Abstract
POLICY REFORM PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE THE FUND’S CAPACITY TO SUPPORT COUNTRIES UNDERTAKING DEBT RESTRUCTURING—SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Title page
POLICY REFORM PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE THE FUND’S CAPACITY TO SUPPORT COUNTRIES UNDERTAKING DEBT RESTRUCTURING—SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
April 5, 2024
Approved By
Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Rhoda Weeks-Brown and Bernard Lauwers
Prepared by inter-departmental team led by Marcos Chamon (SPR), Wolfgang Bergthaler (LEG) and David Moore and Nelson Sobrinho (FIN lead) and consisting of Atif Chaudry and Karim Foda (SPR); Julianne Ams and Chanda De Long (LEG); Dan Nyberg and Beata Jajko (FIN) under the overall guidance of Mark Flanagan (SPR), Yan Liu (LEG) and Papa N'Diaye (FIN). Administrative assistance was provided by Eiman Afshar and Claudia Isern.
Contents
INTRODUCTION
ANNEXES
I. Consolidated Draft Executive Board Understanding of the Fund's Policies with Respect to Arrears and Financing Assurances in Debt Restructuring Cases
II. Comparison of Draft Executive Board Understanding Against Current Policies
Introduction
1. For illustrative purposes, if all of staff’s proposals contained in the main paper (Policy Reform Proposals to Promote the Fund’s Capacity to Support Countries Undertaking Debt Restructurings) are endorsed by the Executive Board, staff attaches to this supplement a clean (Annex 1) and redlined (Annex 2) version of the consolidated draft Executive Board understandings of the Fund’s policies on arrears and financing assurances in debt restructuring cases. The redlined version shows the differences of the proposals versus current Fund policies. The benefit for Executive Directors of this approach is that Annexes 1 and 2 consolidate current Fund policies with proposed revisions to enable a comprehensive view of the amended Fund’s sovereign arrears policies. In line with the approach taken during the 2022 Review of the Fund’s Sovereign Arrears Policies and Perimeter, after the Executive Board meeting and dependent on the outcome of the Executive Board considerations of staff’s proposals, staff will revise Annexes 1 and 2 and reissue them to the Executive Board prior to publication.
Annex I. Consolidated Draft Executive Board Understanding of the Fund's Policies with Respect to Arrears and Financing Assurances in Debt Restructuring Cases
Lending Into Arrears (LIA) Policy
1. Directors concurred that the Fund's policy on lending into arrears to private creditors continues to provide a useful tool enabling the Fund to support a member's adjustment efforts before the member has reached agreement with its private creditors on a debt restructuring. Specifically, Directors agreed that Fund lending into sovereign arrears to private creditors should continue to be on a case-by-case basis and only where:
(i) prompt Fund support is considered essential for the successful implementation of the member's adjustment program; and
(ii) the member is pursuing appropriate policies and is making a good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors.
2. Directors also agreed that Fund lending into non-sovereign arrears stemming from the imposition of exchange controls should continue to be on a case-by-case basis and only where:
(i) prompt Fund support is considered essential for the successful implementation of the member's adjustment program; and
(ii) the member is pursuing appropriate policies, the member is making a good faith effort to facilitate a collaborative agreement between private debtors and their creditors, and a good prospect exists for the removal of exchange controls.
3. With respect to lending into sovereign arrears to private creditors, Directors agreed that greater clarity about the good faith dialogue between a debtor and its creditors during the restructuring process and enhanced debt transparency could help provide better guidance about the application of the Fund's LIA policy and, more generally, promote a better framework for the engagement of debtors and creditors in the restructuring of sovereign debt. Greater clarity concerning the framework for possible debt restructuring would strengthen the capacity of investors to assess recovery values under alternative scenarios, thereby facilitating the pricing of risk and improving the functioning of the capital markets. At the same time, however, Directors stressed the need for continued flexibility in applying the "good faith” criterion to accommodate the characteristics of each specific case to avoid putting debtors at a disadvantage in the negotiations with creditors; and to avoid prolonged negotiations that could hamper the ability of the Fund to provide timely assistance. Indeed, any clarification of the "good faith” criterion should serve primarily to support the difficult judgments that will continue to have to be made in each case, and should be made operational in a manner that does not impair market discipline.
4. Directors considered that the following principles would strike an appropriate balance between clarity and flexibility in guiding the dialogue between debtors and their private external creditors.
First, when a member has reached a judgment that a restructuring of its debt is necessary, it should engage in an early dialogue with its creditors, which should continue until the restructuring is complete.
Second, the member should share relevant information with all creditors on a timely basis, which would generally be aligned with what the member would be required to share under the Debt Limits Policy and normally include:
an explanation of the economic problems and financial circumstances that justify a debt restructuring;
a briefing on the broad outlines of a viable economic program to address the underlying problems and its implications on the broad financial parameters shaping the envelope of resources available for restructured claims; and
the provision of a comprehensive picture of the outstanding debt stock and its terms, and the proposed treatment of all claims on the sovereign, including those of official bilateral creditors; the perimeter of claims subject to the envisaged debt restructuring; and the elaboration of the basis on which the debt restructuring would restore mediumterm debt sustainability, bearing in mind that not all categories of claims may need to be restructured.
Third, the member should provide creditors with an early opportunity to give input on the design of restructuring strategies and the design of individual instruments.
Fourth, any terms offered to the creditors by the member should be consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported program.
5. Although, as a general premise, the form of the dialogue would continue to be left to the debtor and its creditors, under this approach a member in arrears would be expected to initiate a dialogue with its creditors consistent with the principles discussed above. In cases in which creditors have been able to form a representative committee on a timely basis, there would be an expectation that the member would enter into good faith negotiations with this committee, though the unique characteristics of each case would also be considered.
6. Directors stressed that, in going forward with the suggested approach, it would be crucial to strike the appropriate balance between the need to promote effective communication between a debtor and its creditors, and the need to retain flexibility to address the diversity of individual member circumstances.
7. Directors emphasized that in assessing whether the member is making good faith efforts to negotiate, judgments would continue to be required in a number of important areas. These include a consideration of the extent to which creditor committees are sufficiently representative, and whether a reasonable period has elapsed to allow for the formation of representative committees. In the absence of such creditor committees, the member would be expected to engage creditors through a less structured dialogue.
8. Directors viewed the considerations laid out in the staff paper as useful inputs for helping to make such judgments, which would need to be made flexibly. They also noted that to the extent that negotiations become stalled because creditors are requesting terms that are inconsistent with the adjustment and financing parameters that have been established under a Fund-supported program, the Fund should retain the flexibility to continue to support members notwithstanding the lack of progress in negotiations with creditors.
9. Directors recognized that there may be circumstances where, following a default, the debtor enters into good faith discussions with creditors prior to the approval of a Fund arrangement. In these circumstances, creditors are likely to express views as to the appropriate dimensions of the program's adjustment and financing parameters. While such input would be welcome, Directors emphasized that decisions on an adequate macroeconomic framework and the design of the financing plan or the adjustment program that could form the basis for the Fund's lending into arrears will remain in the sole purview of the Fund.
10. Directors recognized that there may be emergency situations, such as in the aftermath of a natural disaster, where the extraordinary demands on the affected government are such that there is insufficient time for the debtor to undertake good faith efforts to reach agreement with its creditors. When a judgment has been made that such exceptional circumstances exist, the Fund may provide financing under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) or the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) despite arrears owed to private creditors. However, it would be expected that the Fund's support provided to the debtor in such cases would help advance normalization of relations with private creditors and the resolution of arrears, so that the approval of any subsequent Fund arrangement for the member would again be subject to the LIA policy on lending into sovereign arrears to private creditors.
11. All purchases and disbursements made while a member has outstanding arrears to private creditors will continue to be subject to financing assurances reviews, which will provide an opportunity for the Fund to monitor relations between a debtor and its creditors, and for the Board to be kept informed about developments in this area at an early stage.
12. The policy outlined above supersedes all previous policies regarding lending into arrears to private creditors.
Codifying Existing LIA Practice into a Policy in Preemptive Restructuring Cases
13. Directors agreed that the current practice in preemptive restructuring cases remains appropriate. To the extent that the Fund determines that a contribution from external private creditors in the form of a debt restructuring will be needed to restore debt sustainability, the restructuring should ideally be undertaken before the approval of the Fund arrangement. However, there may be circumstances under which more flexibility is warranted, so that the conclusion of the debt operation is contemplated at a later date, normally, by the first review under the arrangement. In such cases, the Fund may provide financing only if it has adequate assurances that such a restructuring will be successful. Such assurances are obtained by a judgment that a credible process for restructuring is underway and will result in sufficient creditor participation to restore debt sustainability and close financing gaps within the macroeconomic parameters of the program, taking into account official sector commitments. This judgment will depend on member-specific circumstances, but relevant considerations to inform such judgment may include the engagement of legal and financial advisors by the member, the launching of consultations with creditors, and the design of the debt restructuring strategy, including the terms of the new instruments and use of inducements for creditor participation. Directors welcomed the recommendation to add an expectation that the member would be expected to share relevant information as defined under the LIA policy with all private creditors on a timely basis.
Lending Into Arrears to Official Bilateral Creditors (LIOA) Policy
Directors broadly agreed that the Fund's non-toleration of arrears policy in non-(Official Sector Involvement) OSI cases and the policy on lending into sovereign arrears to official bilateral creditors in OSI cases, covering a three-strand approach, continues to be appropriate, but with adjustments to introduce a fourth strand in the LIOA policy as detailed below. Most Directors agreed that more experience is needed with the Common Framework (CF) and welcomed staff's plan to closely monitor the CF's evolution and revert to the Board on whether it emerges as a new representative standing forum.
14. The LIOA policy is as follows:
Strand 1: If an agreement is reached through the Paris Club that is adequately representative, the Fund would rely on its current practices—i.e., arrears would be considered eliminated (for purposes of the application of this policy) for both participating and non-participating creditors when financing assurances are received from the Paris Club in anticipation of an Agreed Minute. Should another representative standing forum emerge, the Fund would be open to engaging with such a forum. Directors agreed that Strand 1 should remain the central focus of this policy and should be used whenever it is or becomes available.
Strand 2: An official bilateral creditor may choose to consent to Fund financing notwithstanding arrears owed to it. In such cases, the Board would not need to make a judgment as to whether the three criteria in Strand 3 below are satisfied. The Fund would nevertheless continue to encourage the parties to come to an agreement to resolve arrears, since the regularization of arrears is an objective of any Fund-supported program and important for the functioning of the international financial system at large.
Strand 3: In circumstances where an adequately representative agreement has not been reached through the Paris Club, and creditor consent has not been received, the Fund would consider lending into arrears owed to an official bilateral creditor only in circumscribed circumstances where all the following criteria are satisfied:
Prompt financial support from the Fund is considered essential, and the member is pursuing appropriate policies;
The debtor is making good faith efforts to reach agreement with the creditor on a contribution consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported program—i.e., that the absence of an agreement is due to the unwillingness of the creditor to provide such a contribution; and
The decision to provide financing despite the arrears would not have an undue negative effect on the Fund's ability to mobilize official financing packages in future cases.
In applying the above criteria, the Fund will need to exercise judgment based on case-specific circumstances. In exercising this judgment, the Board will be guided by the following considerations:
First, an agreement will be considered "adequately representative" when it provides a majority of the total financing contributions required from official bilateral creditors over the program period. "Contribution" here comprises, and is limited to, debt relief and new financing (e.g. loans, bond financing, guarantees, and grants).
Second, in assessing whether a debtor is acting in good faith, the Fund will consider, inter alia, whether the debtor has approached the creditor to which it owes arrears either bilaterally or through a relevant grouping of official bilateral creditors, recognizing that the latter may take several forms, including ad hoc creditor committees; has offered to engage in substantive dialogue with the creditor and has sought a collaborative process with the creditor to reach agreement; has provided the creditor relevant information on a timely basis consistent with the Fund's policy on confidentiality of information; and has offered the creditor terms that are consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported program. If the debtor requested terms from an official bilateral creditor that would result in financing contributions that exceeded the requirements of the program it would generally not indicate good faith. Finally, an assessment of the second criterion would also take into consideration the extent to which a creditor is being asked to make a contribution that is disproportionate relative to other official bilateral creditors.
Third, in assessing whether the Fund's decision to lend into arrears owed to an official bilateral creditor would have an undue negative effect on the Fund's ability to mobilize official financing packages in future cases, the Fund will consider the signal that such a decision would send to official bilateral creditors as a group, given the specific circumstances of the case. In particular, this criterion would normally not be satisfied where the creditor or group of creditors that has not reached agreement with the debtor accounts for an adequately representative share, i.e., a majority, of total financing contributions required from official bilateral creditors over the program period, as defined above. Separately, an assessment of whether the third criterion is satisfied would take into consideration the creditor's track record of providing contributions in past debt restructurings under Fund-supported programs, even if the creditor does not account for an adequately representative share of total financing contributions.
Strand 4: The Fund shall seek additional safeguards under this policy where an adequately representative agreement has not been reached through the Paris Club or the Common Framework involving the Paris Club, consent is not forthcoming within 4 weeks of being requested, and the three criteria under Strand 3 cannot be satisfied with respect to an official bilateral creditor. The approach would distinguish the Fund-supported programs with normal access from those with exceptional access under the GRA or the PRGT or high combined access under the GRA and PRGT.
In the first case, the "standard safeguards approach” would apply (except as noted below). This would require a combination of program design elements—including the phasing of access under the arrangement (with an initial purchase or disbursement capped at low access), program conditionality to support the restructuring process where warranted under the Guidelines on Conditionality, and a debtor commitment to good faith efforts to establish additional safeguards for Fund lending.
In the second case, the "enhanced safeguards approach” would apply, which requires the debtor commitment and conditionality under the standard safeguards approach, and in addition a direct commitment to the Fund by a sufficient set of creditors about their restructuring intentions. Where such a commitment is provided, arrears would be considered eliminated (for purposes of the application of this policy) for both participating and non-participating creditors. A "sufficient set” of creditors requires the participation of any representative standing creditor forum as well as any creditors with significant influence over the debtor. For this purpose, a creditor is considered to have significant influence over the debtor when it has the ability to extract repayment on more favorable terms, inconsistent with program parameters.
While the standard safeguards approach will normally be sufficient for normal access cases that fall into Strand 4, a shift to the enhanced safeguards approach would be warranted, based on an explicit signal that a creditor or creditor group to which the three criteria in Strand 3 cannot be satisfied either (1) is unwilling to restructure its or their claims in line with program parameters; or (2) views additional support by the Fund to the debtor's effort to coordinate with creditors to be essential.
Emergency situations: There may be emergency situations caused by significant exogenous shocks or natural disasters, where the extraordinary demands on the affected government are such that there is insufficient time for the debtor to undertake good faith efforts to reach agreement with its creditors. When a judgment has been made that such exceptional circumstances exist, the Fund may provide financing under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) or the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) despite arrears owed to official bilateral creditors and without assessing whether the three criteria above have been satisfied or obtaining the creditor's consent. However, it would be expected that the Fund's support provided to the debtor in such cases would help advance normalization of relations with official bilateral creditors and the resolution of arrears, so that the approval of any subsequent Fund arrangement for the member would again be subject to all three criteria set out above. This assessment would be based on the debtor's commitment to make good faith efforts toward resolving the arrears and to conduct itself in a way to promote and encourage creditor coordination. Directors expected that this "exceptional circumstances" clause would generally not be satisfied for cases with long-standing arrears.
Directors concurred that new Fund-supported programs should continue to incorporate the assumption that old OSI-related claims would be restructured in line with the terms stipulated in the original Fund-supported program. Should new arrears arise due to the exercise of a comparability of treatment clause, such arrears shall be classified as non-OSI, and thus be subject to the Fund's nontoleration of arrears policy, regardless of whether an additional debt treatment is required.
International Financial Institutions
15. Directors agreed that application of the non-toleration of arrears policy with respect to multilaterals has worked well, but the policy needs to be updated to clarify how the policy applies to new International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and to ensure that the special treatment multilateral creditors receive under the Fund's arrears policy is not diluted. IFIs are defined as international financial institutions with at least two sovereign members (and no non-sovereign member). While many Directors expressed a preference for staff's original proposal on this issue (in Review of the Fund's Sovereign Arrears Policies and Perimeter), which would reduce scope for judgement in this area and provide for more clarity, a number of Directors could not support staff's original proposal. In the end, most Directors went along with the alternative approach set out in Supplement 1 in light of staff's expectation that implementation of the approach described in Supplement 1 would not fundamentally differ from that in the original proposal. Therefore, Directors endorsed the following:
First, Fund financing in the face of arrears to the World Bank Group should continue to require an Agreed Plan between the debtor and the World Bank to clear the arrears over a defined period. Fund financing in the face of arrears to any other IFI should continue to require that a Credible Plan be in place in cases where a contribution from the official sector is not required in order to restore debt sustainability (non-OSI cases). In this context, a Credible Plan is a plan that is credible to the Fund, and the creditor's concurrence is not required.
Second, in cases where a contribution from the official sector is required in order to restore debt sustainability (OSI cases):
Where the member is in arrears to an IFI, the Fund should judge whether a Credible Plan to resolve such arrears is required as a condition for lending. Factors informing the Fund's judgment in this regard will include: (i) global, rather than regional, membership of the institution; (ii) whether the institution is a regional financing arrangement or a reserve currency union central bank that forms part of the global financial safety net; (iii) the Paris Club's treatment of the institution, (iv) participation of the institution in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, and (v) whether the institution is being excluded from the scope of debt restructuring by official bilateral creditors through a creditor committee based on a representative standing forum recognized under the LIOA policy in the case at hand.
When arrears are owed to an IFI that does not fall under the previous bullet above, Directors agreed that the LIOA policy should be expanded to apply to these cases mutatis mutandis. In these cases, the Fund policy will also provide for the flexibility in extraordinary circumstances for emergency financing cases consistent with the LIOA policy.
In the latter cases, the Fund would consider lending into arrears owed to an IFI creditor only in circumscribed circumstances where all the following criteria are satisfied:
Prompt financial support from the Fund is considered essential, and the member is pursuing appropriate policies;
The debtor is making good faith efforts to reach agreement with the IFI creditor on a contribution consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported program—i.e., that the absence of an agreement is due to the unwillingness of the creditor to provide such a contribution; and
The decision to provide financing despite the arrears would not have an undue negative effect on the Fund's ability to mobilize official financing packages in future cases.
16. In assessing whether a debtor is acting in good faith, the Fund will consider, inter alia, whether the debtor has approached the IFI creditor to which it owes arrears bilaterally; has offered to engage in substantive dialogue with the IFI creditor and has sought a collaborative process with the creditor to reach agreement; has provided the creditor relevant information on a timely basis consistent with the Fund's policy on confidentiality of information; and has offered the creditor terms that are consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported program. If the debtor requested terms from an IFI creditor that would result in financing contributions that exceeded the requirements of the program it would generally not indicate good faith.
17. In assessing whether the Fund's decision to lend into arrears owed to an IFI creditor would have an undue negative effect on the Fund's ability to mobilize official financing packages in future cases, the Fund will consider the signal that such a decision would send to IFI creditors, or to official creditors more generally, as a group, given the specific circumstances of the case.
18. An IFI creditor may choose to consent to Fund financing notwithstanding arrears owed to it. Such consent could be conveyed to the Fund either through an Executive Director designated by the IFI or an authorized executive of the IFI to the Managing Director. In such cases, the Executive Board would not need to make a judgment as to whether the three criteria above are satisfied. The Fund would nevertheless continue to encourage the parties to come to an agreement during the program, since the regularization of arrears is an objective of any Fund-supported program and important for the functioning of the international financial system at large.
19. So long as arrears to IFI creditors remain outstanding, purchases or disbursements will be subject to a financing assurances review where the Executive Board will verify that all three criteria are satisfied and the policy continues to be met for the further use of the Fund's resources in the member's circumstances.
Financing Assurances Reviews
20. Directors also supported strengthening financing assurances reviews under the LIOA and LIA policies while external arrears remain unresolved, and introducing financing assurances reviews both in cases where arrears are deemed away under Strands 1 and 4 under the LIOA policy and in preemptive restructuring cases needed to restore debt sustainability involving official bilateral creditors until the needed restructuring is complete. Financing assurances reviews would continue to provide the Fund with the opportunity to assess continued compliance with the applicable arrears and financing assurances policies, whether the member's adjustment efforts are undermined by developments in debtor and creditor relations, and whether, in light of progress, the debt situation does not undermine the restoration of the member's medium-term external viability and its capacity to repay the Fund.
21. Directors agreed that in cases of unresolved external sovereign arrears subject to a debt restructuring, arrears deemed away under Strands 1 and 4 under the LIOA policy, or where a preemptive restructuring needed to restore debt sustainability is being undertaken that involves official bilateral creditors, requests for new Fund financing should lay out the expected steps and schedule for the restructuring process in an indicative way. Subsequent reviews should detail progress against that schedule taking into account all developments to determine whether the restructuring remains on track to ensure that overall program objectives are met. Directors further supported the proposal that financing assurances reviews should more explicitly assess whether the Fund still has appropriate safeguards to proceed with the financing, or needs to introduce additional standard or enhanced safeguards as warranted.
Form of Financing Assurances
22. For restructuring cases where financing assurances need to be obtained from official bilateral creditors—namely, preemptive cases and Strand 1 and 4 of the LIOA policy—Directors agreed that such assurances could be obtained through the Fund's assessment that a "credible official creditor process” (COCP) is underway. Directors stressed that each creditor would need to establish a track record on which the Fund could base its understanding of the process, key decisionmakers involved, and the expected timeframe for the completion of the debt restructuring, such that an assessment could be made that the key stage had been reached that would provide the Fund with the necessary assurances. Directors noted that, in the absence of sufficient information or a track record to make such an assessment, required financing assurances could continue to be satisfied by specific and credible assurances on debt relief/financing. Directors endorsed the proposal that, in pre-emptive cases, financing assurances would only be sought from a "sufficient set” of creditors, as defined under the enhanced safeguards approach under Strand 4 of the LIOA policy. Directors agreed that the policy for pre-emptive restructuring cases for private creditors remains unchanged.
Perimeter
23. For the purpose of determining the application of the Fund's arrears, financing assurances and debt sustainability policies, Directors broadly agreed with the approach proposed by staff.
24. Specifically, Direct Bilateral Claims will continue to be defined as those claims that are (a) held by a government, or an agency acting on behalf of a government; and (b) originate from an underlying transaction where the creditor government, or an agency acting on behalf of the government, provided or guaranteed financing to the debtor member.
25. In operationalizing this definition, Directors supported using the creditor member's budgetary process to determine which entities form part of the creditor government. For entities that fall outside the government, a case-by-case analysis, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, would continue to be required to determine whether the entity is "acting on behalf of the government." Directors recognized that secondary market purchases of claims by official bilateral creditors would not qualify as Direct Bilateral Claims, as they would not directly extend financing to the debtor member.
26. Directors endorsed two amendments to the classification of official claims: First, to the extent that the IFI purchases securities in the secondary market as part of the global financial safety net, such claims can be treated as claims subject to the Fund's arrears policies as applicable to IFIs; however, the Fund would rely on the IFI's own representation in this regard. Second, any Direct Bilateral Claims or claims held by IFIs that are contractually part of a pooled voting mechanism with private creditors shall be subject to the LIA policy.
Agreement in Principle
27. Directors recognized the continued utility of the Agreement in Principle (AIP) as an optional procedural device to bridge engagement gaps when agreement on policies has been reached with the member but financing assurances to restore debt sustainability have not been received. They agreed that a few clarifications to the AIP are warranted in such cases. A decision to approve an arrangement in principle shall specify the date by which the approval would lapse, which would normally be no later than 4 months after approval. A new AIP shall only be permitted once and would normally be subject to a limit of an additional 4 months. The Fund would only approve a new AIP if the financing assurances restoring debt sustainability are likely to be delivered. and that the member's economic program is being implemented as agreed and remains on track. Once the financing assurances have been obtained, a second decision of the Executive Board is required to make the arrangement effective, which is normally adopted on a Lapse of Time basis. Directors stressed that, in all cases, staff should aim to bring a UCT-quality program forward for Executive Board consideration as fast as possible.
Effectiveness
28. The above amendments and new policies will enter into effect immediately and will apply to all future purchases and disbursements (including under existing arrangements), where the relevant policies apply.
Reviews of the Arrears Policies
29. Directors agreed that the Fund's arrears policies should be reviewed on an as needed basis.
Annex II. Comparison of Draft Executive Board Understanding Against Current Policies
Lending Into Arrears (LIA) Policy
1. Directors concurred that the Fund's policy on lending into arrears to private creditors continues to provide a useful tool enabling the Fund to support a member's adjustment efforts before the member has reached agreement with its private creditors on a debt restructuring. Specifically, Directors agreed that Fund lending into sovereign arrears to private creditors should continue to be on a case-by-case basis and only where:
(i) prompt Fund support is considered essential for the successful implementation of the member's adjustment program; and
(ii) the member is pursuing appropriate policies and is making a good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors.
2. Directors also agreed that Fund lending into non-sovereign arrears stemming from the imposition of exchange controls should continue to be on a case-by-case basis and only where:
(i) prompt Fund support is considered essential for the successful implementation of the member's adjustment program; and
(ii) the member is pursuing appropriate policies, the member is making a good faith effort to facilitate a collaborative agreement between private debtors and their creditors, and a good prospect exists for the removal of exchange controls.
3. With respect to lending into sovereign arrears to private creditors, Directors agreed that greater clarity about the good faith dialogue between a debtor and its creditors during the restructuring process and enhanced debt transparency could help provide better guidance about the application of the Fund's LIA policy and, more generally, promote a better framework for the engagement of debtors and creditors in the restructuring of sovereign debt. Greater clarity concerning the framework for possible debt restructuring would strengthen the capacity of investors to assess recovery values under alternative scenarios, thereby facilitating the pricing of risk and improving the functioning of the capital markets. At the same time, however, Directors stressed the need for continued flexibility in applying the "good faith” criterion to accommodate the characteristics of each specific case to avoid putting debtors at a disadvantage in the negotiations with creditors; and to avoid prolonged negotiations that could hamper the ability of the Fund to provide timely assistance. Indeed, any clarification of the "good faith” criterion should serve primarily to support the difficult judgments that will continue to have to be made in each case, and should be made operational in a manner that does not impair market discipline.
4. Directors considered that the following principles would strike an appropriate balance between clarity and flexibility in guiding the dialogue between debtors and their private external creditors.
First, when a member has reached a judgment that a restructuring of its debt is necessary, it should engage in an early dialogue with its creditors, which should continue until the restructuring is complete.
Second, the member should share relevant information with all creditors on a timely basis, which would generally be aligned with what the member would be required to share under the Debt Limits Policy and normally include:
an explanation of the economic problems and financial circumstances that justify a debt restructuring;
a briefing on the broad outlines of a viable economic program to address the underlying problems and its implications on the broad financial parameters shaping the envelope of resources available for restructured claims; and
the provision of a comprehensive picture of the outstanding debt stock and its terms, and the proposed treatment of all claims on the sovereign, including those of official bilateral creditors; the perimeter of claims subject to the envisaged debt restructuring; and the elaboration of the basis on which the debt restructuring would restore mediumterm debt sustainability, bearing in mind that not all categories of claims may need to be restructured.
Third, the member should provide creditors with an early opportunity to give input on the design of restructuring strategies and the design of individual instruments.
Fourth, any terms offered to the creditors by the member should be consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported program.
5. Although, as a general premise, the form of the dialogue would continue to be left to the debtor and its creditors, under this approach a member in arrears would be expected to initiate a dialogue with its creditors consistent with the principles discussed above. In cases in which creditors have been able to form a representative committee on a timely basis, there would be an expectation that the member would enter into good faith negotiations with this committee, though the unique characteristics of each case would also be considered.
6. Directors stressed that, in going forward with the suggested approach, it would be crucial to strike the appropriate balance between the need to promote effective communication between a debtor and its creditors, and the need to retain flexibility to address the diversity of individual member circumstances.
7. Directors emphasized that in assessing whether the member is making good faith efforts to negotiate, judgments would continue to be required in a number of important areas. These include a consideration of the extent to which creditor committees are sufficiently representative, and whether a reasonable period has elapsed to allow for the formation of representative committees. In the absence of such creditor committees, the member would be expected to engage creditors through a less structured dialogue.
8. Directors viewed the considerations laid out in the staff paper as useful inputs for helping to make such judgments, which would need to be made flexibly. They also noted that to the extent that negotiations become stalled because creditors are requesting terms that are inconsistent with the adjustment and financing parameters that have been established under a Fund-supported program, the Fund should retain the flexibility to continue to support members notwithstanding the lack of progress in negotiations with creditors.
9. Directors recognized that there may be circumstances where, following a default, the debtor enters into good faith discussions with creditors prior to the approval of a Fund arrangement. In these circumstances, creditors are likely to express views as to the appropriate dimensions of the program's adjustment and financing parameters. While such input would be welcome, Directors emphasized that decisions on an adequate macroeconomic framework and the design of the financing plan or the adjustment program that could form the basis for the Fund's lending into arrears will remain in the sole purview of the Fund.
10. Directors recognized that there may be emergency situations, such as in the aftermath of a natural disaster, where the extraordinary demands on the affected government are such that there is insufficient time for the debtor to undertake good faith efforts to reach agreement with its creditors. When a judgment has been made that such exceptional circumstances exist, the Fund may provide financing under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) or the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) despite arrears owed to private creditors. However, it would be expected that the Fund's support provided to the debtor in such cases would help advance normalization of relations with private creditors and the resolution of arrears, so that the approval of any subsequent Fund arrangement for the member would again be subject to the LIA policy on lending into sovereign arrears to private creditors.
11. All purchases and disbursements made while a member has outstanding arrears to private creditors will continue to be subject to financing assurances reviews, which will provide an opportunity for the Fund to monitor relations between a debtor and its creditors, and for the Board to be kept informed about developments in this area at an early stage.
12. The policy outlined above supersedes all previous policies regarding lending into arrears to private creditors.
Codifying Existing Practice into a Policy in Preemptive Restructuring Cases
13. Directors agreed that the current practice in preemptive restructuring cases remains appropriate. To the extent that the Fund determines that a contribution from external private creditors in the form of a debt restructuring will be needed to restore debt sustainability, the restructuring should ideally be undertaken before the approval of the Fund arrangement. However, there may be circumstances under which more flexibility is warranted, so that the conclusion of the debt operation is contemplated at a later date, normally, by the first review under the arrangement. In such cases, the Fund may provide financing only if it has adequate assurances that such a restructuring will be successful. Such assurances are obtained by a judgment that a credible process for restructuring is underway and will result in sufficient creditor participation to restore debt sustainability and close financing gaps within the macroeconomic parameters of the program, taking into account official sector commitments. This judgment will depend on member-specific circumstances, but relevant considerations to inform such judgment may include the engagement of legal and financial advisors by the member, the launching of consultations with creditors, and the design of the debt restructuring strategy, including the terms of the new instruments and use of inducements for creditor participation. Directors welcomed the recommendation to add an expectation that the member would be expected to share relevant information as defined under the LIA policy with all private creditors on a timely basis.
Lending Into Arrears to Official Bilateral Creditors (LIOA) Policy
Directors broadly agreed that the Fund's non-toleration of arrears policy in non-(Official Sector Involvement) OSI cases and the policy on lending into sovereign arrears to official bilateral creditors in OSI cases, covering a three-strand approach, continues to be appropriate, but with adjustments to introduce a fourth strand in the LIOA policy as detailed below-. Most Directors agreed that more experience is needed with the Common Framework (CF) and welcomed staff's plan to closely monitor the CF's evolution and revert to the Board on whether it emerges as a new representative standing forum.
14. The LIOA policy is as follows:
Strand 1: If an agreement is reached through the Paris Club that is adequately representative, the Fund would rely on its current practices—i.e., arrears would be considered eliminated (for purposes of the application of this policy) for both participating and non-participating creditors when financing assurances are received from the Paris Club in anticipation of an Agreed Minute. Should another representative standing forum emerge, the Fund would be open to engaging with such a forum. Directors agreed that Strand 1 should remain the central focus of this policy and should be used whenever it is or becomes available.
Strand 2: An official bilateral creditor may choose to consent to Fund financing notwithstanding arrears owed to it. In such cases, the Board would not need to make a judgment as to whether the three criteria in Strand 3 below are satisfied. The Fund would nevertheless continue to encourage the parties to come to an agreement to resolve arrears, since the regularization of arrears is an objective of any Fund-supported program and important for the functioning of the international financial system at large.
Strand 3: In circumstances where an adequately representative agreement has not been reached through the Paris Club, and creditor consent has not been received, the Fund would consider lending into arrears owed to an official bilateral creditor only in circumscribed circumstances where all the following criteria are satisfied:
Prompt financial support from the Fund is considered essential, and the member is pursuing appropriate policies;
The debtor is making good faith efforts to reach agreement with the creditor on a contribution consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported program—i.e., that the absence of an agreement is due to the unwillingness of the creditor to provide such a contribution; and
The decision to provide financing despite the arrears would not have an undue negative effect on the Fund's ability to mobilize official financing packages in future cases.
In applying the above criteria, the Fund will need to exercise judgment based on case-specific circumstances. In exercising this judgment, the Board will be guided by the following considerations:
First, an agreement will be considered "adequately representative" when it provides a majority of the total financing contributions required from official bilateral creditors over the program period. "Contribution" here comprises, and is limited to, debt relief and new financing (e.g. loans, bond financing, guarantees, and grants).
Second, in assessing whether a debtor is acting in good faith, the Fund will consider, inter alia, whether the debtor has approached the creditor to which it owes arrears either bilaterally or through a relevant grouping of official bilateral creditors, recognizing that the latter may take several forms, including ad hoc creditor committees; has offered to engage in substantive dialogue with the creditor and has sought a collaborative process with the creditor to reach agreement; has provided the creditor relevant information on a timely basis consistent with the Fund's policy on confidentiality of information; and has offered the creditor terms that are consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported program. If the debtor requested terms from an official bilateral creditor that would result in financing contributions that exceeded the requirements of the program it would generally not indicate good faith. Finally, an assessment of the second criterion would also take into consideration the extent to which a creditor is being asked to make a contribution that is disproportionate relative to other official bilateral creditors.
Third, in assessing whether the Fund's decision to lend into arrears owed to an official bilateral creditor would have an undue negative effect on the Fund's ability to mobilize official financing packages in future cases, the Fund will consider the signal that such a decision would send to official bilateral creditors as a group, given the specific circumstances of the case. In particular, this criterion would normally not be satisfied where the creditor or group of creditors that has not reached agreement with the debtor accounts for an adequately representative share, i.e., a majority, of total financing contributions required from official bilateral creditors over the program period, as defined above. Separately, an assessment of whether the third criterion is satisfied would take into consideration the creditor's track record of providing contributions in past debt restructurings under Fund-supported programs, even if the creditor does not account for an adequately representative share of total financing contributions.
Strand 4: The Fund shall seek additional safeguards under this policy where an adequately representative agreement has not been reached through the Paris Club or the Common Framework involving the Paris Club, consent is not forthcoming within 4 weeks of being requested, and the three criteria under Strand 3 cannot be satisfied with respect to an official bilateral creditor. The approach would distinguish the Fund-supported programs with normal access from those with exceptional access under the GRA or the PRGT or high combined access under the GRA and PRGT.
In the first case, the "standard safeguards approach” would apply (except as noted below). This would require a combination of program design elements—including the phasing of access under the arrangement (with an initial purchase or disbursement capped at low access), program conditionality to support the restructuring process where warranted under the Guidelines on Conditionality, and a debtor commitment to good faith efforts to establish additional safeguards for Fund lending.
In the second case, the "enhanced safeguards approach” would apply, which requires the debtor commitment and conditionality under the standard safeguards approach, and in addition a direct commitment to the Fund by a sufficient set of creditors about their restructuring intentions. Where such a commitment is provided, arrears would be considered eliminated (for purposes of the application of this policy) for both participating and nonparticipating creditors. A "sufficient set” of creditors requires the participation of any representative standing creditor forum as well as any creditors with significant influence over the debtor. For this purpose, a creditor is considered to have significant influence over the debtor when it has the ability to extract repayment on more favorable terms, inconsistent with program parameters.
While the standard safeguards approach will normally be sufficient for normal -access cases that fall into Strand 4, a shift to the enhanced safeguards approach would be warranted, based on an explicit signal that a creditor or creditor group to which the three criteria in Strand 3 cannot be satisfied either (1) is unwilling to restructure its or their claims in line with program parameters; or (2) views additional support by the Fund to the debtor's effort to coordinate with creditors to be essential.
Emergency situations: There may be emergency situationse caused by significant exogenous shocks or natural disasters, where the extraordinary demands on the affected government are such that there is insufficient time for the debtor to undertake good faith efforts to reach agreement with its creditors. When a judgment has been made that such exceptional circumstances exist, the Fund may provide financing under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) or the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) despite arrears owed to official bilateral creditors and without assessing whether the three criteria above have been satisfied or obtaining the creditor's consent. However, it would be expected that the Fund's support provided to the debtor in such cases would help advance normalization of relations with official bilateral creditors and the resolution of arrears, so that the approval of any subsequent Fund arrangement for the member would again be subject to all three criteria set out above. This assessment would be based on the debtor's commitment to make good faith efforts toward resolving the arrears and to conduct itself in a way to promote and encourage creditor coordination. Directors expected that this "exceptional circumstances” clause would generally not be satisfied for cases with long-standing arrears.
Directors concurred that new Fund-supported programs should continue to incorporate the assumption that old OSI-related claims would be restructured in line with the terms stipulated in the original Fund-supported program. Should new arrears arise due to the exercise of a comparability of treatment clause, such arrears shall be classified as non-OSI, and thus be subject to the Fund's nontoleration of arrears policy, regardless of whether an additional debt treatment is required.
International Financial Institutions
15. Directors agreed that application of the non-toleration of arrears policy with respect to multilaterals has worked well, but the policy needs to be updated to clarify how the policy applies to new International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and to ensure that the special treatment multilateral creditors receive under the Fund's arrears policy is not diluted. IFIs are defined as international financial institutions with at least two sovereign members (and no non-sovereign member). While many Directors expressed a preference for staff's original proposal on this issue (in Review of the Fund's Sovereign Arrears Policies and Perimeter), which would reduce scope for judgement in this area and provide for more clarity, a number of Directors could not support staff's original proposal. In the end, most Directors went along with the alternative approach set out in Supplement 1 in light of staff's expectation that implementation of the approach described in Supplement 1 would not fundamentally differ from that in the original proposal. Therefore, Directors endorsed the following:
First, Fund financing in the face of arrears to the World Bank Group should continue to require an Agreed Plan between the debtor and the World Bank to clear the arrears over a defined period. Fund financing in the face of arrears to any other IFI should continue to require that a Credible Plan be in place in cases where a contribution from the official sector is not required in order to restore debt sustainability (non-OSI cases). In this context, a Credible Plan is a plan that is credible to the Fund, and the creditor's concurrence is not required.
Second, in cases where a contribution from the official sector is required in order to restore debt sustainability (OSI cases):
Where the member is in arrears to an IFI, the Fund should judge whether a Credible Plan to resolve such arrears is required as a condition for lending. Factors informing the Fund's judgment in this regard will include: (i) global, rather than regional, membership of the institution; (ii) whether the institution is a regional financing arrangement or a reserve currency union central bank that forms part of the global financial safety net; (iii) the Paris Club's treatment of the institution, (iv) participation of the institution in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, and (v) whether the institution is being excluded from the scope of debt restructuring by official bilateral creditors through a creditor committee based on a representative standing forum recognized under the LIOA policy in the case at hand.
When arrears are owed to an IFI that does not fall under the previous bullet above, Directors agreed that the LIOA policy should be expanded to apply to these cases mutatis mutandis. In these cases, the Fund policy will also provide for the flexibility in extraordinary circumstances for emergency financing cases consistent with the LIOA policy.
In the latter cases, the Fund would consider lending into arrears owed to an IFI creditor only in circumscribed circumstances where all the following criteria are satisfied:
Prompt financial support from the Fund is considered essential, and the member is pursuing appropriate policies;
The debtor is making good faith efforts to reach agreement with the IFI creditor on a contribution consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported program—i.e., that the absence of an agreement is due to the unwillingness of the creditor to provide such a contribution; and
The decision to provide financing despite the arrears would not have an undue negative effect on the Fund's ability to mobilize official financing packages in future cases.
16. In assessing whether a debtor is acting in good faith, the Fund will consider, inter alia, whether the debtor has approached the IFI creditor to which it owes arrears bilaterally; has offered to engage in substantive dialogue with the IFI creditor and has sought a collaborative process with the creditor to reach agreement; has provided the creditor relevant information on a timely basis consistent with the Fund's policy on confidentiality of information; and has offered the creditor terms that are consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported program. If the debtor requested terms from an IFI creditor that would result in financing contributions that exceeded the requirements of the program it would generally not indicate good faith.
17. In assessing whether the Fund's decision to lend into arrears owed to an IFI creditor would have an undue negative effect on the Fund's ability to mobilize official financing packages in future cases, the Fund will consider the signal that such a decision would send to IFI creditors, or to official creditors more generally, as a group, given the specific circumstances of the case.
18. An IFI creditor may choose to consent to Fund financing notwithstanding arrears owed to it. Such consent could be conveyed to the Fund either through an Executive Director designated by the IFI or an authorized executive of the IFI to the Managing Director. In such cases, the Executive Board would not need to make a judgment as to whether the three criteria above are satisfied. The Fund would nevertheless continue to encourage the parties to come to an agreement during the program, since the regularization of arrears is an objective of any Fund-supported program and important for the functioning of the international financial system at large.
19. So long as arrears to IFI creditors remain outstanding, purchases or disbursements will be subject to a financing assurances review where the Executive Board will verify that all three criteria are satisfied and the policy continues to be met for the further use of the Fund's resources in the member's circumstances.
Financing Assurances Reviews
20. Directors also supported strengthening financing assurances reviews under the LIOA and LIA policies while external arrears remain unresolved, and introducing financing assurances reviews both in cases where arrears are deemed away under Strands 1 and 4 under the LIOA policy and in preemptive restructuring cases needed to restore debt sustainability involving official bilateral creditors until the needed restructuring is complete. Financing assurances reviews would continue to provide the Fund with the opportunity to assess continued compliance with the applicable arrears and financing assurances policies, whether the member's adjustment efforts are undermined by developments in debtor and creditor relations, and whether, in light of progress, the debt situation does not undermine the restoration of the member's medium-term external viability and its capacity to repay the Fund.
21. Directors agreed that in cases of unresolved external sovereign arrears subject to a debt restructuring, arrears deemed away under Strands 1 and 4 under the LIOA policy, or where a preemptive restructuring needed to restore debt sustainability is being undertaken that involves official bilateral creditors, requests for new Fund financing should lay out the expected steps and schedule for the restructuring process in an indicative way. Subsequent reviews should detail progress against that schedule taking into account all developments to determine whether the restructuring remains on track to ensure that overall program objectives are met. Directors further supported the proposal that financing assurances reviews should more explicitly assess whether the Fund still has appropriate safeguards to proceed with the financing, or needs to introduce additional standard or enhanced safeguards as warranted.
Form of Financing Assurances
22. For restructuring cases where financing assurances need to be obtained from official bilateral creditors—namely, preemptive cases and Strand 1 and 4 of the LIOA policy—Directors agreed that such assurances could be obtained through the Fund's assessment that a "credible official creditor process” (COCP) is underway. Directors stressed that each creditor would need to establish a track record on which the Fund could base its understanding of the process, key decisionmakers involved, and the expected timeframe for the completion of the debt restructuring, such that an assessment could be made that the key stage had been reached that would provide the Fund with the necessary assurances. Directors noted that, in the absence of sufficient information or a track record to make such an assessment, required financing assurances could continue to be satisfied by specific and credible assurances on debt relief/financing. Directors endorsed the proposal that, in pre-emptive cases, financing assurances would only be sought from a "sufficient set” of creditors, as defined under the enhanced safeguards approach under Strand 4 of the LIOA policy. Directors agreed that the policy for pre-emptive restructuring cases for private creditors remains unchanged.
Perimeter
23. For the purpose of determining the application of the Fund's arrears, financing assurances and debt sustainability policies, Directors broadly agreed with the approach proposed by staff.
24. Specifically, Direct Bilateral Claims will continue to be defined as those claims that are (a) held by a government, or an agency acting on behalf of a government; and (b) originate from an underlying transaction where the creditor government, or an agency acting on behalf of the government, provided or guaranteed financing to the debtor member.
25. In operationalizing this definition, Directors supported using the creditor member's budgetary process to determine which entities form part of the creditor government. For entities that fall outside the government, a case-by-case analysis, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, would continue to be required to determine whether the entity is "acting on behalf of the government." Directors recognized that secondary market purchases of claims by official bilateral creditors would not qualify as Direct Bilateral Claims, as they would not directly extend financing to the debtor member.
26. Directors endorsed two amendments to the classification of official claims: First, to the extent that the IFI purchases securities in the secondary market as part of the global financial safety net, such claims can be treated as claims subject to the Fund's arrears policies as applicable to IFIs; however, the Fund would rely on the IFI's own representation in this regard. Second, any Direct Bilateral Claims or claims held by IFIs that are contractually part of a pooled voting mechanism with private creditors shall be subject to the LIA policy.
Agreement in Principle
27. Directors recognized the continued utility of the Agreement in Principle (AIP) as an optional procedural device to bridge engagement gaps when agreement on policies has been reached with the member but financing assurances to restore debt sustainability have not been received. They agreed that a few clarifications to the AIP are warranted in such cases. A decision to approve an arrangement in principle shall specify the date by which the approval would lapse, which would normally be no later than 4 months after approval. A new AIP shall only be permitted once and would normally be subject to a limit of an additional 4 months. The Fund would only approve a new AIP if the financing assurances restoring debt sustainability are likely to be delivered. and that the member's economic program is being implemented as agreed and remains on track. Once the financing assurances have been obtained, a second decision of the Executive Board is required to make the arrangement effective, which is normally adopted on a Lapse of Time basis. Directors stressed that, in all cases, staff should aim to bring a UCT-quality program forward for Executive Board consideration as fast as possible.
Effectiveness
28. The above amendments and new policies will enter into effect immediately and will apply to all future purchases and disbursements (including under existing arrangements), where the relevant policies apply.
Reviews of the Arrears Policies
29. Directors agreed that the Fund's arrears policies should be reviewed on an as needed basis.