Staff Guidance Note on the Fund's Engagement with Countries in Fragile Situations

This note aims to provide country teams with broad guidance on engagement with countries in fragile situations. The aim of the guidance note is to help staff maintain focus on issues specific to countries in fragile situations. While engagement should focus on the issues and principles laid out in the note, there is, of course, scope for staff to tailor engagement to country specific circumstances beyond proposed practices.


This note aims to provide country teams with broad guidance on engagement with countries in fragile situations. The aim of the guidance note is to help staff maintain focus on issues specific to countries in fragile situations. While engagement should focus on the issues and principles laid out in the note, there is, of course, scope for staff to tailor engagement to country specific circumstances beyond proposed practices.

List Of Acronyms

ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy

ADB Asian Development Bank

ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

BSG Budget Support Group

CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment

CSA Country Social Analysis

DAC Development Assistance Committee

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program

DfID Department of International Developments

ECF Extended Credit Facility

EFF Extended Fund Facility

GEMAP Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program

HIPC/MDRI Heavily Indebted Poor Countries/Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives

IDB Islamic Development Bank

IFIs International Financial Institutions

JMAP Joint Management Action Plan

LICs Low-Income Countries

LOI Letter of Intent

MC Management Committee

MEFP Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies

MICs Middle-Income Countries

MDTFs Multi-Donor Trust Funds

NTGL National Transitional Government

PA Palestinian Authority

PFM Public Financial Management

PMA Palestinian Monetary Authority

PNDP Palestinian National Development Plan

PRDP Palestinian Reform and Development Plan

PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility

PRGT Poverty Reduction Growth and Trust

PRS Poverty Reduction Strategy

PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

RAP Rights Accumulation Program

RCF Rapid Credit Facility

RFI Rapid Financing Instrument

RTACs Regional Technical Assistance Centers

SMP Staff-Monitored Program

TA Technical Assistance

UCT Upper Credit Tranche

WBG West Bank and Gaza

Introduction 1

1.This note provides operational guidance to staff on the Fund’s engagement with low- and middle-income countries in fragile situations. It reflects the Executive Board discussion of Macroeconomic and Operational Challenges in Countries in Fragile Situations . The Guidance Note aims to help Fund country teams better tailor engagement with countries in fragile situations to country-specific circumstances, including as regards policy design, the choice of financing facility or instrument, technical assistance and training, and donor coordination.2

2.The Fund is well placed to support member countries as they seek to transition out of fragility. Engagement may take multiple forms: surveillance only, staff-monitored programs (SMPs), emergency financing, or arrangements meeting the upper credit tranche (UCT) standard (hereafter UCT arrangements), all combined with technical assistance (TA) and training. Surveillance3 and programs support macroeconomic stability, which is key to a sustainable transition out of fragility. TA in the core areas of Fund expertise—e.g., public financial management (PFM), revenue mobilization, central banking and payment systems, and basic macroeconomic statistics—helps build capacity that is critical to state building and transition efforts. TA can also be a critical component of efforts to foster macroeconomic stability. As in other countries, Fund financial assistance can help countries meet balance of payments needs and can also catalyze donor assistance, including debt relief.4

3.Over the years, the Fund has engaged extensively in countries in fragile situations.The evidence indicates that, in general, Fund engagement is associated with improved macroeconomic outcomes and increased capacity. However, in some low- and middle- income countries, the experience indicates a greater risk of programs going off-track or failing to meet UCT-standard objectives. In these cases, most of the weak policy performance was linked to policy slippages rather than shocks. At times, this resulted in “stop-and-go”. relationship with countries in fragile situations and, due to frequent delays in reviews, greater volatility of Fund financing.

4.Identifying fragility in countries and tailoring Fund engagement to their specific characteristics is crucial to enhancing the Fund’s effectiveness in these countries. In particular, Fund activities in these countries should be guided by: (i) attention to political economy; (ii) content and pace of reforms that reflect the need for security and social cohesion as well as capacity constraints; (iii) promotion of approaches conducive to sustained engagement; and (iv) close coordination with donors.

5.The guidance note is organized as follows: First, it discusses common features of countries in fragile situations. It then provides guidance on policy design and the choice of form of engagement. Finally, it discusses the political context in countries in fragile situations, specific aspects of TA and training, and donor coordination. Appendix I seeks to clarify how to reflect these various elements in the drafting of Policy Notes and Staff Reports, and the remaining appendices provide country examples and good practices.

Characteristics And Identification Of Fragile Situations

6.While there is no universally accepted definition of “fragility” (see Box 1) and each country case is unique, countries in fragile situations typically share some common characteristics. Countries in fragile situations exhibit a preponderance of characteristics, including: (i) significant institutional and policy implementation weaknesses assessed using the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) or other relevant information;5 (ii) a fractious political context evidenced by a greater tendency to political stress and civil unrest; (iii) severe domestic resource constraints; and (iv) vulnerability to shocks. These characteristics may often translate into limited external assistance (often compounding the domestic resource constraint) and/or high degree of volatility in such assistance. Some countries may also experience domestic conflict, insecurity, and absence of government control, which may present spillover risks to neighboring countries.

Definitions of Fragility

World Bank World Development Report, 2011

Fragile states is the term used for countries facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. Often these countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past severe conflict.

Fragility and fragile situations—Periods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to violence.

OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)Fragility—Situations when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction and development, and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations.

European Commission

Fragility refers to weak or failing structures and to situations where the social contract is broken due to the state’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meet its obligations and responsibilities regarding service delivery, management of resources, rule of law, equitable access to power, security and safety of the populace, and protection and promotion of citizens' rights and freedoms.

7.Notwithstanding these commonalities, there is significant heterogeneity between fragile situations, and fragilities in a given country tend to change over time. The factors driving countries into fragility are case specific, as are the eventual transition out of fragility. Changing resource conditions, uncertain political transitions, shifting demographics, or lack of institutional capacity to deal with sudden and severe shocks can shift states from relative stability to political or economic fragility. In situations of fragility, the above-mentioned characteristics are combined in different ways in different countries at different times. A return to stability can vary from months to years (Somalia, for example, has been a failed state for over two decades, whereas the Kyrgyz Republic went in and out of two major political transitions within the course of one year each).

8.Effective Fund engagement requires, in the first instance, identification and regular updates of the country’s main fragilities and of the authorities’ policy capacity and commitment. These can help country teams tailor engagement through the complex process of emerging from fragility. The multiple dimensions of fragility can be assessed by drawing on analysis from donors, academics, and other relevant sources.6 In particular, a (possibly lagged) snapshot of institutional and policy implementation capacity can be obtained using the World Bank’s CPIA or other relevant information. These inputs can help country teams conduct needed regular assessments of: (i) the authorities’ willingness and ability to implement policy reforms and build institutional capacity; (ii) progress made in building peace, security, and political and social cohesion; and (iii) the level of engagement and the durability of support from the international community (see Appendix I on requirements for Policy Notes and Staff Reports).

Policy Design

9.In line with its central objective, Fund engagement with countries in fragile situations, should be aimed at achieving or ensuring macroeconomic stability and promoting sustainable growth. While this is not different from engagement in non-fragile situations, sustaining a relatively stable economic environment is itself a key ingredient of transition from fragility. Near-term objectives will differ significantly between country cases depending on the individual context, but generally the medium-term objective is to make progress toward a stable and sustainable macroeconomic environment that is consistent with strong and durable poverty reduction and growth.

10.With this overarching objective in mind, policy design in countries in fragile situations (both low and middle income) should ideally capture the following principles, while remaining consistent with the Fund’s Conditionality Guidelines when policies are to be supported by a Fund arrangement.7 These principles broadly apply across the whole Fund membership but are of particular importance in fragile situations (see Appendix V for experiences and good practices):

  • Explicit consideration of the political context: A closer and more realistic assessment of the socio-political constraints to reform and adjustment is a highly valuable input into program design. Staff needs to be in a position to understand what policies and reforms can contribute to social cohesion (e.g., a fall in inflation from very high levels that gives consumers of staple goods a sense of stability); conversely, what policies and reforms can put significant stress on the political and social fabric (e.g., a large fall in public sector employment, including in the military); and whether and how such stress can be managed. An understanding of the political and social context should, to the extent needed or possible, be factored in the implementation of all of the remaining principles below.

  • A well-tailored pace of macroeconomic adjustment:8 Quantitative objectives should take account of weak institutional capacity, uncertainties about domestic policy needs, and exposure to shocks. This principle is particularly important in situations involving peace-related spending, demobilization, or reconstruction, where policy and program design will need to reflect the costs of essential cohesion-building initiatives.

  • Opportunities for “quick wins”: At an early stage of engagement, it is important to focus on achievable, short-term objectives that can deliver early successes in order to build support for the process of reform. The delivery of quick wins in countries in fragile situations may have a more dramatic impact on building public support to reform compared to other low- and middle-income countries.

  • Inclusive growth and social protection: Explicit attention to inclusive growth, job creation, and basic social safety nets would likely be a central component of the country’s and international community’s medium-term strategy. For instance, to enhance peace and security, providing employment opportunities for low-skilled, idle youth may be of utmost importance. While keeping with the Fund’s central mandate, collaboration with donors and IFIs may help identify specific measures to include in Fund-supported programs that would offer the population the prospect of improving income and welfare, thus increasing buy-in to the reform process. The financial implications of these measures should be fully incorporated in the fiscal program.

  • Well-tailored structural reforms. Low capacity would typically suggest the need for a strictly prioritized, gradual agenda of key structural reforms. Consideration should also be given to the timing of socially critical measures. Such approaches could help foster realistic expectations that could enhance the legitimacy of state institutions—an issue of particular relevance for countries in fragile situations. That said, in some but likely rare cases where sufficient external financial support, TA, and government ownership exist, a “window of opportunity” for a more comprehensive structural reform agenda may be considered.

  • Integrated TA: Very close integration between policy advice and program design, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, TA is essential. In many if not most situations of fragility, adoption and effective implementation of key structural or institutional measures will not happen if the Fund or another international partner does not provide targeted and timely TA. Where applicable and beneficial, this approach can be reinforced with structural benchmarks and a TA matrix matching these benchmarks.

  • Contingency planning: Explicit and candid recognition of both political and economic risks should lead to an associated emphasis in program design on contingency plans. In countries in fragile situations, contingency planning may be all the more needed given the often fluid political situation that can affect policy decisions. Contingency planning can take a variety of forms, depending on circumstances, from explicit consideration of approaches to maintain continuous engagement in the face of difficulties (e.g., how to maintain the policy dialogue and delivery of TA when a Fund-supported program has veered off-track) to the design of specific contingency measures.

11.Program design will naturally differ between LIC and MIC cases, both in terms of capacity and financing needs. For instance, middle-income countries (MICs) at risk of, or emerging from, fragility may well have significantly higher financing needs given greater integration with world financial markets and/or heavier debt obligations. However, with these particular concerns in mind, program design in MICs would still need to encompass the principles noted above.

Modalities of engagement

12.Modalities of engagement. The Fund has had an intensive engagement in most countries in fragile situations.9 Sustained engagement is considered key to real progress in institution building and solid improvements in macroeconomic and social indicators. For the Fund, this may well require repeated use of available facilities and instruments (in a manner consistent with the terms of the relevant policies), as well as long-term TA and training, in coordination with the donor community. Given the protracted balance of payments needs typically faced by countries in fragile situations, Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangements are expected to remain the main vehicle of Fund engagement across the set of countries in fragile situations and over the long haul. However, what form of engagement is most appropriate at any specific point in time for a specific country? More specifically, what should be considered when choosing between close engagement in a surveillance-only context, an SMP, use of the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) or Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI), or a UCT arrangement? The following paragraphs should guide decisions on the form of engagement with countries in fragile situations, coupled with adequate consideration to country-specific circumstances, case-specific characteristics of fragility, and the need to promote approaches conducive to sustained engagement (see Appendix II for examples). Given heterogeneity among fragile situations, these paragraphs should not be taken to suggest that there is a “normal” or “standard” progression in forms of Fund engagement with countries experiencing fragility.

  • Close non-financial engagement: There are some middle- and low- income countries in fragile situations that could benefit significantly from frequent policy dialogue with Fund staff and targeted TA, but where a financial arrangement is precluded because of protracted arrears to the Fund, insufficient commitment to implement reforms (for example, due to strong political impediments), or lack of a potential, actual (present or prospective), or protracted balance of payments need. In these instances, close non-financial engagement may be the most effective form of engagement (see Appendix III for examples).10

  • The Fund can have frequent interactions with the country to discuss and monitor macroeconomic developments and provide policy advice, including through elaboration of a quantified macroeconomic framework. This can be achieved using a combination of Article IV consultation missions and staff visits.

  • Extensive TA can also be provided as needed to build capacity.

  • The Fund can, and should, remain closely engaged with the country’s development partners to help countries design and implement a well-coordinated set of policies and to coordinate responses to TA needs. Where useful, and where requested by the member, staff could produce regular reports on macroeconomic developments and policies and related capacity building for the benefit of the international community.

  • Staff-Monitored Program : An SMP can be used to help member countries, including middle- and low-income countries, establish, or re-establish a track record of policy implementation ahead of a Fund financial arrangement. In particular, where needed, an SMP can help provide assurances that the authorities have the capacity and commitment to implement a UCT-quality economic program (see Appendix IV for country examples).

  • The use of an SMP would be more appropriate than an RCF in cases where (i) significant capacity constraints exist and there are no adequate safeguards to Fund resources; and (ii) there is no urgent need to draw on the Fund’s financial resources. In some cases, an SMP and a drawing under the RCF may be used concurrently if an urgent financing need arises.

  • SMPs can also be the preferred modality of engagement with countries that have overdue obligations to the Fund or have arrears to official or external private creditors. In these cases, careful examination of a country’s financing situation will be needed in light of a probable subsequent request for a Fund arrangement or for the resumption of an arrangement that has gone off track.11

  • Rapid Credit Facility (for PRGT-eligible countries) : The RCF is the preferred choice of engagement in low-income countries (LICs) that cannot yet implement UCT policies due to a variety of factors (e.g., inability to make credible commitments beyond the short term, inability to absorb stress from large policy adjustment, severe capacity constraints) but where Fund financing is needed to address an urgent balance of payments need.12 The RCF was designed, inter alia, for circumstances where UCT conditionality is “not feasible, for instance in cases where institutional and policy capacity is highly constrained” or is not needed.13

  • In addition to providing some financial support,14 the RCF can provide a framework for policy support and TA, and also play a catalytic role in mobilizing donor financing.

  • Support under the RCF can facilitate an improvement in policies and outcomes needed to meet the requirements for an ECF arrangement. In some cases, as part of a well-paced progression out of fragility, repeated use of the RCF can help countries build a track record toward a UCT arrangement in a way tailored to country-specific characteristics.15 Support under the RCF can facilitate a build-up in institutional capacity and a gradual improvement in economic policies needed to meet requirements for an ECF arrangement. In these cases, the RCF would facilitate sustained engagement, avoiding a “stop-and-go” pattern that might result from targeting over-ambitious policies under a UCT arrangement. It would best be framed within a medium-term strategy, which would highlight the Fund’s intention to have such a sustained engagement with the concerned member country. Financing under the RCF can also be underpinned by a track-record SMP.16

  • Flexibility can be practiced under certain circumstances for countries that have arrears to official or external private creditors, making RCF disbursements possible without meeting all the conditions of the Fund’s policies on non-toleration of sovereign arrears or lending into arrears.17 18 For instance, in the wake of a conflict or natural catastrophe, use of the RCF can be part of a concerted plan of action by the international community that is expected to lead to the normalization of relations with official creditors and a program supported by a Fund financial arrangement. In all cases where external arrears exist, staff reports for RCF requests should provide detailed information on such arrears and discuss prospects for arrears clearance.

  • The RCF should not be used if a UCT-quality program is feasible and more appropriate.

  • Rapid Financing Instrument (GRA financing) :19 The RFI is designed to provide rapid, low-access financing to address urgent balance of payments needs arising from a variety of circumstances, including fragile or post-conflict situations or other disruptive events. Like the RCF, the RFI was designed for situations where UCT-quality conditionality is either not feasible, for example due to current institutional and policy implementation constraints, or not necessary.

  • In addition to providing financial support, the RFI can provide a framework for policy support and TA, and play a catalytic financing role for both official and market sources.

  • Like the RCF, in some cases, repeated use of the RFI, consistent with the rules, can be part of a well-paced progression out of fragility. Policy support under the RFI can also be tailored to help countries build a track record toward UCT arrangements. Financing under the RFI can also be underpinned by a track-record building SMP. Use of the RFI, with or without an SMP, would provide an opportunity to assess the member’s commitment and progress toward building commitment to reform and the ability to implement an UCT-quality economic program.

  • Like the RCF, there is flexibility in applying the Fund’s policies on non-toleration of sovereign arrears and lending into arrears in the context of RFI disbursements.20

  • UCT Arrangements (for PRGT-eligible countries and GRA financing): As any other Fund members, countries in fragile situations are eligible to use Fund financing facilities requiring the implementation of a UCT-quality economic program. In some circumstances, moving quickly to a UCT arrangement may have large payoffs, but in others, moving too early could be counter-productive and may result in ineffective implementation of the UCT arrangement. An example of the former type of circumstances would be the presence of new governments with strong reform credentials backed by strong TA and policy support from the international community. Therefore, adoption of a UCT arrangement in a fragile situation requires a careful assessment of the strength of the program and the prospects for its implementation, taking note of relevant institutional, social, and political risks and constraints; these arrangements should be deployed only in support of programs that have good prospects for success.

13.Re-evaluation of modes of engagement. As precise judgments on the credibility of policy commitments and on implementation capacity are difficult to make, staff needs to remain open to re-evaluate modes of engagement. This is particularly true for the choice between RCF/RFI and UCT arrangements. For instance, in circumstances where the initial strategy envisaged several RCF or RFI purchases but progress under these purchases has been faster than expected, a quicker switch to a UCT arrangement may be advisable. Similarly, when the initial strategy envisaged early use of a UCT arrangement but that arrangement has been marked by severe and repeated slippages, it could be beneficial to all parties to switch to a different mode of engagement (e.g., use of the RCF/RFI or SMP before a new UCT arrangement).

14.Access: Determination of access should be considered for each RCF/RFI disbursement and UCT arrangement in the context of the needed length of engagement and the access norms, limits, and caps established for each individual facility. As with all Fund financing arrangements, access depends on three standard criteria: (i) the member’s balance of payments need; (ii) the strength of its program and capacity to repay the Fund, taking into account the member’s policy plans, adjustment effort, commitment to implement the program, institutional capacity, track record of policy implementation, and country circumstances, such as vulnerabilities, imbalances, and debt sustainability; and (iii) the amount of outstanding Fund credit and the member’s record of past use.21

Considering The Political Context

15.A deeper understanding of the political context in countries in fragile situations is needed to improve the design of Fund-supported policies, particularly the pace of adjustment and reform, and to have a more informed judgment of the risks of engagement. A deeper knowledge and understanding of specific country contexts, including the political and institutional environment, and the constraints and opportunities they create can help support a more effective and feasible reform strategy. In fact, in the UFR context, the Fund’s Guidelines on Conditionality provide that “the Fund will pay due regard to the domestic social and political objectives, the economic priorities, and the circumstances of members, including the causes of their balance of payments problems and their administrative capacity to implement reforms”. Moreover, the Fund’s Guidance Note on The Role of the Fund in Governance Issues notes that seeking information about the political situation in member countries can be an essential element in judging the prospect for policy implementation.22 Paying attention to countries’ political circumstances can also help improve the prospects for successful and sustained engagement with countries in fragile situations, as it can inform more realistic expectations of what can be achieved, including the adoption of second best reforms, and shed light on the risks involved. Having said that, however, understanding the political context may not be straightforward, especially given the complexity and volatility of political and social developments in countries in fragile situations.

16.Fund staff should coordinate closely with donors and other IFIs to share information on (subject to confidentiality procedures), and understand, the political economy in countries in fragile situations. Fund staff, especially resident representatives, should also conduct their own evaluation of the political situation and social context, to the extent possible. By doing so, the extent and pace of policy measures set under a Fund-supported program, including macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms, may also be consistent with socio-political factors. The main areas to consider when analyzing the main drivers of political decisions in countries can include: (i) political process in the country; (ii) the role of formal and informal norms; (iii) social risks and access to public goods; and (iv) the main fault lines in society. Alongside such understandings, strong outreach by mission teams and resident representatives with local civil society, parliamentarians, and academics can also help build support to the reform program and increase understanding of the role of the Fund in the reform process (see Appendix VI for fuller details and good practices in understanding the political context).

Technical Assistance And Training

17.Capacity building, which includes TA and training, should be an integral part of the Fund’s engagement with countries in fragile situations, regardless of the mode of such engagement. Key principles include the following:

  • Paying closer attention to a country’s absorption capacity, including the availability of staff and other resources in the country.

  • Developing well-tailored TA programs, with discrete objectives and deliverables that are clearly aligned with the objectives of the program, the authorities’ capacity, commitment to implement reforms, and quick wins if identified.

  • Focusing on a programmatic approach to TA. This will typically involve preparation with country authorities of a plan that spells out how the Fund’s TA will support their reform objectives over the medium term. This approach provides greater predictability for the recipient country and continuity in the provision of TA, which in turn facilitates improved coordination among TA providers.

  • Increasing reliance on resident macroeconomic advisors—utilizing new financing facilities and instruments where necessary.23 Given significantly more constrained capacity in countries in fragile situations, boots on the ground may be a more effective and lasting form of delivering TA, particularly at an early stage, when efficient communication and coordination with the authorities are crucial to kick-start capacity building.

  • Enhancing ongoing donor coordination, including the use of trust funds supported by donor financing—without overwhelming country officials and creating competing TA initiatives. The Steering Committees of RTACs would be a natural platform for this, in particular against the background of plans to better integrate them into the Resource Allocation Plans/Regional Strategy Note processes. IMF participation in country-specific donor groups would also be desirable, as appropriate and feasible. See below for more details on donor coordination.

18.Training of country officials, including through increased emphasis on training in home country and greater use of RTACs.24 A regional approach has the advantage of offering opportunities for peer-to-peer learning, while maintaining a focus on the specific needs of the region. Again here, the principle of boots on the ground may be more beneficial in the context of fragility.

Coordinating With Donors

19.The Fund can play an important role in coordination efforts between the authorities and donors, including development agencies, in countries in fragile situations. While the Fund may not always assume the role of lead coordinator, it is often expected to play a catalytic role through its financing and the establishment of a consistent macroeconomic framework. To improve the Fund’s performance in this area, country teams, particularly resident representatives, would be expected to pay more attention to the following:

  • Remain closely engaged with donors on their financing commitments and discuss countries’ financing needs.

  • Help keep donor engagement focused via prioritization of key program objectives within the resource envelope, while working closely with the country authorities to avoid overwhelming their capacity. In some instances, this can be achieved through the use of common conditionality matrices, which target a limited set of complementary reforms supported by the country’s development partners (see Appendix VII for an example).

  • Work closely with country authorities and donors to identify quick wins, taking into consideration financing implications. Where possible, quick win reforms should be embedded into Fund macroeconomic frameworks. Missions should work with country authorities, donors, and IFIs on the ground to help quantify financing implications of the identified reforms and, wherever possible, incorporate them into the authorities’ budget and the Fund’s macroeconomic framework.

  • Discuss with donors their understanding of the political and social situations to provide context to the reform strategy and to better tailor the pace and type of reforms.

  • Be engaged on use of budget support as an important and flexible mode of delivery of donor assistance, including through country-specific trust funds with links to performance under Fund-supported programs.25 In countries that already have multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) in place or where the establishment of MDTFs is under consideration (at the World Bank, other IFI, or bilateral donors), Fund staff should strive to remain fully informed of the process, in order to study the opportunity for a donor budget support window that would be linked to a Fund-supported program.

Staff Guidance Note on the Fund’s Engagement with Countries in Fragile Situations
Author: International Monetary Fund