THIS PAPER summarizes statistics of over-all balance of payments surpluses and deficits for the period 1947–58, for all the countries for which such data are available at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The purpose is to provide (1) a statistical reconciliation of surpluses and deficits, and (2) some measure of the degree of total imbalance in world payments (hereafter referred to as world imbalance) during each year.

Abstract

THIS PAPER summarizes statistics of over-all balance of payments surpluses and deficits for the period 1947–58, for all the countries for which such data are available at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The purpose is to provide (1) a statistical reconciliation of surpluses and deficits, and (2) some measure of the degree of total imbalance in world payments (hereafter referred to as world imbalance) during each year.

THIS PAPER summarizes statistics of over-all balance of payments surpluses and deficits for the period 1947–58, for all the countries for which such data are available at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The purpose is to provide (1) a statistical reconciliation of surpluses and deficits, and (2) some measure of the degree of total imbalance in world payments (hereafter referred to as world imbalance) during each year.

Although it is commonly assumed that an over-all deficit in a country’s balance of payments must have a counterpart in balance of payments surpluses elsewhere, there is, as has been argued elsewhere,1 no necessary symmetry between surpluses and deficits.2 However, if the measure of surplus or deficit is confined to movements in official reserves (including changes in foreign official reserves in a country, in IMF positions, and, for the period of its operation, in accounts with the European Payments Union), surpluses and deficits will be defined symmetrically, except for the amount of gold that is added to world monetary gold holdings. When measured in this way, total surpluses of all surplus countries should, in principle, exceed total deficits of all deficit countries by that amount. Total surpluses and deficits so defined are compared in Table 1 with the annual increases in world monetary gold holdings. The last line (entitled “statistical discrepancy”) in the table indicates the residual error, which is comparatively small in most years.

Table 1.

All Countries: Reserve Movements, 1947–581

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

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No sign indicates credit; minus sign indicates debit. The data cover changes in official gold and foreign exchange reserves, payments and clearing agreements balances, EPU credit and debit balances, net IMF positions, and liquid liabilities to foreign official holders.

For countries included in this group, see Table 5 (p. 365).

Total surpluses and total deficits have been derived from the detailed figures shown in this table in billions of dollars. Net totals have been derived from figures in millions of dollars; therefore, the sums of total surpluses and deficits may not equal the net totals shown.

See page 351.

For the period covered by this study, reserve movements, even when given the wide definition employed here, do not appear to provide the best measure of payments imbalance, either for individual countries or for all countries taken together. During this period, and particularly during the early years, many countries received grants, loans, or similar financing to meet deficits in their balances of payments (hereafter referred to as extraordinary financing); unless such financing is included in the measures of balance of payments surpluses and deficits, the statistics will not provide an indication of the progressive easing of the international payments situation which is generally agreed to have taken place, and which is evidenced by a gradual reduction in restrictions on international payments and by the eventual introduction of convertibility by a number of countries. Such financing must be included at least in the measures of surplus and deficit of the countries receiving it. However, whether it should be similarly included for the countries extending it is debatable; the policy problems on the two sides are not necessarily symmetrical. For instance, Country A may be called upon to help to finance the balance of payments deficit of Country B even though Country A itself is in deficit. In that event, the financing of Country B’s deficit adds to Country A’s balance of payments problem and cannot be considered to represent financing of a surplus from the standpoint of that country. In the present paper, this problem has been somewhat arbitrarily resolved by (1) disregarding extraordinary financing extended by countries other than the United States, and (2) omitting the United States altogether from the deficit tables on the grounds that the U.S. deficits did not involve, in general, any international payments problem during the period covered by this study. The deficits were financed primarily by foreign monetary authorities who were accumulating dollar balances as reserves, and the United States was quite prepared to lose the small amount of gold that flowed abroad from its ample reserve holdings. Indeed, it welcomed the strengthening of the reserve position of the rest of the world. Its postwar policies had been directed toward that outcome.

In the light of these considerations, the measure of world imbalance employed in this paper is defined as the sum of the deficits of all deficit countries other than the United States, measured by reserve movements (as in Table 1), plus extraordinary financing received. This indicator is shown in Chart 1 and in the last line but one of Table 2.

Chart 1.
Chart 1.

Suggested Measure of Imbalance in World Payments, 1947–581

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1962, 003; 10.5089/9781451968873.024.A003

1 Defined as the sum of the balance of payments deficits of all deficit countries, excluding the United States; see text, pages 346 and 351.
Table 2.

Surplus and Deficit Countries, Excluding United States: Reserve Movements and Extraordinary Financing Received, 1947–581

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

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No sign indicates credit; minus sign indicates debit. For the definition of reserve movements, see Table 1, footnote 1. For definition of extraordinary financing, see Part III of text (p. 354).

For countries included in this group, see Table 5 (p. 365).

Total surpluses and total deficits have been derived from the detailed figures shown in this table in billions of dollars. Net totals have been derived from figures in millions of dollars; therefore, the sums of total surpluses and deficits may not equal the net totals shown.

See page 351.

Like any index, a measure of world imbalance cannot be a fully rational number. First, a world total of balance of payments deficits must give equal weight to each movement of the same magnitude even though a loss of reserves of a certain size is much more uncomfortable for a country with small reserves than it is for one with large reserves. Second, for any given country, losses of the same amount become progressively harder to take as its reserves shrink from month to month and year to year. Finally, the adequacy of reserves may be greatly altered by shifts in a country’s world position and by shifts in public confidence. Losses that could be looked upon with equanimity if the underlying position were absolutely sound, might under different circumstances be alarming. Yet the index would register both situations in the same way. Aside from these more fundamental considerations, it is, of course, unavoidable that the elements entering the actual calculation of the index must, to some extent, be delimited arbitrarily.

The index adopted in Table 2 is admittedly not satisfactory for 1958 and would not be at all suitable for the years since then. The main reason is that in this recent period the balance of payments problem of the United States can no longer be disregarded in a measure of world imbalance. Moreover, volatile private capital has recently played a far greater role than ever before in balance of payments developments. At times, these flows are equilibrating; at other times, disequilibrating. Since inflows and outflows of such capital may lead to balance over a few years, consideration must be given to whether, in the analysis of balance of payments developments in recent years, the concept of over-all balance should be supplemented by a concept of basic balance which includes these volatile capital flows below the line. In addition to these conceptual problems, the statistical problems of reconciling surpluses and deficits have recently become more complex. In particular, it has become difficult to reconcile reserve movements separately, apart from changes in commercial bank assets and liabilities, because it has become customary for some countries to hold part of their reserves, not directly in the reserve centers, but through commercial banks in other countries, e.g., in the form of Euro-dollars. For all these reasons, it has been considered desirable to confine the present paper to the period 1947–58 and to make developments after 1958 the subject of a later study.

I. Coverage of Tables

The tables in this paper cover all the countries for which balance of payments data are available in the Fund’s Balance of Payments Yearbooks. While the number of countries that are included increased slowly throughout the period 1947–58, the countries for which data became available as the period progressed are, in general, relatively small; the data are thus reasonably comparable from year to year. Differences in coverage are believed to affect to only a minor degree the reconciliation of surpluses and deficits in Table 1; they do, however, tend to increase gradually the amplitude of the movements in total surpluses and deficits over the period. Table 2 and Chart 1 thus tend to understate the progress toward greater balance in international payments that took place during the period.

Since the balance of payments experience of the industrial countries is quite different from that of the primary producing countries, the tables distinguish these two classifications. The distinction is based on whether manufactured goods or primary products are predominant in the exports of the countries concerned. Within the primary producing countries, two groups are distinguished. The first (Group A) covers certain countries that have reached a degree of economic and financial development that makes them, in several respects, similar to the industrial countries. In general, the countries in this group have a much easier access to foreign capital markets and possess more adequate gold and foreign exchange reserves than do the other primary producing countries (Group B). The balance of payments problems of the two types of primary producing countries are, therefore, sufficiently dissimilar to justify this separation into two groups. However, the distinction between them, like that between industrial and nonindustrial countries, is, of course, by no means clear cut. The countries allocated to each group are shown in Table 5 (p. 365).

II. Reserve Movements

In Table 1, surplus or deficit is measured by “reserve movements.” This term includes the change in (1) a country’s monetary gold holdings, (2) its official foreign exchange reserves, (3) its payments and clearing agreements’ debit or credit balances, (4) its net position vis-à-vis the Fund, (5) its debit and credit balances with the European Payments Union (EPU), and (6) its liquid liabilities to foreign monetary authorities. In principle, the total of these items should equal the change in world monetary gold holdings, including those of the Fund. However, because of errors and omissions in the statistical data, the reconciliation of total surpluses and deficits with the change in monetary gold holdings shows a residual error, which is entered in the last line (“statistical discrepancy”) of Table 1.

When the data on items (2), (3), and (6) are combined for all countries, they should add to zero. In principle, they cover the same claims viewed as assets and as liabilities. The liabilities comprise those to countries only, and exclude those to international organizations. (The data for the United States, however, include liabilities to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the EPU, since U.S. statistics do not separate these from liabilities to countries.) A small discrepancy arises in the years 1947–50, because the changes in sterling liabilities in that period cover those to private as well as to official holders, separate data for the latter not being available.

While it can readily be seen that these items are largely offsetting in the calculation of aggregate surpluses and deficits, it is more difficult to see to what extent the other items are symmetrically recorded. Some of the technical problems involved are discussed below.

Changes in gold holdings

The data on gold holdings included in reserve movements cover changes in the official gold holdings of the countries covered. The increase in world monetary gold holdings that is entered in Table 1 to reconcile total surpluses with total deficits includes also the change in gold holdings of international organizations and in those of countries outside the Soviet area for which gold holdings are reported in the Fund’s publication, International Financial Statistics, but which are not covered by the tables in this paper. The increase in world gold holdings so defined arises from (1) net sales by countries in the Soviet area and (2) gold production, less gold used in industry or hoarded in the rest of the world. In the balance of payments statistics for the countries covered by the tables, the first component is likely to have a counterpart in a surplus above the line, arising from the transactions of these countries with the Soviet area. The second component gives rise to a net credit in the entries for nonmonetary gold in the goods and services account of the balances of payments of the countries concerned. Since the tables cover the major gold-producing countries, most of this net credit should be included above the line in the underlying statistics. The entries for these two components above the line must have a counterpart below the line and their total is likely to be close to the increase in world monetary gold holdings; the latter must, therefore, be entered to reconcile surpluses and deficits below the line with one another, although this involves a small error. The special problems of symmetrical recording that arise from transactions in gold with international organizations are discussed in the next section.

Transactions with international organizations

Changes in countries’ monetary gold holdings that arise from transactions with the International Monetary Fund (e.g., subscriptions and repayments in gold) are almost entirely offset by corresponding changes in the IMF position of the countries concerned, which are also included in the calculation of surplus or deficit. Exchange transactions with the Fund are similarly reflected in offsetting changes in countries’ IMF positions, on the one hand, and in their foreign exchange holdings or liabilities to foreign monetary authorities, on the other. In general, therefore, transactions with the Fund are reflected in two offsetting entries within “reserve movements” and do not create any disparity between total surpluses and deficits. The only exception is that the net total of Fund income and administrative expenditure tends to create a small net surplus or deficit for all Fund members taken together.

Transactions with the EPU are, for the most part, neutralized in the calculation of surpluses and deficits in much the same way as transactions with the IMF. However, changes in the net assets held by the EPU itself resulted not only (as do transactions with the IMF) from the balance of income and expenditure, but also from subscriptions to its capital. These changes in net assets held by the EPU, which were mainly reflected in its gold and dollar holdings rather than in its positions vis-à-vis member countries, are not allowed for in the table. A discrepancy may arise, therefore, from changes in the gold holdings of the EPU. Changes in the dollar holdings of the EPU may result in a similar error in the reconciliation in Table 1, because the corresponding change in U.S. liabilities is included in reserve movements, i.e., in the measure of the U.S. surplus or deficit, but may have no counterpart in a surplus or deficit elsewhere, since the EPU is not treated as a country. Transactions between countries and the BIS may also give rise to a discrepancy between surpluses and deficits if some of these transactions (e.g., government borrowing from the BIS) are included above the line, and other transactions (e.g., gold sales to it) are included below the line in the statistics for the countries concerned.

International nonmonetary organizations—the most important in this context being the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)—could in principle be treated in either of two ways. First, they could be treated like countries, and a surplus or deficit could be included for them for purposes of reconciliation in Table 1. Second, transactions with them in all categories could be treated as contributing to a corresponding surplus or deficit above the line for the countries conducting the transactions. Since the net transactions of these international organizations are almost zero, their effect on the total net surplus of all countries could be neutralized by entering them exclusively above the line, in the same way that the effect of transactions with the IMF is neutralized by entering them exclusively below the line. Only when some transactions with the international organizations are entered above the line and some below the line is it necessary to enter a surplus or deficit for international organizations in a reconciliation of surpluses or deficits.

For the purpose of measuring reserve movements, the only significant classification problem arises in connection with the treatment of the dollar assets of the IBRD. In the course of its operations, mainly in recent years, the IBRD has accumulated more than $1 billion of liquid assets in the United States. The size of these holdings is determined by its loan commitments, and changes in them have been more similar to movements of long-term capital than to those in the dollar reserves of foreign countries. The liquid assets held by other international monetary organizations during 1947–58 have generally been in the nature of working balances. For these reasons, changes in liabilities to international nonmonetary organizations have been excluded, in this paper, from reserve movements.

III. Extraordinary Financing

Extraordinary financing is defined as financing (other than reserve movements) in response to a deficit in the balance of payments of the country receiving the assistance. It comprises, for the most part, official financing, but it also includes some private financing related to official action. In Table 2, extraordinary financing received has been added to reserve movements in calculating surpluses and deficits.

The border line between extraordinary financing and financing of an ordinary character (i.e., financing that is not in response to a deficit in the balance of payments) is admittedly difficult to draw. In a paper covering 50–75 countries for as many as 12 years, it is not possible to examine each transaction and its background carefully. The border line must necessarily be drawn grosso modo. But the arbitrariness involved is not too disturbing, because this paper does not focus on developments in individual countries but reviews broad developments in the world as a whole or in groups of countries.

A rule of thumb applied in order to distinguish extraordinary financing is that it must be of a temporary character. For this reason, aid to developing countries, which has generally tended to increase rather than decrease, has been classified as “ordinary” financing in the absence of clear evidence that it was extended to meet a crisis in the balance of payments of the recipient country. On the other hand, most of the aid extended by the United States to the European countries during the immediate postwar period was essentially of a temporary character,3 the recipients of the aid being expected to adjust their economies gradually so as to be able to do without the aid in a relatively short period. In general, such aid has been classified here as extraordinary financing. As a rule, this classification has been applied to transactions that were entered as compensatory official financing in the early Balance of Payments Yearbooks of the IMF. An exception has been made, however, for the aid received by Greece and Turkey which was classified in the Yearbooks as compensatory official financing, since these two countries appear to have had more deepseated balance of payments problems than could be solved by aid over a relatively short period. They have continued to receive aid since the end of the period of reconstruction in Western Europe.

A special type of extraordinary financing is the accumulation of arrears of payments for imports or for other transactions, resulting from a failure of the monetary authorities to provide foreign exchange, followed by a consolidation or payment of the arrears through official action. The accumulation and payment of such arrears have been classified as extraordinary financing below the line.

In recent years, nonreserve-type financing in response to balance of payments pressures has been rather unusual, and the distinction between such financing and ordinary flows of capital and aid is less difficult to draw than it was in the first few years after World War II. Some of the clearest examples of extraordinary financing are the foreign credits negotiated by countries in connection with stabilization programs, as part of package deals under which the Fund has provided financing jointly with other financial institutions or governments. In such instances, the financing made available to the deficit countries by the other parties seems to be essentially of the same character as that provided by the Fund; it is classified here as extraordinary financing.

IV. Special Problems in Defining Surplus or Deficit for Reserve Centers

When defining surplus or deficit in the balance of payments, there are some problems that apply especially to the reserve centers. Because the measure of world imbalance suggested in this paper excludes a deficit for the United States, a major part of these problems has been eliminated. However, they do arise in respect of the data for the United Kingdom. They relate to the change in the liquid liabilities of the reserve centers to foreigners and have been more extensively discussed elsewhere.4 We shall consider here only the problem of whether the change in U.K. sterling liabilities belongs below the line.

For two of the years covered by this study, 1952 and 1957, the measure of surplus or deficit employed in compiling the data for Table 2 results in a small surplus for the United Kingdom, despite the fact that sterling was undoubtedly under pressure. In both years, the U.K. current surplus exceeded the net outflow of capital (other than changes in foreign-held sterling reserves and extraordinary financing received). However, net withdrawals of sterling reserves led to substantial reductions in U.K. reserves. In 1957, in addition, to meet the sterling crisis, the United Kingdom negotiated a postponement of interest and amortization payments on the postwar loans from the United States and Canada, and obtained from the Export-Import Bank of Washington a new line of credit of $500 million; however, a subsequent improvement in the balance of payments made it unnecessary to draw more than one half of this credit. In constructing an index of imbalance in world payments, it is difficult to justify treating the United Kingdom as being in surplus in these years. The reduction in the sterling holdings of the countries concerned, however, is allowed for in the figures for surpluses or deficits of these countries, and it could be argued that to include the same reduction in sterling balances above the line in the balance of payments of the United Kingdom would imply a duplication in the calculation of deficits. Such a treatment could be justified, perhaps, by the fact that both the United Kingdom and the country holding the sterling might be forced to introduce measures to adjust their balances of payments (although measures introduced by the latter country might also help to ease pressures on the balance of payments of the United Kingdom).

These questions are further complicated by the fact that some withdrawals of sterling have a counterpart in U.K. exports, and others in a conversion into other currencies. Similar problems arise with respect to increases in sterling balances. In spite of these difficulties, the same measure of surplus and deficit is applied in Table 2 to the United Kingdom and to other countries. However, in Table 3 (discussed in the next section), which shows the type of financing by which the deficits that make up the measure of world imbalance were covered, the financing of the 1952 and 1957 “surpluses” of the United Kingdom has been included in the various categories of financing.5 This modification is significant, because analysis by type of financing of the deficits in Table 3 is in itself a more articulate expression of the imbalance in world payments than a single figure can be.

Table 3.

Deficit Countries, Excluding United States: Origin and Financing of Balance of Payments Deficits, 1947–581

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

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No sign indicates credit; minus sign indicates debit. For definition of extraordinary financing, see Part III of text (p. 354). The item “other noncompensatory transactions” is a residual covering movements of capital and central government transfer payments other than extraordinary financing and reserve movements.

Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

See page 351.

V. World Imbalance

In the introductory paragraphs of this paper it has been suggested that the total deficit of all deficit countries, excluding the United States, measured by extraordinary financing received as well as by reserve movements, is perhaps the most suitable measure of total imbalance in world payments for the period 1947–58. World imbalance so defined and two of its components—the aggregate deficit of the industrial countries other than the United States, and that of the primary producing countries—are shown in Chart 1. In reading the chart, one should keep in mind that the statistical series underlying the construction of these measures have gradually become more complete and that the values for the earlier years are, therefore, likely to be somewhat understated in relation to those for later years. While Chart 1 shows that by 1958 considerable progress toward greater balance in international transactions had been made, it is apparent that the primary producing countries had no share in this progress. The differences in the experience of the industrial and the primary producing countries are even more striking when the surpluses of countries within each group are netted against the deficits, as is done in Chart 2. In this chart, as in Chart 1, the data for industrial countries exclude the United States.

Chart 2.
Chart 2.

Industrial and Primary Producing Countries: Net Surpluses (—) and Deficits in Their Balance of Payments1

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1962, 003; 10.5089/9781451968873.024.A003

1 Industrial countries exclude the United States. Based on data in Table 2.

The total imbalance in world payments so defined was greater in 1947 than in any other year covered by the study (and presumably greater than in any other year in history). The imbalance was reduced considerably in the following three years. In 1949, however, the degree of imbalance was still considerable; it exceeded that in 1957, when the data show the greatest imbalance for any year in the late 1950’s. In 1950, the imbalance was temporarily reduced as a result of the rise in the expenditures abroad by the United States that was related, directly and indirectly, to the Korean war; but it was increased again during the later phase of the Korean cycle, when many countries drew down their gold and foreign exchange reserves in a lagged response to the increase in the supply of U.S. dollars.

During 1951–52, some progress was made toward greater balance in world payments, although the imbalance in primary producing countries increased. The following two years, however, brought a high degree of stability in the international payments of both industrial and primary producing countries; in the latter, the comparative stability continued through 1956. From 1954 onward, there was again a rise in the total imbalance until a peak was reached in 1957.6 The rise began in the industrial countries; but in contrast to the early postwar period, the imbalance was not widespread but was confined to relatively few countries, mainly the United Kingdom (1955, 1956, and 1957),7 France (1956 and 1957), and Japan (1957). The rise was brought about by several circumstances that were not too clearly related, such as a high degree of credit expansion in France and Japan, the Suez crisis and the subsequent closing of the Suez Canal, and, for the primary producing countries, a fall in raw material prices after 1956. The reduction in the imbalance from 1957 to 1958 represents mainly the elimination of the deficit of Japan and a sharp reduction in that of France. The reduction in the aggregate deficit of countries other than the United States was offset by the emergence of a large U.S. balance of payments deficit, and, as noted above, the total deficit shown for 1958 is not an adequate measure of world imbalance for that year.

The financing, by type, of the deficits of countries other than the United States which are included in our measure of world imbalance is shown in Table 3 and Chart 3. The table and the chart include data on the financing of the over-all balance of the United Kingdom for 1952 and 1957, years when the U.K. balance of payments showed small surpluses as defined here but when sterling was under pressure, in part because of large withdrawals of sterling balances.8

Chart 3.
Chart 3.

Deficit Countries Excluding the United States: Financing of Balance of Payments Deficits1

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

Citation: IMF Staff Papers 1962, 003; 10.5089/9781451968873.024.A003

1 Based on data in Table 3.

Extraordinary financing was the most important type of financing of balance of payments deficits during the years 1947–50 (and again in 1952 when the aggregate deficit was much smaller), but it has played a much less significant role in recent years. Despite the very large amounts of extraordinary financing available, the reduction in the combined reserves of the deficit countries was larger both in 1947 and in 1948 than in any subsequent year. However, the use of reserves has gradually become the most important source of financing balance of payments deficits. Use of Fund resources did not become a substantial source of deficit financing until 1956; during the years 1950–55 it was overshadowed by financing through the EPU. The change in IMF positions, like the other types of financing shown in Table 3, covers only net financing of those countries which were in over-all deficit during a whole calendar year, and does not include use of Fund resources by countries which may have been in deficit for part of a calendar year. The net figure is the balance of drawings, on the one hand, and subscriptions and repayments, on the other; it does not include the financial support given by the Fund to countries in the form of stand-by arrangements. It should not, therefore, be regarded as a full expression of the contribution by the Fund to the easing of balance of payments pressures. Table 4 compares total drawings on the Fund with the net changes in IMF positions that are shown in Table 3 and also shows data on the amounts available under stand-by arrangements at the end of each calendar year.

Table 4.

Use of Resources of International Monetary Fund, 1947–58

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

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The figures shown in this line may differ slightly from those shown in Table 3 because of the necessary rounding in that table; also, they differ slightly from the totals of lines 2–4 in this table because of other transactions and rounding.

The period for which a stand-by arrangement has been agreed may exceed one year. On the other hand, a stand-by arrangement may be agreed for a period of less than one year or it may be canceled during the year in which it was arranged. The end-of-year figures therefore do not provide a fully accurate indication of the financial support extended by the Fund in the form of stand-by arrangements.

In principle, these figures represent the total of lines I.4, II, and III. However, details may not add to totals because of rounding.

In Table 3, the transactions contributing to the deficits are divided into two groups in order to relate, in the broadest terms, the deficits to the transactions above the line. As a generalization, the over-all deficit of the industrial countries is usually larger, and that of the primary producing countries smaller, than the deficit on goods and services account. For the industrial countries, a major part of the differences between the balance on goods and services account and the over-all balance is accounted for by an export of capital by the United Kingdom. For the primary producing countries, the differences are accounted for by inflows of capital and, particularly in later periods, of economic aid. In reading Table 3, it should be borne in mind that its coverage differs from year to year, since for each year it covers only those countries that were in over-all deficit in that particular year. Considerable variations from year to year in the goods and services deficits and in those arising from other noncompensatory transactions may have resulted from changing coverage rather than from any fundamental change in the pattern of international transactions.

Table 5.

Countries Included in “Other” Groups in Tables 1 and 2

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