People’s Republic of China: 2022 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the People’s Republic of China
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1. China’s growth is slowing in the face of both cyclical and structural headwinds. With this slowdown, China’s growth in 2022 is expected to be below global growth for the first time in over 40 years. In the near term, the pandemic, the deep contraction in the real estate sector, and weaker global growth are the main drags, while a secular decline in productivity growth and demographic headwinds, amid geoeconomic fragmentation pressures, are weighing on medium-term growth prospects.

Abstract

1. China’s growth is slowing in the face of both cyclical and structural headwinds. With this slowdown, China’s growth in 2022 is expected to be below global growth for the first time in over 40 years. In the near term, the pandemic, the deep contraction in the real estate sector, and weaker global growth are the main drags, while a secular decline in productivity growth and demographic headwinds, amid geoeconomic fragmentation pressures, are weighing on medium-term growth prospects.

Context

1. China’s growth is slowing in the face of both cyclical and structural headwinds. With this slowdown, China’s growth in 2022 is expected to be below global growth for the first time in over 40 years. In the near term, the pandemic, the deep contraction in the real estate sector, and weaker global growth are the main drags, while a secular decline in productivity growth and demographic headwinds, amid geoeconomic fragmentation pressures, are weighing on medium-term growth prospects.

2. China weathered the initial impact of the pandemic well. The zero-COVID strategy allowed the economy to swiftly bounce back from the early-2020 lockdowns, while maintaining the death rate at remarkably low levels. This also allowed China to significantly expand the global supply of medical goods and meet the increased demand for durable goods at a critical time for the global economy.

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Vaccine Protection has been Waning

(Vaccinations by month, in percent of population)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: Our World in Data; BMC Infectious Diseases The Lancet; and IMF staff estimates.Notes: Intertemportal vaccine efficacy (VE) in percent based on studies for US-approved vaccines. Due to irregular reporting intervals, some numbers are linearly interpolated. Numbers cannot account for people who have been both fully vaccinated and boosted in a given time period, so present an upper bound.

3. Amid the sharpening tradeoff between growth and protecting lives, the authorities started relaxing COVID policies. The appearance of more contagious variants in 2022 has led to more frequent and longer lockdowns under the zero-COVID policy, with the restrictions and related uncertainty weighing on domestic demand. After a series of announcements in November and December 2022, the containment strategy was relaxed, allowing home quarantine, only very targeted lockdowns, and reduced testing requirements to enter public places and transportation. The authorities’ reported vaccination targets to improve protection among the elderly are welcome, although a broader re-acceleration of vaccinations is urgently needed to address waning immunity in the general population. Given this, further easing of the containment measures could have severe health consequences.

uA001fig02

Real Estate Indicators

(In percent,12M moving sum, year-on year change)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: CEIC Data Company Limited; and IMF staff calculations.

4. The property crisis has intensified during 2022. Beginning in the mid-2010s, developers responded to the authorities’ efforts to limit debt risks by increasingly financing new housing through pre-sales of unfinished homes to households. This helped the sector grow above estimates of fundamental demand (see Box 1) but shifted risks to homebuyers. The regulatory tightening, which intended to address this imbalance and associated risks, that started in 2020 has caused severe financial strains for developers, with homebuyers losing confidence in developers’ ability to complete pre-sold housing units. The resulting liquidity crisis has, for many developers, morphed into a broader solvency crisis, leading to a rapid slowdown in new housing starts and overall housing investment, along with a sharp decline in local government land revenues. The authorities have steadily stepped up support measures, but much-needed developer restructuring continues to be slow, in part complicated by the fact that pre-sale homebuyers awaiting delivery would face disproportionately large losses in market-based liquidation. House price declines have so far been modest, partly due to price floors, pointing to accumulating adjustment pressures.

5. Structural policy trends are clouding medium-term growth prospects. Productivity growth is weak, in large part because of the role of low-productivity state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and declining business dynamism.1 Reforms securing competitive neutrality between SOEs and privately owned firms have been lacking, while SOEs are being tasked to make advances in strategically important sectors and technologies affected by growing geoeconomic pressures, further burdening them with responsibilities. Guidelines to unify domestic markets and prevent anticompetitive behavior at the local level so far largely rely on voluntary compliance by local governments. Credit allocation is becoming less market-determined, as credit policies increasingly use lending targets to support specific sectors, while the announced “traffic-light” system for capital seems to signal more guidance for private capital allocation.

Recent Developments

A. Growth Remains Under Pressure

6. Growth remains under pressure and lacks balance as private consumption continues to underperform. After a rebound in the third quarter as a result of the recovery from the April-May lockdowns, activity in the fourth quarter is estimated to be contracting amid widening outbreaks, with sequential GDP growth estimated at -5.4 percent annualized. Private investment and especially private consumption show persistent weakness, reflecting COVID-related restrictions, a contracting real estate sector, and heightened uncertainty. These factors are reflected in an elevated household saving rate, which, at 32 percent on average in the four quarters ending in September 2022, remains above pre-pandemic levels. As a result, among many areas where rebalancing has faced setbacks (Table 6), internal demand-side rebalancing has been particularly affected, as measured by the share of private consumption in GDP. The GDP share of private consumption in 2022 is projected to be about 2 percentage points lower than in 2019, and about 4 percentage points below the pre-pandemic forecast for 2022. Private investment, therefore, lacks a sustainable driver at a time when the pandemic-related export boost is unwinding and real estate activity is declining. Real estate investment through November 2022 contracted by around 20 percent compared to the same period in 2021.

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Household Saving Rate

(In percent, 4Q moving average)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: CEIC Data Company Limited; National Bureau of Statistics China Household Survey; and IMF staff calculations.Note: Saving rate calculated as (1 – household consumption per capita/household disposable income per capita).

7. External tailwinds are fading, with increased capital outflow and exchange rate pressures (Figure 3).

  • Exports have been declining sequentially in volume terms, as pandemic-specific factors are unwinding and global growth is softening. The strong trade surplus in the first half of 2022 was primarily driven by weak imports amid the domestic slowdown, with the real estate contraction dampening commodity imports—despite the infrastructure focus of fiscal policy support and the rise in global commodity prices.

  • Capital outflows (especially bond outflows) have increased since February 2022, driven by interest rate differentials given monetary policy tightening in advanced economies. However, compared to the cumulative equity and bond inflows of recent years and the trade surplus, total outflows through October 2022 have been small. Similarly, net capital outflows (including net errors and omissions) in the first half of 2022 were smaller than in the previous episode of large outflows in 2015–16.

  • The RMB has depreciated by around 10 percent against the U.S. dollar since March 2022 in the wake of the strongest U.S. dollar in decades. Reflecting similar movements in non-U.S. trading partners’ currencies, the NEER has been relatively stable with about 3.7 percent depreciation (as of November), while the REER depreciated by about 7.4 percent reflecting relatively low inflation in China. The authorities have taken steps to stabilize exchange rate expectations, including by lowering the FX reserve requirement ratios in May and September to provide more onshore FX liquidity, tightening the reserve requirement on FX forwards (an outflow capital flow management measure (CFM)) in September, and raising the cross-border financing macro-prudential adjustment parameter for financial institutions and enterprises (relaxation of an inflow CFM) in October.

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Bilateral US$ Exchange Rate, Cross-country Comparison

(In percent, difference between March 1, 2022 and December 9, 2022)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.

8. Weak demand has resulted in labor market strains and muted inflation pressures. Unemployment remains slightly above pre- pandemic levels at 5.7 percent as of November. Unemployment among the young is particularly high at 17.1 percent, 4.6 percentage points higher than the same month in 2019, at a time in which there are a record number of graduates amid weak demand, especially in sectors disproportionately employing younger workers. The number of migrant workers as of the third quarter remains 4 percent below the pre-pandemic trend. With the output gap widening from -1.5 percent of potential GDP in 2021 to -2.8 percent in 2022, both headline and core CPI inflation have remained below the PBC’s 3-percent goal, with headline CPI inflation reaching 1.6 percent y/y in November on the back of elevated pork and energy prices.

uA001fig05

CPI Inflation

(In percent year-on-year)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: National Bureau of Statistics China; and IMF staff calculations.

9. Macroeconomic policies appropriately turned expansionary again, but providing little support to rebalancing. On the fiscal side, the main steps included a series of tax and other relief measures for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) impacted by lockdowns and the expected spending on investment projects of the carryover from the issuance of Special Local Government Bonds in 2021 (RMB 700 billion, or about 0.6 percent of GDP) and the proceeds from 2022 issuance quota (RMB 4.15 trillion, an increase of RMB 500 billion relative to 2021). Overall, staff estimates suggest that, with these measures, the augmented cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) deficit will increase by 2.2 percentage points of potential GDP in 2022.2 Monetary policy has become moderately accommodative following modest interest rate-based easing measures, cuts to the reserve requirement ratio, adjustments to deposit rate guidance policies that have helped lower deposit rates, and the use of structural credit policies to steer credit to SMEs and other borrower segments. The growth impact of the fiscal measures has, however, been constrained by a focus on enterprises and increasingly less effective infrastructure investment, underscoring the limited role of automatic stabilizers. The effect on confidence and growth would also have been greater if the extent of support that was ultimately delivered had been communicated from the outset, rather than through a series of announcements.

uA001fig06

Confidence by Businesses and Consumers

(In percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: CEIC Data Company Limited; and IMF staff calculations.1/ The Consumer Confidence Index ranges between 0 (most pessimistic) to 200 (most optimistic), with 100 being neutral.

10. The unbalanced recovery and extreme weather events have made the achievement of China’s near-term climate goals more challenging. China is a world leader in renewable energy. In the first half of 2022, China’s installed solar power generation capacity jumped by about 26 percent y/y and installed wind power generation capacity increased by around 17 percent y/y. Given the higher energy intensity of investment and exports, the lagging consumption recovery, however, makes it more difficult to reduce the overall energy intensity of growth—a crucial component of China’s path to carbon neutrality (see 2021 Article IV staff report).3 At the same time, climate change-induced heatwaves have raised energy demand while droughts reduced the availability of hydro power, leading to an increased reliance on domestically-available coal. The latter has been reinforced by higher global energy prices. In response, policymakers have eased some intermediate climate targets on energy intensity and energy consumption so as to ensure energy security. These developments, together with the intrinsic variability of wind and solar power and the need to limit emissions, underline the importance of recently announced market-based reforms in the power sector which aim to unify China’s regionally divided power markets by 2025 and scale up the grid system to onload more renewable energy capacity. The current regulatory framework—largely based on administrative pricing—still lacks efficiency as well as incentives to lower energy consumption, to scale up renewable energy, and to provide ancillary services that would enhance grid stability and inter-provincial power trading (see SIP on market reforms in the power sector).

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Temperatures have Increased Dramatically in Recent Years

(In degrees Celsius)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal; and University of East Anglia CRU database.Note: Data is observable mean temperature.

Authorities’ Views

11. The authorities noted that growth was affected by significant shocks in 2022. They argued that decisive economic measures and their accumulated experience with containment allowed them to further optimize COVID policies and minimize economic disruptions while saving lives. They highlighted that monetary policy tightening in advanced economies had led to moderate capital outflows and exchange rate pressures. Notwithstanding softening external demand, China’s goods exports showed resilience. Climate change was viewed as a growing threat and the authorities highlighted their steadfast implementation of measures to ensure reaching their climate goals.

12. The authorities stressed that macroeconomic policies had proactively supported the economy in 2022. The authorities estimated that the government provided more than RMB 4.2 trillion in tax relief and fee rebates to enterprises. In addition, the business support scope of government funded financing guarantee companies has been expanded and policy bank loans have been expanded to support specific industries. They observed that these measures had clear objectives, were sustainable and targeted with precision, and were promptly implemented to achieve swift results. Monetary policy helped stabilize the macroeconomy by ensuring a reasonable increase in money and credit and providing a modest reduction in financing costs for firms and households. Financial policies have guided financial institutions to increase loans to small and micro enterprises and other groups, support the rescue and development of small and micro enterprises, and actively respond to the adverse impact of cyclical fluctuations on their production and operation.

B. Rising Financial Vulnerabilities

13. Real estate developer restructuring continues to be slow, despite a very large share of the sector being in financial distress. As of November 2022, developers that have already defaulted or are likely to default—with average bond prices below 40 percent of face value— represented 38 percent of the 2020 market share of firms with available bond pricing. Despite these strains, the pace of restructuring has been slow, partially hampered by the potential for very large losses for pre-sale homebuyers due to the large backlog of troubled projects. The sector’s contraction is also leading to strains in local governments. Falling land sale revenues have reduced their fiscal capacity at the same time as local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) have also significantly increased land purchases.

14. The authorities have stepped up their response to the crisis. Central and local governments have taken wide-ranging measures to boost homebuyer demand and have begun to provide funding to complete pre-sold unfinished housing (see text table). After some homebuyers with mortgages secured against unfinished housing threatened to withhold payments to banks in July 2022, regulators introduced mortgage repayment moratoria for affected homebuyers and a central government-funded mechanism for the completion of troubled unfinished housing projects. Since mid-2022, the authorities stepped up support for developer sector financing via bond guarantee schemes, quantitative credit growth targets for banks, and a variety of supply-side measures, notably including bank forbearance.

Text Table. Selected Property Sector Support Measures in 2022

article image
Source: IMF staff.

15. Despite the broadening policy response, the crisis has continued and the need for large-scale restructuring remains. Demand-side easing measures have had limited traction in boosting sales amid widening financial turmoil among private developers. The new housing completion funding mechanism will partially address the backlog of unfinished housing, but its scope appears small relative to the potential scale of construction needs should demand remain weak (see Box 1), and formalized forbearance policies are likely to limit creditor incentives to pursue restructuring. Adding to local government difficulties, while the scheme is funded by the central government, local governments must still backstop housing completion loans, and several highly-indebted regions also have large stocks of unfinished housing.

16. The real estate crisis and the growth slowdown reinforce vulnerabilities from high debt in the non-financial sector and add to financial sector strains.

  • Balance sheet pressures are rising at financial institutions, particularly at smaller banks and some non-bank lenders as asset quality has deteriorated. Moratoria on inclusive and pandemic-related loans continue to grow and banks are allowed easing in NPL classification rules for loans to sectors affected by the real estate crisis and the pandemic. Developer bond price declines and some households’ efforts to suspend mortgage repayments imply worsening credit quality in many smaller banks and some non-bank financial institutions from their real estate-related exposures (see Chapter 1 in IMF’s October 2022 Global Financial Stability Report), raising financial stability risks given their limited capital buffers and interconnectedness to the broader banking sector. Funding conditions for some smaller banks have tightened notably, despite ample aggregate liquidity in the system, reflecting in part governance concerns, lower profitability, and slow progress in their recapitalization efforts,4 although profitability pressures and resulting declines in capital adequacy ratios have also emerged in the banking system more broadly.

  • Debt levels remain particularly elevated for the corporate sector and continued to increase for the government and household sectors. Government and household debt-to-GDP ratios are estimated to have increased to new highs of 108 and 62 percent in the second quarter of 2022, respectively, while corporate debt is hovering around a very elevated 125 percent. While balance sheet risks in the household sector continue to be cushioned by high savings rates, financial stability risks have risen as firms’ debt-servicing capacity has weakened due to the growth slowdown, including beyond the real estate sector—such as those sectors most affected by pandemic control measures. The authorities have unveiled a new draft Financial Stability Law that clarifies the policy framework for addressing stability risks, but key features remain undefined.

Authorities’ Views

17. The authorities were of the view that the problems in the real estate sector remained broadly contained and they were taking strong action. They noted that excessive leverage and weak governance of several large real estate firms had strong spillover effects on the broader property market since the second half of 2021, which were exacerbated by other factors such as the impact of COVID. They expected successive rounds of policy support led by local governments, which have a key role in China’s system of regionally differentiated real estate regulation, to have a gradual but cumulative effect on the market, with signs of stabilization already emerging in the third quarter of 2022.

18. The authorities assessed the banking sector to be generally healthy. They emphasized that banking sector exposures to property developers were limited and that mortgage risk was low due to high prudential requirements and the lack of financial leverage. The overall capital level of the banking system is relatively high. They noted that they continuously monitor and pay close attention to the potential impact of pressure on the profitability of real estate enterprises. On leverage, the authorities emphasized that the private sector debt-to-GDP ratio had been on a downtrend in recent quarters, despite temporary increases due to slower growth.

Outlook and Risks

19. Growth is projected at 2.6 percent for 2022, improving to 3.8 percent in 2023 and to 5.5 percent in 2024—but the forecast is based on strong assumptions and is subject to an unusually high degree of uncertainty.

  • The full lifting of COVID containment measures will eventually boost private demand. The forecast assumes that the need for some containment measures remains in place in the first half of 2023. The recent relaxation of containment measures is expected to lead to higher case numbers than in the earlier stages of the pandemic and to overall higher uncertainty in the near term that will prevent a quick bounce back in demand from the projected 2022Q4 contraction. Alongside voluntary mobility restrictions that may also impact production, potential containment measures introduced on a temporary basis to flatten the infection curve are expected to weigh on the supply side, affecting exports in the first half of 2023. The conditions for fully lifting containment measures are assumed to be met in the second half of 2023. They include (i) a high vaccination rate among the vulnerable population and a sustained higher pace of booster vaccinations to maintain protection; (ii) the availability of pharmaceutical treatments; and (iii) the scaling up of health care capacity (see SIP on COVID policy). Under these assumptions, private consumption is expected to gradually gather pace towards the end of 2023 and over the course of 2024 as conditions normalize, leading to a rebound in private investment. Real estate investment, however, is assumed to continue its contraction in 2023, as the unresolved crisis keeps sales depressed even for developers with healthy balance sheets. In all, however, the significant, rapid easing of restrictions amid still-low population-wide immunity implies that the paths for private domestic demand and exports are subject to an unusually high degree of uncertainty (see ¶23 below).

  • Macroeconomic policy support will be withdrawn gradually. While not quite as sharply as in 2021, fiscal policy consolidation is still expected to commence—somewhat prematurely—in 2023, as public investment projects initiated towards the end of 2022 are completed and temporary measures expire. Over the medium term, annual tightening of 0.75 percent of potential GDP is projected as off-budget activity is anticipated to taper as the authorities’ efforts to rein in off-budget financing gains further traction and tax revenue gradually increases to about 15 percent of GDP over the medium term. Monetary policy is expected to tighten at the margins but remain moderately loose in 2023, as credit policy support is eased and interbank rates move higher, and only become neutral in 2024.

20. Inflation is expected to remain below the authorities’ target in 2023 and 2024. Near-term price pressures are expected to remain muted for two reasons. With the modest growth pickup, the output gap will only close gradually and still be large through much of 2023. Sectoral demand-supply imbalances are expected to remain small despite re-opening, as the full lifting of COVID restrictions is expected to be gradual and result in a slow shift in demand toward contact-intensive sectors. Specifically, end-of-period headline inflation is forecast at 1.9 percent for both 2022 and 2023, and at 1.7 percent for 2024, with fading effects from pork price increases. End-of-period core inflation is expected to rise from 0.4 percent in 2022 to 2.0 percent in 2023 and 2.3 in 2024.

21. The current account surplus is expected to decline, falling to 1.4 percent of GDP in 2023 and 1.2 percent in 2024, compared to a projected 2.1 percent in 2022. The decline reflects weaker growth in the main trading partners, relatively lower spending on durable goods in advanced economies with the shift in demand toward contact-intensive domestic sectors, and a gradual resumption of Chinese overseas travel from around mid-2023. On a preliminary basis and adjusting for remaining transitory pandemic-related factors, the external position in 2022 is assessed to be broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies (see Appendix I).

22. Against the backdrop of declining population and productivity growth, GDP growth is forecast to decrease below 4 percent in the medium term. On the supply side, demographic headwinds compound declining productivity growth. Weaker business dynamism and resource misallocation towards less productive and more capital intensive SOEs are expected to continue, due to a slowing pace of structural reforms. On the demand side, without sustained rebalancing towards consumption, the saving rate will remain too high, enabling continued high investment in less productive sectors even as the real estate sector shrinks (see SIP on medium- and long-term growth prospects). Lower potential growth risks worsening debt dynamics in the economy, as deleveraging through high growth becomes less likely, and creating challenging policy tradeoffs. The slower growth rates relative to the past decades will also weigh on growth in other countries, especially those with close trade links to China (see Box 1 in Chapter 1 of the IMF’s October 2022 Asia and the Pacific Regional Economic Outlook).

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Activity Spillovers to Rest of World

(GDP response to 1 p.p. lower activity in China, in cumulative percent decline)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: IMF October 2022 Regional Economic Outlook, Fernald et al (2020); Response to the overall activity measure of Fernald et al (2020); and IMF staff calculations.Notes: Triangles represent mean response in a panel of 50 countries (excluding China), lines are 68 percent confidence intervals. Shock is scaled to be equivalent of 1 percentage point decline in Chinese growth.

23. Risks are tilted to the downside (see Appendix II). Externally, in the short term, an escalation in the war in Ukraine, a further rise in energy prices, and faster-than-expected tightening in global financial conditions would have a negative impact on trading partner growth. Longer term, rising geopolitical tensions pose risks through financial decoupling pressures (e.g., delisting of Chinese companies from U.S. market),5 and limits to trade, FDI, and knowledge exchange around technology.6 Domestically, there are downside risks from a deepening of the real estate crisis leading to macro-financial spillovers (see below), while broad-based and deeper-than-expected deleveraging could create adverse feedback loops significantly lowering growth. While less-stringent containment measures could lead to a somewhat quicker recovery from the 2022 fourth-quarter trough, uncertainty around case numbers amid still-insufficient population-wide immunity in early 2023 presents large downside risks to private domestic demand and exports. Insufficient preparation for a further easing of containment measures (see ¶29 below) could come with significant health consequences and further set back the recovery of private consumption and investment and impact supply chains, with spillovers to the rest of the world. Should different downside risks materialize together, their interaction would amplify their fallout. Stronger-than-expected inflationary pressures could arise if increased mobility leads to demand-supply mismatches that drive up inflation despite the negative output gap, flexible labor market, and only gradual pace of reopening.

24. Accumulating pressures from the unresolved property crisis could trigger a sharp retrenchment in aggregate demand, with adverse macro-financial feedback loops and potentially large external spillovers.

  • The fall in primary home sales could be even larger than assumed under the baseline, which would deepen financial distress and weaken aggregate demand beyond real estate investment. Larger falls could be the result of greater risk aversion toward pre-sales, possibly due to slow progress in the restructuring of distressed developers, or due to expectations of lower future house prices. They would also exacerbate developers’ liquidity problems, amplify the expected slump in real estate investment, and create adverse spillovers on upstream and downstream sectors. The resulting income, uncertainty, and wealth effects would weigh heavily on private consumption.

  • Larger-than-expected declines in land sales could weaken public finances, particularly in provinces with weak balance sheets. Such weakness could create more stress in financially vulnerable corporates whose credit profiles strongly depend on local governments’ financial strength. The additional stress would raise risks to banking system resilience and financial stability at large, and it would reinforce fiscal pressures. Bank profitability and capital would be further eroded by weak credit demand, narrowing margins, and rising loan loss provisions, amid tightening financial conditions. A sharper slowdown in China’s growth would create external spillovers through sizable trade links and commodity prices, as well as a deterioration in global risk appetite (see Box 5 in the 2021 Article IV Staff Report and Box 1.3 in Chapter 1 of the October 2022 World Economic Outlook).

Authorities’ Views

25. The authorities were optimistic about a steady recovery in 2023. While acknowledging significant uncertainty ahead, the authorities emphasized that they stood ready to address downside risks. They were confident they could contain future COVID outbreaks with even more targeted measures. Proactive and moderate fiscal policy and prudent monetary policy would support growth in 2023, as needed. The authorities viewed shrinking external demand, faster-than-expected tightening of monetary policy in advanced economies and global financial conditions, and uncertainty due to the war in Ukraine as the key external downside risks for 2023, and they acknowledged rising geopolitical risks. They expected the external position to remain broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.

26. The authorities saw still significant potential for higher growth in the medium and long term. They agreed that potential output growth had slowed since 2008, in part due to a decline in total factor productivity growth. At the same time, they pointed to the growth targets implied in their 14th Five Year Plan, which they were confident in achieving with ongoing support for technology and innovation, and improvements in human capital. This support reflected their focus on high-quality growth, including in the areas of digitalization, modernization of agriculture, and green development.

27. The authorities agreed that real estate market risks had increased, while noting that they are manageable overall. They noted considerable progress in addressing problems in the property sector and viewed that the recent policy support to the property sector and the adjustment in COVID policy will revitalize growth and housing market activities, thus effectively containing any negative macro-financial spillovers.

Policies: Achieving High-Quality Growth in the Short and Medium Term

28. A comprehensive set of policies can help lift prospects for high-quality growth—growth that is balanced, inclusive and green. The full lifting of COVID containment measures, if preceded by urgent measures to contain the health impact, will strengthen private consumption and secure rebalancing and the recovery. A more supportive fiscal policy stance than in the baseline that entails greater support to households will bolster demand and help with rebalancing. Additional monetary policy support will cushion the impact of COVID disruptions and the property crisis, while greater reliance on interest-rate based measures will make it more effective. Just as urgent are additional measures to resolve the property crisis and reduce risks of the associated distress resulting in further macro-financial amplification and setbacks to growth. Given strong demographic headwinds, sustaining growth into the medium term will require re-accelerating market-based reforms that can lift productivity by improving the allocation of resources and facilitating the rebalancing of the economy away from a path of excessive, low-productivity investment, including in real estate. A more balanced growth model, combined with structural reforms in the power sector and the harnessing of green finance, will help China in achieving its climate goals. Contributing to multilateral action in support of global public goods such as combating climate change, helping low-income countries, and avoiding damaging risks from geoeconomic fragmentation will help China as well as the global community.

uA001fig09

Growth with Excessive Investment

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: Penn World Table; and IMF staff calculations.

A. Rebalancing Growth

29. The full lifting of COVID containment measures should be preceded by urgent measures to contain the health impact.

  • Health policies: Filling the vaccination gap, especially for the most vulnerable, will require urgently re-accelerating the pace of vaccination, and subsequently maintaining it at a sufficiently high level to ensure that protection is preserved. Rapidly scaling up health care capacity and securing necessary supplies of anti-viral treatments would complement the vaccination efforts to keep the burden on the health care sector manageable (see SIP on exit from the zero-COVID strategy). In the interim period, until these conditions are met, continued efforts to monitor infection levels will help flatten the infection curve.

  • Communication: Clear forward-looking communication around the planned further easing of containment measures and the milestones around it will facilitate the transition and reduce the uncertainty that businesses and households face.

  • Policy support: It will be critical to ensure that local governments have the resources to temporarily scale up health care systems, while financial relief measures should be deployed judiciously (see ¶43).

uA001fig10

Scenarios for Vaccination Campaign Duration

(In months)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: National Health Commission China; and IMF staff calculations and estimations.Notes: “Close 3-dose gaps” scenario assumes the entire eligible population will receive 3 doses if not already received; “Administer 4th dose” scenario assumes entire eligible population will receive a fresh booster. The assumed vaccination pace is based on the median pace of China’s vaccination campaign between March and October 2021 (2021 pace) or in 2022 so far (2022 pace).

30. In the short term, fiscal policy should protect the recovery and facilitate rebalancing. A more supportive fiscal stance in 2023 compared to staff’s baseline, amounting to an increase in the augmented cyclically-adjusted primary deficit of 0.3 percent of potential GDP (see Text Table) and with the composition of expenditures shifting from low-return infrastructure investment towards support for households, will help rebalancing and sustaining demand. In 2023, a combination of short-term labor tax relief such as temporary cuts in social security contributions for wage-earners, and temporary, well-targeted direct transfers to vulnerable households can boost consumption as COVID containment measures are being phased out, with the e-CNY potentially playing an important role in this regard.7 To the extent possible, transfers should be targeted towards households in regions most severely affected by pandemic outbreaks. Under the baseline, an annual tightening of the CAPB of 0.75 percent of GDP from 2024 onwards, through a combination of tax measures and cuts in off-budget investment spending, would be required to stabilize government debt over the long run (see Appendix III). If the recommended fiscal support to restructure the property sector materialized (see ¶40), debt stabilization would be delayed even longer without greater tightening in the medium term.

China: Fiscal Policy for 2023

article image
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.

Augmented net lending /borrowing balance. Includes about 1.6 percent of GDP in unidentified expansionary measures.

31. Going forward, it will take the systematic strengthening of the social protection system to sustain high-quality growth (see Box 2). Despite ongoing reform efforts, China’s social protection system still provides significantly less coverage and lacks in adequacy compared to other countries at similar or higher per capita income levels.8 Higher unemployment and medical insurance benefits would provide individuals across the income spectrum with more financial protection in the event of unexpected employment loss and health costs. Greater system integration in the form of risk pooling and benefit portability would help ensure social insurance is available when and where it is needed. With more financial security, households could draw on precautionary savings to finance increased consumption, supporting rebalancing. In addition, a rules-based automatic activation of spending measures linked to the state of the economy such as temporary expansions in coverage of means-tested social assistance programs and an increase in social assistance benefits when the unemployment rate reaches a certain level, would reduce moral hazard. By bolstering consumption, these reforms would also help create a sustainable source of demand for investment in services and consumer industries as the real estate sector stabilizes toward a smaller size and temporary pandemic-related export tailwinds fade.

uA001fig11

Estimated Fiscal Multipliers

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Source: IMF staff calculations.Notes: Estimated multipliers from a general equilibrium model calibrated to China. See SIP on fiscal multipliers.

32. Combined with a more progressive tax system, these reforms can make fiscal policy a substantially more effective stabilization tool. Social protection spending, particularly unemployment benefit payments, responds automatically to fluctuations in economic activity, making it also a more effective counter-cyclical tool than discretionary spending such as investments, which require long lead times to adequately prepare and execute. Reforms on the revenue side would further strengthen the counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy. Revenue from personal income taxes – one of the few progressive taxes in China – is low by international standards. It should be increased by reducing the basic allowance, while providing a tax credit to low-income wage earners, and broadening the base through removal of deductions for mortgage interest and rental expense.

uA001fig12

G20: Individual Income Tax, 2019

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Source: IMF World Revenue Longitudinal Database.

33. Further monetary policy easing will cushion the impact of COVID disruptions and the property crisis, while greater reliance on interest-based measures will make it more effective. Some additional interest rate-based monetary policy easing is warranted given the still-large output gap and absence of core inflation pressures. Additional easing can ensure that monetary conditions remain accommodative and provide support for balance sheet repair amid real estate market strains and COVID-related uncertainty, with prudential regulatory tools used to address any risks stemming from nonviable firms. Delivering support through interest rate-based measures is more effective in stimulating activity among smaller and more cyclically vulnerable firms compared to credit quantity-based policy tools such as loan growth guidance (see Box 3). Moreover, while credit policies can be targeted to support credit supply for particular regions, sectors, or groups of firms, they can also distort the market-based allocation of factors of production.

34. The RMB should be allowed to adjust flexibly to help absorb shocks and increase the effectiveness of monetary policy. Any concerns about balance sheet effects from exchange rate movements should be dealt with through prudential measures, and CFMs (including the reserve requirement on FX forwards and cross-border financing macro-prudential adjustment parameter) should not be used to actively manage the capital flow cycle and substitute for warranted macroeconomic adjustment and exchange rate flexibility. Foreign exchange intervention should be limited to disorderly market conditions.

Authorities’ Views

35. The authorities noted their plan to continue prioritizing health outcomes, while adjusting measures to keep the costs to the economy to a minimum. Strengthening vaccination is a priority, especially for the elderly and vulnerable populations. The authorities are also reviewing their medical capacity and insurance coverage before considering further recalibration of COVID policies.

36. The authorities plan to implement an aggressive and more precise fiscal policy in 2023. They emphasized that fiscal policy in 2023 will maintain a positive orientation and maintain the stability, continuity and sustainability of the policy, including giving full play to the role of local government special bonds to promote the expansion of effective investment; continue to protect market entities, employment, and people’s livelihood, promote consumption and expand domestic demand. In order to improve the financial situation of local governments, provincial governments will be encouraged to optimize the financial system below the provincial governments, and at the same time strengthen the coordination of financial resources to promote the smooth operation of finance. In addition, the authorities will focus on sustainability and strictly control administrative costs.

37. The authorities also plan to continue the gradual expansion of the social protection system. They noted that China had built the world’s largest social security system, setting up pension, unemployment, work-related injury and medical insurance to provide more protection for the elderly, accidental unemployment, work-related injury expenses or medical expenses. They also noted their intention to further expand the coverage of subsistence allowances by including additional marginal households, and gradually expand the coverage of unemployment insurance, including temporary living allowances for unemployed migrant workers who have been insured for less than one year in 2022. They noted that eligible districts can provide a one-time employment subsidy for enterprises to absorb registered unemployed persons who have been unemployed for more than half a year. In addition, the authorities plan to expand the coverage of medical insurance, workplace insurance, and maternity insurance.

38. Monetary policy will continue to focus on macroeconomic stabilization, among other objectives, using a mix of both quantitative and price instruments. Both types of instruments have played an important role and are used based on the economic and financial situation as well as policy objectives. The authorities noted that quantitative instruments such as structural credit policies could help contribute to the guidance of overall credit growth, while ensuring that credit is directed to key goals or priority sectors for national development, such as green finance or inclusive elderly care.

39. The authorities reiterated their commitment to continue to increase exchange rate flexibility and advancing market-oriented reforms of the exchange rate regime. The authorities considered the reserve requirement on FX forwards as an FX liquidity management measure to anchor market expectations and facilitate the sound operation of the FX market.

B. Ending the Real Estate Crisis and Containing Financial Stability Risks Strong Central Government Action to End the Deepening Real Estate Crisis

40. Setting up more robust mechanisms to facilitate restructuring and restore homebuyer confidence will be critical in the near term. With households wary of buying unfinished housing from distressed developers, breaking the negative feedback loop between developer stress and weak demand requires proactive restructuring of troubled developers. Forbearance policies, which disincentivize creditors from pursuing restructuring, should be rolled back and avoided in the future (see ¶43 below). To facilitate restructuring (which is impeded by potential losses to households) and to boost homebuyer confidence, temporary mechanisms to protect pre-sale homebuyers from the risk of non-delivery will have to be strengthened. This would include partially protecting past pre-sale homebuyers from unfavorable outcomes in restructuring—i.e., via stronger support for completion of troubled pre-sold housing projects—and reassuring new homebuyers that their consumer interests will be protected until reforms address deficiencies in the current pre-sale system (see Box 1). Although the lack of reliable publicly available data implies high uncertainty, the combined cost of these mechanisms is estimated to be manageable and should be provided by the central government, whereas the costs of delaying the necessary adjustment and restructuring would be higher. To prevent moral hazard, these measures should be done in conjunction with a commitment to legal reforms to the pre-sales model to safeguard funds and provide homebuyers protection against the risk of non-delivery.

41. Over the medium term, structural reforms can facilitate the property market’s gradual transformation to a more sustainable size, where demand is driven largely by demographic factors and household income growth. In addition to the strengthening of China’s social protection systems to lower excessively high household savings (see above), providing households with alternative savings options such as “third pillar” pensions would help reduce investment-driven housing demand. Building on the measures announced in November 2022 to this end, policies aimed at increasing the quantity and quality of affordable public and rental housing will diversify housing options for households and also help ease the transition impact on the construction sector.

42. Building on efforts to rein in off-balance-sheet financing and address local SOE debt, fiscal reforms for local governments should alleviate their structural over-reliance on the property market. Such reforms should be centered on raising local government revenues—local government financing is projected to fall to 28.4 percent of GDP in 2022, while own revenues (not including land sales) only cover about half of local government expenditures—if necessary through higher central government revenues and transfers and by strengthening public financial management frameworks to ensure local government debt sustainability (see Box 2). In addition, efforts to strengthen debt frameworks for local government entities should continue. In the long run, instituting a recurrent property tax would also boost revenues in a progressive way, and help curb investment demand for housing.

uA001fig13

Local Government Budget Financing 1/

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: CEIC Data Company Limited; Ministry of Finance 2022 budget; and IMF staff calculations.1/ Local government general budget and local government managed fund budget. Excludes off-budget financing.

Addressing Broader Financial Vulnerabilities

43. Stronger prudential policies for the banking sector will help identify vulnerabilities and rebuild buffers to address the mounting pressures from lockdowns and real estate, especially in smaller banks.

  • Adjusting financial support: Credit policies aimed at alleviating liquidity pressure during periods of COVID-related disruptions remain warranted, but these policies should be market-based, time-bound and targeted, with transparently funded credit guarantees in line with international best practice. Loan moratoria could be recalibrated to include principal-only repayment deferrals based on judicious eligibility criteria. To avoid future asset quality risks, regular loan classification and provisioning rules should be maintained and regulatory forbearance granted to loans benefiting from pandemic- and real estate-related relief measures should be phased out. This should be combined with banks proactively tackling and provisioning for existing asset-quality problems, by improving asset quality transparency and expanding the use of forward-looking loss provisioning in their internal risk assessment framework.

  • Taking into account real estate risks: The authorities should continue upgrading surveillance efforts to be better prepared to address financial stability risks from the property sector and elsewhere. In the case of small- and medium-sized banks, this would entail becoming more proactive in requiring banks to meet prudential requirements supported by asset quality reviews and submit credit capital plans, all under heightened audit and supervision. For the wider system, this will require upgrading the systemic risk surveillance toolkit by filling data gaps and improving stress-test capabilities.

44. Upgrades to restructuring frameworks are urgently needed to help facilitate the exit of nonviable firms and banks while protecting financial stability. Rising financial strains underscore the urgency and complexity of addressing elevated leverage in the economy. The authorities unveiled a reform plan in 2019 to strengthen market-based exit mechanisms by making insolvency and resolution a credible option,9 and the draft Financial Stability Law is a welcome step to further improve on existing restructuring and policy coordination mechanisms. To complement these efforts, the bank resolution regime should establish a single resolution authority with a clear mandate, strong operational independence, legal protection, and sufficient institutional separation from bank supervision. Local governments’ role in financial stability policies should be narrowed, as legal responsibility for resolution funding can worsen their debt challenges, and because as owners, creditors or guarantors of many troubled entities, their participation in risk monitoring and resolution activities can create conflicts of interest. The use of public sector funds for recapitalization or liquidity support should be strictly limited and come only after burden sharing by existing investors, while nonviable firms and banks should exit with shareholders and uninsured creditors bearing losses in accordance with clearly established hierarchy of claims.

45. China should continue strengthening the effectiveness of the AML/CFT framework, including measures to prevent the misuse of e-CNY. A campaign was launched in 2021 to strengthen the national AML/CFT framework. The campaign includes plans to enhance organizational leadership, training and awareness, to invest in analytical capabilities, and to impose more severe fines for breaches, by financial and non-financial institutions, of AML/CFT preventative requirements of reporting entities. The planned amendments (including broadening the range of institutions that are required to comply with AML/CFT obligations and enhancing AML/CFT preventive measures) to strengthen the AML Law are welcome. As part of these efforts the authorities should further (i) enhance the transparency of beneficial owners of legal entities registered in China to prevent their misuse for criminal purposes (e.g., money laundering, corruption, tax evasion) and ensure that (as part of the development of the new beneficial ownership system) competent authorities and institutions have timely access to adequate, accurate and up to date beneficial ownership information; (ii) introduce a comprehensive legal framework to implement United Nations-based targeted financial sanctions requirements related to terrorism, and financing of terrorism and proliferation financing; and (iii) improve financial sector supervision (in particular, fit and proper assessments to prevent criminals from owning/controlling financial institutions) and compliance with AML/CFT preventive measures. To safeguard financial integrity, it should be ensured that the design of e-CNY (including anonymous lower tier wallets) is in line with the authorities’ understanding and analysis of the associated ML/TF risks, and does not interfere with the effective implementation of the full suite of FATF recommendations (including key AML/CFT preventive measures).10

Authorities’ Views

46. The authorities emphasized that they had already proactively addressed strains in the real estate market. They highlighted that since the second half of 2021, a range of actions had been taken to support the supply and demand sides, including reducing mortgage interest rates, supporting the construction and delivery of pre-sold projects, and city-by-city measures to support housing demand. They viewed that these measures had already largely contained the risks related to difficult-to-deliver, pre-sold housing projects and related mortgage repayment difficulties. Furthermore, they noted that many of these measures will only generate an impact with a lag. They noted local governments are playing an active role in stabilizing the real estate market and preventing and defusing financial risks.

47. The authorities agreed with the importance of continuing to strengthen the AML/CFT framework and considered the updates to the AML Law a key step. They recognized the importance of the establishment of a robust beneficial ownership system (in line with the revised FATF recommendations), highlighting the large scale of this project for China. They also outlined the progress made towards establishing an effective regime for targeted financial sanctions. The authorities agreed that AML/CFT requirements applied to e-CNY, similar to requirements for any other form of electronic payment instruments. They noted that the e-CNY did not require a change in the AML/CFT framework. While there were challenges in the implementation of certain AML/CFT measures due to the collection of some customer information, they considered that the e-CNY, with its fiat currency nature, innovative technology and risk-based rationale, will contribute to supervision efforts and regulatory compliance (suptech and regtech) for the authorities and thus strike a good balance between AML/CFT compliance and financial innovation and inclusion.

C. Responding to Potential Downside Risks

48. Additional policy support should be provided under some downside scenarios (Appendix II). Macroeconomic policies would need to be loosened compared to the baseline should aggregate demand falter, and the extent of support might need to be significantly larger should different downside risks materialize together. China has some fiscal space to respond to these scenarios, but any fiscal expansion should be on-budget, centrally financed, and focused on areas with high impact on growth such as spending on low-income households. Further monetary easing should focus on policy rate cuts. Should the lifting of COVID containment measures lead to a faster-than-expected rise in demand and inflationary pressures, monetary policy will need to adapt quickly. A deepening of the real estate crisis and any associated financial amplifications would further stress the urgency of facilitating the orderly restructuring of the sector. In the event of financial instability, the authorities should stand ready to ensure the functioning of core funding markets and provide emergency liquidity assistance to viable banks facing liquidity shortfalls, subject to appropriate safeguards. External short-term risks, such as those stemming from an escalation of the war in Ukraine, should be primarily faced by letting the exchange rate adjust flexibly to changes in the terms of trade.

Authorities’ Views

49. The authorities noted that macroeconomic policies would remain flexible, responding to the realization of downside risks as needed. They noted that both fiscal support such as tax relief and financial support for investment could be implemented in the event of negative shocks to growth. Monetary policy will continue to give top priority to macro stabilization, including by providing needed liquidity, guiding financial institutions to provide stable credit growth, and using structural credit policy tools to increase support for key sectors and regions.

D. Lifting Medium-Term Growth

50. Re-accelerating market-based structural reforms will be key to raising domestic productivity growth. Against the backdrop of demographic headwinds, tepid productivity growth, and a decline in business dynamism in the past decade, medium-term growth prospects depend critically on success in implementing reforms to lift productivity while rebalancing away from excessive, low-productivity investment.

  • Reforming SOEs and ensuring competitive neutrality between SOEs and privately-owned enterprises (POEs). The authorities should avoid resorting to SOEs to respond to fragmentation pressures, further burdening them with mandates in specific sectors. As SOEs tend to be less productive, this risks further widening productivity gaps with advanced economies. Counterfactual estimates suggest that closing productivity gaps between SOEs and POEs could increase total factor productivity by about 6 percent.11Given this, productivity growth can be bolstered by ensuring a level playing field for all enterprises and rolling back support to SOEs, including by removing implicit guarantees, increasing banks’ risk weights on corporate loans to firms with stretched debt-to-earning ratios, adjusting cost advantages provided to SOEs, strengthening financial reporting, and fostering the orderly exit of unprofitable SOEs.

  • Removing local protectionism. Removing administrative borders between prefectures has been estimated to increase local GDP per capita by about 10 percent over the long term.12 Removing obstacles generated by local protectionism, including by further opening up the domestic market, will require a lasting central-government-led effort with adequate staffing and coordination among relevant agencies. A concerted nationwide effort would strengthen the incentives for provincial governments to carry these reforms.13

  • Greater reliance on market forces will also help improve resource allocation. While support for basic R&D can help foster innovation and boost productivity, industrial policy subsidies—which some estimates place well over one percent of GDP14—can be wasteful. Similarly, attempts to guide private capital allocation are likely to lead to productivity losses. Concerns around competition, social, and security issues can be best addressed through relevant regulation and fiscal policy.

  • Where structural reforms are needed, they should be well communicated, minimizing policy uncertainty. Structural reforms and any new regulations should be introduced in a measured, transparent, and predictable manner, thus avoiding adverse effects on private investment and minimizing disruptive labor market dislocations.

51. Staff estimates suggest that comprehensive steps to lift productivity growth and foster rebalancing towards sustainable, less investment-driven growth could significantly raise China’s growth potential (see Box 4). A comprehensive set of structural reforms could lift GDP levels by around 2½ percent over the medium term and 18 percent over the long term. Combined with a re-orientation of fiscal resources toward household support, domestic consumption would increase significantly, with private consumption share of GDP rising by 18 percentage points by 2037. This growth—estimated at an average of about 4¾ and 4½ percent over the medium and long term—would also be less risky, and would be accompanied by a reduction of the augmented general government debt burden from 173 to 146 percent of GDP by 2037.

Authorities’ Views

52. The authorities agreed that reforms could boost productivity, including by increasing competition from removing local protectionism. They noted that they will build on the achievements of the existing work, improve the working mechanism, strengthen supervision and law enforcement, push for the elimination of local protection and administrative monopolies, and accelerate the development of a large unified national market. They believed that SOEs have played their due role in economic and social development and have made positive progress in reform and development. At the same time, they stressed that the Chinese government treats enterprises of all types of ownership the same and creates a level playing field for all types of market players. They remained committed to further mixed-ownership reforms that would help introduce strategic investors and encourage different types of capital to draw on each other’s strengths and promote common development. They noted that demographic headwinds would be offset by continued improvements in human capital and by further urbanization encouraged by the streamlining of hukou, which will improve migrant workers’ access to public services.

E. Achieving the Climate Goals

53. Advancing power sector reform is critical to effectively implement China’s climate agenda. Estimates suggest that China is set to over-achieve its own carbon-peaking target (see SIP on power sector reform, Box 1). However, further efforts will be needed to help close the global mitigation ambition gap. In that context, while climate change-induced weather shocks might require temporary increases in coal usage, future provisions should be made for reducing the role of coal as the baseload power. These include letting power prices fluctuate more freely based on market conditions, strengthening inter-provincial power trading, expanding the grid system, and scaling up of ancillary services to increase renewables’ stability in energy generation and support their growing share in the energy mix. Rebalancing towards more consumption-led growth would shift economic activity to less energy-intensive services sectors.

54. Fostering the development of climate finance further could provide additional impetus to the transition toward a carbon-neutral economy and improve the quality of growth. China is one of the largest green finance-issuing jurisdictions in the world. Various policy initiatives have given rise to a large climate finance ecosystem that is dominated by banks’ green lending. The authorities are seeking to improve green bond standards, which will help, inter alia, to ensure that proceeds are used for eligible climate mitigation and adaptation projects. A greater use of external reviews can also help ensure the reliability of climate-related information. A market-oriented climate finance ecosystem that attracts more domestic and foreign investors and offers more diversified products would require further improvement in climate-related data, definitions, and disclosures. China should also develop a framework to ensure adequate financing for the transition of carbon-intensive activities. At the same time, incorporating climate-related risks into the prudential policy framework and systemic risk oversight, including by further conducting climate stress testing, could help safeguard financial stability risks stemming from potential stranded assets and physical effects of climate change (see SIP on climate finance).

Authorities’ Views

55. The authorities reiterated their firm commitment to reaching a carbon emissions peak by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. They also emphasized their plan to establish new energy sources before closing old ones, to ensure energy security. The authorities noted that coal will continue to be an important energy source in China but based on “cleaner” technologies, in the long term mainly to meet for peak energy demand. They released the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035, the crucial first step towards increasing climate resilience. They also reported that the Emissions Trading Scheme was functioning well and will be strengthened going forward. They noted recent efforts to further enhance the climate finance ecosystem. Regulations are being prepared to implement the updated China Green Bond Principles, while new Green Finance Guidelines for the Banking and Insurance Sector were introduced to improve financial institutions’ climate-related financial risk management. Last year, the PBC conducted its first climate stress test, which assessed transition risks faced by major banks. They were also developing the transition finance framework, complementing the existing green finance framework.

F. Contributing to Multilateral Solutions

56. The threat of geoeconomic fragmentation not only adds to the urgency of domestic structural reforms, but also emphasizes the importance of multilateral efforts to avoid it. Policymakers in China and other countries have some legitimate economic and geopolitical security concerns, given global markets for many goods, services, and financial instruments and the dependencies they create. But fragmentation of the current global division of labor comes at a high cost. The income losses associated with decoupling economies from each other—be it in terms of technology, energy, or financial flows—create important tradeoffs between income and security, and a careful, realistic evaluation of the costs and benefits of fragmentation is needed (see Chapter 3 in the IMF’s October 2022 Asia and the Pacific Regional Economic Outlook). China would benefit not only from reaching new WTO-based agreements in areas like e-commerce and investment facilitation, but also from clarifying and strengthening rules on subsidies, and restoring a well-functioning dispute settlement system at the WTO. Like other major trading nations, China’s ability to lead in the WTO will also depend on its demonstrated commitment to openness and transparency in its own trade policies—including the reform of SOEs. China should also continue to work with other countries to find multilateral solutions in other areas, such as climate mitigation and financing for developing countries. China is now a large creditor with an important role to play in providing debt relief when necessary, and 60 percent of low-income countries are now in or at high-risk of debt distress. The establishment, with China’s support, of the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments to support debt resolution for low-income countries was thus a welcome and important step. The priority now is to make this process for providing relief faster and more predictable. In terms of climate issues, China has a leading role to play in international negotiations and can help catalyze action among other countries to complement their existing climate mitigation commitments.

Authorities’ Views

57. The authorities stressed their support for the multilateral trading system and globalization. They emphasized the need for global cooperation to accelerate the end of the crisis and restore the cross-border mobility of factors of production. They called for countries to refrain from protectionist measures, including through the abuse of national security exceptions for economic gains. They stressed their commitment to coordination and cooperation with all parties to maintain the stability of the global supply chains. They agreed that the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments was an important coordination mechanism among bilateral lenders.

G. Improving Economic Data

58. Further efforts are needed to address significant remaining data gaps. While data are broadly adequate for surveillance, significant data gaps remain (see Informational Annex). These include the need for a breakdown of seasonally-adjusted real GDP by expenditure component, which would help better assess growth momentum and its drivers; general government data with a breakdown of expenditures by economic type (particularly, the decomposition between current and capital expenditure)15 and including the sizeable operations of LGFVs, to better capture fiscal activity and strengthen policy analyses; and data on foreign exchange intervention to facilitate more integrated policy advice and support multilateral surveillance through more comprehensive monitoring of the international monetary system. In addition to China’s continued commitment to timely data dissemination under the IMF Special Data Dissemination Standard and the G20 Data Gaps Initiative, addressing these gaps and improving data quality would further enhance data transparency and support policy making.

Authorities’ Views

59. The authorities maintained that they complied with IMF data requirements. China subscribes to the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standards (SDDS) requirements. GDP accounting is based on the production side, consistent with the 2008 System of National Accounts, including by publishing seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth rates. The authorities also noted that they continue to improve internal control and budget systems across central government agencies and levels of government. Moreover, they highlighted that procedures and processes continue to evolve to better monitor local government debts. They noted that China’s disclosure of foreign exchange data is also in accordance with SDDS.

Staff Appraisal

60. Following the impressive recovery from the initial impact of the pandemic, growth in 2022 slowed significantly, and it remains under pressure. The slowdown reflects recurring COVID outbreaks, the unresolved real estate crisis, and weakening global demand. Reduced efforts in promoting growth-enhancing reforms against the backdrop of increasing geoeconomic fragmentation pressures stand in the way of a much-needed lift to productivity growth and China’s medium-term growth potential. On a preliminary basis and adjusting for remaining transitory pandemic-related factors, the external position in 2022 is assessed to be broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.

61. Macroeconomic policies were eased appropriately in 2022 but they provided little support to economic rebalancing. The effectiveness of the policy support was diminished by a focus on enterprises and increasingly less effective traditional infrastructure investment rather than household support. The lagging consumption recovery makes it more difficult to reduce the energy intensity of growth—a crucial component of China’s path to carbon neutrality, while climate change-induced heatwaves have led to an increased reliance on coal as policymakers have eased some intermediate climate targets.

62. Risks are to the downside. A deepening of the property sector crisis could trigger macro-financial stress and generate potentially large external spillovers. Broad-based and deeper-than-expected deleveraging could create adverse feedback loops significantly lowering growth. While ex ante less-stringent COVID containment measures could lead to a somewhat quicker recovery, uncertainty around case numbers amid still-insufficient population-wide immunity in early 2023 presents large downside risks. Insufficient preparation for a further easing of containment measures could come with significant health consequences and set back the recovery of private consumption and investment and impact supply chains, with spillovers to the rest of the world. A well-sequenced lifting of containment measures also entails risks, including stronger-than-expected inflationary pressures.

63. Policies in the near term should protect the recovery and facilitate rebalancing. A more supportive fiscal policy stance than in the baseline and modified to bolster support for households will boost demand and help rebalancing towards consumption. Further monetary policy easing will cushion the impact of COVID disruptions and the property crisis, while greater reliance on interest rate measures will make it more effective. The full lifting of COVID containment measures should be preceded by urgently re-accelerating the pace of vaccination (and subsequently maintaining it at a sufficiently high level to ensure that protection is preserved), rapidly scaling up health care capacity, and securing necessary supplies of anti-viral treatments. These policies will help set the conditions for high-quality growth—that is, growth that is balanced, inclusive and green.

64. Further action at the national level is needed to end the property crisis and protect broader financial stability. It will be critical to set up more robust mechanisms to protect homebuyer interests and thus pave the way for market-based restructuring and restore homebuyer confidence. To avoid future asset quality risks, regular loan classification and provisioning rules should be maintained, and regulatory forbearance granted to loans benefiting from pandemic- and real estate-related relief measures should be phased out. Over the medium term, structural reforms can facilitate a gradual housing market transformation to a more sustainable size. Stronger prudential policies for the banking sector will help identify vulnerabilities, while upgrades to restructuring frameworks are urgently needed to help facilitate exit of nonviable firms and banks while protecting financial stability. China should also continue strengthening the effectiveness of the AML/CFT framework.

65. Structural reforms will be key to raise productivity growth and more effectively implement the country’s climate agenda. Ensuring competitive neutrality between private and state-owned firms, removing local protectionism, and an overall greater reliance on market forces are the most effective responses to fragmentation risks and to shore up productivity growth. To implement the climate agenda, it will be critical to let power prices fluctuate more freely based on market conditions, strengthen inter-provincial power trading, expand the grid system, and scale up ancillary services. Fostering the development of climate finance further could provide additional impetus to the transition toward a carbon-neutral economy.

66. Together with other countries, China can play a leading role in addressing global challenges. These include addressing geoeconomic fragmentation risks, alleviating debt distress in low-income economies, strengthening global trade openness and transparency, and confronting climate change.

67. China should urgently address remaining macroeconomic data gaps to further improve data credibility and strengthen policy making. While data are broadly adequate for surveillance, significant data gaps remain. Addressing these gaps and improving data quality would further enhance data transparency and support policy making.

68. It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation with China takes place on the standard 12-month cycle.

Addressing Distressed Developers’ Unfinished Housing1

A key challenge to arresting the real estate crisis is tackling the large backlog of partially built housing, as many presold projects owed by troubled developers are now at risk of non-completion. This, in turn, is further weakening homebuyers’ confidence in the pre-sales system and impeding market-based restructuring, further delaying the stabilization in housing demand. Strong government policies to address this complex set of vulnerabilities will be costly but are critical to avoid deeper losses.

China’s property sector is going through a sharp contraction. China’s residential housing sales averaged 1.5–1.6 billion square meters per year from 2018–2021, about 30–50 percent higher than estimated annual demand for the next few years based on demographic and housing stock factors.2 Ratios of average sales prices to median household disposable incomes in the smallest cities are nearly double that of the largest OECD cities, suggesting much of the newly built housing is not affordable for most households. A decline in sales and the contraction of the real estate development sector is necessary for property-related activity to converge towards sustainable demand levels and help reallocate labor and resources to more productive sectors of the economy. However, the liquidity squeeze affecting healthy developers could drive housing demand to overshoot to the downside, adding to price adjustment pressures and increasing spillovers to aggregate demand and public and private balance sheets.

uA001fig14

Residential Real Estate: Annual Pre-Sales and Completions

(In billions of square meters LHS, in percent RHS)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: CEIC Data Company Limited; National Bureau of Statistics China; and IMF staff calculations.

A key underlying challenge to restoring confidence and securing an orderly transition is the large backlog of partially built housing. In the years prior to the crisis, developers expanded their use of pre-sales of unfinished homes as a de facto form of financing, in part by using home purchase deposits to cover the cost of unrelated projects. The annual ratio of housing pre-sales to completions—an indicator of the growth of unfinished housing—reached an average ratio of two in the last four years, up from about one in the decade through 2015. Residential real estate under construction as a result reached 6.9 billion square meters at end-2021, ten times the average floor space completed by the sector each year. The slowdown in sales has sharply limited the availability of funds to finish construction on many pre-sold projects, particularly for distressed developers. The rising risk of non-completion for some of these projects impairs the realizable market value of developer assets, worsening their solvency and liquidity problems, and affects homebuyers’ willingness to purchase homes before they are completed. This not only limits developers’ capacity to continue investment, but risks sizeable losses for households and the banks that funded these purchases via mortgage credit. Homebuyers’ decreased confidence in the pre-sales model also limits the traction of policies aimed at stimulating housing demand.

Without stabilization for pre-sold housing demand, a large segment of partially finished housing would be at risk of noncompletion. While significant data gaps make the task of estimating the cost of completing troubled developers’ partially built housing inevitably imprecise, a range of estimates suggests the cost could be significant. The average of the midpoints of three estimation approaches places the gross cost of completing distressed developers’ pre-sold projects—with no funding from additional sales or restructuring recoveries—at roughly 5 percent of GDP, with one approach implying costs well above that. The wide range reflects significant uncertainty around the distribution of troubled projects within the developer sector, their degree of completion, and the availability of already escrowed cash, among other factors.

Robust mechanisms to restore homebuyer confidence are critical to accelerating developer restructuring and ending the crisis. Launched quickly and administered and funded on an emergency basis by the central government, these measures can shore up household demand, averting the risk of disorderly declines in sales and investment. Equally importantly, these mechanisms will provide safeguards for consumer interests in restructuring, paving the way for more proactive restructuring of troubled developers.

  • A support scheme for homebuyers awaiting delivery should support construction of pre-sold housing and/or compensation to homebuyers as optimal, have central government fiscal backing, capacity for front-loaded disbursement of funds, and mechanisms for ex post burden-sharing, particularly from developers and creditors whose collateral would be impaired absent government support. Its scope should be flexible, given the wide range of circumstances facing troubled projects, provided it adheres to the objective of restoring homebuyer confidence at minimum taxpayer cost. Projects assessed by the authorities to be commercially nonviable should be restructured and sold to healthy developers or taken over by the scheme at zero cost, prioritizing projects with large numbers of pre-sold units. The scheme would then complete taken-over projects or provide partial compensation to homebuyers, depending on which is less costly. Local governments should not be required to fund interventions, as that would limit their incentives for prompt action.

  • A future homebuyer protection scheme would protect new homebuyers from the risk that developers fail to deliver housing purchased via pre-sales. This could take the form, initially, of a government-established insurance policy (or guarantee) scheme to compensate homeowners in the case of project failure or delay, to be underwritten by financial institutions with central government risk-sharing and oversight. Fees would be paid by developers, limiting incentives for reliance on pre-sale funds. Financially weak developers and nonviable projects would be ineligible. Government risk-sharing for this market should be eventually wound down once the crisis subsides and developers possess sufficient collateral to access such insurance on a market-driven basis, or once alternative reforms (including legal reforms to the pre-sales model) are in place to protect pre-sale homeowners against the risk of non-delivery.

  • Clear communication of the crisis response would amplify the impact on homebuyer and investor confidence, while improving the efficiency of the support schemes will require urgently strengthening monitoring and data collection efforts on housing projects and related exposures.

  • Further macroprudential and city-level regulatory housing policy support can help ensure any correction in housing demand does not create macro-financial stability spillovers. Regulatory forbearance, which can create disincentives to restructure, should be phased out and loan moratoria should be subject to strict conditions. Policy interventions that distort market signals—home price floors and LGFV purchases of land—should be avoided, as these will delay needed market adjustments and make them more costly.

uA001fig15

Ranges of Estimates of Gross Completion Costs for Troubled Pre-Sold Housing Projects

(In percent of GDP, assumes no funding from additional home sales or restructuring-related recoveries)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: Capital IQ; CEIC Data Company Limited; WIND; National Bureau of Statistics China; and IMF staf calculations.Notes: NBS = National Bureau of Statistics. Each estimation approach uses a range of assumptions for key inputs to arrive at upper and lower bound cost estimates. Approach (a) uses developer-reported financial data to sum up the gap between distressed developers’ contract sales since 2019 and recognized revenues from mid-2020 (or 2021) onwards, a proxy for the sales value of undelivered homes. Homebuilding costs net of land purchases for these pre-sales are estimated based on developer-reported margins (40%) and a range of estimates for the blended ratio of sold to unsold units. Approach (b) imputes floor space under construction net of completions to distressed developers based on their share of total sector assets. This uses ranges of estimates for: total floor space under construction (based on NBS data); completion costs per square meter; and the share of floor space linked to distressed developers. Approach (c) uses the gap between NBS data on developer-reported planned and completed real estate investment – a proxy for planned but not yet completed investments – and imputes a portion to distressed developers based on their asset market share, deducting their assumed pro rata share of 2022 investment. For approach (a), distressed developers are those identified in a recent firm-level GFSR analysis as having liquidity, viability, and solvency vulnerabilities (for the lower bound estimate) and those with two of those three vulnerabilities or a 30-day trailing price-book ratio (or last available price-book ratio) below 0.25x. For approaches (b) and (c), distressed developers’ market share uses the asset share of the firm groupings identified in the GFSR analysis, which amounts to 23 to 44 percent. All approaches deduct 10–50% of remaining project costs (or available cash, whichever is higher) to factor in uncertainty around existing escrowed funds.

These policies will be costly but are critical to avoiding deeper adjustment-related losses. While the completion cost estimates are large, they could grow if the developer crisis continues, while any spending on stalled projects would avoid significantly larger losses for households stemming from non-completion. As part of a well-communicated policy package that restores homebuyer confidence in the pre-sales model and restructures developers, expanded central government support for the construction of troubled pre-sold housing projects would also help limit the expected declines in home sales, easing funding constraints on construction activity. A rebound in distressed developer sales to declines seen for non-distressed developers would yield roughly 1–2 percent of GDP annually in additional funds for completion, reducing the overall cost of such a scheme, with another 1–2 percent of GDP potentially available from modest recoveries from restructuring distressed developers’ inventories and long-term investments.

1 Prepared by Henry Hoyle. 2 See for instance Rogoff and Yang, “A Tale of Tier 3 Cities”, IMF Working Paper 2022/196, International Monetary Fund, Washington, (forthcoming); Shan and Others, “Credit supply holds the key to China housing outlook in 2022”, Goldman Sachs research report, October 2021; Xia and Huang, “How big is the room for China’s real estate market in the future?” (Chinese), Evergrande Research Institute, 2019.

A Reform Agenda for China’s Fiscal Framework1

Further reform of China’s fiscal policy to increase the progressivity of tax system, prioritize spending on households instead of infrastructure, and improve the intergovernmental framework would strengthen the role of fiscal policy as an automatic stabilizer while accelerating economic rebalancing toward private consumption. The measures would also be consistent with sustained consolidation to reduce fiscal vulnerabilities.

Despite a number of reforms, significant structural gaps remain in China’s fiscal framework. A structural tax revenue deficit has incentivized local government recourse to opaque, off-budget financing mechanisms to cover expenditures, leading to high government debt. An expenditure policy that prioritizes public investment is less effective in stabilizing economic fluctuations than one that prioritizes targeted support to households. Gaps in the social protection system have led households to self-insure through high precautionary savings, stymieing rebalancing toward a more sustainable growth model.

A fiscal framework with a more progressive tax system and high-multiplier spending would better support economic stabilization and rebalancing. China’s tax revenue, which fell by 2½ ppt of GDP over the decade before the pandemic, remains low relative to its peers. Personal income tax reforms to reduce basic allowances while providing a tax credit to low-income wage earners, and broaden the base by removing various deductions would generate more tax revenue. Increasing the coverage and benefit payments of social protection2 would allow households to reduce their high savings rate, facilitating rebalancing towards private consumption. Prioritization of spending on households over investment would also deliver larger stabilization benefits. For example, means-tested transfers to households would boost aggregate demand 50 percent more than an equivalent amount of public investment (see SIP on fiscal multipliers). To ensure consistency across policies, fiscal policy should be undertaken within a medium-term fiscal framework.

uA001fig16

Emerging Markets (EM): Tax Revenue

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: IMF’s World Revenue Longitudinal Data set (WoRLD); and IMF staff calculations.

Intergovernmental reform would help address fiscal imbalances at the local level. Many local governments face permanent funding gaps and have heavily relied on real estate for revenues and as collateral for off-balance sheet borrowing. Building on earlier efforts to rein in off-balance-sheet financing and address local SOE debt, further reforms should be centered on increasing revenues, which could include: greater central government transfers coupled with significant improvement in local government fiscal transparency and better controls; introducing a recurrent property tax system; and establishing an automatic and non-regressive fiscal transfer system. These reforms would help address unsustainable local public finances and mitigate potential macro-financial feedback loops in provinces with relatively weak public finances.3 Efforts should also be made to improve overall fiscal transparency and strengthen public financial management frameworks, including over public investment.4

1 Prepared by John Ralyea. 2 See Ralyea, “Adequate Social Protection for All” IMF Selected Issues Papers, 2021 Article IV Consultation. 3 See Han and others, “Intergovernmental Coordination in China: How Much Fiscal Risk Sharing is There, and Can It Be Improved?” IMF Selected Issues Papers, 2020 Article IV Consultation. 4 For more on public financial management reforms, see the IMF Departmental Paper “Managing Down the Debt Overhang: Market-based Exit Mechanisms for the Chinese Economy,” forthcoming.

The Benefits of Interest Rate-Based Monetary Policy1

The Chinese authorities have recently increased the emphasis on the use of non-interest rate-based monetary policy tools. Evidence suggests that these policies cannot reproduce the benefits of traditional interest rate policy adjustments, suggesting interest rates should continue to play a primary role in the policy toolkit.

China’s monetary policy framework has recently increased its emphasis on quantity-based monetary policy tools. These policies, which induce banks to increase net lending through non-interest rate means, have long featured in China’s policy toolkit. Their use has recently expanded given their promise of more precisely controlling credit growth and avoiding financial risk-taking. Adjustments to policy interest rates have become less frequent, both relative to China’s recent past and to other emerging markets.

Evidence suggests these quantity-based policy tools should not substitute for traditional interest rate-based monetary policy. Using local projections (Jorda, 2006), an unexpected decrease in short-term interest rates is found to generate a significant investment response among Chinese firms that peaks 1.5 years later, in line with theory and evidence on monetary policy transmission (see SIP on monetary policy). Importantly, this result is largely driven by small firms and other firm groups facing financial constraints. This response also controls for unexplained shifts in credit growth, which is used as a proxy for quantity-based monetary shocks.2 These credit policy shocks generate a weaker response for small firms, with statistically significant responses only for large and state-owned firms.

uA001fig17

Interest Rate Shock: Small Firms

(In percentage points)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: Capital IQ CEIC Data Company Limited; WIND; Bloomberg; and IMF staff calculations.Notes: Each time period t is one half-year. Interest rate shocks are unexpected 25 basis point decreases to the 1 -year interest rate swap rate on days of monetary policy announcements. Credit policy shocks are unexpected 12.5 percentage point increases in credit above trend levels. Confidence intervals shown are 90 percent.
uA001fig18

Credit Policy Shock: Small Firms

(In percentage points)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Sources: Capital IQ; CEIC Data Company Limited; WIND; Bloomberg; and IMF staff calculations. Notes: Each time period t is one half-year. Interest rate shocks are unexpected 25 basis point decreases to the 1-year interest rate swap rate on days of monetary policy announcements. Credit policy shocks are unexpected 12.5 percentage point increases in credit above trend levels. Confidence intervals shown are 90 percent.

Greater use of credit policy could weaken monetary policy’s countercyclical impact and bring other downsides. Relatively muted transmission of credit policy shocks to financially constrained firms may reflect bank risk aversion as they allocate policy-induced “excess” credit to lower risk firms, or implicit guarantees and other factors that limit spillovers to riskier credit markets. As smaller firms tend to be the most financially constrained and vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations, credit policies therefore may be less effective in managing countercyclical demand fluctuations. Credit policies’ clearer benefits for larger, more established firms also point to potential for exacerbating disparities in credit availability for smaller firms.

Interest rate policies’ strong effects on investment suggest they should continue to play a primary role in managing cyclical fluctuations. Excessive risk-taking due to lower interest rates should be addressed via prudential policy tools. Well-designed and market-based quantity-based policy tools have a role in China’s monetary policy framework—for instance in addressing market failures in credit supply or amplifying interest rate-based policies—but they should not replace interest rate policies as the primary policy instrument.

1 Prepared by Henry Hoyle. 2 Credit policy shocks are estimated as unexplained changes in credit growth relative to trend given both unexpected interest rate shocks and the expected level of interest rates based on economic activity and inflation measures.

Policies for Higher and Higher-Quality Growth1

Comprehensive structural reforms to lift productivity growth and foster rebalancing towards more sustainable and less investment-driven growth can significantly raise China’s growth potential over the medium- and long-term, while increasing the share of consumption, reducing emissions, and lowering debt ratios.

This box provides estimates of an upside scenario in the long run under the following set of recommended structural reforms (see SIP on potential growth): (i) a budget-neutral re-composition of fiscal expenditures toward households, including strengthening the social protection system, that starts in 2023 and supports a reduction of the excessively high savings rate and rebalancing toward consumption, and triggers an expansion of services/consumer industries and associated investment; (ii) implementation of SOE reforms that help close the SOE-POE productivity gap by improving resource allocation and deleveraging among SOEs, while pro-market reforms improve business dynamism;2 (iii) labor market reforms that gradually lift the retirement age from 60 (male) and 55 (female) to 65 and education reforms that further improve access to and enhance the quality of education and therefore boost human capital.3 This illustrative scenario assumes a linear phasing-in of these reforms over 15 years and, following the reform period, growth rates would eventually converge with the baseline. The scenario assumes the easing of COVID restrictions through 2023 as in the baseline.

uA001fig19

Gains Over the Reform Period in Illustrative Scenario

(In percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Source: IMF staff estimates.Notes: Reforms in illustrative scenario assumed to be phased in linearly over a reform period of 15 years.
uA001fig20

Augmented Debt Scenarios

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Source: IMF staff calculations.

The right set of policies would bring growth benefits that are shared by all. Under the upside scenario, reforms are estimated to lift the level of real GDP by around 2.5 percent by 2027, and by around 18 percent by 2037, with the bulk of the benefits stemming from productivity-enhancing reforms. This would imply average GDP growth rates of about 4¾ and 4½ percent and GDP per capita growth rates of about 5 and 4 percent between 2023–27 and 2028–37, respectively. Combined with a re-orientation of fiscal resources toward household support, domestic consumption would increase significantly, with a consumption share of GDP that is about 18 percentage points higher in 2037. As a consequence, China would not only narrow the gap to advanced economies in terms of per capita GDP but—thanks to the lower energy intensity of a more balanced GDP growth—make faster progress towards its climate coals, with the direct effect on CO2 emissions of a reduction of about 15 percent by 2037.4

Growth would also be less risky. Under the same path for fiscal policy, higher growth would reduce augmented general government debt by 2037 from 173 percent of GDP under the baseline to 146 percent of GDP in the upside scenario. This would create additional fiscal space the authorities could build as a buffer. The corporate debt burden would also fall, mainly because of higher growth. The reduction in saving rates would also make the economy less prone to asset bubbles and provide a sustainable driver for non-real estate investment.

1 Prepared by Anne Oeking. 2 See D. Cerdeiro and C. Ruane, “China’s Declining Business Dynamism,” IMF Working Paper 22/32, 2022. 3 See Selected Issues, IMF Country Report for the People’s Republic of China, “Adequate Social Protection for All,” 2021. 4 See J. Chateau, W. Chen, F. Jaumotte and K. Zhunussova, “A Comprehensive Package of Macroeconomic Policy Measures for Implementing China’s Climate Mitigation Strategy,” IMF Working Paper 22/142, 2022.
Figure 1.
Figure 1.

China: Recent Macroeconomic Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Figure 2.
Figure 2.

China: Fiscal

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Figure 3.
Figure 3.

China: Monetary

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Figure 4.
Figure 4.

China: Credit

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Figure 5.
Figure 5.

China: Financial Markets

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Figure 6.
Figure 6.

China: External

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Figure 7.
Figure 7.

China: Banks

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Table 1.

China: Selected Economic Indicators

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Sources: Bloomberg; CEIC Data Company Limited; IMF International Financial Statistics database; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

IMF staff estimates for 2021.

Surveyed unemployment rate.

Includes government funds.

Adjustments are made to the authorities’ fiscal budgetary balances to reflect consolidated general budgetary government balance, including government-managed funds, state-administered SOE funds, adjustment to the stabilization fund, and social security fund.

Production side nominal GDP.

The augmented balance expands the perimeter of government to include government-guided funds and the activity of local government financing vehicles (LGFVs).

Table 2.

China: General Government Fiscal Data

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Sources: CEIC Data Company Limited; China Ministry of Finance; National Audit Office; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Includes central and local governments’ transfers to general budget from various funds, carry-over.

Includes adjustments to budget stabilization funds.

Including only revenues/expenditures for the year, and excluding transfers to general budget and carry over.

Includes carry over counted as revenue, adjustments to local government spending, proceeding from issuing special purpose bonds, and net expenditure financed by land sales estimated by subtracting the acquisition cost, compensation to farmers, and land development from the gross land sale proceeds.

The overall net lending/borrowing includes net land sale proceeds as a decrease in nonfinancial assets recorded above the line.

Ministry of Finance debt only, excludes bonds issued for bank recapitalization and asset management companies.

Includes local government bonds and explicit debt.

Two-thirds of new contingent debt is assumed likely to be recognized as general government debt.

Total social capital constribution to SCF and GGFs.

Includes only 2/3 of LGFV debt, being categoried as government explicit debt according to NAO report (2013), and excludes the rest 1/3, being categorized as government guaranteed debt or “possible to be recognized” debt.

GDP in this table refers to expenditure side nominal GDP.

Table 3.

China: Balance of Payments

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Sources: CEIC Data Company Limited; IMF Information Notice System; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Includes counterpart transaction to valuation changes.

Includes foreign currency reserves and other reserve assets such as SDRs and gold.

Table 4.

China: Monetary and Credit Developments

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Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff estimates.

Includes local government debt swap, asset-backed securities, loan write-offs, and other components.

Table 5.

China: Nonfinancial Sector Debt

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Sources: CEIC Data Company Limited; Capital IQ; Ministry of Finance; and IMF staff estimates.

Including LGFV debt recognized as LG debt as of 2014 (by the 2014 audit).

Government guided funds and special construction funds (social capital portion only).

Table 6.

China: Rebalancing Scorecard Relative to Pre-Pandemic

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Note: The color coding is based on the change in each indicator relative to the previous year. Color coding: red if the changes go in the opposite direction of rebalancing; yellow if some progress was observed; and green if there was substantial progress in rebalancing. For indicators that are ratios, changes are measured in simple differences and are considered substantial if larger than 0.5 percentage points. For indicators that are indices and for the credit indicators, changes are measured in annual percent change and are considered substantial if larger than 5 percent. See Zhang, L. (2016), “Rebalancing in China—Progress and Prospects,” IMF Working Paper No. 16/183 for the framework.

Reported values for 2022 are for 2022 YTD (through Q3), not full year projections. Environmental indicators have been significantly affected by lockdowns throughout the pandemic.

Given the importance of seasonality for this indicator, the score is calculated from the difference in this share relative to 2021 Q1-Q3 (YTD).

Table 7.

China: SOE Performance

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Sources: CEIC Data Company Limited; National Bureau Statistics China; and Ministry of Finance. 1/ Since June 2019, the government no longer disclose non-financial SOE assets and liabilities. The debt ratios in 2019 is calculated as of June 2019. 2/ Number of zombies refers to legal entities of central SOEs. Number of zombies in 2019 refers to data as of 2019 Q3. According to State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council’s (SASAC) 3-year plan, all zombie enterprises was cleaned up by 2020. 3/ There are 98 central SOEs and 32000 legal entities affilicated to these SOEs by 2021.
Table 8.

China: External Vulnerability Indicators

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Sources: CEIC Data Company Limited; Bloomberg; IMF, Information Notice System; and IMF staff estimates.

Shanghai Stock Exchange, A-share.

Includes foreign currency reserves and other reserve assets such as SDRs and gold.

ARA short for assessing reserve adequacy. Range for the ARA metric under different assumptions of exchange rate regime and capital controls.

Appendix I. External Sector Assessment

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See 2021 IMF CFM Taxonomy for a list of China’s existing CFMs and related policy advice.

Appendix II. Risk Assessment Matrix1,2

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Appendix III. Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Analysis

The Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Assessment (SRDSA) assesses sovereign risk and government debt under both the general “budgetary (official)” and staff’s estimated general government “augmented” definitions. While general “budgetary (official)” debt remains manageable, “augmented” debt and associated gross financing needs are high and debt, under both definitions, is on an upward trajectory. Medium-term fiscal adjustment is expected to stabilize debt around 2037.

1. Staff assess sovereign risk based on two definitions of debt. The main difference is the coverage of local government debt.

  • The general budgetary (official) coverage scenario includes central government debt and “on-budget” local government debt identified by the authorities. General government debt includes central government debt and explicit local government debt (which consists of general and special local government bonds and other recognized off-budget liabilities incurred by end-2014).1

  • Augmented” debt is used in the broad coverage scenario. It adds other types of local government borrowing, including off-budget liabilities borrowed by LGFVs via bank loans, bonds, trust loans and other funding sources, estimated by staff. It also covers debt of government-guided funds and special construction funds, whose activities are considered quasi-fiscal. The augmented deficit is the flow counterpart of augmented debt. Augmented data are staff’s best estimate of general government data. Data limitations mean some nongovernment activity is likely included, and some LGFV and funds may have substantial revenues. It is also possible that some general government activity takes place outside of staff’s augmented definition (e.g., public-private partnerships (PPPs)).

2. Under the baseline scenario, both definitions of debt continue to rise. Government debt under the general budgetary (official) coverage scenario increases to 69 percent of GDP in 2031 from 47 percent of GDP in 2021. Augmented debt rises to 167 percent of GDP in 2031 from 101 percent of GDP in 2021. Large primary deficits, particularly in the early years of the projection period are the main driver behind both debt increases. A favorable growth-interest rate differential and gradual fiscal consolidation, as assumed in the baseline, stabilize both debt-to-GDP ratios. The SRDSA assumes maturing debt is rolled over and asset-based financing declines gradually. Gross financing needs rise in the early part of the projection horizon before trending down. However, augmented gross financing needs remain high, hovering around 30 percent of GDP per year.

3. Several factors mitigate risks associated with China’s high debt level and large financing requirements under the augmented debt scenario. Most of China’s debt (around 90 – 95 percent of the total) is held by domestic residents and only a small portion is denominated in foreign currency. The general government’s positive net financial worth, low real borrowing cost, and a closed capital account further mitigate risks. The availability of liquid assets (government deposits in the banking system are a third of GDP), and the ability of domestic financial institutions to provide financing (the largely state-dominated commercial banking system claims on the government are only a quarter of the banking system’s assets) offsets risks too.

Appendix III. Figure 1.
Appendix III. Figure 1.

China: Risk of Sovereign Stress (Augmented Debt: Broad Coverage)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Source: Fund staff.Note: The risk of sovereign stress is a broader concept than debt sustainability. Unsustainable debt can only be resolved through exceptional measures (such as debt restructuring). In contrast, a sovereign can face stress without its debt necessarily being unsustainable, and there can be various measures—that do not involve a debt restructuring—to remedy such a situation, such as fiscal adjustment and new financing.1/ The near-term assessment is not applicable in cases where there is a disbursing IMF arrangement. In surveillance-only cases or in cases with precautionary IMF arrangements, the near-term assessment is performed but not published.2/ A debt sustainability assessment is optional for surveillance-only cases and mandatory in cases where there is a Fund arrangement. The mechanical signal of the debt sustainability assessment is deleted before publication. In surveillance-only cases or cases with IMF arrangements with normal access, the qualifier indicating probability of sustainable debt (“with high probability” or “but not with high probability”) is deleted before publication.
Appendix III. Figure 2.
Appendix III. Figure 2.

China: Debt Coverage and Disclosures (Augmented Debt: Broad

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

1/ CG=Central government; GG=General government; NFPS=Nonfinancial public sector; PS=Public sector.2/ Stock of arrears could be used as a proxy in the absence of accrual data on other accounts payable.3/ Insurance, Pension, and Standardized Guarantee Schemes, typically including government employee pension liabilities.4/ Includes accrual recording, commitment basis, due for payment, etc.5/ Nominal value at any moment in time is the amount the debtor ow es to the creditor. It reflects the value of the instrument at creation and subsequent economic flows (such as transactions, exchange rate, and other valuation changes other than market price changes, and other volume changes).6/ The face value of a debt instrument is the undiscounted amount of principal to be paid at (or before) maturity.7/ Market value of debt instruments is the value as if they w ere acquired in market transactions on the balance sheet reporting date (reference date). Only traded debt securities have observed market values.
Appendix III. Figure 3.
Appendix III. Figure 3.

China: Public Debt Structure Indicators (Augmented Debt: Broad Coverage)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Appendix III. Figure 4.
Appendix III. Figure 4.

China: Baseline Scenario (Augmented Debt: Broad Coverage)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Appendix III. Figure 5.
Appendix III. Figure 5.

China: Realism of Baseline Assumptions (Augmented Debt: Broad Coverage)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Source : IMF Staff.1/ Projections made in the October and April WEO vintage.2/ Calculated as the percentile rank of the country’s output gap revisions (defined as the difference between real time/period ahead estimates and final estimates in the latest October WEO) in the total distribution of revisions across the data sample.3/ Data cover annual obervations from 1990 to 2019 for MAC advanced and emerging economies. Percent of sample on vertical axis.
Appendix III. Figure 6.
Appendix III. Figure 6.

China: Medium-term risk analysis (Augmented Debt: Broad Coverage)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Appendix III. Figure 7.
Appendix III. Figure 7.

China: Risk of Sovereign Stress (General Budgetary (Official) Debt)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Source: Fund staff.Note: The risk of sovereign stress is a broader concept than debt sustainability. Unsustainable debt can only be resolved through exceptional measures (such as debt restructuring). In contrast, a sovereign can face stress without its debt necessarily being unsustainable, and there can be various measures—that do not involve a debt restructuring—to remedy such a situation, such as fiscal adjustment and new financing.1/ The near-term assessment is not applicable in cases where there is a disbursing IMF arrangement. In surveillance-only cases or in cases with precautionary IMF arrangements, the near-term assessment is performed but not published.2/ A debt sustainability assessment is optional for surveillance-only cases and mandatory in cases w here there is a Fund arrangement. The mechanical signal of the debt sustainability assessment is deleted before publication. In surveillance-only cases or cases with IMF arrangements with normal access, the qualifier indicating probability of sustainable debt (“with high probability” or “but not with high probability”) is deleted before publication.
Appendix III. Figure 8.
Appendix III. Figure 8.

China: Debt Coverage and Disclosures (General Budgetary (Official) Debt)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

1/ CG=Central government; GG=General government; NFPS=Nonfinancial public sector; PS=Public sector.2/ Stock of arrears could be used as a proxy in the absence of accrual data on other accounts payable.3/ Insurance, Pension, and Standardized Guarantee Schemes, typically including government employee pension liabilities.4/ Includes accrual recording, commitment basis, due for payment, etc.5/ Nominal value at any moment in time is the amount the debtor ow es to the creditor. It reflects the value of the instrument at creation and subsequent economic flow s (such as transactions, exchange rate, and other valuation changes other than market price changes, and other volume changes).6/ The face value of a debt instrument is the undiscounted amount of principal to be paid at (or before) maturity.7/ Market value of debt instruments is the value as if they w ere acquired in market transactions on the balance sheet reporting date (reference date). Only traded debt securities have observed market values.
Appendix III. Figure 9.
Appendix III. Figure 9.

China: Public Debt Structure Indicators (General Budgetary (Official) Debt)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Appendix III. Figure 10.
Appendix III. Figure 10.

China: Baseline Scenario (General Budgetary (Official) Debt) (percent of GDP unless indicated otherwise)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Appendix III. Figure 11.
Appendix III. Figure 11.

China: Realism of Baseline Assumptions (General Budgetary (Official) Debt)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Source : IMF Staff.1/ Projections made in the October and April WEO vintage.2/ Calculated as the percentile rank of the country’s output gap revisions (defined as the difference between real time/period ahead estimates and final estimates in the latest October WEO) in the total distribution of revisions across the data sample.3/ Data cover annual obervations from 1990 to 2019 for MAC advanced and emerging economies. Percent of sample on vertical axis.
Appendix III. Figure 12.
Appendix III. Figure 12.

China: Medium-term risk analysis (General Budgetary (Official) Debt)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2023, 067; 10.5089/9798400229787.002.A001

Appendix IV. Implementation of Main Recommendations of the 2021 Article IV Consultation

Progress has been made in opening up to trade and foreign investment, promoting the green transition, building a unified market, and addressing real estate developer risks against the backdrop of recurrent COVID outbreaks. At the same time, there remains significant room for rebalancing, SOE reform in core areas, advancing the green economy, monetary policy reform, addressing the local government debt problem, the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies, and safeguarding financial stability. Further reforms along these lines need to focus more on providing direct fiscal support to households, recalibrating the COVID strategy, taking action in the property sector while protecting financial stability, advancing power sector reform and fostering climate finance, and reaccelerating structural reforms such as enhancing competitive neutrality to promote economic recovery and achieve high-quality growth in the medium to long term.

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Appendix V. Implementation of Main Recommendations from China’s 2017 FSAP 1

(as of September 30, 2022)

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1

See E. Jurzyk and C. Ruane, “Resource Misallocation Among Listed Firms in China: The Evolving Role of State-Owned Enterprises,” IMF Working Paper 21/75, 2021; and D. Cerdeiro and C. Ruane, “China’s Declining Business Dynamism,” IMF Working Paper 22/32, 2022.

2

The uncertainty around this estimate is considerable because of data gaps.

3

For further background, see also Chateau and others, “A Comprehensive Package of Macroeconomic Policy Measures for Implementing China’s Climate Mitigation Strategy,” IMF Working Paper 2022/142.

4

National Audit Office investigations also point to widespread underwriting problems at smaller banks in the fast-growing financial inclusion segment.

5

In a positive step, on August 26, 2022, the U.S. and China reached a preliminary agreement to allow U.S. officials to review audit documents of U.S.-listed Chinese firms.

6

On October 7, 2022, the U.S. announced additional export controls that restrict access to advanced semiconductors and inputs needed for their development and production. The new measures restrict U.S. persons (citizens and companies) from providing direct or indirect support to Chinese companies involved in advanced chip manufacturing.

7

As of May 2022, China has expanded e-CNY pilot scheme to 23 regions, completing 264 million transactions worth RMB 83 billion (US$11.9 billion). Around 4.57 million merchants across China currently accept the e-CNY.

8

See J. Ralyea, “Adequate Social Protection for All,” IMF 2021 China Article IV Staff Report, Selected Issues Papers.

9

“Reform Plan for Accelerating Improvements of the Exit System for Market Players.”

10

As part of the design of e-CNY involves managed anonymity and a threshold-based approach for customer due diligence (CDD), in order to comply with AML/CFT requirements, mechanisms/controls will need to be in place for all transactions in order to enable screening for targeted financial sanctions (covered by the international standards on AML/CFT), to link transactions to understand when a customer reaches a particular threshold (at which point CDD should be carried out), and to detect instances where a customer splits a larger transaction into smaller amounts in order to avoid triggering AML/CFT controls.

11

Jurzyk and Ruane, op. cit.

12

Y. Han, “Administrative Barriers, Market Integration and Economic Growth,” Job Market Paper mimeo, available at https://www.econ.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/JobMarketPaper_YiHAN.pdf

13

See Barwick and others, “Local Protectionism, Market Structure, and Social Welfare: China’s Automobile Market,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4, November 2021.

14

DiPippo and others, “Red Ink: Estimating Chinese Industrial Policy Spending in Comparative Perspective,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2022.

15

China is the only G20 country not reporting the breakdown of expenditure by economic classification and the decomposition between current and capital expenditure.

1

The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) shows events that could materially alter the baseline path. The relative likelihood is the staff’s subjective assessment of the risks surrounding the baseline (“low” is meant to indicate a probability below 10 percent, “medium” a probability between 10 and 30 percent, and “high” a probability between 30 and 50 percent). The RAM reflects staff views on the source of risks and overall level of concern as of the time of discussions with the authorities. Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly. The conjunctural shocks and scenario highlight risks that may materialize over a shorter horizon (between 12 to 18 months) given the current baseline. Structural risks are those that are likely to remain salient over a longer horizon.

2

Green upward and red downward arrows denote upside and downside risks, respectively.

1

In 2014, 2/3 of existing LGFV debt was explicitly recognized as a government liability following a government audit.

1

Information as reported by the authorities, with IMF staff providing translation.

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People’s Republic of China: 2022 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the People’s Republic of China
Author:
International Monetary Fund. Asia and Pacific Dept
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    Vaccine Protection has been Waning

    (Vaccinations by month, in percent of population)

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    Real Estate Indicators

    (In percent,12M moving sum, year-on year change)

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    Household Saving Rate

    (In percent, 4Q moving average)

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    Bilateral US$ Exchange Rate, Cross-country Comparison

    (In percent, difference between March 1, 2022 and December 9, 2022)

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    CPI Inflation

    (In percent year-on-year)

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    Confidence by Businesses and Consumers

    (In percent)

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    Temperatures have Increased Dramatically in Recent Years

    (In degrees Celsius)

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    Activity Spillovers to Rest of World

    (GDP response to 1 p.p. lower activity in China, in cumulative percent decline)

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    Growth with Excessive Investment

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    Scenarios for Vaccination Campaign Duration

    (In months)

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    Estimated Fiscal Multipliers

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    G20: Individual Income Tax, 2019

    (In percent of GDP)

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    Local Government Budget Financing 1/

    (In percent of GDP)

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    Residential Real Estate: Annual Pre-Sales and Completions

    (In billions of square meters LHS, in percent RHS)

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    Ranges of Estimates of Gross Completion Costs for Troubled Pre-Sold Housing Projects

    (In percent of GDP, assumes no funding from additional home sales or restructuring-related recoveries)

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    Emerging Markets (EM): Tax Revenue

    (In percent of GDP)

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    Interest Rate Shock: Small Firms

    (In percentage points)

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    Credit Policy Shock: Small Firms

    (In percentage points)

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    Gains Over the Reform Period in Illustrative Scenario

    (In percent)

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    Augmented Debt Scenarios

    (In percent of GDP)

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    Figure 1.

    China: Recent Macroeconomic Developments

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    Figure 2.

    China: Fiscal

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    Figure 3.

    China: Monetary

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    Figure 4.

    China: Credit

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    Figure 5.

    China: Financial Markets

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    Figure 6.

    China: External

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    Figure 7.

    China: Banks

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    Appendix III. Figure 1.

    China: Risk of Sovereign Stress (Augmented Debt: Broad Coverage)

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    Appendix III. Figure 2.

    China: Debt Coverage and Disclosures (Augmented Debt: Broad

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    Appendix III. Figure 3.

    China: Public Debt Structure Indicators (Augmented Debt: Broad Coverage)

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    Appendix III. Figure 4.

    China: Baseline Scenario (Augmented Debt: Broad Coverage)

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    Appendix III. Figure 5.

    China: Realism of Baseline Assumptions (Augmented Debt: Broad Coverage)

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    Appendix III. Figure 6.

    China: Medium-term risk analysis (Augmented Debt: Broad Coverage)

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    Appendix III. Figure 7.

    China: Risk of Sovereign Stress (General Budgetary (Official) Debt)

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    Appendix III. Figure 8.

    China: Debt Coverage and Disclosures (General Budgetary (Official) Debt)

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    Appendix III. Figure 9.

    China: Public Debt Structure Indicators (General Budgetary (Official) Debt)

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    Appendix III. Figure 10.

    China: Baseline Scenario (General Budgetary (Official) Debt) (percent of GDP unless indicated otherwise)

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    Appendix III. Figure 11.

    China: Realism of Baseline Assumptions (General Budgetary (Official) Debt)

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    Appendix III. Figure 12.

    China: Medium-term risk analysis (General Budgetary (Official) Debt)