Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Initial Considerations Statistical Appendix
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This note provides operational guidance and background information on the use of Fund resources for budgetary financing.

Abstract

This note provides operational guidance and background information on the use of Fund resources for budgetary financing.

Quota Simulations—Technical Aspects

Data sets. Simulation results are presented for (i) the current quota data base which covers the period through 2007; and (ii) a derived data base which covers the period through 2008, based primarily on data from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) rather than the IFS (see Section II of the main paper).

Quota increase—size. For illustrative purposes, the size of the quota increase is assumed to be 50 or 100 percent (and 50, 100, 150 percent for the purely selective simulation).

Dynamic EMDCs. Dynamic EMDCs include all under-represented EMDCs plus other EMDCs whose share in global PPP GDP is greater than their post second round quota share under the 2008 reform, and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent (as measured by their calculated and post second round quota share; see Table 3 and Supplement, Chapter II).

Ad hoc increase—eligible countries. Ad hoc increases are allocated to three different groups of countries: (i) all under-represented countries; (ii) all under-represented countries plus other dynamic EMDCs; and (iii) all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs, which implies foregoing on the part of under-represented advanced countries. In addition, part of any ad hoc increase is set aside for the “poorest” countries and to protect over-represented countries from becoming under-represented and under-represented advanced countries from falling below their post second round quota share (see below).

Ad hoc increase—implementation. (i) In the case where only under-represented countries are eligible to receive ad hoc increases (Table 6 and 4a), these increases are distributed across countries in such a way that each eligible country’s out-of-lineness (as measured by the difference between its calculated and post-selective/equiproportional quota share1) is reduced proportionally by a uniform reduction factor (URF);2 (ii) In cases where under-represented countries and other dynamic EMDCs are eligible for ad hoc increases (Tables 7-12 and 5a-10a), over-represented dynamic EMDCs receive a fixed percentage increase over their post- selective/equiproportional nominal quotas—the so-called minimum ad hoc increase shown in the simulation tables. Eligible under-represented EMDCs receive the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness as described above or the minimum ad hoc increase, whichever is greater. Eligible under-represented advanced countries receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. Additionally, in the context of ad hoc increases:

Table 4a.

Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to All Under-represented Countries -- by Member 1/

(In percent)

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Source: Finance Department.

The simulations assume a 50 and 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all members whose calculated quota share is greater than their actual quota share. Countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

Simulations are distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

Based on IFS data through 2007.

Based on preliminary data through 2008 primarily from the World Economic Outlook, October 2009.

Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Table 5a.

Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to All Under-represented Countries and Other Dynamic EMDCs -- by Member 1/

(In percent)

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Source: Finance Department.

The simulations assume a 50 and 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all under-represented countries and other dynamic EMDCs as defined in footnote 7. Eligible under-represented advanced countries receive a uniform proportionate reduction in out-of-lineness; eligible under-represented EMDCs receive a uniform proportionate reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota, whichever is higher. Eligible over-represented countries receive the minimum percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota. Countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

Simulations are distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

Based on IFS data through 2007.

Based on preliminary data through 2008 primarily from the World Economic Outlook, October 2009.

Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and not overrepresented by more than 25%.
Table 10a.

Illustrative Scenarios: Equiproportional, Selective and Ad hoc Increase -- by Member 1/

(In percent)

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Source: Finance Department.

The simulations assume a 50 and 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to dynamic EMDCs as defined in footnote 7. Eligible underrepresented countries receive a uniform proportionate reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum percentage increase above their post equiproportional and selective nominal quota, whichever is higher. Eligible over-represented countries receive the minimum nominal percentage increase above their post equiproportional and selective nominal quota. Under-represented advanced countries receive at least their post second round quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

Simulations are distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

Based on IFS data through 2007.

Based on preliminary data through 2008 primarily from the World Economic Outlook, October 2009.

Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and not overrepresented by more than 25%.
  • Protection of the “poorest”. All scenarios allocate a portion of the ad hoc increase to the “poorest” countries, defined as PRGT-eligible countries. Each country in this group at least maintains its post second round quota and thus its voting share.

  • Protection from becoming under-represented. Over-represented countries are protected from becoming under-represented as their final quota share is the maximum of their calculated quota share and the share they would otherwise receive based on the allocation mechanism. This protection is dropped in the simulations that include a small equiproportional element.

  • Protection for under-represented advanced economies. In those cases where under-represented advanced economies are assumed to forego ad hoc increases, their final quota share cannot fall below their post second round quota share.

Table 1a.

Distribution of Quotas and Calculated Quotas – by Member

(In percent)

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Source: Finance Department.
1/

Includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

2/

Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective.

3/

Based on the following formula: CQS = (0.50*GDP + 0.30*Openness +0.15*Variability + 0.05*Reserves)^K. GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates. K is a compression factor of 0.95.

4/

Based on IFS data through 2007.

5/

Based on preliminary data through 2008 primarily from the World Economic Outlook, October 2009.

6/

Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Table 2a.

Out-of-Lineness -- by Member 1/

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Source: Finance Department.
1/

Out-of-lineness is measured as the calculated quota share based on the quota formula divided by the post second round quota share under the 2008 Quota and Voice Reform which has not yet been implemented; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009.

2/

Based on preliminary data through 2008 primarily from the World Economic Outlook, October 2009.

3/

Current shares based on IFS data through 2007.

4/

Out-of-lineness is measured as the PPP GDP share divided by the post second round quota share under the 2008 Quota and Voice Reform which has not yet been implemented; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009.

5/

Projected PPP GDP share calculated using WEO data from 2006 - 2008.

6/

Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Table 3a.

Illustrative Scenarios: Selective Increases of 50%, 100% and 150% -- by Member

(In percent)

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Source: Finance Department.

Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

Based on IFS data through 2007.

Based on preliminary data through 2008 primarily from the World Economic Outlook, October 2009.

Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Table 6a.

Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs -- by Member 1/

(In percent)

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Source: Finance Department.

The simulations assume a 50 and 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to dynamic EMDCs as defined in footnote 7. Eligible under-represented countries receive a uniform proportionate reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota, whichever is higher. Eligible over-represented countries receive the minimum nominal percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota. Countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at their calculated quota share. Under-represented advanced countries receive at least their post second round quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

Simulations are distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

Based on IFS data through 2007.

Based on preliminary data through 2008 primarily from the World Economic Outlook, October 2009.

Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and not overrepresented by more than 25%.Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.
Table 7a.

Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to All Under-represented Countries and Other Dynamic EMDCs -- by Member 1/

(In percent)

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Source: Finance Department.

The simulations assume a 50 and 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all under-represented countries and other dynamic EMDCs as defined in footnote 7. Eligible under-represented advanced countries receive a uniform proportionate reduction in out-of-lineness; eligible under-represented EMDCs receive a uniform proportionate reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota, whichever is higher. Eligible over-represented countries receive the minimum percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota. Countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

Simulations are distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively

Based on IFS data through 2007.

Based on preliminary data through 2008 primarily from the World Economic Outlook, October 2009.

Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and not overrepresented by more than 25%.
Table 8a.

Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs -- by Member 1/

(In percent)

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Source: Finance Department.

The simulations assume a 50 and 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to dynamic EMDCs as defined in footnote 7. Eligible underrepresentedn countries receive a uniform proportionate reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota, whichever is higher. Eligible over-represented countries receive the minimum nominal percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota. Countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at their calculated quota share. Under-represented advanced countries receive at least their post second round quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

Simulations are distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

Based on IFS data through 2007.

Based on preliminary data through 2008 primarily from the World Economic Outlook, October 2009.

Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and not overrepresented by more than 25%.
Table 9a.

Illustrative Scenarios: Equiproportional, Selective and Ad hoc Increase -- by Member 1/

(In percent)

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Source: Finance Department.

The simulations assume a 50 and 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all under-represented countries and other dynamic EMDCs as defined in footnote 7. Eligible under-represented advanced countries receive a uniform proportionate reduction in out-of-lineness; eligible under-represented EMDCs receive a uniform proportionate reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum percentage increase above their post equiproportional and selective nominal quota, whichever is higher. Eligible over-represented countries receive the minimum percentage increase above their post equiproportional and selective nominal quota. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

Simulations are distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

Based on IFS data through 2007.

Based on preliminary data through 2008 primarily from the World Economic Outlook, October 2009.

Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and not overrepresented by more than 25%.
1

The post-selective/equiproportional quota share is the quota share a country would end up with if only the equiproportional and selective parts of the overall quota increase were implemented.

2

The uniform proportional reduction in out-of-lineness was also used in the 2008 reform for allocating ad hoc quota increases.

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