This Policy Discussion Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Policy Discussion Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Policy Discussion Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.
This Policy Discussion Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Policy Discussion Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Policy Discussion Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.
The 1988 Basle Capital Accord has introduced the norm of a risk-based capital ratio of 8 percent. It was negotiated among the G-10 countries to strengthen their international banks’ capital base while simultaneously levelling the playing field for competition. Since 1988, a large number of non-G-10 countries, although not members of the “Basle Club,” have introduced similar risk-based capital ratios, hoping to achieve similar effects in terms of enhanced safety and competition in their banking markets. This paper explains why the endeavor failed in most cases and discusses what the required conditions would be for effective implementation of the Basle rules beyond the G-10 countries.