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The Role of State-Contingent Debt Instruments in Sovereign Debt Restructurings
Author:
Charles Cohen null

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S. M. Ali Abbas
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Anthony Myrvin null

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Tom Best null

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Mr. Peter Breuer
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Hui Miao null

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Ms. Alla Myrvoda null

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Eriko Togo
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Series:
Staff Discussion Notes
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2020: Issue 006
Language:
English
Publication Date:
19 Nov 2020
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513556482.006
ISBN:
9781513556482
ISSN:
2617-6750
Keywords:
Sovereign debt restructuring; Pandemic; COVID-19; Global financial crisis; Sovereign debt default; State-contingent debt instruments; GDP-linked debt; natural disasters clauses; debt sustainability; value recovery instruments; natural disaster clauses; reference variable; debt contract; investor preference; GLW payment; VRI payout; sector debt suspension; investor appetite; debt stock; Eurobond investor; trading partner; upside payout; investor participation; Natural disasters; Bonds; Debt restructuring; Securities; Global; Caribbean
Legal-disclaimer:
Staff Discussion Notes (SDNs) showcase policy-related analysis and research being developed by IMF staff members and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in this Policy Discussion Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy.
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The COVID-19 crisis may lead to a series of costly and inefficient sovereign debt restructurings. Any such restructurings will likely take place during a period of great economic uncertainty, which may lead to protracted negotiations between creditors and debtors over recovery values, and potentially even relapses into default post-restructuring. State-contingent debt instruments (SCDIs) could play an important role in improving the outcomes of these restructurings.
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Cover Staff Discussion Notes
Staff Discussion Notes
ISSN:
2617-6750
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund