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Annex I. A Draft New FRA Proposal

Draft

Law No. xx/2021

Fiscal Responsibility Act

Table of Contents

[FOR INFORMATION ONLY]

Chapter 1: Title, Scope, and Definitions

Chapter 2: Principles of Fiscal Policy and a Charter of Fiscal Responsibility

Chapter 3: Fiscal Strategy Report

Chapter 4: Annual Budget and Fiscal Strategy Report

Chapter 5: Final Budget Outcomes Report

Chapter 6: Responsibilities of the Auditor General

Chapter 7: Responsibilities of the Peoples’ Majlis

Chapter 8: Local Councils’ Fiscal Strategies and Debt Limits

Chapter 9: Miscellaneous

Schedule 1: Format of a Charter of Fiscal Responsibility

Schedule 2: Format for a Fiscal Strategy Report

Law No. xx/2021

Fiscal Responsibility Act

This Act aims to achieve and maintain fiscal discipline, transparency, and accountability by: (1) specifying the principles, objectives, and procedures of responsible fiscal management; (2) establishing the requirements for formulating, adopting, and reporting the Government’s medium-term fiscal strategy, including for public debt; and (3) facilitating parliamentary scrutiny by requiring the Minister of Finance to report and justify fiscal and public debt outcomes.

Chapter 1: Title, Scope, and Definitions

Title

  • 1. This law will be named “Fiscal Responsibility Act.”

Scope

  • 2. The provisions of this Act apply to all ministries, agencies, and other entities of the Central Government. For the purposes of this Act, the Central Government includes:

    • (a) The Executive and all its ministries/agencies/entities, including autonomous agencies and funds established by law and under government control, with the exception of the Maldives Monetary Authority;

    • (b) The Legislature, the Peoples’ Majlis, and its agencies/entities;

    • (c) The Judiciary and its agencies/entities;

    • (d) Independent agencies/entities/funds/commissions established under the Constitution of Maldives and relevant laws, and which are under the control of Central Government.

In addition, the entities referred to in (e), (f) and (g) below are governed by the provisions of this Act when stipulated in specific provisions of the Act.

  • (e) Local councils and agencies/entities under the jurisdiction of local councils now or to be established in the future;

  • (f) State-owned enterprises;

  • (g) Any other legal person or entity that receives or uses public funds.

Definitions

3. The definitions below aim to achieve the objectives of the law to the greatest extent. The following words and phrases will be given the following meanings.

  • (a) “Cabinet of Ministers” refers to the collective body of Ministers appointed by the President of Maldives, in accordance with the Constitution.

  • (b) “Minister” refers to the Minister appointed by the President to develop and implement the Government’s Fiscal Policy.

  • (c) “The Government,” when referring to a decision-making body, refers to the Executive branch, of which the President of Maldives is the Head, in accordance with the Constitution.

  • (d) “Local Council” means the City Councils, Island Councils, and Atoll Councils established under Law 7/2010 (Decentralization Act).

  • (e) “State-owned enterprise” (SOE) refers to a commercial nonfinancial or financial enterprise established by law, in which the Government has controlling shares, which produces goods or services for the market, and which finances its operations largely on the basis of its own revenues. “Controlling shares” means the ability to exercise powers to govern the financial and operating policies of the entity in order to obtain maximum benefits from its activities.

  • (f) “Fiscal policy” refers to the policies pertaining to revenues, expenditures, public debt, and other elements of the Government’s medium-term fiscal strategy and annual budget.

  • (g) “Fiscal strategy” refers to the fiscal objectives and activities to be undertaken to implement a fiscal policy in the medium term, as well as the approach to be taken to implement fiscal activities.

  • (h) “Medium term” refers to a period of three, four, or five consecutive years.

  • (i) “Financial year” refers to the period from January 1 to December 3 1 , including the start date and end date.

  • (j) “Public debt” refers to the gross debt of the Central Government, as defined in Clause 2 of this Act, and shall include bills, bonds, loans, advances, and overdrafts, denominated in domestic or foreign currency and owed to residents or nonresidents, as well as Central Government guarantees, including all guaranteed debt of local councils, SOEs, and private entities.

  • (k) “Overall fiscal balance” refers to the balance after deducting total budget and nonbudget Central Government expenditures from total budget and nonbudget Central Government revenues, including grants.

  • (l) “Grants” refers to transfers made in cash, goods, or services for which no repayment is required.

  • (m) “Intergenerational equity” refers to the use of national resources in a sustainable manner, keeping in mind the interests of future generations.

  • (n) “Fiscal risks” refer to the possibility of deviations of fiscal outcomes from what was expected at the time that the budget and other fiscal forecasts were approved.

  • (o) “Tax expenditure” refers to a reduction in a tax liability compared with an established tax norm or benchmark. The revenue forgone from tax expenditures has the same impact on the overall fiscal balance as an increase in expenditure of the same amount.

  • (p) “Contingency spending provision” refers to a small reserve of unallocated expenditure in the annual budget that the Government may be authorized to spend on unforeseen contingencies that arise during budget execution.

Chapter 2 Principles of Fiscal Policy and a Charter of Fiscal Responsibility

Principles of Fiscal Policy

2.1. When setting fiscal policy objectives within the medium-term macroeconomic and fiscal framework, the Cabinet of Ministers shall seek to adhere to the following key principles:

  • (a) achievement and maintenance of public debt at a sustainable level, with low risks;

  • (b) maintenance of the overall fiscal balance at a prudent level over the medium term;

  • (c) management of fiscal risks in a prudent manner.

In addition to the above three principles, when formulating fiscal policies, the Cabinet of Ministers may also consider the following three principles:

  • (d) adequate revenue mobilization to contribute to the financing of Government expenditure programs and investment projects;

  • (e) value for money in government expenditure;

  • (f) intergenerational equity

  • (g) environmental sustainability.

Measurable Fiscal Policy Objectives

2.2. The Minister shall set measurable fiscal policy objectives for the principles listed in subsection (1) (a) to (c) in a [Charter for Fiscal Responsibility].1

Approval of the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility

  • 2.3. Following a general election of the People’s Majlis, the Minister shall prepare a draft Charter of Responsibility.

  • (a) The Charter of Responsibility is a government document for which the Government is accountable to the Peoples’ Majlis for reporting on its implementation.

  • (b) The Cabinet of Ministers shall approve the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility.

  • (c) The Minister shall, no later than [three] months after the beginning of the first session of the People’s Majlis after the presidential elections, submit a Charter of Fiscal Responsibility to the People’s Majlis for parliamentary review and approval by issuing a Resolution.

Contents of the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility

2.4 The Charter shall provide:

  • (a) a statement indicating the measurable objectives for fiscal policy that are consistent with the principles set out in clause 2.1;

  • (b) the measurable fiscal objectives, known as “targets,” during a period not less than the new five-year term of the Government;

  • (c) an explanation of the methodology and data to be used to measure the performance of the Government against the fiscal policy targets required in subsection (b);

  • (d) a demonstration—using macroeconomic and fiscal data, assumptions, and projections—of how the fiscal targets set out under subsection (b) are consistent with the principles set out in clause 2.1.

  • (e) The Charter of Fiscal Responsibility shall include the minimum context provided in [Schedule 1].

Cabinet to Adhere to the Principles of Fiscal Policy

2.5. The Cabinet of Ministers shall, in making any policy decisions with implications on public finances, adhere to Principles of Fiscal Policy referred in Clause 2.1, the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility, and other requirements of this Act.

Publication of the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility

2.6. The Minister shall publish the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility at the time the Charter is submitted to the People’s Majlis.

Updates of the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility

2.7. (a) The Minister shall, using the principles of fiscal responsibility, review the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility two years after the Government adopts the initial Charter of its five-year term. This review may lead to a modification of the fiscal targets referred to in clause 2.2.

(b) At other times, the Minister may temporarily depart from the principles of fiscal responsibility and modify the fiscal targets in the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility, but only when Maldives experiences:

  • (i) a natural disaster,

  • (ii) an unanticipated severe economic shock, or

  • (iii) another significant unforeseen event that cannot be funded from the unallocated contingency spending provision of the annual budget or by fiscal policy adjustments.

(c) In either of the two cases specified in subsections (a) and (b), the revised Charter shall indicate:

  • (i) The reasons for the revisions to the fiscal targets set out in clause 2.2 of this Act;

  • (ii) The approach the Government intends to take to ensure that its policy intentions regarding its new fiscal targets are consistent with the principles specified in clause 2.1; and

  • (iii) The period of time that is expected to elapse before the Government’s intentions regarding the fiscal targets specified in clause 2.2 become consistent with the principles and objectives specified in clauses 2.1 and 2.2.

(d) The Minister shall, no later than one week after the Cabinet of Ministers approves a revised Charter of Fiscal Responsibility, submit the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility to the People’s Majlis for parliamentary review and adoption by Resolution.

(e) Should the Cabinet of Ministers modify the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility following the review by the Peoples’ Majlis, the Minister shall publish the updated Charter of Fiscal Responsibility within one week following the issuance of the Resolution of the Peoples’ Majlis.

(f) Each time the Charter is updated, the Minister shall provide, in writing, a statement of compliance with the requirements of subsection ©.

Chapter 3 Fiscal Strategy Report

Fiscal Strategy Report

3.1. (a) A Fiscal Strategy Report shall be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers prior to the preparation of the Government’s draft detailed annual budget of revenues and expenditures.

  • (b) The Fiscal Strategy Report shall be submitted to the People’s Majlis within one week of approval by the Cabinet of Ministers and no later than June 30 of each year.

  • (c) The Fiscal Strategy Report shall be published when it is submitted to the People’s Majlis before end-June.

  • (d) The Peoples’ Majlis shall approve the Fiscal Strategy Report by issuing a Resolution.

Purpose of the Fiscal Strategy Report

3.2. The purpose of the Fiscal Strategy Report is to:

  • (a) elaborate on how, over the forthcoming three-year period, the Government intends to achieve the key fiscal targets laid out in its Charter of Fiscal Responsibility mentioned in Clauses 2.2 and 2.4 of this Act.

  • (b) act as a prebudget document, by providing to the Peoples’ Majlis and the public a statement of the Government’s fiscal policy orientations several months prior to the submission of the detailed annual budget of revenues and expenditures to the Peoples’ Majlis.

Format of the Fiscal Strategy Report

3.3. The Government’s medium-term Fiscal Strategy shall include the minimum context provided in [Schedule 2].

Information to be included in the Fiscal Strategy Report

3.4 The following information to be included in the Fiscal Strategy Report mentioned in Clause 3.1 of this law.

  • (a) The key fiscal policy targets of the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility and the Government’s view on fiscal policy orientations to achieve its key fiscal targets over the upcoming three-year period.

  • (b) Policy orientations would include those relating to:

    • (i) new revenue policies or changes in existing revenue policies;

    • (ii) priorities for current spending and investment project spending

    • (iii) priorities for managing public debt, including debt guarantees.

  • (c) Medium-term macroeconomic, fiscal, and debt projections, and operational targets, as laid out in Schedule 2, sections (2) to (4).

  • (d) Compliance with the Charter for Fiscal Responsibility, as laid out in Schedule 2, section (9). The Minister shall demonstrate how the fiscal and debt projections of the Fiscal Strategy Report are consistent with the objectives and targets set out in the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility.

Update of the Fiscal Strategy Report

3.5. (a) The Minister shall update, once a year, the Fiscal Strategy Report mentioned in Clause 3.1 of this law.

  • (b) The updated Fiscal Strategy Report referred to in subsection (a) shall, after approval by the Cabinet of Ministers, be submitted to the People’s Majlis to complement the annual budget that the Minister submits to the Peoples’ Majlis, in conformity with the provisions of Clause 32 of the Public Finance Act 3/2006, as amended.

Information to be Included in the Updated Fiscal Strategy Report

3.6 In addition to the information to be included in the Fiscal Strategy Report as mentioned in Clause 3.4 of this law, the following information shall be included in the updated Fiscal Strategy Report submitted to the Peoples’ Majlis before end-

October of each year:

  • (a) The timing and impact of new revenue and expenditure policies taken by the Government to achieve the key fiscal policy objectives, as laid out in the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility and in Schedule 2, section (5).

  • (b) Information relating to:

    • (i) Fiscal risks as laid out in section (6) of the Schedule 2, and Schedule 3.

    • (ii) Tax expenditures as laid out in section (7) of the Schedule 2.

  • (c) Explanations of the impact on the fiscal projections due to any changes in historical data, including coverage and accounting policies.

Chapter 4 Annual Budget and Fiscal Strategy Report

Consistency of Annual Budget and Fiscal strategy

4.1 The Minister shall, unless otherwise permitted by this Act, ensure that the annual budget presented to Parliament:

  • (a) is consistent with fiscal targets of the Fiscal Strategy Report formulated according to Chapter 3 of this Act, notably, the overall fiscal balance target, as well as the operational fiscal targets referred to in Schedule 2 of this Act;

  • (b) contains a total expenditure ceiling, a gross borrowing limit for Government, and a guarantee limit for the next financial year, consistent with the fiscal targets of the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility and the operational targets of the Fiscal Strategy Report, as laid out in Schedule 2 of the Act.

Chapter 5 Final Budget Outcomes Report

Approval of a Final Budget Outcomes report

5.1. (a) The Minister shall present a Final Budget Outcomes report to the Cabinet of

Ministers within three months after the end of the financial year.

  • (b) The Cabinet of Ministers shall approve the report within 14 days.

  • (c) The Minister shall submit the Final Budget Outcomes to the Auditor General within three months and 14 days after the end of the financial year, consistent with the timing of the submission of annual financial statements to the Auditor General, as laid out in Clause 38 © of the Public Finance Act 3/2006.

Content of the Final Budget Outcomes Report

5.2. The report referred to section 5.1 shall:

  • (a) identify and explain the main differences between the actual outcomes for revenues and expenditures, as compared with those contained in the annual budget adopted by the Peoples’ Majlis for the same financial year;

  • (b) show separately any in-year adjustments to the original budget;

  • (c) provide comparative information on the revenues and expenditures of the preceding year;

  • (d) use the same presentation format as that of the annual budget. In addition, the report referred to section 5.1 shall:

  • (e) contain a comprehensive discussion of public debt and its components;

  • (f) identify and explain the main differences between the actual outcomes for Government borrowing, total public debt, guaranteed debt, and other contingent liabilities, using the same level of detail as contained in the updated Fiscal Strategy Report that accompanied the annual budget approved by the Peoples’ Majlis in the previous financial year.

  • (g) explain how any data revisions or changes in accounting practices or standards have impacted the reported fiscal outcomes.

  • (h) explain the main differences between the projected financial assets and the actual outcomes, once accrual-based accounting replaces cash-based accounting.

  • (i) include comparative information for any nonfinancial performance data, once a performance-oriented budget is formally adopted.

Submission of the Final Budget Outcomes report to Parliament and Publication

5.3. The Minister shall:

(a) table the Final Budget Outcomes report in the Peoples’ Majlis at its session that begins after the Minister has submitted the report to the Auditor General, according to Clause 5.1(c) of this Act.

(b) publish the Final Budget Outcomes report before the end of June of each year.

Chapter 6 Responsibilities of the Auditor General and Minister

Auditor General to Report on Compliance

6.1 In addition to the Auditor General’s responsibilities to audit the Government’s annual financial statements, in accordance with Clause 39 of the Public Finance Act 3/2006, the Auditor General shall prepare an annual report on the Government’s compliance with this Act.

Auditor General’s Compliance Responsibilities

6.2 The Auditor General’s compliance report referred to in clause 6.2 shall relate to the Minister’s responsibilities concerning:

(a) the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility, notably, the procedures outlined in chapter 2 of this Act relating to its content, submission to the Peoples’ Majlis, publication, updates, and use of escape clauses;

(b) the Fiscal Strategy Report, notably, the procedures outlined in chapter 3 of this Act relating to its content, compliance with key fiscal targets, submission to the Peoples’ Majlis, and publication;

(c) Local councils, notably, the procedures outlined in chapter 8 of this Act relating to establishing local councils’ debt limits;

(d) the Final Budget Outcomes report, notably, the procedures outlined in chapter 5 of this Act relating to its content, explanations of deviations of outcomes from annual budget estimates, publication, and submission to the Peoples’ Majlis.

Minister’s Follow-up of Auditor General’s Report to Parliament

6.3. (a) The Minister shall submit a report to the Peoples’ Majlis following its consideration of the report of the Auditor General submitted to the Peoples’ Majlis in accordance with Clause 40 of the Public Finance Act 3/2006.

(b) The Minister’s report shall indicate measures taken by the Government to implement the recommendations of the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament with respect to the report of the Auditor General of the preceding financial year.

(c) The report referred to in subsections (a) and (b) shall, at the latest, be submitted to the Peoples’ Majlis at the same time as the final Budget Outcomes report of the following year is tabled before the People’s’ Majlis, as laid out in clause 5.3 of this Act.

Chapter 7 Responsibilities of the Peoples’ Majlis

7. 1. The People’s Majlis, in fulfilling the roles and responsibilities set out in the Constitution, shall hold the Government accountable for fiscal policy and performance in accordance with the requirements of this Act, including by;

  • (a) reviewing the reports referred to in this Act through the Committee of Public Accounts and other relevant committees; and

  • (b) considering the recommendations of the Committee of Public Accounts and other relevant committees, and of the Auditor General, in discussing the reports referred to in this Act.

Chapter 8 Local Councils’ Fiscal Strategies and Debt Limits

Exclusion of Local Councils from Fiscal Strategy Report Requirements

8.1.(a) Local councils established under law number 7/2010 (Decentralization Act) are not required to prepare medium-term Fiscal Strategy Reports similar to those applicable to the Government, as described in chapter 3 [clauses 3.1 to 3.6] of this Act.

(b) Local councils may, however, prepare their own medium-term Fiscal Strategy Reports should these be useful for their own planning and budget purposes.

Taking a Loan as per the Law

8.2. By power of the law that local councils have, loans taken by local councils shall be according to the policies set out in this law.

Total Debt of Local Councils

8.3. (a) The total debt of the local councils and debt guarantees issued by the Government to local councils, shall be maintained at levels set by the Minister, consistent with the total public debt and debt guarantee objectives of the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility and the total public debt projections of the Fiscal Strategy Report, as required by this Act.

  • (b) The level of debt and debt guarantees mentioned in subsection (a) of this Clause shall be included in total public debt targets of the Charter of Fiscal Responsibilities, as well as the same three years of the Fiscal Strategy Report.

  • (c) Local councils’ debt and debt guarantee limits shall be communicated to the Councils by the Minister as soon as possible following the Cabinet of Ministers’ approval of the aforementioned limits.

  • (d) The procedures to be followed in order to maintain the total debt of the councils at the level determined by the Minister under s u b s e c t i o n s (a), (b) and (c ) of this Clause, shall be set by the Minister in the Financial Regulations under the Public Finance Act 3/2006.

Chapter 9 Miscellaneous

Entry into Force

9.1. (a) This Law shall come into force, at the latest, within one year from the date this Act is adopted by the Peoples’ Majlis, ratified, and published in the Government Gazette. (b) The Government, in implementing the provisions of this Act relating to the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility, may choose to establish the key fiscal targets mention in Clause 2.4 of the Act for a period 5 years beyond the year in which this Act enters into force.

Transitional Provisions

9.2. The Minister shall have the power to defer giving full effect to the sections of this law pertaining to:

(a) the provisions in the Fiscal Strategy relating to tax expenditures and [others?], which shall enter into force within [two] years following the adoption of this Act by the Peoples’ Majlis;

(b) Accrual accounting and performance-oriented budget, the reporting requirements of which, as outlined in clauses 5.2 (h) and (i) shall enter into force within one year following their respective implementation for a given financial year.

Regulations

9.3. (a) The Minister may make regulations generally as may appear to the Minister to be necessary and expedient for the proper implementation of the intent and objectives of this Act.

(b) Any regulations made pursuant to subsection (a) shall be laid in the Peoples’ Majlis.

Amendment of Schedules 2

9.4. (a) The Minister may, by order [with the approval of Cabinet], amend the Schedules to this Act.

(b) Any amendments to the Schedules shall come into force after it is laid before the Peoples’ Majlis.

Conflicts

9.5. In the event of any conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of this Act and the provisions of any other written law, the provisions of this Act shall prevail.

Schedule 1 Format of a Charter of Fiscal Responsibility

1. Statement of fiscal policy objectives

(a) The statement shall indicate the measurable objectives of Government fiscal policy in the medium term, which are consistent with the principles laid out in section 2.1 of this Act.

(b) The Charter shall specify quantified targets, by the use of ranges, ratios, or other means, of the Government’s intentions regarding each of the principles specified in Article 2.1(1) (a) to (c) of this Act. These three indicators may be referred to as the Government’s key fiscal targets.

© The Charter may specify quantified targets, by the use of ranges, ratios, or other means, of the Government’s intentions regarding each of the principles specified in Article 2.1(1) (d) to (f) of this Act, or of any other fiscal indicators judged necessary for attaining the fiscal objectives of this Act.

2. Methodology and data for assessing fiscal performance

(a) This shall indicate the methodology to be used to measure the performance of the Government against the objectives required under paragraph 1 of this Schedule.

(b) The sources of data shall include a debt sustainability analysis (DSA), the consolidated audited financial accounts of the Government, audited debt statements, and other relevant data.

3. Consistency of Charter for Fiscal Responsibility with the principles of this Act The Charter shall demonstrate how the Government’s fiscal objectives required under paragraph 1 of this Schedule are consistent with the principles in section 2.1 of the Act. The consistency shall be determined using macroeconomic and fiscal data, assumptions, and projections of the economy, as well as any financial and fiscal policy updates.

Schedule 2 Format for a Fiscal Strategy Report 3

1. Medium-Term Macroeconomic Forecast

The medium-term macroeconomic forecast shall indicate the actual, estimated, and projections covering the previous two financial years, the current financial year, and the next three financial years and shall indicate in respect of each financial year the following economic variables—

(a) the gross domestic product;

(b) the rate of inflation (average and year-end);

(c) the average and year-end exchange rate;

(d) a least one key indicative interest rate;

(e) tourism arrivals; and

(f) other relevant macroeconomic indicators.

2. Medium-Term Fiscal and Debt Framework

(a) Fiscal Strategy: This is a statement of the Government’s targets for the variables that are key fiscal objectives under Clause 2.1 of this Act. It shall explain the reasons if these targets have changed from the precious budget and/or Charter and how the government intends to restore compliance with objectives.

(b) Debt Strategy4: This shall include information about financing sources, summary of the Debt Sustainability Analysis, public debt projections, guarantees, and summary of the medium-term debt management strategy.

3. Medium-Term Fiscal and Debt Forecasts

The medium-term fiscal forecast shall cover the previous two financial years, the current financial year, and the next three financial years and shall indicate in respect of each financial year, the following economic variables—

(a) the revenue of Government with respect to:

  • (i) tax revenue;

  • (ii) non-tax revenue;

  • (iii) external grants for the annual budget and for projects; and

  • (iv) privatization receipts.

(b) the expenditure and net lending of Government for:

  • (i) current expenditure;

  • (ii) capital expenditure; and

  • (iii) net lending;

(c) the overall balance of Government;

(d) financing of the overall balance including:

  • (i) net external financing;

  • (ii) net domestic financing, including changes in the balance of the Sovereign Development Fund; (e) total public debt, including:

  • (i) total debt of the Central Government

  • (ii) total debt of local councils, guaranteed and unguaranteed

  • (iii) total debt of state-owned enterprises, guaranteed and unguaranteed

  • (iv) other debt guaranteed by the Central Government.

(e) total public debt, including:

  • (i) external debt

  • (ii) domestic debt.

4. Operational targets and other fiscal indicators

Besides the overall balance required in subsection 3(c) above, the three-year projections shall indicate:

  • (a) the primary balance, which is defined as the overall fiscal balance after deducting interest payments.

  • (b) the current balance, which, in the case of a deficit, indicates the extent to which the Government is borrowing to finance current expenditure in addition to investment spending, and, in the case of the surplus, the extent to which resources are available for debt reduction or other uses.

  • (c) total government expenditure, including subtotals for current expenditure and capital expenditure,

  • (d) any other fiscal indicators judged by the Minister to be useful for transparency and analytical purposes.

5. Statement of new policy measures

This is a statement of the impact of major new revenue and expenditure policies the Government is to introduce to ensure that the targets in paragraph 2 and the limits in paragraph 5 of this Schedule are respected.

6. Fiscal Risks Statement

This is a statement of the main sources of risk to the attainment of the fiscal objectives of Government and a quantified estimation of the fiscal impact of these risks, including:

(a) an alternate fiscal framework based on alternative realistic assumptions of the key macroeconomic variables; and

(b) a statement relating to the specific fiscal risks outlined in Schedule 3 and an estimate of the likely fiscal impact of risks should they materialize.

7. Tax Expenditures report

(a) This is a statement of the revenue foregone from tax expenditures, tax by tax, and in total.

(b) The tax expenditure report covers significant tax revenue losses arise from all of the following:

  • i. Exemptions: exclusions from the tax base

  • ii. Allowances: amounts deducted from the tax base before applying the tax rate(s)

  • iii. Tax credits: amounts deducted from a tax liability

  • iv. Tax rate relief: a reduced tax rate

  • v. Tax deferral: a delay in paying the tax liability

8. Compliance with the Charter for Fiscal Responsibility

(a) This is a demonstration of how the fiscal targets and other fiscal indicators in the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy are consistent with the objectives and targets set out in the Charter for Fiscal Responsibility.

(b) In cases where there are inconsistencies, the reasons for non-compliance shall be specified by the Minister, along with a statement of the new revenue and expenditure measure that shall be taken by the Government to reach compliance, and the duration until compliance is expected to be reached.

9. If the Fiscal Strategy Report does not include any of the information required by this Schedule, the Minister shall state in the Fiscal Strategy Report the reasons for any missing information and shall ensure that such information is available as soon as practicable for future Fiscal Strategy Reports.

Schedule 3 Fiscal Risk Statement

(See Appendix 3)

Annex II. Fiscal Strategy Report Outline

This Appendix provides a possible outline for the first Fiscal Strategy Report. There are no international standards for such a document; the Fiscal Strategy Report’s content and structure vary according to different institutional and political contexts. What follows is an illustrative example of what the Fiscal Strategy Report for budget 2022 could look like. The report would be updated on an annual basis and would cover a three-year timeframe.

The main purpose of such a document is to set and communicate the Government’s key objectives and priorities cast within a macroeconomic and fiscal framework. As discussed in the main text of this report, the Fiscal Strategy Report should be issued early in the budget formulation and preparation calendar, and it should be updated prior to the submission of the draft budget to Parliament by end-October.

Chapter 1. Overview

  • The Fiscal Strategy Report is a strategic document that sets out the main objectives of budget policy for the three coming years. It outlines the medium-term fiscal prospects and priorities for the budget and the Central Government over the period from 2022–24, provides the assumptions and forecasts of the main economic parameters that form the basis of the budget projections for the next fiscal year and projection period, and sets out the main parameters of the state budget.

  • Main fiscal policy objectives over the medium-term (examples below):

    • Maintaining sustainable fiscal policy consistent with the Government’s fiscal targets, maintaining certain social protections, and providing for COVID-19-related additional health spending;

    • Delivering high quality public services through further improvements to the quality of educational institutions, health care services, etc.;

    • Promoting economic development by diversifying away from tourism through quality investments in public infrastructure, education, and health care, and through promoting innovation in selected industries;

    • Creating a more efficient tax system that increases competitiveness and creates incentives to promote economic activity;

    • Other issues could include ensuring the security of the State, fighting corruption, looking after the most vulnerable citizens, promoting long-term economic resilience (especially to climate change); these should be linked to the key initiatives underway and should be developed for the budget.

    • For 2022, the consolidated budget deficit is estimated to be x percent of GDP. Public debt is forecast to be x Rufiyaa (x percent of GDP), rising/falling to x percent of GDP by 2024.

Appendix Table 2.1.

Summary of Consolidated Fiscal Aggregates

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Chapter 2. Projections of Macroeconomic Indicators for the State Budget

2.1 Current situation: Economic conditions in 2020 and expected outcomes for 2021

  • Describe recent developments in the global economy and domestic economy, including outcomes for GDP and prices.

  • Detail expected outcomes for 2021 and how the situation and forecasts may have changed from the 2020 budget, with particular reference to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and necessary health responses to the domestic economy

2.2 Macroeconomic projections for 2022–24

  • Global economic outlook (discussion of global GDP projections and developments in major trading partners; it can be useful to include a table with world GDP projections and those of major trading partners, either based on IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or your own).

  • GDP growth forecasts for the budget year, with particular reference to recovery assumptions from the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as trend forecasts over the medium term

  • Discussion of the main components of GDP growth to explain what is driving the forecasts (often this is by household consumption, business investment, public sector, and exports, but this could be done by sector including tourism).

  • Discussion of employment expectations.

  • Discussion of inflation and wages forecasts.

Appendix Table 2.2.

Key Macroeconomic Indicators and Projections

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Assumptions: These can either be a note to the table that is included in the table, or can be discussed in the text (for example, what is assumed for the exchange rate and interest rates?).

Chapter 3. Fiscal Strategy

  • Statement of medium-term fiscal policy targets (limits on debt and the deficit).

  • If they have changed from the previous budget and/or Charter, explain why.

  • Note whether expected outcomes for 2020 and medium term are consistent with these targets. If not, it should explain why not, and provide the explanation of how the Government intends to restore compliance with the objectives.

Chapter 4. Fiscal Results for 2020 and Expected Outcomes for 2021

4.1 Outcomes for the consolidated budget

  • The consolidated budget deficit was x Rufiyaa (x percent of GDP) in 2019, which is higher/lower than in the approved budget. This reflects (higher/lower) revenues and expenditures.

  • For 2020, the consolidated budget deficit is expected to be x Rufiyaa (x percent of GDP) in 2020, which is higher/lower than the approved budget due to…

4.2 Fiscal outcomes for 2020 compared with the approved budget

  • Outcomes for revenue

  • Outcomes for expenditure

4.3 Expected outcomes for 2021, compared with the approved budget

  • Revenue performance and comparison to forecast in the 2021 budget

    • Main policies introduced after the budget that impact revenue

    • Economic developments that impact revenue

4.4 Expenditure outcomes

  • Expenditure performance and comparison to approved levels in the 2021 budget

  • Main policies introduced after the budget that impact expenditures

Chapter 5: Medium-Term Fiscal Projections and Spending Priorities for 2022–24

5.1 Spending priorities

  • Spending priorities by key spending areas (subheadings for each sector)

5.2 Medium-term expenditure plans

  • Indicative aggregate expenditure ceilings

  • Expenditure ceilings for the budget year by administrative units (for discussion)

  • Table on expenditure by function (Classification of the functions of government- COFOG) 5.3 Tax policy and revenue projections

  • Summary of revenue projections

  • Policy measures that have been announced and are being introduced

  • Factors driving forecasts (stronger than expected growth, etc.)

  • Revenue shares, state and local

Appendix Table 2.3.

Expenditure Ceilings

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Appendix Table 2.4.

Revised Revenue Table (short version)

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Appendix Table 2.5.

State Budget Revenue, by Detailed Component (economic classification)

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Chapter 6. Deficit Financing and Medium-Term Debt Strategy

  • Financing sources 2022–24 (for example, drawing on bilateral loans or market)

  • Summary of DSA

  • Public debt projections: Central Government debt, including on-lent loans to SOEs

  • Guarantees (maximum ceiling, with a breakdown by main beneficiaries, SOEs, local councils, etc.)

  • Summary of the medium-term debt management strategy (high level objectives for managing the external and domestic debt portfolios), when developed as a separate document

Chapter 7. Fiscal Risks [summary; refer to the separate Fiscal Risk Statement

  • Discussion of how alternative macroeconomic parameters would impact the fiscal projections (with a possible table showing sensitivity analysis)

  • Information on Government guarantees, outstanding and by entity

  • Discussion of the fiscal risks related to the SOE and PPPs sector, with brief reference to any reform plans to strengthen oversight

Chapter 8. Tax Expenditure

  • This statement shall be included in the updated Fiscal Strategy Report submitted to the Peoples’ Majlis before end-October of each year. This is a statement of the revenue forgone from tax expenditures, tax by tax, and in total. The tax expenditure report covers significant tax revenue losses arising from all of the following:

    • Exemptions: exclusions from the tax base

    • Allowances: amounts deducted from the tax base before applying the tax rate(s)

    • Tax credits: amounts deducted from a tax liability

    • Tax rate relief: reduced tax rate

    • Tax deferral: delay in paying the tax liability

Chapter 9. Public Financial Management Reforms

  • Reference to medium term PFM reform strategy and brief summary of some of the major elements

Annex III. Outline of a Fiscal Risk Statement Outline

Introduction

  • Medium-term macroeconomic and fiscal projections presented in the budget are formulated, taking into account the expected developments in the domestic and global economy, based on information available at the time of their preparation.

  • There are multiple factors and various risks that, if they were to materialize, could cause budget outcomes differing from those presented. The most significant of these would result from unanticipated macroeconomic developments that adversely impact revenues and the budget position. The IMF classification outlines three types of risks:

    • Macroeconomic risks: risks related to deteriorated macroeconomic parameters, such as terms of trade, inflation, exchange rate, global/regional growth, and domestic growth

    • Specific risks: explicit or implicit public liabilities whose realization is contingent on a specific event (such as risks related to SOEs, PPPs, and natural disasters)

    • Institutional risks: risks that include policy implementation and governance risks

Macroeconomic Risks

  • Fiscal risk statements would usually include some sensitivity analysis to illustrate how variations in key economic assumptions could affect the budget aggregates.

  • An alternative and more technically demanding approach is to construct alternative macroeconomic scenarios, which involves (1) allowing economic parameters to vary at once (in a consistent way) and (2) presenting the fiscal position associated with each scenario.

Appendix Table 3.1.

Sensitivity of Fiscal Position to Changes in Various Economic Parameters

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Government Debt

  • Fiscal risk statements would usually include summary indicators on public debt, even if these are published as part of a separate debt statement These indicators would generally include domestic versus foreign, elaborating upon the specific foreign currency exposures, short versus long term debt, fixed versus variable interest rates, and the value of debt maturing within a year. These elements would need to be consistent with the MTDS and DSA.

  • Some discussion of the possible impact of movements in the currency and market interest rates is warranted to illustrate the sensitivity of the debt estimates to such changes.

Government Guarantees

  • One of the main specific risks faced by Governments relates to their guarantees of other public sector entities’ debt.

  • It is standard practice in fiscal risk statements to publish a table listing the total value of outstanding guarantees, by beneficiary. This might also be done through a debt statement.

  • For SOEs, a summary analysis of the key financial risks may be included to give a sense of the probability that a guarantee may be called in the future.

  • More sophisticated analysis would involve an assessment of the expected exposure from the portfolio of guarantees, which would combine the probability of individual guarantees being called and the loss given default.

Major Project Risks and PPPs

  • Large public infrastructure projects usually present significant risks in terms of the ability to deliver them on time and on budget.

  • It could be useful to include an assessment of such risks for major projects in the Public Sector Investment Program (PSIP), and to consider the performance of the PSIP as a whole.

  • A specialized approach to risk assessment and monitoring of PPPs is warranted because the exposures of government are not always obvious, and may crystallize beyond the budget year. As a first step, it would be useful to disclose the main contractual arrangements that could translate into fiscal risks for the government down the road.

Other Contingent Liabilities

  • Governments often are exposed through other forms of indemnities, such as those granted to statutory office holders and those that can manifest as future legal claims against the state.

  • Contributions to international financial institutions are often in the form of callable capital, and such exposures should be reported.

  • There may also be large future claims against the government, whose timing and magnitude are uncertain (for example, backpay arrangements for public sector salaries and unfunded pension liabilities). These should be discussed and quantified, where possible.

Financial Sector Exposures

  • Governments can face (1) explicit fiscal risks through their ownership of financial institutions or (2) implicit risks through the fact that they are responsible for regulating the financial system.

  • Fiscal risk statements often include a summary of the Financial Soundness Indicators prepared by the regulatory authorities, and some discussion of residual exposures (for example, a discussion of deposit insurance arrangements and the extent to which such schemes are fully funded).

Exposure to Other Public Sector Entities

  • Fiscal risk statements are a good place to publish summary information on the overall performance and health of entities outside of the general Government sector.

  • Beyond individual debt guarantees, the Government may face other exposures to public sector entities, including volatility in their dividend and tax payments; and from the occasional need to assist with refinancing nonguaranteed debt and facilitate major industry restructuring or to temporarily increase subsidies.

  • Where such challenges are known, a fiscal risk statement would outline the situation and estimated exposures. Where such exposures are frequent, it may also be appropriate to make some provision for the average annual cost in the medium-term estimates.

Natural Disasters

  • Natural disasters can have profound impacts on public finances through affecting economic output and revenue, and in requiring a substantial increase in public expenditure to provide income support and to repair major infrastructure.

  • Although the timing and cost of such events can never be known in advance, fiscal risk statements can help to illustrate the average costs of such events and help governments to make an appropriate financial provision for them as part of the medium-term estimates.

Annex IV. Key Elements of a Final Budget Outcome

OECD Best Practices Budget Transparency for Year-End Report

  • The year-end report is the government’s key accountability document It should be audited by the Supreme Audit Institution and should be released within six months of the end of the fiscal year.

  • The year-end report shows compliance with the level of revenue and expenditures authorized by Parliament in the budget Any in-year adjustments to the original budget should be shown separately. The presentation format of the year-end report should mirror the presentation format of the budget.

  • The year-end report, or related documents, should provide nonfinancial performance information, including a comparison of performance targets and actual results achieved, where practicable.

  • Comparative information on the level of revenue and expenditure during the preceding year should be provided. Similar comparative information should be shown for any nonfinancial performance data.

  • Expenditure should be presented in gross terms. Earmarked revenue and user charges should be clearly accounted for separately.

  • Expenditure should be classified by administrative unit (for example, ministry or agency). Supplementary information classifying expenditure by economic and functional categories could also be presented.

  • The year-end report should contain a comprehensive discussion of the government’s financial assets and financial liabilities, nonfinancial assets, employee pension obligations, and contingent liabilities.

Australia and New Zealand End-of-Year Reporting

Australia: One of Australia’s main ex-post accountability documents is the Final Budget Outcome, which is published within three months of the end of the financial year. This document is prepared on the same basis as the budget and the midyear update; it provides a direct comparison of the outcome to the budgeted amounts, both for the flows (revenues, expenditures, and balances) and for the stocks (net debt and net financial worth), with all major deviations explained. It also provides a direct comparison with the financial statements of the general Government sector, as well as the nonfinancial and financial public corporation sectors. All fiscal information is based on common reporting standards, largely in line with GFSM 2001.

New Zealand: New Zealand produces its audited annual report three months after the end of the financial year. This report provides a detailed comparison of budgeted amounts and outturns, as well as brief analysis of the major variations and a description of the progress the government has made in implementing its fiscal strategy, as laid out in the (prebudget) fiscal strategy report. Budgets and forecasts are prepared on the same accounting basis (mainly IPSAS) as accounts. Forecasts also comply with New Zealand’s accounting standard that, among other things, requires the forecasts be prepared using assumptions that are “reasonable and supportable,” internally consistent, and published.

Source: IMF Fiscal Transparency Handbook.

Annex V. Using a Debt Sustainability Analysis to Inform Medium-Term Fiscal Objectives

Many countries chose to anchor their fiscal policy on the ratio of public debt to GDP. Debt-to-GDP is a highly visible ratio that is easy to communicate and monitor. The evolution of the debt stock can be directly linked to a country’s long-term fiscal objectives, including ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability, intergenerational equity, and economic resilience. The evolution of debt to GDP encompasses a broad range of risk factors affecting the country (for example, deficits, exchange rate movements, and materialization of fiscal risks). The coverage of debt differs across countries (Central Government, general government, and public sector), as do the targeted thresholds. Some developing countries (for example, the East African Monetary Union countries) set a medium-term anchor for debt based on the present value of debt to GDP to account for the concessionally of a large share of debt, consistent with the World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries (LIC-DSF) framework.

Given the importance of country-specific factors, it is not possible to provide a one-size-fits-all debt-to-GDP ratio. A country’s debt can be subject to a broad range of risks beyond its stock. Some risks are specific to a country’s external debt, most notably, foreign exchange risks and market access risks. Beyond solvency concerns stemming from the stock of debt, short-term liquidity concerns can also arise when the debt service burden accounts for a substantial part of a country’s budget or foreign exchange revenues.

The IMF’s public debt limits policy is based on a framework that provides a comprehensive view of the risks associated with debt, and a robust indication of a sustainable debt level for countries. The LIC-DSF assesses the risk of a country experiencing debt distress based on its debt-carrying capacity and its projected debt burden under a baseline scenario and several adverse shock scenarios. The framework analyzes both total public debt and public external debt. It is based on the broadest possible coverage of public sector debt (beyond the Central Government, including the general government and SOEs). It takes into account the concessionality of a large share of debt in low-income countries by calculating debt ratios in present value terms (discounted at a standard discount rate of 5 percent). As such, the framework provides a superior analytical tool to assess debt sustainability in lower-income countries with limited access to market financing.

Applicability of the LIC-DSF Framework to Maldives

The debt sustainability framework analyzes both liquidity and solvency issues. Liquidity risks refer to the ability of the country to service its debt in the short run, while solvency risks refer to the ability of the country to repay its debt altogether in the long term. The framework is based on five ratios:

  • - For public debt: (1) public and publicly guaranteed debt as a percentage of GDP

  • - For public external debt:

    • Solvency (stock) metrics: (2) External debt as a percentage of GDP, and (3) external debt as a percentage of exports

    • Liquidity (debt service) metrics: (4) External debt service as a percentage of exports, and (5) external debt service as a percentage of revenues.

The framework also recognizes that the debt-carrying capacity of a country cannot be dissociated from country-specific institutional and macroeconomic factors. The risk thresholds for the five ratios for a country have to comply with an aggregate risk rating composite indicator, CI), which is a weighted average of the country’s CPIA score, real GDP growth, import cover, global growth, and remittances. The CI yields for each country a rating of weak/medium/strong and measures a country’s debt-carrying capacity. Public and external debt benchmarks are lower for a country with weak debt-carrying capacity than for a country with strong debt-carrying capacity.

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The debt sustainability analysis is based on a long-term yearly projection of the evolution of the five ratios under realistic assumptions, as well as under comprehensive shock scenarios. Baseline projections are based on assumptions on the projected fiscal stance (captured by the primary balance) and on parameters affecting debt (including cost of debt, FX projections, and market access risks). When formulating the projections, the realism of the baseline scenario is critical. Baseline assumptions are examined in the light of four realism tools: (1) drivers of debt dynamics; (2) realism of planned fiscal adjustments; (3) fiscal adjustment-growth relationship; and (4) public investment-growth relationship. Shock scenarios take the form of six standardized stress-tests (for example, shock on real growth, primary balance, exports, depreciation, contingent liabilities, other shocks such as natural disasters, endogenous shocks such as fiscal slippages, and combined shocks).

The thresholds are indicative bounds above which the risk of debt distress is considered high. Compliance is assessed under the baseline scenario and under the most extreme shock scenario. The risk level is determined as follows:

  • Low risk of external debt distress if none of the indicators breach the thresholds under the baseline and the most extreme shock scenarios.

  • Moderate risk of debt distress if none of the indicators breach the thresholds under the baseline but at least one indicator breached the threshold under the most extreme shock.

  • High risk of debt distress if any of the indicator breaches its thresholds under the baseline.

The framework provides a final rating of the risk of debt distress for both total and external public debt. It also concludes whether debt is sustainable or not, based on the existence of space to absorb further shocks without having its rating under the methodology downgraded. In assessing the risk level, IMF can also carry out adjustments, based on reasonable judgment, to assess the gravity of threshold breaches (notably, in terms of timeframe of the breaches) and country-specific factors before producing a final risk rating.

The latest Maldives DSA (April 2020) rates the country as being in a high risk of debt distress, even though its debt is assessed as sustainable. In the baseline scenario, debt is currently well in excess of the 30 percent threshold in PV for external debt and above the 35 percent threshold in PV for total debt. The only threshold that is not breached is the one on debt to exports. According to the DSA, key shocks that may cause further upward debt deviations include natural disasters, contingent liabilities (most notably, nonguaranteed SOE debt), and the availability of market financing. Nevertheless, debt ratios display a medium-term downward trend that needs to be accelerated. On this basis, IMF assessed debt as sustainable provided that the authorities comply with their stated ambitious fiscal adjustment strategy in the context of 2020 Rapid Credit Facility outright loan.

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Source: IMF DSA April 2020.

Moving from the Debt Sustainability Analysis to a Five-Year Total Debt Objective

In practice, the debt anchor and operational targets that would be included in the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility and the three-year Fiscal Strategy/MTFF would be directly taken from the updated DSA. The debt-to-GDP target would be taken from the fifth year (or more if a transitional arrangement is in place, for example, the eighth year) of the baseline scenario DSA and converted from a present value level to a nominal value level for the sake of simplicity. The number could also be rounded up by a reasonable amount (for example, by 5 percent of GDP) to take into account the possible materialization of future fiscal risks and provide a safety buffer. The overall balance target would also be taken from the DSA by summing up the fifth-year primary balance target and the expected debt interest servicing. Other operational targets (for example, expenditures targets) would have to be compatible with the primary balance path under the updated DSA.

In being included in the Charter and the MTFF, the debt and operational targets would be submitted to Parliament as the government’s targets, although Parliament would not have to formally approve them. The Charter of Fiscal Responsibility commits the Government to a defined medium-term fiscal stance and includes the five-year objectives taken from the DSA. The three-year Fiscal Strategy/MTFF would be formulated on a yearly rolling basis, along with the annual budget and will need to be consistent with the targets set in the Charter.

Any deviations from the defined fiscal stance would have to be properly justified and would lead automatically to an update of the DSA projections. In case of intra-year fiscal deviations, any supplementary budget would need to include an updated MTFF. Any long-lasting substantial deviation would lead to an update of the Charter. In any case, an updated DSA will need to be attached to any update of the MTFF or the Charter; deviations will have to be justified, especially if they lead to a situation where debt could become unsustainable. The existence of an escape clause would constrain the cases where deviations are possible and acceptable.

Annex VI. Choosing Operational Targets in Maldives

Operational targets must strike a balance between several important, and sometimes competing, criteria. Operational targets should contribute to ensuring fiscal sustain ability, sometimes broadly defined as debt sustainability, while also stabilizing the economy, that is, reducing economic volatility and promoting a countercyclical fiscal stance. They should also remain simple, that is, easily understood by policymakers and the general public, and resilient to political and economic cycles. Finally, they should be easy to translate into clear operational guidance in the annual budget process, and they should be easy to monitor and enforce.

The choice of the relevant operational targets must take into account the specific situation of the country. Although some parameters are common to most developing countries, others are specific to Maldives. Key elements to consider when choosing operational targets include the following:

  • Strong macroeconomic volatility. As a small open economy, Maldives remains particularly sensitive to adverse international macroeconomic developments, such as lower global growth. The current global health crisis triggered a considerable reduction in tourist arrivals and related tourism revenues.

  • Large development needs. The country is faced with substantial investment needs to build economic resilience by investing in infrastructure and diversifying the economy. These needs have translated into an ambitious capital investment program in the past five years. The country’s five-year Strategic Action Plan identifies several medium-term investment priorities. Beyond capital spending needs, continued spending in health and education is also important for achieving the country’s development objectives.

  • Susceptibility to long-term natural risk factors. The rising threats associated with climate change, and their proven detrimental consequences on the Maldives islands, increase the urgency of climate-related adaptation spending. Rising and increasingly unpredictable climate events come with significant short-term reconstruction costs.

  • Limited additional revenue generation. Fiscal revenues have been stable as a share of GDP in recent years. Further diversification of revenues would be useful.

  • Difficulty controlling spending pressures. Although a large share of spending pressures stems from substantial investment needs, current expenditures have also proven difficult to compress in past times.

  • Current debt structure and high debt distress. Maldives has been able to raise a substantial amount of its public debt at concessional terms, mostly linked to investment projects. Limited market access acts as a binding constraint to the country’s fiscal possibilities and amplifies the possible negative consequences of a situation of high debt distress.

  • Exchange rate policy. Maldives maintains a de facto peg to the US dollar, which has provided a useful anchor for macroeconomic stability and shielded the economy from external shocks. Maintaining the peg requires maintaining prudent levels of central bank reserves.

Some of these characteristics may limit the set of adequate operational targets. The following sections provide a synthetic review of the advantages and drawbacks of the most common operational against the Maldivian constraints.

  • Budget balance targets are based on a quantifiable fiscal variable under the direct control of policymakers, and therefore they offer simplicity and ease of implementation. They can effectively promote fiscal discipline by directly linking expenditures to revenues. They are generally expressed as a percentage of GDP. The coverage of such a target may be adapted to include one-off items and interest payments (primary balance rule), although the latter may weaken the link between the rule and a medium-term debt anchor. However, they may lead to a procyclical fiscal stance, as the country may have to undertake spending cuts in times of economic crisis. Even though they would leave the country some policy leeway to define the composition of any needed fiscal consolidation, they may also reduce the quality of spending by encouraging cuts in much-needed investment spending for development and climate resilience.

  • Current balance targets, also known as “golden rules,” impose a limit on the balance of revenues and current expenditures. Their objective is to preserve investment spending from short-term spending cuts, and they de facto allow the country to raise debt only to finance capital expenditures. However, the scope of such targets excludes spending in crucial growth-friendly current expenditures such as health and education. It can also lower the quality of investment spending by reducing the incentives for cost-benefit analyses. Such targets must be associated with a sound public investment management framework prioritizing growth-enhancing projects; otherwise, the link with debt sustainability may be broken. Finally, golden rules can promote unorthodox reallocations between current and capital expenditures, that is, creative accounting.

  • Revenue targets set either floors or ceilings on government revenues. Revenue floors aim to boost revenue collection. However, in encouraging higher tax receipts in crisis times, they may be procyclical. More importantly, they do not ensure fiscal sustainability on their own, and they have to be associated with rules on expenditures and/or fiscal balances.

  • Expenditures targets are formulated as limits on the aggregate level of spending or on specific categories of spending (for example, current, primary, and capital spending). They can be set in level, either nominal or as a percentage of GDP, or in growth terms. Such targets are generally easy to understand, monitor, and enforce, as they target an aggregate that is under the most direct control of the government. However, expenditures targets linked to real GDP growth or set as a percentage of GDP tend to be procyclical, requiring spending cuts in difficult times, unless countercyclical automatic stabilizers (such as social and unemployment benefits) are excluded from the scope of the rule.5 Expenditures targets do not give any guidance on the composition of fiscal consolidation efforts and may reduce the incentive to maintain capital spending. They can be limited in scope to some categories of spending, such as current expenditures; or they may include two separate ceilings on current and capital expenditures.

In choosing the operational target or set of operational targets to guide the efforts towards a medium-term debt anchor, the authorities are faced with a triple constraint: (1) choosing rules that are directly linked to debt sustainability; (2) promoting short-term fiscal discipline; and (3) maintaining a target level and composition of spending to achieve development objectives and increase economic resilience. The choice of the operational targets associated with the debt anchor need to take into account the three objectives, while preserving the simplicity and enforceability of the framework.

A set of two to three operational targets could allow the authorities to reach their objectives. An overall balance target provides useful operational guidance for achieving both debt sustainability and fiscal discipline. A primary balance target also provides useful guidance on the soundness of fiscal policy, yet its link with debt sustainability is weaker. If adequately calibrated, revenue targets can allow the authorities to track progress on revenue mobilization. Maintaining an adequate spending mix would require separate targets or ceilings on current and capital expenditures. Ceilings could be envisaged on some categories of current expenditures, for example, they could exclude priority spending in health and education. Expenditure ceilings are typically expressed as a percentage of GDP, but they can also be expressed as a percentage of revenues (or of recurrent revenues) to avoid measurement issues associated with GDP forecasts.

Fiscal risks can also be addressed adequately through operational targets. A specific target that can be adopted could be a limit on government guarantees.

In the current context of high debt and high fiscal deficits, fiscal discipline could be enhanced through a transitional arrangement. To ensure immediate compliance, operational rules must remain realistic. The rules can be complemented with a path to compliance that clearly lays out an adjustment path of the levels of expenditures and deficits leading up to full compliance after a transition period of three years, for example.

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  • Lledó, Victor, Sungwook Yoon, Xiangming Fang, Samba Mbaye, and Young Kim. 2017. “Fiscal Rules at a Glance.” IMF Background Paper, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/fiscalrules/Fiscal%20Rules%20at%20a%20Glance%20-%20Background%20Paper.pdf

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  • Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2002. “Best Practices for Budget Transparency.” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris: OECD https://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/Best%20Practices%20Budget%20Transparency%20 -%20complete%20with%20cover%20page.pdf

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  • Schaechter, Andrea, Tidiane Kinda, Nina Budina, and Anke Weber. 2012. “Fiscal Rules in Response to the Crisis—Toward the “Next-Generation” Rules. A New Dataset.” IMF Working Paper WP/12/187, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12187.pdf

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  • Simone, Alejandro Sergio, and Petia Topalova. 2009. “India’s Experience with Fiscal Rules: An Evaluation and The Way Forward.” IMF Working Paper WP/09/175, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2009/175/article-A001-en.xml

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  • Stapenhurst, Rick, Roccardo Pelizzo, David Olsen, and Lisa von Trapp. 2008. “Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: A World Perspective.” WBI Development Studies No. 45627, World Bank Institute, Washington DC: World Bank https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/6547

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  • Van Eden, Holger, Pokar Khemani, and Richard Emery. 2013. “Developing Legal Frameworks to Promote Fiscal Responsibility: Design Matters.” In Public Financial Management and Its Emergency Architecture, chapter 2, edited by Marco Cangiano, Teresa Curristine, and Michel Lazare. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

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1

More specifically, the FRA requires that (1) loans and guarantees to a public enterprise by the Government or with Government participation in the name of the state, or guarantees given to any party in the name of the state, shall not exceed the limit set out to take loans or give guarantees in the annual national budget; and (2) the National Fiscal Reserve is the reserve to which the amount from the primary balance surplus is deposited as determined by the President with the advice of the Parliament’s Financial Committee.

2

According to the authorities’ 2021 budget document. See also IMF’s COVID-19policy tracker indicating that “to minimize the economic impact of the COVID-19 virus, the authorities announced on March 20, 2020 an Economic Recovery Plan of 2.5 Billion rufiyaa (3.4 percent of GDP)”.

3

See theApril 2020 IMF RCF Staff report for further details.

4

However, it is not clear whether the Minister of Finance activated FRA’s escape clause for this suspension.

5

Van Eden and others (2013) discuss design issues for fiscal responsibility laws.

6

Examples include the FRAs of India (2006), Pakistan (2007), and Sri Lanka (2003).

8

The Decentralization Administration Act of July 2010 has subsequently undergone extensive amendments, several of which became effective in December 2019.

9

Concerning extrabudgetary Central Government units, SARTTAC (2019) listed 26 trusts funds, the Sovereign Development Fund, three other funds, and 13 corporations (SOEs) that were not charging economically significant prices. This tentative list was reviewed and shortened; see SARTTAC (2020) for the modifications.

10

The IMF RCF Staff report (April 2020) indicates that the debt sustainability analysis includes public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external and domestic debt. Public debt includes debt of the Central Government, including guarantees to SOEs. Public debt does not include the non-guaranteed debt of SOEs, because some can borrow without the guarantee of the government.

11

SOEs are a major source of fiscal risk in the economy of Maldives because they rely excessively on government support. Both the Staff Report for the 2019 Article IV Consultation and the Fiscal Transparency Evaluation (April 2021) indicate that, in 2019, SOEs unconsolidated liabilities represented 84 percent of GDP, of which 21 percent of GDP is government guaranteed debt and 12 percent of GDP direct loans and on-lending by Treasury.

12

Extrabudgetary Central Government comprised five institutions and a recently created SDF. The Maldives’ Fiscal Transparency Evaluation (April 2021) indicates that SDF could be considered partly off-budget because although transfers to the Fund (around 4 percent of total budget) are on budget, the IMF’s investment transactions are off budget. The SDF is a contingency fund formed in 2017 if the government faces difficulty in repaying the loans contracted for major development projects or sovereign bond issues. Given the SDF’s direct link with loan repayments, its assets could, in principle, be netted out from gross public debt. When accrual accounting is adopted (a longer-term aim), the SDF’s assets and liabilities would be included in the Central Government balance sheet.

13

Many, but not all, trust funds identified in SARTTAC (2019) are on-budget or at least recorded in Central Government accounts. According to SARTTAC (2020), Central Government extrabudgetary units in 2020 consisted of the Bar Council, the Capital Market Development Authority, the Civil Aviation Authority, and certain nonmarket institutional units.

14

Under the Pension Act, the MPAO administers three schemes, including an Old-Age Basic Pension Scheme and the Maldives Retirement Pension Scheme. MPAO also disburses other pensions; see SARTTAC (2019, page 31).

15

For FRA purposes, block grants to local councils could be included in the definition of “revenues”. The Council’s revenue should be the audited and certified annual revenue in line with the Decentralization Act.

16

A fiscal rule is defined as a long-lasting constraint on fiscal policy through numerical limits on budgetary aggregates and which has a legislative basis. See Kopits and Symansky (1998) and Lledó and others (2017).

17

For Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Peru, see Corbacho and Schwartz (2007). For India, Japan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and United States, see annexes of Lienert (2010). Legislated fiscal rules in ASEAN countries are documented in Lienert (2015). Studies of experience with fiscal rules in European Union countries include Kamps and Kamps and Leiner-Killinger (2019) and Schaechter and others (2012).

18

For instance, the definitions of “inflation rate” and “unemployment rate” are quite vague. The inflation rate is defined as “the change in prices of goods and services within a certain period of time,” and the unemployment rate refers to “those among the working age group who are willing to work but unable to find work, within a certain period of time.”

19

Unrealistic dates were also a major reason why the United Kingdom’s FRA, adopted in 2010, was repealed one year later and was replaced by the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011.

20

For New Zealand’s experience, see Gill (2018).

21

For the latest Charters of Fiscal Responsibility for these two countries, see Uganda (2016) and UK (2017).

22

In some countries, annexing schedules to an Act is a common legal practice. The Act would authorize the Minister to change the schedule. This may be done by an order subject to the affirmative resolution of Parliament. If the legislative drafting style does not allow a schedule to the Act, the minimum context of the fiscal reports could be included in the government regulation.

23

The MOF published in 2018 a single report called “Fiscal and Debt Strategy Report” containing both the MTFS and the MTDMS and covering a three-year period. In 2019 and 2020, the MOF published the MTFS and MTDMS separately.

24

The legal framework should allow the Minister of Finance to extent the minimum context of the Fiscal Strategy Report. As stated in footnote 26, this could be done through a schedule to the FRA that can be amended by the Minister (and that may be subject to a review by Parliament) or a government regulation.

25

The fiscal risks of SOEs were the topic of a FAD Technical Assistance Mission in January 2020.

27

This could be done through specifying reporting requirements as part of the financial regulations related to the PF Act.

28

The Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy 2020–22 was submitted to the People’s Majlis on July 31, 2019.

29

The 2018, 2019, and 2020 Fiscal and Debt Strategy Reports are available on the MOF’s site. The Reports were published in November in 2018 and October in 2019.

30

The DSA that would be required as part of the fiscal strategy report could be a yearly summary update of the DSA’s underlying the targets set in the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility.

31

Brazil is one of the few cases where penalties and sanctions may apply to public officials deemed responsible for noncompliance. Brazil’s sanctions are not embedded in its FRA but in a separate “Fiscal Crimes Law” that includes fines, dismissal, or jail time. In 2016, the President of Brazil was convicted under the Constitution and this law and was removed from office.

32

For example, in Ecuador, the failure of an institution to provide information can result in the denial of access to credit and the suspension of budget grants.

33

Although not published before 2018, it was submitted to the Parliament in 2016 and 2017.

34

See “basic,” “good,” and “advanced” practices for reporting and forecasting under the IMF’s Fiscal Transparency Code,https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/.

35

New Zealand’s 1994 FRA, which has provided a model for other countries’ FRAs, no longer exists as a standalone law. In 2004, it was integrated into New Zealand’s PFM Act.

36

For some country examples, see the Box 1 in Lienert and others (2010).

37

Public Finance Regulation Chapter 15.3 states that “Public Financial Statements shall be prepared in accordance with ‘International Public Sector Accounting Standards: Financial Reporting under the Cash Basis of Accounting’ published by the International Federation of Accountants.”

1

The authorities may consider using a different name for “Charter of Fiscal Responsibility”, which would better fit with historical background, as well as legal institutional framework.

2

The Minister may use a statutory instrument (such as an order) to amend the schedules. This could be approved by Cabinet and submitted to the Majlis. If this is not a common legal practice in Maldives, the format of the fiscal reports mentioned in the new FRA can be set out in a Government Regulation.

3

See Appendix 2 for a more detailed Fiscal Strategy Report Outline.

4

See Section IV. The MTDS would serve as an input to the DSA and would, in turn, be adjusted to take into account the constraints of a sustainable DSA. If a new Public Debt Act is adopted, this high-level summary of the medium-term debt management strategy could be elaborated further in a separate MTDS document.

5

Expenditures rules can actually have a stabilizing role If the level of expenditures growth is set in real terms at the level of potential output growth. This approach requires that the country has already reached a steady fiscal state (and is not undergoing substantial structural transformations) and poses important measurement challenges.

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Maldives: Technical Assistance Report-Revising the Fiscal Responsibility Act
Author:
International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept.