Abstract
The IMFC in its April 2010 Communiqué pledged to complete the 14th Quota Review before January 2011 in line with the parameters agreed in Istanbul.
“…we support a shift in quota share to dynamic emerging market and developing countries of at least five percent from over-represented to under-represented countries using the current quota formula as a basis to work from. We are also committed to protecting the voting share of the poorest members.”
IMF Communiqué, Istanbul, October 2009
I. Introduction1
1. The IMFC in its April 2010 Communiqué pledged to complete the 14th Quota Review before January 2011 in line with the parameters agreed in Istanbul. 2 The Committee of the Whole (COW) has since continued its work aimed at developing proposals that could command broad support. At its most recent meeting in September, there was a shared commitment to reaching an agreement within the agreed timetable but views remained divided on many issues.3 To facilitate progress towards the agreed goal, this paper suggests possible elements that could help form the basis for an agreement. These elements seek to build on the discussions to date and balance the diverse views that have been expressed. Inevitably, they will not fully meet the preferences or priorities of any individual member, and difficult compromises will be required from all sides if an agreement is to be reached.
2. The 14th Quota Review is a key element of the broader reform of Fund governance. Work continues on other elements, including on the size and composition of the Executive Board, the role of the IMFC, the Fund’s mandate, management selection, and staff diversity. These issues are not yet resolved, and work on them continues. In the meantime, it is important that further progress on quota issues is made, given the complexities involved and the limited time remaining to meet the agreed deadline.
3. Despite the urgency of concluding an agreement on the 14th Review, the ratification process of the 2008 reform is still incomplete. As of early October, 89 members (out of 113 required) accounting for 81.2 percent of the total voting power (85 percent required) have completed the necessary ratification procedures for the reform to become effective. It is crucial for the credibility of the reform process that the remaining members ratify the amendments as rapidly as possible.
II. Size of the Increase
4. The COW has held two substantive discussions on the size of the overall increase. The staff paper for the initial discussion in April sought to respond to the IMFC’s call in its October 2009 Communiqué for the Fund ―to examine the appropriate size and composition of its resources needed to safeguard its long-term ability to meet members’ needs, consistent with the Fund’s status as a quota-based institution.‖4 That paper considered the size of the Fund in light of a range of indicators and scenario analysis. It concluded that a substantial quota increase is needed, with some indicators pointing to a doubling, and other indicators pointing to even larger increases. A follow up paper in September noted that subsequent developments, notably the euro area crisis and progress on further reform of the Fund’s lending facilities, had further strengthened the case for a doubling of quotas.5
5. In these discussions, most Directors supported a substantial overall quota increase to ensure that the Fund has sufficient resources to meet members’ needs. Most Directors indicated that they could support a doubling of quotas, with a number viewing this as an upper bound and a number of others seeing it as a minimum. A few other Directors, pointing to the expanded New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), were not convinced about the need to increase quota resources substantially beyond that needed to achieve the targeted realignment of quota shares. Many Directors noted that the size of the NAB should be reconsidered in light of the quota increase to maintain an appropriate balance between quota and borrowed resources.
6. In light of these discussions, the simulations in this paper are based on a doubling of quotas. Such an increase would broadly restore the ratio of quotas to global output prevailing at the time of the 11th Review in 1998, which was the last general quota increase, and would partially reverse the decline that has occurred in the size of members’ quotas relative to other indicators of potential need. This would significantly strengthen the Fund’s ability to provide actual or contingent financial support to its members under a range of scenarios over the medium term. It is recognized that the necessary broad support for such an increase may only be forthcoming if there is a presumption of some reduction in the size of the NAB as part of the review, scheduled to be completed by November 2011.
III. Realignment of Quota Shares
7. The staff papers on quota share realignment prepared for the COW have been guided by the objectives laid out in the IMFC’s Istanbul Communiqué. These papers have explored a range of issues, including the relative emphasis to be placed on the quota shift to dynamic EMDCs and from over- to under-represented countries, the definition of dynamic EMDCs, the size of the net shift to EMDCs, possible linkages with members’ financial contributions to the Fund, and alternative modalities for distributing the increase between equiproportional, selective and ad hoc quota increases.6 The papers have also explored alternative modalities for giving effect to the IMFC’s commitment to protect the voting share of the poorest members.
8. Given the wide-ranging views expressed on these issues, the most recent staff paper (Fourteenth General Review of Quotas–Further Considerations, 9/3/10) sought to begin to narrow the debate somewhat. In particular, it presented simulations based on a narrower range of overall increases and different combinations of selective and ad hoc increases, where the latter were distributed to a sub-set of members based in part on their shares in the compressed GDP blend variable. This approach was put forward as a possible compromise between those Directors who consider that the quota formula should be the primary distribution mechanism and those who argue that economic weight should play a larger role. The simulations did not include an equiproportional increase given the limited support for such an approach in previous discussions, and the emphasis on realigning quota shares in the 14th Review. The simulations also protected the individual quota shares of the poorest members based on two alternative criteria: the list of PRGT-eligible countries, and the countries eligible for Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief (PCDR).
9. While Directors reiterated their commitment to the IMFC goals, significant differences remained on the details (see The Chairman’s Concluding Remarks Fourteenth General Review of Quotas Possible Elements of a Compromise Committee of the Whole on Review of Quotas Meeting, 10/7/10). A number of Directors viewed the approaches laid out in the staff paper as a good basis for further work. However, many others considered that a larger net shift to EMDCs was needed, called for PPP GDP to play a larger role, and did not support protection for over-represented advanced countries. A number of other Directors emphasized that the formula should remain the primary mechanism for distributing quota increases and favored only limited ad hoc increases. These Directors and several others emphasized that all over-represented countries should contribute to the adjustment in quota shares, while being fully protected from becoming under-represented. Some Directors noted that all eligible under-represented countries should benefit from ad hoc increases.
10. The simulations below seek to refine the approach set out in the last paper in light of these views. They also include some possible additional elements that could, if there was sufficient support, help to facilitate a broader compromise. It is recognized at the outset that these simulations do not include a number of specific elements that Directors have put forward in previous discussions.7 Many of these suggestions and requests, while having considerable merit when considered in isolation, go in conflicting directions and therefore may not provide an adequate basis for achieving the necessary broad support.
11. In a similar vein, further work on the quota formula is not proposed at this stage. All Directors have expressed misgivings about aspects of the formula agreed in 2008, with many considering that it is severely flawed. The need for further work on the formula was already recognized at the time of the 2008 reform8 and an early staff paper issued for consideration of the Executive Board took stock of the issues that had been identified by the Board in the 2008 reform.9 However, while there is unanimity that the formula has flaws, there is little consensus on what they are, or even their general direction, and there are also data constraints precluding refinements in some areas. Recognizing these differences, the approach to the quota distribution illustrated in the last staff paper was put forward as a compromise, as noted above, and the agreement on the 14th Review could include a commitment to a realistic timetable for further work.
12. The simulations set out in this paper include the following elements (see Simulations 1 and 4 of Table 1):
A selective increase amounting to 60 percent of the total. When combined with the additional elements below, particularly protection for the poorest, this would ensure sizable quota increases for most members, while at the same time achieving a realignment of members’ shares based on the current quota formula. No equiproportional increase is proposed.
An ad hoc increase for a sub-set of members amounting to the remaining 40 percent. A major part of this increase would be distributed to members whose post-second round quota share is less than their share in the compressed GDP blend variable. This is in line with the approach illustrated in Simulation 2 of the September paper (Fourteenth General Review of Quotas – Further Considerations, 9/3/10). Relative to the mixed approach considered in previous papers, the GDP blend approach tends to concentrate the ad hoc increases on EMDCs that are under-represented under the compressed GDP blend, generally resulting in larger increases for those countries.
In a change from the previous paper, all members that are under-represented based on the GDP blend variable would be eligible for an ad hoc increase. Under this approach, three under-represented advanced countries (Australia, Greece, and Spain) that are also under-represented using the GDP blend variable would receive part of the ad hoc allocation to reduce their out-of-lineness in terms of the GDP blend. Given the focus of the review on a shift to dynamic EMDCs, it is suggested that these countries could receive a smaller reduction in out-of-lineness (say, one third of the size) compared with that applying for eligible EMDCs.10 In addition, as before, major advanced countries that are under-represented under the GDP blend participate in the ad hoc increase but are capped at their post-selective or post-second round quota share, whichever is greater.
As before, part of the ad hoc increase is used to protect over-represented countries from becoming under-represented. This applies to both advanced countries and EMDCs. Also countries under-represented under the formula only would participate in the ad hoc increase to ensure that their increased share following the selective increase is not diluted.
A further part of the increase is used to protect the individual post-second round quota shares of the poorest members. The same two eligibility criteria as in the previous paper are considered. The PCDR criterion limits eligibility to countries with annual per capita income below the prevailing operational IDA cut-off, or below twice the cut-off for small countries, while PRGT-eligible countries also include many with per capita income above the thresholds, reflecting the asymmetry of PRGT entry and graduation criteria (Table 4).11 A further increase in basic votes is not included, given that only a few Directors indicated at the last discussion that they were open to such an approach.
Illustrative Quota Simulations
(In percent)
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.
GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their post second round or based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced post selective quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Including Korea and Singapore.
Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.
Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between GDP blend (see footnote 4/) and post-selective quota share.
Illustrative Quota Simulations
(In percent)
| Post Second Round Quota Share 3/ | Calculated Quota Share | GDP Blend Share 4/ | 100 percent increase; 0/60/40 Allocation 1/ | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRGT Protection 2/ | PCDR Protection 2/ | |||||||||||
| Simulation 1 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 5/ | Simulation 2 Simulation 1 with Cap 6/ | Simulation 3 Simulation 2 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 7/ | Simulation 4 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 8/ | Simulation 5 Simulation 4 with Cap 6/ | Simulation 6 Simulation 5 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 7/ | |||||||
| Advanced economies | 60.5 | 58.2 | 60.0 | 58.2 | 58.2 | 57.6 | 58.2 | 58.2 | 57.7 | |||
| Major advanced economies | 45.3 | 42.9 | 48.0 | 43.8 | 43.8 | 43.3 | 43.8 | 43.8 | 43.3 | |||
| Of which: United States | 17.7 | 17.0 | 21.6 | 17.7 | 17.7 | 17.5 | 17.7 | 17.7 | 17.5 | |||
| Other advanced economies | 15.1 | 15.3 | 11.9 | 14.4 | 14.4 | 14.3 | 14.4 | 14.5 | 14.3 | |||
| Emerging Market and Developing Countries | 39.5 | 41.8 | 40.0 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 42.4 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 42.3 | |||
| Developing countries | 32.4 | 34.1 | 33.2 | 34.6 | 34.5 | 35.1 | 34.6 | 34.5 | 35.1 | |||
| Africa | 4.9 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 | |||
| Asia 9/ | 12.6 | 17.7 | 17.3 | 16.0 | 16.0 | 16.2 | 16.2 | 16.1 | 16.3 | |||
| Middle East, Malta & Turkey | 7.2 | 6.2 | 5.2 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.5 | |||
| Western Hemisphere | 7.7 | 7.0 | 8.0 | 7.6 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 7.6 | 7.8 | 8.0 | |||
| Transition economies | 7.1 | 7.7 | 6.8 | 7.2 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 7.3 | |||
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |||
| Memorandum items: | ||||||||||||
| EU 27 | 31.9 | 31.3 | 27.8 | 30.4 | 30.4 | 30.1 | 30.4 | 30.4 | 30.1 | |||
| LICs (PRGT-eligible) | 4.3 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | |||
| LICs (PCDR eligibility) | 3.0 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | |||
| Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.) | 6.4 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.9 | ||||||
| Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.) | 5.6 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 6.2 | ||||||
| Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 10/ | 5.8 | 5.8 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.7 | ||||||
| EMDCs (shift in p.p.) | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.8 | ||||||
| Uniform reduction factor 11/ | 40.1 | 45.5 | 64.8 | 45.6 | 56.4 | 75.8 | ||||||
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.
GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their post second round or based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced post selective quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Including Korea and Singapore.
Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.
Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between GDP blend (see footnote 4/) and post-selective quota share.
Illustrative Quota Simulations
(In percent)
| Post Second Round Quota Share 3/ | Calculated Quota Share | GDP Blend Share 4/ | 100 percent increase; 0/60/40 Allocation 1/ | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRGT Protection 2/ | PCDR Protection 2/ | |||||||||||
| Simulation 1 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 5/ | Simulation 2 Simulation 1 with Cap 6/ | Simulation 3 Simulation 2 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 7/ | Simulation 4 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 8/ | Simulation 5 Simulation 4 with Cap 6/ | Simulation 6 Simulation 5 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 7/ | |||||||
| Advanced economies | 60.5 | 58.2 | 60.0 | 58.2 | 58.2 | 57.6 | 58.2 | 58.2 | 57.7 | |||
| Major advanced economies | 45.3 | 42.9 | 48.0 | 43.8 | 43.8 | 43.3 | 43.8 | 43.8 | 43.3 | |||
| Of which: United States | 17.7 | 17.0 | 21.6 | 17.7 | 17.7 | 17.5 | 17.7 | 17.7 | 17.5 | |||
| Other advanced economies | 15.1 | 15.3 | 11.9 | 14.4 | 14.4 | 14.3 | 14.4 | 14.5 | 14.3 | |||
| Emerging Market and Developing Countries | 39.5 | 41.8 | 40.0 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 42.4 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 42.3 | |||
| Developing countries | 32.4 | 34.1 | 33.2 | 34.6 | 34.5 | 35.1 | 34.6 | 34.5 | 35.1 | |||
| Africa | 4.9 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 | |||
| Asia 9/ | 12.6 | 17.7 | 17.3 | 16.0 | 16.0 | 16.2 | 16.2 | 16.1 | 16.3 | |||
| Middle East, Malta & Turkey | 7.2 | 6.2 | 5.2 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.5 | |||
| Western Hemisphere | 7.7 | 7.0 | 8.0 | 7.6 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 7.6 | 7.8 | 8.0 | |||
| Transition economies | 7.1 | 7.7 | 6.8 | 7.2 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 7.3 | |||
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |||
| Memorandum items: | ||||||||||||
| EU 27 | 31.9 | 31.3 | 27.8 | 30.4 | 30.4 | 30.1 | 30.4 | 30.4 | 30.1 | |||
| LICs (PRGT-eligible) | 4.3 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | |||
| LICs (PCDR eligibility) | 3.0 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | |||
| Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.) | 6.4 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.9 | ||||||
| Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.) | 5.6 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 6.2 | ||||||
| Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 10/ | 5.8 | 5.8 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.7 | ||||||
| EMDCs (shift in p.p.) | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.8 | ||||||
| Uniform reduction factor 11/ | 40.1 | 45.5 | 64.8 | 45.6 | 56.4 | 75.8 | ||||||
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.
GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their post second round or based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced post selective quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Including Korea and Singapore.
Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.
Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between GDP blend (see footnote 4/) and post-selective quota share.
Alternative Eligibility Criteria for Protection of the Poorest
See Eligibility to Use the Fund’s Facilities for Concessional Financing (January 11, 2010). Shaded countries are PCDR eligible countries (see Footnote 2). Zimbabwe has overdue obligations to the PRGT and is currently not PRGT eligible (see also footnote 11 in the main text).
Cutoffs based on income (Atlas method; countries with income per capita below the IDA cutoff (currently US$1,135 per year) plus “small states” with income per-capita below 200% of the IDA cutoff); see Proposal for a Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust Fund (April 22, 2010).
Alternative Eligibility Criteria for Protection of the Poorest
| PRGT 1/ | PRGT 2/ | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of | 49 | Nigeria | 1 | Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of |
| 2 | Armenia | 50 | Papua New Guinea | 2 | Bangladesh |
| 3 | Bangladesh | 51 | Rwanda | 3 | Benin |
| 4 | Benin | 52 | Samoa | 4 | Burkina Faso |
| 5 | Bhutan | 53 | Sao Tome and Principe | 5 | Burundi |
| 6 | Bolivia | 54 | Senegal | 6 | Cambodia |
| 7 | Burkina Faso | 55 | Sierra Leone | 7 | Central African Republic |
| 8 | Burundi | 56 | Solomon Islands | 8 | Chad |
| 9 | Cambodia | 57 | Somalia | 9 | Comoros |
| 10 | Cameroon | 58 | St. Lucia | 10 | Congo, Democratic Republic of |
| 11 | Cape Verde | 59 | St. Vincent and the Grenadines | 11 | Cote d’Ivoire |
| 12 | Central African Republic | 60 | Sudan | 12 | Djibouti |
| 13 | Chad | 61 | Tajikistan | 13 | Eritrea |
| 14 | Comoros | 62 | Tanzania | 14 | Ethiopia |
| 15 | Congo, Dem. Republic of | 63 | Timor-Leste | 15 | Gambia, The |
| 16 | Congo, Republic of | 64 | Togo | 16 | Ghana |
| 17 | Cote d’Ivoire | 65 | Tonga | 17 | Guinea |
| 18 | Djibouti | 66 | Uganda | 18 | Guinea-Bissau |
| 19 | Dominica | 67 | Uzbekistan | 19 | Haiti |
| 20 | Eritrea | 68 | Vanuatu | 20 | Kenya |
| 21 | Ethiopia | 69 | Vietnam | 21 | Kyrgyz Republic |
| 22 | Gambia, The | 70 | Yemen, Republic of | 22 | Lao People’s Democratic Republic |
| 23 | Georgia | 71 | Zambia | 23 | Liberia |
| 24 | Ghana | 24 | Madagascar | ||
| 25 | Grenada | 25 | Malawi | ||
| 26 | Guinea | 26 | Mali | ||
| 27 | Guinea-Bissau | 27 | Mauritania | ||
| 28 | Guyana | 28 | Mozambique | ||
| 29 | Haiti | 29 | Myanmar | ||
| 30 | Honduras | 30 | Nepal | ||
| 31 | Kenya | 31 | Nicaragua | ||
| 32 | Kiribati | 32 | Niger | ||
| 33 | Kyrgyz Republic | 33 | Papua New Guinea | ||
| 34 | Lao People’s Democratic Republic | 34 | Rwanda | ||
| 35 | Lesotho | 35 | Sao Tome & Principe | ||
| 36 | Liberia | 36 | Senegal | ||
| 37 | Madagascar | 37 | Sierra Leone | ||
| 38 | Malawi | 38 | Somalia | ||
| 39 | Maldives | 39 | Sudan | ||
| 40 | Mali | 40 | Tajikistan | ||
| 41 | Mauritania | 41 | Tanzania | ||
| 42 | Moldova | 42 | Togo | ||
| 43 | Mongolia | 43 | Uganda | ||
| 44 | Mozambique | 44 | Uzbekistan | ||
| 45 | Myanmar | 45 | Vietnam | ||
| 46 | Nepal | 46 | Yemen, Republic of | ||
| 47 | Nicaragua | 47 | Zambia | ||
| 48 | Niger |
See Eligibility to Use the Fund’s Facilities for Concessional Financing (January 11, 2010). Shaded countries are PCDR eligible countries (see Footnote 2). Zimbabwe has overdue obligations to the PRGT and is currently not PRGT eligible (see also footnote 11 in the main text).
Cutoffs based on income (Atlas method; countries with income per capita below the IDA cutoff (currently US$1,135 per year) plus “small states” with income per-capita below 200% of the IDA cutoff); see Proposal for a Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust Fund (April 22, 2010).
Alternative Eligibility Criteria for Protection of the Poorest
| PRGT 1/ | PRGT 2/ | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of | 49 | Nigeria | 1 | Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of |
| 2 | Armenia | 50 | Papua New Guinea | 2 | Bangladesh |
| 3 | Bangladesh | 51 | Rwanda | 3 | Benin |
| 4 | Benin | 52 | Samoa | 4 | Burkina Faso |
| 5 | Bhutan | 53 | Sao Tome and Principe | 5 | Burundi |
| 6 | Bolivia | 54 | Senegal | 6 | Cambodia |
| 7 | Burkina Faso | 55 | Sierra Leone | 7 | Central African Republic |
| 8 | Burundi | 56 | Solomon Islands | 8 | Chad |
| 9 | Cambodia | 57 | Somalia | 9 | Comoros |
| 10 | Cameroon | 58 | St. Lucia | 10 | Congo, Democratic Republic of |
| 11 | Cape Verde | 59 | St. Vincent and the Grenadines | 11 | Cote d’Ivoire |
| 12 | Central African Republic | 60 | Sudan | 12 | Djibouti |
| 13 | Chad | 61 | Tajikistan | 13 | Eritrea |
| 14 | Comoros | 62 | Tanzania | 14 | Ethiopia |
| 15 | Congo, Dem. Republic of | 63 | Timor-Leste | 15 | Gambia, The |
| 16 | Congo, Republic of | 64 | Togo | 16 | Ghana |
| 17 | Cote d’Ivoire | 65 | Tonga | 17 | Guinea |
| 18 | Djibouti | 66 | Uganda | 18 | Guinea-Bissau |
| 19 | Dominica | 67 | Uzbekistan | 19 | Haiti |
| 20 | Eritrea | 68 | Vanuatu | 20 | Kenya |
| 21 | Ethiopia | 69 | Vietnam | 21 | Kyrgyz Republic |
| 22 | Gambia, The | 70 | Yemen, Republic of | 22 | Lao People’s Democratic Republic |
| 23 | Georgia | 71 | Zambia | 23 | Liberia |
| 24 | Ghana | 24 | Madagascar | ||
| 25 | Grenada | 25 | Malawi | ||
| 26 | Guinea | 26 | Mali | ||
| 27 | Guinea-Bissau | 27 | Mauritania | ||
| 28 | Guyana | 28 | Mozambique | ||
| 29 | Haiti | 29 | Myanmar | ||
| 30 | Honduras | 30 | Nepal | ||
| 31 | Kenya | 31 | Nicaragua | ||
| 32 | Kiribati | 32 | Niger | ||
| 33 | Kyrgyz Republic | 33 | Papua New Guinea | ||
| 34 | Lao People’s Democratic Republic | 34 | Rwanda | ||
| 35 | Lesotho | 35 | Sao Tome & Principe | ||
| 36 | Liberia | 36 | Senegal | ||
| 37 | Madagascar | 37 | Sierra Leone | ||
| 38 | Malawi | 38 | Somalia | ||
| 39 | Maldives | 39 | Sudan | ||
| 40 | Mali | 40 | Tajikistan | ||
| 41 | Mauritania | 41 | Tanzania | ||
| 42 | Moldova | 42 | Togo | ||
| 43 | Mongolia | 43 | Uganda | ||
| 44 | Mozambique | 44 | Uzbekistan | ||
| 45 | Myanmar | 45 | Vietnam | ||
| 46 | Nepal | 46 | Yemen, Republic of | ||
| 47 | Nicaragua | 47 | Zambia | ||
| 48 | Niger |
See Eligibility to Use the Fund’s Facilities for Concessional Financing (January 11, 2010). Shaded countries are PCDR eligible countries (see Footnote 2). Zimbabwe has overdue obligations to the PRGT and is currently not PRGT eligible (see also footnote 11 in the main text).
Cutoffs based on income (Atlas method; countries with income per capita below the IDA cutoff (currently US$1,135 per year) plus “small states” with income per-capita below 200% of the IDA cutoff); see Proposal for a Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust Fund (April 22, 2010).
13. In addition to the above, two new elements are proposed for consideration:
Limiting the size of the maximum percentage increase for any individual country. A few countries are very out-of-line and potentially would stand to receive very large quota increases under the above approach, which in turn would constrain the scope for providing sizeable increases for other dynamic EMDCs. Introducing some flexibility from the calculated results for those countries would free up more of the ad hoc increase for other dynamic EMDCs and could be seen as part of a temporary solution for the current review, recognizing that the process of quota realignment is an on-going one. By way of example, if such a limit or cap was set at 200 percent, or double the size of the overall increase, 6 countries would be affected under the above approach.12 Alternatively, to further reduce the impact on any individual country, such a limit or cap could be set slightly higher at, say, 220 percent. This approach, which is illustrated in Simulations 2 and 5, would affect 3 countries (China, Luxembourg, and Turkey).
A small “haircut” in quota share for all advanced countries using a common percentage reduction factor. As noted, in discussions to date, many Directors have expressed concern about the size of the overall shift in share to EMDCs. Similar to the above flexibility, a willingness on the part of advanced countries to consider some modest flexibility from the calculated results could facilitate a larger net shift, recognizing that many of those countries would already lose significant share under the above approach and this would push some below their calculated quota share. For illustrative purposes, simulations are included in this paper to show the potential impact of a 1 percent reduction factor (see Simulations 3 and 6).
IV. Outcomes
14. The results of combining the above elements are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 (full results for individual members are presented in Tables A1 and A2). All the simulations in this paper achieve shifts significantly in excess of 5 percent both to dynamic EMDCs and from over- to under-represented countries (Table 1). Thus, they can be seen as unambiguously meeting the goals agreed by the IMFC in Istanbul. In addition, they achieve a substantial change in ranking of the largest quotas, with China moving from 6th to 3rd and four EMDCs among the 10 largest shareholders, double the current number (Table 3). The net shift to EMDCs in the first simulation is 2.3 percent. Limiting the maximum increase in individual quotas results mainly in a redistribution among EMDCs (second simulation) and has only a marginal effect on the net shift. However, the introduction of a small haircut for advanced countries has a larger impact, increasing the net shift to 2.8 percent.
Illustrative Scenarios: Quota Shares of 20 Largest Members
(In percent)
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/ in Table 1). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their post second round or post selective quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
Illustrative Scenarios: Quota Shares of 20 Largest Members
(In percent)
| Rank | Post Second Round | 100 percent increase; 0/60/40 Allocation 1/ | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRGT Protection 2/ | PRGT Protection 2/ | |||||||||||||
| Simulation 1 | Simulation 2 | Simulation 3 | Simulation 4 | Simulation 5 | Simulation 6 | |||||||||
| Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 3/ | Simulation 1 with Cap 4/ | Simulation 2 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 5/ | Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 6/ | Simulation 4 with Cap 4/ | Simulation 5 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 5/ | |||||||||
| 1 | United States | 17.67 | United States | 17.67 | United States | 17.67 | United States | 7.49 | United States | 17.67 | United States | 17.67 | United States | 7.49 |
| 2 | Japan | 6.56 | Japan | 6.56 | Japan | 6.56 | Japan | 6.49 | China 7/ | 6.68 | Japan | 6.56 | Japan | 6.49 |
| 3 | Germany | 6.11 | China 7/ | 6.53 | China 7/ | 6.39 | China 7/ | 6.39 | Japan | 6.56 | China 7/ | 6.39 | China 7/ | 6.39 |
| 4 | France | 4.50 | Germany | 5.68 | Germany | 5.68 | Germany | 5.62 | Germany | 5.68 | Germany | 5.68 | Germany | 5.62 |
| 5 | United Kingdom | 4.50 | United Kingdom | 4.56 | United Kingdom | 4.56 | United Kingdom | 4.52 | United Kingdom | 4.56 | United Kingdom | 4.56 | United Kingdom | 4.52 |
| 6 | China 7/ | 4.00 | France | 3.79 | France | 3.79 | France | 3.75 | France | 3.79 | France | 3.79 | France | 3.75 |
| 7 | Italy | 3.31 | Italy | 3.21 | Italy | 3.22 | Italy | 3.19 | Italy | 3.22 | Italy | 3.22 | Italy | 3.19 |
| 8 | Saudi Arabia | 2.93 | Russia | 2.69 | India | 2.70 | India | 2.82 | India | 2.70 | India | 2.77 | India | 2.88 |
| 9 | Canada | 2.67 | India | 2.67 | Russia | 2.70 | Russia | 2.72 | Russia | 2.70 | Russia | 2.71 | Russia | 2.73 |
| 10 | Russia | 2.49 | Canada | 2.30 | Canada | 2.30 | Brazil | 2.40 | Canada | 2.30 | Brazil | 2.33 | Brazil | 2.48 |
| 11 | India | 2.44 | Brazil | 2.21 | Brazil | 2.25 | Canada | 2.28 | Brazil | 2.26 | Canada | 2.30 | Canada | 2.28 |
| 12 | Netherlands | 2.17 | Spain | 1.96 | Spain | 1.97 | Spain | 1.95 | Spain | 1.97 | Spain | 1.99 | Spain | 1.97 |
| 13 | Belgium | 1.93 | Saudi Arabia | 1.87 | Saudi Arabia | 1.87 | Mexico | 1.92 | Saudi Arabia | 1.87 | Mexico | 1.88 | Mexico | 1.97 |
| 14 | Brazil | 1.78 | Netherlands | 1.86 | Netherlands | 1.86 | Saudi Arabia | 1.87 | Netherlands | 1.86 | Saudi Arabia | 1.87 | Saudi Arabia | 1.87 |
| 15 | Spain | 1.69 | Mexico | 1.81 | Mexico | 1.83 | Netherlands | 1.84 | Mexico | 1.83 | Netherlands | 1.86 | Korea | 1.85 |
| 16 | Mexico | 1.52 | Korea | 1.77 | Korea | 1.78 | Korea | 1.83 | Korea | 1.78 | Korea | 1.81 | Netherlands | 1.84 |
| 17 | Switzerland | 1.45 | Australia | 1.39 | Australia | 1.40 | Australia | 1.38 | Australia | 1.40 | Australia | 1.40 | Australia | 1.39 |
| 18 | Korea | 1.41 | Belgium | 1.36 | Belgium | 1.36 | Belgium | 1.35 | Belgium | 1.36 | Belgium | 1.36 | Belgium | 1.35 |
| 19 | Australia | 1.36 | Switzerland | 1.23 | Switzerland | 1.23 | Switzerland | 1.21 | Switzerland | 1.23 | Switzerland | 1.23 | Switzerland | 1.21 |
| 20 | Venezuela | 1.12 | Turkey | 1.01 | Turkey | 0.98 | Indonesia | 0.99 | Turkey | 1.03 | Indonesia | 0.98 | Indonesia | 1.01 |
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/ in Table 1). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their post second round or post selective quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
Illustrative Scenarios: Quota Shares of 20 Largest Members
(In percent)
| Rank | Post Second Round | 100 percent increase; 0/60/40 Allocation 1/ | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRGT Protection 2/ | PRGT Protection 2/ | |||||||||||||
| Simulation 1 | Simulation 2 | Simulation 3 | Simulation 4 | Simulation 5 | Simulation 6 | |||||||||
| Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 3/ | Simulation 1 with Cap 4/ | Simulation 2 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 5/ | Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 6/ | Simulation 4 with Cap 4/ | Simulation 5 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 5/ | |||||||||
| 1 | United States | 17.67 | United States | 17.67 | United States | 17.67 | United States | 7.49 | United States | 17.67 | United States | 17.67 | United States | 7.49 |
| 2 | Japan | 6.56 | Japan | 6.56 | Japan | 6.56 | Japan | 6.49 | China 7/ | 6.68 | Japan | 6.56 | Japan | 6.49 |
| 3 | Germany | 6.11 | China 7/ | 6.53 | China 7/ | 6.39 | China 7/ | 6.39 | Japan | 6.56 | China 7/ | 6.39 | China 7/ | 6.39 |
| 4 | France | 4.50 | Germany | 5.68 | Germany | 5.68 | Germany | 5.62 | Germany | 5.68 | Germany | 5.68 | Germany | 5.62 |
| 5 | United Kingdom | 4.50 | United Kingdom | 4.56 | United Kingdom | 4.56 | United Kingdom | 4.52 | United Kingdom | 4.56 | United Kingdom | 4.56 | United Kingdom | 4.52 |
| 6 | China 7/ | 4.00 | France | 3.79 | France | 3.79 | France | 3.75 | France | 3.79 | France | 3.79 | France | 3.75 |
| 7 | Italy | 3.31 | Italy | 3.21 | Italy | 3.22 | Italy | 3.19 | Italy | 3.22 | Italy | 3.22 | Italy | 3.19 |
| 8 | Saudi Arabia | 2.93 | Russia | 2.69 | India | 2.70 | India | 2.82 | India | 2.70 | India | 2.77 | India | 2.88 |
| 9 | Canada | 2.67 | India | 2.67 | Russia | 2.70 | Russia | 2.72 | Russia | 2.70 | Russia | 2.71 | Russia | 2.73 |
| 10 | Russia | 2.49 | Canada | 2.30 | Canada | 2.30 | Brazil | 2.40 | Canada | 2.30 | Brazil | 2.33 | Brazil | 2.48 |
| 11 | India | 2.44 | Brazil | 2.21 | Brazil | 2.25 | Canada | 2.28 | Brazil | 2.26 | Canada | 2.30 | Canada | 2.28 |
| 12 | Netherlands | 2.17 | Spain | 1.96 | Spain | 1.97 | Spain | 1.95 | Spain | 1.97 | Spain | 1.99 | Spain | 1.97 |
| 13 | Belgium | 1.93 | Saudi Arabia | 1.87 | Saudi Arabia | 1.87 | Mexico | 1.92 | Saudi Arabia | 1.87 | Mexico | 1.88 | Mexico | 1.97 |
| 14 | Brazil | 1.78 | Netherlands | 1.86 | Netherlands | 1.86 | Saudi Arabia | 1.87 | Netherlands | 1.86 | Saudi Arabia | 1.87 | Saudi Arabia | 1.87 |
| 15 | Spain | 1.69 | Mexico | 1.81 | Mexico | 1.83 | Netherlands | 1.84 | Mexico | 1.83 | Netherlands | 1.86 | Korea | 1.85 |
| 16 | Mexico | 1.52 | Korea | 1.77 | Korea | 1.78 | Korea | 1.83 | Korea | 1.78 | Korea | 1.81 | Netherlands | 1.84 |
| 17 | Switzerland | 1.45 | Australia | 1.39 | Australia | 1.40 | Australia | 1.38 | Australia | 1.40 | Australia | 1.40 | Australia | 1.39 |
| 18 | Korea | 1.41 | Belgium | 1.36 | Belgium | 1.36 | Belgium | 1.35 | Belgium | 1.36 | Belgium | 1.36 | Belgium | 1.35 |
| 19 | Australia | 1.36 | Switzerland | 1.23 | Switzerland | 1.23 | Switzerland | 1.21 | Switzerland | 1.23 | Switzerland | 1.23 | Switzerland | 1.21 |
| 20 | Venezuela | 1.12 | Turkey | 1.01 | Turkey | 0.98 | Indonesia | 0.99 | Turkey | 1.03 | Indonesia | 0.98 | Indonesia | 1.01 |
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/ in Table 1). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their post second round or post selective quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
Illustrative Quota Simulations—by Member
(In percent)
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.
GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in advanced out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their share, post second round or post selective quota whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
Illustrative Quota Simulations—by Member
(In percent)
| Post Second Round Quota Share 3/ | Calculated Quota Share | GDP Blend Share 4/ | 100 percent increase; 0/60/40 Allocation 1/ | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRGT Protection 2/ | PRGT Protection 2/ | ||||||||
| Simulation 1 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 5/ | Simulation 2 Simulation 1 with Cap 6/ | Simulation 3 Simulation 2 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 7/ | Simulation 4 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 8/ | Simulation 5 Simulation 4 with Cap 6/ | Simulation 6 Simulation 5 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 7/ | ||||
| United States | 17.670 | 16.987 | 21.645 | 17.670 | 17.670 | 17.493 | 17.670 | 17.670 | 17.493 |
| Japan | 6.556 | 6.493 | 7.282 | 6.556 | 6.556 | 6.490 | 6.556 | 6.556 | 6.490 |
| Germany | 6.110 | 5.678 | 5.201 | 5.678 | 5.678 | 5.621 | 5.678 | 5.678 | 5.621 |
| France | 4.505 | 3.789 | 4.036 | 3.789 | 3.789 | 3.751 | 3.789 | 3.789 | 3.751 |
| United Kingdom | 4.505 | 4.663 | 4.151 | 4.564 | 4.564 | 4.518 | 4.564 | 4.564 | 4.518 |
| China 9/ | 3.996 | 7.917 | 8.128 | 6.533 | 6.394 | 6.394 | 6.681 | 6.394 | 6.394 |
| Italy | 3.306 | 2.992 | 3.379 | 3.214 | 3.217 | 3.185 | 3.217 | 3.224 | 3.192 |
| Saudi Arabia | 2.930 | 1.337 | 0.842 | 1.866 | 1.866 | 1.866 | 1.866 | 1.866 | 1.866 |
| Canada | 2.672 | 2.303 | 2.345 | 2.303 | 2.303 | 2.280 | 2.303 | 2.303 | 2.280 |
| Russia | 2.494 | 2.938 | 2.746 | 2.695 | 2.699 | 2.716 | 2.699 | 2.709 | 2.725 |
| India | 2.442 | 2.403 | 3.027 | 2.668 | 2.700 | 2.816 | 2.701 | 2.766 | 2.882 |
| Netherlands | 2.166 | 1.857 | 1.308 | 1.857 | 1.857 | 1.839 | 1.857 | 1.857 | 1.839 |
| Belgium | 1.932 | 1.324 | 0.784 | 1.363 | 1.363 | 1.349 | 1.363 | 1.363 | 1.349 |
| Brazil | 1.783 | 2.153 | 2.654 | 2.215 | 2.255 | 2.396 | 2.256 | 2.334 | 2.477 |
| Spain | 1.688 | 2.236 | 2.422 | 1.964 | 1.974 | 1.954 | 1.974 | 1.993 | 1.973 |
| Mexico | 1.521 | 1.793 | 2.080 | 1.806 | 1.831 | 1.919 | 1.832 | 1.881 | 1.970 |
| Switzerland | 1.451 | 1.227 | 0.724 | 1.227 | 1.227 | 1.215 | 1.227 | 1.227 | 1.215 |
| Korea | 1.412 | 2.108 | 1.909 | 1.768 | 1.780 | 1.826 | 1.781 | 1.806 | 1.852 |
| Australia | 1.358 | 1.396 | 1.537 | 1.394 | 1.397 | 1.383 | 1.397 | 1.403 | 1.389 |
| Venezuela | 1.115 | 0.484 | 0.518 | 0.703 | 0.703 | 0.703 | 0.703 | 0.703 | 0.703 |
| Sweden | 1.005 | 0.942 | 0.743 | 0.942 | 0.942 | 0.932 | 0.942 | 0.942 | 0.932 |
| Argentina | 0.888 | 0.597 | 0.669 | 0.623 | 0.623 | 0.623 | 0.623 | 0.623 | 0.623 |
| Austria | 0.887 | 0.836 | 0.650 | 0.836 | 0.836 | 0.828 | 0.836 | 0.836 | 0.828 |
| Indonesia | 0.872 | 0.902 | 1.053 | 0.951 | 0.961 | 0.994 | 0.961 | 0.979 | 1.012 |
| Denmark | 0.793 | 0.731 | 0.508 | 0.731 | 0.731 | 0.724 | 0.731 | 0.731 | 0.724 |
| Norway | 0.790 | 0.812 | 0.631 | 0.798 | 0.798 | 0.790 | 0.798 | 0.798 | 0.790 |
| South Africa | 0.784 | 0.578 | 0.640 | 0.578 | 0.578 | 0.578 | 0.578 | 0.578 | 0.578 |
| Malaysia | 0.744 | 0.792 | 0.471 | 0.762 | 0.762 | 0.762 | 0.762 | 0.762 | 0.762 |
| Nigeria | 0.735 | 0.477 | 0.410 | 0.735 | 0.735 | 0.735 | 0.511 | 0.511 | 0.511 |
| Poland | 0.708 | 0.949 | 0.911 | 0.843 | 0.850 | 0.871 | 0.850 | 0.862 | 0.884 |
| Iran | 0.628 | 0.658 | 0.842 | 0.720 | 0.731 | 0.770 | 0.731 | 0.753 | 0.793 |
| Turkey | 0.611 | 1.148 | 1.296 | 1.006 | 0.977 | 0.977 | 1.033 | 0.977 | 0.977 |
| Thailand | 0.604 | 0.789 | 0.636 | 0.674 | 0.674 | 0.674 | 0.674 | 0.674 | 0.674 |
| Singapore | 0.591 | 1.195 | 0.356 | 0.817 | 0.817 | 0.817 | 0.817 | 0.817 | 0.817 |
| Kuwait | 0.579 | 0.315 | 0.242 | 0.384 | 0.384 | 0.384 | 0.384 | 0.384 | 0.384 |
| Ukraine | 0.576 | 0.422 | 0.393 | 0.422 | 0.422 | 0.422 | 0.422 | 0.422 | 0.422 |
| Finland | 0.530 | 0.513 | 0.421 | 0.513 | 0.513 | 0.507 | 0.513 | 0.513 | 0.507 |
| Ireland | 0.528 | 1.077 | 0.428 | 0.733 | 0.733 | 0.726 | 0.733 | 0.733 | 0.726 |
| Algeria | 0.526 | 0.411 | 0.323 | 0.411 | 0.411 | 0.411 | 0.411 | 0.411 | 0.411 |
| Iraq | 0.499 | 0.267 | 0.162 | 0.329 | 0.329 | 0.329 | 0.329 | 0.329 | 0.329 |
| Libya | 0.471 | 0.252 | 0.150 | 0.311 | 0.311 | 0.311 | 0.311 | 0.311 | 0.311 |
| Greece | 0.462 | 0.572 | 0.586 | 0.514 | 0.516 | 0.511 | 0.516 | 0.519 | 0.514 |
| Israel | 0.445 | 0.408 | 0.343 | 0.408 | 0.408 | 0.404 | 0.408 | 0.408 | 0.404 |
| Hungary | 0.436 | 0.407 | 0.300 | 0.407 | 0.407 | 0.407 | 0.407 | 0.407 | 0.407 |
| Pakistan | 0.434 | 0.342 | 0.449 | 0.419 | 0.422 | 0.431 | 0.422 | 0.427 | 0.437 |
| Romania | 0.432 | 0.380 | 0.369 | 0.380 | 0.380 | 0.380 | 0.380 | 0.380 | 0.380 |
| Portugal | 0.432 | 0.448 | 0.426 | 0.438 | 0.438 | 0.434 | 0.438 | 0.438 | 0.434 |
| Philippines | 0.428 | 0.430 | 0.379 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 |
| Czech Republic | 0.420 | 0.519 | 0.387 | 0.457 | 0.457 | 0.457 | 0.457 | 0.457 | 0.457 |
| Egypt | 0.396 | 0.404 | 0.452 | 0.420 | 0.423 | 0.433 | 0.423 | 0.429 | 0.439 |
| New Zealand | 0.375 | 0.262 | 0.232 | 0.266 | 0.266 | 0.264 | 0.266 | 0.266 | 0.264 |
| Chile | 0.359 | 0.377 | 0.356 | 0.366 | 0.366 | 0.366 | 0.366 | 0.366 | 0.366 |
| Colombia | 0.325 | 0.381 | 0.500 | 0.407 | 0.416 | 0.446 | 0.416 | 0.433 | 0.463 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0.316 | 0.767 | 0.381 | 0.485 | 0.485 | 0.485 | 0.485 | 0.485 | 0.485 |
| Bulgaria | 0.269 | 0.164 | 0.116 | 0.184 | 0.184 | 0.184 | 0.184 | 0.184 | 0.184 |
| Peru | 0.268 | 0.270 | 0.290 | 0.277 | 0.278 | 0.282 | 0.278 | 0.280 | 0.284 |
| Morocco | 0.247 | 0.185 | 0.188 | 0.185 | 0.185 | 0.185 | 0.185 | 0.185 | 0.185 |
| Bangladesh | 0.224 | 0.169 | 0.238 | 0.224 | 0.224 | 0.226 | 0.224 | 0.224 | 0.230 |
| Congo, Dem. Republic of | 0.224 | 0.035 | 0.029 | 0.224 | 0.224 | 0.224 | 0.224 | 0.224 | 0.224 |
| Zambia | 0.205 | 0.039 | 0.030 | 0.205 | 0.205 | 0.205 | 0.205 | 0.205 | 0.205 |
| Serbia | 0.196 | 0.129 | 0.107 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 |
| Vietnam | 0.193 | 0.303 | 0.248 | 0.240 | 0.241 | 0.243 | 0.241 | 0.242 | 0.245 |
| Kazakhstan | 0.179 | 0.328 | 0.250 | 0.241 | 0.242 | 0.245 | 0.242 | 0.243 | 0.246 |
| Slovak Republic | 0.179 | 0.261 | 0.174 | 0.210 | 0.210 | 0.210 | 0.210 | 0.210 | 0.210 |
| Luxembourg | 0.176 | 0.503 | 0.093 | 0.298 | 0.281 | 0.278 | 0.298 | 0.281 | 0.278 |
| Sri Lanka | 0.173 | 0.089 | 0.107 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 |
| Belarus | 0.162 | 0.143 | 0.139 | 0.143 | 0.143 | 0.143 | 0.143 | 0.143 | 0.143 |
| Ghana | 0.155 | 0.050 | 0.045 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 |
| Croatia | 0.153 | 0.150 | 0.133 | 0.150 | 0.150 | 0.150 | 0.150 | 0.150 | 0.150 |
| Zimbabwe | 0.148 | 0.016 | 0.011 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 |
| Ecuador | 0.146 | 0.147 | 0.135 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 0.145 | 0.208 | 0.293 | 0.219 | 0.226 | 0.233 | 0.226 | 0.233 | 0.233 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 0.141 | 0.064 | 0.049 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 |
| Cote d’Ivoire | 0.136 | 0.056 | 0.054 | 0.136 | 0.136 | 0.136 | 0.136 | 0.136 | 0.136 |
| Sudan | 0.132 | 0.089 | 0.117 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 |
| Uruguay | 0.129 | 0.077 | 0.062 | 0.087 | 0.087 | 0.087 | 0.087 | 0.087 | 0.087 |
| Qatar | 0.127 | 0.194 | 0.156 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.155 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.155 |
| Tunisia | 0.120 | 0.114 | 0.103 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 |
| Angola | 0.120 | 0.214 | 0.142 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 |
| Uzbekistan | 0.116 | 0.071 | 0.078 | 0.116 | 0.116 | 0.116 | 0.116 | 0.116 | 0.116 |
| Slovenia | 0.115 | 0.136 | 0.102 | 0.123 | 0.123 | 0.123 | 0.123 | 0.123 | 0.123 |
| Jamaica | 0.115 | 0.047 | 0.036 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 |
| Kenya | 0.114 | 0.076 | 0.078 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 |
| Lebanon | 0.112 | 0.168 | 0.068 | 0.133 | 0.133 | 0.133 | 0.133 | 0.133 | 0.133 |
| Myanmar | 0.108 | 0.057 | 0.072 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 |
| Yemen, Republic of | 0.102 | 0.100 | 0.072 | 0.102 | 0.102 | 0.102 | 0.102 | 0.102 | 0.102 |
| Oman | 0.099 | 0.139 | 0.106 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 |
| Dominican Republic | 0.092 | 0.097 | 0.105 | 0.099 | 0.099 | 0.101 | 0.099 | 0.100 | 0.103 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 0.090 | 0.042 | 0.027 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.058 |
| Guatemala | 0.088 | 0.086 | 0.092 | 0.089 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.091 |
| Panama | 0.087 | 0.079 | 0.053 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 |
| Tanzania | 0.083 | 0.046 | 0.058 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 |
| Costa Rica | 0.078 | 0.077 | 0.069 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 |
| Cameroon | 0.078 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.058 |
| Lithuania | 0.077 | 0.111 | 0.095 | 0.092 | 0.092 | 0.093 | 0.092 | 0.093 | 0.094 |
| Uganda | 0.076 | 0.055 | 0.044 | 0.076 | 0.076 | 0.076 | 0.076 | 0.076 | 0.076 |
| Bahrain | 0.074 | 0.098 | 0.045 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 |
| Bolivia | 0.072 | 0.047 | 0.050 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 |
| El Salvador | 0.072 | 0.060 | 0.059 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 |
| Jordan | 0.072 | 0.073 | 0.047 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 0.071 | 0.056 | 0.042 | 0.056 | 0.056 | 0.056 | 0.056 | 0.056 | 0.056 |
| Islamic Republic of Afghanistan | 0.068 | 0.041 | 0.029 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 |
| Senegal | 0.068 | 0.032 | 0.033 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 |
| Azerbaijan | 0.067 | 0.086 | 0.089 | 0.080 | 0.081 | 0.084 | 0.081 | 0.083 | 0.085 |
| Cyprus | 0.066 | 0.065 | 0.046 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.064 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.064 |
| Gabon | 0.065 | 0.040 | 0.033 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 |
| Georgia | 0.063 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 |
| Latvia | 0.060 | 0.086 | 0.066 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.070 |
| Namibia | 0.057 | 0.023 | 0.021 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 |
| Ethiopia | 0.056 | 0.054 | 0.070 | 0.061 | 0.062 | 0.065 | 0.062 | 0.063 | 0.066 |
| Papua New Guinea | 0.055 | 0.030 | 0.020 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 |
| Bahamas, The | 0.055 | 0.022 | 0.018 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Nicaragua | 0.055 | 0.026 | 0.021 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 |
| Honduras | 0.054 | 0.052 | 0.041 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.052 |
| Liberia | 0.054 | 0.013 | 0.002 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 |
| Moldova | 0.052 | 0.021 | 0.015 | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Madagascar | 0.051 | 0.026 | 0.025 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 |
| Iceland | 0.049 | 0.100 | 0.034 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 |
| Mozambique | 0.048 | 0.031 | 0.025 | 0.048 | 0.048 | 0.048 | 0.048 | 0.048 | 0.048 |
| Guinea | 0.045 | 0.014 | 0.013 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 |
| Sierra Leone | 0.044 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 |
| Malta | 0.043 | 0.035 | 0.018 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 |
| Mauritius | 0.043 | 0.027 | 0.022 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 |
| Paraguay | 0.042 | 0.043 | 0.039 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 |
| Turkmenistan | 0.041 | 0.062 | 0.051 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 |
| Estonia | 0.039 | 0.071 | 0.049 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 |
| Mali | 0.039 | 0.032 | 0.022 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 |
| Suriname | 0.039 | 0.010 | 0.006 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 |
| Armenia | 0.039 | 0.025 | 0.026 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.027 |
| Guyana | 0.038 | 0.007 | 0.004 | 0.038 | 0.038 | 0.038 | 0.021 | 0.021 | 0.021 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 0.037 | 0.017 | 0.014 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 |
| Botswana | 0.037 | 0.049 | 0.036 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 |
| Cambodia | 0.037 | 0.034 | 0.033 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 |
| Tajikistan | 0.036 | 0.019 | 0.015 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 |
| Congo, Republic of | 0.035 | 0.034 | 0.024 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Haiti | 0.034 | 0.016 | 0.018 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Somalia | 0.034 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Rwanda | 0.034 | 0.011 | 0.013 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Burundi | 0.032 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Togo | 0.031 | 0.010 | 0.008 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 |
| Nepal | 0.030 | 0.032 | 0.035 | 0.032 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.034 |
| Fiji | 0.029 | 0.012 | 0.008 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 |
| Malawi | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.013 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 |
| Macedonia, FYR | 0.029 | 0.030 | 0.025 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 |
| Barbados | 0.028 | 0.013 | 0.009 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 |
| Chad | 0.028 | 0.032 | 0.024 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 |
| Niger | 0.028 | 0.013 | 0.014 | 0.028 | 0.028 | 0.028 | 0.028 | 0.028 | 0.028 |
| Mauritania | 0.027 | 0.011 | 0.009 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.027 |
| Benin | 0.026 | 0.023 | 0.018 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.026 |
| Burkina Faso | 0.025 | 0.019 | 0.024 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 |
| Albania | 0.025 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.030 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.030 |
| Kosovo | 0.025 | 0.016 | 0.015 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.017 |
| Central African Republic | 0.023 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 |
| Lao, People’s Dem. Republic | 0.022 | 0.014 | 0.016 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0.022 | 0.052 | 0.030 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 |
| Mongolia | 0.021 | 0.015 | 0.013 | 0.021 | 0.021 | 0.021 | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.015 |
| Swaziland | 0.021 | 0.016 | 0.009 | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.016 |
| Lesotho | 0.015 | 0.010 | 0.005 | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 |
| Gambia, The | 0.013 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 |
| Montenegro | 0.012 | 0.015 | 0.011 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 |
| San Marino | 0.009 | 0.012 | 0.005 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 |
| Belize | 0.008 | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| Eritrea | 0.008 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 |
| Vanuatu | 0.007 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Djibouti | 0.007 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 |
| St. Lucia | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0.006 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Grenada | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Samoa | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Cape Verde | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| Seychelles | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| Timor Leste | 0.005 | 0.007 | 0.003 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| Solomon Islands | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Maldives | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Comoros | 0.0037 | 0.0019 | 0.0014 | 0.0037 | 0.0037 | 0.0037 | 0.0037 | 0.0037 | 0.0037 |
| St. Kitts and Nevis | 0.0037 | 0.0022 | 0.0015 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 |
| Bhutan | 0.0036 | 0.0050 | 0.0044 | 0.0042 | 0.0042 | 0.0043 | 0.0042 | 0.0043 | 0.0043 |
| St. Vincent and the Grenadines | 0.0035 | 0.0024 | 0.0018 | 0.0035 | 0.0035 | 0.0035 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 |
| Dominica | 0.0034 | 0.0017 | 0.0012 | 0.0034 | 0.0034 | 0.0034 | 0.0022 | 0.0022 | 0.0022 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 0.0031 | 0.0016 | 0.0005 | 0.0031 | 0.0031 | 0.0031 | 0.0031 | 0.0031 | 0.0031 |
| Tonga | 0.0029 | 0.0013 | 0.0009 | 0.0029 | 0.0029 | 0.0029 | 0.0018 | 0.0018 | 0.0018 |
| Kiribati | 0.0023 | 0.0018 | 0.0008 | 0.0023 | 0.0023 | 0.0023 | 0.0018 | 0.0018 | 0.0018 |
| Micronesia, Fed. States of | 0.0021 | 0.0014 | 0.0011 | 0.0015 | 0.0015 | 0.0015 | 0.0015 | 0.0015 | 0.0015 |
| Marshall Islands | 0.0015 | 0.0010 | 0.0007 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 |
| Palau, Republic of | 0.0 0 15 | 0.0010 | 0.0007 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 |
| Tuvalu | 0.0008 | 0.0004 | 0.0001 | 0.0005 | 0.0005 | 0.0005 | 0.0005 | 0.0005 | 0.0005 |
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.
GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in advanced out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their share, post second round or post selective quota whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
Illustrative Quota Simulations—by Member
(In percent)
| Post Second Round Quota Share 3/ | Calculated Quota Share | GDP Blend Share 4/ | 100 percent increase; 0/60/40 Allocation 1/ | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRGT Protection 2/ | PRGT Protection 2/ | ||||||||
| Simulation 1 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 5/ | Simulation 2 Simulation 1 with Cap 6/ | Simulation 3 Simulation 2 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 7/ | Simulation 4 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 8/ | Simulation 5 Simulation 4 with Cap 6/ | Simulation 6 Simulation 5 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 7/ | ||||
| United States | 17.670 | 16.987 | 21.645 | 17.670 | 17.670 | 17.493 | 17.670 | 17.670 | 17.493 |
| Japan | 6.556 | 6.493 | 7.282 | 6.556 | 6.556 | 6.490 | 6.556 | 6.556 | 6.490 |
| Germany | 6.110 | 5.678 | 5.201 | 5.678 | 5.678 | 5.621 | 5.678 | 5.678 | 5.621 |
| France | 4.505 | 3.789 | 4.036 | 3.789 | 3.789 | 3.751 | 3.789 | 3.789 | 3.751 |
| United Kingdom | 4.505 | 4.663 | 4.151 | 4.564 | 4.564 | 4.518 | 4.564 | 4.564 | 4.518 |
| China 9/ | 3.996 | 7.917 | 8.128 | 6.533 | 6.394 | 6.394 | 6.681 | 6.394 | 6.394 |
| Italy | 3.306 | 2.992 | 3.379 | 3.214 | 3.217 | 3.185 | 3.217 | 3.224 | 3.192 |
| Saudi Arabia | 2.930 | 1.337 | 0.842 | 1.866 | 1.866 | 1.866 | 1.866 | 1.866 | 1.866 |
| Canada | 2.672 | 2.303 | 2.345 | 2.303 | 2.303 | 2.280 | 2.303 | 2.303 | 2.280 |
| Russia | 2.494 | 2.938 | 2.746 | 2.695 | 2.699 | 2.716 | 2.699 | 2.709 | 2.725 |
| India | 2.442 | 2.403 | 3.027 | 2.668 | 2.700 | 2.816 | 2.701 | 2.766 | 2.882 |
| Netherlands | 2.166 | 1.857 | 1.308 | 1.857 | 1.857 | 1.839 | 1.857 | 1.857 | 1.839 |
| Belgium | 1.932 | 1.324 | 0.784 | 1.363 | 1.363 | 1.349 | 1.363 | 1.363 | 1.349 |
| Brazil | 1.783 | 2.153 | 2.654 | 2.215 | 2.255 | 2.396 | 2.256 | 2.334 | 2.477 |
| Spain | 1.688 | 2.236 | 2.422 | 1.964 | 1.974 | 1.954 | 1.974 | 1.993 | 1.973 |
| Mexico | 1.521 | 1.793 | 2.080 | 1.806 | 1.831 | 1.919 | 1.832 | 1.881 | 1.970 |
| Switzerland | 1.451 | 1.227 | 0.724 | 1.227 | 1.227 | 1.215 | 1.227 | 1.227 | 1.215 |
| Korea | 1.412 | 2.108 | 1.909 | 1.768 | 1.780 | 1.826 | 1.781 | 1.806 | 1.852 |
| Australia | 1.358 | 1.396 | 1.537 | 1.394 | 1.397 | 1.383 | 1.397 | 1.403 | 1.389 |
| Venezuela | 1.115 | 0.484 | 0.518 | 0.703 | 0.703 | 0.703 | 0.703 | 0.703 | 0.703 |
| Sweden | 1.005 | 0.942 | 0.743 | 0.942 | 0.942 | 0.932 | 0.942 | 0.942 | 0.932 |
| Argentina | 0.888 | 0.597 | 0.669 | 0.623 | 0.623 | 0.623 | 0.623 | 0.623 | 0.623 |
| Austria | 0.887 | 0.836 | 0.650 | 0.836 | 0.836 | 0.828 | 0.836 | 0.836 | 0.828 |
| Indonesia | 0.872 | 0.902 | 1.053 | 0.951 | 0.961 | 0.994 | 0.961 | 0.979 | 1.012 |
| Denmark | 0.793 | 0.731 | 0.508 | 0.731 | 0.731 | 0.724 | 0.731 | 0.731 | 0.724 |
| Norway | 0.790 | 0.812 | 0.631 | 0.798 | 0.798 | 0.790 | 0.798 | 0.798 | 0.790 |
| South Africa | 0.784 | 0.578 | 0.640 | 0.578 | 0.578 | 0.578 | 0.578 | 0.578 | 0.578 |
| Malaysia | 0.744 | 0.792 | 0.471 | 0.762 | 0.762 | 0.762 | 0.762 | 0.762 | 0.762 |
| Nigeria | 0.735 | 0.477 | 0.410 | 0.735 | 0.735 | 0.735 | 0.511 | 0.511 | 0.511 |
| Poland | 0.708 | 0.949 | 0.911 | 0.843 | 0.850 | 0.871 | 0.850 | 0.862 | 0.884 |
| Iran | 0.628 | 0.658 | 0.842 | 0.720 | 0.731 | 0.770 | 0.731 | 0.753 | 0.793 |
| Turkey | 0.611 | 1.148 | 1.296 | 1.006 | 0.977 | 0.977 | 1.033 | 0.977 | 0.977 |
| Thailand | 0.604 | 0.789 | 0.636 | 0.674 | 0.674 | 0.674 | 0.674 | 0.674 | 0.674 |
| Singapore | 0.591 | 1.195 | 0.356 | 0.817 | 0.817 | 0.817 | 0.817 | 0.817 | 0.817 |
| Kuwait | 0.579 | 0.315 | 0.242 | 0.384 | 0.384 | 0.384 | 0.384 | 0.384 | 0.384 |
| Ukraine | 0.576 | 0.422 | 0.393 | 0.422 | 0.422 | 0.422 | 0.422 | 0.422 | 0.422 |
| Finland | 0.530 | 0.513 | 0.421 | 0.513 | 0.513 | 0.507 | 0.513 | 0.513 | 0.507 |
| Ireland | 0.528 | 1.077 | 0.428 | 0.733 | 0.733 | 0.726 | 0.733 | 0.733 | 0.726 |
| Algeria | 0.526 | 0.411 | 0.323 | 0.411 | 0.411 | 0.411 | 0.411 | 0.411 | 0.411 |
| Iraq | 0.499 | 0.267 | 0.162 | 0.329 | 0.329 | 0.329 | 0.329 | 0.329 | 0.329 |
| Libya | 0.471 | 0.252 | 0.150 | 0.311 | 0.311 | 0.311 | 0.311 | 0.311 | 0.311 |
| Greece | 0.462 | 0.572 | 0.586 | 0.514 | 0.516 | 0.511 | 0.516 | 0.519 | 0.514 |
| Israel | 0.445 | 0.408 | 0.343 | 0.408 | 0.408 | 0.404 | 0.408 | 0.408 | 0.404 |
| Hungary | 0.436 | 0.407 | 0.300 | 0.407 | 0.407 | 0.407 | 0.407 | 0.407 | 0.407 |
| Pakistan | 0.434 | 0.342 | 0.449 | 0.419 | 0.422 | 0.431 | 0.422 | 0.427 | 0.437 |
| Romania | 0.432 | 0.380 | 0.369 | 0.380 | 0.380 | 0.380 | 0.380 | 0.380 | 0.380 |
| Portugal | 0.432 | 0.448 | 0.426 | 0.438 | 0.438 | 0.434 | 0.438 | 0.438 | 0.434 |
| Philippines | 0.428 | 0.430 | 0.379 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 |
| Czech Republic | 0.420 | 0.519 | 0.387 | 0.457 | 0.457 | 0.457 | 0.457 | 0.457 | 0.457 |
| Egypt | 0.396 | 0.404 | 0.452 | 0.420 | 0.423 | 0.433 | 0.423 | 0.429 | 0.439 |
| New Zealand | 0.375 | 0.262 | 0.232 | 0.266 | 0.266 | 0.264 | 0.266 | 0.266 | 0.264 |
| Chile | 0.359 | 0.377 | 0.356 | 0.366 | 0.366 | 0.366 | 0.366 | 0.366 | 0.366 |
| Colombia | 0.325 | 0.381 | 0.500 | 0.407 | 0.416 | 0.446 | 0.416 | 0.433 | 0.463 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0.316 | 0.767 | 0.381 | 0.485 | 0.485 | 0.485 | 0.485 | 0.485 | 0.485 |
| Bulgaria | 0.269 | 0.164 | 0.116 | 0.184 | 0.184 | 0.184 | 0.184 | 0.184 | 0.184 |
| Peru | 0.268 | 0.270 | 0.290 | 0.277 | 0.278 | 0.282 | 0.278 | 0.280 | 0.284 |
| Morocco | 0.247 | 0.185 | 0.188 | 0.185 | 0.185 | 0.185 | 0.185 | 0.185 | 0.185 |
| Bangladesh | 0.224 | 0.169 | 0.238 | 0.224 | 0.224 | 0.226 | 0.224 | 0.224 | 0.230 |
| Congo, Dem. Republic of | 0.224 | 0.035 | 0.029 | 0.224 | 0.224 | 0.224 | 0.224 | 0.224 | 0.224 |
| Zambia | 0.205 | 0.039 | 0.030 | 0.205 | 0.205 | 0.205 | 0.205 | 0.205 | 0.205 |
| Serbia | 0.196 | 0.129 | 0.107 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 |
| Vietnam | 0.193 | 0.303 | 0.248 | 0.240 | 0.241 | 0.243 | 0.241 | 0.242 | 0.245 |
| Kazakhstan | 0.179 | 0.328 | 0.250 | 0.241 | 0.242 | 0.245 | 0.242 | 0.243 | 0.246 |
| Slovak Republic | 0.179 | 0.261 | 0.174 | 0.210 | 0.210 | 0.210 | 0.210 | 0.210 | 0.210 |
| Luxembourg | 0.176 | 0.503 | 0.093 | 0.298 | 0.281 | 0.278 | 0.298 | 0.281 | 0.278 |
| Sri Lanka | 0.173 | 0.089 | 0.107 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 |
| Belarus | 0.162 | 0.143 | 0.139 | 0.143 | 0.143 | 0.143 | 0.143 | 0.143 | 0.143 |
| Ghana | 0.155 | 0.050 | 0.045 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 |
| Croatia | 0.153 | 0.150 | 0.133 | 0.150 | 0.150 | 0.150 | 0.150 | 0.150 | 0.150 |
| Zimbabwe | 0.148 | 0.016 | 0.011 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 |
| Ecuador | 0.146 | 0.147 | 0.135 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 0.145 | 0.208 | 0.293 | 0.219 | 0.226 | 0.233 | 0.226 | 0.233 | 0.233 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 0.141 | 0.064 | 0.049 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 |
| Cote d’Ivoire | 0.136 | 0.056 | 0.054 | 0.136 | 0.136 | 0.136 | 0.136 | 0.136 | 0.136 |
| Sudan | 0.132 | 0.089 | 0.117 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 |
| Uruguay | 0.129 | 0.077 | 0.062 | 0.087 | 0.087 | 0.087 | 0.087 | 0.087 | 0.087 |
| Qatar | 0.127 | 0.194 | 0.156 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.155 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.155 |
| Tunisia | 0.120 | 0.114 | 0.103 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 |
| Angola | 0.120 | 0.214 | 0.142 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 |
| Uzbekistan | 0.116 | 0.071 | 0.078 | 0.116 | 0.116 | 0.116 | 0.116 | 0.116 | 0.116 |
| Slovenia | 0.115 | 0.136 | 0.102 | 0.123 | 0.123 | 0.123 | 0.123 | 0.123 | 0.123 |
| Jamaica | 0.115 | 0.047 | 0.036 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 |
| Kenya | 0.114 | 0.076 | 0.078 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 |
| Lebanon | 0.112 | 0.168 | 0.068 | 0.133 | 0.133 | 0.133 | 0.133 | 0.133 | 0.133 |
| Myanmar | 0.108 | 0.057 | 0.072 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 |
| Yemen, Republic of | 0.102 | 0.100 | 0.072 | 0.102 | 0.102 | 0.102 | 0.102 | 0.102 | 0.102 |
| Oman | 0.099 | 0.139 | 0.106 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 |
| Dominican Republic | 0.092 | 0.097 | 0.105 | 0.099 | 0.099 | 0.101 | 0.099 | 0.100 | 0.103 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 0.090 | 0.042 | 0.027 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.058 |
| Guatemala | 0.088 | 0.086 | 0.092 | 0.089 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.091 |
| Panama | 0.087 | 0.079 | 0.053 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 |
| Tanzania | 0.083 | 0.046 | 0.058 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 |
| Costa Rica | 0.078 | 0.077 | 0.069 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 |
| Cameroon | 0.078 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.058 |
| Lithuania | 0.077 | 0.111 | 0.095 | 0.092 | 0.092 | 0.093 | 0.092 | 0.093 | 0.094 |
| Uganda | 0.076 | 0.055 | 0.044 | 0.076 | 0.076 | 0.076 | 0.076 | 0.076 | 0.076 |
| Bahrain | 0.074 | 0.098 | 0.045 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 | 0.083 |
| Bolivia | 0.072 | 0.047 | 0.050 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 |
| El Salvador | 0.072 | 0.060 | 0.059 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 |
| Jordan | 0.072 | 0.073 | 0.047 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 0.071 | 0.056 | 0.042 | 0.056 | 0.056 | 0.056 | 0.056 | 0.056 | 0.056 |
| Islamic Republic of Afghanistan | 0.068 | 0.041 | 0.029 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 |
| Senegal | 0.068 | 0.032 | 0.033 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 |
| Azerbaijan | 0.067 | 0.086 | 0.089 | 0.080 | 0.081 | 0.084 | 0.081 | 0.083 | 0.085 |
| Cyprus | 0.066 | 0.065 | 0.046 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.064 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.064 |
| Gabon | 0.065 | 0.040 | 0.033 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 |
| Georgia | 0.063 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 |
| Latvia | 0.060 | 0.086 | 0.066 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.070 |
| Namibia | 0.057 | 0.023 | 0.021 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 |
| Ethiopia | 0.056 | 0.054 | 0.070 | 0.061 | 0.062 | 0.065 | 0.062 | 0.063 | 0.066 |
| Papua New Guinea | 0.055 | 0.030 | 0.020 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 |
| Bahamas, The | 0.055 | 0.022 | 0.018 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Nicaragua | 0.055 | 0.026 | 0.021 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 |
| Honduras | 0.054 | 0.052 | 0.041 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.052 |
| Liberia | 0.054 | 0.013 | 0.002 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 |
| Moldova | 0.052 | 0.021 | 0.015 | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Madagascar | 0.051 | 0.026 | 0.025 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 |
| Iceland | 0.049 | 0.100 | 0.034 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 |
| Mozambique | 0.048 | 0.031 | 0.025 | 0.048 | 0.048 | 0.048 | 0.048 | 0.048 | 0.048 |
| Guinea | 0.045 | 0.014 | 0.013 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 |
| Sierra Leone | 0.044 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 |
| Malta | 0.043 | 0.035 | 0.018 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 |
| Mauritius | 0.043 | 0.027 | 0.022 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 |
| Paraguay | 0.042 | 0.043 | 0.039 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 |
| Turkmenistan | 0.041 | 0.062 | 0.051 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 |
| Estonia | 0.039 | 0.071 | 0.049 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 |
| Mali | 0.039 | 0.032 | 0.022 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 |
| Suriname | 0.039 | 0.010 | 0.006 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 |
| Armenia | 0.039 | 0.025 | 0.026 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.027 |
| Guyana | 0.038 | 0.007 | 0.004 | 0.038 | 0.038 | 0.038 | 0.021 | 0.021 | 0.021 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 0.037 | 0.017 | 0.014 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 |
| Botswana | 0.037 | 0.049 | 0.036 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 |
| Cambodia | 0.037 | 0.034 | 0.033 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 |
| Tajikistan | 0.036 | 0.019 | 0.015 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 |
| Congo, Republic of | 0.035 | 0.034 | 0.024 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Haiti | 0.034 | 0.016 | 0.018 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Somalia | 0.034 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Rwanda | 0.034 | 0.011 | 0.013 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Burundi | 0.032 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Togo | 0.031 | 0.010 | 0.008 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 |
| Nepal | 0.030 | 0.032 | 0.035 | 0.032 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.034 |
| Fiji | 0.029 | 0.012 | 0.008 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 |
| Malawi | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.013 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 |
| Macedonia, FYR | 0.029 | 0.030 | 0.025 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 |
| Barbados | 0.028 | 0.013 | 0.009 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 |
| Chad | 0.028 | 0.032 | 0.024 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.029 |
| Niger | 0.028 | 0.013 | 0.014 | 0.028 | 0.028 | 0.028 | 0.028 | 0.028 | 0.028 |
| Mauritania | 0.027 | 0.011 | 0.009 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.027 |
| Benin | 0.026 | 0.023 | 0.018 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.026 |
| Burkina Faso | 0.025 | 0.019 | 0.024 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 |
| Albania | 0.025 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.030 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.030 |
| Kosovo | 0.025 | 0.016 | 0.015 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.017 |
| Central African Republic | 0.023 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 |
| Lao, People’s Dem. Republic | 0.022 | 0.014 | 0.016 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.022 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0.022 | 0.052 | 0.030 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 |
| Mongolia | 0.021 | 0.015 | 0.013 | 0.021 | 0.021 | 0.021 | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.015 |
| Swaziland | 0.021 | 0.016 | 0.009 | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.016 |
| Lesotho | 0.015 | 0.010 | 0.005 | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 |
| Gambia, The | 0.013 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 |
| Montenegro | 0.012 | 0.015 | 0.011 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 |
| San Marino | 0.009 | 0.012 | 0.005 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 |
| Belize | 0.008 | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| Eritrea | 0.008 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 |
| Vanuatu | 0.007 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Djibouti | 0.007 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 |
| St. Lucia | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0.006 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Grenada | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Samoa | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Cape Verde | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| Seychelles | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| Timor Leste | 0.005 | 0.007 | 0.003 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| Solomon Islands | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Maldives | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Comoros | 0.0037 | 0.0019 | 0.0014 | 0.0037 | 0.0037 | 0.0037 | 0.0037 | 0.0037 | 0.0037 |
| St. Kitts and Nevis | 0.0037 | 0.0022 | 0.0015 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 |
| Bhutan | 0.0036 | 0.0050 | 0.0044 | 0.0042 | 0.0042 | 0.0043 | 0.0042 | 0.0043 | 0.0043 |
| St. Vincent and the Grenadines | 0.0035 | 0.0024 | 0.0018 | 0.0035 | 0.0035 | 0.0035 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 | 0.0025 |
| Dominica | 0.0034 | 0.0017 | 0.0012 | 0.0034 | 0.0034 | 0.0034 | 0.0022 | 0.0022 | 0.0022 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 0.0031 | 0.0016 | 0.0005 | 0.0031 | 0.0031 | 0.0031 | 0.0031 | 0.0031 | 0.0031 |
| Tonga | 0.0029 | 0.0013 | 0.0009 | 0.0029 | 0.0029 | 0.0029 | 0.0018 | 0.0018 | 0.0018 |
| Kiribati | 0.0023 | 0.0018 | 0.0008 | 0.0023 | 0.0023 | 0.0023 | 0.0018 | 0.0018 | 0.0018 |
| Micronesia, Fed. States of | 0.0021 | 0.0014 | 0.0011 | 0.0015 | 0.0015 | 0.0015 | 0.0015 | 0.0015 | 0.0015 |
| Marshall Islands | 0.0015 | 0.0010 | 0.0007 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 |
| Palau, Republic of | 0.0 0 15 | 0.0010 | 0.0007 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 | 0.0010 |
| Tuvalu | 0.0008 | 0.0004 | 0.0001 | 0.0005 | 0.0005 | 0.0005 | 0.0005 | 0.0005 | 0.0005 |
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.
GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in advanced out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their share, post second round or post selective quota whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
Illustrative Quota Simulations—Voting Share by Member
(In percent)
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used. Basic votes are calculated using the agreed percentage of total votes, 5.502 percent of total votes (provided there are no fractional votes) as in the Proposed Amendment to Enhance Voice and Participation, which has not yet entered into effect.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/ in Table 1). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their post second round or post selective quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
Illustrative Quota Simulations—Voting Share by Member
(In percent)
| 100 percent increase; 0/60/40 Allocation 1/ | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post Second Round Voting Share 3/ | PRGT Protection 2/ | PRGT Protection 2/ | |||||
| Simulation 1 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 4/ | Simulation 2 Simulation 1 with Cap 5/ | Simulation 3 Simulation 2 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 6/ | Simulation 4 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 7/ | Simulation 5 Simulation 4 with Cap 5/ | Simulation 6 Simulation 5 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 6/ | ||
| United States | 16.727 | 16.727 | 16.727 | 16.560 | 16.727 | 16.727 | 16.560 |
| Japan | 6.225 | 6.225 | 6.225 | 6.163 | 6.225 | 6.225 | 6.163 |
| Germany | 5.803 | 5.395 | 5.395 | 5.342 | 5.395 | 5.395 | 5.342 |
| France | 4.286 | 3.610 | 3.610 | 3.574 | 3.610 | 3.610 | 3.574 |
| United Kingdom | 4.286 | 4.342 | 4.342 | 4.299 | 4.342 | 4.342 | 4.299 |
| China 8/ | 3.806 | 6.203 | 6.071 | 6.071 | 6.343 | 6.071 | 6.071 |
| Italy | 3.154 | 3.067 | 3.070 | 3.039 | 3.070 | 3.076 | 3.046 |
| Saudi Arabia | 2.799 | 1.793 | 1.793 | 1.793 | 1.793 | 1.793 | 1.793 |
| Canada | 2.554 | 2.206 | 2.206 | 2.184 | 2.206 | 2.206 | 2.184 |
| Russia | 2.386 | 2.576 | 2.580 | 2.596 | 2.580 | 2.589 | 2.605 |
| India | 2.337 | 2.550 | 2.581 | 2.691 | 2.582 | 2.643 | 2.753 |
| Netherlands | 2.076 | 1.785 | 1.785 | 1.767 | 1.785 | 1.785 | 1.767 |
| Belgium | 1.855 | 1.317 | 1.317 | 1.305 | 1.317 | 1.317 | 1.305 |
| Brazil | 1.714 | 2.122 | 2.160 | 2.294 | 2.161 | 2.235 | 2.370 |
| Spain | 1.624 | 1.886 | 1.895 | 1.876 | 1.895 | 1.913 | 1.894 |
| Mexico | 1.467 | 1.736 | 1.760 | 1.843 | 1.760 | 1.807 | 1.891 |
| Switzerland | 1.400 | 1.189 | 1.189 | 1.177 | 1.189 | 1.189 | 1.177 |
| Korea | 1.364 | 1.700 | 1.712 | 1.755 | 1.712 | 1.736 | 1.779 |
| Australia | 1.312 | 1.347 | 1.350 | 1.337 | 1.350 | 1.355 | 1.342 |
| Venezuela | 1.084 | 0.694 | 0.694 | 0.694 | 0.694 | 0.694 | 0.694 |
| Sweden | 0.979 | 0.919 | 0.919 | 0.911 | 0.919 | 0.919 | 0.911 |
| Argentina | 0.869 | 0.618 | 0.618 | 0.618 | 0.618 | 0.618 | 0.618 |
| Austria | 0.867 | 0.819 | 0.819 | 0.812 | 0.819 | 0.819 | 0.812 |
| Indonesia | 0.854 | 0.929 | 0.937 | 0.968 | 0.938 | 0.955 | 0.986 |
| Denmark | 0.779 | 0.720 | 0.720 | 0.714 | 0.720 | 0.720 | 0.714 |
| Norway | 0.776 | 0.784 | 0.784 | 0.776 | 0.784 | 0.784 | 0.776 |
| South Africa | 0.770 | 0.575 | 0.575 | 0.575 | 0.575 | 0.575 | 0.575 |
| Malaysia | 0.733 | 0.750 | 0.750 | 0.750 | 0.750 | 0.750 | 0.750 |
| Nigeria | 0.724 | 0.724 | 0.724 | 0.724 | 0.512 | 0.512 | 0.512 |
| Poland | 0.699 | 0.826 | 0.832 | 0.853 | 0.832 | 0.844 | 0.864 |
| Iran | 0.623 | 0.710 | 0.720 | 0.757 | 0.721 | 0.741 | 0.778 |
| Turkey | 0.607 | 0.980 | 0.953 | 0.953 | 1.005 | 0.953 | 0.953 |
| Thailand | 0.600 | 0.666 | 0.666 | 0.666 | 0.666 | 0.666 | 0.666 |
| Singapore | 0.588 | 0.802 | 0.802 | 0.802 | 0.802 | 0.802 | 0.802 |
| Kuwait | 0.577 | 0.392 | 0.392 | 0.392 | 0.392 | 0.392 | 0.392 |
| Ukraine | 0.573 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 |
| Finland | 0.530 | 0.514 | 0.514 | 0.509 | 0.514 | 0.514 | 0.509 |
| Ireland | 0.528 | 0.723 | 0.723 | 0.716 | 0.723 | 0.723 | 0.716 |
| Algeria | 0.527 | 0.418 | 0.418 | 0.418 | 0.418 | 0.418 | 0.418 |
| Iraq | 0.501 | 0.341 | 0.341 | 0.341 | 0.341 | 0.341 | 0.341 |
| Libya | 0.475 | 0.324 | 0.324 | 0.324 | 0.324 | 0.324 | 0.324 |
| Greece | 0.466 | 0.516 | 0.517 | 0.512 | 0.517 | 0.520 | 0.515 |
| Israel | 0.450 | 0.415 | 0.415 | 0.411 | 0.415 | 0.415 | 0.411 |
| Hungary | 0.441 | 0.414 | 0.414 | 0.414 | 0.414 | 0.414 | 0.414 |
| Pakistan | 0.439 | 0.425 | 0.428 | 0.437 | 0.428 | 0.433 | 0.442 |
| Romania | 0.438 | 0.388 | 0.388 | 0.388 | 0.388 | 0.388 | 0.388 |
| Portugal | 0.438 | 0.443 | 0.443 | 0.439 | 0.443 | 0.443 | 0.439 |
| Philippines | 0.433 | 0.434 | 0.434 | 0.434 | 0.434 | 0.434 | 0.434 |
| Czech Republic | 0.427 | 0.462 | 0.462 | 0.462 | 0.462 | 0.462 | 0.462 |
| Egypt | 0.404 | 0.426 | 0.429 | 0.439 | 0.429 | 0.434 | 0.444 |
| New Zealand | 0.384 | 0.281 | 0.281 | 0.278 | 0.281 | 0.281 | 0.278 |
| Chile | 0.369 | 0.375 | 0.375 | 0.375 | 0.375 | 0.375 | 0.375 |
| Colombia | 0.336 | 0.414 | 0.422 | 0.451 | 0.423 | 0.438 | 0.467 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0.328 | 0.487 | 0.487 | 0.487 | 0.487 | 0.487 | 0.487 |
| Bulgaria | 0.283 | 0.203 | 0.203 | 0.203 | 0.203 | 0.203 | 0.203 |
| Peru | 0.282 | 0.291 | 0.292 | 0.296 | 0.292 | 0.294 | 0.298 |
| Morocco | 0.263 | 0.204 | 0.204 | 0.204 | 0.204 | 0.204 | 0.204 |
| Bangladesh | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.243 | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.246 |
| Congo, Dem. Republic of | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.241 |
| Zambia | 0.223 | 0.223 | 0.223 | 0.223 | 0.223 | 0.223 | 0.223 |
| Serbia | 0.215 | 0.159 | 0.159 | 0.159 | 0.159 | 0.159 | 0.159 |
| Vietnam | 0.212 | 0.256 | 0.257 | 0.259 | 0.257 | 0.258 | 0.261 |
| Kzakhstan | 0.199 | 0.257 | 0.258 | 0.261 | 0.258 | 0.259 | 0.262 |
| Slovak Republic | 0.199 | 0.228 | 0.228 | 0.228 | 0.228 | 0.228 | 0.228 |
| Luxembourg | 0.195 | 0.311 | 0.295 | 0.292 | 0.311 | 0.295 | 0.292 |
| Sri Lanka | 0.193 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 |
| Belarus | 0.183 | 0.164 | 0.164 | 0.164 | 0.164 | 0.164 | 0.164 |
| Ghana | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 |
| Croatia | 0.174 | 0.172 | 0.172 | 0.172 | 0.172 | 0.172 | 0.172 |
| Zimbabwe | 0.170 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 |
| Ecuador | 0.167 | 0.168 | 0.168 | 0.168 | 0.168 | 0.168 | 0.168 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 0.167 | 0.236 | 0.243 | 0.249 | 0.243 | 0.249 | 0.249 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 0.162 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 |
| Cote d’Ivoire | 0.158 | 0.158 | 0.158 | 0.158 | 0.158 | 0.158 | 0.158 |
| Sudan | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.154 |
| Uruguay | 0.151 | 0.112 | 0.112 | 0.112 | 0.112 | 0.112 | 0.112 |
| Qatar | 0.149 | 0.175 | 0.175 | 0.175 | 0.175 | 0.175 | 0.176 |
| Tunisia | 0.143 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 |
| Angola | 0.143 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 |
| Uzbekistan | 0.139 | 0.139 | 0.139 | 0.139 | 0.139 | 0.139 | 0.139 |
| Slovenia | 0.138 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 |
| Jamaica | 0.138 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 |
| Kenya | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 |
| Lebanon | 0.135 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 |
| Myanmar | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 |
| Yemen, Republic of | 0.126 | 0.126 | 0.126 | 0.126 | 0.126 | 0.126 | 0.126 |
| Oman | 0.123 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 |
| Dominican Republic | 0.116 | 0.123 | 0.123 | 0.125 | 0.123 | 0.124 | 0.126 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 0.115 | 0.084 | 0.084 | 0.084 | 0.084 | 0.084 | 0.084 |
| Guatemala | 0.113 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.115 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.115 |
| Panama | 0.111 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 |
| Tanzania | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 |
| Costa Rica | 0.104 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.103 |
| Cameroon | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.084 | 0.084 | 0.084 |
| Lithuania | 0.102 | 0.116 | 0.117 | 0.117 | 0.117 | 0.117 | 0.118 |
| Uganda | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.101 |
| Bahrain | 0.099 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 |
| Bolivia | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 |
| El Salvador | 0.097 | 0.086 | 0.086 | 0.086 | 0.086 | 0.086 | 0.086 |
| Jordan | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 0.096 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 |
| Islamic Republic of Afghanistan | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 |
| Senegal | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 |
| Azerbaijan | 0.093 | 0.105 | 0.106 | 0.109 | 0.106 | 0.107 | 0.110 |
| Cyprus | 0.092 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 |
| Gabon | 0.091 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 |
| Georgia | 0.089 | 0.089 | 0.089 | 0.089 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 |
| Latvia | 0.086 | 0.095 | 0.095 | 0.095 | 0.095 | 0.095 | 0.095 |
| Namibia | 0.084 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 |
| Ethiopia | 0.082 | 0.087 | 0.088 | 0.091 | 0.088 | 0.089 | 0.092 |
| Papua New Guinea | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 |
| Bahamas, The | 0.081 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 |
| Nicaragua | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 |
| Honduras | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 |
| Liberia | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 |
| Moldova | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 |
| Madagascar | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 |
| Iceland | 0.076 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.093 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.093 |
| Mozambique | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.074 |
| Guinea | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 |
| Sierra Leone | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 |
| Malta | 0.070 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 |
| Mauritius | 0.070 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 |
| Paraguay | 0.069 | 0.069 | 0.069 | 0.069 | 0.069 | 0.069 | 0.069 |
| Turkmenistan | 0.068 | 0.076 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 |
| Estonia | 0.067 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 |
| Mali | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 |
| Suriname | 0.066 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 |
| Armenia | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 |
| Guyana | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.049 | 0.049 | 0.049 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 |
| Botswana | 0.064 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 |
| Cambodia | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 |
| Tajikistan | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 |
| Congo, Republic of | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 |
| Haiti | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 |
| Somalia | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 |
| Rwanda | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 |
| Burundi | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 |
| Togo | 0.059 | 0.059 | 0.059 | 0.059 | 0.059 | 0.059 | 0.059 |
| Nepal | 0.058 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.061 | 0.060 | 0.061 | 0.061 |
| Fiji | 0.057 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 |
| Malawi | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 |
| Macedonia, FYR | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 |
| Barbados | 0.056 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 |
| Chad | 0.056 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 |
| Niger | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 |
| Mauritania | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 |
| Benin | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 |
| Burkina Faso | 0.053 | 0.053 | 0.053 | 0.053 | 0.053 | 0.053 | 0.053 |
| Albania | 0.053 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.058 |
| Kosovo | 0.053 | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.046 |
| Central African Republic | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 |
| Lao, People’s Dem. Republic | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0.050 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 |
| Mongolia | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 |
| Swaziland | 0.050 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 |
| Lesotho | 0.043 | 0.043 | 0.043 | 0.043 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 |
| Gambia, The | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 |
| Montenegro | 0.040 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 |
| San Marino | 0.038 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 |
| Belize | 0.037 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 |
| Eritrea | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 |
| Vanuatu | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 |
| Djibouti | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 |
| St. Lucia | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 0.035 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 |
| Grenada | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Samoa | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 |
| Cape Verde | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Seychelles | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Timor Leste | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Solomon Islands | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Maldives | 0.033 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Comoros | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 |
| St. Kitts and Nevis | 0.033 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Bhutan | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.034 |
| St. Vincent and the Grenadines | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Dominica | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Tonga | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 |
| Kiribati | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 |
| Micronesia, Fed. States of | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 |
| Marshall Islands | 0.031 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 |
| Palau, Republic of | 0. 0 31 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 |
| Tuvalu | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 |
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used. Basic votes are calculated using the agreed percentage of total votes, 5.502 percent of total votes (provided there are no fractional votes) as in the Proposed Amendment to Enhance Voice and Participation, which has not yet entered into effect.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/ in Table 1). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their post second round or post selective quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
Illustrative Quota Simulations—Voting Share by Member
(In percent)
| 100 percent increase; 0/60/40 Allocation 1/ | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post Second Round Voting Share 3/ | PRGT Protection 2/ | PRGT Protection 2/ | |||||
| Simulation 1 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 4/ | Simulation 2 Simulation 1 with Cap 5/ | Simulation 3 Simulation 2 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 6/ | Simulation 4 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 7/ | Simulation 5 Simulation 4 with Cap 5/ | Simulation 6 Simulation 5 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 6/ | ||
| United States | 16.727 | 16.727 | 16.727 | 16.560 | 16.727 | 16.727 | 16.560 |
| Japan | 6.225 | 6.225 | 6.225 | 6.163 | 6.225 | 6.225 | 6.163 |
| Germany | 5.803 | 5.395 | 5.395 | 5.342 | 5.395 | 5.395 | 5.342 |
| France | 4.286 | 3.610 | 3.610 | 3.574 | 3.610 | 3.610 | 3.574 |
| United Kingdom | 4.286 | 4.342 | 4.342 | 4.299 | 4.342 | 4.342 | 4.299 |
| China 8/ | 3.806 | 6.203 | 6.071 | 6.071 | 6.343 | 6.071 | 6.071 |
| Italy | 3.154 | 3.067 | 3.070 | 3.039 | 3.070 | 3.076 | 3.046 |
| Saudi Arabia | 2.799 | 1.793 | 1.793 | 1.793 | 1.793 | 1.793 | 1.793 |
| Canada | 2.554 | 2.206 | 2.206 | 2.184 | 2.206 | 2.206 | 2.184 |
| Russia | 2.386 | 2.576 | 2.580 | 2.596 | 2.580 | 2.589 | 2.605 |
| India | 2.337 | 2.550 | 2.581 | 2.691 | 2.582 | 2.643 | 2.753 |
| Netherlands | 2.076 | 1.785 | 1.785 | 1.767 | 1.785 | 1.785 | 1.767 |
| Belgium | 1.855 | 1.317 | 1.317 | 1.305 | 1.317 | 1.317 | 1.305 |
| Brazil | 1.714 | 2.122 | 2.160 | 2.294 | 2.161 | 2.235 | 2.370 |
| Spain | 1.624 | 1.886 | 1.895 | 1.876 | 1.895 | 1.913 | 1.894 |
| Mexico | 1.467 | 1.736 | 1.760 | 1.843 | 1.760 | 1.807 | 1.891 |
| Switzerland | 1.400 | 1.189 | 1.189 | 1.177 | 1.189 | 1.189 | 1.177 |
| Korea | 1.364 | 1.700 | 1.712 | 1.755 | 1.712 | 1.736 | 1.779 |
| Australia | 1.312 | 1.347 | 1.350 | 1.337 | 1.350 | 1.355 | 1.342 |
| Venezuela | 1.084 | 0.694 | 0.694 | 0.694 | 0.694 | 0.694 | 0.694 |
| Sweden | 0.979 | 0.919 | 0.919 | 0.911 | 0.919 | 0.919 | 0.911 |
| Argentina | 0.869 | 0.618 | 0.618 | 0.618 | 0.618 | 0.618 | 0.618 |
| Austria | 0.867 | 0.819 | 0.819 | 0.812 | 0.819 | 0.819 | 0.812 |
| Indonesia | 0.854 | 0.929 | 0.937 | 0.968 | 0.938 | 0.955 | 0.986 |
| Denmark | 0.779 | 0.720 | 0.720 | 0.714 | 0.720 | 0.720 | 0.714 |
| Norway | 0.776 | 0.784 | 0.784 | 0.776 | 0.784 | 0.784 | 0.776 |
| South Africa | 0.770 | 0.575 | 0.575 | 0.575 | 0.575 | 0.575 | 0.575 |
| Malaysia | 0.733 | 0.750 | 0.750 | 0.750 | 0.750 | 0.750 | 0.750 |
| Nigeria | 0.724 | 0.724 | 0.724 | 0.724 | 0.512 | 0.512 | 0.512 |
| Poland | 0.699 | 0.826 | 0.832 | 0.853 | 0.832 | 0.844 | 0.864 |
| Iran | 0.623 | 0.710 | 0.720 | 0.757 | 0.721 | 0.741 | 0.778 |
| Turkey | 0.607 | 0.980 | 0.953 | 0.953 | 1.005 | 0.953 | 0.953 |
| Thailand | 0.600 | 0.666 | 0.666 | 0.666 | 0.666 | 0.666 | 0.666 |
| Singapore | 0.588 | 0.802 | 0.802 | 0.802 | 0.802 | 0.802 | 0.802 |
| Kuwait | 0.577 | 0.392 | 0.392 | 0.392 | 0.392 | 0.392 | 0.392 |
| Ukraine | 0.573 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.428 |
| Finland | 0.530 | 0.514 | 0.514 | 0.509 | 0.514 | 0.514 | 0.509 |
| Ireland | 0.528 | 0.723 | 0.723 | 0.716 | 0.723 | 0.723 | 0.716 |
| Algeria | 0.527 | 0.418 | 0.418 | 0.418 | 0.418 | 0.418 | 0.418 |
| Iraq | 0.501 | 0.341 | 0.341 | 0.341 | 0.341 | 0.341 | 0.341 |
| Libya | 0.475 | 0.324 | 0.324 | 0.324 | 0.324 | 0.324 | 0.324 |
| Greece | 0.466 | 0.516 | 0.517 | 0.512 | 0.517 | 0.520 | 0.515 |
| Israel | 0.450 | 0.415 | 0.415 | 0.411 | 0.415 | 0.415 | 0.411 |
| Hungary | 0.441 | 0.414 | 0.414 | 0.414 | 0.414 | 0.414 | 0.414 |
| Pakistan | 0.439 | 0.425 | 0.428 | 0.437 | 0.428 | 0.433 | 0.442 |
| Romania | 0.438 | 0.388 | 0.388 | 0.388 | 0.388 | 0.388 | 0.388 |
| Portugal | 0.438 | 0.443 | 0.443 | 0.439 | 0.443 | 0.443 | 0.439 |
| Philippines | 0.433 | 0.434 | 0.434 | 0.434 | 0.434 | 0.434 | 0.434 |
| Czech Republic | 0.427 | 0.462 | 0.462 | 0.462 | 0.462 | 0.462 | 0.462 |
| Egypt | 0.404 | 0.426 | 0.429 | 0.439 | 0.429 | 0.434 | 0.444 |
| New Zealand | 0.384 | 0.281 | 0.281 | 0.278 | 0.281 | 0.281 | 0.278 |
| Chile | 0.369 | 0.375 | 0.375 | 0.375 | 0.375 | 0.375 | 0.375 |
| Colombia | 0.336 | 0.414 | 0.422 | 0.451 | 0.423 | 0.438 | 0.467 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0.328 | 0.487 | 0.487 | 0.487 | 0.487 | 0.487 | 0.487 |
| Bulgaria | 0.283 | 0.203 | 0.203 | 0.203 | 0.203 | 0.203 | 0.203 |
| Peru | 0.282 | 0.291 | 0.292 | 0.296 | 0.292 | 0.294 | 0.298 |
| Morocco | 0.263 | 0.204 | 0.204 | 0.204 | 0.204 | 0.204 | 0.204 |
| Bangladesh | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.243 | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.246 |
| Congo, Dem. Republic of | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.241 | 0.241 |
| Zambia | 0.223 | 0.223 | 0.223 | 0.223 | 0.223 | 0.223 | 0.223 |
| Serbia | 0.215 | 0.159 | 0.159 | 0.159 | 0.159 | 0.159 | 0.159 |
| Vietnam | 0.212 | 0.256 | 0.257 | 0.259 | 0.257 | 0.258 | 0.261 |
| Kzakhstan | 0.199 | 0.257 | 0.258 | 0.261 | 0.258 | 0.259 | 0.262 |
| Slovak Republic | 0.199 | 0.228 | 0.228 | 0.228 | 0.228 | 0.228 | 0.228 |
| Luxembourg | 0.195 | 0.311 | 0.295 | 0.292 | 0.311 | 0.295 | 0.292 |
| Sri Lanka | 0.193 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 |
| Belarus | 0.183 | 0.164 | 0.164 | 0.164 | 0.164 | 0.164 | 0.164 |
| Ghana | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 |
| Croatia | 0.174 | 0.172 | 0.172 | 0.172 | 0.172 | 0.172 | 0.172 |
| Zimbabwe | 0.170 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 |
| Ecuador | 0.167 | 0.168 | 0.168 | 0.168 | 0.168 | 0.168 | 0.168 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 0.167 | 0.236 | 0.243 | 0.249 | 0.243 | 0.249 | 0.249 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 0.162 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.114 |
| Cote d’Ivoire | 0.158 | 0.158 | 0.158 | 0.158 | 0.158 | 0.158 | 0.158 |
| Sudan | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.154 |
| Uruguay | 0.151 | 0.112 | 0.112 | 0.112 | 0.112 | 0.112 | 0.112 |
| Qatar | 0.149 | 0.175 | 0.175 | 0.175 | 0.175 | 0.175 | 0.176 |
| Tunisia | 0.143 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 |
| Angola | 0.143 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 | 0.176 |
| Uzbekistan | 0.139 | 0.139 | 0.139 | 0.139 | 0.139 | 0.139 | 0.139 |
| Slovenia | 0.138 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 | 0.146 |
| Jamaica | 0.138 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 |
| Kenya | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 |
| Lebanon | 0.135 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 | 0.155 |
| Myanmar | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.132 |
| Yemen, Republic of | 0.126 | 0.126 | 0.126 | 0.126 | 0.126 | 0.126 | 0.126 |
| Oman | 0.123 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 |
| Dominican Republic | 0.116 | 0.123 | 0.123 | 0.125 | 0.123 | 0.124 | 0.126 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 0.115 | 0.084 | 0.084 | 0.084 | 0.084 | 0.084 | 0.084 |
| Guatemala | 0.113 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.115 | 0.114 | 0.114 | 0.115 |
| Panama | 0.111 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 |
| Tanzania | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 |
| Costa Rica | 0.104 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.103 |
| Cameroon | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.103 | 0.084 | 0.084 | 0.084 |
| Lithuania | 0.102 | 0.116 | 0.117 | 0.117 | 0.117 | 0.117 | 0.118 |
| Uganda | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.101 |
| Bahrain | 0.099 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 |
| Bolivia | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 |
| El Salvador | 0.097 | 0.086 | 0.086 | 0.086 | 0.086 | 0.086 | 0.086 |
| Jordan | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 0.096 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 |
| Islamic Republic of Afghanistan | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 |
| Senegal | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.094 |
| Azerbaijan | 0.093 | 0.105 | 0.106 | 0.109 | 0.106 | 0.107 | 0.110 |
| Cyprus | 0.092 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 | 0.090 |
| Gabon | 0.091 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 |
| Georgia | 0.089 | 0.089 | 0.089 | 0.089 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 |
| Latvia | 0.086 | 0.095 | 0.095 | 0.095 | 0.095 | 0.095 | 0.095 |
| Namibia | 0.084 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 |
| Ethiopia | 0.082 | 0.087 | 0.088 | 0.091 | 0.088 | 0.089 | 0.092 |
| Papua New Guinea | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.082 |
| Bahamas, The | 0.081 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 |
| Nicaragua | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 |
| Honduras | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.079 |
| Liberia | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.081 |
| Moldova | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 |
| Madagascar | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 |
| Iceland | 0.076 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.093 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.093 |
| Mozambique | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.074 |
| Guinea | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.072 |
| Sierra Leone | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 |
| Malta | 0.070 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 |
| Mauritius | 0.070 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 |
| Paraguay | 0.069 | 0.069 | 0.069 | 0.069 | 0.069 | 0.069 | 0.069 |
| Turkmenistan | 0.068 | 0.076 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.077 |
| Estonia | 0.067 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.078 |
| Mali | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 |
| Suriname | 0.066 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 |
| Armenia | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 |
| Guyana | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.049 | 0.049 | 0.049 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.065 |
| Botswana | 0.064 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.068 |
| Cambodia | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 |
| Tajikistan | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 | 0.064 |
| Congo, Republic of | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 |
| Haiti | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 |
| Somalia | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.062 |
| Rwanda | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 |
| Burundi | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.060 |
| Togo | 0.059 | 0.059 | 0.059 | 0.059 | 0.059 | 0.059 | 0.059 |
| Nepal | 0.058 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.061 | 0.060 | 0.061 | 0.061 |
| Fiji | 0.057 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 |
| Malawi | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 |
| Macedonia, FYR | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 |
| Barbados | 0.056 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.047 |
| Chad | 0.056 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 |
| Niger | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 |
| Mauritania | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.055 |
| Benin | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.054 |
| Burkina Faso | 0.053 | 0.053 | 0.053 | 0.053 | 0.053 | 0.053 | 0.053 |
| Albania | 0.053 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.058 |
| Kosovo | 0.053 | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.046 |
| Central African Republic | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 |
| Lao, People’s Dem. Republic | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0.050 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 |
| Mongolia | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.044 |
| Swaziland | 0.050 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 |
| Lesotho | 0.043 | 0.043 | 0.043 | 0.043 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 |
| Gambia, The | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 0.042 |
| Montenegro | 0.040 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 |
| San Marino | 0.038 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 | 0.039 |
| Belize | 0.037 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 |
| Eritrea | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 |
| Vanuatu | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 |
| Djibouti | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 |
| St. Lucia | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.035 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 0.035 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 |
| Grenada | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Samoa | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 |
| Cape Verde | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Seychelles | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Timor Leste | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Solomon Islands | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Maldives | 0.033 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| Comoros | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 |
| St. Kitts and Nevis | 0.033 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Bhutan | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.034 |
| St. Vincent and the Grenadines | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Dominica | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| Tonga | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 |
| Kiribati | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 |
| Micronesia, Fed. States of | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 |
| Marshall Islands | 0.031 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 |
| Palau, Republic of | 0. 0 31 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 |
| Tuvalu | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 |
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used. Basic votes are calculated using the agreed percentage of total votes, 5.502 percent of total votes (provided there are no fractional votes) as in the Proposed Amendment to Enhance Voice and Participation, which has not yet entered into effect.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/ in Table 1). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their post second round or post selective quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
15.The main impact of the two alternative eligibility lists for protection of the poorest members is on the distribution within EMDCs. Limiting protection to the 47 members eligible for PCDR frees up more of the increase for dynamic EMDCs and leads to a larger overall shift to this group, and to under-represented countries as a whole, by about 0.3 percent. It also avoids the potential anomalies that can arise as a result of providing protection to PRGT-eligible members with relatively higher per capita incomes. For example, if the quota share of PRGT-eligible countries is protected, South Africa’s quota share (not PRGT-eligible) would fall below Nigeria’s (PRGT-eligible), even though South Africa has higher calculated quota and GDP blend shares.
16. A quota realignment combining the various elements discussed in this paper would represent a significant shift in favor of underrepresented economies and dynamic EMDCs (see Simulations 3 and 6). The overall quota shift to dynamic EMDCs would be about 6.4–6.7 percent, more than double the shift to this group under the 2008 reform (Table 5). In total, 64–65 members would see an increase in quota share, of which 54–55 are EMDCs. After taking account of protection for the poorest members, 97 EMDCs would either receive an increase or maintain their quota share under PCDR protection (116 under PRGT protection). In terms of the largest increase, 14–16 EMDCs would receive nominal quota increases greater than 150 percent, and 8 of the 10 countries with the largest quota increase would be EMDCs (Table 6).
Summary of Voting and Quota Share Shifts 1/
Correspond to simulations 3 and 6 in Table 1.
The pre-Singapore calculations exclude Tuvalu and Kosovo.
Excludes oil-exporting EMDCs which WEO classifies in the functional group “fuel exporters”, consisting of 27 countries.
Relative to post Second Round these are Australia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Relative to pre-2008 Reform, Australia and the United Kingdom are excluded and Japan and the United States are included.
These include 47 and 71 PCDR-or PRGT-eligible countries, respectively, that maintain the post second round quota share.
The adjustment coefficient measures the extent to which deviations between actual and calculated quota shares are reduced by the quota adjustment.
Summary of Voting and Quota Share Shifts 1/
| Simulation 3 (PRGT protection) | Simulation 6 (PCDR protection) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| From pre-2008 Reform 2/ | From post Second Round | From pre-2008 Reform 2/ | From post Second Round | |||
| Shift of voting shares (ppts) | ||||||
| to under-represented countries | 8.6 | 6.3 | 8.9 | 6.6 | ||
| to dynamic EMDCs | 9.1 | 6.0 | 9.4 | 6.3 | ||
| to EMDCs | 5.4 | 2.7 | 5.3 | 2.7 | ||
| to non-oil EMDCs 3/ | 7.8 | 4.1 | 8.0 | 4.3 | ||
| Shift of quota shares (ppts) | ||||||
| to under-represented countries | 9.0 | 6.7 | 9.3 | 6.9 | ||
| to dynamic EMDCs | 9.3 | 6.4 | 9.6 | 6.7 | ||
| to EMDCs | 4.0 | 2.8 | 3.9 | 2.8 | ||
| to non-oil EMDCs 3/ | 6.6 | 4.3 | 6.8 | 4.5 | ||
| Number of countries that increase quota share | 57 | 64 | 58 | 65 | ||
| Advanced Countries 4/ | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | ||
| EMDCs | 47 | 54 | 48 | 55 | ||
| Number of countries that increase or maintain quota share | 57 | 126 | 58 | 107 | ||
| Advanced Countries | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | ||
| EMDCs 5/ | 47 | 116 | 48 | 97 | ||
| Number of countries with nominal quota | ||||||
| increases greater than 150% | 40 | 17 | 42 | 19 | ||
| Advanced Countries | 6 | 3 | 6 | 3 | ||
| EMDCs | 34 | 14 | 36 | 16 | ||
| Adjustment coefficient 6/ | 67.6 | 58.1 | 67.5 | 57.9 | ||
Correspond to simulations 3 and 6 in Table 1.
The pre-Singapore calculations exclude Tuvalu and Kosovo.
Excludes oil-exporting EMDCs which WEO classifies in the functional group “fuel exporters”, consisting of 27 countries.
Relative to post Second Round these are Australia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Relative to pre-2008 Reform, Australia and the United Kingdom are excluded and Japan and the United States are included.
These include 47 and 71 PCDR-or PRGT-eligible countries, respectively, that maintain the post second round quota share.
The adjustment coefficient measures the extent to which deviations between actual and calculated quota shares are reduced by the quota adjustment.
Summary of Voting and Quota Share Shifts 1/
| Simulation 3 (PRGT protection) | Simulation 6 (PCDR protection) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| From pre-2008 Reform 2/ | From post Second Round | From pre-2008 Reform 2/ | From post Second Round | |||
| Shift of voting shares (ppts) | ||||||
| to under-represented countries | 8.6 | 6.3 | 8.9 | 6.6 | ||
| to dynamic EMDCs | 9.1 | 6.0 | 9.4 | 6.3 | ||
| to EMDCs | 5.4 | 2.7 | 5.3 | 2.7 | ||
| to non-oil EMDCs 3/ | 7.8 | 4.1 | 8.0 | 4.3 | ||
| Shift of quota shares (ppts) | ||||||
| to under-represented countries | 9.0 | 6.7 | 9.3 | 6.9 | ||
| to dynamic EMDCs | 9.3 | 6.4 | 9.6 | 6.7 | ||
| to EMDCs | 4.0 | 2.8 | 3.9 | 2.8 | ||
| to non-oil EMDCs 3/ | 6.6 | 4.3 | 6.8 | 4.5 | ||
| Number of countries that increase quota share | 57 | 64 | 58 | 65 | ||
| Advanced Countries 4/ | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | ||
| EMDCs | 47 | 54 | 48 | 55 | ||
| Number of countries that increase or maintain quota share | 57 | 126 | 58 | 107 | ||
| Advanced Countries | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | ||
| EMDCs 5/ | 47 | 116 | 48 | 97 | ||
| Number of countries with nominal quota | ||||||
| increases greater than 150% | 40 | 17 | 42 | 19 | ||
| Advanced Countries | 6 | 3 | 6 | 3 | ||
| EMDCs | 34 | 14 | 36 | 16 | ||
| Adjustment coefficient 6/ | 67.6 | 58.1 | 67.5 | 57.9 | ||
Correspond to simulations 3 and 6 in Table 1.
The pre-Singapore calculations exclude Tuvalu and Kosovo.
Excludes oil-exporting EMDCs which WEO classifies in the functional group “fuel exporters”, consisting of 27 countries.
Relative to post Second Round these are Australia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Relative to pre-2008 Reform, Australia and the United Kingdom are excluded and Japan and the United States are included.
These include 47 and 71 PCDR-or PRGT-eligible countries, respectively, that maintain the post second round quota share.
The adjustment coefficient measures the extent to which deviations between actual and calculated quota shares are reduced by the quota adjustment.
Illustrative Simulations: Largest Increases and Decreases in Quota Shares
(in percentage points)
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/ in Table 1). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their selective post second round or post quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
Illustrative Simulations: Largest Increases and Decreases in Quota Shares
(in percentage points)
| Rank | PRGT Protection 2/ | PRGT Protection 2/ | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Simulation 1 | Simulation 2 | Simulation 3 | Simulation 4 | Simulation 5 | Simulation 6 | |||||||
| Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 3/ | Simulation 1 with Cap 4/ | Simulation 2 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 5/ | Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 6/ | Simulation 4 with Cap 4/ | Simulation 5 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 5/ | |||||||
| 1 | China 7/ | 2.54 | China 7/ | 2.40 | China 7/ | 2.40 | China 7/ | 2.69 | China 7/ | 2.40 | China 7/ | 2.40 |
| 2 | Brazil | 0.43 | Brazil | 0.47 | Brazil | 0.61 | Brazil | 0.47 | Brazil | 0.55 | Brazil | 0.69 |
| 3 | Turkey | 0.40 | Korea | 0.37 | Korea | 0.41 | Turkey | 0.42 | Korea | 0.39 | Mexico | 0.45 |
| 4 | Korea | 0.36 | Turkey | 0.37 | Mexico | 0.40 | Korea | 0.37 | Turkey | 0.37 | India | 0.44 |
| 5 | Mexico | 0.29 | Mexico | 0.31 | India | 0.37 | Mexico | 0.31 | Mexico | 0.36 | Korea | 0.44 |
| 6 | Spain | 0.28 | Spain | 0.29 | Turkey | 0.37 | Spain | 0.29 | India | 0.32 | Turkey | 0.37 |
| 7 | Singapore | 0.23 | India | 0.26 | Spain | 0.27 | India | 0.26 | Spain | 0.31 | Spain | 0.29 |
| 8 | India | 0.23 | Singapore | 0.23 | Singapore | 0.23 | Singapore | 0.23 | Singapore | 0.23 | Russia | 0.23 |
| 9 | Ireland | 0.21 | Ireland | 0.21 | Russia | 0.22 | Ireland | 0.21 | Russia | 0.21 | Singapore | 0.23 |
| 10 | Russia | 0.20 | Russia | 0.21 | Ireland | 0.20 | Russia | 0.21 | Ireland | 0.21 | Ireland | 0.20 |
| 1 | Saudi Arabia | -1.06 | Saudi Arabia | -1.06 | Saudi Arabia | -1.06 | Saudi Arabia | -1.06 | Saudi Arabia | -1.06 | Saudi Arabia | -1.06 |
| 2 | France | -0.72 | France | -0.72 | France | -0.75 | France | -0.72 | France | -0.72 | France | -0.75 |
| 3 | Belgium | -0.57 | Belgium | -0.57 | Belgium | -0.58 | Belgium | -0.57 | Belgium | -0.57 | Belgium | -0.58 |
| 4 | Germany | -0.43 | Germany | -0.43 | Germany | -0.49 | Germany | -0.43 | Germany | -0.43 | Germany | -0.49 |
| 5 | Venezuela | -0.41 | Venezuela | -0.41 | Venezuela | -0.41 | Venezuela | -0.41 | Venezuela | -0.41 | Venezuela | -0.41 |
| 6 | Canada | -0.37 | Canada | -0.37 | Canada | -0.39 | Canada | -0.37 | Canada | -0.37 | Canada | -0.39 |
| 7 | Netherlands | -0.31 | Netherlands | -0.31 | Netherlands | -0.33 | Netherlands | -0.31 | Netherlands | -0.31 | Netherlands | -0.33 |
| 8 | Argentina | -0.26 | Argentina | -0.26 | Argentina | -0.26 | Argentina | -0.26 | Argentina | -0.26 | Argentina | -0.26 |
| 9 | Switzerland | -0.22 | Switzerland | -0.22 | Switzerland | -0.24 | Nigeria | -0.22 | Nigeria | -0.22 | Switzerland | -0.24 |
| 10 | South Africa | -0.21 | South Africa | -0.21 | South Africa | -0.21 | Switzerland | -0.22 | Switzerland | -0.22 | Nigeria | -0.22 |
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/ in Table 1). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their selective post second round or post quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
Illustrative Simulations: Largest Increases and Decreases in Quota Shares
(in percentage points)
| Rank | PRGT Protection 2/ | PRGT Protection 2/ | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Simulation 1 | Simulation 2 | Simulation 3 | Simulation 4 | Simulation 5 | Simulation 6 | |||||||
| Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 3/ | Simulation 1 with Cap 4/ | Simulation 2 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 5/ | Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 6/ | Simulation 4 with Cap 4/ | Simulation 5 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 5/ | |||||||
| 1 | China 7/ | 2.54 | China 7/ | 2.40 | China 7/ | 2.40 | China 7/ | 2.69 | China 7/ | 2.40 | China 7/ | 2.40 |
| 2 | Brazil | 0.43 | Brazil | 0.47 | Brazil | 0.61 | Brazil | 0.47 | Brazil | 0.55 | Brazil | 0.69 |
| 3 | Turkey | 0.40 | Korea | 0.37 | Korea | 0.41 | Turkey | 0.42 | Korea | 0.39 | Mexico | 0.45 |
| 4 | Korea | 0.36 | Turkey | 0.37 | Mexico | 0.40 | Korea | 0.37 | Turkey | 0.37 | India | 0.44 |
| 5 | Mexico | 0.29 | Mexico | 0.31 | India | 0.37 | Mexico | 0.31 | Mexico | 0.36 | Korea | 0.44 |
| 6 | Spain | 0.28 | Spain | 0.29 | Turkey | 0.37 | Spain | 0.29 | India | 0.32 | Turkey | 0.37 |
| 7 | Singapore | 0.23 | India | 0.26 | Spain | 0.27 | India | 0.26 | Spain | 0.31 | Spain | 0.29 |
| 8 | India | 0.23 | Singapore | 0.23 | Singapore | 0.23 | Singapore | 0.23 | Singapore | 0.23 | Russia | 0.23 |
| 9 | Ireland | 0.21 | Ireland | 0.21 | Russia | 0.22 | Ireland | 0.21 | Russia | 0.21 | Singapore | 0.23 |
| 10 | Russia | 0.20 | Russia | 0.21 | Ireland | 0.20 | Russia | 0.21 | Ireland | 0.21 | Ireland | 0.20 |
| 1 | Saudi Arabia | -1.06 | Saudi Arabia | -1.06 | Saudi Arabia | -1.06 | Saudi Arabia | -1.06 | Saudi Arabia | -1.06 | Saudi Arabia | -1.06 |
| 2 | France | -0.72 | France | -0.72 | France | -0.75 | France | -0.72 | France | -0.72 | France | -0.75 |
| 3 | Belgium | -0.57 | Belgium | -0.57 | Belgium | -0.58 | Belgium | -0.57 | Belgium | -0.57 | Belgium | -0.58 |
| 4 | Germany | -0.43 | Germany | -0.43 | Germany | -0.49 | Germany | -0.43 | Germany | -0.43 | Germany | -0.49 |
| 5 | Venezuela | -0.41 | Venezuela | -0.41 | Venezuela | -0.41 | Venezuela | -0.41 | Venezuela | -0.41 | Venezuela | -0.41 |
| 6 | Canada | -0.37 | Canada | -0.37 | Canada | -0.39 | Canada | -0.37 | Canada | -0.37 | Canada | -0.39 |
| 7 | Netherlands | -0.31 | Netherlands | -0.31 | Netherlands | -0.33 | Netherlands | -0.31 | Netherlands | -0.31 | Netherlands | -0.33 |
| 8 | Argentina | -0.26 | Argentina | -0.26 | Argentina | -0.26 | Argentina | -0.26 | Argentina | -0.26 | Argentina | -0.26 |
| 9 | Switzerland | -0.22 | Switzerland | -0.22 | Switzerland | -0.24 | Nigeria | -0.22 | Nigeria | -0.22 | Switzerland | -0.24 |
| 10 | South Africa | -0.21 | South Africa | -0.21 | South Africa | -0.21 | Switzerland | -0.22 | Switzerland | -0.22 | Nigeria | -0.22 |
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/ in Table 1). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their selective post second round or post quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
17. The elements discussed in this paper would also build upon the shifts achieved under the 2008 reform. Taken together, the two reforms would lead to an increase in quota share of dynamic EMDCs of over 9 percent (Table 5). The net shift in quota and voting share to EMDCs as a group would be 3.9 and 5.3 percent, respectively, under PCDR protection. Excluding EMDCs that are oil exporters, whose quota shares generally decline, the net shifts to EMDCs from the two reforms combined would be significantly larger, at 6.6–6.8 percent for quota share and 7.8–8.0 percent for voting share.
V. Issues for Discussion
18. This paper seeks to lay out several elements that could help provide a basis for a possible compromise on the 14th Review within the timetable laid out by the IMFC. Directors may wish to give their views on whether they consider these elements, taken together, as providing a reasonable basis for moving forward. In particular:
Can Directors support a doubling of quotas under the 14th Review, recognizing that some rebalancing between quotas and NAB resources may be necessary under the forthcoming NAB review?
Would Directors support an approach to distributing the increase along the lines discussed in this paper? In particular, would they support using a combination of selective increases for all members based on the quota formula and ad hoc increases for a sub-set of members using the compressed GDP blend variable as the primary distribution key? Do they agree that under-represented advanced countries could participate in the latter to a limited degree?
What are Directors’ views on the additional elements of flexibility discussed in this paper that could help facilitate the shifts to dynamic EMDCs, notably limiting the maximum percentage quota increase for individual members and a small haircut for all advanced countries?
What are Directors’ views on the alternative eligibility lists for protecting the quota shares of the poorest members?
Illustrative Quota Simulations—Voting Share for Major Country Groups
(In percent)
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used. Basic votes are calculated using the agreed percentage of total votes, 5.502 percent of total votes (provided there are no fractional votes) as in the Proposed Amendment to Enhance Voice and Participation, which has not yet entered into effect.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/ in Table 1). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their post second round or post selective quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Including Korea and Singapore.
Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.
Illustrative Quota Simulations—Voting Share for Major Country Groups
(In percent)
| Post Second Round Quota Share 3/ | 100 percent increase; 0/60/40 Allocation 1/ | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRGT Protection 2/ | PCDR Protection 2/ | ||||||||
| Simulation 1 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 5/ | Simulation 2 Simulation 1 with Cap 5/ | Simulation 3 Simulation 2 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 6/ | Simulation 4 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 7/ | Simulation 5 Simulation 4 with Cap 5/ | Simulation 6 Simulation 5 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 6/ | ||||
| Advanced economies | 57.9 | 55.8 | 55.8 | 55.2 | 55.8 | 55.8 | 55.2 | ||
| Major advanced economies | 43.0 | 41.6 | 41.6 | 41.2 | 41.6 | 41.6 | 41.2 | ||
| Of which: United States | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.6 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.6 | ||
| Other advanced economies | 14.9 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 14.1 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 14.1 | ||
| Emerging Market and Developing Countries | 42.1 | 44.2 | 44.2 | 44.8 | 44.2 | 44.2 | 44.8 | ||
| Developing countries | 34.5 | 36.5 | 36.5 | 37.0 | 36.5 | 36.5 | 37.0 | ||
| Africa | 6.2 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 | ||
| Asia 8/ | 12.8 | 16.1 | 16.0 | 16.2 | 16.3 | 16.1 | 16.3 | ||
| Middle East, Malta &; Turkey | 7.3 | 6.6 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | ||
| Western Hemisphere | 8.2 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 8.1 | 8.3 | 8.5 | ||
| Transition economies | 7.6 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 7.8 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 7.7 | ||
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | ||
| Memorandum items: | |||||||||
| EU 27 | 30.9 | 29.5 | 29.5 | 29.2 | 29.5 | 29.5 | 29.3 | ||
| LICs (PRGT-eligible) | 6.1 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.8 | ||
| LICs (PCDR eligibility) | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | ||
| Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.) | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.6 | |||
| Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.) | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.9 | |||
| Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 9/ | 5.5 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 6.3 | |||
| EMDCs (shift in p.p.) | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.7 | |||
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used. Basic votes are calculated using the agreed percentage of total votes, 5.502 percent of total votes (provided there are no fractional votes) as in the Proposed Amendment to Enhance Voice and Participation, which has not yet entered into effect.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/ in Table 1). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their post second round or post selective quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Including Korea and Singapore.
Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.
Illustrative Quota Simulations—Voting Share for Major Country Groups
(In percent)
| Post Second Round Quota Share 3/ | 100 percent increase; 0/60/40 Allocation 1/ | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRGT Protection 2/ | PCDR Protection 2/ | ||||||||
| Simulation 1 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 5/ | Simulation 2 Simulation 1 with Cap 5/ | Simulation 3 Simulation 2 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 6/ | Simulation 4 Full CQS Protection; Advanced Countries in Ad hoc 7/ | Simulation 5 Simulation 4 with Cap 5/ | Simulation 6 Simulation 5 with common percentage reduction for advanced countries 6/ | ||||
| Advanced economies | 57.9 | 55.8 | 55.8 | 55.2 | 55.8 | 55.8 | 55.2 | ||
| Major advanced economies | 43.0 | 41.6 | 41.6 | 41.2 | 41.6 | 41.6 | 41.2 | ||
| Of which: United States | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.6 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.6 | ||
| Other advanced economies | 14.9 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 14.1 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 14.1 | ||
| Emerging Market and Developing Countries | 42.1 | 44.2 | 44.2 | 44.8 | 44.2 | 44.2 | 44.8 | ||
| Developing countries | 34.5 | 36.5 | 36.5 | 37.0 | 36.5 | 36.5 | 37.0 | ||
| Africa | 6.2 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 | ||
| Asia 8/ | 12.8 | 16.1 | 16.0 | 16.2 | 16.3 | 16.1 | 16.3 | ||
| Middle East, Malta &; Turkey | 7.3 | 6.6 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | ||
| Western Hemisphere | 8.2 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 8.1 | 8.3 | 8.5 | ||
| Transition economies | 7.6 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 7.8 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 7.7 | ||
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | ||
| Memorandum items: | |||||||||
| EU 27 | 30.9 | 29.5 | 29.5 | 29.2 | 29.5 | 29.5 | 29.3 | ||
| LICs (PRGT-eligible) | 6.1 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.8 | ||
| LICs (PCDR eligibility) | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | ||
| Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.) | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.6 | |||
| Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.) | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.9 | |||
| Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 9/ | 5.5 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 6.3 | |||
| EMDCs (shift in p.p.) | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.7 | |||
All simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas which is distributed on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion 0/60/40, respectively.
Eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.
Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used. Basic votes are calculated using the agreed percentage of total votes, 5.502 percent of total votes (provided there are no fractional votes) as in the Proposed Amendment to Enhance Voice and Participation, which has not yet entered into effect.
Broadly corresponds to Simulation 2 in Table 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Further Considerations (9/3/10) except that advanced countries are also eligible for ad hoc increases. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 4/ in Table 1). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend; eligible advanced countries receive one third of the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. In addition, major advanced economies are capped at their post second round or post selective quota share, whichever is greater.
The maximum nominal increase for an individual country is capped at 220 percent.
All advanced countries receive a 1 percent reduction in their final quota shares.
Same as Simulation 1 except with protection for PCDR-eligible countries.
Including Korea and Singapore.
Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.
The paper was prepared by a staff team led by S. Bassett and S. Prowse, and consisting of H. Treichel, R. Rozenov, L. Kohler, C. Janada, and B. Wennerholm. T. Krueger also contributed.
See Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (4/24/10).
See The Chairman’s Concluding Remarks: Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Further Considerations (9/20/10).
See Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (10/4/09).
See Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—The Size of the Fund—Initial Considerations (3/15/10); and Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Further Considerations (9/3/10).
Equiproportional increases are distributed to all members in proportion to actual quota shares and do not result in any realignment. Selective increases are distributed to all members in proportion to their calculated quota shares. Ad hoc increases are distributed to a sub-set of members based on one or more agreed distribution keys.
See also Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares—Further Considerations—Simulation Requests (8/30/10).
See Quotas—Updated Calculations and Quota Variables (9/15/09).
The ad hoc increases are allocated on the basis of a uniform reduction factor so that each eligible member’s out-of-lineness—in this case relative to their share in the compressed GDP blend variable—is reduced by proportionately the same amount. In this proposal, the three eligible advanced countries would receive one third of the uniform reduction factor applying to eligible EMDCs.
For purposes of the simulations in this paper, Zimbabwe is not included among the ―poorest‖ members that receive an additional quota increase to protect their post-second round quota share as it is currently not PRGT and PCDR eligible. This, however, does not preclude such an increase when the formal proposal for quota increases is made.
The 6 affected countries are China, Equatorial Guinea, Luxembourg, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Without the cap, the increases for these members under the approach outlined above would range between 201 and 240 percent. These countries would still receive the largest individual percentage increases under the review.