Monetary Stabilization With and Without Government Credibility

In recent years, a number of economists, including Lucas ((1972), (1975)), Sargent and Wallace (1975), and Barro (1978), have stressed the difference between anticipated and unanticipated money growth, arguing that while unanticipated money growth affects output, anticipated money growth affects only prices. They have also advanced the idea that private market participants form their expectations rationally, so that anticipated money growth reflects, in particular, the revealed policy behavior of the monetary authorities. These views have led these economists to contend that the monetary authorities can curb inflation rapidly at little cost, in terms of lost output and unemployment, by reducing money growth and simultaneously convincing private market participants that the reduction in money growth will be long-lived. This conclusion is in marked contrast to the one suggested by empirical work on the expectational Phillips curve when proxies for price expectations are derived from the past behavior of prices. A recent survey of such studies by Okun (1978), for example, concluded that in the United States price expectations adjust so slowly, and the effect of excess supply on wage-price decisions is so small, that it costs 6 per cent to 17 per cent of a year’s gross domestic product (GDP), in terms of lost output, to obtain a reduction of only one percentage point in the inflation rate for the 1980s.

Abstract

In recent years, a number of economists, including Lucas ((1972), (1975)), Sargent and Wallace (1975), and Barro (1978), have stressed the difference between anticipated and unanticipated money growth, arguing that while unanticipated money growth affects output, anticipated money growth affects only prices. They have also advanced the idea that private market participants form their expectations rationally, so that anticipated money growth reflects, in particular, the revealed policy behavior of the monetary authorities. These views have led these economists to contend that the monetary authorities can curb inflation rapidly at little cost, in terms of lost output and unemployment, by reducing money growth and simultaneously convincing private market participants that the reduction in money growth will be long-lived. This conclusion is in marked contrast to the one suggested by empirical work on the expectational Phillips curve when proxies for price expectations are derived from the past behavior of prices. A recent survey of such studies by Okun (1978), for example, concluded that in the United States price expectations adjust so slowly, and the effect of excess supply on wage-price decisions is so small, that it costs 6 per cent to 17 per cent of a year’s gross domestic product (GDP), in terms of lost output, to obtain a reduction of only one percentage point in the inflation rate for the 1980s.

In recent years, a number of economists, including Lucas ((1972), (1975)), Sargent and Wallace (1975), and Barro (1978), have stressed the difference between anticipated and unanticipated money growth, arguing that while unanticipated money growth affects output, anticipated money growth affects only prices. They have also advanced the idea that private market participants form their expectations rationally, so that anticipated money growth reflects, in particular, the revealed policy behavior of the monetary authorities. These views have led these economists to contend that the monetary authorities can curb inflation rapidly at little cost, in terms of lost output and unemployment, by reducing money growth and simultaneously convincing private market participants that the reduction in money growth will be long-lived. This conclusion is in marked contrast to the one suggested by empirical work on the expectational Phillips curve when proxies for price expectations are derived from the past behavior of prices. A recent survey of such studies by Okun (1978), for example, concluded that in the United States price expectations adjust so slowly, and the effect of excess supply on wage-price decisions is so small, that it costs 6 per cent to 17 per cent of a year’s gross domestic product (GDP), in terms of lost output, to obtain a reduction of only one percentage point in the inflation rate for the 1980s.

How much truth is there in the new optimistic view? The major potent criticism of it is that this view does not make allowance for the existence of long-term contractual arrangements concerning goods prices and, mainly, wage rates—arrangements that may be implicit or explicit. As shown by Fischer ((1977), (1980)), in particular, the existence of long-term contracts implies that anticipated money growth cannot necessarily be assumed to be fully reflected in the aggregate price level. How much of anticipated money growth is reflected depends on how far ahead of time the money growth in question has been anticipated and how long contractual arrangements tend to be.1 Once the new theory is modified to make allowance for long-term contracts, there is no longer any reason to expect that a monetary stabilization that affects the monetary growth rate expected to prevail in the future will have a rapid effect on the rate of inflation. This fact does not, however, vitiate the basic point that to cut inflation, it is important to reduce money growth expectations. If new contractual arrangements reflect money growth expectations, then the more rapidly these expectations are lowered, the more quickly the overall rate of inflation will fall.

With contractual arrangements reducing the frequency of wage and price adjustment in the labor and product markets, even a stabilization program that rapidly affects money growth expectations may still have a serious negative impact on real output. A liquidity squeeze may drive real interest rates up, causing a reduction in investment and in the demand for consumer durables. In fact, it will be argued here that the reduction in money growth expectations could, in itself, make matters worse initially, as far as the reduction in output is concerned. This could happen if, for example, the reduction in money growth expectations led private market participants to bid up real interest rates further on the assumption that the liquidity squeeze was going to worsen before it improved. These recessionary effects could be partly offset or, on the contrary, compounded as a result of exchange rate developments. For a floating exchange rate, Dornbusch (1979) has shown that the liquidity squeeze may lead to a sharp appreciation of the real exchange rate. The appreciation could speed up price adjustment in the labor and goods markets by lowering prices of imported goods, but it could also worsen the foreign trade performance of the country. The first effect would be favorable for output, while the second would be unfavorable.

The present study attempts to estimate empirically for the Federal Republic of Germany the importance of the various effects that may slow down price adjustment and reduce the level of output, in order to assess the extent to which the success of a monetary stabilization program depends on its direct impact on long-run expectations. The Federal Republic of Germany was selected because of the active monetary policy it followed for a number of years, its large volume of foreign trade, and its relatively free-floating exchange rate (at least against non-European Monetary System (EMS) currencies). The analysis uses a simple monetarist model in which the long-run inflationary expectations of private market participants are assumed to reflect the monetary policy of the authorities. Contrary to existing empirical work in this field, the model makes allowance for discretionary changes in the policy stance of the monetary authorities—changes that private market participants cannot anticipate but can take into account in forming their expectations as soon as the changes are announced. The model allows for the existence of contract prices in the goods and labor markets and views the interest rate and the exchange rate as variables that are determined in the financial asset markets in the short run.

Following econometric estimation of its parameters, the model is used to simulate the effects of a monetary stabilization program under two alternative assumptions. In one case, the program affects money growth expectations; and in the other, the program does not. The results show that the program with effects on expectations leads rapidly to a reduction in inflation, but also to a fall in output that is both marked and sustained. The ratio of cumulated lost output to final reduction in the inflation rate is high, but not as high as in the studies quoted by Okun (1978). It costs about 4 per cent of a year’s gross national product (GNP) to achieve each percentage point reduction in the annual inflation rate. In the long run, after six to seven years, output is back to its full-employment level, while inflation remains at its new lower level. The program leads also to a sharp and sustained overshooting of the exchange rate and, after a lag, to a worsening of the foreign trade performance in volume terms, although not in nominal terms. For the program that has no impact on expectations, the results are even worse. The recessionary tendency develops less rapidly, but the fall in inflation is exceedingly slow. Furthermore, the reduction in inflation is directly related to the low level of output, so that output cannot be brought back to its full-employment level without at the same time bringing the inflation rate back to its previous level. Exchange rate overshooting and the worsening of the foreign trade performance are much less marked, however, than in the previous case. These results are subject to many statistical caveats, and consequently they should be viewed as providing only a rough and tentative quantification of the effects under study.

A second set of simulations is utilized to study how the effects of the two previous types of stabilization programs are influenced by a policy of temporarily fixing the exchange rate and simultaneously neutralizing the effects of foreign exchange market intervention on the monetary base. With both types of programs, the fixed-rate policy is shown to delay somewhat the decline in the inflation rate in terms of the domestic demand deflator, but not in terms of the GDP deflator. There is little, if any, effect on output. The main effect of preventing the exchange rate from appreciating is that the foreign trade performance improves in volume terms, although it does not improve as much in value terms. These latter estimates should, of course, be interpreted with caution.

Section I of this paper describes the quarterly model of the economy of the Federal Republic of Germany that is used in the empirical investigation. Section II discusses the parameter estimates and presents the various simulation results. Some tentative policy conclusions are indicated in Section III.

I. The Model

Table 1 presents the model used in this study. It has been kept small so that the analysis can focus on the essential aspects of price, interest rate, output, and exchange rate dynamics. The elaboration of concrete policy decisions would obviously require a far more elaborate analytical framework. The model applies the main principles of the rational-expectations version of the monetarist approach to a world of contract prices. Private market participants enter into contractual wage and price arrangements covering several periods. The contracts negotiated at a given point in time stipulate the rates of change of wages and prices for n future periods on the basis of the money growth anticipations and the amount of economic slack existing at that point in time. Therefore, the average price level tends to adjust to changes in money growth expectations only gradually and is not directly influenced by actual money growth. The impact effect of a monetary shock is a liquidity squeeze or glut that prevents the nominal interest rate from adjusting in line with the inflation rate implied by the monetary shock. This interest-rate overshooting leads to a similar overshooting of the exchange rate. The resulting changes in real interest rates and international price competitiveness lead to output variations. The various blocks of the model’s equations are discussed in more detail in subsequent paragraphs.

Table 1.

Model of a Monetary Economy1

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All variables denoted by small letters are in logs, except for the interest rates (is and il), the change in foreign assets () and the dummy variables (z1 and z2).

The various signs should be interpreted as follows: a dot (˙) denotes the rate of change of the variable (i.e., Δṁ = m − m-1, with m and m−1 in logs); a delta (Δ) signifies that the variable is considered in first-difference terms (i.e., Δṁ = ṁ − ṁ-1); a superscript (el) denotes the long-run expected value of the variable (i.e., el = rate of growth of money expected to prevail on average from period t to period t + 6 at the time of period t a superscript (es) denotes short-run expected values of the variable (i.e., es = rate of increase of domestic demand deflator expected to prevail from period t to period t + 1 at the time of period t a tilde (˜) signifies that the variable is expressed in terms of deviation from an average of past values; and, finally, an asterisk (*) signifies that the variable refers to the industrial world, minus the Federal Republic of Germany, while a subscript U.S. signifies that the variable refers to the United States. All variables are expressed in deutsche mark, except for the deflator of imports (pm) and the variables referring to the rest of the industrial world or to the United States that are expressed in U. S. dollars.

The coefficients of equation (1) are to be derived by estimating the coefficients of:

k=1k=6m˙k/6=j=1j=nα1,jm˙jα2(yy¯)1α3z1α4k=1k=6r˙k(1)

while the coefficients of equations (3) and (4) are to be derived, respectively, from the estimation of the coefficients of

p˙=j=1j=nα6,jp˙j(3)

and

p˙d=j=1j=nα7,jp˙d,j(4)

PRICE BLOCK

The experiences of stagflation during the late 1960s and the 1970s have led to a major change in the commonly accepted views on price and wage dynamics. The notion behind the original Phillips curve—that wage rates respond only to excess demand conditions in the labor market—has been replaced by the view, expressed by the expectational Phillips curve, that wage rates are influenced as much, if not more, by inflationary expectations as by actual excess demand conditions. There are two separate arguments behind the new view. The first focuses on the crucial role played by expectations. It concludes that, if inflation is expected to persist, wage rates may continue to increase for some time, even when no excess demand is present. The theoretical justification for this argument can be found in the existence of long-term contractual wage arrangements that oblige market participants to look ahead. If the level of the wage rate, or, more likely, its rate of change, is going to be fixed for a substantial period of time, the arrangement has to take into account not only existing excess demand conditions but also the expected overall rate of inflation during the whole contract period. Long-term contracts, by themselves, only delay the effect of an unexpected change in excess demand conditions on the average money wage rate. The second argument goes further by focusing on the weakness of the response of the money wage rate to excess demand conditions even at the time when new labor contracts are negotiated. The argument is supported by the observation that employees and employers tend to view their relationships in a long-run context that extends far beyond the duration of a particular labor contract. As Hall ((1980), p. 82) has noted, “wages are insensitive to current economic conditions because they are effectively installment payments on the employer’s obligation to transfer a certain amount of wealth to the worker over the duration of the employment arrangement.”

The expectational Phillips curve is now widely accepted as a theory of wage dynamics, and, when combined with some type of cost-plus pricing model, with or without contractual price arrangements in the goods markets, it is also accepted as a theory of price dynamics. The problem is that its policy implications depend upon the assumption made with respect to the formation of price expectations. Practically all econometric models assume that private market participants are exclusively backward-looking and form their price expectations on the basis of the past behavior of the actual price series themselves. Thus, the expectation term in the Phillips curve equation can be replaced by a distributed lag function of past inflation rates. By repeated substitution, the current inflation rate can be expressed, as in the original Phillips curve equation, as a function of an excess demand variable only, although in this case all the lagged values of this variable enter the equation.2 From a policy standpoint, the implication of this specification is that inflation can be eliminated only by being “squeezed out” through a period of excess supply. This specification will also, in general, lead to the conclusion that the adjustment period will be long and painful for two reasons. First, the coefficient on the excess supply term tends to be small. Second, inflation rate series tend to be rather erratic, so that inflationary expectations are usually found to adjust slowly to current inflationary developments.3

The rational expectations approach that is used to derive the price block of the model presented in Table 1 starts from the more plausible assumption that private market participants are forward-looking, so that they form their price expectations on the basis of what they expect to be the major factors influencing inflation in the future. If the amount of money is acknowledged as the major determinant of the overall price level in the long run,4 then private market participants can be assumed to set long-term contractual rates of change of wages, and by implication the rates of change of prices, on the basis of their expectations about long-run money growth. These expectations will reflect the monetary policy stance of the authorities as it is perceived by private market participants. By changing their policy stance in a convincing manner, the monetary authorities can reduce inflation without having to rely on any excess supply effect. The reduction in inflation will not be immediate because of existing contractual wage arrangements, but the speed of adjustment will be related only to the length of the contract period.

A major difficulty with empirical implementation of a rational expectations approach is that, in the present context, it requires the derivation of a reliable proxy variable for money growth expectations. The general procedure for deriving this proxy is to assume that the monetary authorities are following a specific policy reaction function that becomes known to private market participants from their observation of past events and that is then used by these participants to predict what the monetary authorities are going to do. To the extent that the authorities are found to react to current developments with a lag, it may be possible to form a prediction on the basis of actually known factors. In most cases, however, some factors may enter in the policy reaction function with a short lag, or no lag at all, so that the prediction of money growth may also require forecasting a number of factors known to affect the money supply process.

The policy reaction function used in the present study assumes that the average rate of growth of money over any period of a year and a half is related to the observed rates of change of money in previous quarters, the GNP gap lagged by one quarter, a variable that expresses the policy stance of the monetary authorities during the year and a half considered, and the amount of foreign exchange market intervention during that same period. (See equation (1′) in footnote 2 of Table 1.) The year-and-a-half period is the result of a simplifying assumption. To avoid the complexity of an n-period analysis, the model assumes that, whatever the duration of the contractual wage arrangements, they are based on the anticipated rate of growth of money for the next year and a half. The choice of the period length is arbitrary,5 but it was felt that a short period of a few months would not be very relevant for most labor contracts, while anticipations for a period of several years would probably be too diffused to be relevant.

As is done in similar empirical studies, lagged money growth rates are included in equation (1′) because they may contain information on the normal behavior of the authorities that cannot be readily derived from the way they react to values assumed by specific target variables. The lagged output gap is included to isolate the cyclical response of the authorities. The other two variables included in the equation are elements that are concurrent with the money growth being explained. The dummy variable represents the discretionary component of the policy stance.6 If the rate of growth of money on the left-hand side of the equation covers a period that includes the beginning of the implementation of a major stabilization program, then its value may deviate substantially from the value that the first two explanatory variables would normally imply. To take this into account, the dummy variable z1 is given a value that increases from zero to one in proportion to the number of quarters covered by the left-hand-side variable that are affected by the policy shift. If the left-hand-side variable covers a period that immediately follows a policy change, only one or two of the lagged money growth rates included as explanatory variables will be affected by the policy change, so that the historical series cannot be considered to reflect adequately the information available to private market participants. To offset this fact, the value of z1 is allowed to decay gradually from one to zero in eight quarters.7 The complete series for z1 is given in Appendix II. Finally, the last variable identifies the “unwanted” monetary effects of foreign exchange interventions.8

At any point in time, private market participants can look back and estimate the coefficients of the policy reaction function (1′) from past data. To predict money growth, however, it is not enough for them to have an estimate of these coefficients. They must also forecast the discretionary component of the policy stance, as well as the amount of foreign exchange market intervention. In the present model, it is assumed that private market participants do not anticipate discretionary policy changes but that their long-run expectations are revised once a policy change is announced. The change in their expectations depends on the coefficient of the variable z1, the magnitude of which depends on the effectiveness of past policy changes.

Thus, in equation (1) of Table 1, which is used to predict money growth, the variable z1 enters, but in a modified form denoted by z2. The variable z2 takes the value zero up to the period when the policy change is announced; then, like z1, it takes a value of one when the policy change is announced, after which z2 decays gradually. The complete series for z2 is also given in Appendix II. Finally, equation (1) also assumes that private market participants do not anticipate money growth owing to foreign exchange market interventions so that, prior to interventions, the variable is expected to be nil. This latter assumption seems reasonable, given that periods of speculation during the fixed-rate regime and interventions during the floating-rate period have been erratic and not easily foreseeable several quarters ahead.

The foregoing specification of long-term money growth expectations abstracts from many factors. It nevertheless represents a substantial improvement over previous empirical studies, most of which do not allow either for the effect of policy surprises on money growth expectations or for developments that can be viewed as having affected money growth ex post but that ex ante were impossible to anticipate.9 The two innovations used in the present study—namely, the taking into account of discretionary changes in the policy stance of the monetary authorities and the consideration of unanticipated money growth owing to foreign exchange market intervention—permit a better differentiation of anticipated from unanticipated money. They also make it easier to identify the effects of sudden changes in expectations resulting from discretionary policy changes.

Long-run inflationary expectations in terms of the deflator of domestic demand are defined in equation (2) of Table 1 on the basis of expected money growth, adjusted for growth in potential output and long-run changes in velocity. One-quarter-ahead inflationary expectations in terms of the GDP deflator and the domestic demand deflator are viewed as being formed on the basis of recent inflationary developments.10 (See equations (3) and (4) of Table 1.) The assumption is that the inflation rate for the next quarter can be more reliably forecast from the observation of recent historical price developments than from the use of any behavioral model linking prices to monetary, fiscal, or other such causal factors. The reasons for this assumption include the difficulty in identifying precisely the timing of monetary and fiscal effects on inflation. Thus, the present model combines the traditional approach, in which expectations are determined by historical developments, with the new rational expectations approach that makes allowance for current events and changes in policies. The former approach is considered more appropriate for the short run, while the latter is considered more appropriate for the long run.

Equation (5) of Table 1 determines the domestic rate of inflation in terms of the GDP deflator by using an expectational Phillips curve where the distributed-lag parameters for the inflationary expectations and the excess demand terms depend on how frequently contractual wage arrangements are being reviewed. The domestic demand deflator is defined in equation (6) of Table 1 as a weighted average of the GDP deflator and the deflator of imports.

OUTPUT BLOCK

The view of price dynamics advanced in the present model has direct implications for output determination. Here again, the important distinction is between anticipated and unanticipated money. To the extent that the current money growth was anticipated at the time existing contracts were entered into, it can be considered to be reflected by prevailing prices, so that it has no impact on output. Unanticipated money, however, is not reflected by existing prices and gives rise to an incipient excess supply of, or demand for, money that may lead to a temporary variation in output. As shown in the rational expectations literature, it is only unexpected monetary shocks that lead to output variations. In contrast to most of this literature, however, unexpected shocks are not viewed as “random disturbances” that could not be anticipated one period (quarter) ahead. Rather, unexpected shocks are viewed as resulting from monetary policy changes that could not be anticipated several quarters ahead when existing contracts were agreed upon. The conceptual difference is important, since the latter view implies that a change in the monetary policy stance of the authorities may lead to a money growth that must be considered as unanticipated and, therefore, may be a source of variation in output for a sustained period of time, rather than for only one quarter.11

Unanticipated money is viewed as affecting output through variations in the expected long-term real interest rate. Equation (7) of Table 1 explains the nominal long-term interest rate by reference to the real money stock, real income, the inflation rate expected over the long run, and the difference between short-run and long-run expected inflation rates. Equation (7) represents an inverted demand-for-money equation, with the normal hypotheses that a higher real money stock leads, in itself, to a lower nominal interest rate, while the sign of the coefficient of the expected long-run inflation terms is indeterminate.12 The last term represents an expected liquidity squeeze or glut effect. Its coefficient is expected to be positive. When a monetary stabilization program leads to a sudden downward shift in the long-run expected rate of growth of money, the slow speed of price adjustment in the labor and goods markets will normally lead private market participants to expect that prices are going to keep rising in the short term at a rate that is not consistent from a long-run standpoint with the new money growth rate. The excess of the short-run over the long-run expected inflation rate will indicate how severe the liquidity squeeze is likely to become in forthcoming quarters as a result of the change in monetary policy. If this variable is large, private market participants can then be assumed to bid up the interest rate in anticipation of the forthcoming squeeze.

Equation (8) relates output to potential output, the long-term real interest rate, and the impulse coming from real government expenditures and foreign trade. Substantial lagged effects of real interest rate variations on output should be expected, because it may take time for the initial shock to spread through the whole economy. Planning costs for capital projects, in particular, will lead to a delay in the peak response of investment to shocks. Government expenditures and the ratio of exports to imports, all in real terms, are introduced in equation (8) in the form of deviations from past tendencies, so that any temporary acceleration in the growth of these variables initially has a positive impulse effect on the growth of output, followed by a negative impulse effect of equal magnitude that brings output back to its initial growth path. Here again, the impulses may lead to persistent output effects because of slow diffusion. In the long run, however, the present specification implies that the level of output in relation to the level of potential output is influenced only by the real interest rate.13

EXCHANGE RATE BLOCK

The exchange rate specification followed by the present model is similar to the one developed in Artus (1976). It is based on a version of the asset-market theory of exchange rate determination that emphasizes the role of financial markets in the short-run determination of exchange rates. At any point in time, the supplies of short-term securities denominated in the various currencies and the short-term interest rates are assumed to be predetermined. The exchange rate is the variable that adjusts, so that the relative yields of the securities denominated in domestic and foreign currencies reach a point at which all existing securities are willingly held. This approach leads to the conclusion that short-run changes in exchange rates are related to expected inflation rate differentials, changes in uncovered short-term interest rate differentials, the relative current balance positions of the various countries, and the changes in those relative positions.14 A more technical discussion of the approach and the derivation of the exchange rate equation is presented in Appendix I.15

The exchange rate of the deutsche mark has been floating against a number of major currencies since February 1973, but it has remained pegged against other currencies. Thus, it was not possible to explain the average value of the deutsche mark against all foreign currencies. The problem was solved by specifying an equation for the major floating rate, the deutsche mark/U. S. dollar rate. In this equation, equation (11) of Table 1, the foreign rate of inflation and the foreign rate of interest are measured by the corresponding U. S. variables. The relative strength of the U. S. and German current account balances also enters as an important variable. For the sake of convenience, the current account variables are expressed as ratios of exports of goods and services over imports of goods and services in logarithmic form. All variables in equation (11) are in quarterly average form, except for the current account balance data that refer to flows over quarterly periods.

The specification of short-run exchange rate dynamics followed here clearly allows for substantial “overshooting.” For example, a monetary stabilization policy that leads initially to an increase in the short-run interest rate differential but does not immediately affect the expected short-term inflation rate differential may cause a sharp increase in the real exchange rate for a number of periods. This is particularly true if the coefficient α25 in equation (11) is much larger than one, as the theoretical arguments presented in Appendix I would lead one to expect.

The short-term interest rate variable for the Federal Republic of Germany is determined by equation (12) of Table 1, which is similar to the equation for the long-term interest rate. The current account variable is determined in equations (13) and (14) of Table 1 by reference to activity levels and relative international prices.

II. Empirical Results

Parameters of the model presented in the preceding section were estimated for the Federal Republic of Germany by using two-stage-least-squares regression methods. The frequency of observation is quarterly. The estimation period extends from the third quarter of 1964 to the fourth quarter of 1979, except for equations (1′), (3′), (4′), (7), (11), and (12). The parameters of equations (1′), (3′), and (4′), which are used to derive values of expectations of money growth and inflation, were estimated for each quarter t using observations on the period extending from the first quarter of 1955 to t. The parameters derived for quarter t were then employed to derive the values of the expected money growth and inflation variables for period t + 1.16 The reason for this tedious process is that obviously expectations as of a given point of time can only be formed on the basis of parameters that are estimated from past observations. The parameters of the exchange rate and interest rate equations were estimated from observations on the floating rate period extending from the fourth quarter of 1973 to the fourth quarter of 1979;17 prior to that period, the exchange rate and interest rate variables were considered to be exogenous.

Preliminary estimation of the purely monetarist model revealed that it performs poorly in the two periods 1968–71 and 1973–75, particularly in determining the GDP deflator. In the first period, there was a wage explosion, followed rapidly by a price explosion, that can be explained neither by the rate of monetary growth, which was if anything particularly low during that period and the few quarters that preceded it, nor by the level of resources utilization, which, while high, was not markedly higher than in the low-inflation-rate period of 1964–66. In the second period, there was a new price explosion that was clearly related in part to the boom in commodity prices, in particular oil prices, in world markets. When two dummy variables of the zero-one type were included for these periods, the model was found to track developments during the other periods reasonably well, including the period of oil price increases in 1979. The estimated parameters of this modified version of the monetarist model will now be discussed. It should be kept in mind, however, that the empirical evidence strongly suggests that major developments outside the monetary field may at times provide new inflationary impulses in a way that is not explained by the present model.18

REGRESSION RESULTS

The regression results are presented in Table 2. Looking first at the price block, the money growth equation shown in the table is the one based on the full sample period, which extends from the first quarter of 1955 to the fourth quarter of 1979. Both the discretionary monetary policy variable z1 and the foreign exchange market intervention variable are found to play a crucial role in the money growth process. This result is important because, as explained previously, discretionary monetary policy changes and foreign exchange market intervention cannot easily be anticipated. Thus, it is possible to make a relatively clear-cut distinction between unanticipated money growth and money growth that had been anticipated through observations of past periods. The results from money growth equations for other periods were fairly similar, and are not indicated here to save space. In the definition of the long-run price expectations variable (equation (2)), the long-run rate of change of the velocity of base money is taken to be zero through 1975 and minus one quarter of 1 percentage point per quarter from 1976 onward.19 Those are estimates obtained by comparing the long-run changes in GDP and in the stock of base money. As to the results for the equations used to derive short-run price expectations, they show that if expectations are based on the history of the variables concerned, they must be fairly slow to adjust to new developments.

Table 2.

Empirical Results1

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The period covered by the left-hand-side variables extends from the third quarter of 1964 to the fourth quarter of 1979, except for equations (1′), (3′), (4′), (7), (11), and (12). As explained in the text, the parameters of equations (1′), (3′), and (4′) are estimated for each period t on the basis of observations for the period extending from the first quarter of 1955 to t. To save space, the results are presented here only for the regression equations covering the period extending from the first quarter of 1955 to the fourth quarter of 1979. The parameters of equations (7), (11), and (12) are estimates from observations on the flexible exchange rate period extending from the fourth quarter of 1973 to the fourth quarter of 1979.

Standard errors of the estimated values of the parameters are shown in parentheses below the coefficients. SEE denotes standard error of the estimate. D-W denotes Durbin-Watson statistic. Columns may not add to totals shown because of rounding.

−0.05 from 1976 onward.

Almon constraint: polynomial of degree 3, without zero-constraint.

Almon constraint: polynomial of degree 3, zero-constraint at the end.

Almon constraint: polynomial of degree 3, zero-constraints at the beginning and end.

The results for the expectational Phillips curve indicate clearly the importance of long-run price expectations in the inflationary process. The sum of the coefficients of the expectation term is not significantly different from unity. The mean adjustment lag is about three quarters, which is consistent with the a priori knowledge that most labor contracts in the Federal Republic of Germany are for a period of one year. The output gap, though, has a fairly weak influence on the rate of inflation. An increase of 1 percentage point in the gap between actual and potential GDP reduces the quarterly rate of inflation by 0.23 (0.06)20 percentage point, or the annual rate by about 1 percentage point.

To test further the hypothesis that long-run price expectations reflect monetary expectations rather than past price developments, the variable el was replaced in equation (5) by two alternative measures of inflationary expectations based on the past behavior of the inflation rate series. In the first case, the short-run expectation series es derived in equation (3) was used, while in the second case, a long-run expectation series derived by re-estimating equation (3) with an inflation rate covering six quarters on the left-hand side was introduced. In both cases, the results were significantly inferior in terms of the standard error of the regression. Nor did an attempt to include import prices, with or without lags, in equation (5) lead to any significant decrease in the standard error of the regression. These various tests tend to provide evidence for the monetarist view that a change in import prices does not have a significant effect on long-run inflationary expectations, as long as it is not accompanied by a change in the rate of growth of money. However, a possible reason for these empirical results could be that, except for the period 1973–75, which is dummied out, import prices in deutsche mark were not increasing rapidly during the sample period because of the appreciation of the deutsche mark.

In the output block, the long-term interest rate equation is found to have a positive, but small, coefficient on the long-run expected inflation rate. The coefficient on the expected-liquidity-squeeze variable is positive as expected. Together, these two coefficients imply that a 1 percentage point fall in the long-run expected inflation rate would initially lead to a 0.18 percentage point increase in the long-term nominal interest rate and, therefore, to a 1.18 percentage point increase in the long-term real interest rate. The magnitude of the estimates for the other coefficients also seem plausible; they do, however, have large standard errors that may reflect the small size of the sample. The coefficient of the real money stock is also rather small. The reason seems to be that most of the effect of an unanticipated reduction in the rate of growth of money on the interest rate is picked up in the model by the expected-liquidity-squeeze variable. The implication, as discussed later on in the section on policy simulations, is that a monetary stabilization program that leads to a reduction of the real money stock but has no impact on expectations concerning money growth and inflation will have only a small, gradual effect on output.

The output equation (8) also yields quite reasonable results. The long-run elasticity with respect to the long-term real interest rate is about −6.8 (2.2). This is rather large, especially since in the present model the long-term nominal interest rate is often found over short periods to move in a direction opposite to the one taken by the long-run expected rate of inflation, so that variations in the real rate are fairly large at times. The mean lag of 6.2 (2.4) quarters between variations in the long-term real interest rate and variations in output is also consistent with a priori notions concerning the slow speed of adjustment of output. Impulse effects coming from abnormal variations in foreign trade or in government expenditures tend to be statistically significant, but rather small. For example, a sudden 1 per cent increase in the volume of exports and government expenditures leads in two quarters to a 0.35 (0.06) per cent increase in real GDP, while these two components per se account for about 45 per cent of GDP. As noted previously, the model is specified so that the long-run effect of these two variables on output is nil. It can also be noted that the combined dummy variables for the wage explosion of 1968–71 and the commodity price increases of 1973–75 are found to have had a significant positive effect on the level of output, although since these dummy variables take the value one in 1968–71 and 1973–75 and zero otherwise, their long-run effect is obviously nil. The output effect of the dummy variables probably results from the fact that the variable el, which is based exclusively on money growth expectations, did not correctly reflect the true level of long-run inflationary expectations in the corresponding periods.

The exchange rate equation (11) confirms the main result in Artus (1976)—namely, the sensitivity of the exchange rate to variations in the short-term interest rate and to the current balance. An increase of 1 percentage point in the interest rate differential in favor of Frankfurt (with interest rates expressed as quarterly rates) will lead to an increase of about 4.3(1.3) per cent in the value of the deutsche mark in terms of U. S. dollars, other things equal. A fall of 0.14 (0.06) per cent in the value of the deutsche mark is needed to give private market participants the incentive to buy an additional DM 0.4 billion worth (equivalent to 1 per cent of the mean value of quarterly German exports of goods and services during the sample period) of German financial assets.21 The effect of the dummy variable for the oil embargo (1 in the fourth quarter of 1973 and in the first quarter of 1974, −2 in the second quarter of 1974, and zero otherwise) is similar to the effect estimated in Artus (1976).

Looking at the variables that affect the exchange rate, the short-term interest rate in equation (12) is found to be largely influenced by the anticipated-liquidity-squeeze effect. A sudden reduction in the long-run expected rate of growth of money of 1 percentage point (with the rate of growth defined at a quarterly rate) leads to a 0.3 percentage point increase in the nominal short-term interest rate (here again, expressed as a quarterly rate). This effect, combined with the sensitivity of the exchange rate to interest rate variations, is, of course, a major source of exchange rate overshooting. The trade equation (13) also shows that the sum of the export and import price elasticities is only marginally greater than one in the long run and that it takes three years for this sum to exceed one. There is, therefore, a substantial and persistent J-curve effect that may lead to exchange rate overshooting, since the current balance is, itself, an important determinant of the exchange rate.

In conclusion, most of the important effects seem to be fairly well identified, and the magnitudes of the parameters seem plausible. Despite this, however, the estimates must be considered rather tentative. Without going into an exhaustive analysis of the possible sources of statistical bias in the present econometric estimation, it must be noted that the degree of aggregation of the model is such that various types of aggregation bias are bound to exist. This is particularly true with respect to the estimation of the price elasticity in the foreign trade equation, where aggregation bias may be the reason for the rather low value of the estimated long-run price elasticity. As already noted, the specification of the way in which private market participants’ expectations of the money growth rate are formed is also somewhat simplistic and is, therefore, a likely source of bias in the estimation of parameters of equations where that variable enters. Last but not least, the small number of observations available for the estimation of the parameters of the interest rate and exchange rate equations is, if not a source of bias, certainly a source of inefficiency in the derivation of the estimated values of these parameters. These reservations must be kept in mind in assessing the results of the policy simulations discussed in the following section.

POLICY SIMULATIONS

To analyze quantitatively the importance of a fall in money growth expectations for the success of a monetary stabilization program, two polar cases will now be considered. Both cases assume that the German authorities suddenly reduce the quarterly rate of growth of base money by 1 percentage point and let the exchange rate float freely.22 The first case, however, assumes that private market participants’ expectations of future money growth are not affected by the policy change, while the second case assumes that private market participants immediately revise their expectations to take the policy change into account. More precisely, the effects of each policy are measured by the difference between two simulations for the period 1980–89. The first, the control solution, assumes that both the actual and the expected rates of money growth are 9 per cent a year. The second, the policy solution, assumes a rate of money growth of only 5 per cent a year and an expected rate of money growth of 9 per cent in the case where expectations do not adjust, and 5 per cent in the case where expectations do adjust. The effects of the two policies are presented in Chart 1.

Chart 1.
Chart 1.

Federal Republic of Germany: Cumulative Effects of a Reduction in Quarterly Rate of Money Growth of 1 Percentage Point with Floating Exchange Rate1

Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1981, 003; 10.5089/9781451972672.024.A003

1 The effects are measured by the difference between two simulations for the period 1980–89; the first one, the control solution, assumes a rate of money growth of 9 per cent a year, while the second assumes a rate of money growth of only 5 per cent a year.

Under the first policy, the monetary stabilization program has, on the whole, little effect on inflation or real output for several years. The finding that inflation does not abate rapidly when expectations are not affected is consistent with the results of practically all empirical studies. What is more important is the finding that the effect on output is also small initially. What happens is that, without any change in expected money growth, the reduction in actual money growth has no direct effect on either short-run or long-run expected inflation rate or actual inflation rate in terms of the GDP deflator. The real money stock falls, but the fall is only gradual and, given that the coefficients of that variable in the interest rate equations are small, the rises in short-term and long-term nominal interest rates are insignificant. Since the expected rates of inflation remain constant, the rises in the real interest rates are also insignificant. With the long-term real interest rate stable, the rate of growth of real output remains more or less unchanged. Inflation, therefore, remains high not only because expectations do not adjust but also because the reduction in the growth rate of money per se is not able to give rise rapidly to excess supply in the goods and labor markets. Since the short-term nominal interest rate, the short-term expected inflation rate, and the actual inflation rate are not significantly affected, the exchange rate is also stable in both nominal and real terms.

Gradually, of course, the shortage of money will lead to an increase in the long-term real interest rate, the gap between actual and potential GDP will increase, and the rate of inflation will fall. The current account surplus that results from the fall in output and the increase in the short-term real interest rate will also tend to boost the real exchange rate. The process, however, is exceedingly slow. After five years, the quarterly inflation rate in terms of the GDP deflator will have fallen by about 0.5 percentage point, but the additional GDP gap will be 2 percentage points and increasing. What is even worse is that, as is well known, the whole reduction in the inflation rate in the case where expectations do not adjust is due to the output gap. If the output gap were to be closed, the inflation rate would move back to its initial level.

By contrast, in the second policy simulation, in which money growth expectations adjust, both inflation and output fall rapidly. The main reason is that, owing to the anticipated-liquidity-squeeze effect, the nominal long-term interest rate initially goes up, while the expected long-run inflation rate declines sharply. The resulting marked increase in the expected long-run real interest rate causes a decline in output. The increasing output gap reinforces the effect of falling inflationary expectations, leading to the rapid decrease in inflation in terms of the GDP deflator. A secondary reason for this decrease is that the expected short-run real interest rate also goes up as inflation abates and the expected short-run inflation rate falls. This leads to a sharp increase in the exchange rate, in nominal and real terms, that accelerates the decline of the inflation rate in terms of the domestic demand deflator and tends to reduce the improvement in the ratio of the volume of exports to the volume of imports that results from the recession. The role of the exchange rate in the adjustment process, however, is limited in two ways. First, in the present model, the inflation rate in terms of the GDP deflator is not influenced by what happens to import prices, except in exceptional circumstances, such as 1973–75. Second, the foreign trade price elasticity is not large enough to produce a large output effect.

While inflation falls rapidly when expectations adjust, it is clear that the fall in output is not only sharp at the beginning but also persistent. The trough in terms of the GDP gap is reached nearly three years after the beginning of the new policy, at which time the output gap is about 4 percentage points larger than in the control solution. The output gap then starts declining gradually, while the inflation rate remains at its lower level. In cumulative terms, the cost of reducing the annual inflation rate by 1 percentage point amounts to about 4 per cent of a year’s GNP. The long-run effect on foreign trade is also fairly large. The two successive waves of exchange rate appreciation—the first caused by the interest rate effect and the second caused by the current account increase that, in turn, is caused by the short-run J-curve effects and the recession—lead ultimately to a persistent fall in the ratio of the volume of exports to the volume of imports. Since the foreign trade price elasticity is close to unity in the long run, the ultimate deterioration in volume terms approximately matches the improvement in the terms of trade, and the current balance is not much affected.

The two polar cases considered in the preceding paragraphs will rarely be found in the real world. In the first case, it is quite unrealistic to assume that, year after year, private market participants will keep the same expectations despite the developing track record of the monetary authorities. In the second case, it is rather unrealistic, given the fluctuating rate of monetary growth experienced in the past, to assume that private market participants will immediately and fully adjust their expectations to take into account an announced policy change. How close the situation will be to either of the two polar cases cannot easily be determined a priori. What is clear is that, historically, most monetary stabilization programs in the Federal Republic of Germany have had effects that look more like those of the second policy simulation than the first. This would tend to suggest that the main problem is more likely to be that when expectations adjust to a policy change, this policy change has a major and sustained effect on output because of the existence of long-run contractual wage arrangements and the persistence of the output effects resulting from an initial shock.

It may be useful to conclude by considering how the previous results can be changed by a policy of temporarily fixing the exchange rate. To this end, both policy simulations were repeated, but the additional assumption was made that the monetary authorities were able to prevent the exchange rate from being influenced by the change in monetary policy. It was assumed further that they could do this through foreign exchange intervention or the use of controls on capital flows without losing their monetary independence. Such assumptions cannot, of course, be considered valid for more than a limited period, so that the results of the new simulations are useful only to analyze the extent to which a temporary policy of exchange rate rigidity may help or hinder a monetary stabilization program. The results of the new policy simulations are depicted in Chart 2. The main conclusions discussed previously as to the effects of the monetary stabilization program on inflation and output remain basically unchanged. As could be expected, the inflation rate in terms of the domestic demand deflator tends to fall less rapidly when the exchange rate is fixed. Therefore, the real money stock defined by using the domestic demand deflator tends to fall more sharply, pushing up long-run and short-run real interest rates. The magnitude of this effect, however, is small whether inflationary expectations adjust or not; furthermore, its impact on real output is offset by the more favorable growth of foreign trade in volume terms. The inflation rate in terms of the GDP deflator is not affected by the new exchange rate policy either. In brief, stabilizing the exchange rate rather than letting it appreciate in response to the monetary stabilization program has major implications for the foreign trade performance of the country and its terms of trade, but it neither contributes to nor hinders the effects of the monetary stabilization program on real output or on the domestic component of the inflation rate.

Chart 2.
Chart 2.

Federal Republic of Germany: Cumulative Effects of a Reduction in Quarterly Rate of Money Growth of 1 Percentage Point with Constant Exchange Rate

Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1981, 003; 10.5089/9781451972672.024.A003

III. Conclusions

The present study suggests that even if the sudden adoption of a new restrictive monetary policy is successful in changing the money growth and inflationary expectations of private market participants, it is still likely to have a major and persistent negative effect on the level of economic activity. This finding is in contrast to the conclusions reached by the Lucas-Sargent-Wallace-Barro school, but it can hardly be described as new or original. What is more interesting is that, in the present study, the successful impact of the new policy on expectations is seen not only as the necessary condition for its ultimate success in restoring the noninflationary conditions required for sustained economic growth in the long run but also as the major source of recessionary tendencies during the first few years. The marked initial fall in output occurs because of the adjustment in expectations, not in spite of it. A major reason for this effect is the existence of long-term contractual wage arrangements. Even when such contracts tend to cover only a one-year period, as in the Federal Republic of Germany, they may delay wage-price adjustment sufficiently when there is a sudden reduction in the money growth rate to cause a major recession.

As to the role of the exchange rate, the hypothesis that monetary stabilization causes exchange rate overshooting compared with the inflation rate differential is confirmed by the present study in the case where money growth expectations adjust. Quantitatively, however, the implications of the exchange rate overshooting for both output and inflation seem to be minor. This is mainly because import prices per se do not seem to have a major effect on the inflation rate in terms of the GDP deflator unless the variation in import prices is extremely large, as it was in 1973–75. Further, the short-run foreign trade price elasticity is also too low to allow exchange rate movement to have a marked effect on output through its influence on foreign trade. The exchange rate overshooting is nevertheless large and persistent and may, therefore, be a significant source of concern for the national and foreign authorities, if only because it results for a number of years in improved terms of trade for the country that adopts a restrictive monetary policy, while it also leads to a reduction in that country’s market share in volume terms.

The negative effect of a fall in the money growth rate on output and the overshooting effect on the exchange rate can certainly be avoided if private market participants anticipate the reduction in the money growth rate a long time ahead. It is difficult to see, however, how such a result can be obtained. Gradualism may or may not be a solution; it all depends on whether private market participants will be convinced by an announcement that the rate of money growth will be gradually reduced over the next few years. What seems certain is that they are not likely to be convinced by an announcement that the rate of money growth will be sharply reduced starting in a year or two.

APPENDICES

I. Derivation of Exchange Rate Equation

Considering a two-country world with a floating exchange rate, the net external asset position of either of the two countries can be written as

A=θ(Π)=θ(isis*100ESS)(18)

where A denotes the foreign demand for local securities, net of the local demand for foreign securities; IT denotes the additional yield derived from holding local securities rather than foreign securities; is denotes the local short-term interest rate; is* denotes the foreign short-term interest rate; E denotes the spot exchange rate (foreign currency units per units of local currency); and S denotes the expected future value of the spot rate that corresponds to the time horizon of the interest rate.23

The change in A over a finite time period corresponds to the capital flow f in the balance of payments for that period, so that it is possible to write

f=c0+c1(δisδis*+s˙e˙)(19)

where and ė denote the changes in S and E over the period, expressed as first difference of logs, and Δ indicates that a variable is expressed in first-difference form.

The magnitude of c1 is of crucial importance. On the one hand, if the financial assets of the two countries are perfect substitutes, the value of c1 is infinite and equation (19) collapses to the interest-rate-parity equation

e˙=s˙+ΔisΔis*(20)

On the other hand, if c1 has a finite value, equation (19) can be rewritten as

e˙=c0/c11/c1f+(s˙+ΔisΔis*)(21)

Under a floating exchange rate regime without foreign exchange market intervention, the capital balance f has to equal the current balance b and have an opposite sign. Thus, b can be substituted for −f in equation (21), which yields

e˙=c0/c1+1/c1b+(s˙+ΔisΔis*)(22)

In equation (22), the goods markets have a direct impact on the exchange rate in the short run through the evolution of the current balance, while in equation (20), they do not. As was explained in the text, the evidence does not seem to justify the assumption that the elasticity of substitution c1 is infinite; consequently, equation (22) should be preferred to equation (20).

To complete the determination of the exchange rate in equation (22), it is necessary to specify how expectations with respect to the future value of the spot rate are formed. There is obviously no “good way” of doing this. The hypothesis retained here is that private market participants form their exchange rate expectations on the basis of short-run expected relative rates of inflation, expected short-term interest rates (ies and ies*), and the expected current balance (be). The change from the spot rate expected as of period t − 1 for period t to the spot rate expected as of period t for period t + 1 is expressed as24

s˙=(p˙desp˙des*)+c2(ΔiesΔies*)+c3Δbe(23)

The expectations for interest rates and for the current balance can be assumed to follow the simple schemes

iesies*=c4(isis*c5)(24)
be=c6(bc7)(25)

where c5 and c7 denote the long-run normal values of (isis*) and b (assumed here for simplification purposes to be constant), respectively.

Substituting equations (24) and (25) into equation (23) yields

s˙=(p˙desp˙des*)+c2c4(ΔisΔis*)+c3c6Δb(26)

Substituting equation (26) into equation (22) yields

e˙=c0/c1(p˙desp˙des*)+(1+c2c4)(ΔisΔis*)+1/c1b+c3c6Δb(27)

Equation (27) allows for substantial “overshooting,” in particular if the coefficient c2c4, which indicates the expected persistence of the change in the short-term interest rate differential, is large. This equation is used in the present model, with the following changes: (i) the exchange rate and price variables are measured in terms of period averages rather than at the end of periods, so that the variable b has to be replaced by (b + b−1)/2; (ii) the equation is adapted to the case of the bilateral exchange rate between the deutsche mark and the dollar; (iii) the variable b is defined as the import cover ratio (i.e., the ratio of exports of goods and services to imports of goods and services), rather than as the current balance, to avoid long-run scale effects owing to growth in the values of foreign trade flows and the wealth of private market participants; and (iv) a log form is being used for the sake of convenience.

II. Data Sources

Exchange rate data

The exchange rate in terms of U. S. cents per deutsche mark is published in the Fund’s monthly publication, International Financial Statistics, and is a quarterly average of daily data.

Interest rate data

The series on the German short-term interest rate is consists of quarterly averages of daily quotations for the three-month money market rate in Frankfurt. The sources of this series are various issues of the Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank.

The series on the foreign short-term interest rate (is*) consists of a quarterly average of daily data for the three-month deposit rate on Eurodollar deposits in London. The data are taken from various issues of International Financial Statistics.

The long-term German interest rate series (il consists of the yields on outstanding German industrial bonds with maturities of more than four years. These data are quarterly averages of monthly figures and are published in various issues of the Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank.

Monetary base and its foreign assets counterpart

The German monetary base series adjusted for reserve requirements (M) consists of quarterly averages of weekly data and was derived from the monetary statistics published in various issues of Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch, and the Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank.

The foreign component of the monetary base, estimated at a constant exchange rate (R), is defined as Rt = NFAt + ADJt where NFA denotes the net foreign assets of the Bundesbank and ADJt denotes the cumulative changes in valuation owing to exchange rate changes from December 30, 1960.

All the data used for calculating R are taken from the Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank for the years preceding 1979 and from various issues of the Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank for 1979.

Net foreign assets of the Bundesbank (NFA) are calculated by the formula

  • NFAt = MRt + OEAtFDtSDRtEMCFt

where

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National accounts data

Seasonally adjusted quarterly data on the constant-price values of GDP (Y) and government expenditures (G), on the GDP deflator (Pd), on the deflator of total domestic demand (P), on the deflator of imports of goods and services (Pm), on the import cover ratio (B), and on the ratio of the volume of exports to the volume of imports (X) for the Federal Republic of Germany for 1960–79 were obtained from the national account statistics published in various issues of Statistische Beihefte zu den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundesbank, Reihe 4. The data for Y, X, and G for 1951–59 were derived by first seasonally adjusting the quarterly series for the level of industrial production, the volume of imports and exports on a customs basis, and the level of government expenditures (budgetary data) published in various issues of International Financial Statistics. Then, the resulting series were benchmarked on corresponding yearly national account series published in various issues of the Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Quantity series are in billions of 1970 deutsche mark, while deflator series are in index form with base 1970 equal to one.

The series on potential GDP (Y) were derived by fitting log-linear trends through the various cyclical peaks. The peaks are the first quarter of 1961, the first quarter of 1965, the first quarter of 1966, the third quarter of 1969, the fourth quarter of 1970, the first quarter of 1973, and the first quarter of 1980. The peak in the first quarter of 1980 was assumed to be a “weak” peak, with actual GDP reaching only 99 per cent of potential GDP.

The aggregate actual and potential output series for the rest of the industrial world (Y* and Y*) were obtained by weighting country series on manufacturing output for six industrial countries: Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The series on actual output were obtained from the Fund’s Data Bank, while the series on potential output were taken from Jacques R. Artus and Anthony G. Turner, “Measures of Potential Output in Manufacturing for Ten Industrial Countries, 1955–80” (unpublished, International Monetary Fund, May 12, 1978). The weights used to aggregate the series were based on the overall size of exports of the various countries in 1970.

The sources for the GDP deflator (Pd, us) and the import cover ratio (Bus) for the United States are various issues of International Financial Statistics.

Dummy variables z1 and z2

Seven monetary stabilization programs were identified during the period 1955–79 with the following initial impact periods: the second quarter of 1956, the first quarter of 1962, the fourth quarter of 1965, the third quarter of 1972, the first quarter of 1973, the third quarter of 1973, and the third quarter of 1979. The two programs with initial impact in the third quarter of 1972 and the first quarter of 1973 were given an intensity that was one half that of the other programs. Following the rules explained in the text, z1 and z2 were given the values presented in Table 3.

Table 3.

Dummy Variables z1 and z2

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REFERENCES

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*

Mr. Artus, Assistant Director of the Research Department, is a graduate of the Faculty of Law and Economics in Paris and the University of California at Berkeley.

1

The average duration of contractual wage arrangements may obviously be affected by the degree of inflation volatility and the resulting uncertainty as to the future inflation rate. The recent historical evidence tends to indicate, however, that while this average duration differs among countries, it tends to be fairly stable over time as long as runaway inflation is not involved.

2

See, for example, Chan-Lee (1980).

3

It will be shown, in the empirical section of the present paper, that for the Federal Republic of Germany, price expectations series derived from past behavior of actual price series reflect actual series with a mean lag of about three quarters.

4

In the present study, the monetary aggregate considered is always the monetary base, adjusted for changes in reserve requirements. The main reason is that the monetary base, which is more readily controlled by the monetary authorities than other aggregates such as M1 and M2, can more readily be considered as an exogenous variable than the other aggregates. Simultaneity biases are, therefore, decreased. The German authorities have tended in recent years to focus their attention more particularly on “central bank money,” a concept that differs somewhat from base money because it excludes the amount of excess reserves of the banking sector.

5

Most labor contracts in the Federal Republic of Germany, our case study, are for a period of a year and require a few months of negotiations, so that the chosen period seems realistic. Alternative period lengths of one year and two years were not found to lead to any significant changes in the parameter estimates of the model.

6

The word “discretionary” is used here to denote a significant policy change that could not be expected by private market participants on the basis of their observations of how the monetary authorities have normally reacted in the past to various economic developments.

7

In the empirical study, the rate of decay was chosen to be consistent with the estimates of the values of the lag coefficients of the variables -j in equation (1′).

8

To the extent that foreign exchange interventions have unwanted monetary effects, it could be argued that the lagged money growth rates included on the right-hand side of equations (1′) and (1) should be “cleaned” from the unwanted monetary effects of foreign exchange interventions—that is, the term -j should be replaced by the term ( − α4 )-j. The parameters of equation (1′) would then have to be estimated using nonlinear estimation methods. In the empirical work, however, the two specifications were found to lead to similar results, so that the simpler form was kept.

9

Barro (1978) and Barro and Rush (1980) employ a monetary equation that includes as regressors lagged values of money growth, current real federal spending relative to “normal” (generated as a distributed lag of past values) spending, and lagged unemployment rates. Sheffrin (1978) uses a monetary equation that includes only lagged values of money growth. All these studies have the disadvantage of identifying “unanticipated money growth” with the statistical error term in the money growth equation. As shown by Germany and Srivastava (1979) and Buiter (1980), this procedure makes it practically impossible to isolate the effects of anticipated growth from those of unanticipated growth by use of econometric methods.

10

A proxy variable for the one-quarter-ahead inflationary expectations for the deflator of GDP in the United States is derived in the same way. This exogenous variable enters the exchange rate equation (12).

11

As Barro ((1980), pp. 10–11) notes, the view that unanticipated shocks are serially uncorrelated random disturbances that affect quarterly, or other similarly short, time periods does not imply that the resulting output variations should have an equally short duration. The monetary shock only provides an impulse for output variations; once output starts to change, various propagation mechanisms may enter into play and prolong the output variation even after the initial source of variation has long since disappeared. What Barro does not explain satisfactorily, however, is how a one-quarter change in money that is unexpected could, by itself, constitute such an important source of output variation in the first place. In the present model, by contrast, a change in monetary policy will lead to a whole series of deviations between the actual money growth rates of post-policy-change periods and the money growth rates that had been anticipated to prevail during these periods when current contracts were negotiated.

12

Neglecting the last two terms, the inverted demand-for-money equation can be written as

il=a0a1[(mp)(mp)]+a2y+p˙el,witha1anda2>0(15)

Defining the long-run equilibrium value of the real money stock, (mp) , as

(mp)=a3+a4ya5p˙el,witha4anda3>0(16)

and substituting equation (16) into (15) yields

il=a0+a1a3a1(mp)+(a2+a1a4)y+(1a1a5)p˙el(17)

The coefficient of el is negative if a1a5 > 1.

13

No account is taken in the present model of the effect of a fall in investment on the rate of growth of potential output. For the methodology used to calculate potential output, see Appendix II.

14

A major advantage of this approach is that it does not rest on the interest-rate-parity theory that follows from the assumption of perfect substitution between domestic and foreign securities as does, for example, the monetary approach developed by Frenkel (1976) and Bilson (1978). (See the discussion in Appendix I.) Such an assumption does not seem to be warranted. The extremely high share of domestic financial assets in the financial asset portfolios of domestic residents that can be observed in most industrial countries, in particular, is hard to reconcile with the hypothesis that market participants view domestic and foreign financial assets as involving the same degree of risk, or do not give any weight to risk considerations in their investment decisions, or consider that foreign country risks can be diversified away through investment in a multiplicity of foreign countries. For other exchange rate models that do not rest on the perfect substitution assumption, see Kouri (1976) and Branson (1977).

15

As explained in Appendix I, the exchange rate equation employed here does not take into account the existence of foreign exchange market intervention. Initially, an attempt was made to take the amount of intervention into account by using the change in the net-foreign-assets component of base money as a proxy for intervention and subtracting this change from the corresponding current account variable in the fourth term of equation (11) (but not in the fifth term, where the expected future value of intervention, assumed here to be zero, would enter). A policy reaction function was then specified for intervention for each of the two countries considered, so as to reduce simultaneous estimation biases. The standard error of the regression was significantly increased, however, as a result of the introduction of the intervention variable in the exchange rate equation. A likely explanation is that the data on the net-foreign-assets component of base money do not provide a good proxy for intervention. When the actual data on intervention for the Federal Republic of Germany were used in Artus (1976), intervention was found to play a significant role. Such data are confidential, however, and could not be obtained for the post-1976 period.

16

The same method was used to derive values for the short-run expected inflation rate for U. S. goods, which enters the present model as an exogenous variable in the exchange rate equation (11).

17

The deutsche mark started to float in February 1973, but most capital controls were not removed before the fourth quarter of 1973.

18

It is, of course, possible to argue that in both 1968–71 and 1973–75 private market participants were led to expect a sharp monetary expansion because of certain factors that are not picked up by the present model. In 1973–75, it is plausible to assume that private market participants expected that the authorities would ultimately accommodate higher oil prices by allowing an increase in the money stock. In 1968–71, however, no obvious reason for assuming that an upward shift in money growth expectations preceded the wage explosion comes to mind.

19

The inflationary expectations derived from equation (2) seem to be “efficient,” in the sense that the forecast errors are uncorrelated to any of the independent variables.

20

The standard error of the estimate is indicated in parentheses.

21

The sensitivity of the exchange rate to variations in the interest rate and to the level of the current balance is found to be significantly less in the present study than in Artus (1976). This latter study led to the conclusion that a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate in favor of Frankfurt (at a quarterly rate) would rapidly lead to a 13.6 per cent increase in the value of the deutsche mark in terms of U. S. dollars, while a fall of 0.65 per cent in the value of the deutsche mark would be needed to give investors the incentive to buy an additional DM 0.4 billion worth of German financial assets. The 1976 study was in terms of monthly rather than quarterly data, and the specification was somewhat different since, in particular, no account was taken of the U.S. current balance. On the whole, however, the short period considered in the 1976 study—namely, March 1973 to July 1975—seems to have been the main reason for the difference in results.

22

The present simulations assume that the deutsche mark is left to float freely against all currencies. When account is taken of the EMS arrangements, the results remain broadly unchanged, except that the improvement in the Federal Republic of Germany’s terms of trade and its losses in foreign market shares in volume terms are substantially reduced.

23

A more complicated analysis would involve the introduction of the whole maturity spectrum for interest rates and expected future spot rates in equation (18). Wealth effects are also neglected in the present formulation.

24

See the work of Dornbusch (1980) on the respective roles of anticipated and unanticipated changes in the current balance.

IMF Staff papers: Volume 28 No. 3
Author: International Monetary Fund. Research Dept.
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    Federal Republic of Germany: Cumulative Effects of a Reduction in Quarterly Rate of Money Growth of 1 Percentage Point with Floating Exchange Rate1

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    Federal Republic of Germany: Cumulative Effects of a Reduction in Quarterly Rate of Money Growth of 1 Percentage Point with Constant Exchange Rate