Republic of Madagascar: Request for an Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Cancellation of the Current Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for an Arrangement Under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility-Press Release; Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Staff Statement; and Statement by the Executive Director for Republic of Madagascar
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1. President Rajoelina was reelected for a second term and a new government was announced on January 14. Prime Minister Christian Ntsay was re-appointed in January and a new government formed. The General State Policy (PGE) released in January 2024 sets three policy priorities for the new mandate: (i) strengthening human capital, with a focus on education, health, and social protection, (ii) accelerating industrialization and economic development, and (iii) improving governance. Parliamentary elections took place on May 29, while communal elections are expected on November 6, 2024.

Context

1. President Rajoelina was reelected for a second term and a new government was announced on January 14. Prime Minister Christian Ntsay was re-appointed in January and a new government formed. The General State Policy (PGE) released in January 2024 sets three policy priorities for the new mandate: (i) strengthening human capital, with a focus on education, health, and social protection, (ii) accelerating industrialization and economic development, and (iii) improving governance. Parliamentary elections took place on May 29, while communal elections are expected on November 6, 2024.

2. The objectives of Madagascar’s current arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), approved in March 2021, have been partially achieved (Annex I). While growth in 2020 (-7.1 percent) declined more than estimated at program approval (-4.2 percent), the subsequent rebound was also stronger. Fiscal performance was marked by some progress in domestic revenue mobilization and moderate fiscal consolidation. Budget under-execution in 2021, smaller-than-projected tax revenue increases in 2021-23, and a protracted conflict with oil distributors resulted in a volatile domestic primary balance, with higher deficits in 2022-23. International reserves at end-2023 came out higher than envisaged at program approval. Public financial management (PFM) reforms showed good progress, while energy sector reforms (implementation of an automatic fuel pricing mechanism and recovery of the public utility JIRAMA) have been slow.

3. The authorities are seeking a new 36-month arrangement under the ECF to support the continuation of reforms. The authorities’ request for cancellation of the current ECF-supported arrangement (that expires in July 2024) and the request of a new arrangement are motivated by the start of a new presidential mandate and the limited time remaining on the current arrangement, the persistence of balance of payments problems over a longer period, and the will to align the new program priorities with the new PGE. The new program aims to increase economic resilience and foster long-term inclusive growth by anchoring fiscal sustainability, strengthening governance and the fight against corruption, consolidating monetary and financial stability, and advancing reform to support industrialization and human capital development.

4. The authorities are also requesting an arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) to help address climate vulnerabilities. Those stem from higher average temperatures, more variable rainfalls, and more intense cyclones affecting water supply, food security, and infrastructure resilience. The RSF will underpin ambitious reforms over three years to strengthen adaptation to climate disasters, support mitigation efforts, enhance the protection of ecosystems, and create conditions for green private sector investment.

Recent Economic Developments

5. Growth is estimated to have eased to 3.8 percent in 2023 from 4 percent in 2022, partly reflecting lower private investment due to the uncertainty around the 2023 presidential elections and a sharp decline in the textile industry.1 Tourist arrivals increased by 97 percent in 2023 but remain 10.6 percent below the pre-pandemic level. In late March 2024, tropical cyclone Gamane made landfall in the north-east region, damaging infrastructure and agricultural crops, and displacing over 80,000 people.

6. Inflation pressures have waned. The headline inflation rate eased to 7.3 percent year-on-year in April 2024, after a peak of 12.4 percent in March 2023. The decline was mostly driven by the dissipated impact of a 43-percent increase in fuel prices in July 2022, a good local rice harvest, and a slowdown in private credit following a tightening of monetary policy. Core inflation, which excludes rice and energy, fell to 8 percent year-on-year in April 2024, from a peak of 12.3 percent in March 2023.

7. The current account deficit is estimated to have narrowed to 4.5 percent of GDP in 2023 from 5.4 percent in 2022, owing primarily to a decline in imports rather than an increase in exports and reflecting the slowdown in economic activity. While vanilla exports rebounded in July and August 2023 following the liberalization of the sector, they underperformed in the last quarter of 2023 and first quarter of 2024, hinting at potential scarring effects of the 2022 botched reform on worldwide demand for Malagasy vanilla.2 Food imports dropped significantly in 2024Q1, following a good rice harvest, while mining exports were adversely affected by lower nickel and cobalt prices. The ariary appreciated by about 5 percent in the first three months of the year. Estimated gross international reserves increased to 5.7 months of imports at end-2023 (vs. 4.2 months in 2022) driven by the central bank's (BFM) interventions as well as lower imports. Madagascar's external position at end-2023 remained broadly in line with the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies (Annex III).

8. BFM further increased rates in August 2023 by 50 basis points to 9 percent (deposit facility rate) and 11 percent (marginal lending rate), bringing real rates above zero for the first time since June 2022. In February 2024, BFM completed its transition to an interest ratetargeting monetary policy framework and increased the minimum reserve requirements from 9 to 12 percent, partly reversing the April 2023 relaxation, to maintain a structural liquidity deficit in a context of lower private credit and deposit growth. BFM maintained rates unchanged in May 2024.

9. Fiscal performance has been affected by weaker-than-expected revenue collection and higher-than-expected transfer spending. The delayed implementation of a new agreement with oil distributors to settle cross-liabilities resulted in a customs revenue shortfall of about 0.6 percent of GDP in 2023, which compounded a lower collection implied by lower-than-expected imports. Spending cuts on wages and goods and services did not offset an increase in transfers to JIRAMA, resulting in an estimated 2023 domestic primary deficit of 0.4 percent of GDP compared with a 0.7 percent surplus target under the fourth review of the 2021 ECF arrangement.

Outlook and Risks

10. Economic growth is expected to rebound to 4.5 percent in 2024, mostly driven by private investment and strong growth in tourism. The impact of cyclone Gamane on agricultural production is mitigated by the better than anticipated local rice production in the first quarter of 2024. Growth in the manufacturing and extractive industries, aided by a rebound in textile manufacturing and rise in graphite production respectively, is projected to accelerate in 2024.3 Medium-term potential growth was revised up to 5 percent, bolstered by the reforms supported by the RSF and the ECF, including government programs aimed at boosting agricultural productivity, increasing access to electricity, and improving road infrastructure. Inflation is projected to gradually converge to 6 percent by 2028, while the current account deficit would stabilize just under 5.0 percent of GDP, partly driven by higher investment to increase resilience to climate change-related risks.

11. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside (Annex II). The main risks come from persistent governance issues and food insecurity potentially fueling popular discontent and delaying longstanding policy reforms. Higher international oil prices combined with an uncertain global growth environment would exacerbate existing fiscal and external imbalances. An intensification of regional conflicts could lead to supply chain disruptions, higher inflation, and lower growth. Madagascar remains vulnerable to extreme climate events affecting infrastructure and food security. Lack of progress on structural and governance reforms (notably for JIRAMA) would continue weighing on public finances and affect external confidence and investment. On the upside, a new economic agenda and renewed reform momentum focusing on building resilient infrastructure and social protection could boost growth.

12. The external and overall risk of debt distress continues to be assessed as “moderate” and the government has some space to absorb shocks.4 The Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) finds that none of Madagascar's debt indicator thresholds were breached under the baseline projections up to 2044. However, stress test results show breaches of debt indicator thresholds for external and overall public debt under some scenarios. While Madagascar's debt-carrying capacity is currently assessed as "medium", the country's rating lies close to the minimum threshold. Any further deterioration in Madagascar's fundamentals could result in a downgrade of the country's assessed debt-carrying capacity, thereby raising the risk of debt distress. Likewise, a pessimistic climate scenario with no adaptation and mitigation measures would also lead to an elevated risk of debt distress.

Policies Under the New Arrangements

13. The new ECF and RSF arrangements are key to strengthening fiscal sustainability and addressing structural issues. Building on the experience of the previous program, the priorities of the new arrangements are closely aligned with those of the new administration, presented in the PGE. The ECF-supported arrangement focuses on four pillars: (i) anchoring fiscal sustainability by increasing domestic revenue, reducing fiscal risks, building buffers to enhance resilience to shocks, and strengthening fiscal institutions and public financial management, (ii) strengthening governance and the fight against corruption, (iii) consolidating monetary and financial stability, and (iv) fostering stronger and more inclusive growth. Energy sector reforms, especially JIRAMA's overhaul, are essential for progress under the four pillars.

A. Anchoring Fiscal Sustainability (ECF Pillar I)

14. The new program aims to stabilize debt below 60 percent of GDP in the medium term. Public debt has increased significantly over the past five years, from 41.2 percent of GDP in 2019 to an estimated 55.6 percent in 2023, partly driven by higher foreign-financed public investment and larger SOE debt. Staff estimate that a medium-term debt anchor of 60 percent of GDP is consistent with maintaining Madagascar's debt servicing capacity (Annex IV) and recommend this debt anchor be used to design and adopt a medium-term fiscal strategy. Given the current debt level and absent any shock, this anchor implies a primary deficit of 2.9 percent of GDP. The 2023 primary deficit is estimated at 3.6 percent of GDP and 4.5 percent when excluding the collection of customs revenue arrears from 2021-22. While public debt is expected to increase to 58 percent of GDP in 2032 before declining, it will be important to continue with consolidation over the medium-term and long-term to reduce the risk of deviations above the anchor and preserve fiscal space.

15. To bring the primary deficit to around 3 percent of GDP, the program envisages a consolidation effort (i.e., improvement in the primary balance on an accrual basis, excluding exceptional customs revenue) of 1.6 percentage points of GDP by 2027. The adjustment would result from an increase in net tax revenue on an accrual basis of 2.4 percentage points of GDP and contraction of non-interest current expenditures by 1.6 percentage points partly driven by smaller transfers to JIRAMA or its suppliers, whereas domestically financed capital expenditures would grow by 0.8 percentage points of GDP and investment financed by foreign loans (project loans) would increase by 1.6 percentage points (Text Table 1).

Text Table 1.

Madagascar: Envisaged Fiscal Consolidation Effort

(In percent of GDP)

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Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

17. In the short term, the deficit target is determined by the availability of financing and the need to clear past domestic arrears. While foreign-financed investment has increased in recent years, low revenue collection and limited domestic financing have constrained the ability of the government to spend more for development. Liquidity pressures resulting from the delayed payment of oil customs taxes by fuel distributors in 2022 and 2023 and the need for additional transfers to JIRAMA have resulted in the accumulation of domestic arrears to an estimated MGA 796.3 billion or 1.1 percent of GDP at end-2023. To support the gradual clearance of those arrears and avoid further accumulation, the program sets a ceiling on outstanding domestic arrears as an indicative target (IT).

Text Table 2.

Madagascar: 2024 Fiscal Projections Based on Revised Budget Law

(Billions of Ariary, unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 1 Primary balance excluding foreign-financed investment and grants.

18. The Council of Ministers approved a revised budget for 2024 in line with program projections.5 This budget is expected to be adopted by Parliament in June (prior action (PA)). The revised budget targets a domestic primary surplus of 0.2 percent of GDP. Based on current projections for capital grants and externally financed investment, this domestic primary surplus would imply a 3.6 percent-of-GDP primary deficit on an accrual basis, that is, excluding the exceptional collection of 2023 oil customs tax arrears received in early 2024, or a 2.9 percent of GDP primary deficit on a cash basis (Text Table 2). The improvement compared to 2023 is mainly driven by a reduction in public expenditures, including transfers to oil distributors from their 2023 peak. Given the program objective to stabilize debt, the primary balance is used as the new program fiscal anchor. The domestic primary balance will continue to be monitored as an IT.6

19. Credible measures are needed to boost domestic revenue mobilization over 2024-27. The envisaged reduction of the primary deficit requires a sustainable increase in tax revenue, supported by quantifiable measures. The revenue package to support program objectives includes both tax policy and revenue administration measures (Text Table 3). The early implementation of some of those measures could increase 2024 revenue above current projections.

  • Tax policy. The authorities are committed to reforming taxes on wages (IRSA), including by increasing the upper marginal tax rate from 20 to 25 percent, and possibly the rates of intermediate brackets, following Fund capacity development (CD) recommendations.7 They will review excise taxes, with a view to increasing their efficiency. Notably, they intend to align the excise rates applicable on local alcohol and tobacco products to rates on imported products. Finally, the authorities committed to reduce tax expenditures (estimated around 3.2 percent of GDP in 2022) by MGA 280 billion per year in each budget law, building on work by the African Development Bank, the World Bank and IMF CD.

  • Revenue administration. The authorities commit to monitor improvements on tax and customs administration through the provision to staff of a monthly dashboard prepared with Fund CD, focusing on indicators related to compliance management (notably for VAT administration) and controls (continuous structural benchmark (SB)). The authorities will pursue their digitalization efforts to increase the tax base and to strengthen VAT administration, controls, and collection, building on Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT) recommendations (MEFP, A15). They will continue to improve customs controls, notably the control of transfer prices in the mining sector thanks to ongoing Fund CD in this area (MEFP, A16).

Text Table 3.

Madagascar: Fiscal Measures over 2024-27, Cumulative Gains

(In percent of GDP)

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Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

20. Reforms to turn around JIRAMA are key to more effective spending. Transfers to JIRAMA and its suppliers represented 1.3 percent of GDP in 2023. The authorities appointed a new CEO in May 2024 following an international recruitment process initiated in 2023 with the support of the World Bank (PA). The next step is to finalize the recruitment process for the company's other senior executives, including the Chief Financial Officer. JIRAMA’s recovery plan will need to enable a significant gradual reduction in government transfers, consistent with the planned fiscal adjustment under the program, leaving space to finance other transfers, including social ones. The authorities have committed to have this plan approved by the Council of Ministers by end-November 2024 (SB). JIRAMA will continue to provide Fund staff a monthly dashboard to monitor recovery efforts and publish all fuel purchase contracts (continuous SBs).

21. The implementation of an automatic fuel pricing mechanism (PA) should further reduce fiscal risks (Annex VII). The mechanism allows pump prices for gasoline, diesel, and kerosene to fluctuate with reference prices (proxy for market prices) on a monthly basis. It is designed as a "price band” mechanism, with two main characteristics: (i) pump prices in month M are automatically adjusted by the change in the reference price between month M-2 and month M1, capped at 200 ariary/liter, and (ii) any change in the reference price beyond 200 ariary would be postponed to the next month until the change in pump prices fully reflects that of the reference price. The subsidy resulting from the initial gap between the pump and reference prices and the delayed adjustment would be paid to oil distributors within a month after the end of every quarter. A timely settlement of the subsidy is key to limit pressure on the cash flow of oil distributors and avoid the accumulation of cross-liabilities as observed in the past. For 2024, the estimated subsidy (around MGA 239 billion or 0.31 percent of GDP) has been budgeted for in the revised budget law.

22. The program aims to reinforce fiscal institutions and PFM processes building on ongoing efforts (with FAD resident PFM expert) to improve budget execution and traceability (Annex IV). Commitment plans will be extended to all ministries (SB), following up on efforts during the previous program to pilot commitment plans in some ministries, and enable progress in cash management via improved cash flow projections. The adoption of a new cash flow management legislation will introduce more robust tools to reinforce the Treasury Single Account (SB). To support the proposed debt anchor, the program also aims to strengthen the budget preparation process through better macro-fiscal forecasting. The introduction of commitment appropriations to better monitor multi-year investment projects and a more structured process for public investment project evaluation, selection, and budgeting (RSF RM02) will improve the budget medium-term focus. Lastly, efforts will continue to enhance the management of fiscal risks, in particular arising from state owned enterprises (SOEs). The authorities commit to publish an annual report on SOEs, highlighting their financial results, implications for the budget and realized governance efforts (MEFP, A32).

B. Strengthening Governance and the Fight Against Corruption (ECF Pillar II)

23. The authorities have made good governance one of the three pillars of the new PGE and requested a Governance Diagnostic Assessment (GDA). The GDA will support the elaboration and operationalization of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2025-2035, whose adoption and publication should happen before end-January 2025 (SB). Some measures can be rapidly implemented such as adequate budgeting and staffing of anti-corruption institutions, and a better enforcement of the asset declaration requirements for government officials. The adoption of a legal framework to protect whistleblowers is a key reform that would need more preparation and CD support, possibly over the course of the GDA. The GDA report will be finalized and published in 2025 (MEFP H38).

24. Better government transparency is crucial to improve accountability. The authorities have started publishing ultimate beneficial ownership (UBO) information for new public procurement contracts but contracts themselves are not systematically released and the identification of UBO needs to be enhanced. The financial accounts of SOEs are generally not published. The authorities agreed to consider the adoption of a "Freedom of Information Act” that would enshrine the right of citizens to know about public affairs and the creation of a dedicated watchdog to enforce that right before the end of the program (MEFP A44). Madagascar's accession to the Open Government Partnership Initiative would further demonstrate its commitment to greater transparency and stronger governance. These reforms would also help increase transparency on the use of natural resources, henceforth enhancing the impact of policies to protect forestry and biodiversity, including those supported by the RSF.

25. Further reforms would improve fiscal governance. Governance issues in the customs and tax administrations call for strengthening internal controls.8 The tax and customs administrations' monthly performance dashboard to be produced under the program (A19) should help to strengthen internal controls and monitor improvements with a focus on indicators related to compliance management and controls. In addition, the GDA will help identify measures to further strengthen internal controls and reduce vulnerabilities to corruption.

26. The ongoing operationalization of the Malagasy Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSM) created in 2021 still requires clarifications. The authorities adopted in May a first implementing decree of the August 2021 law creating the FSM. However, some elements require more clarity, such as the regulation of the Fund's capacity to engage the State's signature in investment projects or PPPs, and the guarantee of its transparency and independence through the publication of annual reports and financial statements (MEFP, A49).

27. The independence and financial autonomy of the central bank must be preserved and strengthened. Priority reform areas to fortify BFM independence include: (i) limiting BFM's involvement in the gold sector by adopting an operational strategy for non-monetary gold purchases in line with recommendations of Fund staff , (ii) reviewing the remuneration of Treasury deposits, (iii) moving towards a clear, transparent, and market-based debt management framework through a single central securities depository (CSD) for public debt securities, and (iv) strengthening the institutional framework for financial stability (see below). A new safeguards assessment of the BFM was initiated and will be completed by the first program review. The last assessment was completed in 2021 and most recommendations have since been implemented, with the exception of completing an external assessment of the internal audit function and safeguarding BFM's purchases of unrefined gold for the ultimate diversification of its foreign reserves.

28. Better market regulation should help prevent state capture. Beyond the operationalization or reinforcement of regulators in specific sectors (some of them crucial from a climate perspective, such as the water or electricity regulators), efforts to reform the vanilla and clove sectors could help prevent and curb monopolistic practices. The implementation of the Conseil Economique, Social et Culturel, provided for in the 2010 Constitution would encourage public debate and civil society's involvement in policy making.

29. The program will support efforts to enhance the effectiveness of implementation of the anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework. The newly adopted AML/CFT law (Law 2023-026) amended the 2018 AML/CFT law to improve conformity with international standards, and the authorities committed to adopt the associated decree by end-June 2024. An additional decree establishing the mechanism for implementing targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism, the financing of terrorism, and the financing of mass destruction weapons proliferation should be adopted by end-June 2024, and the report of the national assessment of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing should be validated by the Council of Ministers by that date. The authorities will continue ongoing work on the designation and operationalization of supervisors of designated non-financial establishments and professions (MEFP, H40).

C. Consolidating Monetary and Financial Stability (ECF Pillar III)

30. The program will support the implementation of the new monetary policy operational framework (Box 1). A monetary policy consultation clause (MPCC) will help monitor BFM's performance in implementing the new framework and keeping inflation under control. The reviewbased approach to monetary policy conditionality is deemed appropriate as BFM has been transitioning under the previous program to a more forward-looking monetary policy framework ascribing a greater role to policy interest rates.9 Fiscal dominance is minimal as the 2016 central bank law strictly limits central bank lending to the government; average annual inflation has remained in the single digits; and the central bank is committed to continuing the strengthening of its policy framework. The increased use of repo operations by banks would contribute to strengthening monetary policy transmission. BFM aims to encourage such operations (MEFP ^51), and the authorities have committed to implement a Central Securities Depository (CSD) by end-December 2024 (SB).

31. BFM should stand ready to raise its policy rates to keep inflation on a downward path. The projected path for M3 (MPCC) has been set to support the decline in inflation. While the current policy stance is appropriate, BFM should be ready to raise interest rates as needed to drive inflation down if price pressures were to reappear, continue to manage bank liquidity through open market operations, and communicate more predictably and transparently about its interest rate policy and liquidity management to enhance credibility and accountability. Continued improvement of monetary policy decision communication, including through the development of a quarterly monetary report, would help better anchor expectations.

32. Maintaining a flexible exchange rate regime remains the best way to absorb external shocks. While restrictions on residents' holding of bank accounts in foreign currency were lifted before becoming effective, FX repatriation and surrender requirements on export proceeds, considered capital flow management measures (CFMs), remain in place. The phasing out of CFMs should be done in a properly timed and sequenced manner. This would require considering external vulnerability risks and progress made with reforms to foster necessary institutional and financial development, including macroprudential reforms, and in line with the IMF's Institutional View on Liberalization and Management Capital Flows and Integrated Policy Framework. Meanwhile, BFM is reviewing its FX intervention strategy to move away from fixed-volatility triggers towards more riskbased triggers (MEFP A54).

33. Bolstering financial stability is key to the development of credit markets. Overall, the banking sector remains profitable, liquid, and resilient. The definition and requirements of minimal capital adequacy, as well as liquidity ratios, are being adapted to follow Basel III recommendations. The effective implementation of the 2020 banking law would also reinforce financial stability (MEFP A60). At the macroprudential level, the authorities committed to adopt the long-awaited financial stability law by end-June 2025 to strengthen the supervision of the financial system (SB). The forthcoming Financial Sector Stability Review (FSSR) will provide a comprehensive diagnostic of gaps in the oversight of the financial sector to be addressed in subsequent reviews, including through capacity development.

Strengthening the Monetary Policy Operational Framework

Madagascar's central bank (BFM) officially transitioned to an interest rate targeting operational framework in February 2024. The transition was supported by multiple IMF technical assistance missions. With the new framework, BFM aims to manage demand through changes in interest rates rather than through adjustments to reserve money M0.

Under the new framework, BFM aims to stabilize the overnight interbank rate around the middle of the interest rate corridor determined by its deposit and marginal lending facility rates. Liquidity forecasting and management operations play a key role in achieving that operational target, with broad money being downgraded to an intermediary target.

The new framework is not a fully-fledged inflation targeting framework. It represents a transitional framework featuring more forward-looking monetary policy and falls under the category of evolving monetary policy regimes.

The program supports the new monetary policy framework by defining a Monetary Policy Consultation Clause (MPCC).1 The MPCC is based on a specified path for broad money (M3) consistent with the central bank’s implicit inflation objective over 12 months. The choice of M3 growth over inflation as MPCC target was motivated by the lack of an announced inflation target and very recent transition to interest rate targeting. Besides M3 growth, reviews would also look at other macroeconomic variables, including inflation and growth, and pay particular attention to the interactions between fiscal and monetary policies.

The path for M3 was calibrated based on nominal GDP growth, following the quantity theory of money. The range was set based on observed past volatility of M3 growth.

1 IMF policy paper, 2014 “Conditionality in Evolving Monetary Policy Regimes”.

D. Fostering Stronger and More Inclusive Growth (ECF Pillar IV)

34. In a context of high social fragility and vulnerability to climate disasters, sustained efforts are needed to build resilience and increase potential growth. This fourth pillar of the program will closely align with the PGE’s priorities on human capital and industrialization.

35. The program will support stronger social safety nets. Drawing lessons from past analyses,10 the program envisages an increase in spending for education and health and continued improvements in the social safety net coverage. In this context, the program sets a floor on social spending, using the new functional classification developed with Fund CD support (IT). Additionally, the authorities committed to (i) expand the social registry to 600,000 households (SB), from the initial pilot program which covered 81,278 households in 2 regions, and continue to work on measures to mitigate the planned increases in fuel prices (RSF RM07 and RM08) (ii) adapt the legal framework of the national Social Security Fund (CNAPS) to extend contributory coverage to selfemployed workers, and (iii) extend the food bank program (SB) (MEFP A56).

36. Digitalization can accelerate financial inclusion and the development of social protection programs. The authorities have introduced the possibility to file and pay taxes online and started processing some payments via mobile money (e.g., salaries, scholarships). Digital payments and mobile money providers are governed by law, including the banking law and the 2017 law on electronic money and electronic money providers. Most digital financial services are currently provided by institutions supervised by the Banking and Financial Supervision Commission (CSBF). The authorities committed to work on a new strategy for financial inclusion, updating the previous strategy that expired in 2022, and to upgrade regulations to mitigate new potential risks (MEFP fl58). They are working on the implementation by BFM of a national switch, which aims to facilitate and secure electronic transactions between different players in the financial system and businesses (MEFP fl59).

37. Industrialization will benefit from a more reliable supply of electricity following JIRAMA’s recovery and a greater formalization of the economy. Allowing informal and selfemployed workers to voluntarily contribute to the social protection system will increase workforce formalization. Reforms to support industrialization efforts include updating the 2014 industrialization strategy and improving the business environment through governance reforms. The GDA would allow to identify more specific actions in this regard.

E. Combatting Climate Change (RSF)

38. Madagascar faces significant risks to balance of payments stability given its high vulnerability to climate hazards (Annex V). Weather-related shocks (notably cyclones, droughts, and floods) could reduce agricultural exports and disrupt port activity - a major factor for an island country. Erosion linked to deforestation could also hamper hydropower production and lead to additional needs for fuel imports and / or power outages harmful to the industrial sector - as seen with the loss in production from the Andekaleka dam, a major source of power for the Antananarivo urban area. Climate change could also have serious implications on debt sustainability (see DSA).

39. Failing to address climate change would have severe economic and human costs. According to the World Bank's forthcoming Climate Change and Development Report (CCDR), direct losses from cyclones and impact on tourism and fisheries are likely to be the primary drivers of climate-related losses. The CCDR also shows a robust correlation between climate shocks and economic growth and points out that as the risk of climate shocks increases, the probability of Madagascar experiencing strong economic growth diminishes. Climate change disproportionally affects some population groups, with poor households and women being the most exposed given their higher employment in the informal sector and agriculture. This is compounded by specific regional vulnerabilities, notably in Madagascar's Southern regions ("Grand Sud"), which have been suffering from an acute drought for several years.

40. Financing needs related to climate change are enormous (especially for adaptation). According to the implementation plan of its updated Nationally Defined Contribution (NDC2), Madagascar's financing needs ("conditional contributions") total US$24.4 billion over the period 2022-2030. With a focus on disaster risk management and five priority climate-sensitive development sectors (agriculture, land, and blue economy; hydropower; urban resilience; resilient transport; social protection, health, and education), the CCDR identifies priority near- and medium-to-long term climate resilience investments for a combined cost of nearly US$10 billion by 2050 (about 67 percent of 2022's GDP), of which US$3.5 billion would be required by 2030. These investments would generate higher import needs in the near term but would help mitigate risks to balance of payments stability in the medium-to-long term. The needs far outstrip current financial flows, despite ongoing efforts to secure support by international actors like the Green Climate Fund (GCF).

41. Madagascar’s RSF request is grounded in the analysis of climate challenges made in the 2022 Climate Macroeconomic Assessment Program (CMAP) and in the CCDR. Proposed reform measures (RMs) aim to complement existing support by development partners (Text Table 4). Their sequencing is intended to put in place the institutions and mechanisms required to advance the climate agenda in the first three reviews and prepare further reforms towards the end of the RSF arrangement.

Text Table 4.

Madagascar: Climate-Related Priorities Supported by Development Partners

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42. The RSF discussions placed great emphasis on implementation capacity and cooperation among development partners. Discussions with the authorities and with donors confirmed assistance for implementing RMs in the few areas not covered by IMF core expertise and CD capabilities. Reform ideas that still required time and efforts to mature have been identified as MEFP commitments (e.g., clean cooking, agricultural insurance, development of environmental taxation). The proposed RSF revolves around the following five priorities:

RSF Priority 1. Reinforcing Governance and Mainstreaming the Climate Agenda into PFM/PIM Processes

43. Climate governance issues will be addressed at the start of the RSF-supported arrangement to advance the effective implementation of the national climate change agenda. Both the CMAP and the CCDR note that the institutional and political fragmentation of the national climate change agenda results in delays in reform implementation. The longstanding Inter-ministerial Committee for Environment (CIME) chaired by the Minister of Environment on behalf of the Prime Minister is devoid of specific competences on climate change issues and has been largely inactive over the last few years. While the national bureau for coordination of climate issues and the REDD+ strategy (BNCC-REDD+), an agency under the Ministry of Environment, has been entrusted with a broad mandate for the definition and operationalization of overall climate-related policies and commitments, the absence of a functional decision-making mechanism hampers its efforts. To address these challenges, the CIME will be reactivated under the leadership of the Prime Minister with a mandate to lead and supervise all climate-related policies (RM01).

44. The RSF will build on past reforms of the public investment management (PIM) framework to make it climate-sensitive, with a strong focus on actual implementation. Madagascar has one of the lowest public investment efficiency rates in the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region, highlighting considerable room for improvement. A more robust PIM framework has been adopted in early 2023 with IMF and World Bank support, but its implementation is barely starting, and the framework does not yet include climate considerations. The 2004 decree on environmental impact assessments is outdated and does not mention climate considerations either. The RSF will support in a sequenced manner the integration of climate change concerns into the public investment projects evaluation and selection process (RM02) and ensure effective and transparent implementation (RM03).

45. Madagascar is still at an early stage in the integration of climate considerations in PFM. The budget does not allow the tracking of expenditures that would contribute to the transition to a more resilient and low-carbon development model, complicating both decision making and access to climate financing. The RSF would take advantage of the work of the FAD resident advisor -currently working on the reform of the budget classification, a major enabler to track climate-related expenditures - and support the production of a first Climate Budget Statement appended to the 2026 budget (RM04).

RSF Priority 2. Enhancing Adaptation to Climate Change and Resilience Against Natural Disasters

46. Climate change increases the need for adequate governance of the water sector, as the availability of water resources is crucial for the economy and for overall development. While Madagascar is currently subject to acute water stress only in its Southern region ("Grand Sud"), climate change combined with urbanization and agricultural expansion puts pressure on water resources and raises the risk of water scarcity for agriculture, drinking, and other domestic resources (set to increase if the country improves water services access - currently at only 53 percent of the population, lower than the SSA average of 65 percent). Risks to agriculture are macro-critical since food exports are about 40 percent of merchandise exports (versus about 15 percent on average in SSA). The expected development of hydropower could also be undermined by changes in precipitation patterns and related impacts on river basins, compounded by deforestation: the Andekaleka hydroelectric dam has seen its capacity reduced by 78 percent due to the decline of water flows, thereby contributing to frequent power outages in the capital region11.

47. Adopting and ensuring the effective implementation of an integrated water resource management (IWRM) approach is key to addressing the challenges of the “water, energy and food” nexus. The current Water Code (Law 98-029) fails to consider the environmental and climate change dimensions. There is no effective IWRM at the level of the twelve main Madagascar river basins, some of which are heavily exposed to climate change.12 This leaves the country poorly equipped to face water stress, tackle possible conflicts between different water uses, and take preventive measures (protection of forested areas or reforestation, creation of reservoir dams). The RSF suggests addressing this challenge through the adoption of a new Water Code (RM05), as a first step towards the operationalization of IWRM plans at the level of those river basins most exposed to climate change. CD support (European Union and World Bank) will be essential to achieve the objectives under this RM, notably to help put in place adequate institutional arrangements as the authority in charge of water and sanitation created under the 1998 law has not been able to fulfil its mandate effectively.

48. Given its major exposure to natural disasters, Madagascar has already put in place many elements of an overall disaster risk management framework. Madagascar has developed a national disaster risk management strategy (2016). It has also adopted in 2019 a series of regulations outlining norms for resilient construction and land planning. Climate-responsive social protection is being developed with the support of the World Bank and UNICEF, in connection with the extension of the Unified Social Register. Work to improve and extend the early warning system is ongoing with UN support.

49. The RSF proposes to support improvements in financing instruments to respond to natural disasters. Madagascar has adopted in 2023 a national disaster risk financing and insurance strategy (prepared with the support of AfDB) outlining a layered disaster risk financing model, and already possesses some elements of this financing model, notably through the ARC financing mechanism (insurance policy on droughts and cyclones). It has also already made use of a World Bank CAT DDO. However, while a national contingency fund (FNC) has been created as a conduit for emergency response, it remains to be operationalized and properly budgeted (current budget allocation is only MGA 2 billion) to enable swift disbursement of emergency spending: the CCDR notes that disbursements made by the African Risk Capacity took up to six months to reach the end beneficiaries due to cumbersome internal procedures. The RSF will henceforth support adequate budgeting and operationalization of the FNC, as well as improvements in process for emergency expenditure, including adequate transparency and reporting mechanisms (RM06). This action will benefit from World Bank support and will also be able to build on the experience gathered by IMF (FAD) CD, notably through the recent audit of the expenditure chain (2023) and through previous work on COVID spending.

RSF Priority 3. Supporting Efforts to Curb the Increase of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions

50. While carbon emissions per capita remain very low compared to other SSA countries, the RSF would support efforts to convey the right price signals in the energy sector. Madagascar's emissions are increasing, albeit from a low level and with a composition skewed towards land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) and agriculture (80 percent of emissions). Reforms under the ECF (automatic fuel pricing mechanism) would go a long way towards reducing fuel subsidies - already relatively modest at 1.6 percent of GDP cumulatively over 2021-23 and expected to decrease to 0.3 percent of GDP in 2024. The full elimination of fuel price subsidies by May 2026 (RM07) would complement these efforts, increase incentives for conservation and create fiscal space to finance social safety nets and/or investment in climate-resilient infrastructure. Similarly, an increase in the diesel excise tax would reduce the tax advantage of using diesel over gasoline with a positive mitigation impact (RM08).

51. Initiatives to promote the development of renewable electricity will also be encouraged under the RSF. The 2015-2030 New Energy Policy and the 2022 SDG7 implementation plan aim to raise the share of renewable energy in electricity generation from 40 percent currently to about 85 percent in 2030 while increasing household access to electricity from 33 percent to 70 percent by 2030. While most of this increase is expected to accrue from large hydropower projects (Sahofika and Volobe), there is scope to develop mini-grid and off-grid solar or hydropower solutions notably to enhance electricity access in rural areas. Progress in this field could be achieved through the creation of a dedicated financing vehicle called National Sustainable Energy Fund (FNED), which could leverage State contribution and support from donors to support renewable energy projects in rural areas (RM09).

RSF Priority 4. Reinforcing the Protection of Forests and Biodiversity

52. Deforestation has major negative consequences in terms of water resources, agriculture, biodiversity, and resilience to natural disasters. Forest coverage has declined from 29 percent to 21 percent between 2000 and 2020 (CCDR). Deforestation leads to high erosion rates, increased flood risks, and reduced water resources for agricultural and household usage. It also impacts biodiversity - a major source of natural capital and attraction for Madagascar's tourism sector.

53. The effectiveness of current efforts to protect forests could be enhanced through a framework more conducive to private initiative and supportive of reforestation projects. Madagascar is equipped since 2018 with a national REDD+ strategy, implemented notably through a 2021 decree regulating access to the forest carbon market. Madagascar has implemented an effective Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) mechanism under the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), which covers public projects only. Extending the scope of this mechanism to reforestation schemes would tap into significant private interest (RM10). World Bank CD support would help make sure that this new framework is conducive to high-quality projects, not just in terms of mitigation but also in terms of adaptation to climate change (fighting soil erosion for example) and benefits for local communities.

RSF Priority 5: Mobilizing Climate Finance

54. Current climate financing flows to Madagascar are well below estimated needs. As a low GHG emitting country frequently hit by climate shocks (cyclones, droughts, floods, sea level rise), most of Madagascar's climate finance needs are on adaptation. The AfDB estimates that Madagascar mobilized around USD 420 millions of climate financing per year on average in 2019-20, covering 16 percent of its estimated needs. The private sector share was around 5 percent and 70 percent of these private financing flows went to the energy sector. However, Madagascar has the potential to be an attractive destination for climate investments with multiple adaptation and mitigation co-benefits, building on the financial sector reforms under the ECF. The upcoming CCDR points to several private sector investment opportunities. Reforms under this priority area focus on addressing two key structural challenges.

55. Given Madagascar’s abundant natural capital endowment, the proposed adoption of a National Climate Finance Mobilization Strategy (RM11) will strengthen Madagascar’s position on the global as well as domestic stage as an attractive destination for climate investments. This RM addresses the fragmented climate agenda identified by the CCDR and the CMAP and brings a sharpened focus on developing a strategy that includes the private sector and prioritizes key investment areas with a tentative budget, options for innovative blended financing mechanisms and a timeline. The strategy will be developed after extensive consultations and adopted as a decree -thus ensuring its publication and giving it a strong legal standing vis-a-vis various stakeholders, especially within the administration.

56. In addition, a national green taxonomy (RM12) will bring clarity and transparency to financial market participants keen on investing in green projects and/or projects with clearly defined climate outcomes.13 It will help financial actors and others (climate funds) make an informed investment decision and prevent greenwashing. Clearly defined outcomes in the fields of adaptation, mitigation and biodiversity can also incentivize investors interested in supporting Madagascar's climate policies and support tracking and monitoring of climate finance flows in the country.

Program Modalities

57. The authorities have requested a 36-month arrangement under the ECF with access at 105 percent of quota (SDR 256.62 million) (Table 12). This arrangement is justified by the need to support external buffers that would otherwise decline, barring significant fiscal contraction, in a shock-prone environment given Madagascar's exceptional vulnerability to natural disasters. In the absence of Fund financing, international reserves would decline to 4.7 months of imports by 2027 from 5.7 months in 2023, as import growth is expected to exceed that of reserves. As budget execution contributes to balance of payments need, the first four disbursements will be used as budget support. The memorandum of understanding between both BFM and the government, used for IMF financing on-lent to the budget, will be updated accordingly. The proposed arrangement will be key to catalyze budget support by other development partners and close the fiscal financing gap during the program period (Text Table 5). The Fund-supported program is fully financed with firm commitments for the next 12 months, and good prospects that financing will be adequate for the remaining program period beyond the upcoming 12 months.14

Text Table 5.

Madagascar: Projected Budget Financing, 2024-2027

(Billions of Ariary)

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Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

58. The arrangement would be subject to semi-annual reviews. Performance criteria (PCs) for the primary fiscal balance, new external payment arrears and new external debt on a contractual basis will facilitate the reduction of fiscal financing needs and limit debt expansion.15 A PC on the central bank's net foreign assets will ensure that reserves remain adequate. A review based MPCC based on the projected path for broad money would provide flexibility and incentives for strengthening the new monetary policy operational and analytical framework. Prior actions were set to support governance reforms at JIRAMA, ensure the consistency of the 2024 budget with program objectives, and demonstrate the authorities' strong commitment to fuel pricing reform. Structural benchmarks aim to support domestic revenue mobilization, contain fiscal risks, strengthen governance and fiscal institutions, consolidate the monetary and financial policy framework, and foster more inclusive growth.

59. The authorities have requested a 36-month RSF arrangement with access at 100 percent of quota (SDR 244.4 million). Madagascar meets the RSF eligibility based on its per capita GNI, as part of Group A for the purpose of interest charges. The proposed access is based on staff's assessment that: (i) the proposed package is exceptionally strong considering the country's starting position and implementation capacity, (ii) the country authorities have shown a strong commitment to support a successful RSF, (iii) Madagascar's debt is sustainable and capacity-to-repay adequate even if subject to significant risks (A60). The duration of the requested RSF is aligned with the duration of the ECF arrangement (36 months) to give the authorities the necessary time to implement strong outcome-oriented reforms that are expected to strengthen the country's resilience to climate change and thus contribute to long-term prospective external stability. Given past challenges in reform implementation, the proposed reform package is more strictly focused on the areas where the Fund has direct expertise and can directly support implementation through technical assistance. This is commensurate with the proposed 100 percent of quota access. RSF disbursements will be used as budget support and substitute for deposit withdrawal or more expensive financing sources (Text Table 5). The resulting increased policy space will support climate-related investments, which will enhance resilience and adaptation to natural disaster shocks (Annex V). Disbursements will be equally split among twelve reform measures (RMs) expected to be completed over six reviews.

60. Madagascar’s capacity to repay (CtR) the Fund remains adequate but is subject to significant risks. Annual repayments are expected to peak in 2027 and reach 0.8 percent of GDP, 6.2 percent of government revenue and 3.0 percent of exports. Outstanding credit is expected to peak in 2026 at 360.6 percent of quota (268.9 percent owed to the PRGT and 91.7 percent to the RST), 6.0 percent of GDP or 50.0 percent of government revenue, and expected to decline thereafter. While outstanding credit as a share of GDP and debt service to the Fund indicators are projected to be well above the 75th percentile of the comparator group, adherence to program targets and the programs' ability to catalyze donor support would ensure that risks are somewhat mitigated during peak years. In addition, CtR risks are mitigated by the authorities' strong commitment to reforms, track record of paying the Fund, and an appropriately sequenced phasing between ECF and RSF that takes the authorities' capacity into consideration.

61. Risks to the program are moderate but manageable. A deterioration of the global outlook and renewed surge in global oil and food prices would complicate the envisaged energy sector reforms, including the planned reduction in the fuel subsidy and transfers to JIRAMA, as well as the conduct of monetary policy. Capacity constraints could delay the implementation of key policy measures. Nevertheless, risks are mitigated by the authorities' strong ownership of the program. Planned technical assistance from the Fund and other development partners will bolster the country's capacity to implement reforms. Extensive engagement with civil society, the private sector, and other multilateral and bilateral partners will help to flexibly adjust the design of reforms and strengthen accountability.

Staff Appraisal

62. Madagascar’s growth eased amid declining inflationary pressures in 2023, but prospects are affected by the prevalence of natural disasters. Economic growth slowed, while inflation declined. Fiscal performance has been weak in a context of slow reform progress, with lower tax collection on an accrual basis relative to GDP than in 2022 and continuing high transfers to JIRAMA. Growth prospects in 2024 and beyond are likely to be impacted by natural disasters related to climate change. In early 2024, tropical cyclone Gamane struck the northern region, affecting more than 80,000 people and destroying houses and infrastructure. Spikes in food and energy prices due to worsening geopolitical tensions could further dampen the economic outlook for 2024.

63. In this context, the authorities have requested a cancellation of the 2021 ECF arrangement, to replace it with new ECF and RSF arrangements. Considering the short time left before the end of the 2021 ECF, its cancellation allows to combine a three-year RSF with a successor ECF. The authorities’ request is motivated by the start of a new presidential mandate, the persistence of balance of payments problems over a longer period, and the will to align program priorities with the new General State Policy (PGE).

64. The priorities of the ECF arrangement are consistent with the government’s reform agenda and will be supported by appropriate capacity development. The new ECF aims to increase economic resilience and foster long-term inclusive growth by anchoring fiscal sustainability, strengthening governance and the fight against corruption, buttressing monetary and financial stability, and advancing reform to support industrialization and human capital development. The RSF will help address climate vulnerabilities coming from higher average temperatures, more variable rainfalls, and more intense cyclones affecting water supply, food security, and infrastructure resilience. It will underpin ambitious reforms to strengthen resilience and adaptation to climate disasters, support mitigation efforts, enhance the protection of ecosystems, and create conditions for green private sector investment. Capacity development, tailored and focused on program objectives, will be crucial.

65. The program macro-framework is based on a gradual convergence of economic growth to 5 percent thanks to the reforms supported by the ECF and RSF. Inflation is projected to gradually converge to 6 percent by 2028, while the current account deficit would stabilize under 5 percent of GDP, partly driven by higher investment to increase resilience to climate change related risks. Tax revenue would gradually increase, creating space for investment and additional social spending. Gross official reserves would be maintained at a level consistent with reserve adequacy.

66. Creating additional fiscal space for priority spending requires raising government revenue and containing fiscal risks. Revenue mobilization, a key objective of the program, needs to be supported by a comprehensive revenue administration and tax policy strategy. It is crucial to contain fiscal risks from potential budget implications of administered fuel prices, and the longstanding issue of transfers to SOEs, notably JIRAMA. In this context, the implementation of an automatic fuel pricing mechanism should help contain the subsidy resulting from the initial gap between the pump and reference prices. The newly recruited CEO of JIRAMA will prepare a recovery plan that should enable a gradual reduction in government transfers, creating fiscal space for other transfers, including social ones.

67. The program intends to reinforce fiscal institutions and PFM processes to improve budget execution and traceability. The authorities made progress by implementing commitment plans in selected ministries. They will extend them to all ministries and are working on adopting a new cash flow management legislation and improving cash flow projections. The program will also strengthen the budget preparation process through better macro-fiscal forecasting. The introduction of commitment appropriations to better monitor multi-year investment projects and a more structured process for public investment project evaluation, selection, and budgeting will improve the budget medium-term focus. Staff recommend that the authorities consider formally adopting a medium-term fiscal strategy with a debt anchor of 60 percent of GDP.

68. The program will support stronger social safety nets to meet Madagascar’s substantial needs. The program seeks to ensure adequate levels of social spending based on the new functional classification as well as improved efficiency and execution of such spending through strengthened planning, execution, and monitoring. The program will support an increase in spending for education and health and continued improvements in the social safety net coverage. Digitalization will also be key to accelerate financial inclusion and the development of social protection programs.

69. The program, together with the requested Governance Diagnostic Assessment, will support further efforts to fight corruption, promote transparency, and improve governance. The authorities are preparing a new anti-corruption strategy for 2025-2035. To enhance transparency, they have started publishing UBO information for new public procurement contracts. Strengthening internal controls in the customs and tax administrations and clarifying the functioning and governance of the Malagasy Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSM) are important steps to improve governance. More work is also needed to further improve the AML/CFT framework and implement it. Looking forward, strengthening citizens’ access to information and legal protections of whistleblowers will be key reforms to improve government accountability over the course of the program. The implementation of the Conseil Economique, Social et Culturel, provided for in the 2010 Constitution would bolster civil society’s involvement in policy making and oversight.

70. The program will support the implementation of the new monetary policy operational framework. A monetary policy consultation clause anchored on the projected path for M3 will guide the central bank to drive inflation down. While the current policy stance is appropriate, BFM should stand ready to raise interest rates as needed to support the decline in inflation, continue to manage bank liquidity through open market operations, and communicate more predictably and transparently about its interest rate policy and liquidity management to enhance credibility and accountability. The adoption of an operational strategy in line with Fund staff advice to limit BFM’s involvement in the gold sector is crucial to preserve the independence and financial autonomy of the central bank. Maintaining a flexible exchange rate regime remains the best way to absorb external shocks.

72. The RSF will build on the authorities’ climate agenda to support reforms with five priorities: (i) reinforcing climate governance and mainstreaming climate into PFM/PIM processes, (ii) strengthening adaptation to climate change and resilience against natural disasters, (iii) curbing the growth of GHG emissions, (iv) reinforcing the protection of forest and biodiversity, and (v) mobilizing climate finance. Reforms under the RSF aim to complement existing support by development partners.

73. Staff support the authorities’ request to cancel the current ECF arrangement, as well as their request for new 36 month-arrangements under the ECF and the RSF, with access equivalent to respectively 105 and 100 percent of Madagascar’s quota (SDR 256.62 million and SDR 244.40 million).

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Madagascar: Real Sector Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Madagascar: Inflation and External Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Figure 3.
Figure 3.

Madagascar: Government Revenue and Spending

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Figure 4.
Figure 4.

Madagascar: Monetary Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Figure 5.
Figure 5.

Madagascar: Financial Sector Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Sources: Malagasy Authorities; IMF Financial Access Survey; World Bank; and IMF staff estimates.
Figure 6.
Figure 6.

Madagascar: Medium-Term Macroeconomic Prospects

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates.1 Domestic borrowing is net, not showing short-term T-bills rollover, and including net on-lending of IMF financing by the central bank.
Table 1.

Madagascar: Selected Economic Indicators

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Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 1 Primary balance excl. foreign-financed investment and grants. 2 RCF disbursements in 2020, ECF disbursements in 2021-2023, and planned ECF and RSF disbursements in 2024-2027 onlent by the central bank to the Treasury. 3 A negative value indicates a financing gap to be filled by budget support or other financing still to be committed or identified.
Table 2.

Madagascar: National Accounts

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Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
Table 3a.

Madagascar: Fiscal Operations of the Central Government

(Billions of Ariary)

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Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 1 Operating subsidies and arrears repayment. 2 Includes third party accounts, trade accounts, and other operations to be regularized. 3 Primary balance excl. foreign-financed investment and grants. 4 RCF disbursements in 2020, ECF disbursements in 2021-2023, and planned ECF disbursements in 2024-2025 onlent by the central bank to the Treasury. 5 A negative value indicates a financing gap to be filled by budget support or other financing still to be committed or identified.
Table 3b.

Madagascar: Fiscal Operations of the Central Government

(Percent of GDP)

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Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 1 Operating subsidies and arrears repayment. 2 Includes third party accounts, trade accounts, and other operations to be regularized. 3 Primary balance excl. foreign-financed investment and grants. 4 RCF disbursements in 2020, ECF disbursements in 2021-2023, and planned ECF disbursements in 2024-2025 onlent by the central bank to the Treasury. 5 A negative value indicates a financing gap to be filled by budget support or other financing still to be committed or identified.
Table 4.

Madagascar: Fiscal Operations of the Central Government

Quarterly Projections (Billions of Ariary)

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Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 1 Primary balance excl. foreign-financed investment and grants. 2 RCF disbursements in 2020, ECF disbursements in 2021-2023, and planned ECF disbursements in 2024-2025 onlent by the central bank to the Treasury. 3 A negative value indicates a financing gap to be filled by budget support or other financing still to be committed or identified.
Table 5a.

Madagascar: Balance of Payments

(Millions of SDRs)

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Sources: Malagasy authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 1 Includes official external financial support only with a disbursement schedule. 2 Includes reserve accumulation. 3 Debt relief assumed through April 2022. 4 2021 gross official reserves include the IMF SDR allocation
Table 5b.

Madagascar: Balance of Payments

(Percent of GDP)

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Sources: Malagasy authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 1 Includes official external financial support only with a disbursement schedule. 2 Includes reserve accumulation. 3 Debt relief assumed through April 2022.
Table 5c.

Madagascar: Balance of Payments

(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

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Sources: Malagasy authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 1 Includes official external financial support only with a disbursement schedule. 2 Includes reserve accumulation. 3 Debt relief assumed through April 2022. 4 2021 gross official reserves include the IMF SDR allocation
Table 6.

Madagascar: Monetary Accounts1

(Billions of Ariary, unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 1 End of period. 2 Large increases in 2020 and 2021 reflect RCF disbursements and ECF disbursements on lent by the central bank to the Treasury.
Table 7.

Madagascar: Balance Sheet of the Central Bank1

(Billions of Ariary, unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 1 End of period.
Table 8.

Madagascar: Selected Financial Soundness Indicators1

(Ratios, percent, unless otherwise indicated)

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Source: Malagasy authorities. 1 Ratios only concern banking sector.
Table 9.

Madagascar: External Financing Requirements and Sources, 2022-27

(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

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Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
Table 10.

Madagascar: Decomposition of Public Debt and Debt Service by Creditor1

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Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates. 1 As reported by Country authorities according to their classification of creditors, including by official and commercial. 2 Multilateral creditors” are simply institutions with more than one official shareholder and may not necessarily align with creditor classification under other IMF policies (e.g. Lending Into Arrears). 3 Debt is collateralized when the creditor has rights over an asset or revenue stream that would allow it, if the borrower defaults on its payment obligations, to rely on the asset or revenue stream to secure repayment of the debt. Collateralization entails a borrower granting liens over specific existing assets or future receivables to a lender as security against repayment of the loan. Collateral is “unrelated” when it has no relationship to a project financed by the loan. An example would be borrowing to finance the budget deficit, collateralized by oil revenue receipts. See the joint IMF-World Bank note for the G20 “Collateralized Transactions: Key Considerations for Public Lenders and Borrowers” for a discussion of issues raised by collateral. 4 Includes other-one off guarantees not included in publicly guaranteed debt (e.g. credit lines) and other explicit contingent liabilities not elsewhere classified (e.g. potential legal claims, payments resulting from PPP arrangements).
Table 11.

Madagascar: Projected External Borrowing Program, on a Contractual Basis

(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

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Sources: Malagasy authorities; and IMF staff projections.
Table 12.

Madagascar: Proposed Schedule of Disbursements and Timing of Reviews Under the ECF and RSF Arrangements

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Source: IMF staff.
Table 13.

Madagascar: Capacity to Repay Indicators Compared to UCT Arrangements for PRGT Countries

(In percent of the indicated variable)

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Notes: 1) T = date of arrangement approval. PPG = public and publicly guaranteed. 2) Red lines/bars indicate the CtR indicator for the arrangement of interest. 3) The median, interquartile range, and comparator bars reflect all UCT arrangements (including blends) approved for PRGT countries between 2012 and 2022. 4) PRGT countries in the control group with multiple arrangements are entered as separate events in the database. 5) Comparator series is for PRGT arrangements only and runs up to T+10. 6) Debt service obligations to the Fund reflect prospective payments, including for the current year. 7) In the case of blenders, the red lines/ bars refer to PRGT+GRA. In the case of RST, the red lines/ bars refer to PRGT+GRA+RST.
Table 14.

Madagascar: Indicators of Capacity to Repay the Fund

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Source: IMF staff projections.
Table 15.

Madagascar: Timeline of the Proposed Reform Measures Under the RSF

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Annex I. Performance Under the 2021 ECF Arrangement

This annex provides an assessment of Madagascar's performance under the 2021 ECF arrangement and draws lessons from the policy slippages and delays observed over the last three years.

1. Madagascar completed four reviews under the 2021 ECF arrangement with broadly satisfactory performance, albeit mixed in the latest reviews. The arrangement was approved by the IMF Executive Board on March 29, 2021, for a duration of 40 months, with a total access of SDR 219.96 million (90 percent of quota). While the first review was delayed by 4 months, the authorities gradually caught up with the initial program schedule and the 4th review was successfully completed last June according to schedule. Cumulative disbursements reached SDR 171.08 million (70 percent of quota, about 78 percent of the total approved amount) and were fully used for budget support.

2. Macroeconomic performance under the program was affected by multiple exogenous shocks (Figure A.I.1). Growth and inflation underperformed initial program projections in a context of lower global growth, a slow reopening of international air routes after the pandemic, rising commodity prices, and a series of climate shocks in January-March 2022 and 2023. While underexecution of public expenditures led to the domestic primary balance target being comfortably met in 2021, the program accommodated higher fiscal deficits in 2022-23. As a result of lower growth, a depreciated exchange rate, higher fiscal deficits, higher JIRAMA debt, and the decision of the government to mobilize the 2021 SDR allocation, total public debt is estimated to be higher than initially projected (around 55 percent of GDP in 2023). International reserves are very close to initial program targets and remain adequate although below the regional SADC target of 6 months import cover.

3. While satisfactory in the first two reviews, quantitative performance has been mixed in the latest reviews (Table AI.1). Continuous performance criteria have always been met throughout the program. A protracted dispute with oil distributors and recurrent tax revenue underperformance contributed to several breaches of the domestic primary balance quantitative performance criterion (QPC) and the revenue indicative targets (ITs) in 2022 and 2023. The QPC on the central bank's net foreign assets was breached twice in 2022, but the deviations were small and transitory in a context of a volatile foreign exchange market. The ceiling on net domestic assets was breached only once (IT) as the central bank (BFM) transitioned to a new interest-targeting operational monetary framework. After significant efforts to improve budget execution, the authorities increased social spending execution over time and the social spending IT was met for the first time in March 2023.

Table AI.1.

Madagascar: Quantitative Performance Criteria and Indicative Targets

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4. The structural reform agenda saw adequate progress, although much remains to be done (Figure A.I.2). The assessment of structural benchmarks (SBs) since program approval shows that 20 out of 26 distinct non-continuous SBs were implemented (77 percent), of which 9 were met with delays. The authorities also implemented 6 prior actions (PAs). 4 out of 6 continuous SBs have been met since June 2023. The pending and still unmet SBs mostly involve structural reforms in the energy sector which stalled during the electoral period.

5. Delays in meeting some SBs point to the need for strong ownership and more streamlined structural conditionality. While currently not on the World Bank list of Fragile and Conflict-Afflicted States (FCS), Madagascar shares many of the characteristics of FCS, including weak institutions, a very centralized power, and limited capacity.

  • The centralized and concentrated power structure at the highest level of the executive branch requires regular engagement with both the President and the Prime Minister to ensure strong ownership of program reforms. This can be better done through in-person missions and through the Resident Representative. Of the 9 delayed SBs, 7 were set either at program approval or in the first review when missions were still fully virtual, with no opportunity to meet with the President or the Prime Minister (the Res Rep relocated to the country only during the first review mission). Similarly, of the 6 unmet SBs, 3 were set at the time of the first review.

  • Madagascar's limited capacity calls for a more parsimonious use of SBs in line with the IMF engagement strategy with FCS. Staff's approach to break down big reforms in small steps has helped to make progress in the areas of budget execution (SB 5, 20, 21, 26 and PA 5) and energy sector reform (SB 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, continuous SB 1, 2 and 3, PA 2 and 6), but also resulted in a couple of unmet benchmarks. Two unmet SBs (SB 3 and 4) were additional quantitative targets on revenue which did not address structural impediments to better revenue performance and should have been avoided.

Figure AI.1.
Figure AI.1.

Madagascar: Macroeconomic Performance under the ECF Program (2021-2024)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Source: IMF staff calculations.Note: Shaded areas are projections.
Figure AI.2.
Figure AI.2.
Figure AI.2.

Madagascar: Structural Performance under the ECF Program (2021-2024)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Annex II. Risk Assessment Matrix1

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Annex III. External Sector Assessment

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Annex IV. Towards a Stronger Fiscal Framework

1. This annex describes how to calibrate a medium-term debt anchor that would preserve Madagascar’s debt servicing capacity. It also proposes measures to strengthen public financial management (PFM) institutions supportive of the overall fiscal framework. The debt anchor can be used to derive a primary balance target and estimate fiscal adjustment needs. Details on the methodology used are provided in a 2023 paper by the IMF African Department, and in a 2018 Staff Discussion Note by the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department.1

A. Fiscal Anchor to Preserve Debt-Servicing Capacity

2. Based on the methodology defined in the 2023 and 2018 papers mentioned above, the estimation of a medium-term debt anchor is done in three steps:

  • Calibration of a debt limit above which fiscal sustainability is jeopardized and the primary surpluses needed to offset debt dynamics cannot be sustained. While the literature does not offer an exact point estimate, typical limits for developing countries range between 30 and 70 percent of GDP and depend on country-specific factors such as the quality of institutions and access to concessional financing. Calculations using an effective interest rate of 1.6 percent (average over 2019-2023), a debt maturity of 22 years, and conservative thresholds for the interest spending-to-revenue and debt service-to-revenue ratios (16 and 45 percent respectively), suggest a debt limit for Madagascar between 85 and 115 percent of GDP.

  • Definition of a safety buffer below the debt ceiling to ensure that the debt limit is not exceeded in the face of shocks. The size of the buffer depends on country-specific exposure to macroeconomic and fiscal shocks (e.g., shocks to exchange rate, economic growth, contingent liabilities, etc.) with empirical estimates ranging from 10 to 30 percent of GDP.2 A sufficiently large buffer increases the government’s ability to pursue countercyclical fiscal policies and seems justified for a country highly vulnerable to natural disasters such as Madagascar.

  • Calculation of the debt anchor as the difference between the debt limit and the safety buffer. The median debt anchor for SSA countries is estimated around 55 percent of GDP. In the case of Madagascar, applying a 30 percent buffer to the above calibrated limits yields a debt anchor of 55 to 85 percent of GDP.3 A debt anchor of 60 percent of GDP would provide enough room for further borrowing at concessional terms to finance development projects while being consistent with the DSA rating of moderate risk of debt distress with some space to accommodate shocks.4

3. One can then compute the target primary balance that would stabilize debt at this level at a given horizon in the absence of shocks. Finally, the primary gap, defined as the difference between the target primary balance and the current cyclically adjusted primary balance determines the adjustment needs.

B. A Stronger Institutional Fiscal Framework to Support the Debt Anchor

4. An institutional framework with clear and transparent PFM processes is key for the conduct of fiscal policy. While numerical rules (e.g., debt anchor and target primary balance) are useful to ensure fiscal sustainability, their effectiveness is greatly undermined if they are not underpinned by a strong institutional framework and adequate PFM institutions and processes.

5. A functioning medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) is necessary to support the medium-term orientation of fiscal policy and anchor annual budget preparation. A MTFF can be defined as a set of institutional arrangements for prioritizing, presenting, reporting, and managing fiscal aggregates (revenue, expenditure, fiscal balance, and public debt), generally over a three-to-five-year period. While Madagascar is equipped with a MTFF presented each year alongside the annual budget and covering a three-year time horizon, this MTFF remains a largely formal exercise and does not really inform annual budget preparation. Medium-term fiscal projections need to be based on more realistic macroeconomic forecasts to serve as a credible and predictable forward guidance tool. A credible MTFF informing budget choices made in the annual budget preparation will help restore the credibility of the annual budget, currently undermined by overly optimistic growth projections, overestimated tax revenue projections, over-execution of spending in the energy sector, and under-execution of investment spending (which becomes a residual given available financing).5 Strong macro-fiscal forecasting capacity, the ability to monitor multi-year commitments, and the prioritization and adequate costing of investment projects are all requirements for a credible MTFF. Recent and ongoing CD delivered by IMF and the World Bank on public investment may support progress in this field.

6. Adequate fiscal risk management can bolster credibility of the MTFF in the face of shocks and unexpected events. Madagascar's recent experience with the COVID-19 pandemic, rising fuel prices, and multiple climate shocks highlights the importance of building fiscal buffers to flexibly respond to unexpected shocks. While the annual budget law includes an annex on debt sustainability and a fiscal risk statement, FAD technical assistance recommended establishing a dedicated risk analysis and management unit, improving fiscal risk analysis and disclosure, and incorporating the results into the budgetary process and the MTFF (e.g., by identifying specific mitigation measures and adequately calibrating contingency reserves).

7. In the case of Madagascar, streamlining the expenditure chain would also significantly contribute to a stronger fiscal framework. The current situation is characterized by bottlenecks that hamper execution and undermine the credibility of budget figures, leading to very strong variability between the initial budget and the actual execution both in terms of aggregate numbers and composition of spending. Pervasive ex-ante controls lead to a concentration of spending at the end of the year (most notably for investment spending), thereby increasing fraud potential, complicating cash management, and leading to arrears accumulation. The recent removal of the spending commitment authorization requirement (by the President and Prime Minister) in 2023 was a step in the right direction, but there is a need to further fluidify spending execution, better structure actors in the expenditure chain, and further rationalize ex-ante spending controls, building on the recommendations of the 2023 audit of the expenditure chain conducted with IMF CD.

Annex V. Combatting Climate Change

A. Madagascar and Climate Change

1. Madagascar is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change and climate hazards worldwide. Specifically, it ranks as the 21st most vulnerable out of 185 countries according to the 2021 ND-GAIN vulnerability score, with acute vulnerabilities notably in terms of agricultural capacity.1

2. Madagascar is already prone to climate-related disasters due to its geographical location and topography. Madagascar is hit on average by three climate-related disasters every year, affecting close to 6 percent of the population. Based on fatalities and losses arising from extreme weather events over 2000-2019, Madagascar was ranked 12th most impacted country out of 180 countries according to the 2021 Climate Risk Index (CRI).2

3. Given the size of the island and its geography, the exposure to climate hazards is subject to significant regional variation. Droughts are more frequent in the south-west, whereas cyclones predominate in the east and parts of the north, and floods in the east and central regions (IMF CMAP, 2022). Storms, including cyclones, are by far the most frequent disasters and have affected Madagascar ten times more than the average sub-Saharan African (SSA) country since 2000 (Figure AV.1).

Figure AV.1.
Figure AV.1.

Madagascar: Climate-Related Disasters, 2000-2023

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Sources: EM-DAT database; and IMF staff calculations.Note: Warmer temperatures and larger rainfalls are deemed partly responsible for the propagation of epidemics and insect infestations.

4. Climate conditions are expected to deteriorate, with more frequent and intense extreme events. Table AV.1 outlines the climate hazard profile for Madagascar based on ongoing and forecast climate developments. Average temperatures have been steadily increasing in the past twenty years and this trend is expected to continue in the future. Winter and spring rainfalls have been decreasing with longer dry spells in some regions. Cyclones are expected to increase in intensity. Anecdotally, Madagascar was hit by a record number of 6 storms in 2022. More intense cyclones and concentrated rainfalls would increase the risk of floods and landslides in affected regions.

Figure AV.2.
Figure AV.2.

Madagascar: Sectoral Vulnerabilities to Climate Change (2021)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Sources: Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) score; and IMF staff calculations.Note: A higher score indicates a greater vulnerability.

5. Sectoral vulnerabilities are generally higher than in other SSA countries, with specific vulnerabilities linked to the Water-Energy-Food nexus. This is clearly shown by Figure AV.2. More specifically, areas of vulnerability are as follows:

  • Water. Growing irrigation needs and the salinization of groundwater in coastal areas resulting from the increase in sea levels threaten access to drinking water. This may threaten progress towards better access to basic drinking water services - currently at a level of 53 percent of the population, significantly lower than the average of 65 percent in SSA (Source: World Bank, upcoming CCDR). Prolonged droughts affect agriculture but may also constrain the hydropower generation capacity, which currently represents 40 percent of Madagascar's energy mix and is expected to increase significantly. Even with good site selection, the increase in dry spells linked to climate change may lead to a greater variability of hydropower production.

  • Food. The rise in temperatures and change in rainfall patterns reduce agricultural yields, increasing the need for irrigation against a backdrop of scarcer water resources and raising the risk of food insecurity. The primary sector (including fisheries) represents 22 percent of Madagascar's GDP and food exports are about 40 percent of merchandise exports (versus about 15 percent on average in SSA). The primary sector also accounts for 74 percent of employment. Hence, the potential effects of climate change are very large.

  • Ecosystems. Damage to ecosystems harms tourism which is mostly driven by Madagascar's unique biodiversity and landscapes and accounts for 17 percent of exports in 2019. Cyclones and resulting floods and landslides have a devastating impact on ecosystems and natural capital, but also damage infrastructure and destroy people's habitat.

Table AV.1.

Madagascar: Climate Hazard Profile

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Source: IMF Country Report 22/342, Climate Macroeconomic Assessment Program, November 2022. 1 The warm spell duration index counts the number of days with at least 6 consecutive days when the daily maximum temperature exceeds the 90th percentile in the calendar 5-day window for the base period 1979-2009.

6. Deforestation is a major threat to Madagascar’s natural capital and has negative consequences in terms of water resources, agriculture, and resilience to natural disasters. Forest coverage has declined from 29 percent to 21 percent between 2000 and 2020 (source: World Bank, upcoming CCDR). Key drivers of deforestation include land clearing for subsistence agriculture ("slash and burn”) or cash crops, firewood and charcoal use, logging, or artisanal mining. Shortfalls in forest governance, attested by the importance of illicit trade in precious woods, are also a significant factor3. Deforestation results in high erosion rates, increased flood risks and reduced water yield for agricultural or household usage. As natural and productive ecosystems declined, Madagascar's renewable natural capital per capita dropped by 31 percent between 1995 and 2018 (Source: upcoming CCDR).

7. Climate change in Madagascar is likely to affect women, poor and rural dwellers disproportionally. Regarding gender equality, Madagascar ranks 143 out of 170 countries in the 2021 edition of UNDP's Gender Inequality Index. Gender disparities notably limit women farmers' access to productive assets (e.g., land, equipment) and services (e.g., finance)4. This has an impact on their ability to develop resilience against climate change. Children in Madagascar are also the 10th most exposed to climate risks in the world5. This is likely to reinforce the impact of poverty and deprivation, with already a 42 percent stunting rate among children under age 5 - with a negative impact on productivity of Malagasy children when they grow up compared to their full potential, aggravated by the negative fallout of climate shocks on school dropout rates6. These fragilities are compounded by the poor state of the road network, with half of rural households living more than 10 km away from a basic health center, and a quarter of households nationwide disconnected from the road network. Conversely, only 11 percent of the population has access to a good road (i.e., passable in all seasons) in rural Madagascar.

8. Madagascar’s southern “Grand Sud” region is particularly vulnerable, with droughts having major consequences in terms of food insecurity and social exclusion. As of January 2024, the World Food Programme said 334,000 inhabitants in the "Grand Sud” faced emergency levels of food insecurity, as the region faces its worst drought in 40 years. Moreover, droughts in the Grand Sud are associated with a high incidence of gender-based violence and school dropouts, attesting to the close links between climate change and social exclusion.

9. While carbon emissions per capita remain very low compared to other SSA countries, CO2 emissions have significantly increased in the last decade. Average greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per capita in Madagascar are less than half those in SSA and low-income countries (LICs). However, annual emissions have increased by about 40 percent since 2011, driven by population growth but also by an increase in carbon intensity (Figure AV.3). The increase of fossil fuels in electricity generation and the persistence of wood and charcoal cooking are major factors in this increase of emissions.

Figure AV.3.
Figure AV.3.

Madagascar: Drivers of CO2 Emissions

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Sources: Our World in Data; World Bank; and IMF staff calculations.
Figure AV.4.
Figure AV.4.

Madagascar: Composition of GHG Emissions (2020)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Source: 2022 CMAP, on the basis of the Carbon Pricing Assessment Tool (CPAT)

10. The composition of GHG emissions remains largely skewed towards land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) as well as agriculture. Taken together, these two sectors represent more than 80 percent of GHG emissions in 2020 (See Figure AV.4). This highlights the need for action on deforestation and climate-smart agricultural practices.

11. The potential for clean electricity remains underexploited. While Madagascar has the third-largest hydropower potential in Africa, it currently taps into less than 1 percent of this vast potential, whose size provides a hedge against climate-induced changes in rain or weather patterns. Delays in launching new large-scale hydropower plants, partly explained by the poor financial health of the State-owned utility JIRAMA, have resulted in an increased need for fossil fuels for electricity generation7. Increasing the electricity access rate (currently at 33 percent of households) would also require a wider recourse to off-grid or small-grid developments (based on small hydropower plants or solar energy - with Madagascar also a prime location for developing solar power).

12. Mitigation actions would also bring significant co-benefits in terms of reduction of air pollution. Madagascar's households rely overwhelmingly (more than 97 percent in 2020, according to the 2022 updated NDC) on firewood and charcoal for their cookstoves. Transitioning to clean cooking would not only produce sizeable emission reductions, but would also reduce air pollution, thereby saving an estimated 12,000 lives annually by 2030 (source: World Bank, 2011). Benefits in terms of gender impact would also accrue as women are most exposed to indoor air pollution linked to cooking activities.

13. An overview of climate challenges in Madagascar was provided by the 2022 Climate Macroeconomic Assessment Program (CMAP) undertaken by IMF technical assistance. The main findings from the CMAP are summarized in Box AV.1.

Takeaways from the 2022 Madagascar CMAP

A team from the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs, African and Research Departments conducted in March-April 2022 a hybrid mission for a Climate Macroeconomic Assessment Program of Madagascar.

The report took stock of Madagascar’s high vulnerability to climate hazards, with a significant risk of undermining the country’s development agenda. It noted efforts to update the national framework for climate change building on the 2016 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and on the 2019 National Adaptation Plan but identified persistent strategic gaps as well as difficulties in implementation.

With respect to Madagascar’s mitigation goals as covered in the NDC, the report advocated carbon and energy pricing reforms focused on key emitting sectors, notably energy and land use, land use change and forestry. With respect to disaster risk management, the report highlighted progress made in several areas and gaps that remained to be addressed, notably in terms of ex ante financing mechanisms. In the field of adaptation, the report noted first efforts to develop and implement adaptation measures in various policy domains but regretted the lack of a clear prioritization framework superseding fragmented external financing initiatives. The CMAP report stressed that ongoing public financial management and public investment management reforms could provide an opportunity to increase the hitherto very limited focus on climate.

Lastly the report called for efforts to quantify the impact of climate and climate change on growth and fiscal aggregates and proposed a first methodology to that effect. The report advised that policy responses should aim to design a comprehensive package of measures going beyond adaptation investments only and target more broadly Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In the report’s analysis, an approach combining investments to scale up resilient infrastructure and to build human capital as well as revenue measures from mitigation and additional grants or concessional finance would significantly increase potential growth while preserving fiscal sustainability.

B. Macroeconomic Impact of Climate Change

14. DIGNAD simulations8 show that natural disasters have a significant short run impact on the balance of payments and the fiscal deficit, and a long-term impact on debt. Natural disasters are expected to damage physical capital and reduce productivity in the tradable and nontradable sectors, leading to a calibrated loss of 6 percent in real GDP in the year of the shock. As a result of the reconstruction cost of the destroyed physical capital and lower real GDP, the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio is expected to increase by 2.5 percentage points one year later9. The current account deficit to GDP ratio is projected to increase by about 1.4 percentage points due to larger imports of goods and services for the reconstruction with a simultaneous increase in external debt to finance the fiscal deficit. While the twin deficits - fiscal deficit and current account deficit - are projected to gradually revert to pre-disaster levels over 12 years, persistent high public debt poses a risk for debt sustainability.

15. Improving public investment efficiency and scaling up public adaptation investment could enhance the resilience to natural disaster shocks. Madagascar has one of the lowest public investment efficiency rates in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region, highlighting considerable room for improvement. The model suggests that investing 6 percent of GDP over four years in more resilient infrastructure and improving public investment efficiency would yield substantial gains. Following investment in adaptation and increase in efficiency, the loss in real GDP would be limited to about 0.6 percent the year of the disaster and the cumulative output gain would amount to 27 percent of the baseline's real GDP after 12 years. The fiscal deficit to GDP ratio would improve by 1 percentage point compared to the baseline scenario the year after the shock. Furthermore, public debt would follow a slightly declining trajectory, being 2 percentage points lower than in the baseline scenario 12 years after the shock.

16. Natural disasters affect more vulnerable households. Simulations show that the consumption of poor households declines more in percentage than that of the rich, resulting in greater consumption inequality. Weak economic infrastructure, poverty, and heavy reliance on rainfed subsistence agriculture, in a context of limited access to insurance, amplifies the impact of adverse weather conditions on vulnerable households. This impact is attenuated by higher public adaptation investment and public investment efficiency.

C. National Policies and Institutions to Combat Climate Change

17. Madagascar has a longstanding commitment to environmental protection and fighting climate change. With a high awareness of climate-related disasters and of its unique natural capital linked to biodiversity, Madagascar has enshrined in the Preamble of its 2010 Constitution the need to preserve the exceptional wealth of fauna and flora for the future generations.

18. Improving resilience is a key priority of Madagascar’s Plan Emergence (PEM). The plan relies on three pillars (social and human capital, economic, and environmental) which include measures to strengthen energy, water, and road infrastructure, improve healthcare and education, and achieve food self-sufficiency. The plan also touches on several areas of mitigation measures, including the promotion of electricity production from renewable resources and the sustainable management of natural resources.

19. Madagascar can build upon several strategic documents in the field of climate change (Table AV.2). The revised national policy for fighting climate change (PNLCCR) remains a high-level document which includes a long list of general actions but few concrete and specific measures. However, specific programs are described in the authorities’ action plan for fighting climate change (PANLCC) and national adaptation (PNA) plan (both documents overlap substantially with similar programs ranked differently) and in the 2022 second Nationally Determined Contribution (CDN2), officially submitted in January 2024 to replace CDN1 (2016). CDN2 increased mitigation objectives from emissions (reduction of 48 MtCO2e vs 30 Mt CO2e in CDN1) and extended coverage, but targets in absorption became less ambitious (37.8 MtCO2e of absorption by carbon sinks vs 61 Mt CO2e in CDN1). The adaptation section of CDN2 clearly links PEM priorities and PNLCCR strategic axis with programs from the national adaptation plan. A 2022 CDN2 Implementation Plan provides more specific details, including in terms of financing needs. Madagascar is also equipped since 2018 with a national Reduction of Emission due to Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) strategy to fight deforestation and since 2016 with a national strategy for the clean development mechanism (SNMDP), covering mitigation aspects.

20. The importance of forestry for Madagascar is reflected in the role assigned to the BNCC-REDD+. The national bureau for coordination of climate issues and the REDD+ strategy (BNCC-REDD+), an agency under the Ministry of Environment, has been entrusted with a broad mandate not only to monitor the implementation of the REDD+ strategy but also to play a pivotal role in the definition and operationalization of overall climate-related policies and commitments. Its effectiveness is however limited by the lack of high-level coordination on climate policies - with a longstanding inter-ministerial committee on environment (CIME) devoid of specific competences on climate change and having been largely inactive over the past few years, while a national committee on climate change (CNCC) remains a forum for discussions at technical level.

21. The national risk and disaster management strategy is a reference document for managing climate risks and responding to natural disasters. Institutionally, disaster risk management efforts are driven by the emergency prevention and management unit (CGPU) within the Prime Minister's Office and by the national risk and disaster management office (BNGRC) at the operational level. The latter manages the national contingency fund (FNC) still to be operationalized. A national disaster risk financing and insurance strategy has been adopted in 2023 to complete the disaster risk management framework and coordinate the various financing instruments already in place.

22. Building upon these strategies and institutional elements, Madagascar has made some progress in addressing challenges related to climate change and natural disasters. Already in 2019, several decrees prepared with WB support adopted norms for resilient construction and land planning. Efforts have started to develop a framework more favorable to renewable energy. A national strategy for the rice sector - a key part of agriculture - includes climate-smart interventions. Small-scale pilot agricultural insurance schemes supported by IFC, GIZ and the World Food Program have taken place but need to be scaled up to provide a real safety net for subsistence farmers exposed to climate hazards and an alternative to "slash and burn” agriculture on new land claimed from forested areas, which may require a significant subsidy to ensure the success of the scheme.

23. However, much remains to be done, as evidenced in the 2022 CMAP and in the World Banks’s upcoming CCDR. Climate governance is scattered. Even though it is a member of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, Madagascar has yet to mainstream climate change into its PFM and PIM processes - an evolution which would be particularly relevant for one of the most disaster-prone countries in SSA and which could build on some first efforts, notably in the road sector.10 Adaptation policies, especially for the protection and use of the water resource and for agriculture, need to be stepped up. With respect to mitigation, there is scope to improve price signals on fossil fuels and to encourage renewable energy and cleaner appliances. Improving the governance of the State-owned electricity utility - a priority under the ECF program - will be a prerequisite for creating a market more conducive to clean energy. Lastly, deforestation (with a decrease in the forest coverage from 29 percent to 20 percent of the territory between 2000 and 2020) calls for a response in terms of forest governance and expansion of the REDD+ mechanism.

Main Findings from the 2024 Madagascar CCDR

The Madagascar Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR) was prepared by a World Bank Group team in 2023 and is expected to be published by the end of June 2024.

This report presents the national policies and strategies related to climate change and development in Madagascar, along with priority reforms aimed at enhancing climate governance. It outlines the key challenges faced by the country and identifies important investments and reforms necessary for addressing them. The CCDR emphasizes near- and medium-term priorities, including food-water-energy resilience, urban resilience, resilient transport, human dimensions of climate change, and the blue economy. Additionally, it includes an analysis of the macroeconomic impacts of climate change and concludes with an estimation of the climate finance needs.

In terms of the institutional framework, the CCDR acknowledges Madagascar's dedication to combating climate change. However, it emphasizes a notable lack in coordination when implementing climate policies. To address this issue, the report proposes a new Governance Framework for the Climate Change agenda. This framework would establish a robust high-level mandate responsible for designing and overseeing climate policy, to be housed within the Prime Minister’s office. Furthermore, the CCDR advocates for the integration of climate considerations into both public procurement and public financial management.

The CCDR emphasized the necessity of bolstering agricultural resilience by enhancing access to droughtresistant seed varieties and establishing stable irrigation systems in drought-prone areas and the water catchment for aquaculture fish farming and livestock. It recommended investing in Clean and Resilient Energy Access by rehabilitating and reinforcing the existing hydroelectric power plants to ensure a reliable energy supply. Additionally, it proposed setting up a watershed protection program that includes regulating mining and agricultural activities within the watershed. Regarding the blue economy, Madagascar needs continued support to a growing network of marine protected areas and to the development of blue carbon credit projects, such as mangrove restoration initiatives.

The report also analyzes the impacts of climate change on GDP, debt, and inequality, as well as its effects on various sectors such as agriculture, fishing, mining, and others. The modeling demonstrates that structural reforms and adaptation strategies can substantially mitigate the adverse effects of climate change. Through input-output models, significant vulnerabilities in key sectors such as fishing, agriculture, recycling, mining, maintenance, and construction are uncovered, underscoring the importance of understanding sectoral interdependencies to better anticipate the extensive effects of climate shocks. Additionally, the report illustrates that climate change exacerbates inequality.

Finally, the report estimates Madagascar's priority climate finance needs in the areas covered by the CCDR to be around $10 billion, with one-third allocated for short-term actions by 2030. While the majority of the country's current climate finance is sourced from public funds, there are numerous opportunities to mobilize additional climate finance from various sources. These opportunities include developing markets for green finance and climate resilience, defining a regulatory framework for renewable energy certificate origination, registration, and issuance, leveraging carbon markets, and establishing regulatory frameworks for financial markets compliant with the International Organization of Securities Commissions standards.

Table AV.2.

Madagascar Strategic Documents Related to Climate Change

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Source: IMF Staff, on the basis of 2022 CMAP and documents shared by the authorities

D. Climate Finance

24. According to Madagascar’s NDC2 Implementation Plan (November 2022), financing needs (“conditional contributions”) total US$ 24.406 billion over the period 2022-2030. This breaks down into US$ 11.625 billion for adaptation, US$ 7.290 billion for mitigation and US$ 2.8 billion for compensation of irreversible loss and damage11 linked to climate change, with the remainder (US$ 2.69 billion) covering cross-cutting aspects such as coordination, capacity development, monitoring, and evaluation. The most significant financing needs have to do with agriculture (US$ 5.6 billion), forestry and biodiversity (US$ 6.6 billion), water and sanitation (US$ 3.7 billion), in consistency with the country’s foremost priorities of food security and management of natural resources. Unmet needs related to energy are comparatively smaller (US$ 1.7 billion).

25. Against this backdrop, climate financing flows are increasing but remain modest. Climate-related finance increased from US$ 265 million in 2018 to US$ 597 million in 2021, thereby reaching around 4.1 percent of GDP in 2021. Multilateral development banks provided 57 percent of climate-related financing in 2021. 84 percent of the flows were at concessional terms (41 percent) or in the form of grants (43 percent). Over the past 5 years, the energy and agriculture sectors were the main recipients of climate-related development finance.

Figure AV.5.
Figure AV.5.

Madagascar: Climate-Related Development Financing

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Source: OECD DAC data.

26. Private climate finance in Madagascar remains very limited. A 2023 report from the African Development Bank (2023 Country Report - Mobilizing private sector financing for climate and green growth) points out that in 2019-2020 private sector financing represented only 5 percent of total annual climate financing flows (US$ 21.45 million out of US$ 424.04 million), with total climate financing flow covering only 16 percent of needs expressed by Madagascar. Moreover, private sector financing flows are heavily concentrated in the energy sector with more than 70 percent of the total. According to the African Development Bank, this shortfall in private financing needs to be bridged with innovative financing mechanisms (green bonds, carbon markets, debt for climate swaps) to harness private sector financing for climate goals.

27. While Madagascar is not present in international debt markets, the sovereign has strived to obtain concessional financing in support of its climate and disaster risk management goals. The AfDB-funded Africa Disaster Risk Financing Programme (ADRiFi) has contributed to the payment of annual premia for drought insurance (around US$ 0.5 million/year) and for tropical cyclone insurance (US$ 2 million/year) provided by the African Risk Capacity. Madagascar benefitted from a catastrophe drawdown option (Cat-DDO) by the World Bank following floods in 2020. The World Bank has also activated its Immediate Response Mechanism (IRM), Contingency Response Components (CERC) of existing projects, and Crisis Response Window (CRW) to respond to the drought in the South of the country and after a series of cyclones in early-2022.

28. The World Bank’s upcoming CCDR emphasizes the need to design a multi-faceted national strategy for climate finance mobilization and opportunities for private financing. The CCDR emphasizes that the Central Bank of Madagascar needs to comprehensively integrate climate-related risks in their governance and operations, especially climate risks related to fossil fuel imports and the booming mining sector and its impact on Madagascar’s natural capital. Collecting and disclosing data on the financial sector’s exposure to climate risks is identified as a first step. The CCDR also points out opportunities for Madagascar to restore carbon sinks by drawing additional resources from the forest carbon market and using them to finance REDD+ initiatives and addressing the governance requirements for such carbon-based finance to translate into resiliencebuilding opportunities for beneficiary local communities and businesses. It points out that large mining companies can also undertake large-scale reforestation and forest restoration activities to boost their corporate social responsibility efforts and tap into carbon finance. It underscores the potential revenues from Renewable Energy Certificates, accruing from the expected increase in renewable energy production linked to the transition towards hydropower. It also insists on risk sharing mechanisms, notably to encourage renewable energy or energy efficiency investments. Lastly, the CCDR advocates in the medium term the issuance of sovereign green bonds for renewable energy and reforestation by the Madagascar State.

E. Collaboration with Bilateral and Multilateral Partners

29. Madagascar has been working closely with development partners including bilateral and multilateral partners and NGOs to support its climate policies. World Bank and UN institutions as well as EU institutions or individual countries have been a major source of concessional funding and capacity development.

30. A Development Policy Operation (DPO) has been agreed between Madagascar and the World Bank in 2023 with a strong focus on climate resilience. The DPO is expected to provide three tranches of US$ 100 million each in budget support over 2023-2025, with the first tranche already disbursed in June 2023. The DPO includes climate-related prior actions or triggers in the field of public financial management / public investment management (adoption of the PIM decree in 2023) and in the field of energy (JIRAMA governance, adoption of the electricity Least Cost Development Plan, more effective regulation of the electricity market for increased competition and faster development of renewable energy).

31. Support for adaptation policies includes notably agriculture and water. The World Food Program has helped respond to food insecurity in the South triggered by recurring droughts and supported first experiments with small-scale agricultural insurance mechanisms. The EU is working on a "Green Compact” (Pacte Vert) to support local agriculture, with a strong focus on climate-smart agriculture, notably through use of climate-resilient seeds. The World Bank is providing support for the water sector and for urban resilience. It is also supporting the transport sector, with support for the maintenance and rehabilitation of the road network channeled through the Madagascar Road Agency and a strong emphasis on designing infrastructures more resistant to climate hazards. Bilateral donors such as France (AFD project on urban resilience in Antananarivo) are also involved.

32. On mitigation, support provided by donors is focused mostly on renewable energy, especially hydropower. The AfDB and World Bank have supported efforts to increase electricity production from renewable energy sources, through direct involvement in large hydropower projects, support for solar projects, or capacity development and institution-building in the energy sector. Renewable energy and energy efficiency are also supported by other partners such as AFD through the SUNREF fund, UNDP through the recently launched FIER (Integrated Financing for Renewable Energies), or USAID through the Empower Southern Africa (ESA) program. The OPEC development fund is also supporting clean cooking with a US$ 36.5 million program launched in 2023, while UNIDO is helping in the preparation of a clean cooking strategy. Lastly, support against deforestation is provided notably by the World Bank, which supports the REDD+ mechanism, with up to US$ 50 million in financing until 2024 contingent on progress in reduction of emissions, and a first disbursement of US$ 8.8 million in December 2023.

33. Development partners have provided crucial support to strengthen response to natural disasters. Apart from AfDB and World Bank efforts mentioned above with respect to insurance and risk financing strategy, the World Bank is providing financing and technical assistance to develop social safety nets. This includes - also with support from UNICEF - a very active workstream on developing climate-responsive social protection. Madagascar also benefits from support under the UN-led "Early Warning System for All” initiative, which aims at remedying gaps in the early warning system against natural disasters, and from support under the CREWS (Climate Risks and Early Warning Systems) joint initiative by the World Meteorological Organization, the World Bank and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). UNDRR also initiated work in early 2024 on a roadmap to increase the resilience of infrastructure against climate-related and other disasters.

34. Madagascar is a pilot country for the IMF-World Bank enhanced cooperation framework for scaled-up climate action. The framework takes into account the specific mandates and relative expertise of each institution and aims to support countries to mobilize both private and public funding for climate action. During and prior to the staff visit, multiple consultations were organized with the World Bank across all reform areas to identify synergies and opportunities and push for ambitious policies as well as technical assistance for implementation. These synergies as well as the catalytic potential for private climate finance are identified in the tables below.

Table AV.3

Madagascar: Jointly Identified Challenges, Reform Objectives, CD Support and Catalytic Potential

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Table AV.4.

Madagascar: Timeline of Proposed Reforms and Synergies

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References

  • Hussain, Farah Imrana; Tlaiye, Laura E.; Jordan Arce, Rolando Marcelo. Developing a National Green Taxonomy: A World Bank Guide (English). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/953011593410423487/Developing-a-National-Green-Taxonomy-A-World-Bank-Guide

  • IMF Climate change dashboard: Country Data | Climate Change Indicators Dashboard (imf.org).

  • IMF, 2022, Staff Climate Notes.

  • IMF, 2022, Climate Macroeconomic Assessment Programme (CMAP) for Madagascar

  • World Bank Group, 2022, Country Environmental Analysis for Madagascar

  • World Bank Group, forthcoming, Country Climate and Development Report for Madagascar

Annex VI. Macroeconomic Effects of Climate Change

1. Staff used the Debt-Investment-Growth, and Natural Disasters (DIGNAD) model to assess the impact of climate change on economic growth, the balance of payments, and fiscal accounts in Madagascar. The DIGNAD model, developed by the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund, is a dynamic general equilibrium model designed to study the macroeconomic impact of an exogenous one-off natural disaster shock (cyclone, drought, flood)1. The model allows for investment in public adaptation infrastructure that is more resilient to climate shocks, featuring a lower depreciation rate but higher costs compared to standard infrastructure.

2. In the DIGNAD model, a natural disaster shock affects the economy through 5 channels: (i) damage to public capital, (ii) damage to private capital, (iii) a temporary productivity loss, (iv) a decline in public investment efficiency, and (v) a loss in credit worthiness. Among these five channels, damage to capital and loss in productivity are the main channels.

3. The model is calibrated to the Malagasy economy. The public investment to GDP ratio is set to its 2023-2029 average of 7.7 percent. Consumption and labor income tax rates are set to 20 percent and 13 percent, respectively2. The steady state public domestic debt to GDP ratio is set to 15.2 percent, which corresponds to the projected average over 2023-2029. The external public debt to GDP ratio is set to 44.8 percent, which is the average projected over 2023-2029. About 89 percent of external debt is assumed to be at concessional terms. The remittance to GDP ratio is set to 2.4 percent (10-year average). The GDP growth in the absence of natural disaster is set to 5 percent3. Public investment efficiency (PIE) is set to 31 percent.

4. Staff considered three scenarios with varying level of public adaptation investment and PIE improvement before a disaster hits.

  • Scenario 1: Baseline. The baseline scenario assumes that authorities maintain their investment in standard capital infrastructure without scaling up for adaptation infrastructure during 2024-2027. A simulated natural disaster is projected to occur in 2028, calibrated to result in a 6 percent decline in GDP4. Recovery is assumed to begin in the same year as the shock and to be concluded by 2033.

  • Scenario 2: some adaptation investment is considered, where 1 percent of GDP per year is allocated for adaptation investment from 2024 to 2027. Half of this investment is financed through concessional public borrowing. Additionally, the authorities are assumed to strengthen their capacity to attract climate financing, securing a total of 2 percent of GDP in grants over the four years.

  • Scenario 3: adaptation investment with an increasing PIE. Scenario 3 assumes adaptation investment scale-up by 1.5 percent per year over 2024-2027 and financed through concessional public borrowing of about 1 percent of GDP. Like scenario 2, the authorities are assumed to strengthen their capacity to attract climate financing, securing a total of 2 percent of GDP in grants over the four-year period. Notably, Scenario 3 differs from previous scenarios by assuming an improvement in PIE from 31 percent to 51 percent, although still below the Sub-Saharan African average PIE of 61 percent.

5. Natural disasters have a significant short run impact on the balance of payments and the fiscal deficit, and a long-term impact on debt. Natural disasters are expected to damage physical capital and reduce productivity in the tradable and non-tradable sectors, leading to a calibrated loss of 6 percent in real GDP in the year of the shock. As a result of the reconstruction cost of the destroyed physical capital and lower real GDP, the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio is expected to increase by 2.5 percentage points one year later5. The current account deficit to GDP ratio is projected to increase by about 1.4 percentage points due to larger imports of goods and services for the reconstruction with a simultaneous increase in external debt to finance the fiscal deficit. While the twin deficits - fiscal deficit and current account deficit - are projected to gradually revert to pre-disaster levels over 12 years, persistent high public debt poses a risk for debt sustainability.

6. Investing in public adaptation investment as in scenario 2, reduces the short run impact of natural disasters on the fiscal and current account deficits while GDP is higher by 4 percent in 2028, and by 16 percent 12 years after the shock, in 2040. While investing in public adaptation between 2024-2027 increases the fiscal and current account deficits compared to the baseline scenario, this helps to mitigate the short-term impact of natural disasters on both deficits. As the government incurs lower costs during reconstruction, the current account deficit to GDP improves by 0.5 percentage point, and the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio by 0.8 percentage point in 2029. The loss in real GDP is limited to about 2.2 percent in 2028, and thanks to previous investments in adaptation, real GDP is nearly 4 percent higher than the baseline in the same year. The cumulative gain amounts to 16 percent of the 2040 baseline's real GDP by 2040.

Figure VI.1.
Figure VI.1.

Madagascar: Macroeconomic Impacts of Climate Change

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Sources: DIGNAD SImulation; and IMF staff estimates.

7. Improving public investment efficiency and scaling up public adaptation investment could further strengthen the resilience to natural disasters shock. Madagascar has one of the lowest public investment efficiency rates in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region, highlighting considerable room for improvement. The model suggests that investing 6 percent of GDP over four years in more resilient infrastructure and improving public investment efficiency would yield substantial gains. Following investment in adaptation and increase in efficiency, the loss in real GDP would be limited to about 0.6 percent the year of the disaster and the cumulative output gain would amount to 27 percent of the baseline's real GDP after 12 years. The fiscal deficit to GDP ratio would improve by 1 percentage point compared to the baseline scenario the year after the shock. Furthermore, public debt would follow a slightly declining trajectory, being 2 percentage points below the baseline scenario 12 years after the shock.

8. Natural disasters affect more vulnerable households. Simulations show that the consumption of poor households declines more than that of the rich, whereas improving public investment efficiency and scaling up public adaptation investment help limit the rise in consumption inequality.

Annex VII. Automatic Fuel Pricing Mechanism and Fuel Pricing Issues

1. The authorities committed to implement an automatic fuel pricing adjustment mechanism. The mechanism, which results in monthly adjustments to the market prices of gasoline, diesel and kerosene, has three main characteristics: (i) pump prices in month M are automatically adjusted by the change in the reference prices (proxy for market prices) between month M-2 and month M-1, capped at 200 ariary/liter, (ii) the adjustment takes place to the extent that it closes the gap between the pump and the reference prices, and (iii) any change in the reference prices beyond 200 ariary would be postponed to the next month until changes in pump prices fully reflect those of reference prices. The subsidy resulting from the initial gap between pump and reference prices and the delayed adjustment will be paid to oil distributors after the end of every quarter.

2. As part of the RSF program, the authorities agreed to fully close the gap between pump and reference prices by May 2026 and to align diesel taxes with those on gasoline by November 2026.

  • Closing the gap between pump and reference prices would require an increase in pump prices by about 25 percent on average, based on the current price structure.1 The required change would vary across the three types of fuel, with the increase in the pump price being the highest for kerosene whose subsidy is currently the largest (49 percent), and the increase in diesel prices the second highest (29 percent). Given that the administered price for gasoline is currently above the reference price, gasoline prices could even decrease. The change can be implemented gradually, over several months, to smooth the impact on households' budget. The pace of price increases could also differentiate across the types of fuel, with kerosene prices being increased more gradually than diesel prices, to allow for the implementation of measures to mitigate the impact on poorest households, such as the distribution of solar kits.

  • Aligning diesel taxes with those on gasoline would require an increase of both the excise tax and of the contribution to the road maintenance fund by a total of 515 ariary/liter, which would increase the pump price for diesel by the same amount.2 The tax increase could be included in the 2027 budget law and would be effective on January 1, 2027. This reform would address two concerns: (i) increasing excise taxes on diesel to reach those on gasoline would be a way to correct the comparatively larger negative externalities associated with diesel consumption, and (ii) aligning the contribution to the road maintenance fund of diesel with gasoline would compensate for the fact that vehicles using diesel fuel tend to be heavier, and to increase the need for road maintenance.

3. A plan to communicate about planned fuel price increases to the public should be prepared in a timely manner. It should be released ahead of the price increases implementation, explain the reasons behind the increases, and communicate about the path for price increases, potentially differentiated across the types of fuel, and about the mitigating measures put in place.

4. The two reforms could generate 0.38 percent in GDP in savings or additional tax revenue in 2027, with a potentially positive impact on most vulnerable households through targeted transfers (Figures AVII.1 and AVII.2). On the one hand, closing the gap between the pump and reference prices could lead to 0.29 percent of GDP in budget savings. On the other hand, the alignment of diesel taxes with those on gasoline could generate 0.09 percent of GDP in tax revenue. The additional fiscal space from the reforms could be used to increase transfers to most vulnerable households (30 percent) and to support public investment, mostly through the road maintenance fund (20 percent), with the rest being allocated to the budget.3 Thanks to the transfers, the impact on the 40 percent most vulnerable households could be positive.

Figure AVII.1.
Figure AVII.1.

Madagascar: Fiscal Revenues Raised by the Reforms

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff projections.
Figure AVII.2.
Figure AVII.2.

Madagascar: Impact on Households in 2023

(In percent of Total Consumption by Decile)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Sources: Malagasy Authorities; and IMF staff projections.

4. The two reforms would bring the pump prices for diesel and kerosene close to their efficient level (Figure AVII.3). The efficient level covers the social cost of fuel consumption, which accounts for externalities generated from their use (notably environmental externalities). The gasoline price is above its efficient price, while the LPG / kerosene price remains below its efficient price. With a large share of the population relying on firewood and charcoal for cooking, greater access to LPG is an important element of the transition to a low-carbon economy, together with an increased use of solar energy thanks to the distribution of solar kits.

Figure AVII.3.
Figure AVII.3.

Madagascar: Energy Prices, Projected and Efficient in 2030

(In US$ per liter)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Annex VIII. Capacity Development Strategy

A. Context

1. Madagascar has been an intensive user of IMF technical assistance (TA) and training over the past decade. Priorities have been closely aligned with the objectives of the ECF arrangement and have included reforms at the central bank (BFM), tax policy and revenue administration, Public Financial Management (PFM), financial sector, and the anti-corruption legal framework. Fund TA departments and the country team have maintained close interaction with the Malagasy authorities and leveraged the proximity of AFRITAC South (AFS) to ensure that TA needs and activities are always aligned, and capacity development (CD) is more relevant, effective, and efficient.

2. FAD headquarters (HQ) and AFS engagement with Madagascar has been intense both on the revenue (tax and customs administration, tax policy) and the expenditure side (PFM). Recommendations in tax and customs administration have helped reverse the decline in revenue collection in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis and support the administration modernization process, notably (for tax administration) based on the 2022 Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT) mission and the action plan subsequently adopted. On the tax policy side, a 2021 TA mission advised on reforms to boost domestic revenue collection in line with the program's objectives, however with limited implementation so far given the political sensitivity of some recommendations. With respect to PFM reforms, activities over the last three years have focused on developing a functional budget classification, streamlining the expenditure chain and improving reporting on budget execution; they have benefitted since January 2022 from the support of a resident advisor located in the Ministry of Finance (Budget Directorate)1. AFS-led missions have also provided support on fiscal risk management and on transition to accrual accounting. After a period of backsliding linked to institutional changes, renewed efforts have also started on public investment management (PIM) - a major area of focus under the previous program. FAD has also supported a stocktaking and updating of the Strategic Plan for Modernization of Public Finance, which serves as a lodestar for the public finance reform agenda and for aligning support from various development partners.

3. Madagascar was a pilot for a Climate Macroeconomic Assessment Program (CMAP) in early 2022. Led by FAD, the CMAP helped assess the macro-fiscal impact of climate plans on growth and debt sustainability, and to identify green PFM priorities (see Annex V for more detail). Recommendations from the CMAP fed into the preparation of discussions for the RSF.

4. Based on the 2015 FSAP recommendations, MCM and AFRITAC South provided TA to: (i) modernize the monetary policy operational framework, including by improving liquidity management and forecasting; (ii) develop foreign exchange markets; (iii) strengthen banking supervision; and (iv) improve central bank internal audit functions and bring them to international standards. HQ-based TA has provided advice on the international reserve diversification strategy by including gold following purchases of non-monetary gold by the central bank.

5. FIN, MCM, and LEG helped the BFM strengthen its safeguards and transition to IFRS. The BFM concluded its efforts to transition to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) with the issuance of the 2020 accounts.

6. STA (including AFS) has provided intensive TA for National Accounts rebasing, CPI updating, external statistics, and government finance statistics. The authorities have also strengthened their participation in the enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS), with a web-based National Summary Data Page (NSDP) launched in May 2019. However, performance in disseminating key data on a timely basis on the NSDP remains mixed, even when updated data is available through other official sources such as the national statistical institute.

A001fig20

CD Workstreams and Effectiveness

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2024, 205; 10.5089/9798400281709.002.A001

Source: IMF CD Hub.

B. CD Strategy and Priorities Going Forward

7. IMF TA support under the proposed new ECF and RSF arrangements will focus on deepening reforms initiated in recent years. It will also expand to address high-priority policy objectives, notably related to climate and governance. IMF TA will continue to play a pivotal role in strengthening skills in the Ministry of Economy and Finance, BFM, and the statistical agency. IMF TA will be needed to support mainstreaming climate concerns into PFM and PIM and to intensify engagement on governance-related topics, in line with the new General State Policy.

8. In this context, key priorities will include: (i) continuing the modernization of the customs and tax revenue administrations to improve compliance, reduce tax evasion and enhance tools and key performance indicators to monitor the effectiveness of both administrations and the advancement of their reform strategies; (ii) designing and implementing tax policies to converge towards a level of taxation more consistent with the country's tax potential, notably through progress on transfer pricing legislation and implementation; (iii) supporting improvements to the fiscal framework through improved PFM processes, notably enhanced forecasting and budgeting as well as progress in the evaluation, selection, budgeting and execution of public investment projects; (iv) improving the policy framework for adaptation and resilience to climate change through adoption and effective implementation of green PFM and climate-smart investment practices; (v) enhancing the operational framework of monetary policy following the transition to interest rate targeting; (vi) modernizing BFM's FX intervention strategy ; (vii) further strengthening financial sector stability based on a comprehensive diagnostic of existing gaps (Financial Sector Stability Review).

9. With respect to governance, IMF TA will aim to support the preparation, adoption, and implementation of a new anticorruption strategy for 2025-2035. Madagascar's current anticorruption strategy covers the period 2015-2025 and the authorities have announced their attention to adopt a new strategy for the next ten years. In staff's view, a governance diagnostic assessment (GDA) is the adequate way to take stock of achievements under the current strategy and pave the way towards a new strategy.

10. The authorities find that the Capacity Development strategy is appropriate for Madagascar. They emphasize that TA provision has been key during the 2021 ECF program, and request that this effort is sustained in the coming years to support the ongoing reforms and address the challenges arising from the implementation of the new PGE.

C. Engagement Strategy

11. Engagement with the authorities. Over the duration of the current program, the team engaged with the authorities on a regular basis and in the context of program reviews. The authorities also used the opportunity to discuss their capacity development needs and priorities in meetings with FAD, MCM, LEG held during the Annual and Spring Meetings, as well as with the country team.

12. The country team used the program negotiations to evaluate TA needs linked to program commitments both under the ECF and RSF. These were informed by discussions with functional departments and AFS and led to a first assessment of TA priorities based on program objectives.

13. Engagement with outside partners. The Madagascar team holds regular discussions on TA with other partners, including the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European Union, and discussed with them proposed program commitments (both under the ECF and RSF) to ascertain their possible contribution to their implementation and articulation with Fund TA.

D. Priorities by Department

FAD

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MCM

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STA

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LEG

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Appendix I. Letter of Intent

Antananarivo (Madagascar)

June 7, 2024

Ms. Kristalina Georgieva

Managing Director

International Monetary Fund

Washington D.C. 20431 (United States)

Madam Managing Director,

In a challenging environment marked by a succession of severe climate and external shocks, our economy has grown faster than that of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the past three years. In 2024, this trend is expected to continue, with a growth projection of 4.5 percent compared to 3.8 percent on average for SSA. However, this performance is unfortunately insufficient to meet our many important challenges.

To address these challenges, we have adopted a new General State Policy (PGE) based on three major pillars: (i) human capital, including strengthening education, health, professional training, and social protection, (ii) industrialization and economic transformation to establish strong and sustainable growth, and (iii) good governance and the rule of law.

Following the conclusion of the first four reviews of the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement approved in March 2021, our request for a new ECF-supported arrangement and the cancellation of the existing one, is driven by our ambitious reform plan and the short time remaining under the current arrangement (which expires in July 2024) as well as our desire to strengthen our foreign exchange reserves and our willingness to align the new program priorities, including those related to climate under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF), with the new PGE.

To meet the country's external financing needs and support our ambitious reform program, the Republic of Madagascar is requesting ECF financing in the amount of SDR 256.62 million, corresponding to 105 percent of our quota, accompanied by financing under the RSF in the amount of SDR 244.4 million, corresponding to 100 percent of our quota, over a period of thirty-six months. The Republic of Madagascar is also requesting the first disbursement of the amount equivalent to SDR 36.66 million under the ECF arrangement, upon the Fund's approval of this arrangement. We intend to use the first four disbursements under the ECF and all disbursements under the RSF for budget support purposes and will amend the existing memorandum of understanding between the central bank and the government accordingly.

The attached Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) outlines the measures and structural reforms envisaged to support our ambition to accelerate our growth and fight poverty and corruption while strengthening our fiscal and external sustainability. Based on the government's guidance set out in the PGE, the ECF-supported program focuses on four important pillars: (i) anchoring fiscal sustainability by increasing domestic revenues, reducing fiscal risks, creating buffers to improve resilience to shocks, and strengthening fiscal institutions and public financial management (PFM), (ii) strengthening governance and fighting corruption, (iii) consolidating monetary and financial stability, and (iv) supporting stronger and more inclusive growth through improved social safety nets and greater financial inclusion.

Reforms in the energy sector, in particular the recovery of JIRAMA, are essential for progress under the four pillars. To that end, we have recruited a new CEO for JIRAMA with a clear project for its restructuring as soon as possible. A recovery plan is expected to be approved in the coming months and will be used to determine the necessary budget appropriations in the next budget law. We will also adopt an automatic adjustment mechanism for pump prices and have budgeted for the corresponding subsidies in the 2024 revised budget law to be soon adopted by Parliament. The revised law sets out realistic revenue and expenditure targets, which will help to strengthen our debt sustainability.

The arrangement supported by the RSF builds on our climate agenda by supporting our reform program around five areas: (i) strengthening climate governance and integrating climate into PFM and public investment management processes, (ii) strengthening climate change adaptation and resilience to natural disasters, (iii) curbing the growth of greenhouse gas emissions, (iv) strengthening the protection of forests and biodiversity, and (v) mobilizing climate finance.

We are confident the IMF's support will catalyze additional financing, including for climate, which we will continue to actively pursue throughout the program. This support will also strengthen the role of the public and private sectors in the country's development.

We do not intend to adopt any measure or policy that would aggravate Madagascar's balance of payments difficulties. We do not intend to impose new or tighten restrictions on payments and transfers in current international transactions, nor to introduce import restrictions to support our balance of payments, nor to engage in multiple exchange rate practices, nor to enter bilateral payment arrangements that would be inconsistent with Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement. In addition, in line with the IMF's safeguards policy, the central bank is committed to complying with the recommendations of the upcoming update of the BFM Safeguards Assessment and will continue to provide staff with access to its most recent audit reports and to allow external auditors to meet with IMF staff.

The Government believes that the policies set forth in the attached Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policy (MEFP) are adequate to achieve the objectives of its program, but it will take any further measures that may become appropriate for this purpose. The Republic of Madagascar will consult with the Fund on the adoption of these measures, and in advance of revisions to the policies contained in the MEFP, in accordance with the Fund's policies on such consultation.

We agree that this Letter of Intent, together with the attached MEFP and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, as well as the Staff Report on the Request for Arrangements Under the ECF and RSF and the Debt Sustainability Analysis, will be made public once the request has been approved by the IMF Executive Board.

Please accept, Madam Managing Director, the assurance of our distinguished consideration.

/s/

Ms. Rindra Hasimbelo Rabarinirinarison

Minister of the Economy and Finance

/s/

Mr. Aivo Andrianarivelo

Governor of the Central Bank of Madagascar

Attachments:

- Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies

- Technical Memorandum of Understanding

Attachment I. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies

This Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) reviews recent economic developments and lays out the medium-term economic objectives and policy framework of the Government of Madagascar, for which we are seeking support under new Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements. In accordance with the objectives of the new General State Policy (PGE), namely human capital development, industrialization, and good governance, this MEFP presents the reforms and macroeconomic and structural policies aimed at preserving fiscal sustainability, strengthening governance and the fight against corruption, consolidating monetary and financial stability, and promoting strong and inclusive growth, while responding to the challenges of climate change.

CONTEXT

1. Despite a succession of shocks, the program approved by the IMF in 2021 has made it possible to initiate several structural reforms. Four of the six reviews under the program have been completed; the conclusions of the fourth review were approved by the IMF's Executive Board in June 2023 in line with the timeline envisaged at the time of the program's approval.

2. However, multiple shocks have affected the country's macroeconomic performance. Economic growth has been slightly lower than initially projected with a slower-than-expected recovery after the pandemic and several climate-related natural disasters, while inflation has exceeded expectations due to sharp increases in commodity prices, especially food and energy. The domestic primary fiscal deficit exceeded the targets set in 2022 and 2023 due to difficulties in collecting domestic tax revenues, related in particular to the fall in vanilla prices, cash flow difficulties of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and problems with VAT payments by oil companies, delays in the implementation of certain reforms, and a dispute between the State and oil distributors. Despite this, the tax burden rate (net tax and customs revenues/GDP) has increased by 1.3 percentage points in three years, reaching 11.2 percent of GDP in 2023. Total public debt increased from 51.9 percent of GDP at the end of 2020 to more than 55 percent of GDP in 2023. The level of international reserves remains adequate.

3. Progress has been made on structural reforms. We have completed the anti-corruption system with the establishment of the Agency for the Recovery of Illicit Assets (ARAI), strengthened the autonomy of the Cour des Comptes by giving it access to the main information systems of the Ministry of Finance and by creating a dedicated budgetary mission, and improved transparency in public financial management (PFM) with the development of a functional budget classification, the publication of quarterly reports on budget implementation, as well as several independent audit reports on expenditure in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We have made progress in budget implementation with the preparation of expenditure commitment plans for the 4 social ministries (education, health, water, and population) and 6 other ministries before the start of each year and the simplification of expenditure commitment procedures. We approved a modernized mining code and adopted a new manual on public investment management (PIM). Finally, we have begun work on setting up a single social register that will eventually make it possible to better target social transfers.

4. We want to accelerate this reform dynamic. The Government of Madagascar therefore decided during the Council of Ministers on February 7, 2024, to request the termination of the program supported by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) started in 2021 and the negotiation of two new arrangements supported by the ECF and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) for a minimum period of 36 months. These new arrangements should help to accelerate reform efforts, to affirm macroeconomic stability by contributing both to the financing of the budget and to bolstering foreign exchange reserves, and by supporting Madagascar's efforts in the fight against climate change.

RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS

5. Growth has remained stable in 2023, according to our estimates. Economic activity grew at an average annual rate of 4 percent in 2022 and 2023, supported mainly by the recovery of tourism activities. After peaking at 12.4 percent year-on-year in March 2023, inflation has fallen almost continuously to 7.5 percent in December 2023. Annual average inflation rose to 9.9 percent in 2023 compared to 8.2 percent in 2022.

6. Accelerating the implementation of reforms would allow for a gradual increase of the growth rate from 2024 onwards. Growth is projected to be 4.5 percent in 2024 and gradually accelerate to above 6 percent over the medium term, thanks to the implementation of the PGE that provides for further structural reforms and for building resilience to climate shocks, supported by the programs with the IMF under the ECF and the RSF.

7. The balance of goods and services improved in 2023 despite the decline in vanilla exports and mining products. The trade deficit decreased from 9.3 percent to 8.1 percent of GDP thanks to the recovery in tourism, as the decline in the exports of goods was offset by a comparable decline in imports. The stability of the current account balance over the medium term should help strengthen external buffers and maintain foreign exchange reserves around 5.8 months of imports.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES UNDER THE NEW EXTENDED CREDIT FACILITY (ECF) ARRANGEMENT

8. The new arrangement aims to consolidate past achievements and further accelerate the dynamics of reforms envisaged in the PGE. The ECF will also play a catalytic role in ensuring better support mobilization from Madagascar's other technical and financial partners. In this context, the program will be structured around four main pillars, namely: (i) anchoring fiscal sustainability; (ii) strengthening governance and the fight against corruption; (iii) consolidating monetary and financial stability; and (iv) promoting inclusive and sustainable growth.

Pillar 1: Anchoring Fiscal Sustainability

9. Our objective is to stabilize debt below 60 percent of GDP in the medium term. We may revisit this ceiling in consultation with the IMF as we make progress towards greater domestic revenue mobilization. Despite a significant increase in recent years, the country's debt level remains sustainable with a moderate risk of debt distress. We are committed to better domestic resource mobilization and a more rational and efficient use of mobilized resources. An improvement in the primary balance in accrual terms (i.e., excluding windfall revenues related to the payment in 2023 of import duties and taxes on petroleum products arrears) of around 1.6 percentage points of GDP is needed by 2027. This adjustment will be achieved through an increase in net tax revenues by 2.4 percentage points of GDP and a reduction in primary current expenditure by 1.6 percentage points of GDP, offset by an increase in investment spending. This reallocation of current spending towards investment spending, together with an acceleration of structural reforms, demonstrates our strong commitment to putting in place the fundamentals for faster, more sustainable, and more inclusive growth.

10. We recognize the importance of developing a medium-term fiscal strategy anchored in our debt target. We will determine each year, when preparing the budget, the primary balance compatible with this objective, considering available financing. We will ensure that budget realism is improved, particularly revenue growth assumptions and the expenditure envelope, to reflect our capacity to implement the investment projects identified in the budget law and exogenous risks including related to climate.

11. Our borrowing strategy will support our debt stabilization objective and include the necessary measures to continue to improve debt management. We will continue to seek concessional external borrowing while at the same time developing the domestic bond market to diversify funding sources and reduce exchange rate risks. We are working on reducing contingent liabilities risks, in particular those related to SOEs (see below), as their realization could lead to a faster-than-expected deterioration in our debt indicators. In addition, we will continue efforts to strengthen our debt management capacity to align it with international best practices, building on the recent diagnosis using the Debt Management Performance Assessment (DeMPA) methodology, finalized with World Bank support in February 2023.

12. The draft 2024 revised budget law is in line with this debt stabilization perspective. To this end, it includes a downward revision of total net revenues, excluding grants, by 12.6 percent compared to the 2024 initial budget law, in line with the outturn at end-December 2023 and endMarch 2024. In parallel with the reduction in revenue forecasts, we have made the necessary tradeoffs to reduce non-interest expenditures excluding externally financed investment by 10.2 percent compared to the initial budget law. These revisions have reduced the primary deficit to 2.9 percent of GDP (prior action 2). As in the past, we commit to take the necessary corrective measures in case revenues do not materialize as planned and to reviewing the allocation of expenditures in line with new needs that may arise at the end of the year, including to support the recovery of some distressed SOEs.

Mobilizing Tax Revenues

Domestic revenue mobilization remains a priority to achieve the objectives set in our PGE. The availability of sufficient domestic resources will also ensure sustainable and viable financing of our development projects.

13. We are committed to scaling up our efforts to mobilize more resources. The tax revenue-to-GDP ratio remains lower than our projections initially made at the time of the previous ECF's approval. Several factors can explain this lower-than-expected ratio, including the existence of tax expenditures, estimated at 3.2 percent of GDP (estimate of the Tax Policy Unit for 2022), generating distortions, and giving rise to fraud. In addition, certain non-optimal tax rates could be reviewed to improve the redistributive role of taxation. Insufficient tax compliance and a narrow tax base are also an issue for the tax and customs administrations. Although measures have already been taken over the past three years to address these shortcomings, they are still insufficient and need to be strengthened. To facilitate progress monitoring, we commit to provide IMF staff with a monthly dashboard of tax and customs performance indicators (continuous structural benchmark 1).

14. We will devote special attention to the issue of tax expenditures. To this end, we will rely on the work of the Tax Policy Unit and on the report prepared by the African Development Bank at the end of 2023, which provide recommendations regarding certain tax expenditures and governance improvements. We will ensure the enforcement of Decree 2023-328 dated March 30, 2023, on the conditions for adoption, evaluation and monitoring of tax and customs incentives.

15. At the level of the tax administration (Direction Generale des Impots), we will work on consolidating the gains, strengthening the implementation of the reforms already undertaken and examining other avenues to increase tax revenues. Over the past three years, we have worked on (i) modernizing our tax system to promote investment and consumption; (ii) digitalizing taxpayer services and tax operations; (iii) broadening the tax base and controlling fiscal discipline; as well as (iv) strengthening human capacities and governance mechanisms. The implementation of these actions has led to some improvement in tax management, but more remains to be done. Our future actions will benefit from the results of the TADAT (Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool) evaluation as well as from various technical assistances' recommendations. We are planning actions to:

  • Control the tax base and discipline by ensuring: (i) the correct application of tax rules and by adopting an effective tax policy to ensure sustainable development; (ii) the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion; (iii) legal stability for taxpayers, justice, and tax fairness.

  • Digitize tax services and procedures (new Integrated Tax Administration System or SAFI) and leverage advanced technologies in a rational risk-based approach.

  • Develop the online invoicing platform (e-invoicing).

  • Strengthen the existing collaboration with the various national public entities (DGD, SAMIFIN, CNAPS) and extend them to other entities if necessary.

  • Strengthen international tax cooperation by increasing collaboration with partners.

  • Rationalize existing tax benefits and the granting of new incentives.

  • Improve the tax audit system to better reconcile the State rights and those of taxpayers and establish performance-based management of tax audit.

  • Strengthen internal control structures, initiatives, and collaborations in the fight against corruption by providing users with an online platform for whistleblowing and grievances.

16. As far as the customs administration (Direction Generale des Douanes) is concerned, we will develop a new strategic plan that will take into account the lessons learned from the previous plan and extend the reforms initiated between 2020 and 2023. These actions will focus on:

  • Strengthening controls, value control and the use of mirror statistics.

  • The continuation of customs modernization actions, including the strengthening of its human resources management system.

  • Strengthening risk control functions without compromising the customs' role as a trade facilitator.

  • Better collaboration with other jurisdictions.

17. To achieve our objective of increasing the tax burden ratio (net domestic tax revenues/GDP) by 2.4 percentage points of GDP between 2023 and 2027, we commit to implement the following reforms:

Tax policy measures (revenue gains estimated at 1.5 percentage points)

  • Review all excise duties, including by aligning the rates applied to the local production of alcoholic beverages and tobacco with the rates on the same imported products (0.5 percentage points).

  • Review the personal income tax structure, including by increasing the top marginal rate from 20 to 25 percent (0.1 percentage points).

  • Reduce domestic and customs tax expenditures by an annual average of MGA 280 billion during the program (0.9 percentage points), for example through the gradual elimination of VAT exemptions on certain products such as kerosene, or the abolition of the VAT exemption on the first tranche of electricity and water consumption in line with the implementation of the JIRAMA tariff reform.

Administrative actions (estimated gains of 0.9 percentage points)

  • Improve the management, control, and collection of VAT (0.3 percentage points).

  • Strengthening customs controls (0.3 percentage points).

  • Continue efforts to digitize (SAFI) and broaden the tax base (0.3 percentage points).

18. We are committed to implementing contingency measures if the above projected revenues do not materialize. If revenues from the measures are lower than expected, we will work on identifying new compensatory measures.

Improving the Quality of Public Spending

The large transfers to JIRAMA and fuel subsidies have a crowding out effect on public Investment expenditure and social transfers necessary for development. We will seek to redirect government spending to promote economic growth and strengthen budget predictability.

19. Over the duration of the program, we are committed to limiting transfers other than pensions and to maintaining them at the amounts allocated in the initial budgets. Transfers (excluding pensions) constitute an important (3.8 percent of GDP in 2023) and volatile part of the budget. The emergence of additional non-budgeted needs will be met through the reallocation of expenditure or an increase in expenditure within the limits of the law and conditional on a better revenue performance compared to the initial budgets, to avoid widening the deficit. If necessary, the preparation of a revised budget law will be considered and discussed with the IMF.

20. Turning around the national company JIRAMA is a necessity. The company's financial situation and the quality of its service delivery in terms of electricity and water supply remain major sources of concern for decision-makers in Madagascar. The few reform measures on which the company has been able to make progress, such as the tariff reform, have not succeeded in limiting the sharp deterioration of the financial situation, despite substantial support from the government. This support materializes through sizeable transfers such as operating subsidies, the assumption of payments of the company's suppliers, the assumption of expenses of fuel and heavy fuel oil requisitions, and loans. In addition, JIRAMA has not paid its taxes, including those collected from third parties such as VAT and the taxes on salary income (IRSA) of its employees.

21. The reforms undertaken aim to change the governance of JIRAMA, improve revenues, and reduce costs and subsequently the burden borne by the State. We are committed to:

  • Finalizing the recruitment process for the company's new senior executives, including the Chief Financial Officer. The goal is to continue the actions already initiated under the previous program and suspended during the presidential elections. The recruitment of the new management team is being carried out in close collaboration with the World Bank; the new Chief Executive Officer took up his post on May 1, 2024 (prior action 3).

  • Developing and presenting a new "recovery plan" and the resulting "business plan". These are the first tasks that the new managers will tackle. The recovery plan will present the strategy to be carried out to redress the financial situation and the horizon for achieving it (structural benchmark 3).

  • Improving the company's revenue collection by strengthening the use of prepaid systems and the fight against fraud. 85 percent of public administrations are now equipped with prepaid meters with a target of 100 percent by the end of 2024. We are also in the process of deploying the geo-filling system for monitoring fuel stocks to reduce thefts.

  • Controlling and reducing technical losses, costs related to the purchase of fuel and electricity and personnel, including energy supplies.

22. We are also committed to strengthening JIRAMA’s transparency. We are committed to regularly sharing available information on the implementation progress of the company's recovery plan, including its financial statements. The same applies to all information related to contracts signed with electricity and fuel suppliers, calls for tenders and their results. We are committed to publishing audited financial statements for the years 2021, 2022 and 2023, and to continuing to publish them annually. We will continue to provide a monthly dashboard on JIRAMA's revenues and expenses as well as the details of all budget transfers to JIRAMA. We will inform the IMF and World Bank staff of any actions that could affect the implementation of the company's recovery plan and publish fuel purchase contracts (continuous structural benchmarks).

23. We will pay attention to the fiscal risk that the restructuring of Air Madagascar's debt could possibly pose to our budget. The latest estimates show a debt of about US$100 million, 60 percent of which is owed to the State. A restructuring plan is still to be approved by creditors. In view of the budgetary implications that this operation could possibly have, we will consult the IMF and the World Bank before any financial participation of the government in this restructuring. We are committed to making the required payments following the activation of the State guarantee on certain contracts.

24. We are continuing efforts to put Madagascar Airlines on the path to operational and financial sustainability. Since its takeover of the activities of Air Madagascar and its domestic subsidiary Tsaradia, Madagascar Airlines has suffered significant losses. A new Chairman of the Board of Directors was appointed in November 2023; long-haul flights to Europe and other regions have been suspended and some rental contracts have been cancelled. In this context, the World Bank has announced a US$25 million loan to support future investments and the company's recovery.

25. In line with our commitments in the 2021 ECF program, we will implement an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism (prior action 1). This should prevent the further accumulation of arrears. The dispute with the oil companies severely impacted budget implementation during the previous program since projected revenues were not collected in time. We will therefore take all necessary actions to prevent such a situation from happening again.

  • The main objective of the automatic fuel price determination mechanism is to limit the gap between the average prices applied at the pump (PMAP) and the calculated reference prices (PRC) from the sector's regulatory office (Malagasy Hydrocarbons Office or OMH), which are a proxy for market prices. Competition law limits to six months the validity of price administration measures, so that regulations regarding the administration of fuel prices and the computation of the PRC need to be renewed every semester. We commit to publish those regulations before the beginning of each semester for which they apply.

  • A "price band" type smoothing system makes it possible to contain monthly price changes. The various simulations we have carried out have shown that this is the most suitable option for our country. Every month, the PMAP is adjusted by the change in the PRC between month M-2 and month M-1, capped at 200 ariary/liter. Any change in the PRC beyond 200 ariary/liter is postponed to the next month until the change in the PMAP fully reflects that of the PRC. The PMAP in month M cannot exceed the PRC in month M-1 in case of an increase in the PRC between M-2 and M-1 or, once the PMAP has caught up with the PRC, decrease below the PRC in month M-1. The "smoothing balance" (solde de lissage) resulting from the difference between the PMAP and the PRC has been duly budgeted in the revised budget law and required budget appropriations will be integrated into subsequent budget laws to allow for the quarterly payment of that balance to oil distributors within one month after the end of each quarter. The revised budget law also includes appropriations to regularize payment arrears to oil distributors for the remainder of the 2023 smoothing balance, fuel requisitions made by the government in 2023, and the activation of the State guarantee on certain JIRAMA commercial contracts.

  • Further reforms will be introduced with the support of the RSF to gradually bring the PMAP to the PRC and align diesel excise taxes to their level for gasoline (see A80 and 81).

  • To support the introduction of this mechanism, we have set up an inter-ministerial committee which, on the basis of various studies, has identified possible measures to mitigate the impact of greater price volatility on the most vulnerable populations.

26. We will conclude a new memorandum of understanding with oil distributors providing for the terms and conditions for the settlement of cross-debts at the end of June 2024. We will ensure that oil distributors comply with their fiscal and parafiscal obligations, particularly regarding the payment of duties and taxes on petroleum products, royalties to the Ministry of the Environment, the contribution to the sector development (RDS), the contribution to the road fund (RER), and the OMH fee. Whereas payment delays have resulted from the oil distributors' request for a simultaneous payment of all cross-arrears and debt with the government, we will make all necessary arrangements to accelerate the payment by distributors of both past arrears and new monthly contributions.

27. We will maintain our efforts to contain our wage bill. The efforts made to improve their management will be pursued in line with the specific objectives defined in the roadmap of the General Directorate of Budget and Finance. The development of the Payroll Management Tool (PMS 2.0) is 45 percent complete: it will make it possible to establish annual forecasts of the wage bill and to monitor monthly salary expenditure by ministry and institution. Over the past year, we have made progress in the development of other AUGURE management modules, such as the Management of High State Jobs (HEE) module and the Forward Management of Staff, Jobs and Skills (GPEEC) module. The operationalization of those modules will not only contribute to improving the forecasting and payment of salaries and pensions, but also the detection and elimination of ghost workers' positions. For the next three years, our efforts will focus on improving the information system and the gradual digital transformation of procedures related to compensation management.

28. We will pay attention to our pension system balance. The strategic document for the reform of the public pension fund management has been submitted to the Council of Ministers and is awaiting validation. We have already begun to implement some measures to reduce the deficit of the Civil and Military Pension Fund (CRCM), including its provisioning in the budget law and the adoption of a decree allowing the transfer of the surpluses of the Provident and Pension Fund (CPR) of non-civil servants to the CRCM; the development of a pension management tool, which is scheduled to be deployed in the coming months, the gradual clearance of the transitory accounts of pension funds recording contributions paid that have not yet been subject to revenue orders; and the improvement of revenue collection from EPN (national public establishments) and CTD (local governments). In the future, we will focus on finalizing draft texts governing pension funds that will endorse the policy choices decided, based on the technical assistance reports already available, in particular under the mission conducted in June 2019 by the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department (unification or not of the funds, potential increase in the age of compulsory retirement pension, proposal to abolish the reversibility of disability pensions for beneficiaries and possible limitation of the increase for children).

29. We will continue our efforts to increase social spending and consolidate the achievements of the previous program. Social spending suffered both from inadequate budget allocations and from an implementation problem, which we sought to resolve in the context of the previous program. In accordance with the PGE, we want to increase the budget allocated to social spending. We will use the functional budget classification developed with the help of a long-term expert from the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department to monitor social spending in the new program (indicative target).

30. Redirecting spending towards better managed and more resilient public investment is also our priority. Our public investments suffer from weaknesses in planning and programming, limiting the adequacy of the allocated budget and leading to poor execution. The lack of selective prioritization in relation to the scale of needs and the lack of resources is also a shortcoming of the existing process. In this sense, we intend to fully implement, with the support of the technical assistance of the IMF and the WB, the mechanism provided for in the Decree on PIM 2023-255 and the PIM Manual, both adopted in February 2023, to select, plan and execute investment expenditures. Each project will be evaluated and selected according to the expected cost, benefit, and impact, whether economic, social, or environmental (reform measures 2 and 3, FRD).

Strengthening our Public Financial Management Institutions and Processes

The implementation of a new fiscal rule (debt anchor) requires significant progress to improve the credibility of the multiannual framework and the annual budget and ensure the effectiveness of the rule and compliance with the public debt trajectory.

31. We are aware that the strengthening of our medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) is a major prerequisite for our new fiscal rule success. We will work on strengthening the realism of our revenue and expenditure forecasts and putting the preparation of the MTFF (or "medium-term framework" presented in volume 3 of each budget law) back at the center of budget preparation, avoiding an excessive focus on the coming year. To this end, we commit to continue the implementation of commitment authorizations and payment appropriations with the support of IMF technical assistance, which will thus allow better monitoring of spending trends on multi-year projects.

32. We intend to improve the analysis and regular publication of fiscal risks that may affect the public finance path provided for in our MTFF and in our annual budget. Indeed, we intend to make greater use of the available information to carry out quantitative assessments of these risks and to determine the possible implications for the budget. This will allow us to implement the necessary actions and mechanisms to mitigate the impacts and ensure the necessary budget allocations to counter these risks. We naturally rely on our technical and financial partners, in particular the World Bank and the IMF (AFRITAC South) to help us make progress in this area. In particular, we commit to continue to improve the annual fiscal risk statement, particularly risks related to SOEs, and to work on the improvement and regular and rapid publication of the annual report on SOEs, highlighting their financial results, their relations with the State budget and the efforts made for their governance.

33. We are determined to continue efforts to rationalize the public expenditure chain and consequently improve the execution of the budget in general and social and investment spending in particular. To this end, we will work to capitalize on the introduction of annual commitment and money order plans (PAEM) at the ministerial level, which we intend to generalize to all ministries at the next budget law (structural benchmark 5 at end-January 2025). We will work on the implementation of the recommendations from the audit of the public expenditure chain conducted in 2023, including on the professionalization of actors and better anticipation of the preliminary steps necessary to begin spending operations in new fiscal years. We will also consolidate the achievements of the previous program, which removed the spending commitment authorization by the Presidency and the Prime Minister's Office, and will ensure that controls are more selective, depending on the risks and the stakes.

34. We will rely on our technical and financial partners and on the framework drawn up at the halfway point of the implementation of the Strategic Plan for the Modernization of Public Financial Management (PSMFP) carried out in 2023, to advance our reform projects. For better coordination of actions and efficient monitoring of reforms, we have set up, in collaboration with our technical and financial partners, technical working groups focused on various themes that constitute our main projects for the next three years, namely the digital transformation of public finances, the improvement of the management of public investments and the public expenditure chain, as well as the acceleration of disbursements related to external financing.

35. We will continue our efforts to accelerate the digital transformation of the budget and financial processes. Since last year, with the support of our partners, we have embarked on a vast project of digital transformation of public finance occupations. In addition to the implementation of IT and operational governance, this approach aims, among other things, to reduce the time taken to produce financial statements and the time taken to execute public expenditures. It will also contribute to making accounting and financial data more reliable and exhaustive while ensuring maximum data protection and interoperability of all existing and operational systems at the level of the various departments of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (DGI, DGD, DGT, DGBF, ARMP, DSI). To support this transformation effort, we will attach special importance to strengthening our human resources capacities.

36. Finally, we are committed to improving our cash management, which will help us control arrears accumulation. To this end, a new law on cash management will be submitted to Parliament for approval before May 2025 (structural benchmark 6). This law will strengthen the Treasury Single Account while guaranteeing depositors the permanent availability of funds, provide the tools for a more realistic cash flow plan in conjunction with the new PAEMs, and facilitate, in conjunction with the Central Bank, the use of borrowing on the money market to finance occasional cash flow dips.

Pillar 2: Strengthening Good Governance and the Fight Against Corruption

37. Good governance is one of the three main pillars of our PGE. We have asked the IMF to conduct a Governance Diagnostic Assessment (GDA) to support our governance reform efforts through an inventory of corruption vulnerabilities in the various sectors covered by the governance framework adopted by the IMF's Executive Board in April 2018, in particular public financial governance, the rule of law, market regulation and anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT).

38. The GDA will support the development and operationalization of our new National Anti-Corruption Strategy (SNLCC), which will cover the period 2025-2035. As part of the strengthening of this third pillar of the PGE and given that the current strategy is coming to an end, we have already started the process of designing a new one by the end of this year. The development of this new SNLCC will be carried out in several steps and will take into account both the progress already made and the many challenges that remain to be met. To do this, we have set up a steering committee, led by the President of the Committee for the Safeguarding of Integrity (CSI). The latter is composed of representatives of public institutions (Presidency, Prime Minister, sectoral ministries) and of Anti-Corruption System (SAC) entities. The work on the GDA, which will begin in the second half of 2024, will be able to support the work of this steering committee with the objective of adopting and publishing the 2025-2035 SNLCC, including its implementation plan, by January 2025 (structural benchmark 7). The GDA, once finalized and published in 2025, will support the operational implementation of the strategy across the various sectors vulnerable to corruption as well as the subsequent changes to the implementation plan, which will be reviewed annually considering the progress made and potential difficulties.

39. We will ensure that anti-corruption entities continue to have the necessary human and financial resources to carry out their respective missions. To implement the current anticorruption strategy, the SAC has repeatedly encountered issues of insufficient resources, or even a reduction in the available budget envelopes. We will ensure that this problem is addressed, including through the budgeting of the resources necessary to meet the growing needs of the SAC and to enable it to carry out its missions effectively.

40. We will strengthen the implementation of existing anti-corruption provisions. The Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau (BIANCO) will work to enforce the obligation to declare assets for senior officials, politically exposed persons, and other relevant persons, by referring them to the competent courts when needed. As indicated in our commitments of the previous ECF program, BIANCO, in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, has developed a draft decree setting out the modalities for the dynamic management of asset declarations that will be submitted before end-July 2024 to the Council of Government and the Council of Ministers.

41. We will continue to ramp up the Agency for the Recovery of Illicit Assets (ARAI) created in 2022. To this end, to ensure better effectiveness of the legal provisions on the recovery of illicit assets, we will adopt an implementing decree of Ordinance No. 2019-015 of 5 July 2019 on the recovery of illicit assets during the second half of 2024.

42. We will extend the territorial network of the Anti-Corruption Clusters (PAC). Since 2023, the PAC have started to hold hearings and mobile inquiries in the most remote places under their jurisdiction (Antalaha, Sambava, Ambilobe, Diego Suarez, Toamasina, Ambatondrazaka). We will continue to increase those hearings and mobile investigations to ensure good local justice. The establishment of the Fianarantsoa PAC, which is currently well underway, will also contribute to a proper administration of justice.

43. We will continue to strengthen our AML/CFT framework in line with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). After the adoption of Law No. 2023-026 of February 1, 2024 amending and supplementing certain provisions of Law No. 2018-043 of February 13, 2019 on AML/CFT, we will issue by the end of June 2024 (i) the implementing decree taking into account the amendments made by this law, and (ii) the decree establishing the mechanism for the implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism, the financing of terrorism and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We will validate the report of the national assessment of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing submitted on November 2, 2023, by the Council of Ministers by the end of June 2024. We will adopt in the Council of Ministers the midpoint update of the national AML/CFT strategy 2022-2026, which will reflect the conclusions of the national risk assessment. Finally, we will adopt the necessary regulatory texts for the establishment of the national register of beneficial owners, which will facilitate the prevention and detection of AML/CFT offences and contribute to better asset recovery. Beyond that, we will continue our capacity-building efforts, including financial capacity as recommended by the ESAAMLG high-level mission, and work on the appointment and operationalization of supervisors of designated non-financial institutions and professions. All of these measures will allow us to remain compliant with the requirements of international standards and thus avoid inclusion in the FATF's "grey list".

44. As transparency is a condition for good governance, we will continue the good practices of communicating to the public all the actions undertaken by the SAC through the regular availability to the general public of activity reports and various statistics related to their respective activities. Over the next three years, based on the findings and recommendations of the GDA, we will also strengthen citizens' access to information to ensure better oversight of public action and adopt the necessary texts to guarantee access to information and to protect whistleblowers.

45. In terms of public finances transparency, we are continuing our efforts, particularly regarding public procurement. We have strengthened the legal framework for public procurement through the adoption of a new Code of Ethics for Civil Servants that defines the penalties for violations of public procurement rules, as well as two decrees strengthening the professionalization and appointment procedures of persons responsible for public procurement and bringing the Tender Committee into line with the Public Procurement Code. We are also committed to:

  • Continuing to publish budget execution reports on a quarterly basis and improving their content as new classifications become available.

  • Publishing the audited financial accounts of all public enterprises on an annual basis.

  • Preserving and strengthening the achievements in terms of access to information for the Cour des Comptes, particularly regarding access to the State's financial information systems.

  • Regularly publishing on the website of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) the public procurement contracts awarded and publishing the beneficial owners of these contracts. We are committed to better identifying and publishing these beneficial owners in accordance with the international standards in force.

  • Strengthening consultation and exchanges with civil society organizations for the drafting of finance laws and before the adoption of new public policies. In this regard, we have initiated consultations for the establishment of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council provided for in the 2010 Constitution, to facilitate the participation of civil society in the debate on the country's policies.

46. Regarding tax and customs administrations, we will also ensure that internal control mechanisms are strengthened. In addition to the increased visibility provided by the tax and customs dashboard mentioned above, we are counting on the Fund's support through the GDA mission to help us identify measures to improve internal control mechanisms and reduce vulnerabilities to corruption.

47. In accordance with the principles of good governance, we will take the necessary measures to ensure free and fair competition in the productive sectors. We will ensure that transparency is improved on the activities, projects, and finances of the National Vanilla Council, which benefits from a contribution of US$4 per kilogram of dried vanilla exported for its activities. We will avoid any restrictions on exports from the agricultural sector, which plays a key role in Madagascar's economy and employs a considerable number of people.

48. Improving the business climate remains at the forefront of our concerns. We are making progress in the digitization of tax payments, the issuance of work permits, the establishment of a credit bureau, as well as in the operationalization in the coming months of electronic processing and systematic VAT reimbursement via the escrow account. This should make it possible to reduce VAT credits arrears. In addition to legislative reforms, such as the overhaul of the Investment Law, the Tourism Code, the Foreign Exchange Code and the Labor Code, we also intend to continue our efforts to digitize business creation via the ORINASA platform with the deployment of the platform in all regions. The same applies to the deployment of the digital platform for the issuance of building permits, which is already operational in the urban municipality of the capital. We will also pay special attention to infrastructure development, housing, uninterrupted electricity supply, industrialization, liberalization of the telecommunications sector, development of the mining and tourism sector, and improvement of agricultural productivity.

49. We reiterate the commitments we made under the previous ECF-supported program to strengthen transparency and limit the fiscal risks associated with the operationalization of the Malagasy Sovereign Fund (FSM). In this regard, at the beginning of May 2024, we adopted a first decree on the reserves rate to be maintained by the FSM. The decree implementing the law of September 2021 creating the FSM is under preparation with UNDP support. We will ensure that: (i) the FSM priorities are further clarified in order to avoid conflicting objectives and maximize the effectiveness of the fund; (ii) the modalities of financing the fund are specified so as not to create a risk of contingent debt, nor contravene the principle of budgetary unity, in particular by avoiding any allocation of budgetary revenues; (iii) the possible ability of the FSM to commit the State's signature on investment projects or PPPs involving public payments is limited to avoid the associated contingent liabilities; and (iv) the transparency and good governance of the fund is ensured through the submission to Parliament and the regular publication of annual reports and financial statements.

Pillar 3: Strengthening Monetary and Financial Stability

50. We will continue the reforms already initiated at the level of Banky Foiben'i Madagasikara (BFM) to strengthen the operational framework of monetary policy. The new interest rate targeting operational framework came into effect in February 2024 with the validation and publication of a comprehensive implementation strategy, a money market intervention guide, and a methodology for calculating and publishing the reference rate, as well as a calendar of quarterly meetings of the Monetary Committee. The indicative timetable for BFM's interventions on the money market, starting in 2024, has also already been published. We will ensure that we conduct day-to-day liquidity management operations to keep the interest rate on overnight interbank blank loans in the middle of the interest rate corridor defined by our deposit facility and marginal lending rates. In addition, we are working to improve our medium- and long-term liquidity forecasts and develop our monetary analysis to better understand the monetary policy transmission mechanisms under the new operational framework.

51. We will undertake the reforms necessary to develop the secondary market for government securities. Based on the recommendations of the IMF and the International Finance Corporation, we will, among other things, review the functioning of the primary dealer system and set up a single central securities depository (CSD) for all government securities before the end of December 2024 (structural benchmark 8). We will encourage banks to conduct repo operations among themselves, to ensure the development of this market.

52. We are also working to improve our communication on monetary policy decisions. The improvement of BFM's communication policy aims to better anchor expectations and improve the effectiveness of monetary policy. The good practices already adopted will be maintained and strengthened for greater transparency, accountability, and credibility of our institution. We are considering preparing a quarterly report presenting the analyses underlying monetary policy decision-making, which will strengthen our communication framework for better anchoring expectations and a better understanding of our actions.

53. We will ensure that BFM's independence is preserved and strengthened. Independence in decision-making will forge our credibility as well as our effectiveness in achieving our inflation objective and the success of our mission. Therefore, we will always stand ready to make the necessary adjustments to the interest rate to keep inflation at a level that will not hurt the economy.

54. We are also committed to reviewing the strategy for managing BFM's interventions in the foreign exchange market while continuing to improve the functioning of the interbank currency market. We recognize the value of a floating exchange rate regime in absorbing external shocks and preserving monetary policy autonomy. On the regulatory front, BFM will continue its collaboration with the Ministry of Economy and Finance for the finalization of the preliminary draft law on foreign exchange. In terms of market improvement, two projects are underway, namely (i) the infrastructure modernization through the search for a new platform integrating negotiations, market information, auctions, and other data processing systems; and (ii) the adherence to the FX Global Code within the framework of the Foreign Exchange Association to align with international standards and best practices and enhance the confidence and credibility of the market. We sent a request for technical assistance to the Fund to assist us on the use of a risk-based foreign exchange market intervention model as well as support in the process of adhering to the FX Global Code (a first part was carried out in April 2024). Since last year, following the request of the oil companies, we have been thinking about the implementation of forward operations.

55. BFM remains committed to continuing to diversify its gold reserves within the framework and limits discussed with Fund’s staff. As part of the diversification of our foreign exchange reserves, we have introduced monetary gold into our holdings. This has led us to update our foreign exchange reserve management strategy, develop an operational strategy for gold purchases before any resumption of unrefined gold (dore) purchases, and revise the Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Mines and Strategic Resources (MMRS). We are committed to respecting the terms of these documents, notably regarding the purchase price of dore, and to minimizing the period of holding of dore on BFM's balance sheet to reduce financial risks. We are also committed to limiting the share of monetary gold in our total reserves to 8 percent (+/- 2 percent), with an investment horizon set at 10 years.

Pillar 4: Fostering Inclusive, Strong, and Sustainable Growth

56. We are committed to further strengthening our social protection system. Over the past three years, we have made significant progress in strengthening social protection with the help of our technical and financial partners. In particular, we have increased the number of individuals and/or households benefiting from social protection, increased the allocation of funds from the country's own internal resources for the implementation of social safety net activities, and improved the effective disbursement of allocated funds in a timely manner to ensure the implementation of planned activities. We have set up a single social registry that will serve as a reference for all social protection activities undertaken in the country through a pilot project that has collected information on an increasing number of households. We have updated our social protection strategy and a directory of interventions to guide our future interventions. To consolidate these advances, we will ensure that we continue to expand the coverage of the social registry (structural benchmark 11), adapt the legal framework of the CNAPS to extend contributory coverage to the fund to selfemployed workers, and extend the food bank program (structural benchmark 10).

57. We will continue our efforts to promote financial inclusion. The rise of mobile money has helped to promote the expansion of financial services and the diversification of the services offered, ranging from simple money transfers between individuals to more developed services such as paying bills, receiving salaries, saving money, and obtaining credit. However, despite this important progress, the access rate to financial services in Madagascar remains among the lowest in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region. In 2021, among the population of adults aged 15 and over, only 26 percent had access to financial services, through accounts hosted in financial institutions or mobile money accounts, compared to 55 percent in SSA countries. Notable advances in financial inclusion include:

  • The modernization and simplification of public operations through services digitalization. We have successfully introduced the possibility of declaring and paying our taxes online. We have also initiated the payment of the salaries of certain civil servants via mobile money, including for those in remote and isolated areas, such as FRAM teachers, as well as the payment of student scholarships at all universities in the country, through the implementation of the e-Poketra. Social protection remittances, particularly during the COVID period, have also contributed to improving financial inclusion.

  • Improving access to information with the establishment of public credit registers and private credit bureaus to facilitate credit granting activities.

  • The strengthening of the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework that has led to the adoption of various documents, laws, and basic texts necessary to promote access to and use of financial services.

58. In order to consolidate the gains, we will work to implement the following actions:

  • Work on a new national financial inclusion strategy. As the previous strategy expired in 2022, it is important to have a new one to clarify our intentions in terms of financial inclusion and frame the actions we intend to initiate.

  • Launch the various Finscope surveys, depending on the availability of funding, to measure the actions taken under the previous strategy while collecting information to feed the new one.

  • Operationalize the platform that was developed to host the Financial Inclusion Database to improve the availability of information on the state of financial inclusion in the country, the activities undertaken, and the results achieved.

  • Continue the efforts of popularization of and education on financial and digital services to anchor the culture of using financial services through integrating the theme of financial education into the teaching program.

  • Addressing the various challenges at several levels to promote financial inclusion in collaboration with our technical and financial partners. These challenges include, inter alia: (i) improving regulation; (ii) establishing financial infrastructure (fintech); (iii) developing new tools to further strengthen customer identification in the granting of credit, transparency, and competitiveness; (iv) improving access to electricity; (v) strengthening connectivity via the internet and mobile; (vi) strengthening consumer protection; (vii) accelerating financial and digital education efforts.

  • Deepen our reflection on the interest of the e-ariary project and intensify exchanges with stakeholders on this subject. Officially launched in March 2021, the study and preparation phase will be spread out until April 2025, before deciding on the interest of a potential pilot experimentation phase.

59. We intend to operationalize the National Payment Switch in order to promote the interoperability of existing digital payment systems. After a suspension of almost a year, due to the closure of the Madagascar Financial Inclusion Project (PIFM) at the end of 2022, and following the transfer of funding from the Switch project to the Integrated Growth Pole Project (PIC3), financed like the PIFM by the World Bank, a new contract between the platform provider and the PIC3 was signed in February 2024 to restart the work on the implementation of the national payment switch at the level of BFM. This project, which aims to facilitate and secure electronic transactions between the various players in the financial system and companies, is entering the phase of finalizing the work of installation and configuration, for commissioning in 2025. The implementation of the switch is a decisive step in promoting financial inclusion in the country. It will not only allow interconnectivity between the different players in the financial system, but also their interoperability by ensuring the compatibility, speed, and security of all electronic means of payment.

60. We will continue our efforts to strengthen financial stability. Comprising 33 institutions in 2023, our financial system is marked by the preponderant weight of the banking system. The latter, despite the pandemic, has remained healthy, profitable, liquid and relatively insensitive to market risks.

  • At the micro-prudential level, we have already taken the necessary instructions to bring the definition and the capital requirement into line with the standards set by Basel III. We will proceed with the next steps to complete the process. The same applies to the establishment of new liquidity ratios in accordance with the recommendations of Basel III. We have already adopted in 2023 the instruction establishing these new ratios for banks and financial institutions, and we will finalize the remaining steps in the coming months. We will also complete the adoption of the various priority texts necessary for the implementation of the new banking law, including the texts on risk concentration; related parties; credit institutions licensing fees; licensing of these institutions; criteria for classifying banks as systemic banks and the Statement on the Preventive Recovery Plan for credit institutions.

  • We are contemplating a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of our financial system. To this end, we have requested a Financial Sector Stability Review by the IMF to refine the stress tests that we conduct on a regular basis and to identify the factors that could possibly be sources of vulnerability for our banking sector.

  • Finally, we will redouble our efforts to adopt and enact the Financial Stability Law before June 2025 (Structural Benchmark 9), an important step in strengthening our system of macroprudential supervision of the financial system as a whole.

FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY FACILITY

61. Strengthening the country's resilience to climate change remains a top priority for Madagascar. Our country is one of the most exposed and affected by climate change. The 2021 Climate Risk Index ranks Madagascar 12th out of 180 countries in terms of weather-related losses (cyclones and floods). Climate change, including longer and more severe droughts, heat waves and cascading impacts on water resources, is expected to worsen. Aware of the magnitude of these challenges, Madagascar updated its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in 2022 and formalized its National Adaptation Plan (NAP) in 2021. Several sectoral strategies have also been developed. Climate change adaptation and mitigation activities must now be in line with these documents.

62. In this regard, we commit to undertake the necessary reforms to address current and future climate risks. The actions envisaged in the program supported by the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) will help us advance our ambitious climate reform agenda. This agenda benefits from the diagnostics carried out by the IMF in 2022 under the Climate Macroeconomic Assessment Program (CMAP) and by the World Bank under the upcoming Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR). This latest report highlights that our aspiration to become an emerging market by 2040 will be derailed if we fail to cushion the effects of climate change on the environment and on the population.

63. To this end, the reforms supported under the RSF will aim to address the long-term challenges related to climate change. They will be structured around five (05) main pillars, namely: (i) strengthening climate governance and integrating the climate issue into public financial management (PFM) / public investment management (PIM) processes; (ii) enhancing adaptation and building resilience to climate change; (iii) curbing the growth of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; (iv) strengthening the protection of forests and biodiversity; (v) mobilizing climate finance.

64. We have designed the reform measures (RMs) under the RSF with a strong focus on implementation and attention to secure support of partners. We confirmed assistance in implementing RMs with the World Bank and other partners, particularly in areas that are not covered by the IMF's core expertise and capacity to deliver technical assistance (TA). We exchange regularly with our partners in our coordination group with international donors (Plate-forme de suivi de I'environnement) and will continue to reach out to this group for additional support as needed. We have frontloaded - especially under the first pillar - the RMs that can serve as catalysts for future progress, while pointing out areas where reforms are not yet mature and could benefit from additional preparatory work, such as agriculture or clean cooking.

Pillar 1: Strengthening Climate Governance and Integrating Climate into our PFM and PIM Processes

65. We will take the necessary steps to strengthen the country's overall climate governance framework. The CCDR's diagnostic of the governance of climate policies points to limited awareness of the current and future impacts of climate change and the absence of an effective mechanism for high-level coordination between all the structures involved in the fight against climate change, with a long-established Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Environment (CIME) largely unable to play this role and a Ministry of Environment and Environment. sustainable development (MEDD) with limited institutional weight. To address this concern and pave the way for the success of future reforms, we will adopt a decree clarifying the mandate of the CIME to cover all climate policies. The decree will provide that the committee will be chaired by the Prime Minister and that it will hold semi-annual meetings with publicly disclosed reports. The Committee will be supported by a technical secretariat shared between the MEDD and the MEF to operationalize climate policies and monitor their implementation (RM1, end October 2024).

66. We will build on previous reforms of our PIM framework to make it climate sensitive. With the support of the World Bank and IMF/AFS technical assistance, we adopted a new PIM Decree (Decree 2023-255) and a PIM Handbook covering the entire lifecycle of public investment projects. We will now work to integrate climate-related considerations into this updated PIM framework. First, with the technical assistance of partners, we will adopt a new decree on environmental impact assessments (EIAs) to replace a 2004 decree that poorly reflected concerns about climate adaptation and mitigation and adopt and publish criteria for the prioritization and selection of investment projects that including integration of elements related to climate change (adaptation, mitigation, and resilience) (RM2, end October 2024).

67. We will use this new climate-sensitive PIM framework to make the most of our public investment effort and increase its resilience. To this end, with the support of the technical assistance of the IMF/AFS and the World Bank, we will adopt a decree to make it compulsory to produce every year a budget document listing the investment projects selected for the public investment program and explaining how the selection criteria have been applied, notably with respect to the effective application of the criteria related to climate adaptation and mitigation, and we will produce a first report in accordance with this obligation in the context of the 2027 budget (RM3, end October 2026).

68. We will implement Climate Budget Tagging (CBT) to provide a comprehensive view of the weight of climate-related spending in our budget. This will build on the work on PFM reforms (including budget classification reform) supported by the IMF through a resident advisor. With IMF TA, we will adapt the budget classification to allow for the tagging of climate-related adaptation and mitigation spending and annex a first climate budget statement (CBS) to the 2026 draft budget law (RM4, end October 2025).

69. Taken together, these reforms will be major catalysts for further progress on the climate agenda, which is why they will be largely frontloaded. In particular, we will use the reactivated CIME to closely monitor the implementation of the reforms agreed under the RSF and explore future reform priorities. Green PFM and PIM reforms will help us live up to our commitment as a member of the Coalition of Finance Ministries for Climate Action. These reforms will be mutually reinforcing with other PFM and PIM reforms, such as the multi-year budgeting improvements expected under the ECF program. They will also complement efforts already underway in specific sectors, such as the focus on road construction and maintenance with the support of the World Bank, including through its Development Policy Operation (DPO) project.

Pillar 2: Strengthening Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience to Natural Disasters

70. We will implement the necessary adaptation measures to strengthen our resilience to climate change. Climate change is expected to have a significant impact on Madagascar's economic development and, depending on the climate scenario, may lead to a significant increase in poverty. Adaptation issues are particularly important in several sectors identified in our NAP, including water and agriculture, two priorities of our PGE, as adopted in 2024. Madagascar is also committed to developing urban and rural development plans that incorporate building standards that are resilient to extreme weather events and to establishing early warning systems for natural disasters, enabling rapid evacuation and response.

71. We will reform water governance to help address climate challenges. Water has been identified as one of the main sectors affected by climate change. The expected increase in the frequency and intensity of droughts and floods will have negative consequences for agriculture and food security. Smallholder farmers who rely entirely on rain-fed agriculture are particularly vulnerable. Institutional and policy reforms are therefore needed to improve the management of available water resources and thus increase the resilience of the agricultural sector. To this end, we will approve in the Council of Ministers, by November 2025, a bill to update the 1998 Water Code, with a view to integrating climate change into the overall water policy and reinforcing the overall policy framework for integrated water resources management (IWRM), including by strengthening the National Authority for Water and Sanitation's (ANDEA) institutional framework (RM5, end October 2025). We will have the support of the European Union's TA to take this step and we will closely link this reform with the World Bank's ongoing projects in the water sector to maximize its impact.

72. On agriculture, we remain firmly committed to the development of climate-smart agricultural practices and will continue our efforts to develop agricultural-index insurance against climate disasters. In this sense, we will intensify the promotion of climate-smart agricultural techniques such as PFUMVUDZA (Zimbabwean model, a variant of agroecology, which integrates minimal perturbation to the soil, maintaining a straw cover and rotating cultures), as well as the use of seeds and animal species adapted to climate change and the conditions of each agroecological zone, such as short-cycle varieties. In addition, we will encourage the adoption of more sustainable water use techniques, such as drip irrigation and buried water tanks full of sand. To strengthen the resilience of our farmers to climate disasters, we will conduct a feasibility study on the extension of agricultural insurance. This study will explore how to overcome the barriers to adoption identified in the small-scale pilot projects supported by the German Cooperation (GIZ) and the World Food Programme (WFP) in the South of Madagascar which are: (1) lack of interest from insurance companies operating in the domestic market, (2) limited availability of climate data at the granular level, (3) difficulty in reaching an informal agricultural sector dominated by subsistence farmers.The study will be available by October 2024 and will inform our plans to move forward with the implementation of a large-scale agricultural index insurance mechanism.

73. Resilience to natural disasters is of paramount importance for Madagascar and the country has already made significant efforts. As the country most affected by cyclones in Africa, with 35 cyclones hitting Madagascar in the last 20 years and a high exposure to drought, we have a long-standing National Disaster Risk Management Strategy (SNGRC, first adopted in 2003 and updated to cover the period 2016-2030). We have recently complemented it, with the support of the African Development Bank, with a Disaster Risk Financing Strategy (2023). At the same time, following the finalization last year of the mid-term review of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, we also envisage to conduct an interim review of our SNGRC. Together with our donor partners in the Cash Working Group (including the World Bank and UNICEF), we have also made efforts to develop climate-responsive social protection, with the adoption in 2023 of manuals covering disaster-responsive social protection in the event of cyclones and droughts.

74. We will continue to build momentum to increase investments to build community resilience. As part of the collaboration with the African Risk Capacity (ARC) and the African Development Bank through the ADRiFi (Africa Disaster Risk Financing) program, Madagascar is currently working on the construction of Multi-Purpose Community Shelters (ACUM). An ACUM is an adequate infrastructure with a capacity of 1,000 people designed to serve as accommodation sites for victims in the summer period in the event of a cyclone or flood and to be used for multiple functions in normal times (storage, community granary, training or meeting rooms). The construction of ACUMs, developed according to an approach aimed at limiting the risks of genderbased violence, makes it possible to provide a sustainable solution to the problems of lack of permanent accommodation sites in the event of a climate crisis and to preserve the education system by avoiding the use of school buildings as shelters for disaster victims. In terms of housing, we will also continue our efforts to promote the construction of traditional housing forms that are more resistant to climatic hazards.

75. Much remains to be done, however, as climate change is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of cyclones and require a more effective Early Warning System (EWS). With the support of the United Nations "EWS for All" initiative, we have started working on the gaps in our EWS identified in the upcoming CCDR, to implement an EWS that effectively reaches local communities to improve disaster preparedness and mitigate loss and damage. To this end, we will adopt by November 2025 an Order in Council as part of the National Disaster Risk Management Strategy that clarifies roles and responsibilities related to EWS, including those of the private sector, with the support of standard operating procedures to allow for near real-time data exchange for the communication and dissemination of alerts between relevant government agencies, with the aim of ensuring the dissemination of alerts, triggering the anticipatory actions by communities or targeted sectors, and enabling the rapid dispatch of an emergency response by the relevant authorities.

76. To make our EWS more effective, it is crucial to put in place a more structured governance around the following four main pillars: knowledge of risks, observations and forecasts, dissemination, and communication, as well as preparation and response. This involves a sustained support for the process to decentralize the National Bureau for Disaster Risk Management (BNGRC), not only through the operationalization of existing territorial offices but also through the construction of new offices in regions exposed to risks, ensuring that every level of government has the requested capacity to effectively respond to emergencies. Moreover, the integration of information and communication technology is essential to improve the speed and effectiveness of the collection and diffusion of data. Strengthening these aspects will enable us not only to improve the resiliency of communities against disasters, but also to optimize the resources and efforts of all stakeholders involved in disaster risk management.

77. We will continue to streamline our payment systems in the event of an emergency. We have taken a crucial step by developing our Disaster Risk Financing Strategy through a participatory approach as part of the collaboration with the African Development Bank through the ADRiFi program. This document calls for the capitalization of achievements and the sustainability of existing risk financing mechanisms. While we already have elements of a layered disaster risk financing model (including through the African Risk Capacity drought and cyclone insurance policy) and are working to further improve our insurance mechanisms (including through the World Bank's REPAIR regional project), the strategy highlights the need to streamline emergency payment systems to enable swift disbursements. To address these concerns, we will adequately budget the recently established National Contingency Fund (FNC) and update the FNC allocation annually based on a historical disaster needs assessment complemented by an analysis of the consequences of increasing frequency and scale of climate disasters. With the support of the World Bank, we will also approve the necessary implementation regulations to simplify PFM processes for disaster-related expenditures and operationalize the FNC, while ensuring adequate transparency and reporting of expenditures for each selected type of hazard (RM6, end April 2025).

Pillar 3: Support Efforts to Curb the Growth of GHG Emissions

78. Although our emissions are still at a very low level, we are keen to adopt the tools for low-carbon development, in line with our commitments under NDC2. In Madagascar, per capita carbon emissions remain low compared to other countries in the world and even in continental subSaharan Africa. Their composition is heavily skewed towards land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) and agriculture (80 percent of the total). Nevertheless, we have committed to significantly reduce our GHG emissions, including by significantly expanding hydropower and renewable energy sources (from 40 percent currently to around 85 percent in 2030) as part of efforts to increase our electricity access rate (from 33 percent of households currently to 70 percent by 2030) in line with the Sustainable Development Goal 7 Implementation Plan, adopted in 2022. Energy sector reforms undertaken with the support of the World Bank through its DPO operation place emphasis on energy efficiency standards and a stronger regulatory framework that can facilitate private sector participation in renewable energy projects.

79. Aware of the significant impact of urbanization on GHG emissions. Madagascar is committed to promoting sustainable urban and territorial planning. We will significantly increase urban green spaces by developing public parks and gardens that will serve as carbon sinks and improve the quality of life of citizens. We will launch a national urban reforestation program, in partnership with municipalities, schools, and civil society organizations, to plant native trees and promote biodiversity while absorbing atmospheric CO2. Through policies that promote public transport and reduce dependence on private vehicles, we will contribute to the reduction of CO2 emissions. Finally, as part of our spatial planning policy, we will work with local authorities to optimize land use and prevent urban sprawl, to create compact and efficient cities, thereby reducing emissions from heating, cooling, and transport.

80. We will continue our efforts to fully restore price signals for different types of fuels. Building on the progress already made with the automatic fuel pricing mechanism (prior action under the ECF program) and the expected success of the solar kit program to reduce the need for kerosene for the most vulnerable populations, we will fully eliminate fuel price subsidies resulting from an administered retail price (PMAP) that has durably been below the calculated reference price (PRC) (RM7, end April 2026). It will also increase fiscal space for resilient public investment.

81. We will gradually increase taxes on diesel to bring them into line with the rates applicable to gasoline. Excise taxes and road maintenance charges are currently lower for diesel than for gasoline - a difference that does not correspond to environmental externalities or the respective impact on road infrastructure of diesel vehicles compared to gasoline-powered cars, and which has favored a largely diesel-oriented fleet structure (60 percent of total consumption of fuel products). We commit to gradually raise excise taxes and other levies on diesel fuel to align them to the level applicable to gasoline (RM8, end October 2026). We will also benefit from the support of the World Bank to prepare and implement mitigation measures for the most vulnerable groups, including public transport vehicles and their users.

82. To go further, we will seek the support of technical and financial partners to carry out studies on the socio-economic and fiscal impact of tax or customs reforms relating to energy. These would involve the implementation of tax reforms (reform of the taxation of oil products, carbon tax on fuels and charcoal, and taxes on motor vehicles) or customs reforms on the customs clearance of petroleum products. On this last point we already have the terms of reference for a study designed to produce a roadmap anchored on the results of this study and including a time plan, accountable administrative departments as well as realistic and transparent targets. In this regard, we would like to point out that the tariff structure of the Malagasy customs already promotes the use of renewable energy and electric or hybrid cars.

83. We will continue our efforts to facilitate the production of renewable energy and promote access to affordable electricity for all in rural areas. As highlighted by the CCDR currently being finalized, the country is already one of the most active markets in sub-Saharan Africa for mini-grids and off-grid installations for solar energy or small hydropower, thanks to a favorable fiscal framework, donor initiatives (World Bank's Off-Grid Market Development Fund, AFD's SUNREF) and the support of the Agency for the Development of Rural Electrification (ADER). We will aim to amplify this dynamic through the operationalization of a dedicated financing vehicle created by Law 2017-021 on the Sustainable Electricity Development Fund (FNED). This dedicated financing vehicle will benefit from contributions from the State’s budget and levies paid by JIRAMA as the incumbent operator; it will also be able to benefit from the support of partners such as GIZ who are interested in rural electrification. The FNED will be able to rely for the examination of projects on the technical expertise of ADER, which will have to be strengthened in its resources and staff. It may possibly conclude one or more agreements with banks or credit institutions to distribute assistance in the form of guarantees or loans, in addition to subsidies that FNED may pay directly. To this end, we will adopt the decree on the FNED and operationalize the FNED financing mechanism to support off-grid and mini-grid electrification and proactively incentivize private sector funding, with at least a total of 11.5 MW in newly installed renewable energy production capacity arising from operations supported by FNED. (RM9, end April 2026). In addition to GIZ, this measure will be able to benefit from technical assistance from the World Bank.

84. We will also look at ways to shift the composition of our motor vehicle fleet towards more energy-efficient vehicles and electric vehicles. We are working on the development of an e-mobility program and are planning the development of the necessary charging infrastructure. We are also working on a motor vehicle registration tax (vignette) that could be linked to the level of GHG emissions and energy efficiency standards, while exploring options to avoid a negative impact on the most vulnerable households.

85. We will also work to expand clean cooking, to address a major source of GHG emissions and air pollution, generating significant health co-benefits. With UNIDO's support, we are preparing a development policy letter for clean cooking. This will identify regulatory measures or financial incentives to support the spread of clean and energy-efficient cookstoves, in a context where 97 percent of households (2020 data) depend on firewood and charcoal.

Pillar 4: Strengthening the Protection of Forests and Biodiversity

86. In addition to efforts to build resilience to climate change, we will take the necessary steps to protect forest ecosystems. Deforestation reduces resilience to natural disasters and negatively affects the link between water, energy, and food. Forest cover decreased from 29 to 21 percent between 2000 and 2020 (CCDR).

87. We will step up our efforts to combat deforestation and encourage reforestation through REDD+. We can build on the experience gained from the 2018 national REDD+ strategy and the existence of an effective Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) mechanism implemented under the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). We want to broaden the scope of this mechanism to stimulate the participation of the private sector in the effort and also to cover reforestation projects, beyond projects related to avoided deforestation. To this end, we will, with the support of the World Bank, revise decree 2021-1113 to improve the participation of the private sector and extend the scope of the REDD+ mechanism to reforestation projects (RM10, end April 2025).

88. We will build on other actions that can help protect forests and ecosystems. We will adopt a new forestry code, developed with the help of FAO, which will provide a better framework for the regulation of commercial logging, the control of forestry and the establishment of a sustainable financing mechanism. We will also build on ongoing efforts to improve the implementation of land legislation at the communal level to incorporate protected area concerns.

Pillar 5: Mobilizing Climate Finance

89. We are committed to presenting a bold vision of mobilizing climate finance from different sources to implement our climate change agenda. Madagascar has the potential to be an attractive destination for climate investments with multiple adaptation and mitigation cobenefits. Currently, the private sector accounts for only 5 percent of total climate finance flows in the country, 70 percent of which is for the energy sector (source: African Development Bank report). The World Bank's upcoming CCDR report highlights several opportunities for private sector investment. Taking full advantage of these opportunities requires that the fundamental regulatory and institutional mechanisms are in place, first and foremost a climate finance mobilization strategy, a national green taxonomy, and a commitment to update the regulatory framework so that Madagascar is ready to take full advantage of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement when UNFCCC rules are finalized.

90. We want Madagascar to be ready, at the regulatory and institutional levels, to participate in the mechanisms provided for in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. We acknowledge that Madagascar's current regulatory framework (Decree 2012-690) has not been updated since the Kyoto Protocol was replaced by the Paris Agreement in 2015. With the support of the World Bank and building on a gap analysis funded by the UK Embassy, we will adopt the necessary legal texts for the overhaul of the Clean Development Mechanism's designated national authority and the adaptation of carbon project approval procedures to comply with Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. These texts will outline the rules, modalities, and procedures for the development of activities with eligible adaptation and/or SDG co-benefits under the Article 6 collaborative framework, in addition to enabling Madagascar to meet its reporting obligations under the Agreement.

91. Given Madagascar's abundance of natural capital, a climate finance strategy will strengthen Madagascar's position on the global and national stage as an attractive destination for climate investments with adaptation and mitigation co-benefits. We recognize that this requires a greater focus on developing a bankable pipeline of projects, with incentives in place to attract multiple sources of capital. We are fully aware that the private sector must be a key stakeholder in this bold vision. Taking full advantage of reforms to improve the business environment under the ECF program, climate governance reforms under the first pillar of the RSF to strengthen inter-ministerial coordination, and with the assistance of interested development partners and input from the private sector, we commit to adopt an inter-ministerial decree on a climate finance mobilization strategy that prioritizes key areas of investment stipulated in national framework documents with a tentative budget, options for innovative blended financing mechanisms, and a timeline for implementation (RM11, end October 2025).

92. We commit to create, through a green taxonomy, an enabling environment for the development of green financial products by the financial sector and to incentivize the private sector to invest in projects with adaptation and mitigation co-benefits. In the context of a symposium organized by the Central Bank of Madagascar (BFM) in September 2023 on the impacts of climate change on the Malagasy economy, we published the "Antananarivo Declaration on Climate Change and Financial Innovation: From Challenges to Opportunities for Central Banks" to highlight the implications of climate change on financial stability. This declaration also led to the creation of a working group within BFM to strengthen the central bank's preparedness for climate risk management. With the support of the IMF's MCM Department, we will adopt a decree to implement a national green taxonomy to inform all green and climate-related investments (RM12, end April 2027). As an intermediate step towards the realization of this RM, we will establish by May 2025 a steering committee with the MEF, MEDD, BFM and other key stakeholders, including private sector participants, to inform the drafting process. We will also follow best practices from international networks such as the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) and the Sustainable Banking and Finance Network (SBFN).

DATA QUALITY

93. We are committed to producing and disseminating quality statistical information in a timely manner to ensure rigorous monitoring of the program. To this end, we will provide our National Statistical Institute (INSTAT), as well as our other departments in charge of statistics, with the financial, human, and material resources necessary to effectively carry out their respective missions. As in the past, we are counting on the support of our partners to support us financially and technically. In addition to improving the quality and frequency of production of existing statistics, we also plan to produce new statistics to further improve the availability of economic information in the long-term. Among the projects under consideration are: (i) the launch of a survey to produce a producer price index (PPI); (ii) improving the calculation and publication of national accounts statistics through more disaggregated data; and (iii) the publication of new foreign trade indicators and industrial production indices (IPI).

94. In the shorter term, we will work to complete the following activities:

  • Complete and publish the results of the latest Continuous Household Survey (CHS2021) to provide more up-to-date information on household living conditions and poverty.

  • Update the information on the household reference consumption basket for the calculation of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) using the results of the 2021 Continuous Household Survey (CHS).

  • Finalize and publish GDP data from 2021 to 2023, according to the publication schedule, to allow better monitoring of the country's economic situation.

  • Update the information on the National Data Summary Page (NSDP), to improve data transparency.

  • Continue preparations for a series of surveys on diaspora remittances (formal and informal) to better assess their weight in the country's GDP.

  • Continue the process of including statistics on the activities of the insurance sector in monetary statistics in accordance with the guidelines of the Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and the compilation guide.

  • To carry out the migration to sixth edition of the Balance of Payments Manual, with the support of requested technical assistance.

  • To support the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock in the launch and implementation of the agricultural census, which has been long delayed.

  • Move forward on the project to rebase the national accounts.

  • Implement regular and reliable collection of data on capital grants.

PROGRAM MONITORING PROCEDURES

95. Under the ECF arrangement, the program will be reviewed semi-annually and will be evaluated based on periodic and continuous performance criteria, indicative targets, and a monetary policy consultation clause (Table 1). Progress on structural reforms will be assessed according to structural benchmarks (Table 2). Detailed definitions, calculation methods and reporting requirements for all performance criteria will be specified in the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU) attached to this memorandum. The TMU will also define the scope and frequency of data to be reported to IMF staff for program monitoring. Throughout the duration of the program, the authorities will not introduce restrictions on current payments or multiple currency practices without the prior approval of the IMF in accordance with Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement. The first and second reviews of the program will be held on or after November 30, 2024 and May 30, 2025 respectively, based on performance criteria on the test dates of end-June 2024 and end-December 2024.

96. Under the RSF-supported arrangement, progress will be measured through the achievement of the reform measures detailed in Table 3.

Table 1.

Madagascar: Quantitative Performance Criteria and Indicative Targets

(Billions of ariary; unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Madagascar authorities; and IMF staff projections. 1 Cumulative annual ceiling monitored on a continuous basis starting from January 1, 2024. 2 If the end of period year-on-year M3 growth is outside the upper/lower bound, a formal consultation with the Executive Board as part of program reviews would be triggered. 3 Primary balance excluding foreign-financed investment and grants. 4 Spending on social protection, based on the budget functional classification. 5 Cumulative amount from the beginning of each year.
Table 2.

Madagascar: Prior Actions and Structural Benchmarks, June 2024-June 2025

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Table 3.

Madagascar: Proposed RSF Matrix of Reform Measures

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Attachment II. Technical Memorandum of Understanding

1. This Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU) contains definitions and adjuster mechanisms that explain the calculation of the quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets set out in Tables 1 and 2 attached to the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies for 2024-2027. Unless otherwise specified, all quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets will be evaluated in terms of cumulative flows from the beginning of each calendar year.

DEFINITIONS

2. For the purposes of this TMU, the terms "external" and "domestic" are defined in terms of residence.

3. For the purposes of this TMU, "government" is defined to comprise the scope of government financial operations reported in the operations globales du Tresor (OGT). The government does not cover the activities of state-owned enterprises and sub-national authorities.

4. For the purposes of this TMU, the program exchange rates1 are as follows:

Program Exchange Rates

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5. Accounts denominated in currencies other than SDRs will first be valued in SDRs and then converted to MGAs. Amounts in currencies other than those shown in the table above, as well as monetary gold, will first be valued in SDRs at the exchange rate or gold price in effect on March 28, 2024 (SDR 1667.4 per ounce of gold) and then converted into MGA.

6. The performance criteria used in the program, as defined below, refer to the net foreign assets of the central bank, external payment arrears, new external debt owed or guaranteed by the government and/or the central bank, and the primary balance.

7. In addition to the specific performance criteria listed in paragraph 6, as for any Fund arrangement, continuous performance criteria also include the non-introduction of exchange restrictions and multiple currency practices. Specifically, these criteria cover: (i) the imposition or intensification of restrictions on payments and transfers made in the context of current international transactions; (ii) the introduction or modification of multiple currency practices; (iii) the conclusion of bilateral payment agreements that do not comply with Article VIII; and (iv) the imposition or intensification of import restrictions for balance of payments reasons. These continuous performance criteria, given their non-quantitative nature, are not included in the table of performance criteria annexed to the MEFP.

8. Total government revenue consists of tax and non-tax budget revenue (as defined in Chapter 5 of the Government Finance Statistics Manual (2001 edition) but excluding revenue from Treasury Operations) and grants. Revenues are accounted for on a cash basis. Taxes on imports of petroleum products, paid through the issuance of promissory notes, are recorded as revenue at the time of the issuance of the promissory notes: to reconcile the difference in timing between the issuance of the promissory notes and the actual payment to the Treasury, an equivalent amount is recorded (negatively) under the item "other net transactions of the Treasury" until the actual payment.

PROVISION OF DATA TO THE FUND

9. The following information will be provided to IMF staff for program monitoring purposes (see Table 1 for details):

  • Data on all variables subject to quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets will be provided to IMF staff on a monthly basis, with a lag of no more than four weeks for central bank net foreign assets (NFA) and eight weeks for other data. The authorities will promptly communicate any data revisions to IMF staff.

  • The Financial Intelligence Unit (SAMIFIN) will continue to publish, on a publicly accessible website, quarterly data (no later than the end of the month following the quarter) on reports of suspicious transactions related to money laundering of the proceeds of corruption, tax evasion, customs fraud, terrorist financing, and other crimes, addressed to the authorities in charge of law enforcement (Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau, National Gendarmerie, National Police, Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, Ministry of Mines, Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy, Anti-corruption Courts, etc.) and to other competent authorities (Directorate General of Taxation, Directorate General of Customs, Directorate General of the Treasury,...). SAMIFIN will also similarly publish data on the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions on terrorism, terrorism financing, and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

  • The Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau (BIANCO) will publish on a publicly accessible website quarterly data (no later than the end of the month following the quarter) on the number of persons indicted, the number of persons convicted by decision of a court of first instance, the number of persons convicted by a court of last resort and the number of verifications of asset declarations of public officials.

  • For variables that are relevant for assessing performance against program objectives but are not explicitly defined in this TMU, the authorities will consult with IMF staff, as needed, on how best to measure them and report them.

QUANTITATIVE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA

A. Floor on the Primary Balance

10. The primary balance is calculated as follows:

  • It corresponds to the difference between the sum of tax and non-tax revenues and grants and the sum of capital expenditures and current spending excluding interest payments (as reported in the authorities' table of government financial operations or OGT).

  • For the purpose of calculating the primary balance, tax revenues are recorded on a cash basis (see A8) and measured on a net basis, i.e., net of VAT credit refunds. Grants include both current and capital grants. Spending is recorded on a commitment basis. Current spending excluding interest payments is the sum of expenditures on wages and salaries, goods and services, transfers and subsidies and Treasury operations (net) excluding VAT credit refunds. Capital expenditures include expenditures financed from domestic and external resources. The primary balance is calculated cumulatively from the beginning of the calendar year. For reference, using data at end of December 2023, the value of the primary balance would be as follows:

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B. External Debt

Ceiling on the Accumulation of New External Payment Arrears

11. These arrears consist of overdue debt service obligations (principal repayments and interest) related to loans contracted or guaranteed by the government or the central bank of Madagascar (BFM). Debt service obligations (including unpaid penalties and interest charges) are considered overdue when they have not been paid within 30 days of the due date or after the end of a grace period agreed with each creditor, or unilaterally granted by each creditor before the due date. They exclude arrears resulting from the non-payment of debt service for which the creditor has agreed in writing to negotiate a different payment schedule, as well as debt service payments under contractual obligations that are not made on time for reasons beyond the control of the Malagasy authorities. This monitoring target should be observed on a continuous basis from the approval by the IMF Executive Board of the request for the ECF arrangement.

Ceiling on New External Debt

12. For program monitoring purposes, the present value of debt at the time of its contracting is calculated by discounting future debt service payments. The discount rate used for this purpose is 5 percent.

13. Where an external loan agreement provides for multiple disbursements and where the interest rate applicable to each disbursement is linked to the evolution of a reference rate from the date of signature, the interest rate in effect at the time of signature shall be used for the calculation of the present value and grant element applicable to all disbursements provided for under that agreement.

14. For program monitoring purposes, the definition of debt is provided in paragraph 8 of the Guidelines on Public Debt Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs attached to Executive Board Decision No. 15688-(14/107), adopted on December 5, 2014 (see Annex). External debt is defined according to the creditor's residence.

15. In the case of loans with a variable interest rate in the form of a benchmark rate plus a fixed spread, the present value of the debt will be calculated using a program reference rate plus the fixed spread (in basis points) indicated in the loan agreement. The program's reference rate for the six-month USD LIBOR is 5.34 percent and will remain fixed for the duration of the program. The spread between the three-month EURIBOR and the six-month USD LIBOR is -144 basis points. Where the variable rate is linked to a different benchmark interest rate, a spread reflecting the difference between the benchmark rate and the six-month USD LIBOR (rounded to the nearest 50 basis points) is added.

16. The performance criterion (ceiling) applies to the present value of the new external debt contracted or guaranteed by the government or BFM. The cumulative ceiling applies to debt contracted or guaranteed whose value has not yet been received, including private debt for which public guarantees have been extended. The present value is determined using the IMF's concessionality calculator or the Excel template available online. This monitoring target is to be calculated by calendar year beginning January 1, 2024, and observed on a continuous basis from the IMF Executive Board's approval of the request for the ECF arrangement until the conclusion of the first review, at which time it will be renewed and possibly adjusted. The ceiling is subject to an adjustment factor defined below.

17. The ceiling set out in paragraph 16 does not apply to: (i) the use of IMF resources; (ii) debts contracted to restructure, refinance or prepay existing debts, to the extent that their terms are more favorable than the existing debts, and up to the amount of the debt restructured, refinanced or repaid early; and (iii) debts classified as international reserve liabilities of BFM.

C. Floor on the Net Foreign Assets of the Central Bank of Madagascar

18. The target floor for NFA of BFM is evaluated using the end-period stock, calculated using program exchange rates. The NFA of BFM is defined as the difference between BFM's gross foreign assets and total foreign liabilities, including debt owed to the IMF. All foreign assets and foreign liabilities are converted into SDR at the program exchange rates reported in paragraph 4. For reference, at end-December 2023, NFA were SDR 1236.7 million, calculated as follows:

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INDICATIVE OBJECTIVES

A. Floor on Domestic Primary Balance

19. The domestic primary balance corresponds to the difference between the sum of domestic tax and non-tax revenue and domestically financed capital expenditures and current spending excluding interest payments. Tax revenues are measured on a cash basis and on a net basis, i.e., net of VAT credit refunds. Spending is recorded on a commitment basis. Current spending excluding interest payments is the sum of expenditures on wages and salaries, goods and services, transfers and subsidies, and treasury operations (net) excluding VAT credit refunds. The primary balance is calculated cumulatively from the beginning of the calendar year. For reference, using data at end-December 2023, the value of the domestic primary balance would be as follows:

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B. Floor on Priority Social Spending

20. The scope of social expenditure monitored under the program includes domestic expenditures linked to education, health, social protection, and water and sanitation. The floor on social spending is calculated cumulatively from the start of each calendar year on the basis of the budgetary appropriations allocated to these sectors by the budget law, on the basis of the functional classification of public administrations (CFAP 2014). This floor is defined as the sum of budgetary appropriations for divisions 07 (health) including nutrition, 09 (education) and 10 (social protection) as well as for groups 052 (wastewater management) and 063 (water supply), excluding externally financed investments.

C. Floor on Gross Domestic Tax Revenue and Gross Customs Revenue

21. To monitor this target, government tax revenues are recorded on a cash basis and calculated on a gross basis, i.e., before VAT credit refunds. They include all domestic taxes and taxes on foreign trade received by the treasury of the central government. Tax revenue excludes: (1) proceeds from the local sale of in-kind donations; and (2) gross receipts to the government from signing bonuses paid in connection with the awarding of mining or oil exploration rights. Revenues are measured on a cash basis as indicated in the table of government financial operations (OGT). The gross tax revenue floor is calculated cumulatively from the beginning of the calendar year. For reference, for the year ending in December 2023, gross domestic tax revenue was MGA 4,149 billion, with MGA 3,773 billion net domestic tax revenue and MGA 376 billion in VAT refunds, and gross customs revenue was MGA 4,084 billion, with MGA 3,990 billion net customs revenue (including MGA 1,092 billion in oil tax arrears (droits et taxes a ['importation de produits petroliers) due for 2021 and 2022 by oil companies) and MGA 94 billion in VAT refunds.

D. Ceiling on Domestic Arrears

22. Domestic arrears are amounts owed by the government to resident creditors, but not paid. They include (1) remaining payments "in the accounting phase" or expenses committed and validated, but not yet processed by the General Directorate of the Treasury (DGT), and (2) remaining payments "in the financial phase", i.e., expenses committed, validated and processed by the DGT but not paid within 90 days. The ceiling is calculated cumulatively from the beginning of the calendar year.

MONETARY POLICY CONSULTATION CLAUSE

23. The authorities will complete a consultation with the IMF's Executive Board on: (i) the monetary policy stance and measures taken to achieve the program's objectives; (ii) the reasons for a possible deviation, taking into account mitigating factors; and (iii) proposed measures if necessary, if the year-on-year M3 money supply growth at the end of the period is outside a band of ± 4 percentage points around the 12 percent midpoint of the target band for end-June, end-September and end-December 2024 and end-March 2025.

24. The target band midpoint will be reassessed at each review.

STRUCTURAL BENCHMARKS AND REFORM MEASURES UNDER THE RSF

25. Regarding the structural benchmark for the provision of detailed data on any budget transfers to JIRAMA suppliers to the staff of the IMF and the World Bank and the provision of related documents within a maximum of 45 days after the end of the month, the information to be provided is as follows: (1) the details of each transfer, including the commitment reference, the beneficiary, the purpose of the transfer (objet), the commitment date (date d'engagement) and the amount of the transfer; 2) the agreement or convention signed with the supplier in relation with the transfer.

26. Calls for tenders, the results of these tenders, and contracts for JIRAMA fuel purchases will be published on the JIRAMA’s website within a maximum of 45 days after the end of the month of acceptance of an offer.

27. Regarding the structural benchmark on the provision of a dashboard presenting key performance indicators for the tax and customs administrations, the dashboard to be communicated monthly will include the indicators from the template provided by the IMF staff and built on the basis of the authorities' proposals.

28. In connection with the implementation of an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism, and until the elimination of subsidies, the authorities will provide IMF staff with the calculations necessary to estimate the monthly flows and outstanding stocks of government's gross liabilities vis-a-vis fuel distributors (solde de lissage) within four weeks of the end of each month.

29. With respect to RSF RM06 on disaster risk management, the authorities (CPGU - Cell for Prevention and Management of Emergencies within the Prime Minister's Office) will provide IMF staff, by the end of November 2024, with a note on the conclusions of the simulation exercise to be undertaken by September 2024 on the operationalization of the National Contingency Fund (FNC), highlighting findings from this exercise in terms of obstacles to swift disbursement of emergency spending and necessary regulatory texts to be adopted by April 2025 to address these obstacles and put in place arrangements to ensure adequate transparency and reporting of emergency expenditures under the FNC.

MEMORANDUM ITEMS

30. Official external budget support refers to grants and loans, including in-kind assistance when the products are sold by the government and the receipts are earmarked for a budgeted spending item. It also includes any other exceptional financing provided by foreign public entities or the private sector that is included in the budget. Grants and loans specifically earmarked for investment projects are excluded. Official external budget support is calculated as a cumulative flow from January 1st of each year.

31. Disbursements of international loans earmarked for investment projects are calculated as a cumulative flow from January 1st of each year.

USE OF ADJUSTERS

32. The performance criterion for BFM NFA will be adjusted according to deviations from the amounts of official external budget support projected in the program. This difference will be calculated cumulatively as of January 1, 2024. The NFA floor will be adjusted downwards (upwards) by the cumulative downward (upward) deviation of actual budget support from projected budget support (official external budget support). This adjustment will be capped at the equivalent of SDR 120 million, evaluated at the program exchange rates indicated in paragraph 4.

33. The performance criteria for the primary balance will be adjusted according to deviations from amounts projected in the program of official external budget support in the form of loans and disbursements of international loans earmarked for investment projects. These deviations will be calculated cumulatively from the beginning of each calendar year. The following is an explanation of these adjustments:

  • If the actual official external budget support in the form of loans and the disbursements on international loans earmarked for investment projects are lower than projected on a test date, the floor on the primary balance for that test date will be increased by the cumulative deviation of the actual value of official external budget support in the form of loans and disbursements on international loans earmarked for investment projects from projected amounts, subject to a maximum of 0.5 percent of GDP, calculated at the actual quarterly average exchange rates.

  • Conversely, if the actual official external budget support in the form of loans and disbursements on international loans earmarked for investment projects are higher than projected on a test date, the floor on the primary balance for that test date will be reduced by the cumulative deviation of the actual value of official external budget support in the form of loans and disbursements on international loans earmarked for investment projects, subject to a maximum of 0.5 percent of GDP, calculated at the actual quarterly average exchange rates.

34. Two adjustment factors can be applied to the external debt ceiling set in present value:

  • An adjustor of up to 5 percent of the external debt ceiling set in present value terms applies in case of deviations resulting from a change in financing terms. The application of the adjustor may be triggered by changes in interest rates, maturity, grace period, payment schedule, commissions, fees related to a debt or receivables. The adjustment factor cannot be applied when deviations are due to an increase in the nominal amount of the total debt contracted or guaranteed and are related to debt sustainability.

  • The external debt ceiling at present value will be adjusted downwards by a maximum of US$42 million if loans linked to projects financed by the World Bank in 2024 do not materialize.

Table 1.

Madagascar: Data Reporting Requirements

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Annex. Guidelines on Performance Criteria with Respect to External Debt

Excerpt from paragraph 8(a) of the Guidelines on Public Debt Conditionality in Fund Arrangements attached to Executive Board Decision No. 15688-(14/107), adopted December 5, 2014.

(a) For the purpose of these guidelines, the term "debt” will be understood to mean a current, i.e., not contingent, liability, created under a contractual arrangement through the provision of value in the form of assets (including currency) or services, and which requires the obligor to make one or more payments in the form of assets (including currency) or services, at some future point(s) in time; these payments will discharge the principal and/or interest liabilities incurred under the contract. Debts can take a number of forms, the primary ones being as follows:

  • i) loans, i.e., advances of money to the obligor by the lender made on the basis of an undertaking that the obligor will repay the funds in the future (including deposits, bonds, debentures, commercial loans and buyers' credits) and temporary exchanges of assets that are equivalent to fully collateralized loans under which the obligor is required to repay the funds, and usually pay interest, by repurchasing the collateral from the buyer in the future (such as repurchase agreements and official swap arrangements);

  • ii) suppliers' credits, i.e., contracts where the supplier permits the obligor to defer payments until sometime after the date on which the goods are delivered or services are provided; and

  • iii) leases, i.e., arrangements under which property is provided which the lessee has the right to use for one or more specified period(s) of time that are usually shorter than the total expected service life of the property, while the lessor retains the title to the property. For the purpose of these guidelines, the debt is the present value (at the inception of the lease) of all lease payments expected to be made during the period of the agreement excluding those payments that cover the operation, repair, or maintenance of the property.

(b) Under the definition of debt set out in this paragraph, arrears, penalties, and judicially awarded damages arising from the failure to make payment under a contractual obligation that constitutes debt are debt. Failure to make payment on an obligation that is not considered debt under this definition (e.g., payment on delivery) will not give rise to debt.

1

Textile suppliers in Madagascar were adversely affected by the collapse of two major French clothing retailers in 2023.

2

The government's attempt to enforce a minimum export price in 2022 has led to a drop in demand in a context of very good harvests in 2022 and 2023, leading to oversupply of high-quality beans and a collapse in world prices. The emergence of new players (e.g., Uganda, Papua New Guinea) is also threatening Madagascar's dominant market position.

3

Madagascar's African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) status was renewed in 2024, maintaining the textile industry's duty-free access to the U.S. market, the largest market for Madagascar's textile exports. Madagascar's mining industry, which is the world's third largest supplier of graphite, is also expected to benefit from China's decision to halt global exports of the mineral in end-2023.

4

Madagascar has long-standing arrears to Algeria and Angola (for a total of US$ 188 million) which continue to be deemed away under the policy on arrears to official bilateral creditors, as the underlying Paris Club agreement is adequately representative, and the authorities are making best efforts to resolve the arrears. In addition, Madagascar owes US$ 18 million to private external creditors. The authorities are pursuing appropriate policies and continue to make good faith efforts to reach a collaborative agreement with these creditors on terms consistent with the relief expected under the HIPC initiative. Prompt Fund support is considered essential for the successful implementation of the program.

5

Despite a significant downward revision in revenue projections towards more realistic levels between the initial and revised budget law, staff's revenue projections remain slightly lower than the authorities by 0.2 percentage points of GDP, because of more conservative assumptions following weaker-than-expected collection in the first quarter of 2024. Those lower revenue imply slightly lower capital expenditures in staff's projections to reach a similar primary deficit target.

6

It is important to keep monitoring the domestic primary balance excluding foreign-financed investment and grants, which are not fully under the control of the government.

7

The wage tax or impot sur les revenus salaries et assimiles (IRSA) is withheld every month by employers on earned income including salaries and benefits.

8

Chalendard, Cyril, Ana Fernandes, Gael Raballand, and Bob Rijkers, 2023 "Corruption in Customs", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.138 (1), February, pages 575-636.

9

Operational Guidance on Program Design and Conditionality, January 2024. In the present case, the review-based approach to monetary policy conditionality involves assessing changes in M3 growth compared to the set band in the context of the evolution of other key macroeconomic variables.

10

IMF. 2023. Social Spending and Outcomes in Madagascar, IMF Country Report 23/118. World Bankw 2010-22: Boosting Infrastructure and Social Service Delivery.

11

Cooke et alii, 2022, "The Economic Contribution of Madagascar's Protected Areas - A review of the Evidence".

13

Hussain, Farah Imrana, Tlaiye, Laura E.; Jordan Arce, Rolando Marcelo, 2020. Developing a National Green Taxonomy: A World Bank Guide. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.

14

The World Bank approved a 3-year programmatic Development Policy Operation (DPO) in June 2023 with three annual disbursements of US$ 100 million each. There are also firm commitments from the African Development Bank on a two-year budget support operation with financing of SDR 50 million in both 2024 and 2025.

15

The continuous PC for new external debt on a contractual basis will be reevaluated each year with the objective to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio at 60 percent in the medium-term.

1

The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) shows events that could materially alter the baseline path (the scenario most likely to materialize in the view of IMF staff). The relative likelihood is staff’s subjective assessment of the risks surrounding the baseline (“low” is meant to indicate a probability below 10 percent, “medium” a probability between 10 and 30 percent, and “high” a probability between 30 and 50 percent). The RAM reflects staff views on the source of risks and overall level of concern at the time of discussions with the authorities. Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly. The conjunctural shocks and scenarios highlight risks that may materialize over a shorter horizon (between 12 to 18 months) given the current baseline. Structural risks are those that are likely to remain salient over a longer horizon.

1

David and others, 2023, "Navigating Fiscal Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa: Resilient Strategies and Credible Anchors in Turbulent Waters", IMF Departmental Paper 2023/007; Eyraud and others, 2018, "Second-Generation Fiscal Rules: Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility and Enforceability", IMF Staff Discussion Note 2018/004.

2

For an estimation of buffers for low-income countries derived from a risk-based approach, see notably Caselli and others, 2022, "The Return to Fiscal Rules", IMF Staff Discussion Note 2022/002; Eyraud and others, 2018, "Second-Generation Fiscal Rules: Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility and Enforceability", IMF Staff Discussion Note 2018/004; and Baum and others, 2017, "Can They Do It All? Fiscal Space in Low-Income Countries" IMF Working Paper 17/110.

3

A lower buffer could be applied to the debt limit computed from the debt-service-to-revenue ratio, given the limited risk that the government would not be able to rollover domestic debt (about 35 percent of total public debt).

4

The median debt-to-GDP level in existing fiscal rules in sub-Saharan African countries is 70 percent of GDP.

5

See IMF Country Report No. 23/117, Box 3. Strengthening Budget Credibility.

2

The Global Climate Risk Index (CRI) developed by Germanwatch analyses quantified impacts of extreme weather events both in terms of fatalities as well as economic losses that occurred. The countries ranking highest are the ones most impacted.

3

See notably Waeber et alii, 2019, "Uplisting of Malagasy precious woods critical for their survival," Biological Conservation.

4

World Bank, upcoming CCDR.

6

See Marchetta, 2019, "The Role of Weather on Schooling and Work of Young Adults in Madagascar." American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Online Library.

7

The new General State Policy announced in January 2024 provides for the two large hydropower projects in Sahofika and Volobe to enter construction phase in 2024.

8

The Debt-Investment-Growth, and Natural Disasters (DIGNAD) model, developed by the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund, is a dynamic general equilibrium model designed to study the macroeconomic impact of an exogenous one-off natural disaster shock (cyclone, drought, flood). See Annex VI for full details of the model.

9

Although reconstruction starts immediately, most of the fiscal impact is observed one year later.

10

Adoption in 2020 of a National Standard on Road Infrastructures Resilient to Flooding and Geological Phenomena in Madagascar (NIRIPG - Norme sur les Infrastructures Routieres Resistantes aux Inondations et Phenomenes Geologiques).

11

Not addressed under the RSF.

1

In the simulation, we did not separate the effect of a cyclone from a drought. The latter would further reduce productivity whereas the former would cause more damage to infrastructures.

2

The labor income tax rate is between 0-20 percent with 4 brackets.

3

The assumed GDP growth ignores productivity losses associated with natural disasters which are estimated around 0.5 percentage point in the current macroframework.

4

Madagascar has experienced only four episodes of negative GDP growth below -5 percent since 1980, which corresponded to a combination of natural disasters, political crises, and pandemics. The calibrated 6 percent decline in GDP would correspond to a 11-percent loss in GDP compared to a situation with no disaster, where the economy would have grown at 5 percent. The 2022 Climate Macroeconomic Assessment Program (CMAP) report pointed out that a typical tropical cyclone causes losses of 1.8 percent of GDP, average floods imply losses of 2.4 percent of GDP (EM-DAT, 2022) and an average drought reduces yearly real growth by 0.3 percentage point. The World Bank disaster risk profile indicates that the average annual direct loss from earthquakes, floods, and tropical cyclones is approximately $100 million, which is around 0.6 percent of GDP. Given those estimates, the calibrated decline in GDP looks prudent.

5

Although reconstruction starts immediately, most of the fiscal impact is observed one year later.

1

Estimates are based on the methodology used in the Climate Assessment Policy Tool (CPAT). To use the tool, reference prices in local currency are converted in constant 2021 USD and the required change in pump prices to close the gap between pump and reference prices is inferred from 2024 prices expressed in constant 2021 USD under a no change scenario. The resulting required change in pump prices is spread over several years as needed to allow for a gradual implementation of the reforms.

2

Based on the current price structure, the excise tax on diesel amounts to 228 ariary/liter and the contribution to the road maintenance fund to 134 ariary/liter, while they amount to 503 ariary/liter and to 288 ariary/liter respectively for gasoline. With the 20 percent VAT, the increase in diesel taxes required to align the tax structures between diesel and gasoline amounts to 515 ariary/liter.

3

For transfers to households, CPAT assumptions are used: (i) transfers are directed to the 40 percent poorest households, (ii) 70 percent of targeted households would effectively receive transfers, and (iii) 10 percent of the transfers would not reach their target.

1

The resident advisor devotes 60 percent of his time to Madagascar and 40 percent to the Union of Comoros, the latter through a mix of quarterly in-person missions to Moroni and remote support.

1

Data refers to reference exchange rates published on the IMF or the central bank of Madagascar's website for March 28, 2024.

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Republic of Madagascar: Request for an Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Cancellation of the Current Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for an Arrangement Under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility-Press Release; Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Staff Statement; and Statement by the Executive Director for Republic of Madagascar
Author:
International Monetary Fund. African Dept.