France: Selected Issues
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International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
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Selected Issues

Abstract

Selected Issues

Corporate Debt in France1

France’s corporate debt has risen significantly since the global financial crisis and is among the highest in advanced economies, reflecting mainly an increase in intercompany loans and bonds. The increase in debt has financed real investments, as well as acquisition of financial assets and extension of intercompany loans. The increase in debt (and its level) appear less worrisome when debt is consolidated among non-financial corporations. Despite the increase in the stock of debt, debt service has increased moderately. A cross-country regression analysis reveals that French publicly listed firms are on average not more indebted and have not increased their debt more than peers in other countries, after controlling for firm and sector characteristics as well as common time effects. However, the increase in debt is concentrated among large firms with sizeable leverage in a few industries, raising questions about these firms’ ability to service this debt when interest rates rise. Stress test scenarios of a large and sudden increase in interest rates suggest that corporate debt at risk could be significant at a macroeconomic level, but that cash buffers would mitigate the impact of the shock on debt service.

A. Introduction

1. Is the increasing corporate sector leverage a source of concern? The objective of this paper is to document the evolution of French corporate debt since the global financial crisis, analyze the use of this debt, and uncover the importance of heterogeneity across sectors and firms which may have implications at the macroeconomic level. The paper also undertakes a cross-country regression analysis to assess whether there are any France-specific factors that affect the capital structure of firms, or whether instead French firms are on average no more reliant on debt finance than firms in other countries after controlling for firm characteristics and sectoral and time common factors. By making use of stress test scenario analyses at the firm level, the paper also quantifies the impact of various interest hikes on the amount of debt at risk, and assesses whether such shocks are macroeconomically relevant. Such a cross-country study is particularly timely, given the recent decisions by the Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière (HCSF) to set a limit to banks’ exposures to individual large indebted corporates and to activate the countercyclical capital buffer. This paper also complements existing studies by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE), the HCSF and the Banque de France by highlighting the cross-country comparative dimension.2

2. The paper is organized as follows. Section B presents cross-country macroeconomic stylized facts on the level and evolution of corporate debt, while Section C focuses on the firm-level and sectoral composition of debt. Section D studies how the new debt has been used. Section E presents the cross-country regression analysis and Section F is devoted to stress scenario analyses. Finally, Section G concludes.

B. Cross-Country Stylized Facts

3. Unconsolidated nonfinancial corporate debt in France has increased by 20 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2017 and stands at 132 percent of GDP, among the highest in advanced countries. This contrasts with developments in other large euro area countries which have experienced either a stabilization of their corporate debt (Germany) or a significant decrease (Italy and Spain).3 The increase in French corporate debt as a share of GDP since 2010 can be explained mostly by an increase in intercompany loans and bond financing, while bank credit to non-financial firms has increased more moderately. A particularity of French firms’ corporate debt is that intercompany loans and bonds account for about half of non-financial companies’ debt. This feature has been reinforced since the global financial crisis.

A01ufig1

Unconsolidated NFC debt

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics, and IMF staff estimates.
A01ufig2

NFC Unconsolidated Debt Outstanding

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Source: Haver Analytics (ECB Sector Accounts).

4. Netting out intercompany loans, consolidated corporate debt is much lower at 77 percent of GDP, and more in line with peers. Nonetheless, it has still experienced an increase of 12 percentage points of GDP since 2010, mainly resulting from net bond issuances. Subtracting cash holdings from consolidated debt, aggregate net consolidated debt has barely increased during the crisis and stands at 64 percent of GDP, close to the euro area average, suggesting that, in the aggregate, French firms used part of the proceeds to accumulate liquid financial assets, which also account for a larger share of their assets.4

A01ufig3

Consolidated NFC debt

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations
A01ufig4

Net Consolidated Debt

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics and IMF staff calculations.
A01ufig5

Corporate Bond Issuance

(Billions of dollars)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Source: Dealogic, and IMF staff calculations.

5. Unconventional monetary policies, including quantitative easing programs, likely boosted the demand for corporate bonds. Corporate bond issuance has risen in euro area countries since the global financial crisis. The ECB’s purchase of government bonds and asset-backed securities led investors into buying assets with similar characteristics but higher yields, such as corporate bonds, reducing the costs of bond financing. The ECB’s corporate sector purchase programme (CSSP) initiated in mid-2016 brought corporate bond yields even further down.

6. More developed bond markets in France already at the onset of the crisis supported also a higher growth in issuance compared to peers. Bonds represented 13 percent of the unconsolidated corporate debt in France in 2008, against 9 percent in Germany, 5 percent in Italy, and 1 percent in Spain. This ratio has grown to 22 percent in 2017, against 11 percent in Germany and Italy, and 3 percent in Spain. French corporates are responsible for half of the corporate bonds outstanding in the euro area. Furthermore, French firms seem to have easier access to bond financing, as about 8 percent of the large French firms have issued a bond since 2010, against 4 percent of the large firms in other large euro area countries. On the other hand, the high and increasing reliance of French firms on intercompany loans could be explained by a higher importance of corporate groups in France with the parent company distributing liquidity to affiliates, while a higher centralization of cash management within corporate groups since the crisis may have also contributed to accentuating the trend.5

7. Bond issuance surged amid loosening financing conditions relative to the pre-crisis period (Figure 1). The average yield at issuance more than halved from 5 percent in 2007 to 2.1 percent in 2017, while the average maturity increased from 10 years in the period 2000–07 to 15 years in the period 2010–17, with a peak average maturity of 23 years in 2014. The access of firms to bond issuance seems also to have improved, as the share of high-yield issuance increased from a pre-crisis average of 5 percent to a post-crisis average of 15 percent. At the same time, while 73 percent of the issued bonds had a fixed rate prior to the crisis, this number has increased to 93 percent in the post-crisis period. In contrast, only about 50 percent of the outstanding corporate bank loans have a fixed rate. Around one third of the bond issuances was used to repay debt, while about 15 percent was used to finance mergers and acquisitions, with a peak of 30 percent in 2016. Market financing conditions have also improved in other large euro area countries.

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Characteristics of Bonds Issued

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

C. Sectoral and Firm-Level Composition of Debt

8. In this section, we rely on firm-level data to uncover potential heterogeneity in sectoral and firm-level indebtedness:

  • Sectoral considerations. We aim to understand whether differences in corporate debt levels across countries result from differences in the sectoral composition of output and different propensities to borrow across sectors, or whether firms that belong to the same sector tend to display different debt levels across countries.

  • Broad-based versus concentrated leverage. Making use of firm-level data is important because aggregate data could mask pockets of vulnerabilities that could be macroeconomically relevant if leverage is sufficiently heterogeneously distributed across firms and if there is some concentration of high and increasing leverage among a few sectors or large firms.

9. We rely on firm-level consolidated data from Worldscope on listed nonfinancial firms in France and in peer countries to analyze potential heterogeneity across firms and sectors. Worldscope is an adequate data source for cross-country comparisons because it contains comparable data on consolidated balance sheets and financial statements of listed companies.6 In our dataset, we have 440 French firms (e.g. headquartered and listed in France) which represent around 60 percent of the total gross output of nonfinancial firms. To improve comparability, we add to the sample of listed firms the state-owned railway company, SNCF, which is not listed in France, contrary to railway companies in peer countries. The SNCF alone was responsible for 10 percent of consolidated debt, for an increase in consolidated debt to GDP of over 2 percentage points between 2010 and 2016, or 23 percent of the increase in consolidated debt in our sample of firms. The euro area peer countries are Germany, Italy, and Spain. Other countries considered also include Belgium, the Netherlands, the US and the UK. The Worldscope data are reasonably representative and account for about 40 percent of their total consolidated debt. According to Worldscope data, aggregate debt-to-asset ratios are close to 30 percent, which is below the corresponding ratios in the main peer countries.

A01ufig6

Representiveness of Worldscope

(Percent of gross output/sales; Percent of consolidated debt)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Worldscope and IMF staff estimates.
A01ufig7

Debt to Assets

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Worldscope and IMF staff estimates.

10. Our analysis shows that, as in other peer countries, the consolidated debt stock of listed firms as well as the post-crisis debt increase is concentrated in a few sectors (Figure 2). The manufacturing and utilities sectors account each for around 20 percent of the debt stock of listed firms in France and the transportation and retail sector each for about 10 percent. In Germany the manufacturing sector accounts for 60 percent of the debt stock, while network sectors account for over 60 percent of the debt stock in Italy and Spain. Similarly, the debt increase in the post crisis period was mainly caused by the transportation, oil and gas, manufacturing, healthcare and retail sector in France, while the manufacturing and healthcare sectors were responsible for the debt increase in Germany. The construction and utilities sectors contributed to the decrease in debt in Spain, while the utilities sector contributed to the decrease in debt in Italy. The concentration of debt to some extent reflects the distribution of assets and of output across sectors among listed firms.

Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Distribution of Debt Stock

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

11. While network sectors and retail are the most leveraged sectors in France, there is no evidence that leverage is on average higher in France (Figure 3).7 Sectoral debt to assets ratios constructed from aggregated firm-level data are not particularly high in France compared to peer countries, while network sectors tend also to be more leveraged in peer countries. A particularity of France is that highly leveraged sector (utilities, retail, and telecom) have also a high debt to income ratio, suggesting a low capacity to service the debt despite the low interest rate environment (see also Figure 4).

Figure 3.
Figure 3.

Leverage and Buffers of Publicly Listed Companies

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

12. The debt stock and the increase in debt are concentrated among a few firms in France. In our sample, 15 out of 440 firms are responsible for 63 percent of the outstanding debt stock of publicly listed companies, while state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are responsible for 41 percent of this debt. Out of 280 firms increasing debt between 2010 and 2016, 15 firms account for 66 percent of the debt increase, while firms with the state as a shareholder account for 45 percent of the debt increase.8 There is a large intersection between the listed firms which have increased debt the most in our sample and the largest bond issuers.

13. Bond issuance is concentrated among a few sectors in every large euro area country. In France, Italy, and Spain, network sectors (utilities, transportation, and telecom) and also the oil sector are the main bond issuers, while in Germany the auto-industry was responsible for almost half of the bond issuances. In Italy and Spain, the utilities and telecom sectors are responsible for more than half of the bond issuances. In France the utility sector is responsible for 20 percent of the issuance, followed by 12 percent from the transportation sector, and around 9 percent from the telecom, oil, and retail sectors each.

A01ufig8

Bond Issuance Per Sector 2009-17

(Percent of total issuance)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Source: Dealogic and IMF staff calculations.

14. As in other countries, gross bond issuance in the post-crisis period was highly concentrated among a few firms. The five largest issuers were responsible for almost half of the bond issuances in Germany, Italy, and Spain between 2009 and 2017, while in France the five largest issuers were responsible for 34 percent of the issuance. The largest issuer in Spain was responsible for almost one third of the issuance, while the largest issuer in Germany and Italy was responsible for around 15 percent of the issuance, and in France for 10 percent. French enterprises with any state-ownership were responsible for around one third of the bond issuance, while firms majority-owned by the state were responsible for 18 percent of the issuance.

D. How Do Firms Use Their Debt Financing?

15. At the macroeconomic level, French firms tend to be more dependent on external financing for gross capital formation than their euro area peers. In France, there is a positive correlation between bank credit and investment in physical capital. While French firms had lower gross savings than corporates in other euro area countries in the period 2010–16 (20 vs 25 percent of GVA), they invested more in capex (24 vs 20 percent of GVA), which explains a higher need for external financing.

A01ufig9

Nominal NFC Investment, Credit, and FDI Growth

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics, and IMF staff estimates.
A01ufig10

Income Sources and Uses, 2010-16

(Percent of GVA)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics and IMF staff calculations.

16. A particularity of French firms is that a large part of their external financing is also used to acquire financial assets (such as equity and cash) or to extend intercompany loans. During the period 2010–16, external financing9 of French firms (17 percent of GVA) was much larger than the net amount of 4 percent of GVA needed to finance their capex (24 percent of GVA) net of internal sources of funds (20 percent of GVA). This discrepancy between the actual external borrowing and net needs for external borrowing is much higher than in other large euro area countries. This is explained by the large investment of French firms in financial assets. Indeed, French firms invested on average 17 percent of their GVA in financial assets, double as much as other large euro area countries where corporate savings were higher than capex. On aggregate, for every €1 in new external financing, French firms spent 23 cents in capex, 20 cents in extending intercompany loans, 20 cents in cash, 27 cents in acquiring equity, and 10 cents in other financial assets. This particularity of French firms is not a consequence of the global financial crisis: even before French firms spent a high share of their external financing in financial assets, only Spanish firms had a similar behavior prior to the crisis. As a result, the ratio of cash to consolidated debt has increased from 22 to 28 percent despite the higher level of debt and now stands at the euro area average. Equity assets have also gained from positive valuation effect.

A01ufig11

Decomposition of Income Sources

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations.
A01ufig12

Decomposition of Income Use

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations.

17. The high level of financial liabilities and assets of French firms is related to corporate structures with intercompany connections. According to unconsolidated sectoral accounts, almost 60 percent of the financial assets held by nonfinancial corporates are from other corporates and other corporates hold 45 percent of the corporate sector liabilities.10 Specifically, 41 percent of the corporate loans were extended by other companies which also hold half of the corporate sector equity. The only other large euro area which presents a somehow similar but less financially interconnected corporate landscape is Spain.

A01ufig13

Financial Assets

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations.
A01ufig14

Financial Liabilities

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations.

18. In our dataset, publicly listed firms which have increased their debt the most have used the proceeds to increase their cash holdings and to invest. Two-thirds of the 15 firms with the highest debt increase have increased their cash holdings by at least 30 percent of their debt increase amount, while one third of them have increased their cash holdings by more than 70 percent of their debt increase amount. There is also a positive correlation between the incurrence of debt and investment in physical capital. Interestingly, the large firms with an interest coverage ratio (ICR) below 2.5 have used at least 40 percent of their borrowing to increase their cash holdings. This suggests that part of the borrowing has been used for precautionary purposes, potentially related to risks of faster than expected rise in interest rates. This behavior of borrowing to accumulate cash could also be related to carry-trade strategies.

19. On average, listed firms which increased their indebtedness between 2010 and 2016 do not appear particularly vulnerable (Table 1). They invested more and were more profitable than firms which did not increase their indebtedness. Around 60 percent of the listed firms in France have increased debt between 2010 and 2016. If we compare the balance sheet and performance of these firms with those which have not increased debt, we find that the former: (i) are more leveraged in 2016 but were less leveraged at the beginning of the crisis; (ii) are larger; (iii) have ICR which are comparable to the ones of firms which have not increased debt; (iv) have lower cash to debt ratios; (v) have invested more; (vi) had faster growing sales; and (vii) were more profitable.

Table 1.

Characteristics of French Firms Which Have Increased Debt Between 2010–16

article image

20. However, the picture for large indebted firms appears less positive (Table 2). Large indebted firms are defined as large firms which have an ICR below 3 and a net debt to equity ratio above 100.11 12 Large indebted firms, whether they are French firms, or firms from peer countries, are more leveraged and have a substantially lower ICR than the other firms in our sample. They have lower cash to debt ratios than the rest of the sample, but their cash to debt ratios have increased more since the crisis. These firms have also invested less, had lower sales growth, and are less profitable than other firms.

Table 2.

Characteristics of Large Indebted Firms

article image

E. Is Corporate Debt a France Specific Issue? Cross-Country Econometric Analysis

Econometric Specifications

21. We perform two sets of regression analyses to understand the importance of firm-level characteristics and of country and sectoral factors in explaining the levels and evolution of corporate debt over time. The purpose is to uncover the extent to which firm-level indebtedness decisions are influenced by country characteristics, in particular in France, as well as the importance of firm-level characteristics and sectoral factors. As in previous sections, we rely upon consolidated balance sheet information and financial statements of publicly listed firms from Worldscope, covering the period 2010 to 2016, for France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the US.

22. First, we aim at understanding the determinants of firm leverage, in particular whether firms are more (or less) indebted than their peers, after accounting for firm and sectoral observed or unobserved characteristics. We rely upon a simple panel regression analysis explaining a measure of firm leverage (Yisj, t) of firm i, that belongs to country j and sector s at the end of year t by: its lagged value, a set of firm-level control variables, and a complete set of time dummies (Dt), sector fixed effects (Gs) and country fixed effects (Fj) to account for unobserved characteristics. Firm-level observed control variables are lagged by one period (vector Xisj, t-1) and include profitability (return on assets), size (measured by total assets, relative to the average for all firms in a country), tangibility of assets (the ratio of fixed assets to total assets), availability of cash flows (the ratio of sales to total assets), growth opportunities (the annual growth rate of sales), and the dividend payout ratio. These variables are considered as standard determinants of firm indebtedness.13 Specifically, we consider the following panel specification for the period 2010–2016, with standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity:

Y i s j , t = α Y i s j , t 1 + Σ β X i s j , t 1 + D t + F j + G s + ε i s j , t ( 1 )

23. Second, we aim at uncovering the determinants of the change in firm leverage between 2010 and 2016 to determine whether country characteristics mattered. A simple cross-sectional regression analysis relates the change in leverage (ΔYisj) of firm i that belongs to sector s and country j between 2010 and 2016 to its initial debt-to-asset ratio in 2010 (Yiisj, 2010), a set of firm-level characteristics averaged over 2010–2016 (Xisj), country fixed effects (Fj) and sectoral fixed effects (Gs). The cross-sectional regression is specified as follows, with standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity:

Δ Y i s j = α Y i s j , 2010 + Σ β X i s j + F j + G s + ε i s j ( 2 )

Findings

24. Firm-level characteristics, as well as country, time and sectoral fixed effects, help explain firm leverage (Table 3). In our regression analysis, we considered the following measures of firm leverage as dependent variables: the debt-to-asset ratio, the debt-to-equity ratio, the long-term debt-to-asset ratio and the long-term debt-to-equity ratio. We find that more profitable firms, firms offering higher dividend payouts, and with a higher proportion of fixed assets to total assets tend to have higher leverage, while firms with faster sales growth tend to be less indebted. These findings are driven by long-term debt defined as the portion of debt that has a maturity above one year. There is also very little persistence of firm indebtedness, as demonstrated by the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, meaning that the debt level converges very fast to the value predicted by firm-level characteristics and various fixed effects. This result holds for each of the four measures of leverage considered. This suggests that firms in our sample have on average experienced notable changes in their capital structure during the period considered.

Table 3.

Determinants of Firm Leverage

article image
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Period of observation is 2010-2016, Fixed effect for 2010 omitted

France is the country omitted and Chemicals is the industry omitted.

25. Our analysis uncovers very large effects related to time trends and sectoral effects:

  • Time trends. Time effects common to all firms appear to be very significant economically, implying that debt-to-asset ratios are on average five percentage points higher in 2016 relative to 2010 (compared to an average debt-to-asset ratio of 30 percent in our sample). Debt-to-asset ratios and long-term debt-to-assets ratios are significantly different from their levels in 2010 from 2013 onwards. These time effects show that debt has increased significantly after the crisis after controlling for firm and sector characteristics. The better access of large firms to financing after the crisis could be related to the low interest rate environment and unconventional monetary policies by major central banks. These time effects also appear to be driven by the portion of debt with a remaining maturity above one year.

  • Sectoral effects. The sector to which a firm belongs seems to significantly impact its leverage.14 In particular, sectors such as telecommunication, transportation and utilities tend to be much more indebted than other sectors in all countries.

26. The evidence suggests that, once firm characteristics, sectoral and time effects are taken into account, French publicly listed firms are on average no more (or even less) leveraged at a consolidated level than firms from many countries:

  • Firms more leveraged than French firms. Italian, Spanish and US firms appear significantly more leveraged than French firms once sectoral fixed effects, time fixed effects and firm characteristics are controlled for. For Italian firms, the difference seems to mainly reflect a higher reliance on short-term debt. For Spanish firms, the difference is significant both for short-term and for long-term maturities. For US firms, the difference seems to reflect a higher reliance on long-term debt than for French firms.

  • Firms with comparable leverage. Dutch and German firms have debt ratios that are not economically or statistically different from French firms.

  • Firms significantly less leveraged than French firms. British firms are the only ones to appear to have debt ratios that are systematically lower than the ones of French firms, after controlling for the sector of operation, time effects, and observable firm characteristics.

A01ufig15

Country-specific Determinants of Leverage, 2010-16

(In percent of assets, relative to France)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Note: Country fixed effects from each regression; France is the omitted country; A * indicates significance at the 5 percent level.Sources: Worldscope and IMF staff calculations.

27. A large share of the cross-sectional variation in the change in leverage is explained by country and sectoral fixed effects, but also by some firm characteristics (Table 4). Our regression specification explains about half of the cross-sectional variable in the change in leverage, mainly because the change in indebtedness is significantly negatively influenced by the initial leverage, so that a firm that has a leverage above (respectively below) the leverage predicted by its characteristics, country and sector, will experience a decline (respectively an increase) in its indebtedness. The change in leverage also appears to be significantly influenced by the country or sector it belongs to. This implies that some country and sector characteristics changed during the period of observation and contributed to the evolution of firm leverage.

Table 4.

Determinants of the Change in Firm Leverage

article image
Robust standard errors in parentheses; averages over 2010-2016 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

period average unless otherwise noted

France is the country omitted and Chemicals is the omitted industry

28. Country and sector fixed unobserved effects have economically large impacts on the change in leverage, and suggest that French firms have not increased their leverage more than peers:

  • Country effects. On average, French firms’ indebtedness has not increased more than among firms in peer countries. In fact, the change in firm debt between 2010 and 2016, after controlling for the initial leverage, was larger in Italy, in Spain and in the US. The change in French firm’s indebtedness was not significantly different than that of peers in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.

  • Sectoral effects. Firms operating in sectors such as telecommunications, transportation and utilities have increased their indebtedness more than firms operating in other sectors of activity. These sectors usually finance themselves via bonds and could profit from the looser bond financing conditions.

F. Risks Associated with High Corporate Debt

29. Financing costs have declined since the crisis, leading to a decrease in interest payments as a share of income despite higher debt levels (Figure 4). In our firm-level dataset, the effective interest rate (defined as the ratio of interest payments to the stock of debt) has declined from 4 percent in 2010 to 3 percent in 2016 and median ICRs (defined as EBIT over interest expenses) have increased over time. However, the ratios of consolidated debt and total debt service to income have risen in France in recent years due to the sheer amount of new debt and are above the ones of peer countries. The consolidated debt to income ratio has increased from 694 percent in 2007 to 885 percent in 2017. By the same token, total debt service of French firms has increased steadily since the global financial crisis, reaching more than 50 percent of income in 2017.

Figure 4
Figure 4

Impact of Common Time Effects and of Sectoral Effects on Firm Leverage

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Figure 5.
Figure 5.

Impact of Country Effects and Sectoral Effects on the Change in Firm Indebtedness

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Figure 6.
Figure 6.

Debt Serviceability

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

30. The share of debt owed by vulnerable firms (“debt at risk”) has doubled in France in recent years. Vulnerable firms are defined to be those with an interest coverage ratio below two for three consecutive years. The share of debt owed by vulnerable firms in France is the second highest in our sample, behind the Netherlands. In our dataset of listed firms, the share of debt owed by vulnerable French firms has increased from 9 percent in 2013 to 18 percent in 2016 (in terms of GDP, from 3 percent in 2013 to 6 percent in 2016). Since debt is concentrated among a few large firms, the ratio of debt under risk is often driven by few large firms. The ratio of debt under risk has also increased in Germany, the Netherlands, UK, and US.15

A01ufig16

Share of Debt Owed by Firms with an ICR<2

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Worldscope and IMF staff calculations.
A01ufig17

Debt Owed by Listed Firms with an ICR<2

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Worldscope and IMF staff calculations.

31. French corporate debt at risk is concentrated in the transportation and retail sectors. In general, only four firms are responsible for 90 percent of the debt at risk in France in our dataset, and SNCF’s debt at risk accounts for 10 percent of total consolidated debt (text chart). In the Netherlands and UK, the telecom sector accounts for a large share of the debt at risk, while the oil and gas sector accounts for a large part of the debt at risk in Spain, Italy, and the US. In Spain the construction sector also contributes to a large part of the debt at risk, while the utilities sector has a more prominent role in debt at risk in Germany.

A01ufig18

Share of Debt Owed by Firms with an ICR<2

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Worldscope and IMF staff calculations.

32. A large share of debt in France is owed by firms which have a low interest coverage ratio and a high net debt to equity ratio.16 A high net debt to equity ratio may be the consequence of a financing choice of large firms which have ample access to cheap borrowing and does not necessarily reflect a risk to service its debt. However, a large net debt to equity ratio and at the same time a low ICR signals that the firm concerned has chosen a capital structure that is vulnerable to shocks to interest rates. The share of debt owed by listed firms with a net debt to equity ratio above 100 percent is lower in France than in other large euro area countries. However, the concern is that, in France (as in Italy and Spain), a large share of these firms which have chosen a high net debt to equity ratio also have also have low ICR ratios.

A01ufig19

Distribution of Total Debt

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Worldscope and IMF staff calculations.

33. A risk mitigating factor is that firms have used their debt to increase their buffers of liquid assets. Aggregate data show that the ratio of cash holdings to consolidated debt has increased in all large euro area countries. In France, this ratio has increased from 22 percent in 2010 to 28 percent in 2016. However, our firm-level dataset on listed firms shows that the cash to debt ratio of vulnerable firms in France is lower than the cash to debt ratio of nonvulnerable firms, 18 vs 48 percent. In addition, this ratio has decreased recently for vulnerable firms while it has increased for nonvulnerable firms.

A01ufig20

Cash Holdings

(Percent of consolidated debt)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Haver Analytics and IMF staff calculations.
A01ufig21

Cash to Debt Ratios

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Worldscope and IMF staff calculations.

34. Shock scenarios show that an increase in interest rate could increase considerably the amount of consolidated debt under risk, but that risks are reduced through the holdings of liquid assets.17 We shock the data in 2013–16. We consider that a firm is vulnerable if its ICR falls below two in all three years. We consider the following four scenarios:

  • a 200 basis points increase in interest rate on total debt;18 19

  • a 200 basis points increase in interest rate on total debt and a 100 bps increase in interest rate on liquid assets;

  • a 200 basis points increase in interest rate on total debt and on liquid assets; and

  • a 200 basis points increase in interest rate on total debt and on liquid assets, combined with a 10 percent increase in profits (if these are positive).

35. Debt at risk can increase substantially and become macroeconomically relevant, but cash buffers and other liquid assets could significantly attenuate the extent of the shock. An increase in the interest rate on debt of 200 bps (shock 1) double or more than double the amount of debt at risk in all countries, with the exception of the Netherlands which has already a high ratio under the baseline. The share of debt owed by French listed firms at risk increases from 18 to 35 percent, or from 6 percent of GDP to 12 percent of GDP.20 However, given that firms own a considerable amount of liquid assets, considering a concomitant increase in interest rates on liquid assets (shocks 2 and 3) decreases the ratio debt at risk considerably in France, Germany, Italy, UK, and US. In France the ratio of debt at risk under shock scenarios 2 and 3 are even lower than under the baseline due to firms’ large holdings of liquid assets. Finally, with the exception of Spain, there is no difference between the results of scenario 3 and 4, when we assume an increase in profits in addition to the interest rate increase.

A01ufig22

Share of Debt Owed by Listed Firms with an ICR<2

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Worldscope and IMF staff estimates.
A01ufig23

Debt Owed by Listed Firms with an ICR<2

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2018, 244; 10.5089/9781484371138.002.A001

Sources: Worldscope and IMF staff calculations.

36. In more complete scenarios, additional risk factors could add to the stress experienced by leveraged firms. A weakening of growth would adversely impact firms’ cash flows and their ability to repay their debt. Moreover, sudden increases in interest rates beyond the “normal” increase related to the expected normalization of monetary policy would be associated with additional shocks, such as decompression of risk premia and a decline in stock market value which would increase debt-to-equity ratios, while firms may face pressure to distribute dividends to support stocks (also, the value of new goodwill accounted for in recent years could decline). Last, the value of financial assets other than cash would decline, limiting the ability to use them to offset cash outflows.

G. Conclusions

37. Corporate debt has increased significantly in France since the financial crisis, in contrast to other large euro area countries. The increase in corporate debt as a share of GDP can be mostly explained by an increase in intercompany loans and bond financing. The increase in debt is concentrated among a few sectors (network sectors and retail) as in peer countries, and among firms with the state as a shareholder have contributed to this increase. Firms have used their borrowing to invest in physical capital, but also to accumulate financial assets (mainly equity and cash) and to extend intercompany loans.

38. Regression analyses show that, after controlling for firm characteristics and sectoral and time fixed effects, French firms are not more indebted than comparable firms in peer countries. Moreover, they have not increased their leverage more than peers. In general, listed French firms which have increased their indebtedness since the crisis do not appear particularly vulnerable: they invested more and were more profitable than firms which did not increase their indebtedness. However, there are some pockets of vulnerabilities among large indebted firms which have high interest rate payments relative to their income and are less profitable.

39. Interest payments as a share of income have decreased since the crisis due to lower interest rates, but a faster-than-expected increase in interest rates could make it difficult for firms to service their debt. The share of debt owed by vulnerable listed French firms (those with an ICR below 2 for three consecutive years) has doubled from 3 percent of GDP in 2013 to 6 percent of GDP in 2016. Shock scenarios performed on publicly listed firms show that this ratio can increase up to 12 percent of GDP after an increase in interest rates. However, the fact that many firms have invested part of their debt to boost cash buffers mitigates the risks from a rate hike.

40. The authorities should remain vigilant to prevent the build-up of imbalances in the corporate sector that could have spillovers to the banking system. In this context, they should consider:

  • Building buffers in the banking system to limit potential spillovers. The decision to limit bank exposures to large indebted corporates and the activation of the countercyclical capital buffer are welcome decisions.

  • Continuing to rely on communication tools to raise awareness of market participants.

  • Further reducing tax incentives favoring debt relative to equity.

References

  • Charasson-Jasson, Hélène, 2017, “L’endettement des Grands Groupes Français: Comment Evolue-t-il? Que Finance-t-il?”, Banque de France Bulletin No. 214, November-December 2017.

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  • Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Martinez-Peria, Maria Soledad, and Thierry Tressel, 2015, “The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Firms’ Capital Structure”, Policy Research Working Paper No. 7522. World Bank, Washington, DC.

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  • Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière (HCSF), 2018, “Private non-financial sector indebtedness: where do we stand?,” Thematic Publication, January 15, 2018.

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  • Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE), 2017, “Faut-il s’inquiéter de la hausse de l’endettement des enterprises en France?,” Note de conjonctore, December 2017.

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1

Prepared by Luiza Antoun de Almeida and Thierry Tressel (EUR). The paper has benefitted from excellent research assistance provided by Tania Mohd Nor. We thank the authorities for very constructive and helpful discussions and comments.

2

The paper by the HCSF (2018) can be found at: https://www.economie.gouv.fr/hcsf. The paper by INSEE (2017) is published as a chapter of the Note de Conjoncture December 2017, available at: https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/3292415. The paper by the Banque de France is a chapter of the Banque de France Bulletin No. 214 of November-December 2017.

3

In Spain, the decline reflects a correction after a pre-crisis credit boom.

4

The measure of liquid assets includes only cash and deposits. Other liquid assets such as money market funds are not included.

5

In France, about ⅔ of employment is by firms that belong to a group (INSEE Premiere, March 2012, No. 1399).

6

The stylized facts presented in the paper are not directly comparable to others, including the study from INSEE which relies upon firm-level data on listed and non-listed French firms.

7

The conclusions are drawn from our sample of listed firms.

8

SNCF alone accounts for 10 percent of the debt stock and 23 percent of the debt increase in our sample.

9

External financing includes all incurring of financial liabilities, such as loans, bonds, and equity.

10

Equity accounts for most of the increase in intercompany liabilities in France between 2010 and 2016.

11

Large firms with an ICR below 3 and a net debt to equity above 100 in 2016 represent 24 percent of the debt in our sample (8 percent of GDP) and 9 percent of the assets in our sample (11 percent of GDP).

12

We use same definition used by the Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière in setting the macroprudential limit of banks’ exposures to large indebted firms.

13

See for instance A. Demirguc-Kunt, M. Martinez-Peria, and T. Tressel, “The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Firms’ Capital Structure”, Policy Research Working Paper No. 7522, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2015.

14

In each sector, our cross-country dataset involves between minima of 31 firms (in Telecom), 51 firms (in Transport) to maxima of 740 firms (in manufacturing) and 755 firms (in the residual unclassified “other” category).

15

SNCF was flagged as a vulnerable firm in 2016 but not in 2013. SNCF’s debt alone represents 3.4 percent of GDP in 2016. Similarly, the considerable increase in the Netherlands is caused by the inclusion of one company in the sample of vulnerable firms which owes a relatively large share of total debt.

16

A low ICR is defined as an ICR below 3 and a high net debt to equity ratio is defined as a net debt to equity ratio above 100. This is the definition of large indebted firms used by the Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière (HCSF) in its macroprudential policy to limit banks’ exposures to vulnerable firms.

17

These shock scenarios do not take into account that part of the debt is under a fixed interest rate and would be thus not immediately affected by an interest hike. Hence the results presented are upper bounds of the effects of the shocks.

18

A 200 basis points increase in interest rate corresponds to halving the decrease in interest rates since the onset of the global financial crisis.

19

In a variation on the main scenario, we shocked only the debt that is under variable interest rates (estimates suggest that only about 65 percent of total debt).

20

If only the debt under variable rate is shocked, the share of debt owed by vulnerable listed French firms would increase to 23 percent (instead of 35 percent).

References

  • Batini, Nicoletta, 2016, “Structural Unemployment—Causes and Potential Remedies”, Selected Issues Paper, International Monetary Fund.

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  • Tressel, Thierry, 2017, “Revisiting the Competitiveness Problem,” Selected Issues Paper, International Monetary Fund.

1

Prepared by Nicoletta Batini and Simon Voigts (EUR).

2

Also see N. Batini, “Structural Unemployment—Causes and Potential Remedies”, Selected Issues Paper, International Monetary Fund, 2016 and T. Tressel, “Revisiting the Competitiveness Problem,” Selected Issues Paper, International Monetary Fund, 2017.

3

See LOI n° 2015-994 du 17 août 2015 relative au dialogue social et à l’emploi.

4

See LOI n° 2016-1088 du 8 août 2016 relative au travail.

5

See LOI n° 2015-990 du 6 août 2015 pour la croissance.

6

The CICE is a tax credit amounting to 7 percent of gross payroll for remuneration equal to or below 2½ times the minimum wage.

7

In effect, this reduction occurred in 2012, when the CICE was introduced, but it was not captured by standard OECD measures of the tax wedge.

8

As of 2014, according to the Delegation Générale a l’Emploi et á la Formation Professionelle.

9

See Cour de Comptes, Rapport Public Annuel, 2017.

10

A person working on ultra-short (less than a month) work contracts for the minimum wage (SMIC) for 46 percent of the time and tapping unemployment insurance between them, topped up with other benefits, can make an income equal to 83 percent of someone who works full time for SMIC (Cahuc and Prost, 2015).

11

Plan D’action Pour La Croissance et la Transformation des Entreprises.

12

Retirement saving vehicles in France include: (i) PERCO: Company-sponsored collective DC pension plan; pays out lump sum or annuities; savings may be subject to lifestyle management by default; (ii) PERE: Company-sponsored collective DC pension plan; pays out annuities only; lifestyle management is possible but not by default; (iii) PERP: Individual retirement saving scheme; (iv) Madelin: Individual retirement saving scheme for the self-employed members of the workforce; (v) Life assurance contracts: Operates like a savings account; when the person insured dies, the beneficiary receiving the proceeds pays inheritance tax only over €152,500; savings are predominantly held in bonds.

13

Also see OECD 2014, “France: Structural Reforms: Impact on Growth and Options for the Future.”

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France: Selected Issues
Author:
International Monetary Fund. European Dept.