APPENDIX I: Further Details of Country Poverty Analysis and Monitoring
APPENDIX II: Further Details of Country Participatory Processes
In June 1997, Uganda launched the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) following a national consultation process involving a cross-section of stakeholders (central and local government, civil society, and private sector). The PEAP provides national priorities for poverty reduction and guided sector policies. A Poverty Status Report (PSR) is produced on a semiannual basis to review the implementation of the PEAP. The 1999 PSR incorporated data from the recent Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP), which directly consulted poor communities on their priorities, needs, and perceptions of quality of government services. Existing democratic consultation processes were used for the PRSP. Civil society organizations were included in the drafting committee and are involved in monitoring its implementation.
As a result of these consultations, government and civil society ownership of the PEAP is high, and institutions have been strengthened—for example, the role of districts in the development, selection, and implementation of the PEAP; the partnership between government and civil society; and the creation of a more open political environment in which previously sensitive issues (e.g., land ownership, women’s empowerment, security, corruption, and governance) are now part of policy dialogue. Civil society discussions in macroeconomic issues are more advanced in Uganda than elsewhere. Structural reforms are widely discussed in the press and in parliament.
In 1997, the government of Tanzania adopted the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES), and in 1999 the Poverty and Welfare Monitoring Indicators were issued. Both were developed in consultation with stakeholders and through wide-ranging parliamentary discussions. The Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) is being developed to guide external aid. It has nine working groups, with representatives of donors, academics, and civil society. A committee of ministers and the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania steered the preparation of the PRSP. A technical committee, headed by a Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, coordinated consultations through processes established for the TAS discussions. The PRSP was shared with the working groups, donors, academics, and CSOs. The full PRSP was approved by the cabinet in August 2000.
Initially, there was a tension between the TAS and the PRSP. Some donors noted that separate consultation processes for the PRSP and the TAS imposed a burden on government, undermined ownership, and delayed some activities, such as the public expenditure review (PER). Furthermore, there were some concerns that ownership did not extend beyond the Ministry of Finance. The full PRSP was completed rapidly in only six months. It did build on established consultation processes, and some groups, such as line ministries, the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development, research organizations, and parliamentarians, were able to become more involved. However, owing to the lack of time, some NGOs were not able to participate. Some NGO and citizen groups felt that the key economic and structural adjustment policies were negotiated outside the PRSP process, and that they had very limited knowledge of the proposed programs.
The Gambia has a long history of participation in both project development and policymaking. The SPA-I was launched in 1994 after two years of consultation with civil society (including the poor) and donors. Implementation of this original strategy, however, was compromised as a consequence of various adverse shocks, including a coup (leading to reductions in aid flows and tourist arrivals), as well as a substantial currency devaluation by neighboring countries and a deterioration in the terms of trade. In spite of the problems in implementing the SPA-I, the government continued to build on the participatory processes already established. Since then, coordination between civil society and the government on poverty programs has increased substantially.
Well-organized institutional mechanisms have been established by the government for producing both the interim and full PRSP. The SPA Coordinating Office (SPACO), established in 1994 and located in the Ministry of Finance, managed the formulation of the I-PRSP (I-SPA II). Three structures were established in order to guide SPACO with this task: a task force comprising the central and local government officials, NGOs, donors, and representatives of communities; the High-Level Economic Committee (a cabinet subcommittee chaired by the Secretary of State for Finance and Economic Affairs); and technical groups in line ministries charged with assessing the level of institutional knowledge on poverty.
The I-PRSP (I-SPA II) built on the results of ongoing consultation processes. In addition, specific activities were organized to feed directly into the document. First, in order to directly consult the poor, two high-quality PPAs were completed. Second, a national dialogue was established to exchange information among civil society groups and government. Third, The Association of Non-governmental Organizations (TANGO) undertook an in-depth participatory evaluation of the SPA-I in order draw lessons for the full PRSP. Fourth, the authorities organized six divisional workshops in early October 2000. This active participatory structure provided the basis for significant progress in defining the five pillars of the full PRSP.
The I-PRSP (I-SPA II) notes a number of areas where there is still scope for improvement of the participatory process. For example, the people’s awareness of their rights remains limited, the civil society’s participation and dialogue in the political process could be increased, and the link between expressed priorities of the poor and the planning process remains weak. In order to address some of these issues, the I-PRSP (I-SPA II) presents a coordinated plan for producing the full PRSP, which was discussed widely with civil society groups. The high-level government commitment to the process is illustrated by the fact that the President of The Gambia launched the full PRSP process at the National Workshop on October 26, 2000.
Mozambique prides itself on its democratic processes and the peaceful transition from civil war to peace. The governing party, FRELIMO, has populist and socialist roots, and considers that its entire government program is pro-poor. A Poverty Unit set up in the Ministry of Planning and Finance in 1995 conducted the National Poverty Assessment in 1996-97. In 1998, the government embarked on the preparation of an action plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA), which was finalized just before the PRSP process was launched. There were many participatory processes at that time, with some good examples in an NGO-led mobilization aimed at reforming the land law, designing the national HIV/AIDS strategy, and some sector-wide programs.
The preparation of the 1-PRSP coincided with the national presidential elections in December 1999, when FRELIMO won by a very small margin and the opposition party gained a majority in some of the poorest provinces. In this context, the government was nervous about embarking on broad-based consultations for the preparation of the I-PRSP, although they constantly affirmed their commitment to the principle of consultation. The I-PRSP provided little detail on how NGOs would be involved in the development of the full PRSP. It appears that “participation” largely meant “information dissemination” and did not include civil society participation in poverty analysis, policy formulation, and monitoring.
Both the PARPA and the I-PRSP were prepared by a small group within the Ministry of Finance and Planning, assisted by an interministerial committee of planning directors. No national PRSP steering committee with broad-based representation was formed. Even though the poverty unit undertook a PPA, the results were not incorporated in the I-PRSP. Therefore, poor people’s views were not well represented in the document.
Mali achieved a transition to democracy in 1991-92 after 23 years of dictatorship. This produced an upswell in the demand for increased government transparency and accountability, and participation in policymaking. There was a strong demand for decentralization of power and resources, which was eventually recognized in law. Mali’s successful record of economic stabilization and growth has attracted a significant inflow of external assistance, which, in turn, has stimulated the growth of NGOs and other civil society groups. However, all these institutions, including the new local communes, are young and have little experience of participating in policy dialogue. Nevertheless, a number of policy initiatives were undertaken in the latter half of the 1990s, with participation by donors, NGOs, and other institutions. These included the ten-year health and education plans, the decentralization process, and a national poverty reduction strategy (SNLP, 1998).
The PRSP process was entirely in line with the philosophy and methodology of these previous plans, and the government demonstrated a ready willingness to embark on consultations on the I-PRSP. However, the pressure of time permitted only limited consultation, largely of an information dissemination nature. As in the case of Mozambique, the I-PRSP in Mali states the intention to prepare a participation strategy, to be discussed with civil society groups, in which details will be set out on how participation will be built into the full PRSP. The I-PRSP itself was drafted by a technical group within the Ministry of Finance, assisted by small working groups derived from other policy and statistical units. The line ministries and civil society groups had limited involvement.
IMF Executive Board paper “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers—Operational Issues” (SM/99/290, 12/12/99. http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/prsp/povertyl.htm). This paper was based in two background papers for the September 1999 Development Committee meeting, “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative: Strengthening the Link Between Debt Relief and Poverty Reduction” (DC/99-24, September 17, 1999. http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp#pp) and “Building Poverty Reduction Strategies in Developing Countries” (DC/99-29, September 22, 1999. http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategics/keydocs.htm#build).
The World Bank/IMF PRSP Sourcebook provides a more detailed guide to assist countries in the development of poverty reduction strategies, (http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/sourctoc.htm)
Including Joint Staff Assessments of the PRSPs and PRSP progress reports. However, the views expressed in the paper are the authors’ own and may not fully reflect the position taken in these documents.
Uganda’s PRSP was a summary of a more detailed national Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). The analysis in this paper is based on the detailed PEAP rather than the summary document.
The Gambia’s I-PRSP is called the Interim Strategy for Poverty Alleviation II (I-SPA II) and will be referred to throughout this paper as the “I-PRSP (I-SPA II).”
The differences between a full and an interim PRSP are defined in “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers—Operational Issues,’” 1999.
Mozambique’s full PRSP was presented to the Bank and Fund Boards in September 2001.
In Burkina Faso, civil society participated in the selection of indicators prior to the start of the PRSP process, and these indicators were then used for the PRSP.
This is particularly true for the countries with I-PRSPs. A new macroeconomic framework and policy matrix was not required for I-PRSPs if one had been agreed between the authorities, the Fund and the Bank within the previous 12 months, unless this had become seriously outdated because of a change in country circumstances.
An analysis of the poverty impacts of macroeconomic, structural and social policies should be interpreted broadly, to include economic, environmental and social impacts. Although the focus would be primarily on the poor, the distributional impacts on other groups should also be included.
The World Bank Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty advances a three-pillar framework for analyzing poverty: opportunity, empowerment, and security. Macroeconomic and structural policies are folded into the first of these and governance issues into the second.
Expressed as the head count index, the poverty gap index, and the squared poverty gap index.
Household surveys include multitopic surveys such as the Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS), budget/consumption surveys, demographic and health surveys (DHS), and specific-topic surveys.
See PRSP Sourcebook, Chapter 4, “Monitoring and Evaluation”.
’ The IDGs include: The proportion of people living in extreme poverty in developing countries to be reduced by at least one-half by 2015; gender disparities in primary and secondary education to be eliminated by 2005; infant and child mortality to be reduced by two-thirds the 1990 level by 2015; maternal mortality to be reduced by three-fourths between 1990 and 2015; access to reproductive health services to be made available to all individuals of appropriate age no later than 2015; and a national strategy for sustainable development to be implemented in every country by 2005.
For example, in Uganda, national consultations were held to discuss the selection of goals and determine appropriate indicators. Civil society organizations and communities are involved in monitoring the delivery of the Poverty Action Fund. Although corruption is still a problem and the delivery of services poor, the direct feedback to government from the monitoring of public actions by diverse civic groups is creating a more open and accountable environment.
A full set of indicators is not expected for I-PRSPs.
A detailed analysis of the poverty impacts of the reform program is expected only for the full PRSPs.
This could include how programs and policy reforms affect the poor, particularly (a) macroeconomic adjustments, such as tax increases, the reduction or elimination of subsidies, and exchange rate realignment; (b) structural reforms, such as liberalization and civil service reform; and (c) public expenditures. See “Key Features of IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)-Supported Programs” at http://www.imf.OTg/external/np/prgf/2000/eng/key.htm
Such as the impact of export-led development, generation of foreign exchange through exploitation of the national resource base (forestry, mining, and agricultural practices), reduction in environmental spending, and the weakening of environmental laws.
The PPA in Uganda enabled policymakers to appreciate the multidimensional nature of poverty. In addition to income, health, and education access, poor people emphasized security (owing to war, insurgency, cattle rustling, and domestic violence), corruption, isolation, lack of access to clean water, and a lack of access to information on government policies as priority concerns. The PPA also highlighted the location-specific nature of poverty and identified the most vulnerable groups.
In Burkina Faso, men and women operate in a system of production in which some resources are neither pooled nor traded among household members. Plots controlled by women have significantly lower yields than men’s because women have less access to agricultural inputs such as labor, manure, and fertilizers. Women and children are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity.
In 1997, Burkina Faso had a 7.17 percent average prevalence rate, making it the second-most-affected country in West Africa.