The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Requests for Purchasing Under the Rapid Financing Instrument, Debt Relief Under the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust, Rephasing of Access Under the Three-year Arrangements Under the Extended Credit Facility and the Extended Fund Facility, and Reduction of Access Under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Requests for Purchasing under the RapidFinancing Instrument, Debt Relief under the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust, Rephasing of Access Under the Three-Year Arrangements under the Extended CreditFacility and the Extended Fund Facility, and Reduction of Access under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Abstract

Requests for Purchasing under the RapidFinancing Instrument, Debt Relief under the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust, Rephasing of Access Under the Three-Year Arrangements under the Extended CreditFacility and the Extended Fund Facility, and Reduction of Access under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Context

1. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the ECF-EFF arrangements had gotten off to a promising start. The authorities met all but one performance criterion for the first review of the ECF-EFF arrangements and are on track toward meeting most structural benchmarks.1 Moreover, a pick-up in the pace of depreciation has contributed to narrowing the spread between the official and parallel exchange rates from 35 percent in mid-November to 27.5 percent as of April 22; the fiscal deficit in the first half of the fiscal year was narrower than programmed amid strong revenues; SOE debt has continued to edge down as a share of GDP as of December 2019; the newly-established T-bill auctions are progressing well; and the NBE has kept monetary conditions tight, though inflation remains close to recent peaks on the back of rising food prices.

2. A decisive policy response has slowed the pandemic, but the virus is spreading, and national elections had to be postponed. At the outset of the global pandemic, the authorities enforced temperature screening at ports of entry and strengthened epidemic response coordination, including by designating isolation and treatment centers and training rapid response teams. When the first case of COVID-19 was identified in Ethiopia on March 12, and the virus started to spread, the authorities closed schools, banned large gatherings, and announced social distancing. In addition, travelers entering Ethiopia became subject to a mandatory 14-day quarantine. As of April 23, 116 cases had been identified—including some without known contacts with foreigners— and three people have died. The authorities indicated that a new timeline for the elections— previously scheduled for August 29—will be announced once the pandemic subsides.

3. The authorities have requested emergency financing to help deal with the unfolding crisis. They have requested a purchase under the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI)—to meet urgent balance of payments needs arising from both the external shock and the needed fiscal policy response to the crisis—as well as debt relief under the Catastrophe Containment (CC) window of the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT). Given their request for RFI financing, and to remain within the GRA normal access limits, the authorities have requested rephasing of future disbursements/purchases under the ECF-EFF arrangements and reducing the second and third EFF purchases, as well as the overall access (by a total of SDR 150.35 million; 50 percent of quota), under the EFF arrangement. In this context, they reaffirmed their commitment to the objectives under the ECF-EFF arrangements. To further free up resources for the COVID-19 response, they also intend to request debt service relief from official bilateral creditors under the G20 initiative.

Outlook and Risks AMID COVID-19

4. The impact of the pandemic on economic activity is projected to be large but temporary. It was initially felt through weakening demand for hospitality services and air transport, with Ethiopian Airlines suspending passenger flight routes and reporting sharp losses. Exports of flowers and manufacturing goods—as well as commodities—such as coffee and oil seeds—were hit hard by falling global demand and/or declining prices. Nevertheless, given Ethiopia’s limited trade integration and exposure to short-term financial flows, the bulk of the impact on activity is expected to result from domestic containment measures as well as lower remittances and foreign direct investment. While the largely rural and subsistence-based agricultural sector will be less affected, secondary and tertiary activities—especially tourism and hospitality services—are expected to be hit across the board. Given the late spread of the pandemic to Ethiopia, the shock would materialize mostly in Q2 and Q3 of 2020—spreading the negative impact on GDP across two fiscal years. Staff revised growth projections from 6.2 and 6.1 percent to 3.2 and 3.7 percent in 2019/20 and 2020/21, respectively, despite significant policy support. The recovery would start gradually in Q4 2020, with real GDP remaining below pre-shock projections throughout the medium-term.

5. External accounts are expected to weaken materially. The current account is projected to strengthen modestly this fiscal year amid a significant decline in imports of goods and services on the back of weak domestic demand and lower project inflows. Falling remittances and the concurrent decline in exports—led by air travel—would less than offset the import contraction amid a substantial strengthening in the terms of trade (including from higher coffee prices and lower global oil prices). However, the overall balance of payments is projected to weaken, on the back of a large drop in foreign direct investment, including due to privatization delays, in part due to the pandemic. As a result, an additional financing gap of US$1.7 billion has emerged for 2019/20 (Text Table 1). In 2020/21, both exports and imports are expected to grow on the back of an incipient recovery, resulting in a deterioration in the trade balance, but an improved services balance and stronger remittances will mitigate the impact on the current account. Privatization revenues will help contain the additional financing gap, which is projected to reach US$731 million.

Text Table 1.

Ethiopia: Additional Balance of Payments Needs Relative to Program Approval

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

article image
Source: IMF staff estimates.

Reflects a correction in staff’s baseline on the timing of principal repayment on one of the underlying debt.

In 2019/20, reflects a move from below the line to above the line in the Balance of Payments.

6. The shock could also worsen bank asset quality and intensify liquidity shortages. Asset quality at the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) remains a concern amid large SOE exposures. While deposit funding in the banking system remains stable to date, both private and public banks are now facing increasing calls from borrowers to delay loan payments, especially in sectors directly affected by the pandemic. This could translate into weakening asset quality and intensified liquidity pressures going forward.

7. Risks are tilted to the downside. A prolonged COVID-19 outbreak in Ethiopia, including protracted containment measures and uncertainty about the intensity and duration of the pandemic, could further deteriorate the outlook, impair balance sheets, threaten debt sustainability, and slow the recovery.2 Widespread social discontent and political instability related to the crisis fallout could complicate the adjustment. Ethiopia is also affected by the worst locust infestation to hit East Africa in decades, though the impact so far seems to be mainly in pastoral regions that are not major food-producing areas. Should it intensify and spread to major crop-producing regions, food shortages could deepen and reignite inflation. Moreover, political instability in the run-up to the elections could delay the implementation of reforms.

Economic Policies to Combat the COVID Crisis

Key policy objectives in the near term include (i) providing the health sector with sufficient resources to combat the pandemic, (ii) augmenting the spending envelope, and allowing for a temporarily wider fiscal deficit, to support the economy and protect the most vulnerable during the downturn; (iii) accelerating the pace of exchange rate depreciation to support activity; (iv) addressing tight liquidity conditions in commercial banks to prepare for a potential deterioration in asset quality; and (v) progressing with key commitments under the ECF-EFF arrangements.

A. Fiscal Policy

8. The authorities are loosening the fiscal stance temporarily to combat the pandemic and support the most vulnerable. The initial response included a health sector support package— including to fund medical supplies, facilities, and to cut trade taxes for medical goods—amounting to 5 billion birr (US$154 million; 0.15 percent of GDP) in spending (Box 1). The package is expected to be funded by reallocating budgetary funds away from uncommitted investment projects. On April 3, the authorities announced that additional spending needs during the remainder of the fiscal year would total $1.64 billion (1.6 percent of GDP). They indicated that the bulk of the outlays would be channeled toward emergency food distribution (0.6 percent of GDP) and health sector support (0.4 percent of GDP).3 With tax revenues declining due to the downturn, and despite higher-than-expected grants, the 2019/20 general government deficit would increase by 1½ percent of GDP to 4 percent of GDP. To partially offset the impact of the wider deficit on public sector debt, the authorities should consider making space by constraining spending of SOEs that are not engaged in implementing emergency response measures to the pandemic.

Economic Policy Response to COVID-19

The authorities have established an inter-ministerial task force chaired by the Prime Minister to coordinate preventative and response measures to mitigate the impact of COVID-19. They announced an initial package to bolster healthcare spending in early March, followed by a set of measures aimed at stabilizing the economy at end-March. The authorities have also published an estimate for the total cost of the pandemic for the remainder of the fiscal year.

Initial healthcare measures. The authorities announced a 300-million-birr package to bolster healthcare spending (funding for health facilities, trade tax cuts for medical imports) in early March. On March 23, the package was augmented to 5 billion birr (US$154 million or 0.15 percent of GDP), to be funded largely through reallocations within the budget.

Initial stabilization measures. The authorities announced a set of measures to counter the economic impact of COVID-19 on March 27. It includes:

  • Tax exemptions and preferential access to currency for importers of materials and equipment to be used in the prevention and containment of COVID-19.

  • NBE liquidity support of 15 billion birr (US$457 million or 0.45 percent of GDP) to private banks by redeeming NBE bills (associated with the abolished “27 percent rule”) to facilitate debt restructuring.

  • Increased mobile banking transfer limits at the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia to limit in-person transactions.

  • Intensified enforcement action against businesses found to be illegally increasing consumer prices.

Spending measures for the remainder of 2019/20. On April 3, the authorities announced that the multi-sector emergency response plan to be implemented over the next three months will require US$1.64 billion in funding (about 1.6 percent of GDP). The funds are expected to be allocated as follows:

  • US$635 million (0.6 percent of GDP) for emergency food distribution to 15 million individuals vulnerable to food insecurity and not currently covered by the rural and urban PSNPs.

  • US$430 million (0.4 percent of GDP) for health sector response under a worst-case scenario of community spread with over 100,000 Covid-19 cases of infection in the country, primarily in urban areas.

  • US$282 million (0.3 percent of GDP) for provision of emergency shelter and non-food items.

  • The remainder (US$293 million, 0.3 percent of GDP) would be allocated to agricultural sector support, nutrition, the protection of vulnerable groups, additional education outlays, logistics, refugee support and site management support.

9. Staff supports relaxing the fiscal stance to address the pandemic. Tax revenues are projected to drop by nearly ¾ percent of GDP relative to 2018/19 due to the severity of the shock. This is expected to more than offset the revenue overperformance in the first half of the fiscal year. While staff expects grant receipts to come in ¾ percent of GDP higher than previously anticipated, higher spending and lower tax revenues are projected to result in a fiscal financing gap of 1.4 percent of GDP, to be financed through budget support under the RFI (0.4 percent of GDP) as well as unidentified financing from donors and domestic banks (1 percent of GDP). Staff emphasized the need to continue reassessing spending needs and to prepare for potential SOE-related contingent liabilities. Staff welcomed the authorities’ commitment to a transparent and accountable delivery of these policy measures, including through an independent and robust ex-post audit of how emergency relief funds are spent.

10. Fiscal consolidation is expected to resume in 2021/22. The authorities remain committed to introducing measures to raise tax revenues for 2020/21 by 1 percentage point of GDP. In the event that the pandemic renders this difficult, staff would support delaying implementation until the crisis abates and then introducing them in a supplementary budget law. Spending needs to counter the pandemic are expected to amount to 0.9 percent of GDP. With slightly higher grants than previously projected (0.1 percent of GDP), the deficit would increase to 3½ percent of GDP, 1¼ percent of GDP higher than anticipated at the approval of the ECF-EFF arrangements in December. The deficit is projected to return to its previously projected path by 2021/22.

11. Public debt is projected to remain sustainable although downside risks and liquidity pressures have increased. The authorities aim to strengthen Ethiopia’s debt position to help improve the external debt distress rating to “moderate” over the course of the ECF-EFF arrangements. However, downside risks have increased. The authorities have made progress on the first phase of reprofiling but have yet to finalize it (it is included in the baseline scenario). Progress on the second phase is uncertain, but staff emphasized the need to get specific and credible assurances ahead of the first review, taking into account the implications of the COVID-19 shock for the needed relief. The joint World Bank–IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) shows that debt is sustainable. However, liquidity pressures to service external debt have increased, the room to absorb shocks is now smaller than at program approval due to lower export projections, and a large or more persistent impact of the COVID-19 shock than presently assumed could further worsen the outlook. On the domestic front, public debt remains vulnerable to contingent liability shocks, including those stemming from public banks. Despite severe losses due to COVID-19, Ethiopian Airlines intends to continue servicing its debt and does not have plans to seek government support.

Text Table 2.

Ethiopia: Additional Fiscal Needs in 2019/20 and 2020/211

(In percent of GDP)

article image
Sources: Ethiopian authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Government financial statistics are reported by the authorities based on GFSM 1986.

Excluding special programs (demobilization and reconstruction).

Poverty-reducing spending is defined to include total spending on health, education, agriculture, roads, and food security.

Includes prospective donor financing to close the financing gap.

Reflects privatization receipts net of financial investments or recapitalization on SOEs.

Including grants and excluding requested IMF RFI.

B. Monetary, Exchange Rate, and Financial Sector Policies

12. Staff agrees with the need to ensure adequate commercial bank liquidity buffers. The NBE injected 15 billion birr (0.45 percent of GDP) into private banks in March by redeeming NBE bills (Box 1). The measure aimed at addressing tight liquidity conditions that had arisen prior to COVID-19 and aids banks in repaying some of the 1-month loans previously provided through the Individual Bank Lending Facility—introduced in February—for the same purpose. The NBE is also planning to extend 16 billion birr (0.5 percent of GDP) in liquidity to the CBE. Staff supported the decision to build adequate liquidity buffers but emphasized the need to ensure that NBE lending to the CBE reflects the terms available to private banks and avoids implicit solvency support. Structural weaknesses in CBE’s balance sheet should be dealt with through a comprehensive solution that addresses debt sustainability challenges at its SOE borrowers.

13. Staff urged the authorities to closely monitor the impact of COVID-19 on financial stability. The authorities are encouraging banks to reschedule loan repayments, currently on a case-by-case basis, but have not changed loan classification rules. Staff recommended close monitoring of liquidity positions, loan-to-deposit ratios, and asset quality. In particular, there is an urgent need to step up monitoring of deposits and bank liquidity, as well as frequent supervisory review and reassessment of banks’ loan portfolios during the crisis. Staff also emphasized the need to consider policy options to deal with potential further bank liquidity shortages, such as strengthening the framework for emergency lending and adjusting reserve requirements.

14. Continued vigilance is needed to ensure that the single-digit inflation objective will be achieved as planned. While it is difficult to predict how the COVID-19 shock will affect the inflation trajectory, staff and the authorities agreed that it will be important to adjust the policy stance as needed to ensure that the single-digit inflation objective can be achieved once the crisis abates. The planned liquidity injections (discussed above) aim at achieving financial stability objectives but will also expand reserve money beyond the levels projected at the time of the ECF-EFF approval. Consequently, and also in view of the upward revision of the near-term inflation path—reflecting higher-than-expected inflation outturns in recent months—a significant tightening of policy will be needed when conditions normalize to bring inflation down to the authorities’ single-digit objective as anticipated at ECF-EFF approval. In the meantime, first-round effects from the crisis should be accommodated.

15. Staff urged the authorities to increase the pace of exchange rate depreciation. Increasing the pace of depreciation would help reduce real overvaluation and act as a shock absorber during the crisis. The authorities underscored continued commitment to closing the gap with the parallel rate to eventually move to a market-clearing exchange rate but signaled a need to continue moving with caution.

16. The authorities remain committed to the objectives of the ECF-EFF arrangements. While much of the focus in the near term will be on responding to the fallout of the crisis, the authorities underscored that they will continue to further the reform agenda. They highlighted their commitment to gradually ending financial repression by increasing T-bill issuances, ceasing new NBE financing to the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) in June, and gradually reducing direct NBE advances to the government. They also remain committed to implementing the FX roadmap to be finalized by end-April to lay the groundwork for an eventual move to a market-clearing exchange rate. Dealing comprehensively with debt sustainability challenges in the SOEs to strengthen bank balance sheets will also be key. Finally, the authorities remain committed to strengthening governance under the ECF-EFF arrangements.4

Modalities of Support

17. The authorities request a purchase under the RFI equivalent to 100 percent of quota, provided that the Executive Board approves the request for a rephasing of access under the ECF-EFF arrangements and a reduction of access under the EFF arrangement. Current and prospective access under Ethiopia’s existing ECF arrangement does not leave any space for borrowing under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF), given the hard cap on cumulative exceptional access to PRGT resources. Given their urgent needs, the authorities are therefore requesting a purchase under the RFI regular window in the amount of 100 percent of quota (SDR 300.7 million, about US$ 415 million). They have also requested that access be made available entirely as budget support. The urgent balance of payments difficulties that led the authorities to request access under the RFI were caused primarily by the COVID-19 shock. The purchase would provide support to address these needs and would help avoid a sharper drop in international reserves.

18. Given their request for the RFI purchase, and to remain within the normal General Resources Account (GRA) access limits, the authorities request a rephasing of access under the ECF-EFF arrangements and a reduction of access under the EFF arrangement (by SDR 150.35 million; 50 percent of quota). Under the applicable policies on annual access limits for financing via the GRA, Ethiopia’s access in the first 12 months since the approval of the ECF-EFF arrangements is limited to 145 percent of quota (including prospective purchases). With 90 percent of quota in EFF access already approved or available in this period, an additional 100 percent of quota in RFI access can only be accommodated through a reduction of access for the second and third disbursements under the EFF arrangement, and the resulting reduction in overall access. The requested reduction in access would bring total access to GRA resources under the EFF arrangement to 250 percent of quota. The authorities are also requesting rephasing of future disbursements/purchases (the third and subsequent ECF-EFF disbursements), given delays in the first review discussions resulting from COVID-19 and to comply with limits on annual access to the GRA, which will allow to accommodate the RFI purchase within the normal GRA annual access limit.

19. The authorities also request debt relief under the CCRT. Ethiopia is PRGT eligible and meets the income threshold with GNI per capita of US$790 in 2018, below the threshold of US$1,175. Ethiopia has eligible debt service of SDR 8.56 million falling due during the initial period of debt service relief until October 13, 2020 (Table 5). Its eligible debt service falling due amounts to SDR 14 million between the CCRT request approval date and April 13, 2022 (the maximum potential period of debt service relief, subject to availability of resources and decisions of the Executive Board).

20. Ethiopia’s capacity to repay the Fund is assessed to be adequate. Considering the proposed access under the RFI and the modified access under the ECF-EFF arrangements, debt service to the Fund will peak at 0.3 percent of GDP, 2.9 percent of exports, and 1.7 percent of revenues in 2027/28. These ratios are broadly unchanged compared to those at the time of ECF-EFF approval and compare favorably with other high access programs in recent years. However, the outstanding Fund credit to gross reserves ratio would now peak at 41.3 percent in 2021/22, compared to 32.7 percent at the time of the approval of the ECF-EFF arrangements. The authorities will establish a memorandum of understanding between the central bank and the ministry of finance, that clarifies responsibilities for timely servicing of the financial obligations to the IMF.

21. An updated safeguards assessment of the NBE is underway. Initial findings suggest that amendments to the NBE Law are needed to address governance and autonomy weaknesses, strengthen oversight, and to improve financial reporting and external audit arrangements. Moreover, fiscal dominance has weakened the financial position of the central bank, the preparation of annual financial statements is significantly delayed, and the external auditor has an unusually long tenure, which raises concerns about their independence as well as about audit quality (in light of unmodified (clean) audit opinions despite shortcomings in the financial reporting practices in past years). The framework for emergency liquidity support to banks is also underdeveloped. Staff has recommended to the authorities to take steps to address these shortcomings.

Staff Appraisal

22. Ethiopia faces a pronounced economic slowdown and an urgent balance of payments need as a result of the pandemic. COVID-19 is affecting Ethiopia through both global spillovers and domestic containment measures. Economic growth projections have been revised down substantially for this fiscal year and next.

23. Staff welcomes the swift policy response to contain the virus and limit the human and economic fallout. Beyond strengthening the health system’s ability to respond to the pandemic, the authorities have moved decisively to contain the virus and have announced a set of measures to limit the pandemic’s impact on the economy and to support vulnerable households.

24. Staff supports expanding the fiscal deficit on a temporary basis, within the framework of a continued commitment to strengthen debt sustainability. The increase in the spending envelope is appropriately targeted toward dealing with the fallout of the crisis, and the authorities highlighted that these needs are temporary. The authorities should continue their efforts to finalize the first phase of debt relief, and secure credible assurances for the second phase, ahead of the first review of the ECF-EFF arrangements.

25. Strengthening bank liquidity will help prepare for the expected slowdown. Targeted liquidity provision to ensure adequate bank liquidity buffers is needed in the face of the crisis. Structural weaknesses in the systemically important bank’s balance sheet should be dealt with through a comprehensive solution that addresses debt sustainability challenges in its state-owned enterprise borrowers.

26. The authorities should continue to gear monetary policy toward achieving the single-digit inflation objective. While it is difficult to predict how the COVID-19 shock will affect the inflation trajectory, it will be important to adjust the policy stance as needed to ensure that the single-digit inflation objective can be achieved.

27. Staff also welcomes the authorities’ continued commitment to the objectives of the ECF-EFF arrangements. Discussions on the first review of the arrangement have been delayed amid the heightened uncertainty. While a shift toward proactively dealing with the fallout of the crisis is needed in the near term, the authorities should continue working toward their commitments under the ECF-EFF arrangements and implement the reform agenda as conditions permit.

28. Staff supports the following requests from the authorities:

  • Request for a purchase under the Rapid Financing Instrument in the amount of SDR 300.7 million (100 percent of quota), provided that the Executive Board approves the request for a rephasing of the ECF-EFF arrangements. Staff support is based on the severity of the impact of the pandemic, the authorities’ existing and prospective policies to address this external shock, the urgent balance of payments need, and the authorities’ policy commitments to the objectives of the ECF-EFF arrangements. Staff also supports the authorities’ request to use this financing as budget support as the additional financing need results primarily from outlays on healthcare and social protection to face the COVID-19 shock.

  • Rephasing of access under the ECF-EFF arrangements and reduction of access under the EFF arrangement (by SDR 150.35 million; 50 percent of quota). The rephasing of access under the ECF-EFF arrangements, and the reduction of access under the EFF arrangement, would allow for an RFI purchase up to the maximum limit to deal with Ethiopia’s urgent balance of payments needs while remaining within the normal GRA access limits.

  • Request for debt relief under the CCRT. Ethiopia is eligible for the debt relief and staff assesses that Ethiopia faces exceptional balance of payments needs stemming from the impact of COVID-19 and is pursuing appropriate macroeconomic policies to address the disaster.

Table 1.

Ethiopia: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2017/18–2024/25

article image
Sources: Ethiopian authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

For 2015/16 and earlier, based on December 2011 base; for all subsequent data and projections, the base is December 2016.

Based on data from Central Statistical Agency (CSA), except for the current account balance, which is based on BOP data from National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE).

Public and publicly-guaranteed external debt, which includes long-term foreign liabilities of the NBE and external debt of Ethio-Telecom.

Table 2a.

Ethiopia: General Government Operations, 2017/18–2024/251

(Millions of birr)

article image
Sources: Ethiopian authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Government financial statistics are reported by the authorities based on GFSM 1986.

Excluding special programs (demobilization and reconstruction).

Poverty-reducing spending is defined to include total spending on health, education, agriculture, roads, and food security.

External interest and amortization are presented after HIPC debt relief from the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

Includes prospective donor financing to close the financing gap.

Reflects privatization receipts net of financial investments or recapitalization on SOEs.

Including grants and excluding requested IMF RFI.

Table 2b.

Ethiopia: General Government Operations, 2017/18–2024/251

(Percent of GDP)

article image
Sources: Ethiopian authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections. The Ethiopian fiscal year ends July 7.

Government financial statistics are reported by the authorities based on GFSM 1986.

Excluding special programs (demobilization and reconstruction).

Poverty-reducing spending is defined to include total spending on health, education, agriculture, roads, and food security.

External interest and amortization are presented after HIPC debt relief from the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

Includes prospective donor financing to close the financing gap.

Reflects privatization receipts net of financial investments or recapitalization on SOEs.

Including grants and excluding requested IMF RFI.

Table 3.

Ethiopia: Monetary Survey and Central Bank Accounts, 2017/18–2024/25

article image
Sources: NBE and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Claims on the general government by the banking system less deposits of the general government with the banking system.