The Bahamas
Financial Sector Assessment Program-Detailed Assessment of Observance of Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
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International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
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The Bank Supervision Department (BSD) of the Central Bank of the Bahamas (CBoB) has a generally effective supervisory program in place for the size and complexity of the Bahamian banking system. Since the prior FSAP in 2012, clear progress has been made enhancing the framework in a number of areas as well as in the execution of its supervision program. CBoB supervision continues to evolve in a number of positive directions, with most of the areas viewed by assessors as warranting enhancements included in the execution of the program.

Abstract

The Bank Supervision Department (BSD) of the Central Bank of the Bahamas (CBoB) has a generally effective supervisory program in place for the size and complexity of the Bahamian banking system. Since the prior FSAP in 2012, clear progress has been made enhancing the framework in a number of areas as well as in the execution of its supervision program. CBoB supervision continues to evolve in a number of positive directions, with most of the areas viewed by assessors as warranting enhancements included in the execution of the program.

Introduction1

1. The Bank Supervision Department (BSD) of the Central Bank of the Bahamas (CBoB) has a generally effective supervisory program in place for the size and complexity of the Bahamian banking system. Since the prior FSAP in 2012, clear progress has been made enhancing the framework in a number of areas as well as in the execution of its supervision program. CBoB supervision continues to evolve in a number of positive directions, with most of the areas viewed by assessors as warranting enhancements included in the execution of the program.

2. Several initiatives undertaken by CBoB have strengthened the overall regulatory and supervisory framework for the banking and trust company sector. CBoB, together with the Ministry of Finance (MoF), has either introduced or updated several key pieces of legislation and regulations pertaining to AML/CTF as well as issued guidance (Applications Manual, Administrative Money Penalty regime) and consultation proposals for Basel II/III regulatory reforms (capital, DSIB designation, and liquidity). In addition, CBoB has broadly enhanced its risk-based supervision regime, including as it pertains to AML/CTF, which is evidenced by enhanced off-site surveillance (review of all AML/CTF policies and procedures of all SFIs) and on-site targeted examinations conducted at SFIs to assess compliance with requirements.

3. CBoB has enhanced its engagement with the largest SFIs with respect to addressing the lingering non-performing loan (NPL) problems in the banking sector. CBoB has communicated to the SFIs its expectations that banks take action to significantly lower overall NPL levels. CBoB now regularly monitors the actions SFIs are taking in this regard and has periodic meetings to discuss strategy and progress.

Methodology

4. This assessment of the current state of the implementation of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP) in The Bahamas has been completed as part of the 2019 FSAP. The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) was undertaken by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the BCP assessment mission took place January 8 to 28, 2019.

5. The ratings assigned during this assessment are not directly comparable to those from the previous assessment. The methodology issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in September 2012 was used for the current assessment and the authorities have opted to be assessed and graded on the essential criteria (EC) only. The 2013 BCP assessment, prepared in the context of the 2012 FSAP, was based on the 2006 methodology. Since then, the methodology has been revised leading to some substantive changes.

6. The 2012 methodology reflects lessons from the global financial crisis (GFC) and emerging supervisory best practices. New principles have been added to the methodology along with new EC for each principle that provide more detail. Altogether, the revised CPs now contain 247 separate essential and additional criteria against which a supervisory agency may be assessed. In particular, the revised BCPs strengthen the requirements for supervisors, the approaches to supervision and supervisors’ expectations of banks. While the BCPs set out the powers that supervisors should have to address safety and soundness concerns, there is a heightened focus on the actual use of the powers, in a forward-looking approach through early intervention.

7. The 2019 FSAP assessment team reviewed the framework of laws, rules, and guidance and held extensive meetings with authorities and market participants. The assessment team met officials of the CBoB, the MoF, auditing firms, and banking sector participants. The authorities provided a comprehensive self-assessment of the CPs, as well as detailed responses to additional questionnaires, and facilitated access to staff and to supervisory documents and files on a confidential basis.

8. The team appreciated the very high quality of cooperation received from the authorities. The team extends its warm thanks to staff of the authorities, who provided excellent cooperation, including provision of documentation and technical support.

9. The standards were evaluated in the context of the sophistication and complexity of the financial system of The Bahamas. The CPs must be capable of application to a wide range of jurisdictions whose banking sectors will inevitably include a broad spectrum of banks. To accommodate this breadth of application, a proportionate approach is adopted within the CP, both in terms of the expectations on supervisors for the discharge of their own functions and in terms of the standards that supervisors impose on banks. An assessment of a country against the CPs must, therefore, recognize that its supervisory practices should be commensurate with the complexity, interconnectedness, size, and risk profile and cross-border operation of the banks being supervised. In other words, the assessment must consider the context in which the supervisory practices are applied. The concept of proportionality underpins all assessment criteria. For these reasons, an assessment of one jurisdiction will not be directly comparable to that of another.

10. An assessment of compliance with the BCPs is not, and is not intended to be, an exact science. Reaching conclusions required judgments by the assessment team. Banking systems differ from one country to another, as do their domestic circumstances. Furthermore, banking activities are undergoing rapid change after the GFC, prompting the evolution of thinking on, and practices for, supervision. Nevertheless, by adhering to a common, agreed methodology, the assessment should provide The Bahamian authorities with an internationally consistent measure of the quality of their banking supervision in relation to the revised CPs, which are internationally acknowledged as minimum standards.

Institutional and Market Structure—Overview

A. Institutional Framework for Regulation and Supervision

11. CBoB is responsible for the prudential regulation and supervision of banks, trust companies and credit unions that operate both from and within The Bahamas. Besides this responsibility, CBoB in its capacity as central bank, also acts as the lender of last resort for financial institutions. If and when necessary, it also oversees the operations of the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC).

12. The Bahamas regulatory framework include other financial sector authorities responsible for financial regulation. These are as follows:

  • The Securities Commission of The Bahamas oversees the registration, supervision and regulation of broker-dealers, mutual fund administration, securities investment advisors, and public companies.

  • The Registrar of Insurance Companies is responsible for the licensing, registration, supervision and regulation of registered re-insurers, insurers, and insurance intermediaries.

  • The Inspector of Financial and Corporate Service Providers oversees the licensing and regulation of financial and corporate service providers.

  • The Compliance Commission of The Bahamas is responsible for enforcing compliance with AML requirements of designated financial institutions (e.g. co-operative societies, friendly societies, trustees, administrative managers or investment managers of superannuation schemes, trustee, counsel, attorney or accountants receiving money in the course of business).

13. These regulators, known as the Group of Financial Service Regulators (GFSR), meet to discuss domestic issues of importance primarily focused on greater harmonization of the regulatory system. The GFSR, chaired by CBoB, meets at least quarterly in an effort to achieve supervisory coordination across the financial system in addressing common domestic themes. A memorandum of understanding (MoU), signed in 2002, outlines the ability to share information amongst the regulators as well as conduct joint on-site examinations and develop joint guidance and procedures where applicable.

B. Overview of the Banking Sector

14. The off-shore component of The Bahamas banking system is large compared to the operations of the domestic financial institutions. As at June 30, 20182, seven commercial domestic banks with total assets of B$12.3 billion3 include three indigenous domestic banks (B$3.3 billion) and four foreign bank subsidiaries (B$9 billion). In addition, one development bank and ten credit unions, which represent only B$0.5 billion of total domestic assets, have a considerable number of small retail depositors. The Bahamas international (offshore) financial sector, made up of many firms,4 had total off-shore balance sheet assets of B$255.6 billion. Of this total, 208 banks and trust companies, including 121 nominee trust companies, represented B$168.2 billion of total assets.

15. The domestic banks primarily deal in residential mortgage lending and consumer financing (with some commercial lending) while the off-shore banks focus on either private banking and trust services or conduct treasury operations on behalf of affiliated institutions. Offshore banks hold substantial off-balance sheet fiduciary assets on behalf of international clients (about B$120 billion), with a relatively smaller amount of primarily liquid on-balance sheet assets. As of June 2018, domestic banks’ loan books consisted of residential mortgages (43 percent); consumer credit (38 percent), business credit (17 percent) and commercial mortgages (2 percent).

16. Overall, the banking sector has strong capital and liquidity levels. As of September 2018, the system-wide capital adequacy ratio stood at 32 percent, well above the regulatory requirement of 17 percent. The ratio of liquid assets to total assets was 30 percent as at June 30, 2018.

17. Although the growth in consumer credit is very low, the banking sector remained profitable mainly due to fee income, stable lending rates, and lower deposit rates. System-wide return on assets has remained stable in the 2.2–2.5 percent range over the last three years. Asset growth was minimal and mainly driven by credit to the central government.

18. NPL’s remain high at 9 percent, after peaking at 17.2 percent in 2014, with three institutions representing 61 percent of aggregate NPLs. NPLs are made up of residential mortgages at B$323.6M (or 61.7 percent), consumer loans at B$143.7M (or 27.4 percent) and commercial loans at B$57.1 million (or 10.9 percent). The real estate market in The Bahamas has been relatively soft for the past several years, as evidenced by the significant stock of distressed properties listed for sale.

19. The Bahamas has been listed by the Financial Action Task Force as a country with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies and is taking steps to address this. Several laws and regulations have been revised in The Bahamas in 2018 to address AML/CFT requirements of both banking and non-banking institutions. CBoB, in its capacity as the regulatory and supervisory authority of financial institutions has strengthened its risk-based supervisory framework to include the testing of bank’s compliance with AML/CFT requirements.

Preconditions for Effective Banking Supervision5

20. The Bahamian economy has returned to moderate growth after a period of stagnation. After a decline in real GDP from 2013–2015, growth in this tourism-driven economy is projected at 2.3 percent in 2018. Growth is vulnerable to downturns in the U.S., the largest source market for tourism, which accounts for 45 percent of GDP. Real estate investment and construction are also important economic drivers, representing about 22 percent of GDP.

21. Debt-to-GDP has risen to 55 percent in FY2017, from 38 percent in FY2012. In response, the government has increased VAT from 7.5 to 12 percent and announced austerity measures.

22. The Bahamas has a fixed exchange rate and capital controls. The Bahamian dollar is pegged to the U.S. dollar at parity. Capital controls afford some scope for monetary policy independence, for example through reserve requirements, changes in the discount rate and selective rate controls.

23. CBoB has the mandate to promote financial system stability. CBoB’s mission is to foster an environment of monetary stability conducive to economic development, and to ensure a stable and sound financial system. On matters of systemic importance, CBOB it works closely with the MoF, including on the drafting or formulation of any legislation pertaining to financial stability measures. Further, the MoF has primary responsibility for all fiscal matters, including the funding of any resolution-related interventions pertaining to financial institutions.

24. Although the GFSR seeks to coordinate certain regulatory and supervisory matters pertaining to financial institutions, it does not act in a capacity to contribute to financial stability policy measures. Although the GFSR contributes to the consistency in the regulation and supervision of financial and non-financial institutions in The Bahamas, it does not have representation of the MoF nor does it examine in-depth macroprudential issues at this time.

25. The Bahamas legal system is well developed for the regulation and supervision of financial institutions. The CBoB can operate independently and has the authority to impose sanctions, take preventive corrective action and resolve weak banks, including revocation of the license.

26. CBoB has the primary regulatory responsibility for The Bahamas payments system, including the systemically important payment systems. Since 2004, the CBB has been operating a Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system, the Bahamas Interbank Settlement System, which constitute a systemically important payment system and provides RTGS (with finality and irrevocability) for payments of B$150,000 or larger. CBoB also governs the payments systems through the Payments Policy and Oversight Unit as well as through its participation in the National Payments Council.

27. The framework for crisis management, recovery and resolution is currently under development in The Bahamas. Proposed legal reforms will bring the CBoB’s resolution framework more in line with international best practice and if passed, will give the central bank the authority to require banks to have recovery plans, resolution plans for DSIBs, and the ability to appoint a statutory administrator.

28. With the passage of the proposed legislation, CBoB, together with other relevant authorities, will need to build the critical crisis management infrastructure needed to manage a major bank failure. The CBoB would like to make use of an expanded GFSR as the informal financial crisis management committee (FCMC). This committee would require representation from the MoF on the GFSR, and would be tasked with the responsibility of not only ensuring that the pending legal reforms contain all the necessary powers to minimize legal risk but also to become fully operational including developing a national crisis management plan once promulgated.

29. The DIC continues to build toward its target funding level of B$88.5 million. The DIC, a public corporation established under the Protection of Depositors Act, 1999, insures eligible Bahamian dollar deposits of licensed banks. The current DIC fund stands at B$56M as of December 31, 2018, which represents approximately 0.8 percent of insurable deposits and 2.9 percent of insured deposits.

30. Although the DIC has a Board of Directors in place, the infrastructure needed to manage the failure of a member financial institution would fall to CBoB. At this time, the DIC has the power to take control of the assets of an insolvent financial institution. However, under the proposed legislative resolution reforms, CBoB will have the power to appoint a statutory administrator that would, among other things, ensure prompt payouts of the deposits of a bank in liquidation.

31. The proposed legislation will formalize CBoB’s authority to provide emergency liquidity assistance. Amendments to emergency liquidity assistance provisions clarify the purpose of such lending and address solvency tests, collateral mandates, penalty rates, and maturity limits.

32. Transparent information is provided by SFIs to the public. Given The Bahamas’ requirement to adhere to International Accounting Standards (IAS) and the expectation that IFRS 9 implementation by the supervised institutions will be complete effective January 1, 2018, SFIs are required to disclose their financial statements to enable users to evaluate the nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments to which the entity is exposed and its management of those risks. In addition, the publicly-traded domestic banks are also subject to disclosure requirements imposed by the Securities Commission of The Bahamas.

Main Findings

A. Responsibilities, Objectives, Powers, Independence (CP 1–2)

33. CBoB has broad powers and clear responsibilities underpinned mainly in the CBBA, BTCRA and CUA. CBoB’s primary objective is to promote financial system stability in The Bahamas. CBoB has broad corrective action and sanction powers. Laws and regulations provide CBoB with the power to set and enforce prudential regulations to support delivery of its statutory mandate.

34. The sufficiency of BSD’s supervisory resources should be re-examined in light of CBoB’s current legislative initiatives and to further strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of its’ risk-based supervision framework. BSD would benefit from additional staff to: i) carry out periodic in-depth on-site examinations of key practices (which may entail additional risk specialists to be hired); ii) support further enhancements to the off-site surveillance program; iii) assist in the implementation of regulatory reforms (Basel II/III, IFRS 9 implementation); iv) address the ongoing need for enhanced supervision of SFI’s compliance with AML/CTF standards and v) specialize in dealing with intervention staged SFIs.

35. The reasons for the removal of a CBoB board member or the Governor should be required to be publicly disclosed.

B. Licensing, Changes in Control, and Acquisitions (CP 4–7)

36. CBoB has a very thorough licensing framework in assessing licensing applications which follows criteria that are consistent with ongoing supervision requirements. The BTCRA defines the “banking business” and restricts deposit taking activities to banks and credit unions only. CBoB’s framework for assessing licensing applications follows criteria pertaining to the financial strength of investors, fit and proper guidance for the appointment of senior management and Board members, analysis of proposed business strategy, and determines minimum capital adequacy requirements.

37. CBoB has the power to review, reject, and impose prudential conditions on proposals to transfer significant ownership or controlling interests in SFIs. The BTCRA empowers CBoB to establish clear provisions on acquisitions and investments that require prior supervisory approval or prior notification to CBoB.

C. Supervisory Cooperation and Cross Border Supervision (CP 3, 12, 13)

38. CBoB has MoUs in place to support information sharing as well as co-operation and co-ordination between both domestic and foreign regulatory authorities in dealing with a crisis.

39. The introduction of a resolution regime will help bolster CBoB’s power to undertake recovery and resolution actions in a coordinated manner with other regulatory authorities.

D. Supervisory Approach (CP 8–11)

40. Certain aspects of CBoB’s risk-based supervision framework should be reassessed for efficiency and effectiveness, with the goal of providing CBoB with greater confidence in assessments of key corporate governance, risk management and control practices. CBoB’s off-site supervision surveillance program uses a number of methods for assessing an SFI’s financial condition and compliance with prudential requirements and standards, including those related to corporate governance and risk management. Both domestic and international (including offshore) SFIs are subject to the same risk-based supervisory framework with more emphasis being placed on the largest SFIs in both categories. The program should be re-calibrated to include more frequent on-site examinations that can support more comprehensive assessments of DSIB’s key corporate governance, risk management and internal controls practices, as well as in-depth reviews of material risks (e.g. credit risk, AML, etc.) depending on the business model of the SFI.

41. A careful balancing of the risk-based supervisory framework between onsite and offsite work may allow for enhanced efficiency in the program while promoting CBoB’s ability to gain greater confidence in assessments of the effectiveness of SFI’s governance and risk management practices. In practice, and as noted above, what is likely needed is an increase in resources which could support further development of strong offsite analytic capabilities and increased use of onsite examinations in key areas. A strong supervisory framework for the DSIBs would help ensure CBoB is better equipped to take early intervention measures to address weaknesses in key practices in need of timely and effective remediation.

42. CBoB utilizes a principles-based approach to supervision and maintains wide discretionary powers to select the appropriate measures through which to require firms to address identified weaknesses. The Central Bank’s Guide to the Ladder of Supervisory Intervention provides an overview of the intervention measures CBoB may take depending on the severity of the situation. Over the past years, CBoB has been heavily engaged in the recovery efforts of one of its largest domestic banks. Although CBoB has successfully made use of several corrective measures over the past 10 years pertaining to this SFI, CBoB’s powers to require swift actions will be strengthened with the introduction of the proposed resolution regime.

E. Corporate Governance and Interval Audit (CP 14, 26)

43. Supervision of corporate governance has become a more direct area of emphasis for CBoB, as it has with supervisors in many jurisdictions and in line with the updated Basel Core Principles. However, the current practice of assessing governance largely in the context of individual specific risk areas may attenuate the ability to clearly and directly hold accountable those with key responsibilities on a firm-wide basis before identified weaknesses lead to significant observable events. The Guidelines for Corporate Governance (amended and expanded in 2013) appropriately detail the extensive duties of boards of directors and senior management. CBoB’s principles-based approach to supervision places primary responsibility for ensuring the establishment of an effective framework for risk management and controls with boards of directors and clearly articulates the appropriate split between the oversight role of the board and the active role of management. CBoB has recently notified the industry of plans to step up the level of direct engagement with boards of directors as a part of this enhanced governance focus.

44. In addition to placing significant emphasis on the roles of the board and senior management, the program relies on internal and external auditors and periodic attestations required to be made by boards regarding compliance with laws, rules and standards. It combines substantial offsite analyses and assessments with relatively infrequent onsite examinations where those are deemed warranted by the risk assessment process in its risk-based supervision framework. This balance can be hard to strike effectively. Assessors note that CBoB supervision would benefit from greater interaction with the firms and more use of comprehensive thematic onsite examinations. These exams could cover all aspects of a particular area or practice to increase their level of confidence in assessments of risk management, internal controls and corporate governance. For example, regular periodic reviews of credit risk or ICAAP covering all elements articulated in credit risk, ICAAP, corporate governance and internal audit guidelines.

45. CBoB’s significant reliance on the required board of directors’ annual certifications of compliance—or notice of noncompliance, as applicable—with laws, rules and expectations would benefit from a formal process for the escalation of requirements when there is a discovery that a certification was materially inaccurate. To increase the accountability of the board when signing off on the certification, CBoB should make it clear that if there are material errors it will require a third party or supervisory review of all aspects of the certification and supporting processes. If using external auditors/consultants for this work, CBoB should require the SFI’s board to get an opinion supported by a ‘reasonable assurance’ opinion.

46. The role of internal audit is particularly and increasingly important in the CBoB supervision program and as such internal audit effectiveness warrants even greater attention. CBoB has recently increased the importance of the role of internal audit with respect to supervision of SFIs and heightened associated accountability by requiring the chief internal auditor to attest in writing when signing off on remediation of an area of weakness that requires attention. CBoB’s supervision would benefit from more comprehensive assessments of internal audit, including a periodic review that can shed light on internal audit effectiveness across many elements of its role, as detailed in BCP 26 in this report. When it is discovered that internal audit has missed key issues that are later found by CBoB supervisors, CBoB should consistently articulate these findings to the Board in writing and hold the board accountable for its duty to ensure an effective audit function.

F. Capital (CP 16)

47. CBoB has updated its capital regime and it is now largely in line with the key aspects of Basel standards, though further work is to be done with respect to implementing Basel III. Current required regulatory capital ratios are super-equivalent to Basel, with DSIBs being required to meet a 17 percent target for capital and at a 14 percent trigger supervisors escalate coverage of the SFIs. Credit, Operational and Market risks are now all captured in capital requirements and CBoB issued Guidelines on ICAAP in 2016 to address those risks not well captured in the regulatory regime.

48. More emphasis should be placed on in-depth reviews of the largest SFIs’ ICAAPs. While CBoB published Guidelines requiring periodic ICAAPs at SFIs in late 2016, assessors noted the supervisory reviews of SFIs’ ICAAP reports to date have been done at a fairly high level and focused primarily on ensuring the SFIs’ ICAAP reports contained all required elements, rather than the effectiveness of the overall process. Given the importance of ICAAP with respect to both risk management and SFIs’ internal capital planning processes, more attention should be given during ICAAP reviews to the various inputs into and practices driving the process, as well as the controls around those.

G. Credit Risk and Problem Assets, Provisions and Reserves (CP 17–18)

49. CBoB should undertake deeper and more frequent reviews of credit risk management practices at its largest SFIs, including a review of the current treatment of non-performing loans and impaired assets. CBoB’s credit risk and impaired asset guidelines allow SFIs a variety of credit risk reporting methodology for non-performing loans and provisioning levels. Inconsistent asset classification, collateral valuation and loan loss provisioning practices for asset backed loans (particularly residential mortgages) may lead to an overestimation of the accuracy and comparability of SFI’s reported financial data and underestimation of the overall level of credit risk within and across the SFIs. CBoB has conducted only five in-depth credit reviews on the DSIBs since 2015 (not including the on-site credit reviews undertaken on the problem DSIB), it is imperative that CBoB assure itself that bank’s credit risk management internal controls are in place and effective as well as gaining a view on the extent of the differences in practices across firms. With the implementation of IFRS 9 (beginning January 1, 2018), the banking sector requires further guidance on CBoB’s expectations and discretion as it pertains to the validation of credit risk models used to assess and measure expected credit losses.

H. Risk Management (CP 19–25)

50. Monitoring compliance with quantitative requirements and a focus on financial strength metrics are key areas of focus and resource expenditure. CBoB requires frequent reporting across a wide spectrum of regulatory requirements and positions in order to assess the financial condition of the SFIs and to assess compliance with quantitative elements of the regime—e.g., country and transfer risks; large exposure management and reporting; etc. CBoB’s qualitative expectations and standards are generally in line with international practices and are articulated to the SFIs through clear written Guidelines, examination reports (when examinations are carried out), discussions during semi-annual meetings with the firms and other less formal communications.

I. Abuse of Financial Services (CP 29)

51. Given the importance of this risk area, as well as release of several new or updated pieces of associated legislation, regulations and guidelines, CBOB should continue its enhanced supervisory oversight of SFI’s compliance with AML/CFT requirements. CBoB has made a concerted effort to review most of the SFI’s board policies and procedures pertaining to AML/CTF requirements as well as undertaking a targeted on-site review program aimed at approximately twenty percent of all SFIs, which were identified as warranting reviews. It will be essential for CBoB to take timely corrective measures when discovering gaps in SFI’s compliance with AML/CTF requirements to ensure remediation efforts are carried out on a timely basis. CBoB should undertake a review of the compliance of Credit Unions with the AML/CTF requirements.

Detailed Assessment

A. Supervisory Powers, Responsibilities, and Functions

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B. Prudential Regulations and Requirements

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Summary Compliance with the Basel Core Principles

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Recommended Actions and Authorities Comments

Recommended Actions to Improve Compliance with the Basel Core Principles and the Effectiveness of Regulatory and Supervisory Frameworks

Authorities’ Response to the Assessment

The CBoB expresses its appreciation to the IMF FSAP Mission for providing a thorough and fair assessment of The Bahamas’ compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Supervision. The current FSAP represents this jurisdiction first assessment against the revised 2012 methodology. Over the years, the CBoB has been focused on imposing strengthening measures to its supervisory and regulatory regime to become fully aligned with evolving international standards. In the past two years, the CBoB along with other domestic financial services regulators and the various government stakeholders led by the Attorney General’s Office moved aggressively to introduce legislative/regulatory reforms aimed at closing deficiencies identified by the Caribbean Financial Action Taskforce in its recent mutual evaluation exercise. In the broader context of financial stability, the CBoB has drafted amendments to the Central Bank Act, 2000, the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 2000 and the Protection of Depositors Act, 1999 to introduce a transparent bank resolution framework. The CBoB will continue to collaborate with the appropriate government stakeholders on Crisis Management as well as other key priorities requiring legislative reform or some formal protocols.

Overall, the results of the FSAP signals that the CBoB is moving in the right direction. In most cases, identified gaps were already targeted in terms of legislative and policy reforms and/or process improvements. The CBoB is committed to executing a regime that is not only aligned with international standards but “fit for purpose” and one that can demonstrate effectiveness against international scrutiny. Against this backdrop, the CBoB will take proactive steps to execute a work plan that will address the FSAP’s key recommendations in a timely and orderly manner. The CBoB is currently in an advance stage of its full Basel III implementation, aimed at taking a more proportional approach in the context of small nation states with a conservative financial system. The Basel III capital rules will be set out in a detailed Capital Regulation which will be issued for consultation in the latter part of 2019.

The CBoB will strategically augment its supervision complement and where necessary will continue to reorganize and redefine roles to ensure adequate coverage of our supervisory mandate for safety and soundness as well as reputational risks. The CBoB is committed to introducing and leveraging technology solutions to enhance its ongoing monitoring and detection of emerging risks to ensure timely supervisory intervention.

1

This Detailed Assessment Report has been prepared by Tim Clark and Geraldine Low, IMF external experts.

2

Sources: Central Bank of The Bahamas, and IMF staff calculations.

3

The Bahamian dollar is pegged to the U.S. dollar at parity.

4

The Bahamas international financial sector is made up of 208 Banks and Trusts (B$168.2Bn on balance sheet assets); 783 Investment Funds (B$86.3Bn) and 20 External Insurers (B$1Bn – approximately).

5

This section draws from other documents produced for the FSAP, some of which at the time of this assessment were not yet finalized. A complete analysis of the macroeconomic framework is contained in Article IV reports.

6

In this document, “banking group” includes the holding company, the bank and its offices, subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures, both domestic and foreign. Risks from other entities in the wider group, for example non-bank (including non-financial) entities, may also be relevant. This group-wide approach to supervision goes beyond accounting consolidation.

7

The activities of authorising banks, ongoing supervision and corrective actions are elaborated in the subsequent Principles.

8

Such authority is called “the supervisor” throughout this paper, except where the longer form “the banking supervisor” has been necessary for clarification.

9

In this document, “risk profile” refers to the nature and scale of the risk exposures undertaken by a bank.

10

In this document, “systemic importance” is determined by the size, interconnectedness, substitutability, global or cross-jurisdictional activity (if any), and complexity of the bank, as set out in the BCBS paper on Global systemically important banks: assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement, November 2011.

11

Please refer to Principle 1, Essential Criterion 1.

12

Principle 3 is developed further in the Principles dealing with “Consolidated supervision” (12), “Home-host relationships” (13) and “Abuse of financial services” (29).

13

The Committee recognizes the presence in some countries of non-banking financial institutions that take deposits but may be regulated differently from banks. These institutions should be subject to a form of regulation commensurate to the type and size of their business and, collectively, should not hold a significant proportion of deposits in the financial system.

14

This document refers to a governance structure composed of a board and senior management. The Committee recognizes that there are significant differences in the legislative and regulatory frameworks across countries regarding these functions. Some countries use a two-tier board structure, where the supervisory function of the board is performed by a separate entity known as a supervisory board, which has no executive functions. Other countries, in contrast, use a one-tier board structure in which the board has a broader role. Owing to these differences, this document does not advocate a specific board structure. Consequently, in this document, the terms “board” and “senior management” are only used as a way to refer to the oversight function and the management function in general and should be interpreted throughout the document in accordance with the applicable law within each jurisdiction.

15

Therefore, shell banks shall not be licensed. (Reference document: BCBS paper on shell banks, January 2003.)

16

Please refer to Principle 14, Essential Criterion 8.

17

Please refer to Principle 29.

18

While the term “supervisor” is used throughout Principle 6, the Committee recognizes that in a few countries these issues might be addressed by a separate licensing authority.

19

In the case of major acquisitions, this determination may take into account whether the acquisition or investment creates obstacles to the orderly resolution of the bank.

20

Please refer to Footnote 33 under Principle 7, Essential Criterion 3

21

On-site work is used as a tool to provide independent verification that adequate policies, procedures and controls exist at banks, determine that information reported by banks is reliable, obtain additional information on the bank and its related companies needed for the assessment of the condition of the bank, monitor the bank’s follow-up on supervisory concerns, etc.

22

Off-site work is used as a tool to regularly review and analyze the financial condition of banks, follow up on matters requiring further attention, identify and evaluate developing risks and help identify the priorities, scope of further off-site and on-site work, etc.

23

Please refer to Principle 10.

24

In the context of this Principle, “prudential reports and statistical returns” are distinct from and in addition to required accounting reports. The former are addressed by this Principle, and the latter are addressed in Principle 27.

25

Please refer to Principle 2.

26

Please refer to Principle 1, Essential Criterion 5.

27

Maybe external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions.

28

Maybe external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions. External experts may conduct reviews used by the supervisor, yet it is ultimately the supervisor that must be satisfied with the results of the reviews conducted by such external experts.

29

Please refer to Principle 1.

30

Please refer to footnote 19 under Principle 1.

31

Please refer to Principle 16, Additional Criterion 2.

32

See Illustrative example of information exchange in colleges of the October 2010 BCBS Good practice principles on supervisory colleges for further information on the extent of information sharing expected.

33

Please refer to footnote 27 under Principle 5.

34

The OECD (OECD glossary of corporate governance-related terms in “Experiences from the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables”, 2003, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/26/23742340.pdf.) defines “duty of care” as “The duty of a board member to act on an informed and prudent basis in decisions with respect to the company. Often interpreted as requiring the board member to approach the affairs of the company in the same way that a ‘prudent man’ would approach their own affairs. Liability under the duty of care is frequently mitigated by the business judgment rule.” The OECD defines “duty of loyalty” as “The duty of the board member to act in the interest of the company and shareholders. The duty of loyalty should prevent individual board members from acting in their own interest, or the interest of another individual or group, at the expense of the company and all shareholders.”

35

“Risk appetite” reflects the level of aggregate risk that the bank’s Board is willing to assume and manage in the pursuit of the bank’s business objectives. Risk appetite may include both quantitative and qualitative elements, as appropriate, and encompass a range of measures. For the purposes of this document, the terms “risk appetite” and “risk tolerance” are treated synonymously.

36

For the purposes of assessing risk management by banks in the context of Principles 15 to 25, a bank’s risk management framework should take an integrated “bank-wide” perspective of the bank’s risk exposure, encompassing the bank’s individual business lines and business units. Where a bank is a member of a group of companies, the risk management framework should in addition cover the risk exposure across and within the “banking group” (see footnote 19 under Principle 1) and should also take account of risks posed to the bank or members of the banking group through other entities in the wider group.

37

To some extent the precise requirements may vary from risk type to risk type (Principles 15 to 25) as reflected by the underlying reference documents.

38

It should be noted that while, in this and other Principles, the supervisor is required to determine that banks’ risk management policies and processes are being adhered to, the responsibility for ensuring adherence remains with a bank’s Board and senior management.

39

New products include those developed by the bank or by a third party and purchased or distributed by the bank.

40

The Core Principles do not require a jurisdiction to comply with the capital adequacy regimes of Basel I, Basel II and/or Basel III. The Committee does not consider implementation of the Basel-based framework a prerequisite for compliance with the Core Principles, and compliance with one of the regimes is only required of those jurisdictions that have declared that they have voluntarily implemented it.

41

The Basel Capital Accord was designed to apply to internationally active banks, which must calculate and apply capital adequacy ratios on a consolidated basis, including subsidiaries undertaking banking and financial business. Jurisdictions adopting the Basel II and Basel III capital adequacy frameworks would apply such ratios on a fully consolidated basis to all internationally active banks and their holding companies; in addition, supervisors must test that banks are adequately capitalized on a stand-alone basis.

42

Reference documents: Enhancements to the Basel II framework, July 2009 and: International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: a revised framework, comprehensive version, June 2006.

43

In assessing the adequacy of a bank’s capital levels in light of its risk profile, the supervisor critically focuses, among other things, on (a) the potential loss absorbency of the instruments included in the bank’s capital base, (b) the appropriateness of risk weights as a proxy for the risk profile of its exposures, (c) the adequacy of provisions and reserves to cover loss expected on its exposures, and (d) the quality of its risk management and controls. Consequently, capital requirements may vary from bank to bank to ensure that each bank is operating with the appropriate level of capital to support the risks it is running and the risks it poses.

44

“Stress testing” comprises a range of activities from simple sensitivity analysis to more complex scenario analyses and reverses stress testing.

45

Please refer to Principle 12, Essential Criterion 7.

46

Principle 17 covers the evaluation of assets in greater detail; Principle 18 covers the management of problem assets.

47

Credit risk may result from the following: on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet exposures, including loans and advances, investments, inter-bank lending, derivative transactions, securities financing transactions and trading activities.

48

Counterparty credit risk includes credit risk exposures arising from OTC derivative and other financial instruments.

49

“Assuming” includes the assumption of all types of risk that give rise to credit risk, including credit risk or counterparty risk associated with various financial instruments.

50

Principle 17 covers the evaluation of assets in greater detail; Principle 18 covers the management of problem assets.

51

Reserves for the purposes of this Principle are “below the line” non-distributable appropriations of profit required by a supervisor in addition to provisions (“above the line” charges to profit).

52

It is recognized that there are two different types of off-balance sheet exposures: those that can be unilaterally cancelled by the bank (based on contractual arrangements and therefore may not be subject to provisioning), and those that cannot be unilaterally cancelled.

53

Connected counterparties may include natural persons as well as a group of companies related financially or by common ownership, management or any combination thereof.

54

This includes credit concentrations through exposure to: single counterparties and groups of connected counterparties both direct and indirect (such as through exposure to collateral or to credit protection provided by a single counterparty), counterparties in the same industry, economic sector or geographic region and counterparties whose financial performance is dependent on the same activity or commodity as well as off-balance sheet exposures (including guarantees and other commitments) and also market and other risk concentrations where a bank is overly exposed to particular asset classes, products, collateral, or currencies.

55

The measure of credit exposure, in the context of large exposures to single counterparties and groups of connected counterparties, should reflect the maximum possible loss from their failure (i.e. it should encompass actual claims and potential claims as well as contingent liabilities). The risk weighting concept adopted in the Basel capital standards should not be used in measuring credit exposure for this purpose as the relevant risk weights were devised as a measure of credit risk on a basket basis and their use for measuring credit concentrations could significantly underestimate potential losses (see “Measuring and controlling large credit exposures, January 1991).

56

Such requirements should, at least for internationally active banks, reflect the applicable Basel standards. As of September 2012, a new Basel standard on large exposures is still under consideration.

57

Related parties can include, among other things, the bank’s subsidiaries, affiliates, and any party (including their subsidiaries, affiliates and special purpose entities) that the bank exerts control over or that exerts control over the bank, the bank’s major shareholders, Board members, senior management and key staff, their direct and related interests, and their close family members as well as corresponding persons in affiliated companies.

58

Related party transactions include on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet credit exposures and claims, as well as, dealings such as service contracts, asset purchases and sales, construction contracts, lease agreements, derivative transactions, borrowings, and write-offs. The term transaction should be interpreted broadly to incorporate not only transactions that are entered into with related parties but also situations in which an unrelated party (with whom a bank has an existing exposure) subsequently becomes a related party.

59

An exception may be appropriate for beneficial terms that are part of overall remuneration packages (e.g. staff receiving credit at favorable rates).

60

Country risk is the risk of exposure to loss caused by events in a foreign country. The concept is broader than sovereign risk as all forms of lending or investment activity whether to/with individuals, corporates, banks or governments are covered.

61

Transfer risk is the risk that a borrower will not be able to convert local currency into foreign exchange and so will be unable to make debt service payments in foreign currency. The risk normally arises from exchange restrictions imposed by the government in the borrower’s country. (Reference document: IMF paper on External Debt Statistics – Guide for compilers and users, 2003.)

62

Wherever “interest rate risk” is used in this Principle the term refers to interest rate risk in the banking book. Interest rate risk in the trading book is covered under Principle 22.

63

The Committee has defined operational risk as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. The definition includes legal risk but excludes strategic and reputational risk.

64

In assessing independence, supervisors give due regard to the control systems designed to avoid conflicts of interest in the performance measurement of staff in the compliance, control and internal audit functions. For example, the remuneration of such staff should be determined independently of the business lines that they oversee.

65

The term “compliance function” does not necessarily denote an organizational unit. Compliance staff may reside in operating business units or local subsidiaries and report up to operating business line management or local management, provided such staff also have a reporting line through to the head of compliance who should be independent from business lines.

66

The term “internal audit function” does not necessarily denote an organizational unit. Some countries allow small banks to implement a system of independent reviews, e.g. conducted by external experts, of key internal controls as an alternative.

67

In this Essential Criterion, the supervisor is not necessarily limited to the banking supervisor. The responsibility for ensuring that financial statements are prepared in accordance with accounting policies and practices may also be vested with securities and market supervisors.

68

For the purposes of this Essential Criterion, the disclosure requirement may be found in applicable accounting, stock exchange listing, or other similar rules, instead of or in addition to directives issued by the supervisor.

69

The Committee is aware that, in some jurisdictions, other authorities, such as a financial intelligence unit (FIU), rather than a banking supervisor, may have primary responsibility for assessing compliance with laws and regulations regarding criminal activities in banks, such as fraud, money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Thus, in the context of this Principle, “the supervisor” might refer to such other authorities, in particular in Essential Criteria 7, 8 and 10. In such jurisdictions, the banking supervisor cooperates with such authorities to achieve adherence with the criteria mentioned in this Principle.

70

Consistent with international standards, banks are to report suspicious activities involving cases of potential money laundering and the financing of terrorism to the relevant national center, established either as an independent governmental authority or within an existing authority or authorities that serves as an FIU.

71

These could be external auditors or other qualified parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions.

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The Bahamas: Financial Sector Assessment Program-Detailed Assessment of Observance of Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
Author:
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department