Abstract
Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Samoa
| Risk of external debt distress | High2 |
| Overall risk of debt distress | High |
| Granularity in the risk rating | Sustainable |
| Application of judgment | Yes–The forecast horizon informing mechanical risk signals is extended to 20 years to capture the long-term impact of frequent natural disasters on climate change. |
| Macroeconomic projections | The economy is expected to contract in FY2020–21. Primary deficit widens significantly in FY2020–21, followed by a gradual recovery as opposed to a stable path in 2019 DSA. Tourism earnings are expected to plummet in FY2020–21, widening the current account deficit and pushing reserves well below the adequate level. |
| Financing strategy | While the RCF will help finance BOP needs, the fiscal financing gap will be filled by external grants and concessional borrowing. |
| Realism tools flagged | None |
| Mechanical risk rating under | Moderate |
| the external DSA | |
| Mechanical risk rating under | High |
| the public DSA |
| Risk of external debt distress | High2 |
| Overall risk of debt distress | High |
| Granularity in the risk rating | Sustainable |
| Application of judgment | Yes–The forecast horizon informing mechanical risk signals is extended to 20 years to capture the long-term impact of frequent natural disasters on climate change. |
| Macroeconomic projections | The economy is expected to contract in FY2020–21. Primary deficit widens significantly in FY2020–21, followed by a gradual recovery as opposed to a stable path in 2019 DSA. Tourism earnings are expected to plummet in FY2020–21, widening the current account deficit and pushing reserves well below the adequate level. |
| Financing strategy | While the RCF will help finance BOP needs, the fiscal financing gap will be filled by external grants and concessional borrowing. |
| Realism tools flagged | None |
| Mechanical risk rating under | Moderate |
| the external DSA | |
| Mechanical risk rating under | High |
| the public DSA |
Samoa remains at high-risk of external and overall public debt distress, while the baseline macro framework is further deteriorated compared to the May 2019 DSA due to the inclusion of the impacts of COVID-19. Under the baseline scenario, both the PV of external and public debt-to-GDP ratios incur threshold breaches in 2035 and 2028, respectively. While a model-based risk rating of external debt is moderate, judgement was applied to arrive at a high-risk rating to capture the long-term impact of frequent natural disasters on climate change. In addition, the real GDP growth shock under the standard stress test, a tailored natural disaster shock similar in scale to the median impact of natural disasters in Samoa’s history, and a contingent liability shock further deteriorates debt sustainability. Despite the high risk of debt distress, Samoa’s debt remains sustainable. This assessment hinges upon the government’s efforts to build fiscal buffers and enhance resilience, as well as continued access to grants and concessional financing. A mix of stronger revenue mobilization measures, and expenditure rationalization in a growth-friendly, sustainable manner will create synergies for maintaining debt sustainability.
Samoa: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt under Alternative Scenarios, 2020–40 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2020, 138; 10.5089/9781513542409.002.A002
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2030. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most exterme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.2/ The magnitude of shocks used for the commodity price shock stress test are based on the commodity prices outlook prepared by the IMF research department.
Samoa: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt under Alternative Scenarios, 2020–40 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2020, 138; 10.5089/9781513542409.002.A002
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2030. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most exterme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.2/ The magnitude of shocks used for the commodity price shock stress test are based on the commodity prices outlook prepared by the IMF research department.Samoa: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt under Alternative Scenarios, 2020–40 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2020, 138; 10.5089/9781513542409.002.A002
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2030. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most exterme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.2/ The magnitude of shocks used for the commodity price shock stress test are based on the commodity prices outlook prepared by the IMF research department.
Samoa: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2020–40 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2020, 138; 10.5089/9781513542409.002.A002
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2030. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most exterme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.
Samoa: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2020–40 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2020, 138; 10.5089/9781513542409.002.A002
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2030. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most exterme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.Samoa: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2020–40 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2020, 138; 10.5089/9781513542409.002.A002
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2030. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most exterme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.
Samoa: Drivers of Debt Dynamics–Baseline Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2020, 138; 10.5089/9781513542409.002.A002
1/ Difference between anticipated and actual contributions on debt ratios.2/ Distribution across LICs for which LIC DSAs were produced.3/ Given the relatively low private external debt for average low-income countries, a ppt change in PPG external debt should be largely explained by the drivers of the external debt dynamics equation.
Samoa: Drivers of Debt Dynamics–Baseline Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2020, 138; 10.5089/9781513542409.002.A002
1/ Difference between anticipated and actual contributions on debt ratios.2/ Distribution across LICs for which LIC DSAs were produced.3/ Given the relatively low private external debt for average low-income countries, a ppt change in PPG external debt should be largely explained by the drivers of the external debt dynamics equation.Samoa: Drivers of Debt Dynamics–Baseline Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2020, 138; 10.5089/9781513542409.002.A002
1/ Difference between anticipated and actual contributions on debt ratios.2/ Distribution across LICs for which LIC DSAs were produced.3/ Given the relatively low private external debt for average low-income countries, a ppt change in PPG external debt should be largely explained by the drivers of the external debt dynamics equation.
Samoa: Realism Tools
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2020, 138; 10.5089/9781513542409.002.A002
Samoa: Realism Tools
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2020, 138; 10.5089/9781513542409.002.A002
Samoa: Realism Tools
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2020, 138; 10.5089/9781513542409.002.A002
Table 1.Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ Includes both public and private sector external debt.2/ Derived as [r – g – ρ(1+g) + Ɛα (1+r)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms, Ɛ=nominal appreciation of the local currency, and α= share of local currency-denominated external debt in total external debt.3/ Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes.4/ Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.5/ Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.6/ Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).7/ Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.8/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.
Samoa: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2017–40
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
Table 1.
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ Includes both public and private sector external debt.2/ Derived as [r – g – ρ(1+g) + Ɛα (1+r)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms, Ɛ=nominal appreciation of the local currency, and α= share of local currency-denominated external debt in total external debt.3/ Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes.4/ Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.5/ Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.6/ Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).7/ Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.8/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.
Samoa: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2017–40
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
 |
Table 1.
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ Includes both public and private sector external debt.2/ Derived as [r – g – ρ(1+g) + Ɛα (1+r)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms, Ɛ=nominal appreciation of the local currency, and α= share of local currency-denominated external debt in total external debt.3/ Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes.4/ Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.5/ Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.6/ Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).7/ Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.8/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.
Samoa: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2017–40
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
|
Table 2.Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ Coverage of debt: The central government plus social security, government-guaranteed debt. Definition of external debt is Residency-based.2/ The underlying PV of external debt-to-GDP ratio under the public DSA differs from the external DSA with the size of differences depending on exchange rates projections.3/ Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term, and short-term debt.4/ Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period and other debt creating/reducing flows.5/ Defined as a primary deficit minus a change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio ((-): a primary surplus), which would stabilizes the debt ratio only in the year in question.6/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.
Samoa: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2017–40
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
Table 2.
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ Coverage of debt: The central government plus social security, government-guaranteed debt. Definition of external debt is Residency-based.2/ The underlying PV of external debt-to-GDP ratio under the public DSA differs from the external DSA with the size of differences depending on exchange rates projections.3/ Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term, and short-term debt.4/ Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period and other debt creating/reducing flows.5/ Defined as a primary deficit minus a change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio ((-): a primary surplus), which would stabilizes the debt ratio only in the year in question.6/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.
Samoa: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2017–40
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
 |
Table 2.
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ Coverage of debt: The central government plus social security, government-guaranteed debt. Definition of external debt is Residency-based.2/ The underlying PV of external debt-to-GDP ratio under the public DSA differs from the external DSA with the size of differences depending on exchange rates projections.3/ Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term, and short-term debt.4/ Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period and other debt creating/reducing flows.5/ Defined as a primary deficit minus a change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio ((-): a primary surplus), which would stabilizes the debt ratio only in the year in question.6/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.
Samoa: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2017–40
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
|
Table 3.Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.
Samoa: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2020–40
(In percent)
A bold value indicates a breach of the threshold.
Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.
Includes official and private transfers and FDI.
Table 3.
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.
Samoa: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2020–40
(In percent)
| Projections 1/ | |||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 | 2036 | 2037 | 2038 | 2039 | 2040 | |
| PV of debt-to GDP ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 33 | 39 | 42 | 44 | 44 | 43 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 51 | 53 | 54 | 56 | 57 | 59 | 60 | 62 | 63 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | 33 | 36 | 41 | 44 | 46 | 49 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 63 | 64 |
| 0 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 33 | 41 | 47 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 57 | 59 | 61 | 62 | 64 | 66 | 68 | 69 | 71 |
| B2. Primary balance | 33 | 40 | 44 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 54 | 56 | 57 | 59 | 61 | 62 | 64 | 65 | 67 |
| B3. Exports | 33 | 41 | 46 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 48 | 50 | 51 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 55 | 56 | 58 | 59 | 61 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 67 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 33 | 42 | 47 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 53 | 54 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 60 | 61 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 66 |
| B5. Depreciation | 33 | 49 | 48 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 58 | 60 | 62 | 65 | 67 | 69 | 72 | 74 | 75 | 78 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 33 | 41 | 46 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 56 | 57 | 59 | 60 | 62 | 64 | 65 | 67 | 68 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 33 | 42 | 44 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 51 | 53 | 55 | 56 | 58 | 60 | 62 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 68 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 33 | 48 | 52 | 54 | 54 | 55 | 57 | 59 | 60 | 62 | 64 | 66 | 68 | 71 | 74 | 76 | 79 | 82 | 84 | 86 | 89 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Threshold | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 |
| PV of debt-to-exports ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 114 | 140 | 138 | 139 | 135 | 131 | 151 | 154 | 157 | 160 | 162 | 167 | 172 | 178 | 183 | 188 | 194 | 200 | 204 | 209 | 214 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0 | 114 | 131 | 135 | 141 | 143 | 146 | 167 | 169 | 172 | 174 | 176 | 179 | 183 | 187 | 191 | 195 | 199 | 203 | 208 | 212 | 217 |
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 114 | 140 | 138 | 139 | 135 | 131 | 151 | 154 | 157 | 160 | 162 | 167 | 172 | 178 | 183 | 188 | 194 | 200 | 204 | 209 | 214 |
| B2. Primary balance | 114 | 144 | 146 | 147 | 143 | 139 | 160 | 163 | 167 | 170 | 172 | 177 | 183 | 188 | 194 | 199 | 205 | 211 | 215 | 220 | 225 |
| B3. Exports | 114 | 151 | 160 | 161 | 156 | 151 | 174 | 178 | 182 | 185 | 187 | 191 | 197 | 202 | 208 | 213 | 219 | 225 | 230 | 234 | 239 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 114 | 150 | 156 | 157 | 152 | 148 | 170 | 173 | 177 | 179 | 180 | 184 | 189 | 193 | 198 | 202 | 207 | 212 | 215 | 219 | 223 |
| B5. Depreciation | 114 | 140 | 126 | 128 | 124 | 120 | 139 | 142 | 145 | 148 | 150 | 156 | 162 | 168 | 173 | 179 | 186 | 192 | 197 | 202 | 208 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 114 | 149 | 145 | 153 | 148 | 144 | 165 | 169 | 173 | 175 | 177 | 182 | 187 | 192 | 198 | 203 | 208 | 214 | 219 | 223 | 228 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 114 | 149 | 147 | 148 | 144 | 139 | 161 | 164 | 168 | 171 | 174 | 179 | 185 | 190 | 196 | 202 | 208 | 215 | 219 | 224 | 230 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 114 | 179 | 176 | 178 | 175 | 171 | 199 | 205 | 211 | 217 | 222 | 230 | 239 | 248 | 257 | 266 | 275 | 285 | 293 | 301 | 310 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Threshold | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 |
| Debt service-to-exports ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 |
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 |
| B2. Primary balance | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| B3. Exports | 11 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 17 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| B5. Depreciation | 11 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 11 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 17 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 11 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Threshold | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 |
| Debt service-to-revenue ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 15 | 17 | 14 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0 | 15 | 16 | 14 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 |
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 15 | 18 | 16 | 14 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 |
| B2. Primary balance | 15 | 17 | 15 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 |
| B3. Exports | 15 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 15 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| B5. Depreciation | 15 | 21 | 18 | 15 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 18 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 15 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 15 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 15 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Threshold | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 |
A bold value indicates a breach of the threshold.
Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.
Includes official and private transfers and FDI.
Table 3.
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.
Samoa: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2020–40
(In percent)
| Projections 1/ | |||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 | 2036 | 2037 | 2038 | 2039 | 2040 | |
| PV of debt-to GDP ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 33 | 39 | 42 | 44 | 44 | 43 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 51 | 53 | 54 | 56 | 57 | 59 | 60 | 62 | 63 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | 33 | 36 | 41 | 44 | 46 | 49 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 63 | 64 |
| 0 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 33 | 41 | 47 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 57 | 59 | 61 | 62 | 64 | 66 | 68 | 69 | 71 |
| B2. Primary balance | 33 | 40 | 44 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 54 | 56 | 57 | 59 | 61 | 62 | 64 | 65 | 67 |
| B3. Exports | 33 | 41 | 46 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 48 | 50 | 51 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 55 | 56 | 58 | 59 | 61 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 67 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 33 | 42 | 47 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 53 | 54 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 60 | 61 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 66 |
| B5. Depreciation | 33 | 49 | 48 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 58 | 60 | 62 | 65 | 67 | 69 | 72 | 74 | 75 | 78 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 33 | 41 | 46 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 56 | 57 | 59 | 60 | 62 | 64 | 65 | 67 | 68 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 33 | 42 | 44 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 51 | 53 | 55 | 56 | 58 | 60 | 62 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 68 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 33 | 48 | 52 | 54 | 54 | 55 | 57 | 59 | 60 | 62 | 64 | 66 | 68 | 71 | 74 | 76 | 79 | 82 | 84 | 86 | 89 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Threshold | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 |
| PV of debt-to-exports ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 114 | 140 | 138 | 139 | 135 | 131 | 151 | 154 | 157 | 160 | 162 | 167 | 172 | 178 | 183 | 188 | 194 | 200 | 204 | 209 | 214 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0 | 114 | 131 | 135 | 141 | 143 | 146 | 167 | 169 | 172 | 174 | 176 | 179 | 183 | 187 | 191 | 195 | 199 | 203 | 208 | 212 | 217 |
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 114 | 140 | 138 | 139 | 135 | 131 | 151 | 154 | 157 | 160 | 162 | 167 | 172 | 178 | 183 | 188 | 194 | 200 | 204 | 209 | 214 |
| B2. Primary balance | 114 | 144 | 146 | 147 | 143 | 139 | 160 | 163 | 167 | 170 | 172 | 177 | 183 | 188 | 194 | 199 | 205 | 211 | 215 | 220 | 225 |
| B3. Exports | 114 | 151 | 160 | 161 | 156 | 151 | 174 | 178 | 182 | 185 | 187 | 191 | 197 | 202 | 208 | 213 | 219 | 225 | 230 | 234 | 239 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 114 | 150 | 156 | 157 | 152 | 148 | 170 | 173 | 177 | 179 | 180 | 184 | 189 | 193 | 198 | 202 | 207 | 212 | 215 | 219 | 223 |
| B5. Depreciation | 114 | 140 | 126 | 128 | 124 | 120 | 139 | 142 | 145 | 148 | 150 | 156 | 162 | 168 | 173 | 179 | 186 | 192 | 197 | 202 | 208 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 114 | 149 | 145 | 153 | 148 | 144 | 165 | 169 | 173 | 175 | 177 | 182 | 187 | 192 | 198 | 203 | 208 | 214 | 219 | 223 | 228 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 114 | 149 | 147 | 148 | 144 | 139 | 161 | 164 | 168 | 171 | 174 | 179 | 185 | 190 | 196 | 202 | 208 | 215 | 219 | 224 | 230 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 114 | 179 | 176 | 178 | 175 | 171 | 199 | 205 | 211 | 217 | 222 | 230 | 239 | 248 | 257 | 266 | 275 | 285 | 293 | 301 | 310 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Threshold | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 |
| Debt service-to-exports ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 |
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 |
| B2. Primary balance | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| B3. Exports | 11 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 17 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| B5. Depreciation | 11 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 11 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 17 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 11 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Threshold | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 |
| Debt service-to-revenue ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 15 | 17 | 14 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0 | 15 | 16 | 14 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 |
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 15 | 18 | 16 | 14 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 |
| B2. Primary balance | 15 | 17 | 15 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 |
| B3. Exports | 15 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 15 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| B5. Depreciation | 15 | 21 | 18 | 15 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 18 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 15 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 15 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 15 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Threshold | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 |
A bold value indicates a breach of the threshold.
Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.
Includes official and private transfers and FDI.
Table 4.Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.
Samoa: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt, 2020–40
In percent
A bold value indicates a breach of the benchmark.
Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator and primary deficit in percent of GDP.
Includes official and private transfers and FDI.
Table 4.
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.
Samoa: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt, 2020–40
In percent
| Projections 1/ | |||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 | 2036 | 2037 | 2038 | 2039 | 2040 | |
| PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 45 | 52 | 56 | 59 | 60 | 62 | 65 | 68 | 72 | 76 | 81 | 85 | 91 | 96 | 102 | 108 | 114 | 120 | 127 | 133 | 140 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | 45 | 48 | 50 | 53 | 55 | 58 | 61 | 65 | 69 | 73 | 78 | 83 | 88 | 93 | 99 | 105 | 112 | 118 | 125 | 132 | 140 |
| 0 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 45 | 56 | 66 | 71 | 75 | 79 | 86 | 92 | 100 | 107 | 115 | 124 | 133 | 142 | 152 | 162 | 172 | 183 | 193 | 204 | 215 |
| B2. Primary balance | 45 | 54 | 60 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 70 | 73 | 77 | 81 | 86 | 91 | 96 | 102 | 108 | 114 | 120 | 126 | 133 | 139 | 146 |
| B3. Exports | 45 | 53 | 58 | 61 | 63 | 64 | 67 | 71 | 74 | 78 | 83 | 88 | 93 | 98 | 104 | 110 | 116 | 122 | 128 | 135 | 141 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 45 | 55 | 62 | 65 | 66 | 67 | 70 | 74 | 78 | 82 | 86 | 91 | 96 | 101 | 106 | 112 | 118 | 124 | 130 | 136 | 143 |
| B5. Depreciation | 45 | 58 | 59 | 59 | 58 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 61 | 62 | 64 | 67 | 70 | 73 | 76 | 80 | 84 | 88 | 92 | 97 | 101 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 45 | 54 | 59 | 62 | 64 | 66 | 69 | 73 | 78 | 82 | 87 | 93 | 99 | 105 | 111 | 117 | 124 | 131 | 138 | 145 | 153 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 45 | 57 | 61 | 64 | 65 | 67 | 70 | 74 | 77 | 82 | 86 | 91 | 97 | 102 | 108 | 114 | 121 | 127 | 134 | 140 | 147 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 45 | 69 | 73 | 77 | 80 | 82 | 86 | 91 | 96 | 101 | 107 | 113 | 120 | 127 | 134 | 142 | 149 | 157 | 165 | 173 | 182 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| TOTAL public debt benchmark | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 |
| PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 158 | 204 | 199 | 187 | 173 | 176 | 186 | 195 | 209 | 221 | 234 | 248 | 265 | 281 | 298 | 315 | 333 | 352 | 371 | 390 | 410 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | 158 | 187 | 178 | 166 | 158 | 165 | 174 | 184 | 197 | 209 | 222 | 236 | 252 | 268 | 284 | 301 | 319 | 338 | 357 | 377 | 398 |
| 0 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 158 | 217 | 229 | 222 | 212 | 224 | 241 | 260 | 285 | 307 | 330 | 354 | 383 | 410 | 437 | 466 | 495 | 526 | 556 | 586 | 618 |
| B2. Primary balance | 158 | 213 | 215 | 202 | 186 | 190 | 199 | 209 | 224 | 236 | 249 | 264 | 281 | 297 | 314 | 332 | 350 | 369 | 388 | 408 | 427 |
| B3. Exports | 158 | 207 | 208 | 195 | 180 | 183 | 192 | 202 | 216 | 228 | 240 | 254 | 271 | 287 | 303 | 320 | 338 | 356 | 375 | 393 | 413 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 158 | 215 | 219 | 205 | 189 | 192 | 202 | 211 | 226 | 237 | 250 | 263 | 279 | 295 | 311 | 327 | 344 | 362 | 380 | 399 | 418 |
| B5. Depreciation | 158 | 232 | 212 | 189 | 168 | 165 | 168 | 171 | 178 | 182 | 189 | 196 | 206 | 215 | 226 | 236 | 248 | 260 | 273 | 285 | 299 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 158 | 212 | 210 | 196 | 182 | 187 | 198 | 209 | 224 | 238 | 252 | 268 | 287 | 304 | 323 | 342 | 361 | 382 | 402 | 423 | 444 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 158 | 223 | 217 | 203 | 188 | 191 | 201 | 211 | 225 | 237 | 251 | 265 | 283 | 299 | 316 | 334 | 353 | 372 | 391 | 410 | 430 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 158 | 268 | 261 | 245 | 227 | 233 | 246 | 259 | 277 | 293 | 310 | 328 | 350 | 370 | 391 | 412 | 435 | 458 | 481 | 505 | 529 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 23 | 23 | 21 | 18 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 21 | 23 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 33 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | 23 | 22 | 20 | 18 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 20 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 33 | 35 |
| 0 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 23 | 24 | 23 | 21 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 21 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 29 | 31 | 33 | 35 | 37 | 40 | 42 | 45 | 48 |
| B2. Primary balance | 23 | 23 | 21 | 19 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 33 | 34 |
| B3. Exports | 23 | 23 | 21 | 18 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 27 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 33 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 23 | 23 | 21 | 19 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 29 | 30 | 32 | 34 |
| B5. Depreciation | 23 | 24 | 24 | 21 | 19 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 21 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 24 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 33 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 23 | 23 | 21 | 19 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 27 | 28 | 30 | 32 | 34 | 36 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 23 | 23 | 22 | 19 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 24 | 24 | 26 | 27 | 29 | 30 | 32 | 34 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 23 | 23 | 24 | 22 | 20 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 22 | 24 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 33 | 35 | 37 | 39 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
A bold value indicates a breach of the benchmark.
Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator and primary deficit in percent of GDP.
Includes official and private transfers and FDI.
Table 4.
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.
Samoa: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt, 2020–40
In percent
| Projections 1/ | |||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 | 2036 | 2037 | 2038 | 2039 | 2040 | |
| PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 45 | 52 | 56 | 59 | 60 | 62 | 65 | 68 | 72 | 76 | 81 | 85 | 91 | 96 | 102 | 108 | 114 | 120 | 127 | 133 | 140 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | 45 | 48 | 50 | 53 | 55 | 58 | 61 | 65 | 69 | 73 | 78 | 83 | 88 | 93 | 99 | 105 | 112 | 118 | 125 | 132 | 140 |
| 0 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 45 | 56 | 66 | 71 | 75 | 79 | 86 | 92 | 100 | 107 | 115 | 124 | 133 | 142 | 152 | 162 | 172 | 183 | 193 | 204 | 215 |
| B2. Primary balance | 45 | 54 | 60 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 70 | 73 | 77 | 81 | 86 | 91 | 96 | 102 | 108 | 114 | 120 | 126 | 133 | 139 | 146 |
| B3. Exports | 45 | 53 | 58 | 61 | 63 | 64 | 67 | 71 | 74 | 78 | 83 | 88 | 93 | 98 | 104 | 110 | 116 | 122 | 128 | 135 | 141 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 45 | 55 | 62 | 65 | 66 | 67 | 70 | 74 | 78 | 82 | 86 | 91 | 96 | 101 | 106 | 112 | 118 | 124 | 130 | 136 | 143 |
| B5. Depreciation | 45 | 58 | 59 | 59 | 58 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 61 | 62 | 64 | 67 | 70 | 73 | 76 | 80 | 84 | 88 | 92 | 97 | 101 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 45 | 54 | 59 | 62 | 64 | 66 | 69 | 73 | 78 | 82 | 87 | 93 | 99 | 105 | 111 | 117 | 124 | 131 | 138 | 145 | 153 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 45 | 57 | 61 | 64 | 65 | 67 | 70 | 74 | 77 | 82 | 86 | 91 | 97 | 102 | 108 | 114 | 121 | 127 | 134 | 140 | 147 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 45 | 69 | 73 | 77 | 80 | 82 | 86 | 91 | 96 | 101 | 107 | 113 | 120 | 127 | 134 | 142 | 149 | 157 | 165 | 173 | 182 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| TOTAL public debt benchmark | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 |
| PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 158 | 204 | 199 | 187 | 173 | 176 | 186 | 195 | 209 | 221 | 234 | 248 | 265 | 281 | 298 | 315 | 333 | 352 | 371 | 390 | 410 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | 158 | 187 | 178 | 166 | 158 | 165 | 174 | 184 | 197 | 209 | 222 | 236 | 252 | 268 | 284 | 301 | 319 | 338 | 357 | 377 | 398 |
| 0 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 158 | 217 | 229 | 222 | 212 | 224 | 241 | 260 | 285 | 307 | 330 | 354 | 383 | 410 | 437 | 466 | 495 | 526 | 556 | 586 | 618 |
| B2. Primary balance | 158 | 213 | 215 | 202 | 186 | 190 | 199 | 209 | 224 | 236 | 249 | 264 | 281 | 297 | 314 | 332 | 350 | 369 | 388 | 408 | 427 |
| B3. Exports | 158 | 207 | 208 | 195 | 180 | 183 | 192 | 202 | 216 | 228 | 240 | 254 | 271 | 287 | 303 | 320 | 338 | 356 | 375 | 393 | 413 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 158 | 215 | 219 | 205 | 189 | 192 | 202 | 211 | 226 | 237 | 250 | 263 | 279 | 295 | 311 | 327 | 344 | 362 | 380 | 399 | 418 |
| B5. Depreciation | 158 | 232 | 212 | 189 | 168 | 165 | 168 | 171 | 178 | 182 | 189 | 196 | 206 | 215 | 226 | 236 | 248 | 260 | 273 | 285 | 299 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 158 | 212 | 210 | 196 | 182 | 187 | 198 | 209 | 224 | 238 | 252 | 268 | 287 | 304 | 323 | 342 | 361 | 382 | 402 | 423 | 444 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 158 | 223 | 217 | 203 | 188 | 191 | 201 | 211 | 225 | 237 | 251 | 265 | 283 | 299 | 316 | 334 | 353 | 372 | 391 | 410 | 430 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 158 | 268 | 261 | 245 | 227 | 233 | 246 | 259 | 277 | 293 | 310 | 328 | 350 | 370 | 391 | 412 | 435 | 458 | 481 | 505 | 529 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline | 23 | 23 | 21 | 18 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 21 | 23 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 33 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | |||||||||||||||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020–2030 2/ | 23 | 22 | 20 | 18 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 20 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 33 | 35 |
| 0 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B. Bound Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth | 23 | 24 | 23 | 21 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 21 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 29 | 31 | 33 | 35 | 37 | 40 | 42 | 45 | 48 |
| B2. Primary balance | 23 | 23 | 21 | 19 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 33 | 34 |
| B3. Exports | 23 | 23 | 21 | 18 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 27 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 33 |
| B4. Other flows 3/ | 23 | 23 | 21 | 19 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 29 | 30 | 32 | 34 |
| B5. Depreciation | 23 | 24 | 24 | 21 | 19 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 21 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 24 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 33 |
| B6. Combination of B1-B5 | 23 | 23 | 21 | 19 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 27 | 28 | 30 | 32 | 34 | 36 |
| C. Tailored Tests | |||||||||||||||||||||
| C1. Combined contingent liabilities | 23 | 23 | 22 | 19 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 24 | 24 | 26 | 27 | 29 | 30 | 32 | 34 |
| C2. Natural disaster | 23 | 23 | 24 | 22 | 20 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 22 | 24 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 33 | 35 | 37 | 39 |
| C3. Commodity price | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| C4. Market Financing | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
A bold value indicates a breach of the benchmark.
Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator and primary deficit in percent of GDP.
Includes official and private transfers and FDI.