People’s Republic of China—Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 2022 Article IV Consultation Discussions-Press Release; and Staff Report
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1. Hong Kong SAR is a services-oriented small open economy that relies heavily on the free flow of capital, goods, and people.1 About 90 percent of GDP and employment come from the services sector. Financial services, trade and logistics, and hospitality services, which are underpinned mainly by the free flow of capital, goods, and people, respectively, account for about half of output and employment. Other services, including professional, real estate, IT/telecommunications, and public services, account for the remaining 40 percent of GDP.2

Abstract

1. Hong Kong SAR is a services-oriented small open economy that relies heavily on the free flow of capital, goods, and people.1 About 90 percent of GDP and employment come from the services sector. Financial services, trade and logistics, and hospitality services, which are underpinned mainly by the free flow of capital, goods, and people, respectively, account for about half of output and employment. Other services, including professional, real estate, IT/telecommunications, and public services, account for the remaining 40 percent of GDP.2

Navigating Multiple Shocks

1. Hong Kong SAR is a services-oriented small open economy that relies heavily on the free flow of capital, goods, and people.1 About 90 percent of GDP and employment come from the services sector. Financial services, trade and logistics, and hospitality services, which are underpinned mainly by the free flow of capital, goods, and people, respectively, account for about half of output and employment. Other services, including professional, real estate, IT/telecommunications, and public services, account for the remaining 40 percent of GDP.2

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Hong Kong SAR: Illustration of Economic Structure

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Source: IMF Staff.1 Including wholesale/retail trade, accommodation/food, and transportation.2 Including professional, real estate, information/communications, and public services.Note: Non-services sectors are not shown, such as construction (4% of GDP) and manufacturing (1% of GDP).

2. Large policy buffers and a strong containment effort have helped the economy cope with multiple shocks, including the pandemic. Hong Kong SAR has faced multiple domestic and external shocks since 2019, including social unrest, U.S.-China tensions,3 and the pandemic, which resulted in an economic contraction for two consecutive years. However, the ample pre-crisis buffers—including, for example, fiscal reserves of more than 40 percent of GDP—allowed for swift and bold policy actions that have helped mitigate the impact of the adverse shocks and enabled a gradual recovery. A strict containment strategy under a zero-COVID tolerance approach has helped contain local outbreaks,4 and, as of mid-January 2022, more than 70 percent of the eligible population has been vaccinated with at least two doses.

uA001fig02

Hong Kong SAR: Real GDP Developments

(Seasonal adjusted real GDP; pre-crisis period = 100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.Note: Pre-crisis period (t-1) is set at 1997Q2, 2008Q2, and 2019Q4 for Asian financial crisis, global financial crisis, and COVID-19 pandemic, respectively.
uA001fig03

Hong Kong SAR: FX and Fiscal Reserves

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.Note: Pre-shock period (t-1) is set at 1997Q2, 2008Q2, and 2019Q4 for Asian financial crisis, global financial crisis, and COVID-19 pandemic, respectively. Fiscal reserves are only available since October 1998.

3. Financial linkages with Mainland China continue to deepen, creating both opportunities and challenges for Hong Kong SAR.

  • As a key financial gateway vis-à-vis Mainland China, Hong Kong SAR channels over 60 percent of direct investment into and out of Mainland China. It is also the most important offshore funding platform for Mainland Chinese corporates, accounting for more than 80 percent of total offshore bond issuance and about one-third of its equity financing. Meanwhile, Hong Kong SAR’s banking exposures to Mainland China-related non-banks (mostly corporates) and Mainland China-located banks amount to about 300 percent of GDP.

  • At the same time, the extensive linkages are a key macro-financial vulnerability. The large exposures to Mainland Chinese corporates through both banking and capital market linkages imply that macro-financial developments in Mainland China, including those arising from the recent wave of regulatory measures imposed by the Mainland Chinese authorities on the property and technology sectors, could have a large impact on Hong Kong SAR through various channels.

4. The authorities have prioritized policies to secure growth opportunities from closer ties with Mainland China, while ensuring social stability and achieving carbon neutrality before 2050. The authorities are promoting the flow of capital, people, goods, and knowledge in the Guangdong–Hong Kong SAR–Macao SAR Greater Bay Area (GBA) to effectively integrate Hong Kong SAR’s expertise in financial and professional services with the innovation and manufacturing capacity in the Guangdong Province, including through the Northern Metropolis development.5 The authorities have pledged to address the problem of insufficient housing supply and maintain social stability for sustainable growth. The government has also announced a Climate Action Plan to achieve carbon neutrality before 2050 and promote a greener economy.

From Strong Recovery to Sustainable Growth

A. A Strong but Unbalanced Recovery

5. Strong and swift policy actions have helped mitigate the impact of the adverse shocks and enable a gradual recovery.

  • Fiscal. The government provided a large fiscal stimulus amounting to about 12.3 and 3.5 percent of GDP in 2020 and 2021, respectively. Key measures included: (i) a cash payout and digital consumption vouchers to all eligible residents (Box 1); (ii) employment support through wage subsidies for firms to retain employees and temporary job creation; (iii) one-off relief measures to households and enterprises; and (iv) health-related spending to enhance anti-epidemic efforts.

  • Financial. The countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) was lowered from 2.0 to 1.0 percent and the level of regulatory reserves for credit loss provisions was cut by one half to support banks’ lending capacity. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) introduced a US Dollar Liquidity Facility and encouraged banks to use their liquidity buffers. The key financial relief measures have included: (i) low-interest loans for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and personal loans for unemployed and self-employed individuals with 100-percent government guarantee; and (ii) loan moratoria on principal payments for affected SMEs, sectors and households.

Hong Kong SAR: Key Fiscal Policy Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic

(In percent of GDP)

article image
Sources: Hong Kong SAR government; and IMF staff calculations.

6. The economy has recovered strongly, helped by a rebound in the flow of goods, with tentative signs of a handoff from public to private demand.

  • Growth. The economy continued its recovery in the first quarter of 2021, with a sequential growth of 5.5 percent, led by strong external demand on the back of robust global recovery. Tentative signs of a handoff from public to private demand also emerged in the second and third quarters, with a recovery in private consumption and investment offsetting the drag on growth from fiscal withdrawal and a softening of external demand.6 With local pandemic outbreaks largely under control, high frequency indicators suggest that domestic economic activity continued to expand in the fourth quarter.

  • Inflation. Headline and core inflation rose to 1.6 and 0.6 percent in 2021, partly driven by the expiration of one-off government relief measures introduced in 2020. The underlying headline inflation after netting out such effects stood at 1.4 percent in December 2021, well below its pre-pandemic level, as the impact of the remaining slack in the economy and weak housing rental inflation more than offset rising imported inflation.

uA001fig04

Hong Kong SAR: Contribution to Real GDP Growth

(Seasonally adjusted quarter/quarter percent change)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: C&SD; and IMF staff calculations.

7. The recovery remains uneven as the flow of people has not recovered, owing to travel restrictions in the context of a zero-COVID tolerance approach.

  • On the supply side, the recovery has been uneven across sectors. The border control has significantly limited the flow of people in and out of Hong Kong SAR, putting more stress on contact-intensive activities, notably hospitality services, while the flow of capital has been barely affected and the flow of goods is recovering strongly amid the global recovery, following a large collapse initially. Other less contact-intensive services have also been affected by the pandemic, albeit to a lesser degree.

  • On the demand side, private consumption is lagging other GDP components and remains below its pre-pandemic level, reflecting the significant decline in household income and the uneven recovery in the labor market (Appendix I). The overall unemployment rate fell sharply from a peak of 7.2 percent in the three-month period ending in February 2021 to 3.9 percent in December, driven by both the strong economic recovery and a decline in the labor force (by about 3 percent since the pandemic). However, employment in some contact-intensive sectors (e.g., retail services) declined further in 2021, contributing to the relatively weak recovery in household income and consumption.

uA001fig05

Hong Kong SAR: Output and Employment by Sector

(2020 level; 2019 level = 100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
uA001fig06

Hong Kong SAR: Recovery in Private Consumption Lags Other GDP Components

(2019Q4 level = 100; seasonally adjusted)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources; C&SD; and IMF staff calculations.

8. Financial conditions remain accommodative despite some modest tightening recently, partly due to increased financial market volatility in Mainland China. Interest rates remain low and risk premia are still broadly favorable. However, stock prices have declined notably since mid-2021 led by the real estate and technology sectors amid heightened uncertainty arising from Mainland China’s policy actions to reduce leverage in the property sector and a wave of regulatory policy measures in the technology and fintech-related sectors. The spillovers to local Hong Kong SAR corporates in the US dollar bond market have been relatively limited, while the Hong Kong dollar (HKD) continues to trade in a smooth and orderly manner within the Convertibility Zone.

uA001fig07

Hong Kong SAR: Financial Conditions 1/

(Index; 3-month moving average)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Bloomberg; CEIC; and IMF staff estimates.1/ The financial condition index is estimated using the principal component analysis of four categories of financial variables: price of risks embedded in asset prices, ease of obtaining finance, funding costs, funding, and degree of financial stress.
uA001fig08

US Dollar Credit Spreads: High-Yield Bonds

(In percentage points; based on option-adjusted spreads relative to US Treasury)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Bloomberg; and IMF staff calculations.

9. Financial vulnerabilities remain elevated with overvalued house prices and continued increases in private sector leverage.

  • Large house price misalignment. Following a modest decline of less than 1 percent in 2020 in terms of annual averages, residential property prices have increased by about 4 percent as of November 2021 on the back of a structural housing supply-demand imbalance (see ¶40). Staff’s latest estimates suggest that house prices are significantly overvalued by about 30 percent as of 2021Q3. Prices of private offices, which fell by 17 percent at the peak of the pandemic, have recovered to less than 6 percent below its pre-pandemic level as of November 2021.7

  • Rising private sector leverage. Households’ bank debt increased to 92 percent of GDP in 2021Q3, up by about 10 percentage points from end-2019, mostly driven by robust mortgage borrowing amid low interest rates.8 Credit to non-financial corporates also increased to 304 percent of GDP in 2021Q2 (up from 268 percent at end-2019).9 The credit-to-GDP gap, based on credit for domestic use, narrowed but remained sizeable at 18.6 percent in 2021Q2.

10. The financial system remains resilient supported by significant policy buffers, a strong external position, and strong institutional frameworks. As also noted by the 2021 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), prudential policies, ample capital and liquidity in the banking sector, and a strong external position (with FX reserves and net international investment position of about 135 and nearly 600 percent of GDP, respectively) have provided Hong Kong SAR with important buffers to cope with the series of macro-financial shocks.10 The flow of capital has been little affected by the crisis, with FDI and other investment inflows rebounding significantly in 2020. There is also no sign of significant outflow from the banking system with customer deposits further increasing in the midst of the crisis. Banks’ profitability has declined on the back of reduced net interest margins, but still remain high by international comparison.

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Hong Kong SAR: Financial Non-Reserve Flows by Component

(In Billions of HKD)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.Note: PI = portfolio investment.

11. The crisis has brought Hong Kong SAR’s income inequality and housing market challenges to the fore. Despite the strong recovery, income inequality, which was already among the highest in the region before the pandemic, has likely widened as low-income households working in the contact-intensive service sectors have been worst hit by the pandemic. The share of lower-income households in the total has increased after the outbreak of the pandemic,11 which, in the context of a continued rise in house prices, has further reduced housing affordability that was already among the lowest in the world before the pandemic.

uA001fig10

Hong Kong SAR: Household Income

(In thousand HKD and percent; seasonally adjusted)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: CEIC; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
uA001fig11

House Price to Income Ratio

(Index; 2007Q1 = 100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: IMF RES real estate module; and IMF staff calculations.

B. Handoff to Private Demand with Challenges Ahead

12. Real GDP is projected to have grown by 6.4 percent in 2021, and is expected to moderate to 3.0 percent in 2022, with a continued handoff from public to private demand.

  • The growth projection anticipates a moderate slowdown in fiscal consolidation, with the deficit in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) narrowing by 1½ percent of potential GDP in 2022, largely due to a scaling back of the discretionary stimulus measures.

  • Despite the progress in vaccination, border re-opening is expected to be very gradual throughout 2022, partly due to the renewed outbreaks since late 2021 in both Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China, beginning with a limited opening to Mainland China.

  • Despite the renewed local outbreak, normalization of economic activity is expected to continue with private consumption and investment further gathering momentum along with a recovery in income. Credit growth is expected to rise in 2022 in the context of a recovery in domestic demand.

  • As a result, the negative output gap is expected to narrow to about 1 percent of potential GDP and CPI inflation is projected to gradually rise to about 2 percent in 2022 in line with improving labor market conditions.

13. The current account surplus is expected to narrow with the recovery in domestic demand. The merchandise trade deficit is expected to widen further in 2022 as imports continue to recover along with domestic demand, more than offsetting the modest improvement in services trade surplus as border re-opening is expected to be gradual over the course of the year. On a preliminary basis and adjusting for transitory pandemic-related factors, developments in 2021 suggest that the external position was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies (Appendix II).12

14. The economy will adjust to a new normal, but the pandemic is expected to have scarring effects on potential output. The pandemic will likely have a permanent level effect on potential GDP, owing to the largely uneven recovery in the labor market and the impact of the pandemic on labor participation, offset, in part, by increasing digitalization and the impact it would have on the reallocation of production factors and labor productivity. At the same time, the medium-term growth rates of potential GDP is projected to slow to below 3 percent due to structural headwinds, such as population aging.

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Hong Kong SAR: Labor Force and Labor Productivity

(Seasonally adjusted)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.

15. The balance of risks is tilted to the downside, but ample policy buffers and the strong external position should help mitigate the adverse impact on financial stability and economic growth (Appendix III).

  • Downside. Pandemic-related uncertainty, including renewed local outbreaks led by new variants, could delay the resumption in the flow of people, further weakening the recovery in private consumption. A slower-than-expected global recovery, sustained disruptions in global supply chains, as well as de-globalization and decoupling amid heightened protectionism could reduce the flow of goods and derail the recovery. Moreover, a sharp rise in global risk premia, a disorderly tightening of monetary policy in major advanced economies, large housing market corrections, escalating U.S.-China tensions, and a shift of market confidence in Hong Kong SAR’s status as a major IFC could affect the flow of capital. In particular, under the currency board arrangement, a faster-than-expected tightening in the U.S. monetary policy could lead to tighter financial conditions in Hong Kong SAR.13 Large-scale defaults in Mainland China’s real estate sector and a sudden growth slowdown in Mainland China could prompt negative spillovers to Hong Kong SAR’s economy and financial system.

  • On the upside, a faster-than-expected border re-opening could lead to a stronger recovery in private consumption. A faster-than-expected global recovery could contribute to stronger export growth than currently envisaged. The development of the GBA could further improve medium- and long-term growth prospects.

16. Climate change also poses challenges to growth and financial stability. Even though Hong Kong SAR does not have carbon-intensive heavy industries, the economy is still vulnerable to both physical and transition risks. The FSAP found that the insurance sector’s equity valuations are already adversely affected by physical risks such as storm, floods, and landslides. If global efforts to reduce carbon emissions fall short of envisaged benchmarks, climate-related risk could intensify and have significant adverse effects on both financial institutions and corporates. In addition, banks with large exposures to fossil energy, heavy industry, and transportation sectors in both Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China—sectors with the most carbon emissions—are most vulnerable during the transition towards a low-carbon economy.14

Authorities’ Views

17. The authorities broadly agreed with staff’s assessment of the macroeconomic outlook. They viewed the continued border closures and associated weak tourism as the key factors constraining the pace of economic recovery, while noting that private consumption has started to pick up thanks to improving labor market conditions and the support from the Consumption Voucher Scheme. Regarding the potential scarring effects from the pandemic, the authorities noted that the closer integration with Mainland China and digitalization could generate new business opportunities and help mitigate the effects. They agreed that any shocks that disrupt the free flow of people, goods, and capital could derail the recovery, but were confident that the sizable fiscal and FX buffers and strong capital and liquidity positions in the banking system would help mitigate any adverse impact on financial stability and economic growth. The authorities concurred with staff’s preliminary external sector assessment for 2021.

Supporting Balanced and Inclusive Growth

A. Adjusting Macroeconomic Policy to the Pace of the Recovery

18. As the recovery gains further momentum, financial policies should shift towards addressing solvency issues concerning corporates and individuals. The authorities’ plan to engage with banks to develop an exit strategy from the loan repayment deferral scheme, which will expire at end-April 2022, is welcome.15 As firms repair their balance sheets and adjust business models to the post-pandemic new normal, financial policies should support this process by facilitating the efficient restructuring of viable firms while allowing nonviable firms to exit, leveraging on the Hong Kong SAR’s robust corporate insolvency framework.16 In this context, the planned introduction of a statutory corporate rescue procedure in line with international best practice is timely. The cut in the CCyB during the pandemic was appropriate since it encouraged bank lending and supported the recovery, and there is merit in keeping the CCyB unchanged as of now given the renewed local outbreak. As the indicative buffer guide—a metric based on the credit-to-GDP gap and house price-to-rental gap—based on 2021Q2 data signals a 2.25-percent CCyB, the HKMA should stand ready to adjust the CCyB to the level that is consistent with the updated assessment of systemic risks going forward.

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Hong Kong SAR: Primary Gap Indicators for CCyB

(In percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: HKMA, and IMF staff calculations.

19. Fiscal policy should continue to support the recovery by returning to a balanced budget, albeit at a gradual pace and after recovery is firmly entrenched. As there still remains a large negative output gap, a premature withdrawal of fiscal policy support to return to a balanced budget principle could endanger a sustained recovery.17 As fiscal space remains ample, with the fiscal reserves standing at about 30 percent of GDP at end-November 2021, the pace of fiscal consolidation in 2022 should remain gradual, with the CAPB tightening by about 1½ percent of potential GDP, as assumed in the baseline, to help enable the handoff to private demand. A gradual consolidation over the medium term, at about ½ percent of GDP per year from around 2023 after the recovery is entrenched, would help stabilize the decline in fiscal reserves and safeguard fiscal sustainability (Appendix IV).18

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Hong Kong SAR: Drivers of Changes in Overall Balance

(Change from previous year, percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: CEIC and IMF staff calculations.Note: A positive value denotes an increase in revenue and a decrease in expenditure, respectively.
uA001fig15

Hong Kong SAR: Fiscal Impulse and Overall Balance

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Government budget statements, CEIC and IMF staff calculations. Fiscal impulse: change in cyclically adjusted primary balance in percent of potential GDP.

20. Fiscal policy should focus on more targeted support to foster balanced and inclusive growth, and its role as automatic stabilizers could be strengthened over the medium term.

  • In the near term, fiscal measures should be more targeted to support vulnerable and low-income households, unemployed workers, and affected SMEs, notably leveraging the digitalization of infrastructure.19 This would also increase the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating growth given the higher marginal propensity to consume of lower-income households. This could be accompanied by further refinements to the social safety net to allow more effective identification and delivery of support to the most vulnerable. For example, additional electronic consumption vouchers could be distributed to low-income households that meet the assistance criteria. The eligibility criteria for the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme could also be temporarily relaxed again to provide more help to the unemployed.

  • In the medium term, the introduction of a dedicated unemployment benefit system could be considered to better protect the labor force against idiosyncratic and systemic shocks (Appendix V). In the absence of a formal unemployment benefit system, support for the unemployed is provided through severance payment/long service payment and a means-tested social safety net, but its coverage has been limited against the surge in unemployment during the pandemic. Expanding automatic stabilizers, especially through unemployment benefit systems, could protect household incomes and strengthen resilience against adverse shocks.

21. Fiscal policy should also address structural challenges of population aging, high income inequality, and insufficient public housing supply to promote inclusive growth.

  • Social welfare and healthcare. Hong Kong SAR’s population is aging rapidly with the share of population aged 65 and above projected to increase from less than 20 percent in 2021 to 27 percent in mid-2030. While government spending on the elderly has been rising in the past few years to about 3 percent of GDP or close to one-sixth of operating expenditure in 2019, spending pressure is expected to increase further to address gaps in social safety nets and medical services.20 There is room to strengthen the provision of medical services and financial assistance for the elderly population, notably among low-income households. Staff welcomes the plan to further strengthen the support for elderly persons with financial needs by merging the Normal Old Age Living Allowance (OALA) and Higher OALA in the second half of 2022, which will allow the existing Normal OALA recipients and eligible new applicants to receive higher OALA payments.21

  • Education and training. Education spending has declined to an average 3.9 percent of GDP in 2020 and 2021, from the previous peak of 4.3 percent of GDP in 2019, in part due to more urgent pandemic-related spending needs, but this needs to be reversed. Upgrading human capital through education and job training, with a focus on digital-related technologies, would mitigate the scarring effects of the pandemic and facilitate the sectoral reallocation of labor in the transition to a digitalized economy.

  • Public housing. Stepping up expenditure to increase public housing and related infrastructure investment would be critical in addressing the large housing supply-demand imbalance and improving housing affordability. Increasing the provision of public housing could also play a key role in alleviating poverty and reducing inequality, as it is an effective means of targeted transfer to low-income households given high house prices and rents.

  • A simulation analysis shows that fiscal measures aimed at increasing welfare spending, upgrading low skill workers through education and training, and bolstering public housing programs/infrastructure could help address structural challenges and boost both aggregate demand and potential output.22

uA001fig16

Hong Kong SAR: Government Expenditure on the Elderly

(In billions of HKD)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Hong Kong Legislative Council (RT02/19–20); and IMF staff calculations.
uA001fig17

Hong Kong SAR: Public Expenditure on Housing

(In percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: CEIC; and IMF staff calculations.

22. To address long-term fiscal needs, build buffers, and secure greater equity, a comprehensive tax reform over the medium term remains an imperative. The current regime of a narrow tax base and low tax rates have led to a low tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, less than 14 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2018 before the crisis, with heavy reliance on volatile revenue sources such as property-related taxes. While this regime has supported Hong Kong SAR’s competitiveness in the financial and service industries, it could constrain the rebuilding of fiscal buffers when the economy is facing rising spending pressures. The ongoing global corporate tax reforms could also result in some revenue losses (Appendix VI). In this context, the government should consider a comprehensive tax reform that broadens the tax base to provide a stable source of revenue to meet the long-term spending needs while maintaining fairness and international competitiveness. International benchmarking of other IFCs suggests that there is room to introduce a VAT, raise excise taxes, and increase the progressivity of personal income tax by raising the tax rates on top brackets.23 Considerations could also be given to introducing taxes on capital gains and dividends.

uA001fig18

Hong Kong SAR: Major Revenue Sources

(In billions of HKD)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Financial Services and Treasury Bureau; and CEIC.

Authorities’ Views

23. The authorities agreed that the current macroprudential policy stance is appropriate while crisis measures need to be phased out in a gradual and orderly manner as the recovery gains momentum. They noted that the current low level of CCyB could be maintained to continue supporting the recovery as there is no clear sign of a credit boom. The authorities also underscored that the loan repayment deferral scheme has been helpful in supporting small businesses affected by the crisis and indicated that its exit, when initiated, will be gradual. They noted that credit quality is less of a concern as the scheme only defers principal repayments, enabling banks to closely monitor borrowers’ repayment capacity, and that the scheme’s take-up has dropped to a low level.

24. The authorities concurred that fiscal policy should continue to support a balanced recovery in the near term while rebuilding buffers over the medium term. They will continue to exercise fiscal prudence with a view to achieving a fiscal balance over a period of time in the future and maintaining adequate fiscal reserves in the long run. On the merit of having a dedicated unemployment benefit scheme, the authorities viewed the current system of severance payment/long service payment paid by employers to eligible employees upon meeting certain criteria and means-tested social security as striking a reasonable balance between alleviating financial hardship caused by loss of employment and providing incentives to work. They had an open mind regarding the need for new sources of revenue to address higher spending needs arising from aging population. Nevertheless, the authorities emphasized that the principle of a simple and low tax system that has contributed to Hong Kong SAR’s competitiveness should not be undermined.

B. Strengthening Productivity and Competitiveness

25. Further integration with regional and global economies will strengthen Hong Kong SAR’s status as a regional trade hub and boost growth potential in the long run. Hong Kong SAR is considering participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), whose current members account for more than 70 percent of Hong Kong SAR’s total trade. For the GBA development, the authorities have: (i) strengthened infrastructure connections such as the railway system and logistics to promote the flow of people and goods; (ii) launched financial connection schemes to facilitate the flow of capital; and (iii) enhanced technology collaboration such as establishing a one-stop sandbox framework by linking the Fintech Supervisory Sandbox with the People’s Bank of China’s Fintech Innovation Regulatory Facility to facilitate cross-border fintech applications and promote the flow of knowledge. For more effective integration, the coordination among regulators in Mainland China and Hong Kong and Macao SARs could be strengthened by taking into account the differences in legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks.

26. Accelerated digitalization could enhance the competitiveness of financial services and promote the transformation toward a post-pandemic “new normal.” The Smart City Blueprint 2.0 continues to enhance and expand existing public management measures and services. “Fintech 2025,” which was launched in 2021 following the Smart Banking initiative in 2017, includes, among other measures: (i) fully digitalizing banking operations from front-end to back-end, supported by appropriate Regtech solutions (e.g., Anti-Money Laundering Regtech Lab); (ii) developing a new-generation data infrastructure that enables an efficient and safe access to customer information by banks with an aim to improve credit intermediation efficiency and financial access especially for SMEs; and (iii) expanding the fintech-savvy workforce, for example by developing fintech-specific training programs and qualifications. These initiatives should be implemented with a focus on facilitating the sectoral reallocation of resources towards digitalized services and promoting financial inclusion, especially for low-income groups, the elderly, and SMEs.

Authorities’ Views

27. The authorities concurred that the GBA development and digitalization could boost growth potential in the long term. They noted that the one-stop GBA Fintech Innovation Supervisory “Network Link-up”, of which operational details are being finalized, would help facilitate pilot trials of cross-boundary fintech initiatives, concurrently in Hong Kong SAR and GBA cities in Mainland China. The authorities also noted that the digitalization of infrastructure has the potential to increase the effectiveness of targeted fiscal transfers. They were of the view that the participation in the RCEP, on top of existing bilateral Free Trade Agreements, would further strengthen Hong Kong SAR’s status as a regional trade hub by providing more certainty to trading partners amid the rise of protectionism.

Safeguarding Financial Stability

28. Hong Kong SAR’s financial system has continued expanding even during the pandemic while maintaining its role as a major IFC.

  • Hong Kong SAR’s competitiveness is grounded in the common law system, rule of law, transparent and efficient institutions, high-quality professional services, and strong financial regulatory and supervisory frameworks adapted to international standards and best practices, as well as the well-functioning LERS as an anchor for economic and financial stability.

  • The banking sector in Hong Kong SAR is one of the key business hubs of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) with its assets of 920 percent of GDP as of end-October 2021. Hong Kong SAR is also a global wealth management center, with the total assets under management of 1,300 percent of GDP as of end-2020 (with more than 60 percent of funding sources from foreign investors). Reflecting its role as an international funding center, Hong Kong SAR also hosts the largest foreign exchange and over-the-counter (OTC) interest derivatives markets in Asia.

29. Key macro-financial vulnerabilities, identified by the FSAP, are: (i) extensive linkages with Mainland China; (ii) potential shifts in global investors’ risk sentiment; and (iii) stretched real estate valuation. Despite these vulnerabilities, the FSAP stress tests show that, benefiting from large capital buffers and strong pre-impairment earnings, banks would remain adequately capitalized even in a severely adverse scenario with a prolonged pandemic, a marked slowdown of Mainland China’s economy, a significant tightening of financial conditions, and a sharp housing market correction. The FSAP also assessed that the micro-prudential oversight over the financial system is modernized and strong and the institutional framework for macro-prudential policy is functioning well, while crisis management arrangements have been significantly strengthened.

A. Opportunities and Challenges from Rising Ties with Mainland China

30. Financial linkages with Mainland China have deepened, creating both opportunities and risks to Hong Kong SAR’s financial system.

  • Capital market linkages. In addition to several existing channels of investment flows between Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China, the cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect Scheme in the GBA and the Southbound Bond Connect Scheme have been launched in 2021, with the former expected to provide new asset management business opportunities for Hong Kong SAR banks.

  • Banking system exposures. Hong Kong SAR banks’ exposures to Mainland China-related non-banks, mostly corporates, have risen to about 245 percent of GDP as of September 2021. Hong Kong SAR’s gross claims on Mainland China-located banks also increased during the pandemic to HK$1.7 trillion in September 2021 (about 60 percent of GDP).

  • Offshore renminbi (RMB) business. Hong Kong SAR is the largest offshore RMB center, and its liquidity pool continues to expand with RMB deposits rising to about RMB 835 billion as of October 2021, serving as a main platform for raising and investing renminbi funds and as an intermediary channeling RMB funds between offshore and onshore markets.

uA001fig19

Hong Kong SAR: Banking Sector’s Mainland Non-bank Exposures

(In percent of total assets)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: HKMA; CEIC; and IMF staff calculations.Note: The breakdown is only available from 2013Q4.

31. The authorities should continue to strengthen systemic risk monitoring and analysis of Mainland China-related credit risks.

  • Potentially high credit risk from Mainland China real estate sector. The nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio from Mainland-related lending remains low at 0.77 percent as of September 2021, slightly below Hong Kong SAR banks’ overall NPL ratio of 0.81 percent and well below the onshore Chinese banks’ NPL ratio of 1.75 percent. However, potential financial stress and a slowdown in the Mainland China’s property sector could negatively transmit to Hong Kong SAR, including through financial institutions’ direct exposures (on- and off-balance sheet exposures) as well as indirect real and financial linkages. The FSAP corporate vulnerability analysis using firm-level data at end-2019 found that the estimated aggregate default rate for banks’ exposures to real estate firms in Mainland China could increase significantly under a severe adverse scenario featuring a slowdown in the real GDP growth, significant tightening of financial conditions, and large housing market corrections in both Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China. However, the impact of a significant growth slowdown in Mainland China on Hong Kong SAR banks’ capital would likely be manageable based on the FSAP stress tests.24

  • Need for a further strengthening in the monitoring and analysis of credit risks from high-risk

  • Mainland Chinese borrowers. Against the backdrop of recent financial stress in several Mainland’s property developers, the credit exposures of Hong Kong SAR banks to Mainland China’s real estate sector should be closely monitored and analyzed as recommended by the FSAP. The authorities should also continue to ensure that the internal credit risk models used by Hong Kong SAR banks to determine the capital charges for exposures to Mainland Chinese borrowers, particularly those in the real estate sector with low credit ratings, are sufficiently forward-looking. Continued monitoring of banks’ significant exposures to non-bank Mainland Chinese entities, complemented by periodic stress tests of banks’ large exposures on top of the regular stress testing, would help identify and mitigate risks from potential default of such exposures.

uA001fig20

Hong Kong SAR: Estimated Aggregate Probability of Default for Mainland Chinese Corporate Debt Owed to Hong Kong SAR Banks: By Sector 1/ 2/

(In percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Bloomberg, L.P. and IMF staff calculations.1/ The probably of default (PD) here refers to the cumulative default rates over the next two years. We first calculate the post-shock interest rate coverage ratio (ICR, defined as earnings before interest and taxes/interest payments) and then map the firm-level ICR to PD based on the historical default rates of firms following GFSR (October 2013). The aggregate PD on the corporate debt owed to Hong Kong SAR banks is then estimated for each sector by the average value of individual-firm PDs weighted by the share of each firm’s debt owed to Hong Kong SAR banks in total debt of all firms--with the share approximated by the sum of bank lending for domestic use in Hong Kong SAR (excluding loans to households and financial sector) and Mainland-related lending divided by the total debt of all firms.2/ As noted by the FSAP, the aggregate default rate is estimated based on publicly available firm-level financial data of listed firms rather than firm-level bank exposure data which are not publicly available, and hence is likely to be different from the actual default rate of the overall bank corporate loan book and should be interpreted with caution.

32. Financial ties are broadening to the cross-border use of Mainland China’s central bank digital currency (CBDC), i.e., the e-CNY. The HKMA has strengthened its research for potential issuance of a local CBDC (i.e., the e-HKD) for retail use and potential use of a wholesale CBDC for cross-border payments (Multiple CBDC Bridge project) and has tested the cross-border retail use of the e-CNY in Hong Kong SAR (Box 2). As a major IFC, the efficiency gains from the use of CBDCs, particularly in cross-border cases, could be potentially large for Hong Kong SAR. For example, the e-CNY could potentially reduce the costs and increase the speed of cross-border transactions between Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China residents or corporates, and further strengthen the financial integration between the two economies. However, potential implications and risks from a more widely adopted e-CNY in Hong Kong SAR such as compliance with regulations in both jurisdictions should be carefully studied before a large-scale adoption.

Authorities’ Views

33. The authorities viewed that spillovers from financial strains across property developers in Mainland China to Hong Kong SAR’s financial system would be manageable. They emphasized that Hong Kong SAR banks’ exposures to Mainland-related corporates are being closely monitored and the credit quality has been healthy. Their exposures to high-risk developers are small and not concentrated. The authorities noted that bank-specific Pillar 2 capital add-on could be considered, if needed, to ensure capital adequacy that is commensurate with individual banks’ risk-taking behavior. They also underscored that securities firms’ exposures due to pledged securities lending have been stress tested to ensure their resilience. The authorities noted that they have not decided whether to launch the e-HKD and did not see significant risks from cross-boundary use of the e-CNY in Hong Kong SAR, while continuing to deepen technical research and analysis on policy considerations.

B. Strengthening Resilience to Global Risk Sentiment

34. The free flow of capital should be maintained to safeguard financial stability of both Hong Kong SAR and regional and global economies. Given the importance of Hong Kong SAR as a financial gateway vis-à-vis Mainland China as well as an IFC, any disruption to the free flow of capital into and out of Hong Kong SAR, including in US dollar, could destabilize regional and global financial markets beyond Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China with repercussions on the global economy. The authorities should continue to preserve the rule of law and strengthen the high-quality regulatory and supervisory frameworks to preserve the solid foundation for Hong Kong SAR’s financial stability and competitiveness and maintain the free flow of capital. At the same time, the authorities should also closely monitor the financial system for potential disruptions and be ready to take actions to contain systemic risk, if needed, with clear and careful communication.

35. Some liquidity risks of banks and investment funds deserve closer monitoring. The FSAP identified that, despite the resilience of the overall banking system, some of the foreign bank branches are more vulnerable to liquidity stress, largely due to their higher reliance on unsecured interbank funding and inability to tap the local deposit base. To mitigate such risks, as recommended by the FSAP, further steps can be taken to integrate all existing liquidity stress tests into a single framework to enhance the monitoring of liquidity position of more vulnerable segments including those foreign branches. Furthermore, as some investment funds (e.g., funds with shares denominated in foreign currencies or geared towards riskier asset classes) appear more prone to liquidity stress, the monitoring and stress testing of investment funds’ liquidity could be integrated into the supervisory framework.

36. The LERS remains the appropriate arrangement for Hong Kong SAR as an anchor for economic and financial stability. The credibility of the currency board arrangement has been ensured by a transparent set of rules governing the arrangement, ample fiscal and FX buffers, strong financial regulation and supervision, the flexible economy, and a prudent fiscal framework. The FSAP stress test found that the LERS mechanism and the substantial amount of FX reserves would mitigate the impact of potential large capital outflows on the HKD interest rate, thus helping maintain the solvency and resilience of the banking system.

Authorities’ Views

37. The authorities noted that capital inflows have continued in recent years despite various challenges faced by Hong Kong SAR. They emphasized that Hong Kong SAR continues to be a major IFC, thriving on the rule of law, the robust regulatory and supervisory frameworks, the vibrant ecosystem, and its role as a leading financial gateway for Mainland China. The authorities noted that liquidity risk in the banking and asset management sectors is adequately monitored and managed, while stressing that the regulatory and supervisory approach to liquidity risk is the same for domestic banks and foreign branches. They also viewed investment funds as a shock absorber during liquidity stress episodes, noting that the existing regulatory framework limits concentrated exposures and allows for swing pricing.

C. Containing Housing Market Risks

38. Residential house prices are on the rise again, contributing to a further increase in the already elevated level of household debt. The average debt-servicing ratio for new mortgages increased to 36.9 percent at its peak in February 2021 from 36.0 percent in December 2019, partly driven by the decline in household income. While household assets are large in aggregate—as reflected by the high household net worth-to-liabilities ratio of 11.2 times and safe assets-to-liabilities ratio of 2.9 times in 2019—the wealth distribution is skewed towards high-income households.25

39. Given the stretched valuation, a disorderly adjustment in the property market could pose a risk to the economy. A sharp house price correction could trigger an adverse feedback loop between house prices, debt service capacity, household consumption, and growth, negatively affecting banks’ balance sheets.26 In addition, the FSAP analysis indicated that low-income households could be under significant financial stress when facing rising interest rates and falling income. To mitigate such risks, the authorities should continue to carefully monitor the household debt repayment capacity, particularly for low-income households.

uA001fig21

Hong Kong SAR: House Price at Risk 1/

(Probability density function as of 2021Q3)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Source: IMF staff estimation1/ Updated estimates as of 2021Q3 using the methodology in the IMF Working Paper ‘Predicting Downside Risks to House Prices and Macro-Financial Stability” (Deghi and others, 2Q2Q).

40. The three-pronged approach to increasing housing affordability and containing housing market risks remains valid, but more efforts are needed to raise housing supply.

  • Increasing housing supply is critical to

  • resolve the structural supply-demand imbalance. Housing supply has increased on average since 2015 with the implementation of the government’s Long-term Housing Strategy and the Hong Kong 2030+ Strategy, but has fallen short of target by about 30 percent on average. Staff welcomes the identification of the land to provide 330,000 public housing units within the next ten years and urges the authorities to bring the actual public housing production back to the target without further delays. To this end, a comprehensive approach is urgently needed, including increasing land supply for housing production (e.g., land resumption, reclamation, and re-zoning) while expediting and streamlining the process for land identification and production (e.g., environmental, transport, and other relevant assessments). The recently announced Northern Metropolis development strategy could boost housing supply over the longer-term period.

  • The macroprudential stance for property markets should be maintained to safeguard financial stability. A series of macroprudential policies that have been introduced and tightened since 2009—such as ceilings on loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, caps on debt service-to-income ratio (DSR), and stress testing of the DSR against interest rate increases—have helped contain vulnerabilities in the banking system (Appendix VII). Given resilient house prices and mortgage growth, the existing residential property-related macroprudential policies should be kept unchanged for now and any changes should be data-dependent with due attention to the emerging risk of regulatory leakages. Moreover, the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) should take the lead in strengthening the regular surveillance and data collection on lending by non-bank lenders (e.g., property developers and non-bank financial institutions), and the authorities should regularly reassess the need to expand the regulatory perimeter to mitigate the leakages in macroprudential policies.

  • Stamp duties have been effective in containing speculative activity and external demand. The government has introduced three types of stamp duties to curb excess demand by both residents and nonresidents. Although they have helped curb house price increases and contain household leverage and systemic risks,27 the New Residential Stamp Duty (NRSD) introduced since November 2016 (Appendix VII) is a residency-based capital flow management measure and a macroprudential measure (CFM/MPM) levied at a higher rate on non-residents than on first-time resident home buyers. Therefore, staff recommends phasing it out once systemic risks from the non-resident inflow dissipate.28

uA001fig22

Hong Kong SAR: Housing Production 1/

(In units)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Housing Authority. Hong Kong SAR: Housing Society, Hong Kong SAR; Rating and Valuation Department. Hong Kong SAR; and NF staff calculations.1/ Public Housing includes both rental and subsidized sale flats: Rental flats include those completed under Hong Kong Housing Authority (HKHA) and Hong Kong Housing Society: Subsulizod sale flats include those completed under HKHA and Hong Kong Housing Society, and do not include the 322 subsidized saleflats provided by the Urban Renewal Authority in 2015/16 and those in 2020/21. Private flats from 2003 onwards exclude Village houses; 2004 ligures include subsidized flats converted to private during the year; 2015 figures include flats completed and designated as subsidized sale flats in the year but sold to the public in the open market at prevailing market prices in 2017.2/ The average annual target for housing production is the average annual target for the ten-year period announced in the 2014-19 Long Term Housing Strategy Annual Progress Reports.

Authorities’ Views

41. The authorities agreed that increasing land supply remains the key to fundamentally resolving the structural imbalance between housing demand and supply. They emphasized that various measures had been taken to boost land supply for housing production, including by accelerating land resumption and expediting and streamlining the process of land production, and such efforts were starting to bear fruits. The authorities viewed the current tight macroprudential stance for housing market as appropriate given the elevated house prices, while noting that they will continue to closely monitor the housing market and stand ready to make necessary adjustments with a view to safeguarding financial stability. They noted that mortgage lending by non-banks has been closely monitored and has declined in recent years amid the authorities’ efforts to regulate banks’ lending to non-banks and the expansion in the mortgage insurance program.

D. Further Enhancing Regulatory and Supervisory Frameworks

42. The ongoing efforts to further strengthen the regulatory and supervisory frameworks are welcome. Banking regulation and supervision remain strong, and the regulatory initiatives have kept pace with changes in the banking sector and technological advancements. Staff welcomes the authorities’ early implementation of FSAP recommendations, including efforts to strengthen the monitoring of OTC trades and the planned implementation of risk-based capital requirements and group-wide supervision of insurers (Appendix VIII). The authorities have also improved data collection through the Granular Data Reporting initiative, and further steps should be taken to enhance macroprudential oversight, including by adopting a more comprehensive and systematic approach to identify and address systemic risks. There is also room to further strengthen the regulatory and supervisory frameworks as recommended by the FSAP (see text table). Hong Kong SAR has a solid regime for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) that is delivering good results, and has taken steps to improve its effectiveness further following the 2019 mutual evaluation. These efforts should continue notably to ensure that accurate information on the beneficial owners of legal entities can be accessed on a timely basis, which will be crucial in safeguarding Hong Kong SAR’s reputation as an IFC.

Hong Kong SAR: Key FSAP Recommendations on Regulatory and Supervisory Frameworks

article image
Source: 2021 Hong Kong SAR Financial System Stability Assessment report.

43. A consistent and cross-sectoral supervisory and regulatory framework is critical to effectively address industry-wide fintech-related issues. As the financial system embraces technology, the operational resilience and cyber security of the financial sector should be strengthened in tandem with the development in fintech. Close coordination among regulators is also essential to achieve a more holistic activity-based approach consistent across sectors, especially in the areas of cyber and IT-related risks, Regtech adoption and use of artificial intelligence. Continued review of the regulatory perimeter of non-bank fintech firms is also warranted and the trading of virtual assets should also be closely monitored in order to identify and mitigate risks associated with virtual assets, including those from fraud and money laundering/financing of terrorism.

Authorities’ Views

44. The authorities viewed the cross-sectoral systemic risk monitoring as effective, benefiting from the strong inter-agency coordination. They highlighted the recent progress in strengthening data collection and analytical capacity, including by utilizing trade repositories data and big data on individual mortgage and commercial loans, and conducting joint thematic reviews among different regulators to better analyze and manage identified risks. The authorities also noted that the implementation of the risk-based capital framework for insurers is on track and a regulatory framework for licensing and regulating all virtual asset trading platforms in Hong Kong SAR will be introduced. They did not see the need to update the deposit protection scheme as it has a different role from, and is not part of, the resolution regime and all costs of handling failing banks will be ultimately paid by the banking sector.

Seizing Opportunities for a Greener Economy

45. Hong Kong SAR has made significant progress over the last decade to address climate change, which will help achieve the new commitment of carbon neutrality before 2050. Hong Kong SAR has already reduced coal in fuel mix for electricity generation to 24 percent in 2020, down from 48 percent in 2015, and carbon emissions per capita was already among the lowest in advanced economies as of 2019 (see SIP). In October 2021, the government announced an updated action plan to achieve carbon neutrality, with an ambitious intermediate target of reducing carbon emissions by 50 percent from the 2005 level before 2035. The strategy focuses on de-carbonizing electricity generation, embracing greater energy saving, adopting green transportation, and enhancing waste management, among others. To complement ongoing efforts, the government could consider introducing additional carbon pricing mechanisms to incentivize energy saving and green transportation. As Hong Kong SAR will likely be affected by higher global carbon prices over time via imported products, supportive measures for low-income households could be provided to alleviate the burden.29

uA001fig23

Carbon Intensity, 2019

(In metric tons of CO2-equivalent per one million U.S. dollar)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; Ourworldindata.org; and IMF staff calculations.Note: Major advanced economies include all G-20 advanced economies. Small advanced economies include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, and Switzerland.

46. Climate-related risks should be carefully monitored and assessed by strengthening systemic risk analysis. The authorities’ efforts to address climate-related risks are welcome— climate-related financial disclosures aligned with the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures will be mandated by 2025, and climate-focused scenario analysis by banks, insurers and asset managers, including pilot stress testing exercises, are promoted.30 The HKMA has also introduced and implemented measures in phases that encompass assessing the “greenness baseline”, setting supervisory expectations or requirements, and monitoring and evaluating banks’ progress in managing climate-related risks. It is important to ensure that such risks are adequately embedded in financial institutions’ risk management and the authorities’ systemic risk analysis.

47. Hong Kong SAR should play a key role in global efforts to mobilize private sector investment for green development by enhancing the green and sustainable finance ecosystem. The key initiatives taken by the authorities include: (i) adopting forthcoming international standards such as the Common Ground Taxonomy and the sustainability-related disclosure standards by the International Sustainability Standards Board; (ii) providing subsidies to eligible green and sustainable bond issuers and loan borrowers to cover issuance and other related expenses; (iii) scaling up the government green bond issuance (up to HK$200 billion during 2021–25); and (iv) promoting the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, including the adoption by the HKMA as the manager of the Exchange Fund. The authorities are also exploring how Hong Kong SAR could develop into a regional carbon trading center. Capitalizing on the opportunities from Mainland China and strengthening regional and international collaboration would help develop Hong Kong SAR into a green and sustainable finance center, further strengthening its status as a major IFC.

Authorities’ Views

48. The authorities were committed to achieving carbon neutrality before 2050. They noted that the two power companies—the largest local emitters—are subject to emission caps which have been tightened over time and did not see the immediate need to introduce additional carbon pricing mechanisms. The authorities emphasized that all financial regulators have taken steps to deal with climate-related financial risks and that they are in the forefront of developing climate-related disclosure standards. They also expected that ongoing efforts in establishing a green finance ecosystem would help finance the green transition in Mainland China and other regional economies.

Staff Appraisal

49. Outlook. The economy has recovered strongly supported by swift and bold policy responses, notably a large fiscal stimulus. The financial sector has remained resilient on the back of significant policy buffers, a strong external position, and strong institutional frameworks. However, the recovery remains unbalanced with private consumption lagging. The economic recovery is projected to continue in 2022 with a handoff from public to private demand, facilitated by a moderating pace of fiscal consolidation and a gradual re-opening of the border.

50. Risks. The balance of risks is tilted to the downside. Pandemic-related uncertainty could delay the resumption in the flow of people. A slower-than-expected global recovery and sustained disruptions to global supply chains could reduce the flow of goods and derail the recovery. A sharp rise in global risk premia, a disorderly tightening of monetary policy in major advanced economies, large housing market corrections, escalating U.S.-China tensions, and a shift of market confidence in Hong Kong SAR’s status as a major IFC could affect the flow of capital. Conversely, faster-than-expected border re-opening and global recovery and the development of the Greater Bay Area could improve growth prospects.

51. Fiscal policy. Fiscal policy should continue to support the recovery by returning to a balanced budget at a gradual pace, while focusing in the near term on providing more targeted support for low-income households, unemployed workers, and SMEs. Over the medium term, fiscal policy should strengthen its role as an automatic stabilizer and address structural challenges of population aging, high income inequality, and public housing shortage. A comprehensive tax reform that broadens the tax base while maintaining fairness and international competitiveness is needed to rebuild fiscal buffers.

52. Financial ties with Mainland China. The authorities should continue to strengthen systemic risk analysis of Mainland China-related credit risks, including by ensuring that the internal credit risk models used by Hong Kong SAR banks to determine the capital charges for exposures to Mainland Chinese borrowers, particularly those in the real estate sector with low credit ratings, are sufficiently forward-looking. Continued close monitoring of banks’ significant exposures to non-bank Mainland Chinese entities and a periodic stress test of banks’ large exposures—on top of the regular stress testing—would also help. As the financial ties are broadening to the cross-border use of the e-CNY in Hong Kong SAR, the potential implications from a more widely adopted e-CNY in Hong Kong SAR should be carefully studied.

53. Housing policies. The three-pronged approach—boosting housing supply, macroprudential measures, and stamp duties—to improving housing affordability and containing housing market risks remains valid. Housing supply should be increased, including by expanding land supply and expediting and streamlining the process for land identification and production. While the macroprudential stance for housing market should be maintained for now, the CFR should take a lead in strengthening the regular surveillance and data collection on lending by non-bank lenders and the authorities should regularly assess the need to expand the regulatory perimeter to mitigate the leakages in macroprudential policies. The NRSD, assessed to be a CFM/MPM, should be phased out once systemic risks from non-resident inflows dissipate.

54. Financial sector policies. Financial policies should shift focus towards addressing solvency issues concerning corporates and individuals, as the recovery gains further momentum. The cut in the CCyB during the pandemic was appropriate but the HKMA should stand ready to adjust it to the level consistent with updated systemic risk assessments. The ongoing efforts to further strengthen regulatory and supervisory frameworks are welcome, and further steps should be taken to enhance macroprudential oversight, including by adopting a more comprehensive and systematic approach to identify and address systemic risks. A consistent and cross-sectoral supervisory and regulatory framework is also critical to effectively address industry-wide fintech-related issues.

55. Exchange rate regime and external position. The LERS remains the appropriate arrangement as an anchor for economic and financial stability. The authorities should continue to preserve the rule of law and maintain the free flow of capital. Staff’s preliminary assessment suggests that the external position in 2021 was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.

56. Climate change. The updated action plan to achieve carbon neutrality before 2050 is welcome. To complement ongoing efforts, the government could consider introducing additional carbon pricing mechanisms to incentivize energy saving and green transportation. Climate-related risks should be carefully monitored and assessed by strengthening systemic risk analysis. Hong Kong SAR should play a key role in global efforts to mobilize private investment for green development by enhancing the green and sustainable finance ecosystem.

57. It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation discussions take place on the standard 12-month cycle.

Electronic Consumption Voucher1

Hong Kong SAR has introduced a Consumption Voucher Scheme (CVS), amounting to 1.3 percent of GDP, to boost private consumption and provide targeted support to local retail, catering and service sectors. Being implemented in a digital format, the CVS is expected to have high growth impact and foster the use of electronic payment (e-payment), thereby accelerating a digital transformation of the economy.

The CVS aims to stimulate private consumption and foster a more balanced recovery. Despite strong policy support such as cash handout in 2020, private consumption is lagging in its recovery and employment in contact intensive sectors remains well below its pre-pandemic levels. In response, the government has disbursed electronic consumption vouchers (e-vouchers) in installments with a total value of HK$5,000 (or US$640) to each of the 7.2 million eligible Hong Kong SAR permanent resident and new arrival aged 18 or above in the second half of 2021 to boost local consumption.

The CVS is designed to provide targeted support to local retail, catering and service sectors. Up to mid-January 2022, about 6.3 million eligible registrants have received e-vouchers through four stored value facilities (SVFs: Alipay HK, WeChat Pay HK, Octopus, and Tap & Go). Those e-vouchers generally have a short validity period and can be used only at local retail stores, catering and service outlets and their online platforms, but not for cash-out or for person-to-person payments.

The unique features of the e-voucher could help boost consumption more effectively and promote an inclusive recovery. Its use-it-or-lose-it nature with a short validation period helps kickstart spending while limiting leakages through direct saving. As the e-vouchers can only be used to purchase goods and services from local eligible merchants, the CVS can also effectively provide targeted support to the hardest hit sectors during the pandemic, fostering an inclusive recovery. In addition, the distribution and use of consumption vouchers in digital format reduces the administrative cost while speeding up the implementation. The 7/24 nature of e-payment as well as no minimum purchase requirement would increase the convenience and benefit of using e-vouchers, thereby further helping stimulate consumption amid remaining uncertainty about the ongoing pandemic. The government expects that the CVS would boost overall GDP growth by 0.7 percent.

The CVS could also promote the further development of e-payment, paving the way for the digital transformation of Hong Kong SAR’s economy. Progress in the usage of electronic payment system before the pandemic has been relatively slow despite its advanced physical and digital infrastructure. However, the introduction of the CVS has accelerated a digital transformation of local merchants using e-payment system. The number of consumer accounts in four participating SVFs and the number of merchants accepting e-payment have increased by about 4.7 million and 96,000, respectively, by mid-January 2022. The design of the CVS allowing people to choose the SVFs that best suit their needs has also promoted competition among different payment platforms through lower fees and improved service quality.

1 Prepared by Yu Ching Wong.

Recent Developments in Central Bank Digital Currencies in Hong Kong SAR1

The HKMA has strengthened its research for potential issuance and use of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) at both retail and wholesale levels. The HKMA has also been collaborating with the People’s Bank of China (PBC) to technically test the use of Mainland China’s CBDC (e-CNY) in Hong Kong SAR.

The HKMA has been developing an architectural design of a local CBDC, the e-HKD, for retail use.2 Together with the BIS, the HKMA has been studying two-tier distribution models of retail CBDCs with the central bank in charge of issuing and redeeming the CBDC (first tier) while issuing intermediaries (e.g., commercial banks) distributing and circulating the CBDC (second tier). The HKMA has also proposed a two-tier architecture in the Project e-HKD, aiming to address the problems of cross-ledger synchronization, over-issuance prevention, privacy-preserving transaction traceability, and flexible instantiations of different two-tier distribution models, but has not decided on the distribution model for implementing e-HKD.3 The cross-departmental working group established inside the HKMA is studying the potential use cases, benefits and risks of issuing the e-HKD, as well as the related technical, policy and legal issues.

The HKMA, together with other central banks, has also been actively researching the use of a wholesale CBDC in cross-border payments. The HKMA, the Bank of Thailand, the PBC, and the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, together with the BIS, are jointly exploring the capabilities of distributed ledger technology (DLT) and CBDC in facilitating real-time cross-border foreign exchange payment-versus-payment transactions in a multi-jurisdictional real-time context (Multiple CBDC Bridge or mBridge project). In particular, the project has been developing a DLT-based cross-border platform prototype to support multiple currencies and interface with new or traditional domestic payment systems. This aims to alleviate the pain points in cross-border fund transfers (e.g., inefficiencies, high cost and complex regulatory compliance) and evaluate the feasibility of CBDCs for cross-border fund transfers, international trade settlement, and capital market transactions. It has adopted three general principles: (i) no disruption to other monetary authorities or international monetary system; (ii) compliance with local regulations; and (iii) interoperability between different CBDC systems as well as between CBDC and traditional payment systems.4

The HKMA and the PBC have been testing the cross-border retail use of the e-CNY in Hong Kong SAR. The e-CNY test in Hong Kong SAR, in which PBC-designated banks are participating, aims to provide convenient cross-border payment services for residents in both Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China and enable interoperability with the Faster Payment System in Hong Kong SAR, which is a local payment system connecting banks and digital wallet operators. As the cross-border use of CBDCs entails risks and challenges including, for example, compliance with regulations in both home and host jurisdictions, the e-CNY technical test in Hong Kong SAR is reportedly exploring ways to minimize such risks and adhere to the three general principles listed above, including by imposing a mandatory conversion between the e-CNY and HKD.5

1 Prepared by Fei Han and Phakawa Jeasakul. 2 A retail CBDC would be used like a digital cash by the general public, whereas a wholesale CBDC can only be used by permitted institutions for settlements in financial market infrastructures. 3 See “e-HKD: A technical perspective (request for comments)” (HKMA in collaboration with BIS, 2021). 4 See “Inthanon-LionRock to mBridge: Building a multi CBDC platform for international payments” (2021). 5 See the Selected Issues Paper “Recent Developments and Macro-financial Implications of the e-CNY” in the 2021 China Article IV Consultation.
Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Hong Kong SAR: A Strong yet Uneven Recovery

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Hong Kong SAR: Large Fiscal Stimulus During the Pandemic

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Figure 3.
Figure 3.

Hong Kong SAR: High Financial Vulnerabilities Amid Increased Leverage

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Figure 4.
Figure 4.

Hong Kong SAR: Strong Banking System with Large Buffers

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Figure 5.
Figure 5.

Hong Kong SAR: Increasing Financial Linkages with Mainland China

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Figure 6.
Figure 6.

Hong Kong SAR: Smooth Functioning of The Linked Exchange Rate System

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Figure 7.
Figure 7.

Hong Kong SAR: Further Worsening of Housing Affordability

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Table 1.

Hong Kong SAR: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2017–26

article image
Sources: BIS,CEIC; HKSAR Census and Statistics Department; and IMF staff estimates.

Before issuance and repayment of government bonds and notes.

Based on loans for use in Hong Kong SAR, including trade financing.

Actual values for 2021.

Table 2.

Hong Kong SAR: Balance of Payments, 2017–26

article image
Sources: CEIC and HKSAR Census and Statistics Department; and IMF staff estimates.

Sign convention as per BPM5: Negative = net lending (net outflow); Positive = net borrowing (net inflow).

Table 3.

Hong Kong SAR: Consolidated Government Account, 2017–26 1/

article image
Sources: Annual Report of the Director of Accounting Services; The Treasury, CEIC; and IMF staff estimates.

Fiscal year begins April 1.

Before issuance and repayment of government bonds and notes.

Operating balance, as defined by the authorities, is akin to the current balance.

Balance excluding investment income and interest expenditure.

Change in cyclically adjusted primary balance. A positive value corresponds to an expansionary fiscal stance.

The Bond Fund was established in connection with the implementation of the Government Bond Program. The Fund does not form part of the fiscal reserves and is managed separately from the other Government accounts.

Gross general government debt including issuance under the Government Bond Program minus fiscal reserves and assets of the Government Bond Fund. A negative sign indicates net assets.

Table 4.

Hong Kong SAR: Monetary Survey, 2017–22

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Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations.

Domestic credit measures loans for use in Hong Kong SAR (excluding trade financing). Data from 2018 onwards use the new methodology after the reclassification of working capital loans.

Includes savings, time, demand deposits, and negotiable certificates of deposits issued by licensed banks.

Table 5.

Hong Kong SAR: Financial Soundness Indicators, 2017–21Q3

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Sources: CEIC; Hong Kong SAR authorities; Bank for International Settlements; Bloomberg; IFS; and IMF staff estimates.

Before issuance and repayment of government bonds and notes.

Broad Money refers to M2.

Appendix I. Divergence in the Labor Market1

Amid the successful containment of local outbreaks and a strong economic recovery, the labor market recovery has been fast yet uneven across sectors, with those that rely on the flow of people lagging partly due to a very gradual re-opening of the border. This divergence has contributed to the relatively weak recovery in household income and consumption, and potentially higher income inequality.

1. Despite the rapid recovery in the headline unemployment rate, the employment in the hospitality and trade-related sectors have remained weak. In line with the overall economic recovery, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate declined to 3.9 percent (in the three-month period ending) in December 2021 from the peak of 7.2 percent in February 2021, although still remaining above the pre-pandemic level of about 3 percent, driven by the strong economic recovery and the decline in labor force. This has been a faster improvement compared to previous crises; however, there are large divergences across sectors. The employment in the financial service and real estate sectors has been less affected and recently surpassed its pre-crisis level amid the unaffected flow of capital and the recovering housing market. In contrast, employment in the retail/wholesale and trade sectors remains even below their 2020 lows. Meanwhile, the employment in the professional/business services sector increased notably, partly reflecting the increase in pandemic-related cleaning jobs.2

uA001fig24

Hong Kong SAR: Headline Unemployment Rate Dropped Faster than in Previous Crises

(In percent; seasonally adjusted)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.Note: t denotes the month when the 3-month average unemployment rate peaked during each crisis. The x-axis is in month.
uA001fig25

Hong Kong SAR: Employment By Detailed Sector

(Employment in percent of 2019 levels)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: C&SD; and IMF staff calculations.Note: Numbers in parentheses denote the share of each sector’s employment in total employment during September-November 2021.

2. The recovery in wages has also been uneven, with the contact-intensive sectors lagging. According to the average wage rates from the Labor Earnings Survey conducted by the Census and Statistics Department,3 the (seasonally adjusted) average wage rate of all the sectors covered by the survey has recovered to about 0.5 percent below its pre-pandemic level in 2021Q2 after declining by about 1 percent at the peak of the pandemic, reflecting the flexible wage adjustments in Hong Kong SAR.4 While the average wage rates of some sectors (e.g., financial services and real estate) have surpassed their pre-pandemic levels by 2021Q2, the average wage rates of the hospitality and trade-related sectors remain weak. In particular, the average wage rate of accommodation/food services remained 2 percent below its pre-pandemic level by 2021Q2, and that of professional/business services—the sector with the lowest average wage rate for employees up to the supervisory level—has dropped by 3 percent compared to its pre-pandemic level, despite the expansion in the sector’s employment.

3. The divergence in the labor market recovery has contributed to the relatively weak recovery in household income and consumption, and likely higher income inequality. The job losses in the sectors relying on the flow of people could translate to household income losses. Although some of the unemployed were absorbed by the financial services and real estate sectors, more have moved into the professional/business services sector (including cleaning services), whose lower-level employees have the lowest average wage rate among all sectors. These factors have likely contributed to the drop in the (seasonally adjusted) median household income of about 5½ percent since the pandemic and the increase in the share of the low-income households (defined as those with monthly income below HK$10,000 here), weighing on the consumption recovery and potentially widening income inequality.

uA001fig26

Hong Kong SAR: Household Income

(In thousand HKD and percent; seasonally adjusted)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: CEIC; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
uA001fig27

Hong Kong SAR: Real Private Consumption and Household Income

(Year-on-year percent change)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.

Appendix II. External Sector Assessment

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Given the lack of full-year data for 2021 and the uncertainty from the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, a complete analysis will be provided in the 2022 External Sector Report.

Hong Kong SAR is not in the EBA sample as it is an outlier along many dimensions of EBA analysis, thus one possibility-though with obvious drawbacks-is to use EBA-estimated coefficients and apply them to Hong Kong SAR. Following this approach, the CA norm in 2021 is estimated to be about 16.0 percent of GDP, implying a CA gap of -8.7 percent, which is almost entirely explained by the model residuals. The EBA CA gap is overstated as it does not properly reflect the measurement issues that are relevant for Hong Kong SAR, for which three adjustments are made. First, an adjustment of 3–5 ppt with a midpoint of 4 ppt is made to EBA’s implied contribution of the NIIP position. This is because the positive NIIP contribution in EBA captures average income effects that are less relevant f or Hong Kong SAR since the income balance relative to its NIIP is systematically lower than other peer economies, due to a persistently higher share of debt instruments on the asset side than on the liability side. Second, the opening of the Precious Metals Depository has resulted in a decline of 4–4½ ppt with a midpoint of 4¼ ppt in the gold trade balance that does not reflect changes in wealth but rather the increased physical settlement of gold futures contracts. Third, Mainland China’s increased o nshoring has led to a decline in logistics and trading activities in Hong Kong SAR (1–1½ ppt with a midpoint of 1¼ ppt), which did not result in lower consumption because it is viewed as temporary and to be replaced with increased provision of high value-added services as Hong Kong SAR’s own economy rebalances in response to Mainland demand. See “People’s Republic of China— Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Selected Issues” (Country Report No. 17/12) for more details.

The range is calculated by applying the average semi-elasticities of Hong Kong SAR and similar economies.

The financial linkages with the Mainland have deepened in recent years with the increase in cross-border bank lending, capital market financing, and the internationalization of the RMB. As of end-September 2021, banking system claims on Mainland non-bank entities amounted to HK$6.9 trillion, or about 245 percent of GDP, up by about 8 ppt from end-2020.

Appendix III. Risk Assessment Matrix1

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Appendix IV. Debt Sustainability Analysis

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Hong Kong SAR: Public Sector DSA – Baseline Scenario

(In percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Source: IMF staff.1/ Public sector is defined as general government2/ Based on available data. Public debt includes debt identified identified in the consolidated financial statement It excludes debt issued through the bond fund.3/ Not available for Hong Kong SAR4/ Defined as interest payments divided by debt stock (excluding guarantees) at the end of previous year.5/ Derived as [(r – π(1 +g) – g + ae(1 +r)]/(1 +g+π+gπ)) times previous period debt ratio, with r = interest rate; π = growth rate of GDP deflator; g = real GDP growth rate; a = share of foreign-currency denominated debt; and e = nominal exchange rate depreciation (measured by increase in local currency value of U.S. dollar).6/ The real interest rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 5 as r – π (1+g) and the real growth contribution as -g.7/ The exchange rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 5 as ae(1 +r).8/ Includes asset changes and interest revenues (if any). For projections, includes exchange rate changes during the projection period.9/ Defined as a difference in nominal level of reserves between years t and t-1, divided by nominal GDP in year t. Assumes a buildup of reserves in nominal terms under the baseline scenario.10/ Assumes that key variables (real GDP growth, real interest rate, and other identified debt-creating flows) remain at the level of the last projection year.
Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Hong Kong SAR: Public DSA – Composition of Public Debt and Alternative Scenarios

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Source: IMF staff.

Appendix V. Unemployment Benefits1

The experience of this pandemic crisis has highlighted the role of adequate social safety nets in supporting livelihoods and ensuring resilience against systemic shocks. It offers an opportunity for an in-depth review of the unemployment benefits system in Hong Kong SAR, including its role as an automatic stabilizer .

1. The significant job losses at the onset of the pandemic exposed gaps in the social safety net. During the COVID-19 crisis, the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate reached 7.2 percent for a three-month period ending in February 2021. While the unemployment rate has declined to 3.9 percent in December 2021 with the economic recovery, continued border closure, uneven sectoral recovery, and potential scarring effects following the pandemic imply longer adjustment in the labor market, suggesting that some would remain jobless for a longer period (see Appendix I).

2. In the absence of a formal unemployment benefit system, support for the unemployed in Hong Kong SAR is provided through a means-tested social safety net. A key pillar of the social safety net is the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) Scheme that provides a broad range of supports to meet basic needs.2 The CSSA design encompasses different types of groups with low incomes, such as the unemployed, the elderly, and low-income families. Households with income and assets below threshold levels are entitled to these benefits subject to fulfilment of other eligible criteria, such as residence requirements. However, CSSA’s budget has remained below one percent of GDP over the last decade and about 60 percent of total cases covered by the CSSA Scheme as of August 2021 are for old age support.

3. Large temporary COVID-19 relief measures have supported domestic demand and livelihoods in general throughout the crisis, but support for the unemployed is limited. One-off relief programs for households and enterprises such as cash payouts and an employment support scheme have provided prompt support to cushion the income shock from the crisis. However, unemployed individuals are entitled to limited further support. The CSSA Scheme provides financial support for unemployed individuals to meet their basic needs. However, while the number of CSSA cases covering unemployment support increased by 55 percent (y/y) to about 19,500 cases by end-2020, the increased coverage remains limited against the surge in unemployed persons. Some support to unemployed individuals is provided by the statutory severance payment (SP) and long service payment (LSP) covering eligible employees with a qualifying period of employment, but they do not play the usual unemployment protection function.3 In addition, available statistics suggest that the unemployed remain so for a longer duration than prior to the crisis. The median duration of all unemployed has increased from 65 days in April-June 2019 to 154 days in Feb-Apr 2021 before shortening to 112 days in Aug-Oct 2021. This raises concerns about worsening long-term unemployment, skills obsolescence, and rising inequality.4

uA001fig28

Hong Kong SAR: CSSA Recurrent Expenditure and Unemployment Support

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: Census and Statistics Department; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculation.Note: 1/ In fiscal year.

4. In reaction to the COVID-19 crisis, many countries have actively enhanced their automatic stabilizers by expanding social safety nets. Expanding social safety nets, especially unemployment benefit systems, can protect household incomes and strengthen resilience against systemic shocks. Unemployment benefits have been expanded, for example, by extending their duration, raising benefit levels, or relaxing eligibility rules. In economies with limited automatic stabilizers in place, as in the case of Hong Kong SAR, the need for discretionary measures is greater in the event of a systemic shock.

5. Given the available fiscal space, Hong Kong SAR could further increase the adequacy and coverage of social assistance benefits. Hong Kong SAR maintains a tax regime combining low tax rates and a non-contributory social welfare system. Despite large fiscal reserves at about 30 percent of GDP as of end-November 2021, the level of social welfare spending stood at 3.7 percent of GDP in 2020, well below the average of about 14 percent for advanced economies. Key areas to strengthen the current system include better protecting the unemployed by: (i) strengthening the share of unemployed people covered by the CSSA Scheme by including those who are entitled but not claiming the benefit; (ii) easing the eligibility rules so that an income replacement is provided to individuals before they reach very low income levels, for instance by adjusting the asset test; and (iii) assessing the level of the benefit so that it allows an adequate living standard in comparison with the rest of society. As the crisis abates, such measures could be conditioned on participation in active labor market programs, including retraining for those previously employed in sectors or firms unlikely to fully recover from the economic shock.

6. Hong Kong SAR could consider introducing a dedicated unemployment benefit system to better protect individuals against idiosyncratic and systemic shocks. Such an unemployment benefit system could comprise of: (i) an unemployment insurance program financed from contributions—which can be capped at a given level;—and (ii) a mean-tested unemployment assistance program financed by government revenues for those who have either not contributed sufficiently to be entitled to unemployment insurance or have exhausted their insurance benefits.5 Such benefits could be set at a level high enough to ensure a higher living standard than social assistance, but also limited enough compared to labor incomes to maintain incentives to work.6 They could be complemented by increased spending in retraining and assisting jobseekers. The CSSA Scheme would continue to support poor individuals not covered by the program.

uA001fig29

Hong Kong SAR: Expenditure on Social Protection

(In percent of GDP, 2019 or latest available)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Sources: IMF(GFS); CEIC; and IMF staff calculations.

7. The government could also consider developing transitional programs in the near term to immediately augment unemployment supports. For example, increasing budget allocation to the CSSA Scheme, greater flexibility in the time-bound measures, and appropriate relaxation of eligibility criteria could ease the hurdle for the unemployed to receive adequate support under the current CSSA Scheme.

Appendix VI. Potential Impact of Global Tax Reforms1

The global community has agreed to reform the international corporate tax system around two areas: relocation of taxing rights and minimum tax. As Hong Kong SAR is a key global business and investment hub in the region for many multinational enterprises with relatively lower corporate income tax, these reforms could have an important impact on its fiscal revenues and competitiveness.

1. In October 2021, 136 (out of 140) jurisdictions within the OECD-led Inclusive Framework (IF) have agreed to a “two-pillar” solution to reform the international corporate tax system.2

  • Pillar One is to reallocate some taxing rights over multinational profits from where companies are based to where the services or goods are consumed. This residual profit allocation mechanism applies to the largest and most profitable multinational enterprises (MNEs) with global sales above €20 billion, under which 25 percent of the residual profit exceeding the routine profit at the profitability threshold of 10 percent would be distributed among market jurisdictions.

  • Pillar Two is to create a global minimum corporate income tax rate and subject the profits of multinationals to supplemental tax in the home country. The IF has agreed on a minimum global effective tax rate of 15 percent for companies with revenue above €750 million.

2. Under Pillar One, Hong Kong SAR could lose some of its corporate income tax revenues. There remains some uncertainty about calculation methodologies as well as the removal of unilateral digital services taxes by some jurisdictions. However, once Pillar One becomes effective in 2023, Hong Kong SAR could lose its tax revenues as many MNEs are headquartered in the jurisdiction, accounting for about 6 percent of global residual profits. A recent preliminary study shows that the potential tax revenue loss could amount to about 0.16 percent of GDP if Pillar One is applied to all industries.3

3. Pillar Two could also pose challenges for Hong Kong SAR’s corporate tax regime characterized by simple and low corporate tax rates. Hong Kong SAR has a statutory corporate income tax rate of 16.5 percent, higher than the agreed minimum rate of 15 percent. However, there are several preferential regimes for granting tax breaks and exemption for specific activity. Hence, effective tax rates for some MNEs are lower than 15 percent, and thereby subject to pay top-up tax in their home countries once a global minimum corporate tax rate is implemented in 2023. However, the overall impact remains uncertain as a low corporate tax rate is only one of many factors that attracts MNEs to Hong Kong SAR.

4. The Hong Kong SAR government is committed to the implementation of global tax reforms. The government has set up an Advisory Panel in June 2020 to review the impact on the competitiveness of the business environment, and has made recommendations to the government on the response measures as the OECD finalized the technical details of the reform package.

uA001fig30

Hong Kong SAR: Selected Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rates

(In percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 069; 10.5089/9798400202971.002.A001

Source: OECD.

Appendix VII. Summary of Property Market Measures Introduced Since 2009

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Refer to residential properties, unless otherwise indicated.

Appendix VIII. Implementation of the 2021 FSAP Recommendations1

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Note: FSC = Financial Stability Committee; FSTB = Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau; HKCC = Hong Kong SAR Futures Exchange Clearing Corporation Limited; HKEX = Hong Kong SAR Stock Exchange; IA = The Insurance Authority; SFC = The Securities and Futures Commission.
1

These consultation discussions form part of the Article IV consultation with the People’s Republic of China.

2

Professional services include legal, accounting, engineering and management consultancy as well as some other lower-paying services such as cleaning services.

3

In July 2020, the U.S. revoked the special status granted to Hong Kong SAR and enacted the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, under which it has imposed sanctions on several government officials of Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China whose actions it determined as having reduced Hong Kong SAR’s high degree of autonomy. Under the Act, the U.S. can also impose secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that conduct significant transactions with the sanctioned individuals and entities.

4

There has been a new round of local outbreaks since late December 2021 after nearly three months of no local infection.

5

The Northern Metropolis development strategy also aims to alleviate Hong Kong SAR’s chronic housing shortage and foster a new high-tech hub by consolidating the development of the two districts at the north of the New Territories into a holistic metropolis with a total area of 30,000 hectares.

6

Fiscal year begins in April, so the impact of fiscal withdrawal started to kick in in the second quarter.

7

The cap on the loan-to-value ratio for mortgage loans on non-residential properties was raised from 40 to 50 percent in August 2020, and the double ad valorem stamp duty imposed on non-residential property transactions was abolished on November 26, 2020.

8

Part of the increase in the household debt-to-GDP ratio also reflects the lower nominal GDP. The 2021 FSAP noted that the total household debt could be at least 3–5 percent of GDP higher if credit provided by non-bank lenders is included.

9

The non-financial corporate credit-to-GDP ratio may overstate Hong Kong SAR firms’ leverage, since it includes many multinational and non-local firms that borrow funds from Hong Kong SAR banks to finance their operations outside Hong Kong SAR.

11

The share of the rich (e.g., monthly income above HK$80,000) has remained relatively stable.

12

Given the lack of full year data for 2021 and the uncertainty from the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, a complete analysis will be provided in the 2022 External Sector Report.

13

The FSAP stress tests found that the banking sector would remain resilient in the face of severe macro-financial shocks including tighter financial conditions, with interest rate spreads (over the USD LIBOR) well exceeding the levels seen during the global financial crisis and a 4-ppt increase in corporate bond spreads.

14

As of 2021Q3, Hong Kong SAR banks’ lending to the abovementioned carbon-intensive sectors amounted to about 11 and 25 percent of total loans for use in Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China, respectively, with the combined lending amounting to 5 percent of Hong Kong SAR’s banking sector assets (or 48 percent of GDP).

15

Credit risk related to the moratorium scheme appears manageable as the principal-only payment deferral feature enables banks to closely monitor borrowers’ credit risk and the current usage is small at 2.7 percent of all eligible borrowers.

17

While there are some flexibilities, the principle underlying the government’s management of public finance, as enshrined in the Hong Kong SAR’s Basic Law, is to keep expenditure within the limits of revenues to achieve a fiscal balance and ensure that the budget is commensurate with the growth rate of GDP.

18

The government has doubled the borrowing ceiling of the Green Bond Program to HK$200 billion to allow for the further issuance of HK$175 billion green bonds within the five years in 2022–26, which will reduce fiscal pressure arising from the need to use existing resources in fiscal reserve to finance capital expenditure.

19

The government announced to provide additional reliefs of HK$3.6 billion (0.1 percent of GDP) in January 2022 to support the affected sectors following the tightening of social distance measures amid the renewed outbreak.

20

Total public spending on social welfare and healthcare is about 7 percent of GDP in 2020, well below the OECD average of about 20 percent.

21

There are about 580,000 elderly persons receiving the means-tested Higher OALA (currently at HK$3,815 per month) and about 50,000 elderly persons receiving Normal OALA (currently at HK$2,845 per month).

24

For the detailed FSAP corporate analysis and stress tests, see “Hong Kong SAR FSAP Technical Note—Stress Testing the Banking Sector and Systemic Risk Analysis (2021).“

25

The household net worth-to-liabilities and safe assets-to-liabilities ratios are relatively high in Hong Kong SAR compared to some other advanced economies according to a recent assessment by the HKMA: for example, the former ratio was five times in the U.K., six times in Singapore, seven times in the U.S., and eight times in Japan, while the latter ratio was one in the U.S., the U.K. and Singapore, and three times in Japan.

26

Staff’s house price-at-risk analysis as of 2021Q3 indicates that, real house prices in Hong Kong SAR could fall by about 10 percent over the next four quarters with a 5 percent likelihood.

28

The non-resident housing purchases have declined during the pandemic mainly due to the border closure with Mainland China, while the systemic risk from such inflow remains once the border reopens.

29

Carbon taxes can be a highly effective mitigation tool for the region, especially when supported by complementary measures to compensate those affected by higher energy prices (IMF Departmental Paper No. 2021/007).

30

In December 2021, the HKMA published the results of the pilot banking sector climate risk stress, which showed that climate risks could potentially cause significant adverse impacts on the banking sector under extreme climate scenarios although the banking sector would remain resilient given their strong capital buffers.

1

Prepared by Fei Han.

2

The professional/business services in Hong Kong SAR include some lower-paying services such as cleaning services.

3

The average wage rates from the Labor Earnings Survey only cover employees up to the supervisory level (i.e., excluding managerial and professional employees), and hence the findings based on such data are only for those employees. Having said that, since most of the employment rebound came from non-managerial/professional employees, the average wage rate data may better capture the wage development of the newly created jobs.

4

See Price and Wage Flexibility in Hong Kong SAR,“ IMF Working Paper 17/9.

1

The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) shows events that could materially alter the baseline path (the scenario most likely to materialize in the view of IMF staff). The relative likelihood is the staff’s subjective assessment of the risks surrounding the baseline (“low” is meant to indicate a probability below 10 percent, “medium” a probability between 10–30 percent, and “high” a probability between 30–50 percent). The RAM reflects staff views on the source of risks and overall level of concern as of the time of discussions with the authorities. Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly. “Short-term (ST)” and “medium-term (MT)” are meant to indicate that the risk could materialize within one year and three years, respectively.

1

Prepared by Céline Thévenot and Yu Ching Wong.

2

Other social security programs include the Social Security Allowance (SSA) Scheme that provides Old Age Allowance, Old Age Living Allowance, and Disability Allowance.

3

The qualifying period of employment for SP (LSP) is not less than 24 months (five years) under a continuous contract. The maximum amount of SP/LSP is HK$390,000, calculated at two-thirds of an employee’s last full month’s wages (capped at HK$22,500) for every reckonable year of service.

4

Other data indicated that the proportion of unemployed persons with unemployment duration of six months and above increased to 41.3 percent in 2020Q4 from 21.5 percent in 2020Q1. The latest figure, Aug -Oct 2021, remained at a similar level of 40.1 percent, in conjunction with the decline in the number of long-term unemployed persons as the overall unemployment situation improved.

1

Prepared by Yu Ching Wong.

2

See “Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy,” IMF Policy Paper No. 19/007.

3

See “Digitalization and Taxation in Asia,“ IMF Departmental Paper, DP/2021/017.

1

Information provided by the Hong Kong SAR authorities.

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People’s Republic of China—Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 2022 Article IV Consultation Discussions-Press Release; and Staff Report
Author:
International Monetary Fund. Asia and Pacific Dept
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    Hong Kong SAR: Illustration of Economic Structure

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    Hong Kong SAR: Real GDP Developments

    (Seasonal adjusted real GDP; pre-crisis period = 100)

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    Hong Kong SAR: FX and Fiscal Reserves

    (In percent of GDP)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Contribution to Real GDP Growth

    (Seasonally adjusted quarter/quarter percent change)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Output and Employment by Sector

    (2020 level; 2019 level = 100)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Recovery in Private Consumption Lags Other GDP Components

    (2019Q4 level = 100; seasonally adjusted)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Financial Conditions 1/

    (Index; 3-month moving average)

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    US Dollar Credit Spreads: High-Yield Bonds

    (In percentage points; based on option-adjusted spreads relative to US Treasury)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Financial Non-Reserve Flows by Component

    (In Billions of HKD)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Household Income

    (In thousand HKD and percent; seasonally adjusted)

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    House Price to Income Ratio

    (Index; 2007Q1 = 100)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Labor Force and Labor Productivity

    (Seasonally adjusted)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Primary Gap Indicators for CCyB

    (In percent)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Drivers of Changes in Overall Balance

    (Change from previous year, percent of GDP)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Fiscal Impulse and Overall Balance

    (Percent of GDP)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Government Expenditure on the Elderly

    (In billions of HKD)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Public Expenditure on Housing

    (In percent)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Major Revenue Sources

    (In billions of HKD)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Banking Sector’s Mainland Non-bank Exposures

    (In percent of total assets)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Estimated Aggregate Probability of Default for Mainland Chinese Corporate Debt Owed to Hong Kong SAR Banks: By Sector 1/ 2/

    (In percent)

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    Hong Kong SAR: House Price at Risk 1/

    (Probability density function as of 2021Q3)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Housing Production 1/

    (In units)

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    Carbon Intensity, 2019

    (In metric tons of CO2-equivalent per one million U.S. dollar)

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    Figure 1.

    Hong Kong SAR: A Strong yet Uneven Recovery

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    Figure 2.

    Hong Kong SAR: Large Fiscal Stimulus During the Pandemic

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    Figure 3.

    Hong Kong SAR: High Financial Vulnerabilities Amid Increased Leverage

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    Figure 4.

    Hong Kong SAR: Strong Banking System with Large Buffers

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    Figure 5.

    Hong Kong SAR: Increasing Financial Linkages with Mainland China

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    Figure 6.

    Hong Kong SAR: Smooth Functioning of The Linked Exchange Rate System

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    Figure 7.

    Hong Kong SAR: Further Worsening of Housing Affordability

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    Hong Kong SAR: Headline Unemployment Rate Dropped Faster than in Previous Crises

    (In percent; seasonally adjusted)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Employment By Detailed Sector

    (Employment in percent of 2019 levels)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Household Income

    (In thousand HKD and percent; seasonally adjusted)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Real Private Consumption and Household Income

    (Year-on-year percent change)

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    Figure 1.

    Hong Kong SAR: Public Sector DSA – Baseline Scenario

    (In percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)

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    Figure 2.

    Hong Kong SAR: Public DSA – Composition of Public Debt and Alternative Scenarios

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    Hong Kong SAR: CSSA Recurrent Expenditure and Unemployment Support

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    Hong Kong SAR: Expenditure on Social Protection

    (In percent of GDP, 2019 or latest available)

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    Hong Kong SAR: Selected Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rates

    (In percent)