IMF Policy Paper: A Strategy For IMF Engagement on Social Spending—Background Papers

Background papers to the "Strategy for IMF Engagement on Social Spending"

Abstract

Background papers to the "Strategy for IMF Engagement on Social Spending"

Background Paper III. Mission Chiefs’ Survey: An Overview of Results1

IMF Area Department mission chiefs were surveyed between July and December 2018 to better understand the country team’s approach to social spending issues, the nature and extent of their engagement, and the challenges they faced in this engagement. The survey responses indicated that: i) social spending is widely considered to be macro-critical; ii) when engaging on social spending IMF country teams rely on their own resources and also extensively leverage internal and external expertise; iii) program objectives are typically in line with countries’ social spending priorities; and iv) IMF policy advice to member countries commonly involves social spending reforms.

A. Introduction

1. A survey of IMF mission chiefs (MCs) provides insights into staff views on the Fund’s engagement on social spending. The survey collected views of MCs leading country work for the 189 IMF member countries, as well as those responsible for IMF country work related to Aruba, Curação and St. Maarten, Hong Kong, Macao SAR, and West Bank and Gaza. The survey was conducted during July through December 2018. It sought to capture views on a wide-ranging set of issues related to the IMF’s work on social spending, including on analysis and policy advice and interaction with other stakeholders. It included specific questions on program context, design, and conditionality.

2. Survey responses were representative. The overall response rate stood at (about 80 percent; Figure 1), varying from 73 percent for emerging economies (EMEs) to 81 percent for low-income and developing countries (LIDCs), and 89 percent for advanced countries (AEs).2 All regions were represented in the survey, although with varying response rates (around 80 or more percent in all regions except in LAC).3

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Response Rates by Region and Income Group

(percent of countries)

Citation: Policy Papers 2019, 017; 10.5089/9781498318907.007.A003

Source: Mission Chiefs’ Survey on IMF Engagement on Social Spending.

3. The following sections present and discuss the survey results. Section B provides MCs’ views on drivers of macro-criticality of social spending issues. Section C discusses resources that support IMF engagement on social spending issues, including how external resources are leveraged. Section D discusses policy advice; and Section E addresses specific issues related to countries under IMF-supported programs.

B. Macro-criticality of Social Spending Issues

4. Social spending is widely considered to be macro-critical. Almost 80 percent of MCs see social spending as macro-critical. This view is broadly consistent across country income groups as well as across IMF activities (Figure 2). In general, social spending is more frequently considered to be macro-critical in LIDCs and EMEs (respectively, in almost 90 and 80 percent of countries), than in AEs (almost 60 percent of countries). As expected, the share of mission chiefs that viewed social spending as macro-critical in fragile states was very high (85 percent). Across regions, it is more frequently seen as macro-critical (about 90 percent) in emerging and developing Europe, MENAP and Sub-Saharan Africa. By contrast, social spending issues are less often considered macro-critical in CIS countries.

Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Is Social Spending Macro-critical for your Country?

(percent of yes responses)

Citation: Policy Papers 2019, 017; 10.5089/9781498318907.007.A003

Source: Mission Chiefs’ Survey on IMF Engagement on Social Spending.

5. The drivers of the macro-criticality of social spending vary significantly. The most cited reasons for considering social spending to be macro-critical are: (1) the risk posed to social and political stability by inadequate social spending; (2) the view that social spending is key for achieving the authorities’ distributional objectives; and (3) the need to close development gaps, including those needed to meet the SDGs (Figure 3). Yet, there is some heterogeneity across country groups. Whereas in AEs spending pressures, population ageing, and distributional objectives are the most commonly cited factors, in LIDCs development gaps in education, health, and social protection as well as social and/or political stability are considered the main drivers of macro-criticality (Figure 4, left panel). In countries under IMF supported programs, MCs most often point to the need to close development gaps and the risks to social and/or political stability stemming from inadequate social spending (Figure 4, right panel). These concerns are particularly prominent in fragile states.

Figure 3.
Figure 3.

Why Social Spending is Macro-critical

(percent; multiple responses allowed)

Citation: Policy Papers 2019, 017; 10.5089/9781498318907.007.A003

Source: Mission Chiefs’ Survey on IMF Engagement on Social Spending.Note: MCs were allowed to check all options relevant for their case (no weighting used).
Figure 4.
Figure 4.

Why Social Spending is Macro-critical by Income Group and IMF Activity

(percent; multiple responses allowed)

Citation: Policy Papers 2019, 017; 10.5089/9781498318907.007.A003

Source: Mission Chiefs’ Survey on IMF Engagement on Social Spending.

C. Resources for Addressing Social Spending Issues and Interaction with Other Institutions

6. Country teams rely on their own resources and leverage IMF and external expertise. Overall 80 percent of MCs indicated that own resources and analysis are the main basis for engagement on social spending issues. Analysis, tools, and technical assistance provided by other IMF departments is cited by about 50 percent of MCs as an important source of expertise and analysis. The Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) is the main provider of analysis and expertise with technical assistance and some of the tools that have been developed being used by many teams.4 International Development Institutions (IDIs) (in almost 80 percent of cases), country authorities (31 percent), and academics (20 percent) are recognized as important external contributors of knowledge and expertise. Reliance by IMF staff on external resources varies significantly across countries, partly reflecting the focus and role of IDIs and varying levels of countries’ capacity. While use of World Bank resources is low for AEs,5 the World Bank is a major partner for IMF engagement on social spending in EMEs and LIDCs.6 Conversely, external partners are an important source of information on AEs, alongside authorities’ and scholars’ analyses.7

7. Staff benefits from intensive interaction on social spending with the World Bank and other IDIs. Interaction with development partners most often takes the form of bilateral discussions between IMF country teams and sectoral experts, either at headquarters or during missions. Collaboration on analytical projects appears to be much less frequent.8 Table 1 maps external interactions by topic and counterparts. Cooperation spans all areas of social spending, with social assistance, education, and health being the most common topics. The World Bank accounts for almost half of total interactions and is the most frequent counterpart across all topics, reflecting its significant expertise both on design and implementation of social spending programs. Interaction between IMF country teams and OECD and ILO is rare (only 1.3 and 1.2 percent of interactions respectively), consistent with their limited operational presence in the field.

Table 1.

Interaction with Other Institutions: Mapping Topics and Counterparts

(percent of total interactions)

article image
Source: Mission Chiefs’ Survey on IMF Engagement on Social Spending.

8. The factors primarily holding back engagement on social spending issues are competing priorities for country analysis, availability and quality of relevant data, and availability of expertise within the team (Figure 5). These three challenges were seen as key across surveillance and program countries, as well as across regions and income groups, and also for fragile states. In the case of fragile states data quality/availability issues were signaled as especially relevant.

Figure 5.
Figure 5.

Factors Affecting IMF Country Teams’ Engagement on Social Spending Issues

(percent)

Citation: Policy Papers 2019, 017; 10.5089/9781498318907.007.A003

Source: Mission Chiefs’ Survey on IMF Engagement on Social Spending.

9. Lack of information about other institutions’ engagement and differing institutional priorities pose important obstacles to enhanced external cooperation. MCs pointed to: (1) a lack of information on other institutions’ organizational set up, work plans, and country engagement; and (2) differences in institutional focus (e.g., improving social outcomes versus fiscal sustainability) as the main obstacles to more intensive external cooperation. Establishing cooperation processes and data sharing, alongside a more extensive use of informal channels were identified as key steps to enhancing cooperation.

D. Policy Advice

10. Social spending reforms are a common feature of IMF policy advice to member countries, both in surveillance and program countries (67 and 69 percent of the cases respectively, Figure 6). Some income group and regional variation is observed. While in AEs and EMEs social spending reforms are recommended in three-quarters of the cases, similar recommendations are made in only 1 of 2 LIDCs and fragile states, mostly reflecting less frequent recommendations in Sub-Saharan countries.

Figure 6.
Figure 6.

Has the IMF Team Recommended Reforms in the Area of Social Spending?

(percent of yes responses)

Citation: Policy Papers 2019, 017; 10.5089/9781498318907.007.A003

Source: Mission Chiefs’ Survey on IMF Engagement on Social Spending.

11. IMF policy advice on social spending often centers on targeting based on means-testing, both in surveillance and programs. The introduction or expansion of means-tested schemes is recommended in the majority of cases (64 percent) and the downsizing of schemes that do not require a means test is suggested in 18 percent of the cases. The expansion of social programs not based on a means test is recommended in only about 18 percent of cases. These results indicate that means-tested programs play a central role in IMF policy advice on social spending issues, a pattern that is more pronounced in program contexts when the introduction or expansion of a means-tested program is recommended in 4 of 5 cases, likely reflecting more severe fiscal space constraints during a fiscal adjustment, but only in one half of fragile states.

12. In some cases, IMF policy advice on social spending issues is reported to have been controversial with the authorities or other stakeholders, with higher reported controversy in EDE, LAC and CIS. IMF recommendations on social spending appear to have been controversial with the authorities or given rise to criticism by other stakeholders in only 15 percent of cases. This pattern is consistent across Fund activities (surveillance and programs) and most income groups. For EDE, LAC, and CIS MCs, policy advice was more often reported to be controversial, specifically in 42, 31, and 30 percent of the cases, respectively.

E. Programs: Objectives and Conditionality

13. In Fund-supported programs, MCs believe that objectives are generally aligned with countries’ social priorities and social spending is typically protected. In nearly all cases, MCs indicated that IMF programs entailed either fiscal consolidation or a neutral fiscal stance, with only a few cases of fiscal expansion. The majority of MCs (70 percent) view program objectives as consistent with country authorities’ social priorities, and an additional 19 percent were neutral with respect to this question. Even though fiscal consolidation is required to restore macroeconomic stability in many programs, MCs indicated that key social spending items are typically maintained (54 percent) or increased (37 percent). In most of the cases, the objective is to maintain or increase spending as a share of GDP or in nominal terms (Figure 7).

Figure 7.
Figure 7.

Programs Context and Objectives: Does the Program Seek to Protect Expand Social Spending?

(percent)

Citation: Policy Papers 2019, 017; 10.5089/9781498318907.007.A003

Source: Mission Chiefs’ Survey on IMF Engagement on Social Spending.

14. Conditionality in IMF programs is generally viewed as an effective mechanism to protect social spending. Almost all IMF programs include conditionality aimed at protecting and strengthening social spending. In terms of effectiveness, most MCs (63 percent) indicated that program conditionality is an effective way to protect spending and 22 percent were neutral on this statement. Indicative targets are the most widely used mechanism (indicated by 70 percent of MCs, Figure 8). Commitments of country authorities in Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFPs) are also common (about 40 percent of the cases). Structural benchmarks (SB), which entail design or approval of reform measures by governments, are used to a lesser extent (24 percent of the cases).9 Conditionality has been used on the whole spectrum of spending categories (education, health, social assistance, unemployment benefits, pensions, etc.) with no clear pattern across region and income groups. MCs reported that conditions are met most of the time, even though 75 percent of them acknowledged that during the life of the program at least one conditionality (either quantitative or structural) was missed at some point. Shortfalls in external donor financing flows or government revenue or lack of ownership are the most cited reasons for targets being missed.

Figure 8.
Figure 8.

Does the Program Include Conditionality on Social Spending?

(percent)

Citation: Policy Papers 2019, 017; 10.5089/9781498318907.007.A003

Source Mission Chiefs’ Survey on IMF Engagement on Social Spending.

15. There is room to improve on the design and implementation of conditionality. Almost half of the MCs indicated that the design of social spending conditionality in IMF programs could be improved by narrowing the definition of spending floors (e.g., aiming at the most critical programs in a selected way), broadening consultation with IDIs, and improving data quality. In underscoring the need to strengthen implementation of social spending measures (noted by 40 percent of respondents), MCs pointed to the need to enhance implementation capacity in program countries and early engagement with IDIs to ensure that conditionality reflects country-specific factors.

Annex I. Questionnaire

IMF Engagement on Social Spending

Questionnaire for Mission Chiefs

This questionnaire is being sent to all country mission chiefs. Questions 1–14 are for all countries, while questions 15–24 are only for program countries. The results of the survey will serve as input to the upcoming board paper on IMF Engagement on Social Spending: A Strategic Framework, which is central to management response to the IEO Report on The IMF and Social Protection. Click on hyperlink for Scoping Note. The main purpose of the survey is to assess the nature and extent of country teams’ engagement on social spending issues in their work and collaboration with external institutions on these issues.

Most of the questions can be answered very quickly. Where relevant, please highlight aspects and experiences that you consider important and noteworthy. In answering the questions, please feel free to provide links to information on the internet or notes/presentations that you or your team may have prepared related to social safeguard policies and social spending issues in general. Your response will be a very valuable input to the development of the strategic framework.

IMF Engagement on Social Spending: A Strategic Framework

Survey of Mission Chiefs

Please note that for the purposes of this questionnaire and the Board paper, social spending is defined as spending on 1) basic health, 2) basic education, and 3) social protection (which consists of social insurance and social assistance). Social insurance policies (e.g., unemployment insurance and pensions) aim at protecting populations from shocks that can adversely impact household incomes and welfare, and are typically financed by contributions and payroll taxes. Social assistance policies (e.g., universal and targeted transfers) aim at protecting households from poverty, and are typically financed by general government revenues.

  • 1. Your department: ______________________

  • 2. Mission chief for [country]: ______________________

  • 3. Start date of assignment ______________________

  • 4. Type of Fund engagement during your assignment:

    • a) Surveillance

    • b) Program/near program. Please specify program type, Start Year and End Year (if applicable)

  • 5. Do you assess social spending issues to be macro-critical for your country (affecting or having the potential to affect, domestic or external stability, or global stability, as defined inGuidance Note for Surveillance under Article IV consultations”)?

    • a) Yes

    • b) No

  • 6. Why is social spending macro-critical for your country? (check all options that you assess to be macro-critical)

    • a) Current social spending pressures are putting fiscal sustainability at risk

    • b) Future social spending pressures are expected to put fiscal sustainability at risk

    • c) Social spending is crowding out other important public spending thus creating risks for internal or external stability or growth.

    • d) Lack of adequate social spending is a risk to social and/or political stability.

    • e) The country is facing significant challenges due to population ageing.

    • f) Significant/increasing social spending needs due to high population growth.

    • g) Significant/increasing social spending needs due to conflict and/or refugees. h) Significant/increasing social spending needs due to natural disasters.

    • i) Social spending is inefficient (too much spending, but very little social outcomes).

    • j) Social spending has significant adverse impacts on incentives e.g. affecting labor market participation.

    • k) Social spending is key for achieving the authorities’ distributional objectives.

    • l) The country has large human capital gaps (may include SDG commitments)– scaled up education spending is needed.

    • m) The country has large human capital gaps (may include SDG commitments)– scaled up health spending is needed.

    • n) The country has large social protection gaps (may include SDG commitments)– scaled up social protection is needed.

    • o) Scaled up or significantly reformed social protection is needed to protect against the shocks of technological change (e.g., gig economy).

    • p) Scaled up or significantly reformed education spending is needed to adapt to technological change.

    • q) The country is implementing major reforms of social spending (e.g. move towards universal basic income, pension reform, healthcare reform, etc.) that may have macroeconomic consequences.

    • r) Other (please specify)

  • 7. Has the team recommended reforms in the area of social spending, including introduction and/or modification of social protection schemes, reforms in health and/or education spending?

    • a) Yes

    • b) No

  • 8. If yes to Q7, have your recommendations implied the following? (check all that apply)

    • a) Introduction/expansion of targeted schemes that require some type of means test

    • b) Reduction of targeted schemes that require some type of means test

    • c) Introduction/expansion of schemes that do not require some type of means test (including universal schemes)

    • d) Reduction of schemes that do not require some type of means test (including universal schemes)

  • 9. For any option (a)-(d) above that is checked: has this recommendation been controversial with the authorities or given rise to criticism by other stakeholders in the country?

    • a) Yes

    • b) No

  • 10. Whose analysis/resources have you relied on as your main source? (check all that apply)

    • a) Team’s own resources

    • b) Analysis conducted by another department. (please specify which below)

    • c) Technical Assistance. (please specify the department(s) below)

    • d) Support and tools provided by another department. (please specify the department(s) below)

    • e) Analysis conducted by the World Bank. (please specify below)

    • f) Analysis conducted by international institutions (e.g. AfDB, ADB, IADB, ILO, OECD, Unicef, EU). (please specify which institution(s) below)

    • g) Authorities’ analysis h) Academics’ analysis i) Other (please specify)

  • 11. Please check the appropriate boxes to indicate if the country team had explicit discussions with the listed institution on issues related to social spending (or other social policies) and if such discussions have been helpful. (Note: social assistance includes targeted and universal transfers to households; social insurance includes pensions, unemployment benefits; disability benefits.)

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  • 12. How do you interact with other institutions/organization and leverage external expertise?

    • a) Bilateral discussions with experts (e.g. WB managers and economists) at HQ

    • b) Bilateral discussions with experts (e.g. WB anagers and economists) during missions

    • c) Bilateral discussions with experts (e.g. WB managers and economists) by ResRep

    • d) Collaborating in analytical projects

    • e) Other (please specify)

  • 13. In your experience, indicate which of the following obstacles you have faced when cooperating/trying to cooperate with other institutions/organization on social protection issues. (check all that apply and specify which IDI or other institution (as CSOs or academics) they refer to)?

    • a) Lack of country-level involvement (country presence) by the other institutions/organizations

    • b) Lack of information on who does what (information on work plans and engagement by other institutions)

    • c) Lack of interest from the other institutions to cooperate with the Fund

    • d) Conceptual differences in understanding/approaches to social spending issues

    • e) Differences in institutional focus (e.g. improving social outcomes versus fiscal sustainability).

    • f) Other (please specify)

  • 14. What would improve your cooperation with other external institutions/organizations? (check all that apply and specify which IDI or other institution (as CSOs or academics) they refer to)

    • a) Established discussion channels/cooperation processes

    • b) More extensively using informal contact/discussion channels

    • c) Data sharing

    • d) Other (please specify)

    • e) Current set up works quite well/well enough

  • 15. Indicate which of the following tools your team has used.

    • a) Expenditure Assessment Tool (EAT)

    • b) FAD’s long-term pension and health expenditure projections

    • c) FAD’s Pension Reform Template

    • d) FAD’s Income Inequality (Gini) Database

    • e) FAD’s Energy Subsidies tools and templates

    • f) Macroeconomic and Distributional Implications of Fiscal Policies model developed by SPR

    • g) CEQ (Commitment to Equity project) incidence analysis methodology (in cooperation with CEQ)

    • h) WB ASPIRE database

    • i) WB PovcalNet analysis

    • j) WB Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA)

    • k) Interagency Social Protection Assessments (ISPA) tools

    • l) The SDG Indicators Global Database

    • m) The ILO’s social protection platform

    • n) Other (please specify)

  • 16. Have you found the tool(s) selected above have been helpful?

    • a) Yes

    • b) No

  • 17. Have the following challenges prevented you from covering social spending issues more fully? (check all that apply)

    • a) Covering social spending is not within the tasks mandated to the team

    • b) Lack of expertise within the team

    • c) Inability to draw on outside expertise

    • d) Cannot do adequate analysis because of data quality/availability

    • e) Competing priorities

    • f) The authorities are not interested

    • g) The authorities are sensitive to the topic

    • h) Achieving progress is unlikely anyway because of capacity constraints in the country’s public administration

    • i) Another institution (please specify) is taking the lead on social spending issues and there is no need for the Fund’s engagement in this area

    • j) Other (please specify)

  • 18. In what areas would you find it helpful to have more tools available to conduct analysis? (check all that apply)

    • a) Health

    • b) Education

    • c) Pensions

    • d) Unemployment insurance

    • e) Social assistance transfers to households (such as unconditional and conditional cash transfers)

    • f) Other (please specify)

  • 19. For each option a-f above that is checked, ask: list any tools you would find useful to conduct analysis (e.g. expenditure benchmarking tool)?

---END OF QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NON-PROGRAM COUNTRIES

…Questions for program countries

  • 20. In your view, were program objectives consistent with the authorities’ social priorities? (select one)

    • a) Strongly agree

    • b) Agree

    • c) Neutral

    • d) Disagree

    • e) Strongly disagree

    • f) Not applicable

  • 21. Does the program entail fiscal consolidation?

    • a) The program entails fiscal consolidation.

    • b) The program entails fiscal expansion.

    • c) The program is fiscally neutral.

  • 22. Does the program seek to protect or expand social spending?

    • a) Yes, key social spending is maintained. Then choose from (in nominal terms/ in real per capita terms/as a share of GDP/as a share of total public spending).

    • b) Yes, key social spending is increased. Then choose from (in nominal terms/ in real per capita terms/as a share of GDP/as a share of total public spending).

    • c) No. If no, please specify reasons______________

  • 23. Does the program have quantitative/structural conditionality on social spending? (check all that apply)

    • a) No

    • b) Yes, there are indicative targets (ITs) on a social spending floor

    • c) Yes, there are quantitative performance criteria (floors) (PCs) on a social spending floor

    • d) Yes, there is quantitative conditionality on specific areas, (please specify)

    • e) Yes, there are measures as commitments in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP)

    • f) Yes, there are measures as structural benchmarks (SBs).

  • 24. If the program includes quantitative/structural conditionality, what is included in ‘key social spending’?

    • a) Pension benefits

    • b) Unemployment benefits

    • c) Disability benefits

    • d) Social assistance benefits

    • e) Health benefit

    • f) Education spending

    • g) Other (please specify)

  • 25. If the program has conditionality on social spending, how effective has the conditionality on social spending been?

    • a) The measures are met most of the time.

    • b) The measures are not met most of the time.

  • 26. If during the program period the country authorities missed one or more social spending conditionality (if answer b) to question 25), please indicate the main reason(s). Please select all that apply:

    • a) Shortfall in external donor financing flows

    • b) Shortfall in government revenue (unrelated to external financing)

    • c) Lack of country ownership

    • d) Social spending conditionality defined too broadly

    • e) Social spending target became irrelevant

    • f) Other. Please specify:___________________

    • g) Not applicable

  • 27. Program conditionality on social spending is an effective way to protect such spending during an IMF program in your country

    • a) Strongly agree

    • b) Agree

    • c) Neutral

    • d) Disagree

    • e) Strongly disagree

    • f) Don’t know

    • g) Not applicable

  • 28. In your view, could the design/implementation of the social spending target in your country be improved to increase compliance rate?

    • a) Yes, the design could be improved.

    • b) Yes, the implementation could be improved.

    • c) No

  • 29. If you answered a) to Q28, please indicate how could the design of the social spending target be improved? Please select all that apply:

    • a) More targeted specification of spending floors (e.g. targeting few or most critical sectors and line ministries)

    • b) Revisiting and revising these targets more frequently

    • c) Seeking expertise from the World Bank and other development partners

    • d) Adopting contingency plans to preserve spending from fiscal shocks

    • e) Including adjustors in the design of target to account for external shocks (e.g. shortfall in external assistance)

    • f) Actively seeking and incorporate authorities’ inputs in designing of the targets

    • g) Improving the quality of fiscal data

    • h) Making the target a binding conditionality (e.g. performance criteria) i) Other (please specify)

  • 30. If you answered b) to Q28, please indicate how could the implementation of the social spending target be improved? Please select all that apply:

    • a) More detailed specification of spending floors by type of spending.

    • b) Seeking feedback from the World Bank and other development partners on implementation challenges in the country before conditionality is defined

    • c) Seeking expertise from the World Bank and other development who have more expertise on implementation issues during the program

    • d) Strengthening capacity building focused on improving administrative capacity for social spending to accompany the delivery of the reform process

    • e) Other (please specify)

1

Prepared by Maura Francese and Nghia Piotr Le (FAD).

2

The response rate was very high (83 percent) also for the sub-sample of fragile states.

3

Regions and country grouping (AE: Advanced Economies; CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States; EDA: Emerging and Developing Asia; EDE: Emerging and Developing Europe; LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; MENAP: Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa) follows the WEO country classification.

4

For example, almost 30 percent of teams use FAD’s tool for assessing spending, almost 20 percent use the Department’s long-term pension and health projections, about 16 percent use the inequality database and a similar share of teams uses tools and templates for energy subsidy reform. MCs would most welcome further tools on education, health and social assistance. Technical expertise is also leveraged, with 15 percent of the surveyed teams reporting using FAD TA when engaging on social spending issues.

5

Only 6 percent of AE MCs selected World Bank as an important source of information.

6

The World Bank was indicated as an important source of analysis and resources by respectively 60 and 53 percent of MCs of EMEs and LIDCs, and just above 60 percent for fragile states.

7

For AEs, the shares of MCs that flagged other international institutions and the authorities as an important source of information are 53 and 47 percent respectively.

8

18 percent of MCs indicated collaboration on analytical projects as a modality chosen for interacting with other institutions.

9

On IMF conditionality and the differences between type of conditions, see the IMF website.

A Strategy for IMF Engagement on Social Spending: Background Papers
Author: International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept., International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, &, and Review Department
  • View in gallery

    Response Rates by Region and Income Group

    (percent of countries)

  • View in gallery

    Is Social Spending Macro-critical for your Country?

    (percent of yes responses)

  • View in gallery

    Why Social Spending is Macro-critical

    (percent; multiple responses allowed)

  • View in gallery

    Why Social Spending is Macro-critical by Income Group and IMF Activity

    (percent; multiple responses allowed)

  • View in gallery

    Factors Affecting IMF Country Teams’ Engagement on Social Spending Issues

    (percent)

  • View in gallery

    Has the IMF Team Recommended Reforms in the Area of Social Spending?

    (percent of yes responses)

  • View in gallery

    Programs Context and Objectives: Does the Program Seek to Protect Expand Social Spending?

    (percent)

  • View in gallery

    Does the Program Include Conditionality on Social Spending?

    (percent)