Implementation of the Joint Management Action Plan on Bank-Fund Collaboration

In light of the multilateral effort to ensure the adequacy of the financial resources available to the International Monetary Fund (the “Fund”), and with a view to supporting the Fund’s ability to provide timely and effective balance of payments assistance to its members, the Swedish Riksbank (“Riksbank”) agrees to lend to the Fund an SDRdenominated amount up to the equivalent of EUR 2.47 billion, on the terms and conditions set out in this paper.

Abstract

In light of the multilateral effort to ensure the adequacy of the financial resources available to the International Monetary Fund (the “Fund”), and with a view to supporting the Fund’s ability to provide timely and effective balance of payments assistance to its members, the Swedish Riksbank (“Riksbank”) agrees to lend to the Fund an SDRdenominated amount up to the equivalent of EUR 2.47 billion, on the terms and conditions set out in this paper.

I. Introduction

1. This report assesses implementation of the Joint Management Action Plan on Bank-Fund Collaboration (JMAP), discusses the state of Bank-Fund collaboration more generally, and suggests ways to address challenges to collaboration that have arisen in the context of the recent global economic turmoil. Overall, the report finds that while Bank-Fund collaboration has improved over the past two years, the JMAP appears to have played a supporting rather than a central role in this. The report concludes by describing a number of actions to be taken to move the JMAP and collaboration forward.

II. Origins and Evolution of the JMAP

A. Report of the External Review Committee on Bank-Fund Collaboration

2. In March 2006, the International Monetary Fund (Fund) Managing Director and World Bank (Bank) President established the External Review Committee on Bank-Fund Collaboration1, chaired by Pedro Malan, former Minister of Finance of Brazil. The Committee was asked to suggest ways to improve Bank-Fund collaboration on country work (including policy advice, lending operations, and technical assistance) and thematic work, and to provide recommendations on how to better tailor collaboration to the differing circumstances of the membership.

3. In its report (Malan Report), the Committee found that close collaboration between the Bank and the Fund was vital given their distinct, but closely linked, mandates. It also found that poor collaboration imposed a significant cost on members. While there were many examples of good collaboration, there was scope for improvement in how the institutions worked together. For example, the Committee found insufficient collaboration in the institutions’ strategy development. It also found that, to the extent that mechanisms to improve collaboration existed, these focused more on resolving disputes rather than proactively identifying how the institutions could complement each other.

4. While the Committee acknowledged structural, procedural and cultural differences between the Bank and the Fund (many of which they considered to be part of each institution’s “strengths and complementarities”), they cautioned against using these as excuses for shortcomings in collaboration. Pointing out that “collaboration is much more than co-existing and not standing on each other’s toes”, they called for a stronger culture of collaboration grounded in, among other things, greater trust and encouraged by stronger incentives. It was the absence of such a culture, backed by appropriate incentives, that had prevented past agreements on collaboration from achieving their full potential.

5. The Committee made a number of recommendations, including:

  • Improved leadership and accountability on the part of Governors, Executive Boards and managements with respect to Bank-Fund collaboration.

  • Increased staff exchanges between the Bank and Fund by resolving administrative and financial impediments to mobility between the institutions.

  • Integration of stronger incentives to collaboration into staff performance assessments.

  • Improved complementarity in the design and implementation of new or expanded financing facilities and liquidity instruments to help countries face shocks.

  • Better integration and harmonization of work on fiscal issues, including its macroeconomic and compositional aspects.

  • Clarification of the Fund’s ongoing financing activities in low-income countries (LICs), including the possible phased withdrawal from providing long-term “base line” financing to LICs through successive programs.2

  • Elevation of the Financial Sector Liaison Committee (FSLC), with an expanded mandate to promote collaboration on all financial-sector issues, including the coordination of technical assistance (TA) to member countries.

  • Improving the Bank’s ability to provide the Fund with timely advice on sectoral aspects of public expenditure and the Fund’s ability to provide the Bank with comprehensive macroeconomic assessments on all countries, not just those with a Fund-supported program.

6. The Committee did not recommend revising the 1989 Concordat on Bank-Fund Collaboration. They acknowledged that the Concordat contained ambiguities in important areas but saw these as critical to achieving agreement on a final negotiated text. Nevertheless, they saw merit in the articulation of an “Understanding on Collaboration”—a high-level framework for how the institutions would work together. The framework would acknowledge the interdependence of the institutions and highlight the responsibilities of the managements in promoting collaboration. The details and processes of enhancing collaboration would be fleshed out at the operational level and would be the result of a “living ongoing exercise and not a document that is prepared and then forgotten.”

7. These, and other findings and recommendations, were presented to the Executive Boards of the Bank and the Fund at a joint informal briefing in February 2007 and at separate informal meetings in March 2007. Executive Directors of both institutions generally agreed with the thrust of the Report and its call to reinforce the culture of collaboration. They noted, however, that a number of recommendations dealing with broader elements of institutional governance were for shareholders (rather than the staffs or managements) to consider. The Report was considered in April 2007 by the International Monetary and Financial Committee and the Development Committee, which looked forward “to hearing from the two institutions about concrete proposals to foster a culture of collaboration.”3

B. Joint Management Action Plan

8. The JMAP was Bank and Fund managements’ response to the aspects of the Malan Report on Bank-Fund Collaboration within their purview.4 Drawing on a staff survey and consultations with staff, and presented to the Boards of both the Bank and the Fund in October 2007, the plan identified three broad priority areas for improvements in Bank-Fund collaboration at the staff level:

  • Improving coordination on country work, including through new procedures for country team coordination;

  • Enhancing communication between staff of the two institutions working on common thematic issues, including by sharing information through new electronic platforms;

  • Improving incentives and support for collaboration on policies, review, and other issues, including by taking collaboration into account in performance assessments.

9. The JMAP eschewed dramatic changes or the addition of bureaucratic layers, building instead on existing “good-practice approaches.” A detailed Action Plan Implementation Matrix was prepared, mapping issues raised in the External Review Committee Report to proposed actions. The Plan covered collaboration on country work, financial-sector issues, fiscal issues, technical cooperation, human resources and other internal processes. Proposed actions included the following:

  • A requirement that country teams consult with each other regularly (at least annually) to discuss the key macroeconomic challenges facing the country in question and the necessary macro-critical sectoral reforms, and coordinate respective work programs, including by identifying needs in the area of analytical cross support. The consultations would be documented in a brief memorandum.

  • Improved response to requests by Fund staff for analytical support from Bank staff in areas where the Bank has the primary expertise.

  • Establishment of electronic web portals to share contact information and documents on both country and thematic issues.

  • Development of shared financial sector indicators and strengthening of the FSLC to improve, among other things, information sharing and coordination of technical assistance follow-up to Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) reports.

  • Improved information sharing and harmonization of advice on fiscal issues.

  • Better coordination of technical assistance in setting work program priorities, sharing terms of reference and final reports, and in conducting joint missions.

  • Access to internal job listings for staff of the other institution and enhanced temporary exchange of staff through secondments.

10. Finally, the JMAP mandated the Bank’s Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (PREM) and the Fund’s Strategy, Policy, and Review Department (SPR), in collaboration with other units, to prepare periodic progress reports and identify examples of good practice as well as problem areas that needed further attention.

C. JMAP Interim Reviews and Streamlining

11. The JMAP called for a joint review for the managements of both institutions of implementation after one year. The first review was completed in November 2008 and concluded that, despite challenges in some areas, overall collaboration remained robust (Box 1), with frequent interaction across 19th Street, cross participation in missions, and involvement in internal briefing and review processes. The review also found, however, that limited tangible progress had been made since the JMAP was initiated. Particular challenges had arisen in middle-income countries MICs) where the two institutions’ work programs were more varied; by contrast, collaboration in low-income countries, where Fund and Bank staff work more frequently on similar issues, had tended to be better. Experience with consultations between country teams had been mixed, and limited progress had been made in information sharing and web-based collaboration.

Review of JMAP Implementation: Joint Work on Food and Fuel

The November 2008 management review evaluated the quality of collaboration between the Bank and Fund in response to the food and fuel crises facing many developing countries. It noted that the Bank and Fund had collaborated closely in responding to the crises. A good illustration of this was the Fund Board paper on food and fuel subsidies, on which Bank comments were solicited and incorporated. In addition, there was extensive information and data exchange on several research projects and policy proposals, including between the Fund and the Bank’s Agriculture Department. Both the Bank and Fund participated in the UN taskforce and the Rome Meeting in June 2008, and a workshop was jointly organized with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in September 2008 to discuss work programs and policy perspectives.

12. The review also noted that substantial changes had occurred since the JMAP was approved and that this had altered the landscape for collaboration. Of particular note was the fact that, subsequent to the Malan Report and adoption of the JMAP (and prior to the current global financial crisis), the Fund began to downsize. Moreover, the review noted that the JMAP was not envisaged as static, but instead should be adapted to reflect lessons learned and changes in the operating environment. As a result, Bank and Fund managements agreed to revise the original JMAP implementation matrix to improve the relevance of its specific proposals, streamline the matrix to make it more operationally useful and easily monitored, and to strengthen incentives for collaboration (Annex 1). An interim follow-up review, submitted to the managements in September 2009, found some improvements in JMAP implementation in a number of areas, particularly in collaboration on fiscal issues and in the preparation of Joint Staff Advisory Notes (JSANs) and debt sustainability analyses (DSAs).

III. Progress in JMAP Implementation5

13. Evidence suggests that, while Bank-Fund collaboration has improved over the past two years, the JMAP has played a supporting rather than a central role in this (Box 2). Further progress in Bank-Fund collaboration and in JMAP implementation appears possible (see section V).

A. Collaboration on Country Issues

14. Among other things, the JMAP set out new requirements for country team collaboration. In this context, the JMAP also launched a pilot project to establish joint country team web portals.

Annual Country Team Consultations

15. A key component of the JMAP was to anchor coordination at the country level by introducing a requirement for country teams to hold joint consultations at least annually to discuss respective country-level activities, identify macro-critical sectoral issues, and produce a forward-looking work program. Annual country team consultations serve several purposes: they (i) enable a common understanding of macroeconomic challenges, appropriate macroeconomic policies, and needed structural reforms, providing much-needed consistency between Fund and Bank country work; (ii) help coordinate work plans, allowing among other things, to improve the timeliness of analytical cross support and the preparation of Fund assessment letters, and to identify potential for joint analytical work; (iii) bring together both core team members and staff providing analytical support, sectoral support, and technical assistance; and (iv) help build the relationships of trust essential to support the sharing of information and draft documents.

Staff Views on Bank-Fund Collaboration

In the survey undertaken for this review, a majority of Bank and Fund staff displayed a high degree of satisfaction with collaboration between country teams while a sizeable minority saw room for improvement. Among Bank staff, collaboration through routine sharing of documents and coordinating work programs benefited from the presence of a Fund Resident Representative and a Fund-supported program. The same is true for Fund staff, although the presence of a Fund-supported program had a smaller effect than the presence of a Fund Resident Representative.

Among both Bank and Fund staff, only a minority indicated that the JMAP had led to an improvement in collaboration. The staffs were more likely to attribute the improvement in collaboration to the crises facing member countries in recent years (food and fuel price surges, the global financial crisis, and the ensuing global recession).

Staff in both institutions most often identified information sharing as the area in greatest need of improvement, and called for more routine sharing of early drafts of country documents. Better collaboration on technical assistance and more joint work also featured prominently as suggested areas in need of improvement.

16. Heads of Fund Area Departments and Bank Regional Vice Presidents were advised of this requirement in February 2008. Initial results were mixed, with less than one third of country teams having consulted by November 2008. By December 2009, the share of teams who had consulted with each other had risen to 44 percent. There was significant variation across regions in both compliance and the quality of documentation produced from the consultations. Teams for about three quarters of countries in Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia held the required annual consultations, producing forward-looking and coordinated work programs. In contrast, only one third of teams working on countries in the Middle East and North Africa complied. In all of South and East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean only four country teams complied. In an effort to improve compliance and quality, SPR and PREM drafted and disseminated a Guidance Note on Good Practice for Annual Bank-Fund Country Team Consultations.

17. The reasons given for uneven compliance varied. A number of respondents did not consider formal annual consultations necessary given regular contact between teams. Nevertheless, staff who participated in the exercise generally spoke highly of its value added. For example, one Bank department described the experience as “encouraging in all cases […]. It has given a clear structure to collaboration and has led to a focused approach to joint work and shared work as well as to work contributions made by one institution to the benefit of the other.”

Joint Country Team Web Portals

18. To enhance information sharing between country teams, the original JMAP proposed establishing joint electronic platforms for the sharing of contact information, documents, mission schedules and other material. The recommendation was tested through a pilot study involving staff working on six countries (Dominican Republic, Mauritania, Paraguay, Turkey, Uganda, and Yemen).

19. Experience with the pilots over an 18-month period beginning in April 2007 was disappointing. Only one of the country portals was actively used by both Bank and Fund teams. The experience suggested that the success of joint web portals depended on a number of factors, among them good pre-existing collaboration between teams and the use of more user-friendly technology. Against this background, it was decided that portals should be established only if jointly requested by both teams. To support creation and use of portals SPR and PREM, in consultation with the Fund’s Technical and General Services Department (TGS), prepared and disseminated an Information Note on Joint Bank-Fund Country Team Web Portals to provide operational information and good practice illustrations of portal use, and TGS made web portals more user-friendly. However, while the survey revealed that some country teams were considering establishing a joint web portal, no new portals have been opened since the original pilot was instituted.

Debt Sustainability Analyses

20. Bank and Fund staff report that many of the improvements recommended in the 2006 review of the debt sustainability framework (DSF) have been incorporated into the DSA process, including with respect to the guidelines for the preparation and clearance of joint DSAs.6 In addition, staff guidance on LIC DSAs, which was last revised in 2008, was recently updated to better reflect respective institutional responsibilities and production time lines.7 Collaboration on DSAs conducted in the context of the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative has been smooth, but there is scope for improvement on other joint DSAs (discussed below in the context of revisions to the Debt Sustainability Framework), including with respect to improving understanding of the time required for respective review and approval processes. In the survey of Bank and Fund staff working at the country level, almost twenty percent of Fund staff and just under 10 percent of Bank staff believed that there had been delays in the provision of input for DSAs by counterpart country teams, with potential negative implications for the scheduling of Executive Board meetings.

Joint Staff Advisory Notes

21. As recommended in the Malan Report, the Bank and Fund revisited the arrangements for JSANs and for joint reviews of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) and associated annual progress reports (APRs). In February 2009, Bank and Fund management agreed to simplify the JSAN process and to reduce documentation requirements. Under the simplified process, JSANs are retained for full PRSPs and for interim PRSPs, but are no longer required for APRs, except in the context of the enhanced HIPC Initiative. As a result of the reform, the number of JSANs is expected to drop to about one half the number prepared in recent years. Nevertheless, with two out of ten Fund and one out of ten Bank respondents to the staff survey indicating delays in receiving inputs for JSANs from their counterparts, there may be room to strengthen collaboration, including by enhancing understanding of the time required for respective review and approval processes.

B. Collaboration on Sectoral and Cross-Cutting Issues

22. The JMAP calls for greater dialogue on policy issues of mutual interest, as well as for increased cross participation in missions and more regular exchange of information.

Fiscal Work

23. The JMAP highlights three main areas for deepening collaboration on fiscal work: better exchange of information through a joint web portal, more frequent cross participation in missions, and stronger coordination on public debt management and debt market issues. On the Fund side, work on debt management and debt market issues involves not only the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) but also the Monetary and Capital Markets Department (MCM).

Joint Web Portal on Fiscal Issues

24. To facilitate information sharing and collaboration, the Fund’s FAD and World Bank PREM created a joint web portal on fiscal issues in 2008. Bank and Fund staff have each identified which of the other’s fiscal documents they consider of use in their work. The portal is populated with up-to-date information on FAD’s technical assistance activities, including Regional Allocation Plans setting out work programs for technical assistance, Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) and Review of Standards and Codes (ROSC) mission schedules, mission reports, and other relevant information. More recently, PREM has posted technical assistance reports and Economic and Sector Work (ESW) and intends to provide information on mission plans. The establishment of the joint website is a significant achievement given the lack of systematic information sharing prior to the JMAP, despite fiscal work being an area where the Bank and the Fund share responsibility. The less centralized structure of fiscal work at the Bank (i.e., the Bank does not have a single fiscal affairs department) makes information sharing by the Bank more labor intensive than at the Fund. Nevertheless, Bank staff have made a concerted effort to identify and upload Bank fiscal documents and information of relevance to Fund staff.

Enhancing Cross Participation in Fiscal Missions

25. Cross participation in fiscal missions has increased somewhat. The number of Bank missions in which FAD staff participated increased from six in fiscal year 2008 to nine in fiscal year 2009. Similarly, several FAD missions in the past year included Bank staff: during the third quarter of 2009, for example, Bank staff participated in five FAD technical assistance missions. Cross-participation in missions is decided on a case-by-case basis depending on the subject matter, availability of staff, mission composition, and country authorities’ preferences.

Coordination on Public Debt Management and Debt Market Issues

26. In response to concerns identified in the Malan Report, the practice of holding regular meetings to discuss work on public debt management and debt markets was started in early 2007. The meetings aim to improve collaboration in the provision of technical assistance and capacity building. While the JMAP Action Matrix called for monthly meetings, in practice, meetings about every two months have been sufficient. The meetings have proved useful for updating and coordinating work programs on debt management and debt market issues, to brief counterparts on country work and technical assistance plans, and to discuss topical issues. They have also facilitated discussion of broader issues such as the impact of the financial crisis on debt management, and to coordinate joint Board papers.

27. In close collaboration, the Bank and the Fund have made substantial joint progress on public debt management and debt market issues:

  • The Bank and the Fund have jointly developed an internationally accepted framework for conducting Medium Term Debt Strategies (MTDS) including a Guidance Note and Quantitative Tool. The Bank and the Fund also conduct joint MTDS missions and jointly deliver MTDS training programs. This work has been initiated and reviewed through collaborative Board papers.

  • The Bank and the Fund also conduct joint technical assistance missions covering broader debt management issues. Coordination also takes place through Fund representation on the steering committee and technical advisory group for the Bank’s Debt Management Facility.

Financial Sector Work

28. The JMAP called for better knowledge management and information sharing between the Bank and the Fund at the strategic, analytical and operational levels. In particular, it called for the FSLC to serve as a focal point for discussion, and for coordination of joint financial sector work to be strengthened.

29. A FSLC subcommittee reviewed the policies and practices of the FSAP to adapt them to new realities, including lessons learned in the context of the global financial crisis. The joint assessment took into account the recommendations of the Malan Report and guidance from the G20, and provided the basis for the 2009 joint review of the FSAP. It proved to be a difficult process for Bank and Fund staff given differing views of respective roles and mandates. The results of the review, including recommendations for a reformed FSAP, were discussed by the Executive Boards of the Bank and Fund in September 2009.8 The review aimed to preserve the successes of the program and, as such, two key elements of the program remain unchanged. The review affirmed, first, that the FSAP remains voluntary and continues to be a joint Bank-Fund program in developing and emerging market economies and, second, that joint assessment missions would remain the norm. At the same time, the review introduced changes to improve candor and transparency, analytical rigor, flexibility, cross-country analysis, and focus standards assessments.

30. The FSLC is in the process of implementing the recommendations endorsed by the Boards which include the following key actions:

  • Introduction of an option for “modules” to inject greater flexibility and responsiveness in the FSAP by permitting individual assessments to focus on “stability” or “development” needs, with the Fund or the Bank taking the lead, respectively. Decisions on the particular modality for a country assessment will be taken and decided by consensus in the FSLC.

  • Strengthening of mechanisms for quality control and inter-institutional coordination, including more systematic prioritization of FSAPs among countries.

  • Establishment of a sub-committee to address critical issues, such as the special challenges faced by LICs and data sharing on LIC financial sectors, and technical assistance follow up to FSAPs.

  • Upgrading of the role of the FSLC to enhance its ability to serve as a vehicle for systematic information sharing. To permit the FSLC to play this and other newly mandated roles, new terms of reference have been drafted to improve the governance and accountability of the FSLC and allow it to play a greater role in priority setting, clarify its membership and the mandate of subcommittees and working groups, provide guidance on TA follow up, and require regular reporting to senior management on prioritization, decisions and outcomes.

Statistical Work

31. The JMAP initially featured a small set of measures aimed at strengthening communication between the Fund’s Statistics Department (STA) and the Bank’s Development Data Group (DDG). In particular, STA and DDG were called upon to identify counterparts and exchange contact information. After some delay due to shortcomings in communication—reflecting, in part, the more decentralized organizational structure of the Bank—STA and DDG have now implemented this measure, which should allow them to begin stepping up the exchange of concept and strategy notes, as well as mission information.

32. STA and DDG have been working together on a number of projects that were not initially part of the JMAP. To enable better monitoring of progress, these projects were integrated into the JMAP in 2009. In particular:

  • STA and DDG have worked together closely to encourage participation by Anglophone African countries in the Fund’s General Data Dissemination System. In pursuit of this objective, a coordinated program of technical assistance started in 2006 and is now complete.9 The Fund focused on macroeconomic statistics, and the Bank on social and demographics statistics, reflecting their respective areas of expertise.

  • STA and DDG have worked with representatives of other institutions to revise the 2008 System of National Accounts, taking the lead on, among other things, elaborating new concepts for measuring remittances.10

C. Human Resources Issues

33. The JMAP calls on the staffs of the two institutions to enhance incentives for collaboration and to resolve impediments to staff mobility. In particular, the JMAP envisages enhancing incentives for collaboration by taking the quality of collaboration into account when assessing the performance of senior staff, and obtaining full performance assessments for staff on secondment. To enhance staff mobility between the institutions, the JMAP calls for the Fund and Bank to provide reciprocal access to internal job listings and to open internal vacancies to staff from the sister institution. This measure builds on the adoption of a Bank-Fund pension transfer agreement in 2007, an important step in improving conditions for staff mobility.

Performance Assessments

34. There has been little progress in taking into account the quality of collaboration with the other institution when assessing the performance of senior staff. At both the Fund and the Bank, the practice of requesting feedback on the quality of collaboration provided by senior staff has not yet become common practice. Some Fund area departments stress, however, that good collaboration is expected of their staff, and that there are occasional informal exchanges with counterparts on personnel issues. The Bank’s Human Resources Department notes that there is potential within the existing performance evaluation forms to incorporate views on collaboration with the Fund.

35. During the reporting period, no Bank staff were seconded to the Fund and only two Fund staff were on secondment at the Bank. Both their departments of origin reported having sought full performance assessments and used them to determine merit increases.

Access to Internal Job Listings and Ability to Apply for Internal Vacancies

36. Fund staff have had access to internal job listings at the Bank for some time and can apply for vacancies with permission from the hiring manager at the Bank. Permission is routinely given. Bank staff were given direct access to announcements of Fund internal job vacancies (through a link on the Bank’s intranet) in January 2010. The Fund’s Human Resources Department has indicated that Bank staff can apply for advertised Fund internal vacancies simultaneously with Fund applicants for economist positions at the A11 to A14 grade levels and advertised internal B-level positions. The Fund’s Human Resources Department will clarify procedures Bank staff should follow when applying for Fund vacancies.

37. Mobility between the institutions has picked up in recent years, with a number of Fund staff having been hired by the Bank, in part spurred by Fund downsizing. More recently, a number of Bank staff have been hired by the Fund in the context of Fund retooling.

D. Working Practices and Other Internal Processes

38. The JMAP calls for a number of improvements to internal processes. In particular, it calls for establishing contact points to help country teams obtain more timely analytical cross support, recommends holding periodic front office meetings between Fund area departments and Bank regions, and seeks better coordinated review of joint documents.

Analytical Cross Support

39. Staff consultations undertaken as part of JMAP preparation identified concerns among Fund staff with perceived delays in the timely provision of analytical input by the Bank in areas of Bank expertise (e.g., Public Expenditure Reviews and Poverty and Social Impact Analysis). Similarly, some Bank staff voiced frustration in obtaining up-to-date Assessment Letters from the Fund, particularly in the midst of rapidly changing macroeconomic conditions. Initially, the JMAP called on PREM and SPR to develop a resource window to facilitate analytical cross support. However, upon further consultation within the Bank, the binding constraint appeared to be the availability of staff to undertake work at short notice that was not already included in annual work programs, particularly given competing demands on their time, which had increased in the wake of recent crises. It was therefore agreed that annual country team consultations should be the main vehicle to facilitate timely cross support.

40. In June 2009, following the findings of the interim JMAP review, all Fund area departments and Bank regions identified senior contact persons charged with addressing urgent needs for analytical cross support that could not be accommodated by country teams. The Bank’s Africa Region and the Fund’s African Department report regular and very fruitful discussions between the contact persons. Other departments have argued that there was no need to call upon the contact persons since collaboration, including in the provision of timely cross support, was working well. It is difficult to interpret this claim given the earlier concern with obtaining timely cross support. Possible explanations include a reluctance or lack of awareness on the part of some staff to make use of this channel. Limited use of contact persons does not, however, necessarily imply that the problem has been resolved; in the survey undertaken for this report, four out of ten Fund staff and two out of ten Bank staff perceived delays in receiving analytical cross support.

Regional Front Office Meetings

41. The JMAP encourages Fund area departments and Bank Regional Vice Presidencies to hold joint “front office” meetings to enhance collaboration. This recommendation flowed from the pilot project to improve collaboration on Africa (Box 3). In this area, the Bank’s Africa Region and the Fund’s African Department continue to set the standard, meeting once a month on average. Similar meetings are infrequent among the front offices of other area departments and Regional Vice Presidencies, although some hold meetings prior to or after the Spring and Annual Meetings. Senior staff in these departments do not consider regular meetings to be necessary, arguing that less formal and occasional contacts generally suffice.

Coordination of Review Processes

42. The External Review Committee had raised questions about the coordination of the institutions’ respective review processes, particularly given the relatively decentralized organizational structure of the Bank. The JMAP called for PREM and SPR to examine the review processes for joint documents and to elaborate a statement of good practice to replace current ad hoc arrangements. The interim JMAP review revealed that a major contributing factor to tensions in the preparation of joint country and policy products was a lack of awareness of the respective institutional structures and clearance requirements. In response, PREM and SPR, in consultation with other departments, prepared and disseminated an Information Note on the Review of Joint Bank-Fund Documents. The note describes the respective review processes and makes suggestions on coordinating the review of various types of joint documents.

Enhancing Collaboration on Africa

In March 2007 (prior to the JMAP), the Bank’s Africa Region and the Fund’s African Department initiated a pilot project to improve collaboration in three areas of shared responsibility–public financial management (PFM), financial sector reform, and natural resources.

The pilot project was implemented alongside, but separately from, the JMAP. The results were discussed in September 2008 by Bank and Fund management, at which time it was agreed to merge the project into the JMAP since many of the lessons learned were found to be relevant for the JMAP and Bank-Fund collaboration more broadly. For example:

  • Enhanced collaboration requires more resources. It also requires more joint work program planning and more joint missions.

  • Collaboration does not come naturally to some teams, so that systematic encouragement by managers is needed.

  • Existing mechanisms such as Financial Sector Strategy Notes and PFM Action Matrices are useful in strengthening collaboration (including with other donors), and other similar mechanisms, (e.g., joint strategy notes) merit exploration.

  • All regional department “front offices” should be encouraged to adopt the African departments’ practice of holding regular joint meetings.

IV. New and Emerging Issues

43. When the JMAP was drafted, no one anticipated the series of global crises—food and fuel price surges of 2008, the financial crisis of 2008–09 and the ensuing global recession. The international community, the G20 in particular, responded to the financial crisis and global recession with calls to the Bank and Fund to clarify mandates and enhance efficiency by, among other things, improving the way the Bank and Fund work together. The staffs responded well and collaboration has generally been good in the crisis (Box 4), a finding supported by, among other things, the results of the staff survey (Box 2). Collaboration during the crisis also benefited from the creation of a Low-Income Countries Strategy Unit in SPR that has provided a focus for Fund work in a key area of interest to the Bank and has helped improve the dialogue between the two institutions. Nevertheless, the crisis presented new challenges for the Bank and Fund and underlined the importance of good collaboration in a context of reduced Fund staff resources (Box 5).

Collaboration between Bank and Fund Country Teams in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis

After the onset of the global financial crisis, many member countries turned to the Bank and Fund for help. Many country teams faced requests to propose reform packages at short notice. The result has been a number of examples of good practice in Bank-Fund collaboration. Teams were able to quickly develop a shared understanding of a country’s economic challenges and to propose coherent reform packages. The division of labor varied somewhat within established practice, with the Fund team taking the lead on macroeconomic policies and the Bank team focusing on macro-critical structural reforms and addressing the poverty impacts of the crisis. The following are a few examples of successful collaboration.

Armenia: In March 2009, the Fund approved an exceptional access Stand-By Arrangement, augmented in June to increase direct budget support. At the same time, the Bank fast-tracked a series of quick-disbursing project loans and approved a first development policy operation (DPO). The Fund team concentrated on monetary and exchange rate policy, fiscal aggregates, and financial sector stability, while the Bank focused on expenditure composition and efficiency, infrastructure spending, and investment climate. Collaboration between the teams was strong, with extensive cross participation in missions and many joint meetings with the authorities.

Ghana: In mid-2009, the Fund provided assistance through an arrangement under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and the Bank through an Economic Governance and Poverty Reduction Credit. The Fund team concentrated on fiscal aggregates and monetary and exchange rate policy, while the Bank took the lead on structural reforms, comprising measures in public expenditure management, public sector reform, electricity sector policies, and oil and gas sector policies. The Bank’s lead economist routinely participated in Fund missions.

Mexico: In April 2009, the Fund granted Mexico access to its newly established Flexible Credit Line while the Bank accelerated disbursements under pre-existing loans. While the FCL aimed at assuaging market concerns with potential liquidity problems, accelerated disbursement of Bank loans supported spending in priority areas, including the Oportunidades social program.

Ukraine: In November 2008, the Fund approved a Stand-By Arrangement while the Bank increased its lending to Ukraine. While the division of labor followed established practice, the teams undertook substantial joint work, including by jointly preparing fiscal policy proposals and presenting them to the authorities. Teams paid particular attention to softening the impact of the crisis on the poor. Further, following a joint assessment of conditions in the banking sector, the teams jointly prepared a strategy for bank recapitalization and resolution. The teams also collaborated closely on energy sector reform.

44. In particular, the financial crisis heightened the importance of reforms to the FSAP (discussed above), and led to a G20 call for a further review of the joint DSF (discussed below). Also, as part of its Mutual Assessment Process, the G20 have asked the Fund to provide analysis of the collective macroeconomic implications of their national policies and assess how these policies fit together. The Bank has been asked to assess the implications for development and poverty reduction of G20 national policy frameworks and related macroeconomic scenarios prepared by the Fund. The Bank will provide inputs to the Fund, as needed, for the latter’s analysis of G20 policy plans in the area of structural reform. The Fund and the Bank will work closely together in preparing their respective reports.

Staff Views on the Impact of the Crises on Collaboration

In the survey undertaken for this review, Bank and Fund staff were asked what new challenges to collaboration at the country level had been presented by the series of major economic shocks (food/fuel prices surges, financial crisis and global recession). A considerable range of views was expressed. A number of Bank and Fund respondents noted that mutual reliance had been enhanced given the fiscal implications (and to a lesser extent, financial-sector considerations) of the crises, an area in which Bank and Fund mandates overlap. Other Bank respondents noted that the rapidity with which macro fiscal forecasts had to be revised over the past year had increased the importance of coordination. On the negative side, some Bank respondents were concerned that the vast increase in IMF resources at a time when Bank resources had not increased made Fund counterparts less open to taking Bank views into account. Others were concerned with an increased expectation that the Bank would “burden share” Fund programs.

On the Fund side, some staff expressed the view that financial constraints on the Bank drew the Fund into providing more budget support than would have otherwise been the case and that this increased the need for the Fund to collaborate with the Bank. Related to this, others suggested that the size of the financing need often required both the Bank and Fund to be financially engaged and this implied a need to ramp up collaboration. Several Fund respondents pointed to the increased importance of obtaining timely Bank assessments of the poverty impact of the crises, as well as an increased frustration with the speed at which the Bank operated and a more gradual approach to structural reform taken by Bank staff. Others pointed to a greater blurring of the respective financing roles or the increase in the number of Fund programs as requiring greater coordination.

A. Financing Roles of the Bank and Fund during Crises

45. In response to the series of global crises, Bank and Fund shareholders called for both institutions to step up lending to respond to the unprecedented financial needs of member countries. Along with the augmentation of Fund financial capacity, this has sparked a re-emergence of the debate on the respective financing roles of the two institutions.

46. The financing roles of the Bank and the Fund are, and have always been, both distinct and complementary. At the most general level, the Bank’s country operations are geared at mobilizing investment to augment the human and physical resources available to support members’ development objectives, while the Fund aims to help countries achieve and maintain external stability and, more broadly, sustainable macroeconomic positions. To achieve these objectives, the Bank finances a broad range of projects and structural and policy reforms to help foster long-term growth and poverty reduction, while the Fund provides temporary liquidity support to smooth adjustment in the face of macroeconomic imbalances. The roles of the institutions are thus complementary, as Fund support helps establish an enabling macroeconomic environment for economic development with sustained growth and poverty reduction, especially in LICs, while Bank support helps countries strengthen the structural foundations for growth and human development and, in so doing, assists them in mitigating some of the underlying causes of macroeconomic imbalances.

47. While both Bank and Fund financial support to LICs entails a permanent resource transfer (given the grant element of lending to LICs), the long maturities on Bank lending (up to 40 years) imply significantly greater concessionality than that of the Fund, which provides temporary liquidity support with shorter maturities. In developing and emerging market member countries, the Bank generally maintains a sustained lending relationship with clients, while Fund financing is episodic, aiming to address temporary financing needs that may vary significantly across countries and time. Concerns have been raised, however, about the division of labor between the Fund and the Bank, with questions on the appropriateness of the Fund providing longer term “development” financing to low-income countries, as well as with the precautionary element of some of the Bank’s budget support operations (e.g., the Deferred Drawdown Option for emerging markets), which could be considered primarily balance of payments support.

Budget Support

The Bank and the Fund have a long history of providing both direct and indirect budget support to member countries. In the case of the Bank, direct budget support is typically provided through DPOs, with policy linkages to sectoral and structural reforms and spending priorities. While project finance does not directly finance a fiscal deficit, it nevertheless can constitute indirect budget support by loosening fiscal constraints, since the recipient has less need to finance such projects with its own resources. In the case of the Fund, financing is typically provided via lending to the central bank, and this lending can provide indirect budget support to the extent that it creates room for higher domestic financing of the deficit. In some circumstances, the Fund has also lent directly to treasuries, to help meet the public-sector component of a balance of payments financing need. Such direct budget support has increased in recent years as the global financial crisis has, for many countries, affected both external and fiscal positions simultaneously and as central banks have become increasingly independent.

While the Bank may provide budget support as an ongoing and integral part of its country program, irrespective of external conditions, Fund budget support—direct or indirect—is not possible in the absence of a balance of payments need (i.e., it is a means to address the underlying balance of payments need). However, as fiscal and external financing needs are often closely intertwined, the two institutions tend to provide budget and balance of payments support simultaneously in many of the same countries. The Bank is concerned that in providing budget support, the Fund should draw on Bank expertise on the composition and efficiency of public spending, and the capacity of the country to effectively spend incremental resources. In light of these linkages, close cooperation between the Bank and the Fund on both shorter- and longer-term fiscal policies is critical, with each institution guiding the other in its core areas of expertise.

48. Inevitably, there are areas of overlap. For instance, both institutions provide de facto budget and balance of payments support, as financial support from each provides foreign exchange and tends to loosen fiscal constraints (Box 6). Also, in low-income countries with protracted balance of payments problems and limited access to private financial flows, the Fund has provided financial support over longer periods so as to smooth adjustment to a sustainable macroeconomic position. Conversely the Bank may step up its financial support in the event of shocks that jeopardize a country’s ability to maintain progress over the short-term toward its development objectives (Box 7). From an operational perspective, both institutions work closely with key policymakers, such as ministries of economy and finance, advising on policies and structural reforms that can affect both short-term macroeconomic stability and long-term development.

Responses to Shocks or Crises

The Bank and the Fund have important and distinct roles to play in the event of economic shocks or crises. The Fund generally takes a leading role in responding to the macroeconomic effects of shocks, providing countries with liquidity to smooth macroeconomic adjustment, and coordinating closely with the Bank and other development partners to ensure that total budget and balance of payments financing are part of a consistent overall macroeconomic program. The Fund’s program engagement helps countries put in place a consistent policy mix, which also provides a macroeconomic anchor for the financial support of other development partners. The Fund’s support can also help offset revenue and financing losses and thus limit the need for overall expenditure retrenchment.

Since shocks—whether they be of domestic or external origin—can have serious implications for a country’s ability to maintain core spending and meet development objectives, the Bank has a key role in ensuring that development spending and objectives in critical areas such as health, education and infrastructure are maintained. When shocks occur, additional financing is often required to scale up social spending, thus mitigating the risk of increases in poverty and regress in development efforts. Similarly, declines in foreign direct investment during the global financial crisis have negatively affected infrastructure development, which may justify further increases in development finance. To protect core pro-poor and development spending in times of crisis, the Bank is developing a new Crisis Response Window within International Development Association (IDA) funds. The Fund is concerned to ensure that Bank crisis support be provided in the context of a well-designed, macroeconomic framework, presumably in the context of a Fund-supported program. Given the complementarity between such efforts, the Fund’s crisis role, and the urgency of the required response, it is particularly important that the two institutions coordinate closely in times of shocks or crisis, both on policy and financing.

B. Reform of the Debt Sustainability Framework and Non-concessional Borrowing Policies

49. In response to the concerns of some LICs facing significant financing constraints in the wake of the global financial crisis, the G20 called on the Fund and the Bank to review the joint DSF to determine whether additional flexibility was needed to support the developmental objectives of the increasingly diverse universe of LICs. The staffs subsequently reviewed the DSF resulting in a joint Board paper and a revised guidance note.

50. Collaboration in reviewing the DSF was smooth, with early agreement on the issues to be examined. As a result, additional flexibility was introduced into the framework.11 The review of the DSF provided for greater recognition of the impact of public investment on growth, more explicit consideration of remittances in the determination of risk ratings (data availability permitting), a buffering of the effects of fluctuations in Country Policy and Institutional Assessment scores on debt distress thresholds and ratings, more flexible treatment of external debt of state-owned enterprises, and greater recognition in the write up of the authorities’ views.

51. In parallel, the Fund reviewed its policy on debt limits, leading to reforms that became effective in December 2009, and the Bank is presently reviewing its non-concessional borrowing policy. The changes aim at ensuring that these policies remain appropriate for the needs of LICs by moving away from a single design for concessionality requirements toward a menu of options. The policies reflect better the diversity of situations in LICs, notably regarding debt vulnerabilities and macroeconomic and public financial management capacity and have stronger analytical underpinnings given their systematic link to DSAs. Given the potential implications for both institutions, Bank and Fund staff consulted extensively in the design of these reforms. This process culminated in a coordinated assessment of macroeconomic and public financial management capacity in November 2009.

V. Conclusions and Next Steps

52. Bank-Fund collaboration has improved over the last two years. There have been more frequent contacts among staff, including at the country level, the flow of information has improved, early drafts of policy documents are shared for comment more frequently, and cross attendance by staff at relevant Board meetings has increased. Increased staff mobility, mainly from the Fund to the Bank (and to a lesser extent from the Bank), has helped spread understanding of the structures and processes in each institution and contributed to greater trust among staff. Collaboration between the senior managements is very strong. The Fund Managing Director and the Bank President, and Fund Deputy Managing Directors and Bank Managing Directors, consult with each other on a regular basis.

53. A variety of factors—both intended and exogenous—have contributed to the improvement. Of particular relevance has been the rapid succession of global crises beginning in 2008 which have, of necessity, forced the staffs to work together more closely than in preceding years. Increased staff mobility between the institutions has helped as well. While the increase in mobility was made possible in part by removal of some obstacles to mobility (e.g., agreement between the institutions on the transfer of pension rights), the more important factor underlying greater mobility appears to have been the Fund downsizing, followed by its subsequent re-tooling.

54. The JMAP has had a positive impact in a number of ways, despite shortcomings in implementation. Annual consultations between country teams—though still far from universal practice—have improved information flow, enhanced the consistency of policy advice, deepened and improved working relationships among staff, and contributed to more coordinated work programs and better-coordinated analytical cross support. The creation of the FAD-PREM website improved sharing of fiscal information and analysis. On the Fund side, this reflects an increased level of openness and trust while on the Bank side, considerable effort has been expended to identify and collect the large body of fiscal work produced within the framework of a very decentralized institution. There have also been noteworthy improvements in collaboration on debt management. Overall, however, the JMAP has played a supporting rather than a central role in enhancing Bank-Fund collaboration.

55. Going forward, the managements will focus on the measures that have the greatest potential to enhance collaboration. Measures that do not yield the expected benefits will be phased out.

Next Steps in Improving Bank-Fund Collaboration

56. In line with these principles, and to address concerns with the usefulness and feasibility of a formal JMAP process, managements will continue to shift focus towards measures that focus directly on the effectiveness of collaboration in meeting the needs of client countries and away from unnecessary and formulaic reporting requirements. The key actions to achieve this are:

  • Giving joint country-team consultations a new push: Where staff have adopted this practice, and used it to come to agreement on forward-looking work programs, it has worked well. Regular (i.e., at least annual) consultations between country teams do not require significant incremental resources and, in fact, may save resources over time because of their potential to improve cross-support and the division of labor between staffs. To reinforce commitment to this initiative, which provides the foundation to address many other shortcomings in collaboration, the managements have set an across-the-board deadline of August 2010 for all teams working on countries in which both the Bank and the Fund are active (or potentially active) to have completed at least their first annual consultation. Until such time as the process has been fully internalized, Fund area departments and Bank regions will be expected to report to Management (through PREM and SPR) on compliance annually beginning in September 2010. In addition, both Bank and Fund country-level staff should generally invite their counterparts to review meetings on subjects of mutual interest (e.g., Fund pre-mission policy consultations, Bank reviews of development policy loans).

  • Making greater use of cross-institutional feedback in assessing performance: Bank and Fund managements are aware of the complexities involved in integrating cross-institutional feedback into performance assessments (including, for example, the challenge of identifying the appropriate counterparts from which to receive feedback). However, it is essential that staff incentives be appropriately aligned with institutional commitments to improve Bank-Fund collaboration. To move this forward, the institutions’ human resource departments, in consultation with other departments, will develop joint guidelines and modalities for implementing a framework to obtain cross-institutional feedback at the level of Bank and Fund managers, without creating excessive administrative or technical complexity. The framework could be tested in the performance assessment cycle that begins in 2011. To encourage greater openness and collaboration at the working level, the managements are considering introducing a recognition award for staff that demonstrate a particularly strong commitment to working constructively with their Bretton Woods counterparts.

  • Strengthening staff mobility between the institutions: Given the potential of staff mobility to enhance trust and to foster a better understanding of the institutions’ structures and procedures, the managements have asked the two human resource departments to identify any remaining impediments to mobility between the institutions and, by December 2010, to present a strategy to address them. An area of particular interest will be secondments, which should be supported by a more strategic and coordinated approach and stronger incentives for both staffs to participate.

  • Enhancing clarity on information sharing: The managements will establish a joint task force to develop, by December 2010, guidelines on information sharing between Bank and Fund staff. The guidelines will set out the rules, provide practical suggestions for obtaining information, and highlight good practice examples of information sharing. Consistent with recent moves by both institutions to encourage greater openness towards the public, we will be endorsing a presumption that relevant documents and data can be shared between Bank and Fund staff unless there are clear reasons not to share.

  • Improving awareness of organizational structures: The managements will put in place measures to help the staffs understand better the Fund’s and the Bank’s organizational structures. This will include the integration in orientation programs for new staff of information on the institutions’ structures and review processes, the identification of contact points within each institution to assist Bank and Fund staff in identifying counterparts, and guidance on how to identify institutional counterparts.

57. To encourage progress and increase accountability, staff will continue to monitor progress in improving Bank-Fund collaboration. The managements will present a joint report to the Executive Boards in two years time.

Annex 1. Joint Management Action Plan: Matrix of Monitorable Actions

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Annex 2. Staff Survey Results

Methodology

A survey was conducted to obtain the views on Bank-Fund collaboration from Bank and Fund staff working on one or more of the 143 LICs and MICs in which both institutions had substantial operations in November 2009. It was sent to 195 Fund staff (mission chiefs and resident representatives) and 189 Bank staff (country directors and managers and an economist (either lead or senior) working on each country in which the Bank was active). The survey was administered by the Bank via an external third party provider to guarantee the anonymity of respondents. It was e-mailed to staff on November 13, 2009, with responses accepted until December 1, 2009. Response rates were 67 percent and 41 percent for Fund and Bank staff, respectively.

Characteristics of Respondents (Questions 1 to 6 and Question 28)

Approximately 70 percent of Bank respondents were located in the field; the rest were stationed in Washington. In the case of the Fund, the percentages were reversed, with 70 percent of respondents in Washington and 30 percent in the field. In both cases, approximately one third of responses came from staff working primarily on African countries. The remaining responses were relatively evenly distributed among the other regions/area departments. Three-quarters of Fund respondents had been in their current position for at least 6 months compared with 93 percent of Bank respondents.

One half of respondents worked primarily on MICs, the remainder on LICs. Just over one half of Bank responses were from staff working in countries which have a Fund-supported program, or have been negotiating one in the last 12 months. This compares with 61 percent of Fund respondents. Mission chiefs accounted for about three-quarters of Fund responses;12 60 percent of Bank responses came from country economists.

Satisfaction with Current Degree of Coordination between Country Team and Bretton Woods Counterparts (Question 7)

While a majority of respondents in both institutions reported being “very satisfied” with the degree of collaboration with their Bretton Woods counterparts, more Fund staff chose this response (57 percent) than did Bank staff (52 percent). Less than one percent of Fund staff were “not satisfied” compared with 7 percent of Bank staff, most of which were located in the field.

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Satisfaction with the Current Degree of Coordination between World Bank and IMF Counterparts

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

Satisfaction was highest among Bank staff working on African countries (64 percent were “very satisfied” compared to 46 percent in other regions); all Bank staff working on African countries were at least “somewhat satisfied” with the degree of coordination. In contrast, Fund staff working on African countries tended to be less satisfied than those working in other regions (40 percent reported being “very satisfied, compared with 65 percent of Fund staff working on non-African countries). This is mirrored in the lower level of satisfaction among Fund staff working on LICs (51 percent were “very satisfied”) compared with 62 percent of Fund staff working on MICs.13

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Satisfaction with the Current Degree of Coordination between World Bank and IMF Counterparts

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

While satisfaction among Fund staff with the degree of coordination with the Bank did not vary significantly by Fund program status, it did make a significant difference to Bank staff, with 61 percent of those working on countries with (or negotiating) Fund-supported programs reporting being “very satisfied” compared with 42 percent of those working on countries without existing or pending Fund-supported programs. Bank staff working on countries without Fund-supported programs were four times as likely (12 percent) to report being “not satisfied” than those working on countries with programs.

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Satisfaction with the Current Degree of Coordination between World Bank and IMF Counterparts

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

The presence of a Fund Resident Representative also appeared to result in greater Bank satisfaction with the level of coordination, with 56 percent of Bank staff working on countries with Fund Resident Representatives reporting being “very satisfied” compared with 43 percent of those working on countries without a Fund Resident Representative. This is not surprising given the relatively greater Bank presence in the field. However, there was little difference in the share of Fund respondents reporting being “very satisfied” with the degree of coordination between those working on countries with a Fund Resident Representative (56 percent) and those without (54 percent).

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Satisfaction with the Current Degree of Coordination between World Bank and IMF Counterparts

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

Frequency of contact (Question 8)

About one half of both Bank and Fund respondents reported being in contact (either via e-mail, telephone or in person) at least once a week. However, almost 10 percent of Bank staff reported being in contact with their Bretton Woods counterparts “rarely, if ever” or “only during missions” compared with only 3 percent of Fund staff. Contact was most frequent in LICs, with 71 percent of Bank staff and 53 percent of Fund staff reporting being in contact at least weekly compared with 18 percent and 38 percent (respectively) working on MICs. Similarly, in countries with (or negotiating) Fund-supported programs, contact was more frequent (almost two-thirds of both Fund and Bank staff reported at least weekly contact) compared with 31 and 22 percent of Bank and Fund respondents (respectively) working on countries without programs.

Impact of the JMAP on Country-Level Collaboration (Question 9)

Only a minority of respondents (20 percent from the Bank and 14 percent from the Fund) reported that the JMAP had led to an improvement in Bank-Fund coordination. Just over one half of Bank respondents and 44 percent of Fund respondents reported no change as a result of the JMAP. The remainder of respondents had no opinion. However, Fund staff working on countries without Fund-supported programs were twice as likely to believe that the JMAP had improved collaboration as those working on program countries (20 versus 10 percent of respondents). The contrary was true for Bank staff, with almost one quarter of those working on countries with Fund-supported programs (or on LICs) indicating that the JMAP had improved collaboration (compared with 15 percent of those working on countries without Fund-supported programs and 14 percent of those working on MICs). Similarly, just under a third of Bank respondents working on African countries reported a positive impact from JMAP compared with only 15 percent of those working on countries in other regions. Fund respondents demonstrated a similar but less pronounced pattern (18 percent for Africa; 13 percent for other regions).

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Impact of JMAP on Collaboration in Countries with and without IMF-supported Programs

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

Impact of the Crises on Collaboration (Question 10)

In both institutions, almost two thirds of respondents reported an improvement in collaboration as a result of the recent series of economic shocks (food and fuel price surges, financial crisis, and global recession). At the Bank, staff working in Washington were more likely to have signaled an improvement (38 versus 43 percent in the field) than were staff working on countries with a Fund-supported program (47 versus 30 percent) or Fund Resident Representative (42 versus 35 percent). Staff working on LICs were also more likely to have attributed an improvement to the crises (47 percent, versus 36 percent for MICs). In contrast, Fund staff working in Washington were more likely to have signaled an improvement (41 percent versus 32 percent in the field) as were staff working on countries with Fund-supported programs (41 versus 33 percent) or Fund Resident Representatives (41 versus 37 percent). Unlike for the Bank, Fund staff working on MICs were also more likely to have attributed an improvement the crisis (41 percent, versus 34 percent for LICs).

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Impact of the crises on Collaboration at Headquarters and in the Field

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

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Impact of Crises on Collaboration in LICs and MICs

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

Soliciting Views and Sharing of Information (Questions 12 to 16)

Just over three quarters of Fund respondents and almost two thirds of Bank respondents report that their Bretton Woods counterparts routinely provide them with drafts of key country documents for information or comment.

Bank respondents report that the Fund is more likely to share documents in countries with a Fund program (79 percent compared to 52 percent without programs); where the Fund maintains a Resident Representative (75 percent compared to 48 percent where there is no Resident Representative); in LICs (71 percent compared with 61 percent in MICs); and in Africa (82 percent versus 58 percent in other regions). Fund respondents report that Bank staff are more likely to share documents on countries that have a Fund Resident Representative (80 percent versus 74 percent when there is no Resident Representative) and with Bank staff working on non-African countries (81 percent versus 65 percent for Africa). There is little difference across income level or Fund program status.

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Sharing Drafts of Key Documents for Information or Comments

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

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Routine Sharing of Key Documents

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

About two thirds of respondents indicated that their counterparts made them aware of technical assistance activities in their areas of expertise. However, only 54 percent of Fund respondents report routinely receiving copies of final technical assistance reports from the Bank counterparts. A much higher percentage of Bank respondents (73 percent14) report receiving final Fund technical assistance reports in areas of relevance to their work. A much smaller percentage (38 percent and 44 percent for Bank and Fund respondents, respectively) indicated that their counterparts provide them with copies of the terms of reference for technical assistance in areas of mutual interest. It is even less likely that counterparts will be asked to provide comments on draft terms of reference for technical assistance in areas of relevance to their work. Only 37 percent of Fund respondents indicated that their Bank colleagues provide them with draft terms of reference for comment. The figure was even lower for Bank respondents reporting being asked to provide comments on Fund technical assistance terms of reference (24 percent).

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Providing Copies of TORs and Requesting Comments on Draft TORs for TA

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

Analytical Cross Support (Questions 17 and 18)

Analytical cross support was requested in the last six months by 39 percent of Bank respondents and 46 percent of Fund respondents. Four-fifths of Bank respondents reported receiving the requested support from the Fund “most of the time” compared with only 57 percent of Fund respondents. One third of Fund respondents were able to obtain cross support from the Bank “only some of the time”.

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Analytical Cross Support

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

Annual Joint Country Team Consultations (Questions 19 to 22)

Eighty percent of Bank respondents and 86 percent of Fund respondents were aware of the management-imposed requirement that all country teams meet at least annually with their Bretton Woods counterparts to discuss respective priorities and work programs for the period ahead. Slightly less than this – 70 percent of Bank respondents and 79 percent of Fund respondents—reported holding the required annual consultations within the last 12 months. For those not holding the required consultations, the most commonly cited reasons were “no issues of common interest” or “too time consuming”. A few respondents identified “insufficient support from senior management” as the main reason for not holding consultations. Just over two thirds of both Bank and Fund respondents were aware of the Guidance Note on Good Practice for Annual Bank-Fund Country Consultations.

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Annual Joint Country Team Consultations

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

Joint Country Team Web Portals (Questions 23 to 27)

The vast majority of respondents (89 percent for the Bank; 84 percent for the Fund) indicated that they had not established joint country web portals to share information with their Bretton Woods counterparts nor did they plan to establish one. Less than 3 percent of respondents indicated that they had established a web portal and that it was kept up to date. Similarly few respondents indicated that they had established a web portal but it was out of date. Among Fund respondents, 11 percent indicated an intention to establish such a portal in the future compared with 7 percent of Bank respondents. Despite the preparation and dissemination of a guidance note on the establishment of joint country team web portals, 9 out of 10 percent of respondents had not seen the note and were not aware that resources were available to assist in the establishment of such a portal.

Debt Sustainability Analyses and Joint Staff Advisory Notes (Questions 29 to 32)

Of respondents working on LICs for which a DSA had been prepared in the last 12 months, 93 percent of Bank respondents indicated that they generally received input from Fund counterparts on time. Only 73 percent of Fund respondents reported a similar level of promptness in receiving input from Bank staff.

On the preparation of JSANs over the last 12 months, 92 percent of Bank respondents reported receiving “timely” input from Bretton Woods counterparts compared with 79 percent of Fund respondents.

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Timeliness of Input into Joint DSAs and JSANs

Citation: Policy Papers 2010, 016; 10.5089/9781498337793.007.A001

Staff Views on Areas of Collaboration Most in Need of Improvement

Bank and Fund staff were asked to identify aspects of collaboration most in need of improvement. Staff in both institutions, and the Bank in particular, most often identified information sharing as the area in greatest need of improvement, with many calling for more routine sharing of early drafts of country documents. A number of respondents suggested that openness and sharing of information was too dependent on personalities rather than supported by systematic incentives for collaboration. There is also some evidence that insufficient sharing may be due partly to a lack of clarity on what documents can be shared.

Better collaboration of technical assistance (including in prioritizing and planning, drafting terms of reference, and sharing final reports), and a desire for more joint work (e.g., more joint strategizing, technical assistance, analytical work, and missions) also figured prominently among the staff responses to the question about areas of collaboration most in need of improvement. Other areas cited by a number of staff included better coordination of Bank sectoral analysis with Fund needs; more timely inputs from the Bank; greater clarity on responsibilities within the Bank; and better information on Bank country-level activities. While a significant majority of respondents from both institutions wanted to see more joint work, a minority of Fund staff called for movement in the opposite direction, through a more distinct division of labor and calls for the Bank to stay out of areas within the Fund’s mandate.

Annex 3. Staff Surveys

1

Report of the External Review Committee on Bank-Fund Collaboration, February 2007, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2006/pr0665.htm.

2

The Committee did not see a gradual withdrawal from long-term financing as altering the Fund’s role in providing short-term financing. It also argued that “this would not be a reduction in the Fund’s involvement in low-income countries, but a better focusing of its efforts on such activities as macroeconomic assessments, and policy advice, as well as the “sign-off” on Bank program lending and the provision of relevant technical assistance.”

3

See Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund, April 14, 2007, and Development Committee Communiqué, April 15, 2007, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2007/pr0771.htm and http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/2007/041507.htm.

4

Enhancing Collaboration: Joint Management Action Plan: Follow Up to the Report of the External Review Committee on Bank-Fund Collaboration, September 2007, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/092007.pdf.

5

This report assesses JMAP implementation on the basis of information collected through: (i) an anonymous survey of Fund mission chiefs and resident representatives and Bank country managers, directors, and economists (Annexes 2 and 3); (ii) questionnaires completed by senior managers in Fund area departments and by Fund functional departments (Fiscal Affairs Department, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, and Statistics Department); (iii) input provided by staff at the working level from across the Bank and Fund; and (iv) interim progress reports prepared jointly by Bank and Fund staff for both senior managements in November 2008 and September 2009.

6

The 2006 review assessed the experience with the joint Fund-Bank debt sustainability framework (DSF) for low-income countries, including the cooperation between the staffs. The framework was found to have strengthened Fund surveillance and program design, and it was thought to have had a strong influence on the International Development Association (IDA) grant allocation criteria. Further, the staffs were found to be cooperating well. It was felt, however, that further progress in collaboration could be made if the staffs agreed earlier on timing, scope of analysis, and division of labor.

7

The revised guidance note is available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/070308.pdf.

8

The Financial Sector Assessment Program after Ten Years: Experience and Reforms for the Next Decade, August 28, 2009, available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/082809B.pdf.

11

See Debt Limits in Fund-Supported Programs: Proposed New Guidelines, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/080509.pdf.

12

Four percent of respondents served as both mission chiefs and resident representatives.

13

The specific determining factors cannot be directly inferred from these results since there is a considerable degree of correlation between a number of the demographic factors. For example, LICs are concentrated in Africa, as are IMF-supported programs. Similarly, there are fewer IMF Resident Representatives in MICs than in LICs.

14

This is higher than the 64 percent of Bank respondents indicating that their IMF counterparts routinely make them aware of IMF TA in areas of relevance to their work. One possible interpretation of this result is that Bank staff may not find out about IMF TA directly from Fund staff.

Implementation of the Joint Management Action Plan on Bank-Fund Collaboration
Author: International Monetary Fund