduction for April 1979 was calculated, as a result of the so-called updated parities and adjustments, was 18.35 lire per Belgian franc.¹²¹

Flamm’s main argument was based on the language of a decision of the Commission under which the loan was made and which was incorporated by reference in the Commission’s contract with Flamm:

Loans covered by this provision shall be expressed in Belgian francs. The corresponding payments shall be made in the currency of the country where the property to be financed is situated, on the basis of the parity ruling as at the time of payment.¹²²

According to Flamm, the “corresponding” payments comprehended not only advances under the loan by the Commission but also repayments by the borrower, on the principle that the same parity should apply to both. The court dismissed this argument by referring to Article 15 of the contract, under which the parity at the date of each “transfer” by way of repayment had to be applied. Moreover, it was consonant with the circumstances that the parity referred to by the agreement should be the parity applied for the calculation of remuneration.

One of the arguments of the Commission was presented as follows:

After convertibility of the dollar into gold was discontinued (15 August 1971) nobody could seriously believe in fixed parities. The Jamaica Agreements (January 1976) officially abolished IMF parities and as from March 1973 the de facto position was that currencies floated freely. Consequently, redrafting of Article 63 of the Staff Regulations [on remuneration] and Article 17 of Annex VII [on repayments] no later than 1 January 1978 became not only an economic but also a legal requirement.¹²³

The “Jamaica Agreements” did not officially abolish par values. A communiqué of a committee of the Fund’s Board of Governors could not produce that effect. Par values continued to exist under the law of the Fund until the Second Amendment took effect, but the Commission’s view of the Jamaica communiqué is a common fallacy.

By April 1979, par values had ceased to have legal existence, and perhaps this circumstance is what the European Court was referring to in the first sentence of the following obscure passage:

In consequence of the events in the money markets which occurred in and after 1971, the parity notified to the International Monetary Fund for the lira ceased to be valid. For a time, the lira floated freely. Finally, with the introduction of the European Monetary System, a new exchange rate, which might fluctuate within certain limits, was determined for the currencies of the Member States which participated in the system.¹²⁴

IV. Some Final Comments

The cases discussed in this article suggest answers to the twelve questions that have been posed in the introductory section. The answers, and some evaluation of them, are summarized in relation to each question:

1. In England, the House of Lords as the final appellate court has endorsed, without further examination, the narrow interpretation of “exchange contracts” as contracts for the exchange of one means of payment against another. The decision is regrettable for various reasons, but the concept of the “monetary transaction in disguise” broadens the interpretation a little by permitting a series of contractual relationships to be run together in some circumstances. The effect can enable a court to discover an exchange contract even though the contractual relationship on the basis of which suit is brought is not itself an exchange contract and even though one of the other contractual relations in the series involves the purchase and sale of merchandise. Furthermore, the House of Lords has held that part of a contract is enforceable as a contract for the purchase and sale of merchandise while the rest of the contract is unenforceable as an exchange contract.

The House of Lords has endorsed the propositions that the court must raise the point of the unenforceability of a contract even if the defendant has not, and that this step does not mean that unenforceability is equivalent to illegality.

2. The relationship between Article VIII, Section 2(b) and the private international law of the forum is complex. One case has raised the question whether a forum should forbear from applying the provision because the forum is unaware whether or how the law governing the contract under the forum’s private international law would apply Article VIII, Section 2(b). It is submitted that the forum should apply the provision and not defer to the law governing the contract under private international law.

3. The question whether the initial burden of proof is to establish the consistency or the inconsistency of exchange control regulations with the Articles has been answered in different ways. In one case, the defendant, relying on Article VIII, Section 2(b) and asserting the consistency with the Articles of the regulations on which his defense rested, was held to bear the burden of proving his assertion. The plaintiff, in presenting his claim, was not required to prove in the first instance that the regulations were inconsistent with the Articles.

In another case, the court held that the defendant had not proved that the regulations it had cited applied to its indebtedness, but the dissenting judge was satisfied that the defendant had discharged the burden of proving the existence of an applicable regulation. Furthermore, he was willing to assume, for reasons that apparently were not advanced by the defendant, that the regulation was consistent with the Articles, so that the burden of rebutting consistency rested on the plaintiff.

Discussion of the award of an arbitral tribunal shows the necessity to distinguish between two principles. First, Article VIII, Section 2(b) provides that a contract shall be unenforceable when it is contrary to exchange control regulations that are consistent with the Articles. Second, the provision does not provide that a contract shall be enforceable when it is in accord with regulations that are consistent with the Articles. A consequence of the failure to observe this distinction can lead to an inappropriate allocation of the burden of proof when Article VIII, Section 2(b) is involved in a case.

4. The narrow view of exchange contracts leads to the conclusion that the currencies “involved” are those that are to be exchanged, but the better view is that exchange contracts are contracts that, if performed, would affect the balance of payments of a member and that the currency “involved” is the currency of the member whose balance of payments would be affected.

5. Article VIII, Section 2(b) should apply to exchange control regulations whether they are in existence when a contract is made or whether they are imposed subsequently. The situation when enforcement is sought should be decisive. This conclusion is consistent with the concept of unenforceability and promotes the policy of the provision.

6. Private parties to an exchange contract should not be permitted to nullify the application of Article VIII, Section 2(b) by the terms of their contract, by providing, for example, that the contract is to be performed notwithstanding exchange control regulations. This prohibition should not apply to a governmental debtor that agrees by treaty not to resist payment by relying on the provision.

7. Article VIII, Section 2(b) applies to the exchange control regulations of other members and not to the regulations of the lex fori.

8. Article VIII, Section 2(b) does not deal with claims to recover payments under unenforceable contracts on the basis of unjust enrichment. These claims are governed by the lex fori, including its private international law, without reference to the provision. Allowance of the claims, however, may have effects similar to enforcement and may encourage attempts to defy exchange control regulations.

9. Article VIII, Section 2(b) should be understood to negate claims to damages for nonperformance of the contractual undertaking of a party to obtain an exchange license if the party’s request for a license is refused. Claims to damages for failure to apply for an exchange license might involve more complex considerations, but these claims also might be rejected.

10. If a court rejects the application of Article VIII, Section 2(b) and gives judgment in favor of a plaintiff notwithstanding the exchange control regulations that are part of the law of another member, it is possible that the courts of that other member will refuse to enforce the judgment as contrary to their public policy.

11. There is no legal inconsistency between the provisions of the Articles on the control of capital movements and the provisions of other treaties, such as the Treaty of Rome, under which members agree not to control capital movements, provided that the other treaties apply the same definitions of capital and current transactions as are applied by the Fund.

12. The courts have been, and are still being, called upon to deal with the effects of former par values on various issues. The Second Amendment did not result in the immediate cessation of the relevance of former par values under other legal instruments, but it is reasonable to suppose that by official or judicial action all the legal effects of former par values will disappear in time. Some of the cases decided by the European Court discuss the question of legal liability for delay in official action to substitute actual exchange rates for former par values.

SUMMARIES

Current Account Imbalances and Capital Formation in Industrial Countries, 1949–81—alessandro penati and michael dooley (pages 1–24)

This paper studies the role of domestic and foreign savings in financing capital formation in 19 industrial countries during the years after World War II. The authors’ interpretation of the statistical evidence is that there is very little support for the view that, over the medium term, goods and services freed by savings in one industrial country are systematically made available through current account imbalances to finance investment in physical capital in other industrial countries. Instead, there is strong support for the view that both levels and changes in domestic savings are systematically matched by levels and changes in domestic investment. The close relationship between domestic savings and domestic investment over this period suggests that resources did not flow from one country to another in order to equalize rates of return on real capital.

The study also finds little support for the view that the integration of financial capital markets in recent years has altered the relationships among domestic savings, investment, and current account imbalances in industrial countries. The evidence suggests that changes in net foreign assets, and the associated current account imbalances, were no more sensitive to cross-country differences in rates of return on physical capital in the ten years ending in 1981 than they had been in the 1950s, when extensive capital controls and trade restrictions hampered the economic integration of the industrial countries.

The Private SDR: An Assessment of Its Risk and Return—pierre van den boogaerde (pages 25–61)

This paper reviews the relative attractiveness, in terms of both total return and risk, of SDR-denominated investments during 1977–82. It simulates investments by sequentially using each of the component currencies and the SDR itself as a base currency and investing alternatively in the domestic base currency, in the four other component currencies, and in SDRs.

The starting point is that if the correlation coefficients between the returns on the different currencies included in the SDR basket are lower than one, the standard deviation of the SDR will be less than the weighted average of the individual standard deviations. The outcome fully meets the expectation: the standard deviation of the total return on the SDR is lower than the standard deviations of the returns on each of its component currencies, whichever currency is used as a unit of account, with the exception of the pairwise relationship between the deutsche mark and the French franc owing to both currencies’ inclusion in the European Monetary System (EMS). The study also demonstrates that an assessment of the volatility of the SDR and its component currencies, as measured by the beta coefficient, does not provide an adequate measure of riskiness for the non-dollar currencies, because of the relatively low correlation between these currencies and the SDR during the study period. Finally, and for whichever currency is used as a unit of account, the SDR had an above-average total return during the period studied.

An investment in SDRs thus produced above-average yields and represented a much lower risk than investments in any of its constituent currencies in the study period, which encompasses both a period of weakness and a period of strength of the dollar. Consequently, a number of international market operators could be attracted to the idea of using the SDR as a unit of account.

A Test of the Efficacy of Exchange Rate Adjustments in Indonesia—g. russell kincaid (pages 62–92)

This paper analyzes the impact of relative prices on the non-oil trade account in Indonesia, with special emphasis on the effectiveness of the exchange rate adjustment of November 1978. An exchange rate adjustment can successfully redirect resources into export and import-competing activities only if the more favorable cost-price relationship established immediately following the devaluation is not subsequently reversed by domestic price increases. During the first year following the Indonesian devaluation, tight fiscal and monetary policies were successful in sustaining the improvement in relative prices stemming from the devaluation. In response, the growth in non-oil export volume accelerated sharply, and growth in imports slowed markedly. With the additional foreign resources made available by the second round of oil price increases in 1979–80, domestic expenditure outstripped domestic productive capacity. Relative prices of domestic to foreign goods, in domestic-currency terms, returned to the level existing prior to the devaluation; growth in non-oil export volume virtually ceased, and import volume expanded rapidly. This experience indicates the importance of fiscal and monetary policies in supporting an exchange rate action.

To disentangle the impact of various factors on the non-oil trade account, the import-demand and export-supply functions were econometrically estimated. Import demand was found to be positively related to real income and to excess supply of money, but negatively related to relative price. The supply response of exports was positive for both relative prices and the capacity variable. In both equations, the long-run elasticities were larger than the short-run elasticities; the long-run elasticities for export supply were substantially higher than the short-run elasticities. The estimated equations were employed to simulate the impact of alternative exchange rate scenarios on the non-oil trade account. The results of these simulations, which should be interpreted with due caution, indicate that the non-oil trade deficit was substantially lessened by the exchange rate adjustment of November 1978.

The 1981–82 Recession and Non-Oil Primary Commodity Prices—ke-young chu and thomas k. morrison (pages 93–140)

This paper analyzes the underlying causes of movements in non-oil primary commodity prices. The paper focuses on the large commodity price decline in 1981–82, but investigates this recent experience in light of the major postwar developments in primary commodity markets. An econometric model confirms that from 1957 to 1982, primary commodity prices, in terms of dollars, were positively related to economic activity in the industrial countries and to world inflation, and inversely related to the appreciation of the dollar exchange rate against other major currencies and to supply shocks. Evidence also suggests that commodity prices are inversely related to changes in the real rate of interest.

The cumulative decline in 1981–82 of 25 percent in commodity prices (in nominal dollar terms) is shown to be the largest and most protracted decline in more than three decades. Commodity prices deflated by manufactures prices fell by 20 percent in 1981–82 to a postwar low. The sharp decline in commodity prices during 1981–82 is shown to follow from a more unstable pattern that was first visible in the early 1970s. During 1972–82, primary commodity prices were more than three times as unstable as they were during 1957–71, and fluctuations in economic activity, inflation, exchange rates, and interest rates were also more pronounced.

Commodity prices appear to have responded more strongly to economic activity in the last decade than they did during the preceding 15 years. Although movements in economic activity were influential in both the 1975 and 1981–82 price declines, the 1981–82 decline is shown to have been caused relatively more by exchange rate movements (and possibly interest rate movements) and relatively less by movements in economic activity than was the 1975 decline.

Expectations of Inflation and Interest Rate Determination—rüşdü saracoglu (pages 141–78)

In recent years, there has been considerable dispute concerning the underlying causes of both the high levels and the variability of interest rates. In this paper, the determination of interest rates in five industrial countries (the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom) is studied, with particular attention paid to the roles of monetary factors and expectations of inflation.

The theoretical discussion centers on Fisher’s hypothesis that relates interest rates to expected rates of inflation. It is argued that much of the earlier research on this issue is flawed, because it is based on microeconomic partial-equilibrium analysis and assumes an implausible expectations-formation mechanism. This paper, by contrast, follows recent developments in economic theory in suggesting that the formulation of expectations—and, therefore, the determination of interest rates—is influenced not only by past rates of inflation but also by a host of other variables, such as changes in the money supply or in economic activity. Moreover, variables that influence expected rates of inflation are, themselves, likely to be influenced by these expectations. Consequently, the methodology developed in this paper is intended to reflect the simultaneities and dynamic patterns of feedback that characterize the macroeconomic data, as well as accounting for the fact that market participants utilize data other than past rates of inflation in forming their expectations of inflation. Market participants’ subjective expectations of inflation are proxied by forecasts of inflation that are optimal in the sense of minimizing the variance of forecast errors conditional on information available to market participants. These forecasts are then used to compute ex ante real-interest-rate series for each country and to test several hypotheses regarding interest rates.

The empirical results of the paper indicate that twice during 1968–82, real interest rates underwent substantial changes. These changes had a substantial macroeconomic impact, particularly with respect to inflation. It is argued that the expansionary impact of negative real interest rates following the first oil shock led to the intensification of the inflationary process, whereas the emergence of positive real interest rates following the second oil shock was instrumental in bringing inflation rapidly under control.

Other results suggest that systematic, and thus predictable, changes in the money supply that lead to systematic shifts in the time path of inflation leave real interest rates unchanged, thus supporting a variant of Fisher’s hypothesis. Consequently, it is argued that a relaxation of monetary policy cannot, necessarily, be expected to reduce real interest rates, particularly in the medium run and long run, if such a relaxation causes an upward revision in expected rates of inflation.

The Fund Agreement in the Courts—XIX—joseph gold (pages 179–234)

The present installment in the series of articles on the effects of the law of the International Monetary Fund on litigation discusses decisions by courts in England, the United States, the Netherlands, and Italy, as well as decisions by the Court of Justice of the European Communities and by an arbitral tribunal. The following questions are among the issues affected by the Fund’s Articles of Agreement that are raised by these cases:

(1) What is the meaning of “exchange contracts” in Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Articles?

(2) What is the relationship between Article VIII, Section 2(b) and the private international law of the forum?

(3) On whom does the burden rest of proving that the conditions of Article VIII, Section 2(b) are met or are not met, and what is the effect on the allocation of the burden of proof between the parties if the court itself introduces the question of applying Article VIII, Section 2(b)?

(4) What is the currency “involved” under Article VIII, Section 2(b)?

(5) Does Article VIII, Section 2(b) apply to an exchange contract if the exchange control regulations that are in issue were adopted after the contract was entered into?

(6) Should the parties to an exchange contract be allowed to negate the effect of exchange control regulations?

(7) Does Article VIII, Section 2(b) apply to exchange control regulations if they are part of the law of the forum?

(8) If a payment is made under an exchange contract that is unenforceable under Article VIII, Section 2(b), can the amount paid be recovered as an unjust enrichment of the payee?

(9) Should a party be awarded damages if the other party undertook to apply for or to obtain an exchange license and failed to perform the undertaking?

(10) If a court rejects the application of Article VIII, Section 2(b) and gives judgment in favor of a plaintiff notwithstanding the exchange control regulations that are part of the law of another member of the Fund, will that member’s court recognize and execute the judgment?

(11) What is the relationship between the provisions of the Articles and the provisions of the Treaty of Rome on movements of capital?

(12) Are the former par values of currencies still relevant in issues that courts are called upon to resolve?

RESUMES

Déséquilibres des transactions courantes et formation de capital dans les pays industrialisés, 1949–81—alessandro penati et michael dooley (pages 1–24)

La présente étude porte sur le rôle de l’épargne intérieure et extérieure dans le financement de la formation de capital dans 19 pays industrialisés depuis la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale. Selon l’interprétation que les auteurs donnent des statistiques disponibles, il y a très peu d’éléments en faveur de la thèse selon laquelle, dans le moyen terme, les biens et services libérés par l’épargne dans un pays industrialisé sont systématiquement offerts, par le biais des déséquilibres des transactions courantes, pour financer les investissements en capital matériel dans d’autres pays industrialisés. Il existe en revanche de nombreuses indications qui corroborent la thèse selon laquelle les niveaux et variations de l’épargne intérieure ont systématiquement pour contrepartie les niveaux et variations de l’investissement intérieur. La relation étroite entre l’épargne intérieure et l’investissement intérieur pendant la période considérée donne à penser qu’il n’y a pas eu de flux de ressources d’un pays à l’autre ayant pour effet d’égaliser les taux de rendement du capital réel.

Les auteurs de l’étude ont également trouvé peu d’éléments qui justifient la thèse selon laquelle l’intégration des marchés des capitaux financiers au cours des dernières années a modifié les relations entre l’épargne intérieure, les investissements et les déséquilibres des transactions courantes dans les pays industrialisés. Les faits observés semblent indiquer que les variations des avoirs extérieurs nets et les déséquilibres des transactions courantes dont elles ont été accompagnées n’ont pas été plus sensibles aux différences entre les taux de rendement du capital matériel d’un pays à l’autre durant la décennie qui s’est achevée en 1981 que pendant les années 50, où les mesures étendues de contrôle des mouvements de capitaux et les restrictions commerciales faisaient obstacle à l’intégration économique des pays industrialisés.

Le DTS privé: risques et rendement — pierre van den boogaerde (pages 25–61)

L’auteur analyse l’attrait relatif, sous forme à la fois de rendement total et de risques, des placements libellés en DTS pendant la période 1977–82. Il procède à une simulation des placements en prenant, successivement, les diverses monnaies du panier puis le DTS lui-même comme monnaie de base et en effectuant tour à tour des placements dans la monnaie de base intérieure, dans les quatre autres monnaies du panier et en DTS.

L’auteur pose au départ que, si les coefficients de corrélation entre les rendements des différentes monnaies incluses dans le panier du DTS sont inférieurs à l’unité, l’écart type du DTS sera inférieur à la moyenne pondérée des divers écarts types. Les résultats confirment pleinement cette hypothèse: l’écart type du rendement total du DTS est inférieur aux écarts types des rendements de chacune des monnaies qui composent le panier, quelle que soit la monnaie retenue comme unité de compte, sauf dans le cas de la relation entre le deutsche mark et le franc français, en raison de l’appartenance de ces deux monnaies au Système monétaire européen (SME). L’étude démontre également qu’une évaluation de la volatilité du DTS et de ses composantes, exprimée par le coefficient beta, ne permet pas de mesurer de manière satisfaisante le degré de risque des placements en monnaies autres que le dollar, en raison de la corrélation relativement faible constatée entre ces monnaies et le DTS au cours de la période considérée. Enfin, et ce, quelle que soit la monnaie retenue comme unité de compte, le rendement total du DTS a été supérieur à la moyenne pendant cette même période.

Les placements en DTS ont donc eu un rendement plus élevé que la moyenne et ont été beaucoup moins risqués que les placements dans l’une quelconque des monnaies du panier pendant la période étudiée, c’est-à-dire à une époque où le dollar a connu, tour à tour, une période de faiblesse et une période de fermeté. En conséquence, un certain nombre d’opérateurs sur le marché international pourraient juger attractive l’idée d’utiliser le DTS comme unité de compte.

Détermination de l’efficacité de l’ajustement du taux de change opéré en Indonésie—g. russell kincaid (pages 62–92)

L’auteur analyse l’impact des prix relatifs sur la balance commerciale (pétrole non compris) de l’Indonésie, en étudiant tout particulièrement l’efficacité de l’ajustement du taux de change effectué en novembre 1978. Un ajustement du taux de change ne peut permettre de réorienter avec succès des ressources vers des activités qui concurrencent les exportations et les importations que si l’amélioration du rapport coûts/prix qui suit immédiatement la dévaluation n’est pas renversée par la suite du fait de la hausse des prix intérieurs. En Indonésie, au cours de la première année qui a suivi la dévaluation, des politiques budgétaire et monétaire rigoureuses ont permis d’étayer l’amélioration des prix relatifs découlant de la dévaluation. En conséquence, la croissance en volume des exportations non pétrolières s’est accélérée fortement, et la croissance des importations s’est ralentie de façon marquée. La deuxième série de relèvements des prix du pétrole en 1979–80 ayant dégagé des ressources extérieures supplémentaires, les dépenses intérieures ont dépassé la capacité de production intérieure. Le rapport entre les prix des biens produits dans le pays et ceux des biens étrangers, exprimés en monnaie nationale, a retrouvé son niveau d’avant la dévaluation; la croissance en volume des exportations non pétrolières s’est pratiquement arrêtée et le volume des importations s’est gonflé rapidement. Cette situation montre l’importance des politiques budgétaire et monétaire en tant que mesures d’accompagnement d’un ajustement de taux de change.

Afin d’isoler l’impact qu’exercent divers facteurs sur la balance commerciale non pétrolière, l’auteur estime par des méthodes économétriques la fonction de demande d’importations et celle d’offre d’exportations. Il constate que la demande d’importations présente une relation positive avec le revenu réel et avec l’offre excédentaire de monnaie, mais une relation négative avec les prix relatifs.

L’offre de produits d’exportation réagit d’une manière positive aux variations des prix relatifs et à la capacité. Dans l’une et l’autre équation, les élasticités à long terme sont plus fortes que les élasticités à court terme; les élasticités à long terme relatives à l’offre d’exportations sont sensiblement plus élevées que les élasticités à court terme. Les équations estimées sont utilisées pour simuler l’effet d’autres scénarios de taux de change sur la balance commerciale non pétrolière. Les résultats de ces simulations, qui doivent être interprétés avec la prudence qui s’impose, indique que le déficit du commerce non pétrolier a été sensiblement amoindri par l’ajustement du taux de change de novembre 1978.

La récession de 1981–82 et les cours des produits primaires non pétroliers— ke-young chu et thomas k. morrison (pages 93–140)

Les auteurs analysent les causes profondes des variations des cours des produits primaires non pétroliers. L’étude est axée sur la forte baisse des cours des produits de base en 1981–82, mais l’examen de cet événement récent s’inspire des principaux faits intervenus sur les marchés des produits primaires depuis 1945. Un modèle économétrique le confirme: de 1957 à 1982, il a existé une relation positive entre les cours en dollars des produits primaires et l’activité économique dans les pays industrialisés et l’inflation mondiale, et une relation inverse entre ces cours et la hausse du dollar par rapport aux autres grandes monnaies et les “chocs” subis par l’offre. En outre, l’observation des faits donne à penser qu’il existe une relation inverse entre les cours des produits de base et les variations du taux d’intérêt réel.

Il ressort de l’analyse que la baisse cumulative égale à 25 % qu’ont enregistrée en 1981–82 les cours des produits de base (exprimés en dollars nominaux) a été la plus marquée et la plus longue qu’on ait connue depuis plus de 30 ans. Corrigés au moyen des prix des produits manufacturés, les cours des produits de base ont diminué de 20 % en 1981–82 pour tomber au niveau le plus bas depuis 1945. Les auteurs montrent que la chute des prix des produits de base en 1981–82 s’inscrit dans une tendance au renforcement de l’instabilité qui s’est manifestée pour la première fois au début des années 70. Pendant la période 1972–82, les cours des produits primaires ont été trois fois plus instables que pendant la période 1957–71, et les fluctuations de l’activité économique, de l’inflation, des taux de change et des taux d’intérêt ont également été plus prononcées.

Les cours des produits de base semblent avoir réagi plus fortement à l’activité économique au cours des dix dernières années que pendant les quinze années antérieures. Bien que les variations de l’activité économique aient influé sur les diminutions des prix enregistrées en 1975 et 1981–82, il apparaît que la chute de 1981–82, comparée à la baisse de 1975, résulte relativement plus de l’évolution des taux de change (et sans doute des taux d’intérêt) et relativement moins des mouvements de l’activité économique.

Anticipations inflationnistes et détermination des taux d’intérêt—rù§dù saracoglu (pages 141–78)

La question des causes profondes des niveaux élevés et de la variabilité des taux d’intérêts a été très controversée ces dernières années. L’auteur a étudié la détermination des taux d’intérêt dans cinq pays industrialisés (les Etats-Unis, la France, la République fédérale d’Allemagne, le Japon et le Royaume-Uni) en accordant une attention particulière au rôle des facteurs monétaires et des anticipations inflationnistes.

Le débat théorique est centré sur l’hypothèse de Fisher selon laquelle les taux d’intérêt sont liés aux taux d’inflation attendus. D’après l’auteur, les études précédemment consacrées à cette question sont pour une large part défectueuses dans la mesure où elles reposent sur une analyse microéconomique d’équilibre partiel et sur l’hypothèse d’un mécanisme peu plausible de formation des anticipations. La présente étude suit, en revanche, l’évolution récente de la pensée économique en suggérant que la formulation des anticipations et, par conséquent, la détermination des taux d’intérêt, est influencée non seulement par les taux d’inflation antérieurs mais aussi par une multitude d’autres variables telles que les variations de la masse monétaire ou de l’activité économique. En outre, il est probable que les variables qui influencent les taux d’inflation attendus seront elles-mêmes influencées par ces anticipations. Par conséquent, la méthodologie présentée ici vise à refléter les simultanéités et les schémas dynamiques de feed-back qui caractérisent les données macroéconomiques, tout en tenant compte du fait que les agents économiques fondent leurs anticipations inflationnistes sur des données autres que les taux d’inflation antérieurs. Les anticipations subjectives des agents économiques en matière d’inflation sont remplacées par des prévisions du taux d’inflation qui sont optimales en ce sens qu’elles minimisent la variance des erreurs de prévision dépendant des renseignements dont disposent les agents. On utilise ensuite ces prévisions pour calculer les séries de taux d’intérêt réels ex ante pour chaque pays et tester plusieurs hypothèses relatives aux taux d’intérêt.

Les résultats empiriques de l’étude indiquent qu’à deux reprises durant la période 1968–82, les taux d’intérêt réels ont enregistré de fortes variations. Ces variations ont eu une incidence considérable au niveau macroéconomique, en particulier sur le plan de l’inflation. D’après l’étude, l’incidence expansionniste des taux d’intérêt réels négatifs après le premier choc pétrolier s’est traduite par une intensification du processus inflationniste, tandis que l’apparition de taux d’intérêt réels positifs après le deuxième choc pétrolier a contribué à maîtriser rapidement l’inflation.

D’autres résultats donnent à penser que des variations systématiques, et donc prévisibles, de la masse monétaire qui entraînent des changements systématiques dans l’évolution de l’inflation n’ont pas d’effet sur les taux d’intérêt réels et corroborent ainsi une variante de l’hypothèse de Fisher. Par conséquent, il est soutenu qu’un assouplissement de la politique monétaire ne fera pas nécessairement baisser les taux d’intérêt réels, en particulier dans le moyen et long terme, si cet assouplissement entraîne une révision en hausse des taux d’inflation attendus.

Les Statuts du Fonds et les tribunaux — XIX — joseph gold (pages 179–234)

Dans le présent article, qui fait partie de la série consacrée au rôle joué par le droit du Fonds monétaire international en cas de litiges, l’auteur analyse des décisions rendues par des tribunaux en Grande-Bretagne, aux Etats-Unis, aux Pays-Bas et en Italie ainsi que des décisions de la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes et d’un tribunal arbitral. Certaines des questions soulevées dans le cadre de ces décisions, à propos des statuts du Fonds, sont énumérées ci-après.

1) Que signifie l’expression “contrats de change” qui figure dans l’article VIII, section 2 b) des Statuts?

2) Quel rapport existe-t-il entre l’article VIII, section 2 b) et le droit international privé du for?

3) A qui incombe-t-il de prouver que les conditions d’application de l’article VIII, section 2 b) sont réunies ou non et, si le tribunal lui-même soulève la question de l’application de l’article VIII, section 2 b), quelles en sont les conséquences pour la répartition de la charge de la preuve entre les parties?

4) Quelle est la monnaie “mise en jeu” selon l’article VIII, section 2 b)l

5) L’article VIII, section 2 b) peut-il s’appliquer à un contrat de change si les réglementations du contrôle des changes en question ont été adoptées après la conclusion du contrat?

6) Les parties à un contrat de change devraient-elles être autorisées à priver d’effets les réglementations du contrôle des changes?

7) L’article VIII, section 2 b) s’applique-t-il aux réglementations du contrôle des changes si ces dernières font partie intégrantes de la loi du for?

8) Si un paiement est effectué dans le cadre d’un contrat de change qui n’est pas exécutoire en vertu de l’article VIII, section 2 b), le montant versé peut-il être recouvré parce qu’il constitue un enrichissement sans cause du bénéficiaire?

9) L’une des parties en présence devrait-elle se voir accorder des dommages et intérêts si l’autre partie s’est engagée à solliciter ou obtenir une autorisation de change mais a fait défaut à cet engagement?

10) Si un tribunal décide que l’article VIII, section 2 b) ne s’applique pas et a statué en faveur d’un demandeur en dépit des réglementations du contrôle des changes qui font partie intégrantes du droit d’un autre pays membre du Fonds, le jugement rendu recevra-t-il exequatur d’un tribunal de ce dernier?

11) Quel rapport existe-t-il entre les dispositions des Statuts et celles du Traité de Rome qui concernent les mouvements de capitaux?

12) Les anciennes parités des monnaies peuvent-elles toujours être prises en considération dans le cadre des questions sur lesquelles doivent statuer les tribunaux?

RESUMENES

Los desequilibrios en cuenta corriente y la formación de capital en los países industriales, 1949–81—alessandro penati y michael dooley (páginas 1–124)

En este estudio se examina la función del ahorro interno y externo en el financiamiento de la formación de capital en 19 países industriales durante los años posteriores a la segunda guerra mundial. Los autores consideran, dada su interpretación de los datos estadísticos, que resulta muy difícil sostener que, a medio plazo, los bienes y servicios liberados por el ahorro de un país industrial quedan sistemáticamente a disposición de otros países industriales mediante los desequilibrios en cuenta corriente, para financiar sus inversiones en capital físico. Por el contrario, hay fuertes razones para pensar que tanto los niveles como las variaciones del ahorro interno se ven sistemáticamente igualados por los niveles y variaciones de la inversión interna. La estrecha relación entre ahorro interno e inversión interna durante el período estudiado indica que los recursos no pasaron de un país a otro para que se equipararan las tasas de rentabilidad del capital real.

El estudio tampoco encuentra sostenible la proposición de que la integración de los mercados de capital financiero durante estos últimos años ha alterado las relaciones entre ahorro interno, inversión y desequilibrios en cuenta corriente en los países industriales. Los datos obtenidos hacen pensar más bien que las variaciones del volumen de activos exteriores netos, y los desequilibrios en cuenta corriente relacionados con ellas, no fueron más sensibles a las diferencias entre países en las tasas de rentabilidad del capital físico durante el decenio finalizado en 1981 que durante el decenio de 1950, cuando la generalización de los controles de capital y las restricciones comerciales obstaculizaron la integración económica de los países industriales.

El DEG privado: Evaluación de su riesgo y rendimiento—pierre van den boogaerde (páginas 25–61)

En el presente trabajo se analiza, desde el punto de vista del rendimiento y el riesgo totales, el grado de atracción que podría haber despertado la inversión denominada en DEG durante el período 1977–82. Para ello se han simulado inversiones utilizando en forma secuencial cada una de las monedas componentes y el propio DEG como monedas de base y se ha supuesto la inversión alternativamente, en la moneda nacional de base, en las otras cuatro monedas componentes y en DEG. El punto de partida es que, si los coeficientes de correlación entre el rendimiento de las diferentes monedas que componen la cesta del DEG son menores que la unidad, la desviación típica del DEG será menor que la media ponderada de las distintas desviaciones típicas. Los resultados confirman plenamente las expectativas: La desviación típica del rendimiento total de la inversión en DEG es menor que las desviaciones típicas del rendimiento de la inversión en cada una de las monedas que lo componen, cualquiera que sea la moneda que se utilice como unidad de cuenta, con excepción de una relación paritaria entre el marco alemán y el franco francés, debido a la inclusión de ambas monedas en el Sistema Monetario Europeo (SME). El estudio demuestra también que una evaluación de la volatilidad del DEG y de las monedas que lo componen, medida por el coeficiente beta, no permite determinar con precisión el riesgo de las monedas distintas del dólar debido a la correlación relativamente baja entre esas monedas y el DEG durante el período del estudio. Por último, e independientemente de la moneda que se utilice como unidad de cuenta, el DEG acusó un rendimiento total superior al promedio durante el período analizado.

De manera que en el período estudiado, que comprende un período de debilidad y otro de firmeza del dólar, la inversión en DEG produjo un rendimiento superior a los promedios y fue mucho menos arriegada que la inversión en cualesquiera de las monedas que lo componen. En consecuencia, la idea de utilizar el DEG como unidad de cuenta podría resultar atractiva para muchos de quienes operan en el mercado internacional.

Una prueba de la eficacia de los ajustes del tipo de cambio en Indonesia—g. russell kincaid (páginas 62–92)

En este trabajo se analiza el efecto de los precios relativos en la balanza comercial no petrolera de Indonesia, haciendo hincapié en la eficacia del ajuste del tipo de cambio efectuado en noviembre de 1978. Un ajuste cambiarlo puede reencauzar los recursos hacia actividades de exportación y competitivas con la importación, únicamente si la relación costo/precio más favorable establecida a raíz de la devaluación no se vuelve desfavorable posteriormente con el aumento de los precios internos. En el primer año transcurrido desde la devaluación, gracias a la política fiscal y monetaria restrictiva aplicada, Indonesia consiguió mantener la mejora de los precios relativos originada por la devaluación. Como consecuencia de ello se aceleró en forma notable el volumen de exportaciones no petroleras y se redujo marcadamente el aumento de la importación. Con los recursos externos adicionales que le reportó al país la segunda serie de aumentos de precios del petróleo en 1979–80, el gasto interno superó a la capacidad productiva interna. Los precios relativos de los productos nacionales respecto de los productos extranjeros, en moneda nacional, volvieron al nivel que tenían antes de la devaluación; el aumento del volumen de la exportación de productos no petroleros prácticamente se detuvo y el volumen de importación se incrementó rápidamente. Esta experiencia demuestra la importancia que tienen las políticas fiscal y monetaria en respaldo de las medidas cambiarías.

A fin de identificar el efecto de los diversos factores en la balanza comercial no petrolera se estimaron mediante un modelo econométrico las funciones de la demanda de importaciones y de la oferta de exportaciones. Se observó que la demanda de importaciones está relacionada directamente con el ingreso real y con el exceso de oferta monetaria e inversamente con los precios relativos. La reacción de la oferta de exportaciones fue positiva con respecto a los precios relativos y a la variable de la capacidad productiva interna. En ambas ecuadones, las elasticidades a largo plazo fueron mayores que las elasticidades a corto plazo; las elasticidades a largo plazo de la oferta de exportaciones fueron mucho mayores que las elasticidades a corto plazo. Las ecuaciones estimadas se emplearon para simular el efecto de distintas hipótesis relativas al tipo de cambio en la balanza comercial no petrolera. Los resultados de estas simulaciones, que deben interpretarse con la debida cautela, indican que el déficit comercial no petrolero se redujo considerablemente con el ajuste del tipo de cambio de noviembre de 1978.

La recesión de 1981–82 y los precios de los productos básicos excluido el petróleo—ke-young chu y thomas k. morrison (páginas 93–140)

En este trabajo se analizan las causas fundamentales de las fluctuaciones de los precios de los productos básicos excluido el petróleo. El estudio se centra en la notable disminución de los precios de estos productos en 1981–82, pero examina el fenómeno a la luz de los puntos más destacados de la evolución de los mercados de productos básicos en la posguerra. Mediante un modelo econométrico se confirma que, de 1957 a 1982, los precios de los productos básicos —en dólares— estaban relacionados directamente con la actividad económica en los países industriales y con la inflación mundial, e inversamente con la apreciación del tipo de cambio del dólar frente a las demás monedas principales, y con las perturbaciones de la oferta. Hay datos que también hacen pensar que los precios de los productos básicos están inversamente relacionados con las fluctuaciones del tipo de interés real.

En el estudio se demuestra que la disminución acumulativa de 25 por ciento registrada por los precios de los productos básicos (en dólares nominales) en 1981–82 es la más grande y prolongada en más de tres décadas. Los precios de los productos básicos, deflactados según el índice de precios de los bienes manufacturados, disminuyeron en un 20 por ciento en 1981–82, al nivel más bajo de la posguerra. Se explica que la notable disminución de los precios de los productos básicos en 1981–82 es secuela de la mayor inestabilidad que vienen presentando desde los primeros años de la década del setenta. Durante 1972–82, la inestabilidad de los precios de los productos básicos fue tres veces mayor que durante 1957–71 y, las fluctuaciones de la actividad económica, la inflación, los tipos de cambio y los tipos de interés fueron también más pronunciadas.

Los precios de los productos básicos parecen haber sido mucho más sensibles a la actividad económica en la última década que durante los 15 años anteriores. Si bien las fluctuaciones de la actividad económica contribuyeron a la disminución de los precios tanto en 1975 como en 1981–82, se observa que esta última disminución se debió relativamente más a fluctuaciones del tipo de cambio (y posiblemente del tipo de interés) y relativamente menos a las fluctuaciones de la actividad económica, que la disminución registrada en 1975.

Las expectativas inflacionarias y la determinación del tipo de interés—rü§dü saracoglu (páginas 141–78)

Durante estos últimos años se ha mantenido una extensa polémica sobre las causas básicas del alto nivel y de la variabilidad de los tipos de interés. En este artículo se estudia la determinación de los tipos de interés en cinco países industriales (Estados Unidos, Francia, Japón, Reino Unido y República Federal de Alemania), prestando especial atención a las funciones desempeñadas por los factores monetarios y las expectativas sobre la inflación.

La discusión teórica se centra en la hipótesis de Fisher de que los tipos de interés están relacionados con las tasas previstas de inflación. Se afirma que la investigación precedente de esta cuestión en gran parte es deficiente, ya que se basa en un análisis microeconómico de equilibrio parcial y supone un mecanismo no plausible de formación de expectativas. Por el contrario, en este estudio se recogen los últimos aportes de la teoría económica y se sugiere que la formulación de expectativas—y por tanto la determinación de los tipos de interés —está influida no sólo por las tasas anteriores de inflación sino también por muchas otras variables, tales como las variaciones de la oferta monetaria o de la actividad económica. Además, es probable que las propias variables que influyen en las tasas previstas de inflación sean influidas a su vez por estas expectativas. En consecuencia, la metodología desarrollada en este estudio trata de reflejar las simultaneidades y las pautas dinámicas de retroalimentación que caracterizan los datos macroeconómicos, procurando al mismo tiempo explicar que la formación de las expectativas inflacionarias de participantes en el mercado no se basa exclusivamente en las tasas anteriores de inflación, sino también en otros datos. Las expectativas subjetivas de inflación de los participantes en el mercado se aproximan mediante previsiones de inflación que son óptimas en el sentido de que minimizan la varianza de los errores de previsión condicional a la información de que disponen los participantes en el mercado. Estas previsiones se usan luego para construir la serie ex ante de tipos reales de interés de cada país y para verificar diversas hipótesis sobre los tipos de interés.

Los resultados empíricos del estudio indican que en dos diferentes ocasiones durante el período 1968–82 los tipos reales de interés experimentaron variaciones importantes. Estas variaciones tuvieron un efecto macroeconómico considerable, especialmente con respecto a la inflación. Se sostiene que el efecto expansivo de los tipos reales de interés negativos posteriores a la primera crisis del petróleo llevaron a la intensificación del proceso inflacionario, mientras que la aparición de tipos reales de interés positivos después de la segunda crisis del petróleo ayudó a controlar rápidamente la inflación.

Otros resultados indican que las variaciones sistemáticas, y por tanto previsibles, de la oferta monetaria que conducen a cambios sistemáticos en la trayectoria cronológica de la inflación no afectan a los tipos reales de interés, lo que confirma una variante de la hipótesis de Fisher. Por consiguiente, se sostiene que no cabe esperar que una política monetaria más expansiva invariablemente redunde en la reducción de los tipos reales de interés, en especial a medio y a largo plazo, si esa mayor expansión hace que se revise al alza la tasa prevista de inflación.

El Convenio Constitutivo del Fondo ante los tribunales—XIX—joseph gold (páginas 179–234)

En la presente entrega de la serie de artículos sobre los efectos de las normas jurídicas del Fondo Monetario Internacional en los litigios, se examinan fallos emitidos por tribunales de Inglaterra, Estados Unidos, Países Bajos e Italia, así como fallos de la Corte de Justicia de las Comunidades europeas y de un tribunal arbitral. A continuación se presentan algunas de las cuestiones vinculadas al Convenio Constitutivo del Fondo que se han planteado en esos casos:

1) ¿Cuál es el significado de “contratos de cambio” en la Sección 2 b) del Artículo VIII del Convenio?

2) ¿Cuál es la relación entre la Sección 2 b) del Artículo VIII y el derecho internacional privado del foro?

3) ¿Quién tiene que probar si se han cumplido o no las condiciones de la Sección 2 b) del Artículo VIII y qué efecto tiene, en la asignación de la carga de la prueba entre las partes, el hecho de que el propio tribunal decida discutir la aplicación de la Sección 2 b) del Artículo VIII?

4) ¿Cuál es la moneda “implicada” en la Sección 2 b) del Artículo VIII?

5) ¿Se aplica la Sección 2 b) del Artículo VIII a un contrato de cambio si las disposiciones de control de cambios se adoptaron con posterioridad a su celebración?

6) ¿Debe permitirse que las partes en un contrato de cambio acuerden dejar sin efecto las disposiciones de control de cambios?

7) ¿Se aplica la Sección 2 b) del Artículo VIII a las disposiciones de control de cambios si éstas son parte del derecho del foro?

8) Si de conformidad con un contrato de cambio se hace efectivo un pago que no es exigible según la Sección 2 b) del Artículo VIII, ¿se puede demandar por enriquecimiento sin causa a quien recibió el pago?

9) ¿Debe adjudicársele daños y perjuicios a una parte si la otra se comprometió a solicitar u obtener una licencia de cambio y no cumplió con dicho compromiso?

10) Si un tribunal rechaza la aplicación de la Sección 2 b) del Artículo VIII y falla en favor del demandante a pesar de las disposiciones de control de cambios que forman parte de la legislación de otro país miembro del Fondo ¿reconocerá y cumplirá el fallo el tribunal de ese otro país?

11) ¿Cuál es la relación entre las disposiciones del Convenio y las disposiciones del Tratado de Roma sobre movimientos de capital?

12) ¿Sigue siendo pertinente la antigua paridad en asuntos que se someten a la resolución de los tribunales?

In statistical matter (except in the résumés and resúmenes) throughout this issue,

Dots (…) indicate that data are not available;

A dash (—) indicates that the figure is zero or less than half the final digit shown, or that the item does not exist;

A single dot (.) indicates decimals;

A comma (,) separates thousands and millions;

“Billion” means a thousand million;

A short dash (-) is used between years or months (e.g., 1977–79 or January-October) to indicate a total of the years or months inclusive of the beginning and ending years or months;

A stroke (/) is used between years (e.g., 1978/79) to indicate a fiscal year or a crop year;

Components of tables may not add to totals shown because of rounding.

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