1. Cameroon has shown greater resilience than other CEMAC countries to the twin oil and security shocks affecting the region, but vulnerabilities remain. Having a more diversified and less oil-dependent economy helped. Cameroon’s fiscal deficit was 6.2 percent of GDP at end-2016 compared to 7.2 percent for the CEMAC average, and growth was 4.5 percent compared to -1 percent for the CEMAC average. In addition, the development partner-supported consolidation program approved in June 2017 has started to yield results as fiscal and external buffers are being gradually rebuilt. Nonetheless, real GDP growth decelerated in 2017, reaching 3.2 percent, and private sector credit fell to 2 percent in March 2018 (y/y). Banking system vulnerabilities remain high due to banks’ large sovereign exposures (Figure 1).

Abstract

1. Cameroon has shown greater resilience than other CEMAC countries to the twin oil and security shocks affecting the region, but vulnerabilities remain. Having a more diversified and less oil-dependent economy helped. Cameroon’s fiscal deficit was 6.2 percent of GDP at end-2016 compared to 7.2 percent for the CEMAC average, and growth was 4.5 percent compared to -1 percent for the CEMAC average. In addition, the development partner-supported consolidation program approved in June 2017 has started to yield results as fiscal and external buffers are being gradually rebuilt. Nonetheless, real GDP growth decelerated in 2017, reaching 3.2 percent, and private sector credit fell to 2 percent in March 2018 (y/y). Banking system vulnerabilities remain high due to banks’ large sovereign exposures (Figure 1).

A. Introduction

1. Cameroon has shown greater resilience than other CEMAC countries to the twin oil and security shocks affecting the region, but vulnerabilities remain. Having a more diversified and less oil-dependent economy helped. Cameroon’s fiscal deficit was 6.2 percent of GDP at end-2016 compared to 7.2 percent for the CEMAC average, and growth was 4.5 percent compared to -1 percent for the CEMAC average. In addition, the development partner-supported consolidation program approved in June 2017 has started to yield results as fiscal and external buffers are being gradually rebuilt. Nonetheless, real GDP growth decelerated in 2017, reaching 3.2 percent, and private sector credit fell to 2 percent in March 2018 (y/y). Banking system vulnerabilities remain high due to banks’ large sovereign exposures (Figure 1).

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Cameroon and the CEMAC: Key Indicators, 2014–17

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 256; 10.5089/9781484373378.002.A004

Sources: BEAC; COBAC; and IMF staff calculations.

2. This chapter aims to identify financial risks and mitigating measures that could help prevent future crises and/or limit their impact. After a brief overview of the Cameroon financial sector, the chapter analyzes its links with the rest of the economy to identify sources of vulnerabilities that could amplify future shocks. The analysis focuses on the bank and public-sector nexus including SOEs, some of which may pose systemic risks due to their high-indebtedness and persistent losses. Additional vulnerabilities stemming from the large and less regulated microfinance sector and the rapidly-growing mobile money market are also considered.

B. Overview of the Banking Sector in Cameroon

3. Cameroon’s bank-dominated financial system is the largest in the CEMAC region, but remains shallow and highly concentrated. Total banks’ assets at end-2017 stood at 26.8 percent of GDP (40 percent of the CEMAC banking system’s assets), up from 23.1 percent of GDP in 2010. However, private sector credit to GDP was 15.3 percent compared to 28.5 percent for the SSA average at end-2016. The 4 largest banks accounted for 59.2 percent of the total assets at end-2017 (Table 1). In addition, Yaoundé and Douala, the country’s two largest cities, generate about 90 percent of total banks’ credits and deposits.

Table 1.

Cameroon: Banking Assets, End-2017

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Sources: BEAC; and IMF staff calculations.

4. Cameroon’s banking system continues to show overall resilience to the twin oil price and security shocks, with some improvements in prudential ratios. (Table 2) After declining to 9 percent at end-2016, the system—wide capital adequacy ratio increased to 10.7 percent at end-March 2018 to stay above the CEMAC regulatory requirement of 8 percent. Banks remain profitable. Liquidity conditions have improved since mid-2017 owing to the easing of the government’s liquidity constraint following budget support disbursements. BEAC refinancing declined to CFAF 72 billion at end-2017, an improvement from the high liquidity demand that reached the bidding ceiling of CFAF 200 billion in most of the first half of 2017.

Table 2.

Cameroon: Financial Soundness Indicators, 2014–18

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Sources: BEAC; COBAC; and IMF staff calculations.

Data from the IMF Financial Soundness Indicators database; and the data in Q1–2018 is not yet available.

5. However, banking system vulnerabilities remain. There are significant variations across banks on meeting the prudential ratios. Four banks (13 percent of banks’ total assets) are in distress with 3 of them having negative capital. Also, Cameroon’s structurally high ratio of loans in arrears2 was aggravated in the first quarter of 2018 to 15 percent. Together with declining economic activity, this continues to constrain private sector credit growth, which declined from 14 to 2 percent (y/y) between 2014 and March-18. The construction, extractive industry, and finance and services sectors are the most affected by impaired loans as well as the SMEs with 39 percent of their loans impaired. Banks’ sovereign exposure has also significantly increased going from 11.2 to 16.9 percent of total assets in 2014–17 as most governments in the region resorted to issuing more bonds to finance their larger deficits (Box 1).

C. Macrofinancial Linkages

6. The main channel through which macrofinancial linkages operate in Cameroon is the sovereign-bank nexus, both with the Cameroonian public sector including loss-making SOEs, and the other CEMAC governments as mapped in Figure 2.

Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Cameroon: Macrofinancial Linkages

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 256; 10.5089/9781484373378.002.A004

Source: IMF staff illustration.

Fiscal-Financial Linkages

The importance of the public sector in Cameroon makes it the main source of macro-financial linkages through the impact of fiscal policy operations on the rest of the economy and the existence of an important and diverse SOE sector. These links operate both directly through banks’ exposure to the government but also indirectly through the private sector balance sheet’s response to public sector operations.

Direct Channels Through Credit and Deposits

7. The large increase in Cameroonian banks’ sovereign exposure has raised their vulnerability to a government default. Banks’ exposure to the government debt represents 1.7 times the system-wide capital and 7.7 times the system-wide excess capital. Thus, banks are highly vulnerable to a government default or to an increase in the Cameroonian sovereign risk rating for non- observance of the regional convergence criteria.3 Figure 3 shows the number of banks not respecting capital requirements at various levels of government default, and indicates that with a haircut of 12.4 percent on Cameroonian debt, the banking system’s capital adequacy ratio will fall below the minimum requirement. Also, when the haircut exceeds 65 percent, each of the 14 banks, except two, fail to respect the capital adequacy ratio. At this point however, a default by Cameroon appears unlikely.

Figure 3.
Figure 3.

Cameroon: Impact of Fiscal Risks on Banks’ Soundness and Credit Provision, 2012–17

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 256; 10.5089/9781484373378.002.A004

Sources: BEAC; COBAC; and IMF staff calculations.

8. The increase in bank lending to the government has been accompanied by a decline in private sector credit growth and a large decline in credit to SMEs. Despite excess liquidity in the banking system and the possibility of refinancing government securities at the BEAC, the large borrowing from the government between 2014 and 2017 was accompanied by a 3 percentage points decline in the share of private sector credit to total credits. Credits to SMEs declined by 47 percent in 2017, leading to a reduction of its share of total private sector credit of 10 percentage points between 2014 and 2017.

9. On the liabilities’ side, banks could be adversely impacted by the implementation of the Treasury Single Account (TSA), a key reform envisaged by the authorities.4 Traditionally, the government of Cameroon holds large deposits in banks that built their business around these virtually no-cost resources. Thus, eventually transferring these deposits to the TSA will deprive banks from substantial interest income obtained from investing these resources, and will also complicate liquidity conditions for 10 of the 14 banks (Figure 3). For these reasons, a gradual approach for extending the TSA in close collaboration with the BEAC has been favored and supported under the ECF-supported program. The authorities have defined a strategy for a gradual expansion of the TSA’s scope, starting by conducting a census of all accounts, closing dormant accounts, and preparing a calendar for gradually closing existing accounts.

Indirect Channels through the Accumulation of Arrears to the Private Sector

10. Government arrears are potential source of risk to financial sector stability that could limit credit supply. Government suppliers and contractors often borrow from banks to fulfill their contractual agreements. Thus, delays in their payment could lead to a buildup of NPLs. The large government arrears (Figure 4), and the increased payment delays of government bills, were associated with an increase in banks’ loans in arrears. Loans in arrears increased from 13 to 15 percent in the first quarter of 2018 following the large end-2017 accumulation of expenditures float (unpaid bills with a maturity of less than 90 days). Banks have been mitigating the impact of these arrears on their loan portfolio by restructuring overdue loans, limiting new loans to SMEs, and providing smaller loan amounts. The authorities conducted an audit of the end-2016 stock of domestic arrears at end-2017 and have prepared a plan to gradually repay them over the coming years.

Figure 4.
Figure 4.

Cameroon: Government Arrears and Float, 2015–Q1–18

(in percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 256; 10.5089/9781484373378.002.A004

Sources: Cameroonian authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Links originating from States Owned Enterprises (SOEs)5

11. SOEs in Cameroon play a key role in the economy despite a value added of less than 1 percent of GDP. SOEs hold monopolies in key sectors of the economy including in energy, telecommunication, water, and export cash crop agriculture. SOEs are also large providers of formal employment and account for about one sixth of total public jobs. SOEs affect the financial sector through several channels including: (i) directly in the form deposits and loans; (ii) indirectly through their fiscal relation with the government (taxes, subsidies, and contingent liabilities), and SOEs arrears accumulated toward their suppliers.

12. The financial conditions of SOEs have deteriorated, with 8 of the 12 companies experiencing net losses in 2016 including two with negative capital including SONARA (oil refinery). SOEs’ valued added ratio to GDP declined by more than half between 2011 and 2016 owing to a sales’ contraction of 35 percent and a wage bill increase of 29 percent, driven by CAMTEL, the Douala Port, the oil-refinery company SONARA, and the Cameroun Development Corporation (CDC, in the agriculture sector). This deterioration highlights the need for a better control of SOEs’ operating costs. As a result, the cumulative overall net profit of the SOE sector has become negative since 2012 when SONARA started incurring continuously large losses followed recently, by CDC and SODECOTON (Société de Développement du Coton) in the agriculture sector. In addition, government transfers have been larger than the combined SOEs tax and dividend payments.

13. SOEs’ arrears have been increasing with the potential of affecting both the government and the private sector. SOEs’ arrears have almost doubled since 2013 to reach 3.4 percent of GDP (1.8 percent of GDP in 2013), driven by SONARA (53 percent) and CAMTEL (13 percent) (Figure 5). About two-third of these arrears are tax arrears, which generate revenue gaps for the government. The increasing arrears to social security could lead to an increase in pension contributions and/or government subsidies to compensate shortfalls. The other categories of arrears of about 1 percent of GDP associated with the supplier debt of about 26 percent of GDP could affect the private sector’s balance sheet and lead to rising NPLs. A possible cause of these arrears is the buildup of account receivables mostly due to SONARA and the utility companies (CAMTEL, CAMWATER, and CDE), which could originate from unpaid subsidies by the state and cross SOEs debt.

Figure 5.
Figure 5.

Cameroon: Build-up of Contingent Liabilities from SOEs, 2009–17

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 256; 10.5089/9781484373378.002.A004

Sources: Cameroonian authorities; and IMF staff calculations.Note: Data after 2014 come from the livre vert that was prepared by the government on SOEs for the 2018 budget. The data from the previous period come from the 2014 study, by the IMF team, on SOEs in Cameroon.

14. SOEs’ debt remains high and could translate into fiscal costs given the heightened vulnerabilities and accumulated losses in the sector. Total contingent liabilities defined as total debt plus non-tax arrears, have averaged 9.4 percent of GDP between 2014–16 (Table 3). Short-term contingent liabilities are about 6.5 percent of GDP (57 percent held by the insolvent SONARA). Even after accounting for SOEs’ own funds, contingent liabilities stay above 7.3 percent of GDP at end-2016. In that regard, the financial analysis and risk assessment of SOEs that were attached to the 2018 budget were good steps taken by the government to increase awareness about these risks.

Table 3.

Cameroon: Contingent Liabilities from Main SOEs, 2014–17

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Sources: Cameroonian authorities, “Livre Vert”; and IMF staff calculations.

Sum of tax liabilities, pension liabilities, and other debt.

Sum of pension liabilities, other liabilities, financial debt, and debt to suppliers.

Tax liabilities net of government’s liabilities to SOEs.

15. The analysis of the SOEs-banks nexus shows that SONARA is the main driver of risks to the banking system. The 12 SOEs in the sample are net debtors with a ratio of total deposits to banks’ assets of 1.4 percent and a ratio of total credits to banks’ assets of 2.3 percent, at end-2017. Short term instruments dominate both SOEs deposits and credits (90 percent of sight deposits and 73.4 percent of short term debt). SONARA accounts for 65 percent of SOEs’ deposits and 62 percent of SOEs’ credits and it has 87.9 percent of its debt maturing within a year. SODECOTON and CAMTEL had large loans in 2 banks at end-2016 which they largely repaid in 2017. Thus, SONARA remains the main source of direct SOEs risks to the banking system in terms of large exposure and liquidity risks and credit risk (Table 4). Among the 6 banks that have net positive exposure to SONARA: one bank has negative capital; three banks will fail to meet minimum capital requirement if SONARA defaults; while two banks will lose 85 percent and 50 percent of their respective excess capital.

Table 4.

Cameroon: Direct Risks to Banks Stemming from SOEs, 2006–17

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Sources: BEAC; COBAC; and IMF staff calculations.

In 2017, a full SOEs default will cost 2.3 percent of total bank’s assets, a full SONARA default will cost 1.4 percent, and when SONARA’s deposits are used to repay part of its defaulted loans, the losses decline to 0.6 percent.

External-Financial Linkages

The main external linkages in Cameroon hinge on banks’ exposure to other CEMAC countries’ sovereign debts.

16. Cameroonian banks are the largest holders of non-resident bonds in the region, making most of them exposed to sovereign default in the region. Cameroonian banks’ exposure to CEMAC countries has increased from 5 to 8 percent of total assets between 2015 and 2017 with 57.5 percent held toward Chad (48 percent) and Congo two countries in difficult fiscal and debt situation. Already, in H1–2017, the forced rollover of Chadian and Congolese bonds associated with delays in Cameroonian government payments strained Cameroonian Banks’ liquidity conditions causing the refinancing ceiling to be binding for several months. The situation only reverted after the program approval in late June. In addition, Figure 6 shows that all banks would fail to respect the minimum capital requirement if CEMAC countries (excluding Cameroon) defaulted, except for 3 banks that are not exposed to these countries due, for two banks, to the nature of their activities.

Figure 6.
Figure 6.

Cameroon: Number of Banks that do not Meet Minimum Capital Requirements and CEMAC Governments’ Default Rate, 2017

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 256; 10.5089/9781484373378.002.A004

Sources: BEAC; and IMF staff calculations.

Monetary and Financial Sector Risks

Financial sector shocks that affect the rest of the economy can be generated from changes in monetary policy, regulations, or spillover from the rest of economy in which case the financial sector could become an amplifier of shocks. The existence of ailing banks and the structurally high NPLs as well as fragilities in MFIs and mobile money (Box 1) add to the risks originating from the financial sector.

17. The tighter regional monetary and financial policy impacted on banks’ appetite for government bonds. The increase of the policy rate by 50 basis point to 2.95 percent in March 2017, resulted in higher government bond yields and led the Treasury cash situation to severely tighten in most of 2017. The 3-month T-bill rate went from 2.85 to 3.52 percent between January and December 2017. In addition, implementation of the COBAC’s non-zero risk weight rules on Cameroonian banks affected banks’ solvency ratio and large exposure requirements, as Cameroon’s non-compliance with the arrears and fiscal deficit convergence criteria brought its sovereign risk weight to 85 percent. Applying this weight leads to a large deterioration of banks’ solvency ratios, (Figure 7). To mitigate these impacts, in October 2017, the COBAC allowed banks located in countries with an IMF program to request a derogation for up to three years provided corrective measures are taken (see IMF country report No. 18/9). Banks should also be more pro-active in developing a larger investor base for sovereign bonds.

Figure 7.
Figure 7.

Cameroon: Impact of Monetary Policy and Regulatory Changes on Banks and on Government Financing, 2016–17

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 256; 10.5089/9781484373378.002.A004

Sources: BEAC; COBAC; and IMF staff calculations.1/ The assessment was conducted as of end June 2017 instead of end-2017 because of lack of clarity on whether some banks have already started applying the rule at end-2017 in which case the impact would be double counted.

18. Maintaining unresolved ailing banks could lead to rising contingent liabilities and to maintaining moral hazard that could weaken the financial sector. The broad estimation of contingent liabilities arising from the resolution of ailing banks was 0.7 percent of GDP, some of which have already materialized with the nationalization of one of the banks and the transfer of its impaired loans to the government assets management company (SRC) in exchange for a 0.3 percent of GDP long-term government bonds.

19. The high level of NPLs hurts confidence in the financial system and absorbs bank resources that could otherwise be lent to customers. Access to credit in Cameroon is the second impediment to doing business which is partly explained by large unpaid loans in the banking system. Large NPLs increase borrowing cost as more collateral value will be required and higher interest rate are charged due to high default risk.

20. Finally, the increased interdependence between banks and the MFIs and the rapidly growing mobile banking without proper regulation could be source of vulnerability to the financial sector (Box 1). Several banks rely on the MFIs deposits and could suffer from lack of liquidity if those deposit are to be taken away, especially with the largest MFI been granted a bank license and will be allowed to deposit at the BEAC and to provide large credit. Also, the mobile money sector is bringing a fierce competition to MFIs and money transfer institutions that could amplify vulnerabilities in these sectors in the absence of adequate regulation.

Risks to the Financial Sector Stemming from Microfinance Institutions and Banking

The increased interdependence between banks and the less supervised MFIs could represent a source of vulnerability to the financial sector. MFIs play a key role in Cameroon but suffer from weak capacity and governance, lax supervision, large exposure to connected parties, and high credit risk. The bank-MFIs nexus in Cameroon is complex and requires close monitoring to mitigate risks to the financial sector. Having no access to the central bank, MFIs put the bulk of their deposits in commercial banks which in return provide them credits. This creates a strong interdependence mainly as some banks are owned by MFIs, while big banks increasingly use MFIs (sponsorship and/or direct ownership) to access a larger customer base. The largest MFI, with a 25 percent market share, was recently authorized to operate as a bank reinforcing that interrelation.

The rapidly-expanding mobile financial services requires an enabling regulatory framework that preserves financial stability and limits frauds. Long constrained by low competition in the telecom and internet markets, mobile money penetration is increasing, with an increasing number of financial services offered. Access to mobile money has increased from 8 to 29 percent of the adult population while the volume of transactions has dramatically increased from CFAF 7.5 billion to CFAF 3,447 billion in 2012–17. This rapid growth requires security controls and a regulation to prevent fraud and abuse, limit money laundering and terrorism financing in a region experiencing insurgency and terrorist activities. With the easy access to mobile money services and expending service offered, the MFIs and money transfer institutions are losing market share weakening their balance sheet.

D. Stress Tests on the Impact of Macro-Financial Risks on Banks

21. A stress test conducted using banks’ balance sheets at end-2017 confirmed the dominance of sovereign risks in the banking sector in Cameroon and the deterioration of banks assets quality stemming from worsening economic conditions. Figure 7 summarizes the result of stress tests at various levels of risks. It shows that the system-wide risk-weighted assets ratio (RWA) (Figure 8) would decline by 4.4 percent following a 25 percent haircut on Cameroonian government debt, by 3.5 percent due to a 25 percent haircut on other CEMAC countries’ debt, and by 2.7 percent due to full default on SONARA Also, banks are vulnerable to increased NPLs stemming from worsening private sector balance sheets. Another test related to the increase of the BEAC policy rate was neutral due to the nature and the composition of banks’ portfolio—sight deposits, representing about 70 percent of total deposits, do not bear interest payments, and short-term credits, which account for 57 percent of total credits, react positively to interest rate hikes. Finally, banks are little exposed to exchange rate risks.

Figure 8.
Figure 8.

Cameroon: Summary of Macro-Risks’ Impact on Banks, 2017

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 256; 10.5089/9781484373378.002.A004

Source: IMF staff calculations.

E. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

22. The analysis of macro-financial linkages in Cameroon has showed the dominance of sovereign risks in the banking sector in Cameroon including SOEs. To address these risks, several actions need to be taken or reinforced in various areas:

  • Addressing the fragilities in the financial sector while reinforcing monetary policy operations and the regulatory and supervisory environment through:

    • Addressing the structurally high NPLs, by removing information asymmetries by broadening access to CIP-FIBANE-CASEMF platform, the launching of the creditor information database for MFIs, enhancing the availability and management of collateral with computerization of registries (lands, movable assets), improving contract enforcement, and the training of judges in charge of banks conflicts.

    • Moving ahead with planned resolution of the ailing banks and transfer their NPLs to the public asset management company (SRC) using the recently-updated pricing methodology would be important to reinforce the system-wide capita while limiting the fiscal cost.

    • Reducing banks’ dependence to public funds by gradually transferring public deposits to the TSA in line with the newly prepared government strategy.

    • Enhancing the ongoing BEAC efforts to modernize its monetary policy framework and developpe the interbank market, improve liquidity provision to banks, reduce the need for holding government security (used as collateral for getting liquidity). In addition, reinforce the COBOAC onsite supervision, implement the new MFIs regulation while putting in place an innovation friendly regulation for mobile banking.

  • Building fiscal buffers to control borrowing needs and to better withstand shocks through a steadfast implementation of the ECF program’s fiscal consolidation strategy. Avoiding the buildup of government payment arrears will require : (i) improving revenue collection and reducing tax exemptions to expanding the base; (ii) controlling spending through better spending prioritization and investment efficiency and the preparation of a credible budget; (iii) strengthening PFM by eliminating exceptional budget procedures and adopting the new CEMAC directives; and (iv) improving treasury management by expending the TSA coverage and improving the management of correspondent accounts. In addition, the government should also eliminate the use of direct bank lending by issuing T-bonds and T-bills to meet its borrowing needs while expanding its investor base by attracting non-bank institutions and households.

  • Improving the management and governance of SOEs to limit contingent liabilities and risks to banks. The authorities are encouraged to continue the good practice of providing, together with the budget law, a financial analysis of all SOEs that shows the required subsidies and contingent liabilities. The preparation of credible budgets with adequate provision for subsidies and utility bills to be paid periodically would be important to avoid future cross debts between SOEs and the government. For SONARA, a transparent and flexible oil pricing mechanism that guarantees fair returns to each participant (marketers, public entities, and retailers) and a stable fuel tax, and allows a passthrough of international price fluctuations to domestic prices should be defined.

1

Prepared by Mamadou Barry.

2

Loans in arrears is a wider definition of non-performing loans that includes all loans with past due payments.

3

The COBAC has introduced a non-zero risk weight on debt issued by CEMAC countries not respecting the region’s convergence criteria in 2017: a weight of 20 percent for missing the fiscal balance criterion, 65 percent for missing the one on arrears, 10 percent for missing the one on the debt ceiling, and 5 percent for missing the one on inflation.

4

The TSA reform consists of transferring to the Treasury all public accounts held in commercial banks to the exception of those belonging to SOEs.

5

This analysis in this section relies on the 12 largest SOEs selected among the 26 SOEs that provided certified balance sheets or tax returns for the preparation of the 2018 budget. Those 12 SOEs represent m 90 percent of the 26 SOEs’ total capital and the same proportion of their total debt.

6

The decline in supplier debt between 2014 and 2016 comes from the decline of oil prices that helped SONARA to repay part of its supplier debt and from the use of CFAF 100 billion from the 2015 US$750 million Eurobond to retire a public bond held by SONARA in 2016. SONARA reduced its supplier debt by 30 percent each year in 2015–16.

Cameroon: Selected Issues
Author: International Monetary Fund. African Dept.
  • View in gallery

    Cameroon and the CEMAC: Key Indicators, 2014–17

  • View in gallery

    Cameroon: Macrofinancial Linkages

  • View in gallery

    Cameroon: Impact of Fiscal Risks on Banks’ Soundness and Credit Provision, 2012–17

  • View in gallery

    Cameroon: Government Arrears and Float, 2015–Q1–18

    (in percent of GDP)

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    Cameroon: Build-up of Contingent Liabilities from SOEs, 2009–17

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    Cameroon: Number of Banks that do not Meet Minimum Capital Requirements and CEMAC Governments’ Default Rate, 2017

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    Cameroon: Impact of Monetary Policy and Regulatory Changes on Banks and on Government Financing, 2016–17

  • View in gallery

    Cameroon: Summary of Macro-Risks’ Impact on Banks, 2017