Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Shaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995).
Cf. Robert O’Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams, Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
James Boughton, The IMF and the Silent Revolution: Global Finance and Development in the 1980s (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2000).
Michael Edwards, NGO Rights and Responsibilities: A New Deal for Global Governance (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2000), p.9.
John Clark, Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Agencies (London: Earthscan, 1991); Michael Edwards and David Hulme (eds), NGO Performance and Accountability: Beyond the Magic Bullet (London: Earthscan, 1995).
Boris Bernstein and James M. Boughton, “Adjusting to Development: The IMF and the Poor,” (Washington DC: IMF Papers on Policy Analysis and Assessments PPAA/93/4).
The IMF lends to countries that have a balance of payment need under “adequate safeguards.” These safeguards involve policy actions - so-called conditionality - that the borrowing country agrees to undertake to qualify for the loan. Policy conditions in an IMF-supported program are negotiated between the Fund and the borrowing country. They typically cover macroeconomic policies (i.e., monetary and fiscal policies), exchange rate policy, and a range of structural policies (e.g., financial sector policies, trade policy, reform of public enterprises, etc.).
Marijke Torfs and James Barnes, Letter from Friends of the Earth-US to the IMF Managing Director (then Michel Camdessus), 21 March 1991.
Cf. Jan Aart Scholte, “The IMF Meets Civil Society,” Finance & Development, Vol. 35, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 42-5; Scholte, “In the Foothills: Relations between the IMF and Civil Society,” in Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R.D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler (eds), Non-State Actors in the Global System (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 261.
Many of these groups have come to the conclusion that they can get more leverage for their objectives if they can have them included as performance criteria in IMF programs—rather than pursue them through the agencies or IFIs with more specialized mandates but with less financial leverage.
Ravi Kanbur, “Economic Policy, Distribution and Poverty: The Nature of Disagreements” (January 2000, available via the Internet at http://www.people.comell.edu/paaes/sk145/)
Morris Goldstein, “IMF Structural Programs” (Washington: Institute of International Economics, 2000, paper available via the Internet at www.iie.com); Tony Killick, IMF Programmes in Developing Countries: Design and Impact (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).
The ESAF at Ten Years: Economic Adjustment and Reform in Low-Income Countries (Washington, DC: IMF Occasional Paper No. 156, 1997).
ESAF: Is It Working? (Washington DC: IMF Pamphlet, 1999).
Kwesi Botchwey, Paul Collier, Jan Willem Gunning and Koichi Hamada, Report to the Group of Independent Persons Appointed to Conduct an Evaluation of Certain Aspects of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1998).
Horst Kdhler, “Address to the Board of Governors of the Fund,” Prague, 26 September 2000, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2000/092600.htm.
“IMF Study Group Report: Transparency and Evaluation” (Washington, DC: Center of Concern, April 1998) [unpublished]; Ann M. Florini, “Does the Invisible Hand Need a Transparent Glove? The Politics of Transparency” (Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington DC, April 1999).
Angela Wood and Carol Welch, Policing the Policemen - The Case for an Independent Evaluation Mechanism of the IMF (London/Washington, DC: Bretton Woods Project and Friends of the Earth-US, 1998).
Cf. Edwards, NGO Rights and Responsibilities.
G. John Ikenberry, “The Political Origins of Bretton Woods,” in Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen (eds), A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
The authors thank Graham Hacche for detailed comments on an earlier version of the paper. They also thank James Boughton, Hugh Bredenkamp, Prakash Loungani, J.J. Polak, and Jan Scholte for helpful comments and suggestions.