Kingdom of the Netherlands—the Netherlands: 2021 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Kingdom of the Netherlands—the Netherlands
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1. Restrictions have been lifted almost fully as hospitalizations have stabilized and vaccinations advanced. The Netherlands was hit hard by several waves of infections in 2020–21. The authorities responded and adapted their containment measures, with the strictest restrictions imposed during the winter, including a curfew from late January to late April 2021. After a brief spike in infections in July 2021 led to the reintroduction of some restrictions, infections and hospitalizations fell back and stabilized. Also, progress on vaccinations has been substantial. As of October 2021, about 68 percent of the Dutch population was fully vaccinated (representing about 80.5 percent of people aged 12 and above). This has allowed most restrictions to be lifted, supported by the use of the “corona pass.”

Abstract

1. Restrictions have been lifted almost fully as hospitalizations have stabilized and vaccinations advanced. The Netherlands was hit hard by several waves of infections in 2020–21. The authorities responded and adapted their containment measures, with the strictest restrictions imposed during the winter, including a curfew from late January to late April 2021. After a brief spike in infections in July 2021 led to the reintroduction of some restrictions, infections and hospitalizations fell back and stabilized. Also, progress on vaccinations has been substantial. As of October 2021, about 68 percent of the Dutch population was fully vaccinated (representing about 80.5 percent of people aged 12 and above). This has allowed most restrictions to be lifted, supported by the use of the “corona pass.”

Context

1. Restrictions have been lifted almost fully as hospitalizations have stabilized and vaccinations advanced. The Netherlands was hit hard by several waves of infections in 2020–21. The authorities responded and adapted their containment measures, with the strictest restrictions imposed during the winter, including a curfew from late January to late April 2021. After a brief spike in infections in July 2021 led to the reintroduction of some restrictions, infections and hospitalizations fell back and stabilized. Also, progress on vaccinations has been substantial. As of October 2021, about 68 percent of the Dutch population was fully vaccinated (representing about 80.5 percent of people aged 12 and above). This has allowed most restrictions to be lifted, supported by the use of the “corona pass.”

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Covid-19 Infections, Mobility Restrictions, and Vaccine Coverage

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

2. The formation of a new government will bring decisions on medium-term fiscal objectives and policy reform priorities. Elections took place in March 2021, and negotiations are ongoing to form a government coalition. Under the Dutch fiscal framework, a new government defines key fiscal objectives, including government expenditure ceilings for the four-year duration of the legislature (See Annex I). The new government will submit the Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) to the European Commission.

Recent Economic Developments

3. The pandemic recession was less severe in the Netherlands than in the Euro area. With a contraction of 3.8 percent in 2020 versus the Euro area’s 6.3 percent, the Dutch economy was more resilient, thanks in part to its high degree of technological penetration and digitalization, including a high pre-pandemic prevalence of telecommuting. A strong fiscal policy response focused on supporting affected businesses and households, cushioning the economic impact of the pandemic. The contraction was driven by a record drop in household consumption (-6.6 percent), lower private investment (-5.5 percent) and net exports of goods and services (-0.6 percent), while government consumption increased moderately by 1 percent. On the supply side, contact-intensive sectors (accommodation and food services, culture and recreation, and transport) were the most significantly affected. Following a contraction of 0.8 percent in 2021:Q1 (QoQ, saar), Dutch GDP grewby 3.8 percent in 2021:Q2, on account of a strong recovery of private consumption, as most mobility restrictions were lifted, and exports of goods and services.

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Employed Persons Working From Home

(Percentage of the total employment)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Sources: Eurostat and IMF staff calculations.
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Impact of the Pandemic by Sector of Activity Gross Value Added by Sector

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Sources: Eurostat and IMF staff calculations.

4. Taking advantage of substantial fiscal space, the policy response was large and agile, resulting in a fiscal deficit in 2020. The pre-pandemic fiscal position was strong, with a fiscal balance of 2.5 percent of GDP and government debt of 48 percent of GDP in 2019. After four consecutive years of surpluses, a fiscal deficit of 4.3 percent of GDP was posted in 2020, on account of pandemic support measures and automatic stabilizers. Government debt reached 52.5 percent of GDP in 2020 (Figure 3).

5. Unemployment has remained contained and consumer price inflation subdued. The various policy programs helped limit the impact of the pandemic on the labor market. The unemployment rate increased moderately to 3.8 percentin 2020 from 3.4 percent in 2019, although there were significant differences across types of employment contracts and age groups (See Selected Issues Paper). Headline inflation declined to 1.1 percentin 2020, mainly driven by lower energy prices, and core inflation stood at 1.9 percent. Labor force participation has nearly returned to pre-pandemic levels, and the unemployment rate fell back to 3.2 percentin August 2021, reflecting the resumption of economic activity. Inflation picked up in 2021:1–11, to 1.8 percent, boosted by higher energy prices. Wage growth reverted to pre-pandemic levels in 2021:Q1 (Figure 2).

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Unemployment Rate, Employment Rate and Wage Growth

(year-on-year percent change)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Sources: CBS and Haver.

6. Financial sector pressures have ebbed since the start of the pandemic with credit growth rebounding from its trough in early 2021. Still, firms face tighter credit standards than before the crisis, while their demand for loans has stayed subdued. Banks preemptively increased provisioning in 2020, but the aggregate NPL ratio has not grown so far, reflecting public sector support to households and corporations and the debt service moratoria on offer in 2020. Bank profitability has rebounded to its pre-crisis level while restrictions on dividend payouts have helped bolster capitalization ratios. Among non-bank financial institutions, the average funding ratio of occupational pension funds dropped below 100 percent in the spring of 2020 but climbed to 109 percent by mid-2021, above its end-2019 level.1 Likewise, insurers have largely sustained their solvency ratios, keeping them far above regulatory thresholds (Figure 4).

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Financial Sector Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

7. The external position was stronger than implied by fundamentals and desirable policy settings in 2020. The large current account surplus shrank to 7.0 percent of GDP in 2020 (7.5 percent on a cyclically adjusted basis), from 9.4 percent of GDP in 2019, as an improving trade balance was offset by deteriorating primary and secondary income accounts. Adjusting for biases in the attribution of corporate savings to foreign shareholders2 and some temporary effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the balance of payments, staff estimated the underlying current account surplus at around 5.9 percent of GDP in 2020, implying a staff-assessed current account gap of about 2.4 percent of GDP. Using the EBA’s estimated elasticities, the REERis assessed as undervalued by 0.5–6.5 percent in 2020 (Annex II).

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External Position

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Authorities’ Views

8. The authorities shared staff’s assessment of the external position. They agreed that there is no need for austerity measures, given the limited deterioration of public finances, or further fiscal stimulus, in view of the swift rebound of the economy, but noted that public expenditures to foster potential growth could also contribute to external rebalancing. They highlighted that the IMF EBA methodology could be enriched by considering the impact of multinational corporations and cross-country differences in pension arrangements.

Outlook and Risks

9. The economy is projected to grow robustly in 2021 and 2022. In 2021, growth is projected at 4 percent, supported primarily by a strong pickup of domestic demand, reflecting in part a reduction in the household saving rate from its unusually high level in 2020. High vaccination coverage should contribute to sustain the recovery. Economic activity is projected to exceed its pre-pandemic level in 2021:Q4. This will more than halve the negative output gap of about -1.8 percent in 2020 by 2022.

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Consumption, Investment, and Confidence Indicators

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

10. Over the medium term, no significant scarring is projected. Unemployment is projected to decrease moderately in 2021 and rise somewhat to slightly above pre-pandemic levels in the medium term. Bankruptcies should remain contained but may rise from their recent lows as emergency support programs (which may have protected some unviable firms along with viable ones) are phased out. By 2026 output is projected to catch up with its pre-pandemic trend. Inflation is projected to rise gradually toward 2 percent in the medium term, on the back of stronger domestic consumption and a rebound in energy prices, although temporary spikes might be observed in the near term as the economy exits from the pandemic.

11. The headline current account surplus is unlikely to return to its pre-pandemic highs over the medium term. The ratio of investment to GDP is projected to exceed its 2017–2019 average, without a full offset on the saving side; in particular, the public sector saving investment balance should remain lower than in the pre-pandemic years. By 2026, the trade balance is expected to narrow as net energy exports continue their long-term decline, roughly offsetting the recovery of the factor income account, leaving the current account somewhat above 8 percent of GDP. The NIIP is anticipated to approach 145 percent of GDP, bolstering further the income balance.

12. Risks to the outlook are roughly balanced and appear to vary over the forecast horizon.

  • In the short term, downside risks are related to the evolution of the pandemic. The recovery may slow if infections and, especially, hospitalizations surge, possibly due to incomplete vaccination coverage or lower effectiveness of vaccines against new variants. Larger-than-anticipated weaknesses in the private sector may emerge as government policy support is phased out. Also, disruptions in international value chains may affect the Netherlands, which is a highly open economy.

  • Farther out on the horizon, financial sector risks from high real estate exposures and valuations may materialize. The crisis affected rental income expectations for commercial properties, also by accelerating structural shifts in demand, yet with rather limited price effects. Possible corrections in the tight residential real estate market may have stronger effects on consumer behavior than mortgage quality, given the record of strong performance of residential mortgages across the cycle.

  • On the upside, private demand could growfaster in the near term and beyond if households spend a large fraction of the excess savings built during the pandemic. In the medium term, pension reform could also contribute to a more robust consumption path.

  • A slower/faster-than-expected rebound in the euro area would affect the Dutch economy.

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Household Consumption, Income, and Saving

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Sources: CBS, Haver, and IMF staff calculations.

Authorities’ Views

13. The authorities broadly shared staff’s assessment of the macroeconomic outlook and risks. They noted an increasing adaptation of businesses to restrictions after each wave of infections. The successful vaccination campaign is seen as underpinning a strong rebound of economic growth in 2021 and 2022, possibly somewhat stronger than anticipated by IMF staff, although only a small fraction of accumulated savings is expected to be consumed. A significant share of these savings will likely finance investment in the housing market. While they expect bankruptcies to increase moderately as broad government support is rolled back, the number of bankruptcies should return to (low) pre-pandemic levels. The currently tight labor market implies that unemployment should also remain contained. This suggests only limited aggregate scarring in the medium term, although particular groups, such as the young, could be especially affected. They acknowledged the risk of resurgence of Covid-19 infections, but wide vaccine coverage in the Netherlands should limit the risk.

Policy Discussions: Supporting the Recovery and Boosting Resilience and Growth

A. In the Near-Term: Pave the Way Toward Normalization

As the economy recovers, policy interventions, including fiscal and macroprudential policies, should target areas of weaknesses to foster normalization of economic activity. However, given the near-term uncertainties surrounding the pandemic (including globally), the authorities should stand ready to re-introduce broader support programs, if needed, to contain its economic impact.

14. A set of programs were deployed starting in March 2020 and have been adapted throughout the crisis. These programs provide liquidity to firms, preserve jobs, support household incomes, and ensure continued provision of financial sector services. Notable among these programs was the NOW short work scheme, designed to help keep workers in their jobs and avoid a surge in unemployment, and the TOZO program targeted at the self-employed. These and other programs were made available to businesses experiencing large declines in sales. In 2020, government pandemic support spending amounted to some 3.5 percent of GDP. A budget of about 4.7 percent of GDP was set aside for 2021.3 As of May 2021, tax measures (including the deferral of tax payments and other revenue reduction measures) represented about 3 percent of GDP. In addition, public guarantee schemes were expanded by up to 6.3 percent of GDP to facilitate firms’ access to financing.

Covid-19 Fiscal Measures

article image
Notes:

2021 data are budgeted amounts as of September 2021.

The NOW program initially compensated labor costs by up to 90% at beginning of the pandemic, conditional on loss of turnover of at least 20%. Loan and income support a re provided to the self-employed via the TOZO program, and to workers under flexible contracts via the TOFA program. The TVL program provides allowance to companies affected by the crisis to finance their fixed costs (with the maximum allowance based on the size of the company). Sources: Dutch Ministry of Finance

15. While broad support programs are being phased out, the authorities should remain vigilant to unfavorable developments of the pandemic. The main support programs, notably the NOW, were appropriately allowed to expire on October 1st 2021, in light of the strength of economic activity and a tight labor market (vacancies currently exceed the number of the unemployed). The authorities are maintaining targeted support for businesses in sectors affected by the limited restrictions still in place, while keeping loan guarantees available until end-2021, and offering longer grace periods and maturities for the repayment of tax debts.4 These are welcome precautions, as risks related to the pandemic remain active. The authorities should also stand ready to reintroduce broader support programs should substantial risks materialize. This will not only protect jobs and viable firms, but it will also minimize the risk of spillovers to the financial sector. Fiscal space in the Netherlands remains substantial, providing room to offer additional support.

16. As the economy normalizes, policies should gradually transition to forward-looking interventions. To ease the road to normalization, policy focus should consider the following:

  • Supporting viable firms. The authorities should consider policy proposals for supporting viable but challenged firms through active state engagement with other creditors in restructuring efforts.5

  • Facilitating the mobiiity of factors of production. The expiration of general support measures such as the NOW may temporarily increase unemployment. Therefore, policies should help the laid -off find new jobs. Ongoing initiatives to support training and career counselling, such as the new training allowances and the regional employment teams, are welcome and should be adjusted and expanded as needed to meet post-pandemic demand. Policies to facilitate capital movement include ensuring that restructuring and insolvency procedures are agile to speed up the release of salvageable capital trapped in failing businesses. In this respect, the new law aiming to facilitate debt restructuring for companies in financial difficulties is timely.

  • Fostering investment. Supporting the adaptation of business investment to structural changes would help strengthen the recovery and support growth in the medium term. Public support to R&D would help boost investment in technology, and selected public capital projects could crowd in private investment. Establishing a credit bureau would help improve funding conditions for SMEs, facilitating their investment activity.

17. Complementing measures at the European level, the Dutch authorities implemented a range of policies to strengthen capital buffers and ensure credit provision to the economy. De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) extended capital and liquidity measures taken by the ECB’s Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)to less significant institutions (LSIs) under its supervision. Moreover, recommendations to refrain from payouts to shareholders and limit variable renumeration were passed on to LSIs, as was guidance to prevent procyclical effects from the application of IFRS 9 and the capital provision for market risk. The DNB also reduced the systemic risk buffer applicable to the three largest Dutch banks and postponed the introduction of a floor for mortgage loan risk weights from September 2020 to January 2022. EBA guidance in place until March 2021 allowed temporary flexibility for the classification and provisioning of non-performing loans subject to general payment moratoria benefiting Dutch SMEs and mortgage borrowers.

18. Going forward, financial sector polices should encourage continued financing for viable borrowers and the use of available buffers to recognize impaired exposures. Policy interventions have helped avoid a worsening of bank assets, lifted capitalization above its pre-pandemic level, and underpinned a decline in the aggregate NPL ratio. But loans subject to moratoria or public guarantees, even if representing only a small fraction of the overall credit portfolio6, are of lower quality and about a quarter of outstanding NFC lending is to sectors heavily affected by the crisis. Once borrower support measures are phased out, banks should pro-actively offer debt relief to viable but challenged debtors on a case-by-case basis and within existing frameworks. Losses deemed unavoidable should be acknowledged by deploying provisions and capital buffers while profit distribution should consider still limited visibility about the ultimate impact of the pandemic. The authorities should ensure that banks can play an active role on these fronts by avoiding a premature tightening of macroprudential policies and by subjecting outstanding tax debts to joint restructuring efforts.

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Bank Loan Quality

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Source: EBA.

Authorities’ views

19. The authorities emphasized that further extending broad pandemic support programs beyond the third quarter of 2021 could create unintended consequences and delay the normalization of the economy. However, measures remain in place to support sectors still facing restrictions. In addition, the experience with these pandemic support programs will be helpful to facilitate their reintroduction, if needed. Nevertheless, a program relaunch would most likely be more restricted and targeted than before, thereby also implying a time-lag. The authorities further noted that a new wave of infections would likely have comparatively limited impact on the economy, thanks to the strong adaptation of businesses, but also because containment measures would mostly likely be localized. They pointed to global supply bottlenecks as another important source of near-term risks for the Netherlands, given the open nature of its economy. They stressed also that although it is too early for an in-depth assessment, programs in place to facilitate reallocation of labor seem to be working. They indicated their readiness to tighten macroprudential policies if credit developments call for it in the foreseeable future. They showed an openness to work with private creditors towards ensuring the debt sustainability of viable but temporarily challenged borrowers, though concrete modalities of engagement are still being explored.

B. Agenda for the Medium Term: Boosting Potential Growth and Addressing Areas of Vulnerability

The inauguration of a new Legislature creates an opportunity to define medium-term goais and poiicies. Substantial policy space aiiows the authorities to actively foster potential growth and a green recovery while continuing to reduce areas of vulnerability and secure financial stability. Policy priorities include increasing public support to R&D, addressing skill mismatches and shortages, and moving forward with the implementation of the climate agenda, international tax reform, and pension agreements.

Fiscal Policy

20. Despite the large fiscal package deployed to combat the pandemic, fiscal space remains substantial, providing room to support growth-enhancing reforms. Undercurrent policies, staff projects the fiscal balance to return to a small surplus in the medium term, as the economy recovers, automatic stabilizers shrink, and pandemic-related emergency support measures are phased out. Public debt is projected to start declining after 2022, returning to about 50 percent of GDP by 2026.7 Even if a deficit above current projections were maintained in the medium term, policy space would be more than adequate to deal with unanticipated shocks (See DSA and Carton and Fouejieu, 2020). The extraordinarily low Dutch government bond yields provide further room for maneuver when setting medium-term fiscal objectives. Without prejudging future discussions on European fiscal rules after 2022, the structural fiscal balance would return above the pre-pandemic MTO in the medium term. Thus, policy space is available to foster a stronger and greener recovery, while contributing to address external imbalances, even as fiscal buffers are gradually replenished.

21. Raising public investment in education can help address skill mismatches and shortages accentuated by the pandemic. Already before the pandemic a significant proportion of Dutch firms found it difficult to fill ICT vacancies, and the changes in the structure of production post-pandemic may exacerbate skill shortages. Although total public spending on education is in line with the euro area average, spending in primary education has declined in recent years, while pre-primary education spending is well below the EU average. Student-to-teacher ratios in pre-primary, primary and secondary education are also significantly higher than the EU average. These factors could explain the deterioration of the Netherlands’ PISA reading score in the last several years, which now falls slightly belowthe OECD average. Also, persistent educational achievement gaps exist among children from different socioeconomic backgrounds. The authorities’ recent announcement of new spending worth 8.5 billion euros over two years (about 1 percent of 2021 GDP) to support a National Education Plan is welcome. Additional structural investment in education, while addressing potential efficiency problems, would help address these challenges and maintain the Netherlands among frontier countries in terms of educational outcomes (see Selected Issues Paper).

22. Increasing direct public support to R&D will generate positive spillovers and boost productivity growth. Total spending on R&D in the Netherlands is in line with the EU average, but it remains below that in frontier countries. In fact, government support for R&D in the Netherlands has declined in the past decade, while increasing in frontier countries. Increasing public spending on basic research would not only help maintain the Netherlands’ position as an innovation leader, but would also generate positive spillovers, expanding the productivity frontier. The launch of the National Growth Fund, with R&D one of the main targeted areas of investment, is a welcome development. Post Covid-19, the authorities should also support further development of digitalization, which proved its worth during the pandemic. Next Generation EU funds earmarked for the Netherlands, while relatively modest, can nonetheless be useful in this area.

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Government Spending and Support for R&D

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

23. The Netherlands has an ambitious climate change mitigation commitment and policy framework, but more needs to be done to reach its emissions reduction goals. The Netherlands is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 49 and 95 percent, by 2030 and 2050, respectively, relative to 1990 levels. These commitments are likely to be revised upward in the context of the new EU Green Deal, which envisions a 55 percent emissions reduction by 2030 relative to the 1990 level and net zero by 2050. The Dutch Climate Agreement adopted in 2019, moreover, defines targets across five sectors, with the largest emission reductions envisaged in the power sector (over 50 percent by 2030) based on a strong increase in renewable energy and the phaseout of coal generation. However, under policies adopted as of 2020, GHG emissions are projected to fall by only 34 percent by 2030.8 Newly approved measures in 2021, including a back loaded carbon levy on industry, could reduce emissions by another 9 percentage points— leaving a 6 percentage-point gap relative to the national target. The Independent Study Group on “Implementing the Green Deal” has estimated that public spending on green investment may need to increase by between ½ and ¾ percent of GDP a year in the next decade to ensure the Netherlands meets its goals. The inclusion of additional resources for green spending in the 2022 budget is a positive step.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Per Sector

(Mt CO Equivalents)

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Source: Netherlands Climate and Energy Outlook 2020 (KEV)

24. Climate change mitigation policies should be further strengthened, which would open new growth opportunities. Carbon pricing can be reinforced with feebates (revenue-neutral tax-subsidy schemes) to reduce emissions per unit of production or activity in the five sectors covered by the Climate Agreement, without a large increase in energy prices for the public at large. Carbon prices could also be better aligned across sectors to avoid distortions. The newly introduced industry carbon levy could be made more cost-effective through a revenue-neutral feebate design, which naturally embeds incentives for all firms to cut emissions and better addresses competitiveness and leakage concerns. To attain reduction targets in power generation, taxes on residential and industrial electricity could be gradually removed and replaced with additional surcharges on C02 emissions from power generation/district heating and coal generation (Batini at all, 20219). The recovery post-pandemic also provides an opportunity to foster a greener and more sustainable economy. Public support to innovation and adoption of greener technology among Dutch firms would create new growth opportunities. The National Growth Fund could be used to promote such investments.

25. The Netherlands has continued reforming its international taxation framework to reduce the scope for aggressive tax planning. The Dutch tax system has played a key role in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) from multinational corporations (MNCs) through special financial institutions (SFIs). SFIs transact mainly with non-residents and typically have little (or no) physical production or employment in the Netherlands, thus contributing relatively modestly to the Dutch economy. Their wide use for tax planning has come under scrutiny and prompted reform initiatives by the government aimed at tightening the rules. These include the introduction of a cross-border conditional withholding tax (WHT), revisions to the Advance Pricing Agreements (APA) and Advance Tax Rulings (ATR) practice to strengthen qualifying substance requirements and presence tests, modifications to the innovation box regime, and revisions to the tax treaty policy. These efforts are welcome and should continue. While it is early to quantify the effect of the tax reforms on the activities of MNCs, there are indications of a slight decline in the number of SFIs and of reduced benefits from using the Netherlands as a conduit since the introduction of the new conditional WHT.10

Authorities’ Views

26. The authorities broadly agreed with staff assessment of medium-term fiscal policy recommendations. They noted that medium-term debt sustainability is not a concern at the moment. The 2022 Budget Memorandum also forecast debt-to-GDP ratio to be several percentage points below the 60 percent SGP limit in the medium term. They also see the need for additional investment in education, including to catch-up with learning losses incurred during the pandemic, due to school closure, but also to address pressing needs in the most disadvantaged schools. They noted that efforts are being made at regional levels to address skill shortages, with cooperation between regional authorities and employers in different sectors. They emphasized that National Growth Fund is aimed at supporting R&D and boost productivity.

27. The authorities agree with staff that additional measures are needed to meet the national climate targets for 2030. They believe that carbon pricing remains the most effective instrument to bring about change but might need to be complemented by expenditure measures, such as subsidies and a ramp-up in green investment, including carbon capture and hydrogen infrastructure. They also believe that there are tradeoffs between addressing the supply side of housing and preservation of biodiversity as construction is a source of nitrogen emissions. Given the disproportionate contribution to total emissions relative to GDP, it will also be inevitable to reduce farm agriculture, in particular livestock.

28. Furthermore, the authorities deem important to continue the current reforms to international taxation. They reiterated their commitment to an internationally agreed minimum income tax to help fight tax avoidance globally.

Maintaining financial stability

29. Real estate markets call for heightened vigilance and the pursuit of policies to address near-term risks and long-term challenges confronting residential and commercial properties.11 Prices – and valuations – for housing have continued to soar during the pandemic (see chart), reflecting longstanding supply bottlenecks, low interest rates, and the favorable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. Existing vulnerabilities have been exacerbated by a further rise in already elevated levels of mortgage debt, with some households exceedingly stretching their debt servicing capacity. Consequently, the activation of floors for risk weights applied to mortgage lending from 2022 is welcome and may be complemented by measures such as an additional reduction in eligible loan-to-value ratios, and reviewing the taxation of owner-occupied housing.12 In addition, efforts to improve the elasticity of the housing supply appear warranted, as structural rigidities, such as distorted planning incentives and restrictive building or zoning laws, maintain imbalances. Such policies will also support macroeconomic stability by lessening households’ exposure to house-price fluctuations, which can significantly affect consumer spending.

30. Vacancy rates for commercial properties have increased due to the recession yet with little effect on prices as investment yields have stayed attractive in relation to other assets. With banks maintaining comparatively large exposures, valuation has become a concern, especially since long-term structural change may prevent the full recovery of some property segments. The authorities should contemplate options to better steer the investment cycle of commercial real estate to avoid a build-up of financial stability risks, potentially modelled on policies in place for owner-occupied dwellings. Furthermore, incentivizing climate-friendly modernization or the rededication of obsolete structures should help preserve the value of existing buildings.

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Real Estate Pricing and Valuation

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

31. The crisis has exposed and compounded financial sector challenges, also by suppressing interest rates even further. Since end-2019, net interest margins of banks have declined, lowering the share of operating income originating from traditional intermediation activities. Portfolios of pension funds and insurers have shown some shift towards riskier assets by lengthening durations and reducing holdings of safer assets. Some asset management companies experienced liquidity pressures during the financial market turbulences in early 2020 while lending by other non-bank financial institutions, such as factoring companies, appears to remain brisk, also facilitated by the difficulties of some SMEs to access bank financing. Hence, the crisis has put existing financial sector challenges into sharper relief, warranting supervisory vigilance about, possibly undue, risk-taking behavior. In this context, efforts to improve the transparency of exposures, e.g., with the help of a credit registry, and the development of macro- or micro-prudential tools to address risks outside the banking sector, e.g., by creating supervisory leeway to limit investment fund redemptions at times of stress, would constitute useful complements.

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Bank Net Interest Margin and Income

(Percent; basis points)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Source: EBA.

32. Anti-Money Laundering /Countering the Financing of Terrorism is a key financial stability and integrity issue in the Netherlands.13 Given the open nature of its economy, the Netherlands should continuously monitor international financial flows and carry out analysis to remain agile in its risk-based supervisory activities. A central register for beneficial owners of legal persons went live in September 2020. The authorities should continue refining the accuracy of the beneficial ownership information and promptly establish the planned beneficial ownership register for legal arrangements (e.g., trusts). The Netherlands should continue to prioritize close inter-agency and international cooperation among AML and tax authorities.

Authorities’ Views

33. The authorities broadly shared staff’s assessment of financial sector challenges and policy priorities. They acknowledged imbalances in real estate markets as a key area of concern, requiring a combination of policies to address demand and supplyside pressures while containing associated financial stability risks. Authorities highlighted the potential benefits of the introduction of a credit bureau to support SME financing. They perceived risks in the non-bank financial sector as no immediate cause for alarm but acknowledged the need to monitor developments and stressed efforts to improve transparency and to consider instruments to contain potential vulnerabilities, such as borrower-based measures that would also put limits on the lending activities of non-bank financial institutions or restricting investment fund redemptions at times of stress to preserve liquidity and avoid fire sales of assets. They share the view that effectively addressing AML/CFT challenges requires international co-operation and welcome measures suggested by the EUAML Action Plan in this regard.

Addressing specific vulnerabilities in the Dutch economy

34. While the labor market proved generally resilient during the crisis, the self-employed and workers with flexible contracts were shown to be vulnerable. These groups of workers are more likely to lose their jobs and incomes, and they enjoy lower safety-net coverage in downturns, putting them at higher risk. While having one of the strictest protections for regular contracts among OECD countries, the Netherlands has a comparatively liberal framework for employment under flexible contract arrangements, leaving them vulnerable during the pandemic. In addition, sectors of activity with a high share of flexible work arrangements tend to exhibit relatively lower labor productivity levels and growth, likely reflecting lower incentives for employers to invest in the skills of workers.14

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Employment Protection – Regular vs Temporary contracts

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

35. Policies to reduce labor market duality can contribute to increase resilience to future shocks and support productivity growth. Ensuring appropriate social protection, including a mandatory disability insurance and some basic pension insurance for the self-employed, as currently planned, are steps in the right direction. Continuing realigning tax and other incentives across different types of employment, by, e.g., gradually reducing the tax credit for self-employed once the pandemic has been left behind, would contribute to reducing labor market duality. Improving employment protection for workers inflexible contract arrangements could enhance the resilience of the labor market to adverse shocks, and support wage growth. Given the high prevalence of part-time employment among women, improving availability and affordability of childcare (currently, its cost exceeds EU and OECD averages) would better enable women to work full-time. Ongoing reforms of parental leave, including the expansion of paternity leave, would also facilitate full-time female labor participation. Employing a larger share of the workforce on a more permanent basis would also incentivize employers and employees to invest in training, supporting higher productivity.

36. The second pillar occupational pension system has been under stress for several years. The system is considered one of the most solid in the world, as it incorporates correction mechanisms to ensure that it can stand behind the benefits it offers. However, low interest rates have boosted liability valuations putting pressure on funding ratios.15 As a result, painful corrections have been made, including repeated hikes to contribution rates and suspension of cost-of-living adjustments. Thus trust in the existing system has waned, resulting in a decline in active pension contributors over the past decade, especially among younger cohorts.

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Policy Funding Ratios of Dutch Pension Funds

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Source: DNB.

37. The agreement on pension reform is welcome and delays on its implementation should be kept to a minimum. In June 2019, the government and social partners signed a pension agreement, envisaging a shift of occupational pensions from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution type model while also incorporating elements of risk sharing among members and insurance against longevity risk.16 In May 2021, the authorities decided to postpone the date on which the reform will become effective from January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2023, mainly to allow sufficient time to address a host of technical adjustments. Consequently, present pension arrangements are now required to transition to the new system by January 1, 2027 only. The modifications to pension modalities foreseen by the legislation are anticipated to stabilize contribution rates, encourage early enrollment by acknowledging the time value of money, and may dampen some of the effects of low interest rates on consumption under the current framework. 17 They also upgrade the pension framework to deal with an evolving labor market, characterized by higher mobility and changing patterns of work. Transitional and operational aspects of the reform need to be managed in a careful and timely manner to ensure its success. Moreover, offering additional flexibility, e.g., in contribution levels, may further strengthen incentives for participation and improve economic stability.

Authorities’ Views

38. The authorities agreed that the pandemic further stressed long-standing vulnerabilities across job contracts in the Dutch labor market. They indicated that policy already initiated to reduce labor market duality (including gradually reducing tax incentives or the self-employed) will continue, as noted in the 2022 budget memorandum. In addition to the recently adopted reform of partner leave and a parental leave reform that is now being finalized in Parliament, the government is supporting municipalities through increased financing to improve childcare services. This will contribute to a more equal division of work and child care responsibilities between partners. They however stressed that more structural policies are needed to address these challenges, and the upcoming government will need to take additional steps to increase labor participation rates, and reduce the gap between flexible and permanent labor.

Staff Appraisal

39. The Netherlands has weathered the pandemic comparatively well, reflecting its resilient economy and substantial policy space for effective support. A vigorous health sector response and timely sanitary restrictions helped contain the human toll of the pandemic. Economic impacts were cushioned by pervasive digitalization and fiscal backing for households and firms, also preventing adverse financial sector spillovers. With the ongoing robust recovery expected to carry into 2022, risks appear broadly balanced but are surrounded by substantial uncertainty. A potential resurgence of the pandemic and underlying private sector vulnerabilities, particularly in real estate markets, constitute the main downsides with an unexpectedly vigorous rundown of excess savings and external demand recovery providing a counterweight.

40. Near-term pivoting to more targeted aid is appropriate but should be accompanied by a readiness to reactivate broader measures if warranted. Labor market strength, supported bya successful vaccination campaign, and a return of close-to-normal operating conditions for most businesses justify the authorities’ phase-out of economy-wide support. Still, uncertainty about the pandemic remains, validating government decisions to maintain loan guarantees, stretch tax debt repayments and keep support for sectors still subject to restrictions. The authorities should consider relaunching broader policy instruments if substantial downside risks materialize.

41. To guide the economy towards normalization, support for resource reallocation, viable firms, and investment is called for. Factor mobility will benefit from initiatives to support job-seekers and ensure efficient corporate restructuring or insolvency. Besides, unnecessary bankruptcies should be avoided by keeping financial sector policies appropriately set to enable the deployment by banks of available buffers for debt restructuring within established frameworks. In addition, proposals for government engagement with other creditors in restructuring efforts of viable but challenged companies deserve consideration. Public funding for R&D and selected capital projects as well as the establishment of a credit bureau may bolster private investment, strengthening the recovery and lifting medium-term growth.

42. The comfortable fiscal position allows the replenishment of buffers while offering space to foster a resilient, green and inclusive economy. With extraordinary support measures expiring, the budget deficit will decline and vanish by 2025, bringing public debt ratios to about 50 percent of GDP. In addition, ongoing efforts to reform international and capital taxation should continue, and are expected to help reduce the scope for aggressive tax planning. Available room for maneuver should be used to retain the Netherlands’ position among frontier countries in terms of educational outcomes and improve on the school achievements of disadvantaged groups, with the recently announced National Education Plan a promising start. Moreover, remaining an innovation leader will require public spending on basic research. The launch of the National Growth Fund, making R&D one of its target areas, represents an opportunity in this regard but should be complemented by efforts to further develop digitalization and support green technologies, also with the help of Next Generation EU funds.

43. Maintaining financial sector resilience warrants addressing real estate market imbalances and challenges exposed or compounded by the pandemic. In a context of rapidly rising house prices, the activation of risk weight floors for mortgage lending from 2022 is prudent and additional measures to rein in riskier forms of housing debt should be contemplated. Likewise, modifying the income tax framework by trimming further the subsidization of owner-occupied housing would contribute to relieving demand side pressures while tackling long-standing structural rigidities would make supply more elastic. For commercial properties, the authorities should deliberate options to better steer the investment cycle and prevent the build-up of financial stability risks, potentially modelled on policies in place for residential properties. The crisis has underscored the necessity for supervisory vigilance towards undue financial sector risk taking in the low interest rate environment. Moreover, it has highlighted the need for transparency of financial exposures and for ensuring the availability of instruments to target non-bank financial sector risks.

44. Reducing labor market duality, also with the help of ongoing pension reform, would help strengthen productivity growth and resilience to future shocks. Plans to ensure appropriate social protection, particularly for the self-employed, are welcome. They should be complemented by the continued re-alignment of incentive structures across different types of labor contracts, also to incentivize productivity-enhancing training. Implementation of pension reform without further delay will further help deal with modern labor market dynamics, next to addressing issues of intergenerational equity and helping stabilize contribution rates, with positive effects on consumer behavior.

45. The climate change agenda requires strengthening to meet ambitious goals. Despite the adoption of various policy measures, the reduction of emissions seems likely to fall short of the 2030 targets. Given implementation lags, swift action is needed, with resources earmarked in the 2022 budget a positive step. In addition, the reinforcement of sectoral carbon pricing or the introduction of feebates are possible options. For the power sector, gradually shifting from consumer- to producer-based emissions charges should be considered. In the agriculture and building sector careful policy calibration is called for, including to take account of impacts on vulnerable population segments and interactions with structural imbalances, such as in the housing market. Overall, planning and regulation needs to be well-designed, also with an eye to making public sector efforts at greening the economy a catalyst for private investment.

46. It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation take place on the standard 12- month cycle.

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

The Netherlands: Real Growth

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Sources: CBS, DNB, Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations.
Figure 2.
Figure 2.

The Netherlands: Labor Market and Inflation

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Source: CBS, Eurostat, OECD, Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations.
Figure 3.
Figure 3.

The Netherlands: Fiscal Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Source: CBS, CPB, Eurostat,and IMF staff calculations.
Figure 4.
Figure 4.

The Netherlands: Financial Sector Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Figure 5.
Figure 5.

The Netherlands: External Sector Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Table 1.

The Netherlands: Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework, 2017–26

(Growth rates, in percent, unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Dutch official publications, International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, and IMF staff calculations.

Value implied by investment and current account data.

National definition.

ILO definition.

Table 2a.

The Netherlands: General Government Statement of Operations, 2017–26

(Percent of GDP)

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Sources: The Netherlands’ Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), Ministry of Finance, and IM F staff calculations.
Table 2b.

The Netherlands: General Government Statement of Operations, 2017–26

(Billions of Euros)

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Sources: The Netherlands’ Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), Ministry of Finance, and IMF staff calculations.
Table 2c.

The Netherlands: General Government Integrated Balance Sheet, 2012–19

(Percent of GDP)

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Sources: The Netherlands’ Ministry of Finance, and IMF staff calculations.
Table 3.

The Netherlands: External Sector, 2017–26

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: DNB and IMF staff calculations.
Table 4.

The Netherlands: Monetary Survey, 2014–2020

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Sources: International Financial Statistics and IMF Staff.

Annex I. The Dutch Fiscal Framework

The definition of national budgetary rules for a new legislature starts about a year before the new government takes office (Figure 1). The general elections were held on March 17, 2021. Every new general election entails a reassessment of the fiscal framework for the incoming government. The key inputs for this process are the medium-term macroeconomic forecasts and a long-term (intergenerational) sustainability analysis produced byCPB (the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis). Based on CPB forecasts, SBR (a high-level non-partisan advisory group) proposes a set of budgetary objectives for the incoming government. At the beginning of its mandate, the cabinet sets expenditure ceilings for the next four years using CPB forecasts and taking into account SBR’s advice. These fiscal objectives (set within parameters consistent with the Stability and growth Pact) are published in the “Startnota.”

The “Startnota” sets multi-annual net real expenditure ceilings for the state budget, social security, and healthcare. These ceilings are revised annually in the new budget to reflect recent macroeconomic developments and updated forecasts (the ceilings are adjusted for cyclical components of unemployment and social security benefits, inflation, and other statistical corrections). While fiscal revenues are allowed to fluctuate with the cycle (under the constraint of the fiscal balance objective set in the budget memorandum), expenditure ceilings are expected to be respected, although they can be modified when there is political agreement that changes are warranted.

The latest SBR recommendations were made in the context the pandemic. The 16th SBR report, released in November 2020 stressed three priorities for the incoming government. First, to allow full operation of automatic stabilizers and take discretionary fiscal measures to cushion the impact of the pandemic, and to avoid premature fiscal consolidation in the medium-term. Second, to ensure long-term public debt sustainability and to retain buffers against future downturns. Third, to avoid automatic increases in specific expenditure categories (notably in health expenditure) or cuts in tax revenue, while providing room for public investments that support long-term economic growth.

Figure A1.
Figure A1.

The Dutch Fiscal Framework and Election Cycle

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Annex II. External Sector Assessment

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Official statistics attribute certain corporate saving to Dutch shareholders which should more accurately be attributed to foreign investors holding stakes in Dutch companies. The adjustment uses data provided by DNB to correct for this bias. The adjustment is symmetric, as it also estimates saving by non-resident corporations which should be attributed to Dutch investors with stakes in those corporations.

A sizable portion of the CA surplus reflects corporate saving of multinationals based in The Netherlands. Due to the volatility of such savings, the assessment of the EBA-estimated current account gap is particularly uncertain, justifying a wider-than-usual CA range.

Annex III. Risk Assessment Matrix

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Annex IV. Public Debt Sustainability Analysis

Figure A1.
Figure A1.

The Netherlands Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) – Baseline Scenario

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Source: IMF staff.1/ Public sector is defined as general government.2/ Based on available data.3/ Long-term bond spread over German bonds.4/ Defined as interest payments divided by debt stock (excluding guarantees) at the end of previous year.5/ Derived as [(r – π(1+g) – g + ae(1 + r)]/(1 +g+π + gπ)) times previous period debt ratio, with r = interest rate; π = growth rate of GDP deflator; g = real GDP growth rate; a = share of foreign-currency denominated debt; and e = nominal exchange rate depreciation (measured by increase in local currency value of U.S. dollar).6/ The real interest rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 5 as r – n (1 +g) and the real growth contribution as -g.7/ The exchange rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 5 as ae(1 +r).8/ Includes asset changes and interest revenues (if any). For projections, includes exchange rate changes during the projection period.9/ Assumes that key variables (real GDP growth, real interest rate, and other identified debt-creating flows) remain at the level of the last projection year.
Figure A2.
Figure A2.

The Netherlands Public DSA – Composition of Public Debt and Alternative Scenarios

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2021, 243; 10.5089/9781589068735.002.A001

Source: IMF staff.

Annex V. Past IMF Policy Recommendations

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Annex VI. FSAP Recommendations

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Immediately (I) is within one year, near term (NT) is 1–3 years.

1

The Dutch pension system rests on three pi liars, com prising (i) a public, pay-as-you go, scheme guaranteeing a minimum pension, (ii) mandatory occupational schemes as the main form of pension savings, and (iii) voluntary pension savings that are tax-exempt.

2

Official statistics attribute certain corporate saving to Dutch shareholders which should more accurately be attributed to foreign investors holding stakes in Dutch companies. The adjustment uses data provided by DNB to correct for this bias. The adjustment is symmetric, as it also estimates saving by non-resident corporations which should be attributed to Dutch investors with stakes in those corporations (See Selected Issues Paper for the Netherlands 2019 AIV Consultation, IMF Country Report 19/451

3

Higher extraordinary spending in 2021 partly reflects payments for applications received in 2020.

4

Repayments can start in October2022, and businesses have up to five years to fully repaytheir tax debt.

5

A proposal receiving attention is Bastiaan Overvest and Bert Smid, Balansherstel bedriiven na corona (CPB, May 2021); it aims to prevent the state becoming a holdout creditor in restructurings of viable companies.

6

In Q2 2021, the total loan portfolio of Dutch banks was €1,958.9bn. The loans under expired moratoria amounted to €43.7bn, those under active moratoria to €0.7bn, and loans originated undera public guarantee scheme to €3.2bn.

7

The September 2021 projections of Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) are broadly similar to staff forecasts. These projections inform the discussions on the 2022 budget plan.

8

See PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, TNO Energy Transition, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), and the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), 2020. Netherlands Climate and Energy Outlook 2020. Available at: https://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/netherlands-climate-and-energy-outlook-2020-summary.

9

For a detailed discussion, see Batini, N„ S. Black, O. Luca, and I. Parry (2021): “A Comprehensive Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Strategyfor The Netherlands”.

10

For a thorough discussion of issues and policy recommendations,see Klemm, A. et al. (2021): “Capital income taxation in the Netherlands”, IMF Working Paper No. 21/145, 2021.

11

For a more in-depth analysis of residential and commercial real estate markets in the Netherlands as well as associated policy challenges and recommendations,see Geis, A., and O. Luca (2021): “Real estate in the Netherlands: A taxonomy of risks and policy challenges”, IMF Working Paper No. 21/206.

12

To make further progress with the ongoing reduction of the subsidization of owner-occupied housing, the authorities could consider options such as gradually increasing imputed rental income in Box 1 of the income tax or gradually moving the home and its corresponding mortgage to Box 3 (which covers income from assets), complementing the progressive moderation of the deduction of mortgage interest payments. Klemm at al., Op. Cit.

13

The robustness of the Netherlands’AML/CFT framework and its effectiveness is currently being assessed by the Financial Action task Force.

15

The authorities temporarily reduced the minimum liability coverage ratio from 104.2 percent to 100 percent in June 2019, and to 90 percent in December2019. The policy was renewed in December2020 to prevent pro-cyclical benefit cuts. Coverage ratios in the industry strengthened with revaluations of their investment portfolios in 2021.

16

In addition,the agreement foresees a delay from 2021 to 2024 in the planned increase of the retirement age to 67 and will allow new retirees to claim up to 10 percent of their entitlement in a lump sum payment. Moreover, it adjusts the increase in retirement age for every 1 year rise in life expectancy to 8 months from 1 year and allows workers in physically demanding jobs to retire early.

17

See R.Chen (2021): “A Balance-Sheet Analysis of the Dutch Economy,” IMF Working Paper No. 21/255.

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Kingdom of the Netherlands—the Netherlands: 2021 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Kingdom of the Netherlands—the Netherlands
Author:
International Monetary Fund. European Dept.