Romania
Financial Sector Assessment Program-Detailed Assessment of Observance of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
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This paper discusses findings of the Detailed Assessment of Observance of the Basel Core Principles (BCP) for Effective Banking Supervision in Romania. The supervisory approach of the National Bank of Romania (NBR) has been changing toward a more risk based approach since the previous BCP assessment, but more needs to be done. Further development of the NBR’s supervisory approach will make supervision more effective and in line with the requirements of the 2012 BCP. The NBR may need to devote more supervisory attention to banks’ risk models and building up further expertise in specialized areas such as information technology and market risk. In the area of corrective actions and sanctions, the NBR should review its framework to ensure it is protected from undue legal challenges.

Abstract

This paper discusses findings of the Detailed Assessment of Observance of the Basel Core Principles (BCP) for Effective Banking Supervision in Romania. The supervisory approach of the National Bank of Romania (NBR) has been changing toward a more risk based approach since the previous BCP assessment, but more needs to be done. Further development of the NBR’s supervisory approach will make supervision more effective and in line with the requirements of the 2012 BCP. The NBR may need to devote more supervisory attention to banks’ risk models and building up further expertise in specialized areas such as information technology and market risk. In the area of corrective actions and sanctions, the NBR should review its framework to ensure it is protected from undue legal challenges.

Summary1

1. As an European Union (EU) Member State, Romania is subject and aligned to the EU common regulatory framework for banking supervision. The EU regulatory framework for banking supervision has been subject to significant changes since the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis. The adoption of the Capital Requirements Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRR/CRD IV) which forms the Single Rule Book was an important step towards stronger prudential regulation. Given that a large part of Romania’s banking system is owned by Eurozone banks, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as the home supervisor for Eurozone banks, is a key partner of the National Bank of Romania (NBR). Prudential regulations of the NBR are broadly aligned to the requirements of the Basel Core Principles (BCP). As of 2017, the NBR has identified 11 banks as systematically important, of which 8 are supervised at group level by the SSM.

2. The supervisory approach of the NBR has been changing toward a more risk based approach since the previous BCP assessment, but more needs to be done. As of January 2016, the NBR Board approved the adoption of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) Guidelines of the European Banking Authority (EBA)2 into national supervisory practices making it the core supervisory tool for banking supervision. Nevertheless, the new EBA SREP methodology is still in the early stages of implementation. The processes for ensuring consistency and accuracy of scoring, findings, and supervisory measures across different banks need to be improved and have yet to be formalized and documented. The NBR needs to further enhance off-site monitoring tools by incorporating more forward-looking views (e.g., bottom up stress testing tools). More risk-focused and thematic banking industry-wide analyses and examinations triggered by recent trends or events are also warranted.

3. Further development of the NBR’s supervisory approach will make supervision more effective and in line with the requirements of the 2012 BCP. The NBR may need to devote more supervisory attention to banks’ risk models and building up further expertise in specialized areas such as IT and market risk. In the area of corrective actions and sanctions, the NBR should review its framework to ensure it is protected from undue legal challenges, and strengthen internal procedures to ascertain that supervisory measures or sanctions are more consistently applied across the banking system. Post examination processes should be enhanced for banks to implement supervisory measures in a prompt manner. Intensified engagement with nonexecutive/independent board members is warranted for a more proactive supervisory practice.

4. Some weaknesses were observed concerning regulations not governed by the harmonized EU framework. Prudential regulations of the NBR are broadly aligned with the requirements of the BCP. However, the regulations on related party transactions and country/transfer risk include only high level principles, and lack sufficient specificity. The NBR should consider giving more specific guidance to banks and supervisors through amending regulations, issuing instructions, and/or developing the on-site handbook. The NBR also needs to enhance its oversight of concentration risk and intra-group transactions, even if the exposures comply with the regulatory limits.

5. The authorities should maintain their current successful and proactive approach to steer the timely reduction in problem assets. Nonperforming loans (NPLs) peaked at 21.9 percent in 2013 following the 2007 crisis, before declining to close to 6 percent in 2017. The NBR successfully led efforts to clean up banks’ balance sheets through multiple initiatives designed to ensure the timely recognition, realistic provisioning and disposal of NPLs, and maintains annual bank-by-bank supervisory targets for NPL reductions. The framework for credit risk management was significantly strengthened and close monitoring, including through annual examinations, is conducted. Considering still high levels of nonperforming and forborne exposures, the NBR shall continue to closely monitor these exposures and ensure that proactive measures are implemented to clean up bank balance sheets and prevent any new increase in credit risk.

6. The NBR should better ensure banks’ boards effectively exercise their responsibilities. Corporate governance requirements were appropriately strengthened in recent years and now constitute a cornerstone of the NBR’s supervisory approach. Attention is paid to effective implementation during on-site full-scope examinations and when approving key persons. However, the NBR only requires some banks (i.e., subsidiaries) to have an “adequate” number of independent board members. Banks usually only have one or two independent board member(s), which is insufficient. Although the NBR places a lot of responsibilities on the board, it does not yet organize regular exchanges with nonexecutive and independent members.

Introduction and Methodology

7. This assessment of the implementation of the BCP in Romania has been completed as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), which has been jointly undertaken by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 2017, at the request of the Romanian authorities. The assessment reflects the regulatory and supervisory framework in place as of the completion of the assessment. It is not intended to analyze the state of the banking sector or the crisis management framework, which are addressed by other assessments conducted in this FSAP.

8. An assessment of the effectiveness of banking supervision requires a review not only of the legal framework, but also a detailed examination of the policies and practices of the institutions responsible for banking regulation and supervision. In line with the BCP methodology, the assessment focused on the NBR’s supervision of banks, and did not cover the specificities of regulation and supervision of other financial intermediaries, which are addressed by other assessments conducted in this FSAP.

A. Information and Methodology Used for Assessment

9. This assessment was against the standard issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 2012. Since the past BCP assessment, which was conducted in 2011, the BCP standard has been revised. The revised Core Principles (CPs) strengthen the requirements for supervisors, the approaches to supervision, and the supervisors’ expectations of banks through a greater focus on effective risk-based supervision and the need for early intervention and timely supervisory actions. Furthermore, the 2012 revision placed increased emphasis on corporate governance and supervisors’ conducting sufficient reviews to determine compliance with regulatory requirements and thoroughly understanding the risk profile of banks and the banking system. This assessment was thus performed according to a significantly revised content and methodological basis, compared to the previous BCP assessment carried out in 2011 (Box 1).

10. The Romanian authorities opted to be assessed against both essential criteria (EC) and the additional criteria (AC) but graded on the basis of EC only. To assess compliance, the BCP Methodology uses a set of EC and AC for each principle. The EC set out minimum baseline requirements for sound supervisory practices. The AC are recommended as the best practices against which the authorities of some more complex financial systems may agree to be assessed and graded. Romanian authorities chose to be graded against only EC.

11. Grading is not an exact science and the CPs can be met in different ways. The assessment of compliance with each principle is made on a qualitative basis. Compliance with some criteria may be more critical for effectiveness of supervision, depending on the situation and circumstances in a given jurisdiction. Emphasis should be placed on the commentary that accompanies each Principle grading, rather than on the grading itself.

12. The assessment team held extensive meetings with NBR staff, the Ministry of Public Finance (MOPF), the industry, and other relevant counterparts who shared their views with the assessors. The team also reviewed the framework of laws, regulations, and supervisory guidelines. The NBR provided self-assessments of the CPs and comprehensive questionnaires filled out by the authorities. The NBR also facilitated access to supervisory documents and files, staff, and systems.

13. The assessment team appreciated the excellent cooperation, including extensive provision of internal guidelines/procedures, supervisory files, and reports. In particular, the team would like to thank the NBR staff who responded to the extensive and detailed request promptly and accurately during the assessment.

The 2012 Revised Core Principles

The revised BCP reflect market and regulatory developments since the last revision, taking account of the lessons learned from the financial crisis in 2008/2009. These have also been informed by the experiences gained from FSAP assessments as well as recommendations issued by the G-20 and the FSB, and take into account the importance now attached to: (i) greater supervisory intensity and allocation of adequate resources to deal effectively with systemically important banks; (ii) application of a system-wide, macro perspective to the microprudential supervision of banks to assist in identifying, analyzing, and taking pre-emptive action to address systemic risk; (iii) the increasing focus on effective crisis preparation and management, and recovery and resolution measures for reducing both the probability and impact of a bank failure; and (iv) fostering robust market discipline through sound supervisory practices in the areas of corporate governance, disclosure, and transparency.

The revised BCP strengthen the requirements for supervisors, the approaches to supervision and supervisors’ expectations of banks. The supervisors are now required to assess the risk profile of the banks not only in terms of the risks they run and the efficacy of their risk management, but also the risks they pose to the banking and financial systems. In addition, the supervisors need to consider how the macroeconomic environment, business trends, and the build-up and concentration of risks inside and outside the banking sector may affect the risks to which individual banks are exposed. While the BCP set out the powers that supervisors should have to address safety and soundness concerns, there is heightened focus on the actual use of the powers in a forward-looking approach through early intervention.

The number of principles has increased from 25 to 29. The number of essential criteria has expanded from 196 to 231. This includes the amalgamation of previous criteria (which means the contents are the same), and the introduction of 35 new essential criteria. In addition, for countries that may choose to be assessed against the additional criteria, there are 16 additional criteria. While raising the bar for banking supervision, the CPs must be capable of application to a wide range of jurisdictions. The new methodology reinforces the concept of proportionality, both in terms of the expectations on supervisors and in terms of the standards that supervisors impose on banks. The proportionate approach allows assessments of banking supervision that are commensurate with the risk profile and systemic importance of a wide range of banks and banking systems.

Institutional and Market Structure

14. Romania’s financial sector remains dominated by banks that hold around 80 percent of financial sector assets. In April 2018, there were 35 banks in Romania, 29 of which are foreign-owned (22 subsidiaries, seven branches). The five largest banks concentrate about 60 percent of total deposits in the system (57 percent of all loans). The nonbank financial sector remains small, although their relative share slightly increased, with investment funds, private pension funds, insurance companies and other nonbank financial institutions accounting for about 20 percent of financial system assets. The Romanian insurance market has one of the lowest levels of insurance density and insurance penetration in Europe. The sector has recently stagnated as several major insurance companies have come under financial strain. The Romanian capital market is characterized by relatively few issuers, a limited number of new issues and initial public offereings (IPOs), and low liquidity. The equity market with only 84 listed companies had a market capitalization of EUR 32 billion as at the end of 2015. The fixed-income market is also relatively small and undiversified, with around 80 bonds traded at the Bucharest Stock Exchange, the majority being securities issued by central and local governments. There are only seven corporate bonds issued.

Table 1.

Overview of the Structure of the Banking System (As of end–2016)

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Source: NBR.

15. Foreign-owned banks’ dependencies on parent funding has significantly declined. The share of deposits from the domestic private sector (about a third of which are demandable, and the rest at short terms of up to one year) has increased from about 48 percent of banks’ total liabilities in 2011 to about 66 percent in 2017, while parent funding has declined markedly to about EUR 7 billion (approximately 7 percent of total liabilities), a third of the level in 2011. As a result, the system-wide loan-to-deposit ratio fell to around 77 percent in 2017, from 131 percent in 2008. In the context of the Vienna initiative, debt liabilities were replaced by capital injections from parent banks, boosting capital ratios and reducing vulnerabilities.

16. As a non-Eurozone EU Member State, Romania is subject to the EU common regulatory framework for banking supervision. All Member States must apply the CRR/CRD IV. The SSM is applicable only to Eurozone members and non-Eurozone members who opt to join. Until now, no non-Eurozone EU members have officially opted into the SSM. For non-Eurozone EU countries like Romania, where a large part of the banking system is owned by SSM-supervised Eurozone banks, the SSM has become the home supervisor with whom close collaboration with the NBR takes place.

17. Responsibilities for prudential supervision of the financial sector are split:

  • The NBR is an administratively independent Central Bank with a mandate to supervise credit institutions and verify observance of the laws and regulations that apply to the banking sector.

  • The Financial Supervisory Authority (ASF), established in 2013, is responsible for the supervision of nonbanking financial market participants and the licensing and registration of individuals and institutions. In particular, it supervises (i) the intermediaries of financial instruments operations (financial investment undertakings, undertakings for collective investment, investment management companies, financial investment consultants, financial instruments markets, market and system operators, central depositories, clearing houses, central counterparties, market operations, securities issuers); (ii) insurance, insurance-reinsurance and reinsurance companies, mutual undertakings, and insurance intermediaries; and (iii) the private pension system.

18. The NBR plays key roles in the institutional framework underpinning financial stability. The NBR, established under the Law 312/2004, is responsible for ensuring and maintaining price stability. The main tasks of the NBR include the following: to define and implement the monetary policy and the exchange rate policy; to license, regulate and supervise credit institutions; to promote and oversee the payment systems; to issue notes and coins to be used as legal tender on the territory of Romania; to set the exchange rate regime and supervise its observance; and to manage the official reserves of Romania.

Preconditions for Effective Bank Supervision

A. Sound and Sustainable Macroeconomic Policies

19. Romania made important progress in addressing economic imbalances and restoring growth after the global financial crisis. Partly in the context of successive EU and IMF-supported programs in the period to 2015, macroeconomic stability was restored. Growth more recently accelerated on the back of fiscal stimulus, and Romania’s real GDP growth surged to 6.9 percent in 2017. Low imported inflation and indirect tax cuts kept inflation subdued, but inflationary pressures have increased since mid-2017 on account of sharp wage increases and strong domestic demand, leading monetary policy to tighten after a long period of accommodation. With signs of overheating, there is a risk that the current policy trajectory increases macroeconomic volatility, and wears down buffers, adversely afecting market confidence.

20. Implementation of sound macroeconomic policies is essential for the stability of the Romanian financial system as a whole. Relatively weak cooperation, coordination and synchronization among policies (monetary, macroprudential and fiscal policies) may lead to cyclical imbalances and structural vulnerabilities. Such imbalances and vulnerabilities could lead to negative spill-overs on the financial and the general macro equilibrium, creating the potential for negative reaction to the occurrence of adverse standard business cycle or rare shocks.

B. Framework for Financial Stability Policy Formulation

21. The institutional framework for macroprudential policymaking has recently been strengthened and contains a clear mandate and well-defined objectives, but NBR’s role seems constrained. A new National Committee for Macroprudential Oversight (NCMO) was established in April 2017. By law, the NCMO is the national macroprudential authority with a clear legal mandate to set macroprudential policies with the objective to contribute to safeguarding financial stability by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and containing the build-up of systemic risk. The law was the result of a three-year long parliamentary process, mainly due to concerns about excessive powers of the NBR. As a result, the number of NBR representatives in the nine-member NCMO was reduced from the proposed five members to three, giving the NCMO the same number of representatives as the ASF, and the Government. It is chaired by the Governor of the NBR and the Secretariat resides within the NBR.

22. The institutional arrangement seems to guarantee adequate powers to ensure the NCMO’s ability to act, but its willingness to act remains to be more thoroughly tested. The NCMO has direct (hard) powers over a wide-range of macroprudential tools. It is empowered to recommend actions to be taken by other supervisory authorities or the Government, and to issue warnings, coupled with a ‘comply or explain’ mechanism. As of April 2018, it has only held five meetings and issued ten recommendations, including the required quarterly recommendations on the countercyclical capital buffer. The Technical Commissions on Systemic Risk and Financial Crisis Management, respectively, who should support the NCMO’s work, are still to become operational.

23. The communication process is performed in a transparent and relatively effective manner. The communication process includes the following: (i) an official press release is published on the website after the meeting of NCMO’s General Board, which includes a summary of the meeting; (ii) publication of a macroprudential policy strategy; (iii) publication of the recommendations and adopted decisions on the NCMO’s official website, where the motivation behind these is also detailed; (iv) the publication of the Annual Report, which will take place for the first time next year, by 30 June 2018; (v) publication of opinions; (vi) NCMO’s own website provides various information about macroprudential policies; (vii) the macroprudential measures can also be found within the Financial Stability Report of the NBR which is published on a semi-annual basis; and (viii) there will be future seminars and debates to promote the activities of the NCMO.

24. The macroprudential policy toolkit was recently expanded with the CRR/CRD IV framework becoming operational in Romania. In particular, the authorities have implemented or are phasing-in a number of capital buffers. The stressed Debt Service to Income (DSTI) limit is currently applied to consumer loans and maximum LTV ratios on mortgages have been undermined by the Prima Casa program.

C. A Well-Developed Public Infrastructure

25. The delay in implementing the new personal insolvency regime may be hampering access to credit. The new Personal Insolvency Law3 aims at providing over-indebted consumers with a second chance by allowing them to access a debt discharge, which is in line with the trend observed in Eastern European countries in recent years. Initially scheduled to enter into force in January 2016, implementation of the Law has been postponed several times due to administrative reasons, including the establishment of specialized regional administrative bodies and the lack of trained personnel and financial resources. The law was adopted without an impact assessment and its final effects on the financial sector remain to be seen. On June 9, 2017, the Government approved the methodological norms required to administer the procedure, although additional rules, regulations, and guidelines would need to be prepared for an efficient implementation.

26. Significant improvements have been made on the credit reporting system in the past decade. Credit information sharing is universally considered a key credit infrastructure component for its positive impact on the quality of lending (for example, by reducing information asymmetry) and overall financial sector stability (by providing data driven tools for both lenders and regulators). The project for establishing a Private Credit Bureau was initiated in 2004 with a large participation of local banks. The process of collecting and disseminating data was initially limited to negative information, but later expanded to include positive data following international best practices. After five years of operations, the Bureau started to provide additional services to banks, such as credit scoring.

27. Both the NBR and the ASF have taken important steps to strengthen the oversight of systemically important financial market infrastructures, and increased cooperation between the authorities is recommended. The NBR oversees the real time gross settlement payment system and SaFIR, the central securities depository for government securities and NBR securities, whereas the ASF supervises the clearing and settlement systems of the Bucharest Stock Exchange. The legal framework for financial market infrastructures has been strengthened through the adoption of EU legislation. The NBR also formally adopted the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures and has assessed the systems under its purview against these principles. The NBR’s project to internalize the payment and settlement systems within the central bank is expected the strengthen the financial infrastructure.

28. Parliament passed several populist laws last year that would have allowed debtors to walk away from mortgages (‘datio in solutum’) and convert Swiss Franc denominated loans at historical exchange rates. Recent rulings by the constitutional court have limited the potential negative impact on the banking sector of these laws, but there is a concern that further legislative measures could be in the offing. The final effects of the personal insolvency law, providing over-indebted consumers with a second chance by allowing them to access a debt discharge, remain to be seen. Recently, Romania’s Government decided to cap deductions from nonperforming loan sales to 30 percent of their value, limiting tax deductibility of losses incurred by firms who sell NPLs at a discount relative to what they had provisioned for. As such, banks are discouraged to sell receivables and are encouraged to directly execute debtors.

D. Framework for Crisis Management, Recovery, and Resolution

29. Implementation of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in Romania is recent and institutions are still adapting to the change. The transposition of the EU directive into the country’s primary legislation concluded in 2015 (Law 312/2015). Since then, the institutions in charge of the bank recovery and resolution framework (NBR, MOPF, ASF, and Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund (FGDB)) have made important strides towards adapting to their new responsibilities and toolkit. As the resolution authority, the NBR has been charged with all key responsibilities in the bank resolution area, while some components of the framework have been delegated to the deposit insurer (management of the bank resolution fund and financing of the resolution measures) and to the MOPF (granting extraordinary public financial support) as a key domestic counterpart in crisis prevention and resolution. Some of the operational elements of implementing the new framework have yet to settle, especially part of the contingent arrangements (e.g., a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), framework agreements between the MOPF and FGDB). The operational readiness has not been tested and given a market structure where systemic banks are subsidiaries of major international banks (61 percent of assets in the banking sector fall under single resolution board’s (SRB’s) authority), part of the contingent arrangements require a tight cross-border coordination with the other relevant authorities within the resolution colleges. This international coordination work has started, at the level of the resolution colleges, where a continuous process of reviewing the group resolution plans takes place.

30. The responsibilities of the FGDB have been significantly enlarged in the area of bank resolution. The 2015 resolution framework empowered the FGDB as the administrator of the newly created bank resolution fund. The resolution fund’s target level is 1 percent of deposits covered and is currently at 60 percent of that objective, which should be attained latest by 2024. In addition, the FGDB has the mandate to serve as (i) a temporary administrator; (ii) special administrator of a credit institution under resolution; (iii) shareholder of a bridge institution; or (iv) shareholder of an asset management vehicle.4

E. Public Safety Net

31. The NBR has over the years strengthened its liquidity provision framework. The overarching criteria for liquidity provision are based on objectives of preservation of economic stability and the support to solvent but illiquid entities. However, the existing arrangement has not been tested in recent years under economic stress of systemic nature, and a formal operational framework for emergency liquidity assistance is still under construction. Authorities are using the legal framework of the European Central Bank (ECB) 2017 agreement in this area as the base for their formulation.

32. In December 2015, Romania adopted new legislation (Law 311/2015) which transposed EU Directive 2014/49 on deposit guarantee schemes. The deposit insurance fund has a high level of coverage (99.5 percent of accounts), and at 3.4 percent of the amount of eligible deposits has nearly reached its target. Contingent financing continues to remain work in progress. While the law allows the FGDB to count on the MOPF within specific time limits (five days), the specific arrangements for the financing to take place are yet to be finalized.

33. Romania undertook a crisis simulation exercise in 2013. While many of its lessons have been internalized by the BRRD transposition and other regulatory and supervisory enhancements since then, a new simulation exercise would be useful to test preparedness domestically and in coordination with regional counterparties. Ultimately, authorities should consider preparing a program of continuous tests and simulations that keep the crisis management framework up to speed.

F. Effective Market Discipline

34. Financial reporting, auditing and disclosure requirements in Romania are largely harmonized with those applicable across the European Union and in line with international standards. The Romanian banking system has been required to report financial information based on the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) at a consolidated level since 2006 and at individual level since January 2012. Banks representing close to three quarters of banking assets are subsidiaries of EU banking groups, which are generally listed and subject to effective market discipline at group level. A 2017 law created a new public oversight body for external auditors in Romania. A 2016 analysis of the corporate governance framework conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development assessed corporate governance along five dimensions and rated the structure and functioning of the Board, internal control and stakeholders and Institutions as fair, transparency and disclosure as fair/moderately strong and the rights of shareholders as moderately strong. Areas where corporate governance was considered weak included board effectiveness (incl. lack of requirement for the Board to approve the company’s budget and set the risk profile/appetite, uncommon practice on board evaluation and limited numbers of their audit committee meetings), gender diversity at the Board, and the functioning and independence of the Audit Committee (incl. minority of independent members, lack of proper qualification of members, insufficient disclosure on number of meetings).

35. With respect to rules on corporate governance, according to the Romanian Banking Law5, each credit institution must have robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organizational structure with well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks it is or might be exposed to, adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administration and accounting procedures, and remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management. In this respect, the governance arrangements of a credit institution, the processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks, the internal control mechanisms as well as the remuneration policies and practices must be established by its Articles of Association and internal regulations, according to the Companies Law and in compliance with the provisions of national and European legal framework in banking area.

Main Findings

A. Responsibilities, Objectives, Powers, Independence, and Accountabilities (CPs 1–2)

36. The NBR has clear responsibilities as a supervisor, adequate resources and independence, even if the framework protecting the latter should be strengthened. Banking supervision in Romania falls exclusively within the responsibility of the central bank. As Romania is a member of the EU, banking supervision is also significantly harmonized and integrated across member states. Laws and regulations are regularly updated. The NBR, as a supervisory authority, possesses stable governance arrangements and effective operational independence. However, the MOPF could participate in NBR Board meetings and the reasons for the dismissal of a Board member do not have to be disclosed. The decision to approve sanctions/orders is the sole responsibility of the first deputy governor; there is no internal guidance or formal independent function available to assist the first deputy governor in determining adequate decisions. The NBR dedicates large resources to supervision, in terms of staff, equipment and other variable costs. The NBR adopted detailed arrangements to prevent and manage conflicts of interests at all levels. However, there is no post-employment or cooling-off framework covering situations where a staff or Board member intends to take (or takes) a position in a bank supervised by the NBR (or that it has directly supervised). Although the NBR board members and staff are adequately protected against lawsuits for actions taken and/or omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith, this protection does not apply to the institution.

B. Ownership, Licensing, and Structure (CPs 4–7)

37. The NBR implements a well-designed regime for licensing, transfer of significant ownership and major acquisitions. Only licensed credit institutions can provide banking services. NBR has exclusive competence for granting and withdrawing the license of banks incorporated in Romania and branches of banks located outside the EU. The NBR last licensed a bank in 2009. The licensing framework includes clear and detailed criteria. The ownership structure of locally incorporated banks and branches of EU banks is transparent. The NBR implements a rigorous definition of transfer of significant ownership, in line with the provisions of CRD IV, as well as requirements on the transparency of bank ownership. This largely, but may not fully, cover the transfer of beneficial ownership. The NBR has a detailed framework to review major acquisitions. As part of the consolidation of the Romanian banking system, The NBR reviewed and approved four requests for acquisitions in the past five years (all related to mergers between banks licensed in Romania). Romanian banks only have small activities outside Romania.

C. Ongoing Supervision (CPs 8–10, 12)

38. The supervisory approach of the NBR has changed towards a more risk based approach since the previous BCP assessment. As of January 1, 2016, the NBR Board approved the adoption of the EBA SREP Guidelines (EBA/GL/2014/13) into national supervisory practices. The Romanian regulatory framework has implemented the provisions of CRR, CRD IV and BRRD (resolvability assessment). The SREP is a core supervisory tool of banking supervision in Romania and deploys a good mix of onsite and offsite supervisory tools and techniques. The NBR has broad information collecting power by legislation; in particular, the Central Credit Register allows supervisors to access high-granularity data.

39. Nevertheless, the new EBA SREP methodology is still in the early stages of implementation. During SREP, there is no structured/independent review to ensure consistency and accuracy of scoring, findings, and measures of the supervisory report. Considering the recent adoption of the EBA SREP methodology in Romania, the quality assurance procedure is critical. Authorities should consider a way to ensure consistency and objectivity of SREP scores, findings, and supervisory measures. For instance, the authorities could establish an independent review process, develop on-site and off-site supervisory assessment handbooks, and improve the electronic platform to more effectively manage findings, measures, and follow-ups.

40. With regard to off-site supervision, a significant part of this off-site function includes the approval/rejection of requests concerning amendments in a bank’s situation.6 This responsibility of the offsite function could limit to a certain extent, the ability of the NBR to maintain a thorough and deeper analysis of the risks that banks and banking groups are facing. Regulatory cost and benefit exercises may be warranted in respect of optimum allocation of supervisory resources. Authorities could review the off-site activities regarding various approval processes for supervisors so they may focus more on qualitative risk analysis.

41. More risk-focused, banking industry-wide thematic analyses and examinations across systems, triggered by recent trends or events, appear to be limited. The Financial Stability Department (FSD) publishes financial stability reports on a half yearly basis and performs top-down stress testing, and shares the results with banking supervisors. However, the results of the FSD have limited applicability and are not directly communicated to individual banks for supervisory purposes. During 2016 and 2017, there were no thematic inspections carried out at the banking system level. The NBR is not differentiating the frequency of full-scope examinations based on the outcome of the risk profile analysis of banks; instead, the asset size and the overall SREP score of the previous year are the main factors in determining the scope and intensity of examinations. Authorities should consider a more risk-focused approach such as conducting thematic analysis and/or examinations across the banking system with a mix of off- and on-site activities for a specific type of risk.

42. Other improvements should be sought, including cooperation with other domestic supervisors, bottom-up stress tests, monitoring of intra-group exposures, and more frequent off-site monitoring on a consolidated basis. While the NBR and ASF share relevant data and supervisory findings, there are no regular meetings between the NBR and ASF, and there is no systematic process to prepare on-site examinations of banking groups, develop a joint view on risks in relation to a particular banking group, align supervisory approaches, and discuss potential concerns on the banking group or subsidiaries. In addition, the main quarterly monitoring tools of the NBR do not seem to have embedded a forward-looking view of a bank’s risk profile (e.g., no bottom up stress testing tools) and quarterly KRIs are monitored on a solo basis.7 The NBR should consider developing a bottom-up stress testing methodology as a complementary supervisory tool, and enhance the intra-group exposures monitoring and consolidated supervision, in coordination with the ASF where relevant.

D. Corrective and Sanctioning Powers (CP 11)

43. The NBR has sanctioning powers and tools in almost all respects, however, the sanctioning/order issuance process needs to be enhanced. Regarding the internal process for determining measures and sanctions, the NBR currently conducts insufficient analysis to ensure consistency, accuracy and justification of inspection outcomes and sanctions across the banking system. More specifically, there is no consistent internal independent review process to ascertain that the applied measures or corrective actions are adequate and consistent. Therefore, the NBR should consider establishing an independent review process and/or introducing relevant guidance in this regard. In addition, the NBR, as a competent authority of credit institutions, cannot impose any measures regarding the merger process or acquisition by a third party per Banking Law8.9

44. Post examination processes should be improved to guarantee more effective implementation of corrective actions. Regarding the supervisory follow-up, the time frame described in the internal rules of the NBR is not always adhered to. Assessors note that the issuance of supervisory reports and written orders is often delayed.10 Assessors were informed that formal wrap-up meetings after on-site inspections do not always take place. This practice would hinder banks from implementing supervisory measures in a prompt manner.

E. Cooperation and Cross-Border Banking Supervision (CPs 3, 13)

45. Cooperation among EU supervisors is intense, reflecting increasing integration of the EU banking market and the dominance of EU banking groups in Romania. Arrangements are in place to facilitate and ensure cooperation with relevant domestic and foreign authorities. Cooperation among domestic authorities is organized, but meetings with the ASF are too infrequent to allow for effective coordination. International cooperation is in place for EU banking groups, that control three quarters of banking assets in Romania, and where the NBR is the host supervisor. The NBR is a member of 15 EU colleges of supervisors, which allow for effective information sharing and unified supervisory actions. Close coordination is also in place for crisis management and resolution, at the domestic level with the resolution arm of the NBR and, for large banks active in Romania, within EU supervisory and resolution colleges. All Romanian banks prepared recovery plans starting in 2016; resolution plans were also prepared for almost all of these institutions (and their groups where applicable)

F. Corporate Governance, Risk Management, Internal Control and Audit (CPs 14, 15, 26)

46. An increased emphasis on the role of independent directors and direct and regular exchanges between the NBR and non-executive Board members are essential to ensure effective corporate governance. Corporate governance requirements were strengthened at the EU level and transposed in Romania starting in 2013, clearly laying out the responsibilities of the management body in ensuring banks operate in a safe and sound manner. The NBR conducts a thorough review process, including challenging interviews, before approving members of the management body, and during the on-site full-scope examinations. However, the NBR only requires subsidiaries to have an “adequate” number of independent members in the management body. Banks usually only have 1 or 2 independent member(s), which is insufficient to encourage challenging other executive and nonexecutive members and, where appropriate, lead specialized committees. Moreover, although the NBR places a lot of responsibilities on the management body, it does not yet meet on a regular basis with its nonexecutive and independent members (nor sends them letters detailing serious shortcomings or transmitting on-site reports).

47. Regulations set detailed and demanding requirements for control functions. Discussions with the NBR confirmed the importance placed on risk management, internal control and audit during on-site inspections. However, the NBR has not yet developed detailed internal methodologies to facilitate a comprehensive and consistent review of these issues. Reviews of practices at industry level in these areas could also usefully inform the supervisory process.

G. Capital Adequacy and Liquidity Risk (CPs 16, 24)

48. It is noteworthy that the Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program (RCAP) of the BCBS reviewed the EU-wide capital and liquidity framework and concluded that certain features deviated from Basel standards.11 The RCAP concluded that the EU requirements follow the Basel standards set by the BCBS broadly, but with a number of divergences, where the EU is less conservative than the BCBS, which positively impacts ratios. In terms of the capital framework, the most significant divergences between the Basel III framework and the EU capital regulation do not seem to be material for Romanian banks. A deviation concerns the treatment of credit exposures for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) under the Standardized Approach, where less stringent capital requirements do seem to be applied.

49. There is no dedicated team or unit within the NBR’s supervisory department (SD) responsible for evaluating, approving, reviewing and overseeing banks’ internal models. Two banks have been approved to use the advanced approach to calculate regulatory capital for credit risks and three banks for operational risks. Although the number of banks applying the advanced approach is small, the banks that apply it are large in Romania. The FSD has a quantitative assessment division that assists the SD whenever supervisors need to approve the advanced approach in a certain bank or validate internal models, but they are not involved in supervision and examination on an ongoing basis. There would be an increasing need to devote more supervisory attention to banks’ risk models used for their own risk management purposes and in regulatory capital calculations. NBR examiners should focus more on periodic validations and independent testing of different models, even when the banks are not generating inputs for the regulatory capital calculations.

H. Credit Risk, and Problem Assets (CPs 17–18)

50. Following the sharp deterioration in credit quality after the global financial crisis, the NBR led efforts to clean up banks’ balance sheet and ensure their soundness. The framework for credit risk management was significantly strengthened and close monitoring, including through annual examinations, is still conducted. Nonperforming exposures (NPE) increased rapidly and dramatically after 2007 and peaked at 22 percent in 2013 before declining to 6.4 percent in December 2017. The NBR was instrumental in promoting this rapid reduction through multiple initiatives designed to ensure the timely recognition and realistic provisioning of NPEs (e.g., interim June audits, independent collateral revaluations, full provisioning of high risk exposures, write-offs etc.). The NBR continues to closely monitor NPEs, thanks to detailed and regular reportings, and ensures proactive implementation of requirements on problem loans.

I. Related Parties Transactions, Concentration, and Country risks (CPs 19– 21)

51. The current regulation on the transactions with related parties (RP) has deficiencies against the CP. The current definition of affiliated parties is not as broad as the requirements in this CP. For example, the current definition fails to capture any person in a key position or a major individual shareholder of other group entities within a banking group, including the parent bank/company itself. In terms of RP identification, there is no explicit presumption power of the NBR in the regulation, although the NBR, in practice, may exercise discretion in applying the definition on a case by case basis. Moreover, there are no explicit provisions that require that the “write-off” of RP exposures exceeding specified amounts is subject to prior approval by the board. Information on RP transactions collected during off-site supervision is not sufficiently granular to capture the exact characteristics. Overall, RP regulation describes high level principles, but does not give clear guidance to banks. The NBR should review and amend the regulation on affiliated party transactions in a more prudent manner.

52. The NBR applies the EU-wide large exposure regime, and the banks’ concentration risk management is assessed in the context of SREP. However, there is no explicit requirement in the regulation that the bank’s policies and processes require all material concentrations to be regularly reviewed and reported to the bank’s Board, even though the practices are examined during on-site inspections. The explicit inclusion in regulation may be important in Romania considering the high level of sovereign debt concentration in banking industry. Even if the exposures comply with the large exposure or RP limits, assessors noted several examples where certain exposures should be examined further in the context of concentration risk or RP transaction management.12 The NBR should consider conducting a thematic review on concentration risks across banks (particularly focusing on banks where the large exposure limit is set at EUR 150 million or 100 percent of capital, and banks that have high concentration risks).13

53. The NBR regulation for country and transfer risk management is not sufficiently comprehensive. The NBR will check the country/transfer risk policies and processes implemented by banks if the country and transfer risks are significant for a bank or banking group. However, the regulation includes only high-level principles similar to the BCP text, and lacks sufficient substance. The NBR does not give any further/specific guidance to banks and supervisors through regulations, instructions, or the on-site handbook. It is difficult to ascertain what and how supervisors should examine during on-site inspections.14 There are no specific regulatory provisioning standards for country risk and transfer risk in Romania. Also, there are no specific regulatory requirements for banks to include appropriate scenarios into their stress testing programs to reflect country and transfer risk analysis. It is therefore not clear how supervisors perform a banking group-wide country risk analysis across each entity to form a comprehensive view of country risk.

J. Market Risk, Interest Rate Risk in the Banking Book, and Operational Risk (CPs 22, 23, 25)

54. In the Romanian banking system, the level of market risk is low for most of the Romanian credit institutions that do not have complex instruments. As of June 2017, risk weighted assets (RWAs) for market risk were around three percent of total RWAs. None of the banks use the advanced approach for computing market risk capital charges. The CRR and EBA SREP guidelines are comprehensively stipulated and the NBR conducts on-site inspection on all credit institutions annually. However, there is no market risk specialist in the supervision department; one should be assigned to build up expertise in this area. In terms of interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB), the Basel Committee published a new guideline on standards for IRRBB in April 2016, but the NBR has not updated the IRRBB rules accordingly. Authorities mention that currently they are in the process of amending regulation regarding IRRBB.

55. With respect to operational risks, a guideline on cyber security and/or information communication technology (ICT) for banks has not been implemented yet. Regarding IT resources, the SD has one IT systems specialist but does not have a dedicated unit; this could be considered insufficient in times of increasing demand, since the SD does not use external IT experts. The authorities mentioned that they are planning to hire more IT risk experts and new EBA Guidelines on ICT Risk Assessment (2017) will be implemented starting January 2018.

K. Financial Reporting, Auditing and Disclosure (CPs 26–28)

56. Financial reporting, auditing and disclosure requirements are largely harmonized at the EU level. Banks are required to prepare financial statements in compliance with the IFRS and have them certified by an external auditor which complies with international audit standards. Banks’ external auditors belong to the network of the four biggest global auditing firms and a large French auditing firm (with the exception of the credit cooperative network). Rotation requirements are implemented since 2014, either for the firm or the signing partner. All banks adopted specific policies and most rotated the firm. Five small banks appointed their external auditor in 2001–08 and only rotated the signing partner. The NBR confirmed that the tenure of these signing partners did not exceed seven years. There is, however, no internal methodology defining criteria used by the NBR to assess the adequacy of banks’ policies on rotation (and set a maximum time limit to guide supervisory assessments). Financial and prudential disclosure requirements are detailed and largely unified at the EU level. The NBR confirmed that these fully apply to banks incorporated in Romania on annual basis. The NBR verifies individual disclosure requirements and published detailed and updated information on banking activities and risks. A review of disclosure practices across the entire industry could usefully be conducted.

L. Abuse of Financial Services (CP 29)

57. In recent years, the Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) supervision of the NBR was strengthened particularly to be in line with the changes imposed by the new European Directive. The new European regulatory framework Directive (EU) 2015/849 provides a number of requirements on risk-based supervision, and a newly enhanced AML/CFT law is to be submitted for the Parliament’s legislative procedure. The NBR is in the early stages of implementing a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision. The NBR has assessed the Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (ML/TF) risks, ranked banks, and established a detailed methodology for a risk-based approach to its AML/CFT supervisory activities.

58. Nevertheless, several shortcomings remain. Under Romanian law, only correspondent banking relationships with banks outside the EU are subject to enhanced due diligence measures. Under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standard, however, enhanced due diligence should be implemented with respect to all correspondent banking relationships, and no exception is currently made for intra EU correspondent banking relationships. Simplified due diligence is imposed in specific circumstances without a sound assessment that would have established that these circumstances present low ML/TF risks.

Detailed Assessment

A. Supervisory Powers, Responsibilities, and Functions

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B. Prudential Regulations and Requirements

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Summary Compliance of Base Core Principles

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Recommeded Actions and Authorities’ Comments

A. Recommended Actions

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B. Authorities’ Response to the Assessment

59. The NBR would like to thank the IMF, the World Bank and the entire FSAP mission team for the BCP assessment work. We recognize the importance of the FSAP not just as an independent peer review assessment but also as a collaborative process that provides learning opportunity to staff on both sides, and is of value for its policy advice. The Basel Core Principles for effective banking supervision introduced requirements that represent a challenge to supervisors worldwide and require adopting a long-term approach toward gradual compliance. In this regard, it is important that the IMF and World Bank continue to analyze different supervisory approaches and disclose the assessments results, in order to build a larger sample of practices, representative enough to outline the main tendencies or tools for reaching convergence with the Basel Core Principles.

60. Since the last FSAP mission to Romania in 2008–2009, substantial improvements have been made and are positively reflected in the report. The measures adopted by the Central Bank include strengthening of banks’ capital positions and setting medium-term targets for increasing minimum Capital Adequacy Ratios (CARs); strengthened NBR monitoring of banks’ loan portfolios and problem loans workout procedures and capacity; reviewed the bank resolution framework in order to facilitate rapid action and options for bank restructuring; strengthened deposit insurance funding arrangements and significantly lowered the payout period; introduced risk-based supervision; and fully implemented IFRS. One of the results of these measures is the plummeting NPL ratio from a peak of 21.9 percent in 2013, to 6.4 percent as of December 2017.

61. Regarding the outcome of the current assessment, we highly value the recommendations provided by the FSAP team with the aim to better align our practices to the highest standards in this field. The NBR Board, in its meeting from 28 February 2018, has thoroughly analyzed the FSAP recommendations. Three recommendations have already been implemented and six more will be implemented by end of May 2018. Furthermore, a detailed action plan and timeline for implementing the remaining recommendations have been approved. Accordingly, the responsible NBR line departments have been tasked with specific steps to carry on the action plan within the approved timeline, and are providing weekly updates on the implementation status.

62. We wish to submit a number of general and specific comments on the Report’s recommendations and evaluations below: The NBR is a competent authority from an EU Member state and is bound to comply with all relevant and applicable EU legislation in the field of banking activity. In this regard, NBR strongly respects the principle of cross EU supervisory practices harmonization, through the implementation of the regulatory packages according to CRD4/CRR and all related European Commission binding technical standards, as well as the EBA Guidelines and Recommendations. These acts represent the best practices and approaches to follow for full supervisory convergence at the EU level. Therefore, there are parts of the Basel Core Principles and consequently, related FSAP recommendations, that are difficult to implement in the national regulatory framework, as they have a different EU level regulatory regime. Considering the above, the NBR will enter into a process of regulatory framework review to the fullest extent possible, given certain limitations imposed by the applicable EU legal and regulatory framework, in the context of the FSAP recommendations.

Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for supervisors (CP 2)

63. The independence of the NBR continued to be strong as part of a broader process in the context of Euro adoption. This involves ensuring compliance with the European Commission and the ECB recommendations included in the Convergence Reports.

64. Under the current Statute, NBR Board Members and personnel tasked with prudential supervision have legal protection against lawsuits while exercising their duties, in good faith, and their legal costs are covered by the NBR. The NBR fully welcomes the recommendation and will pursue this aim by seeking to build consensus among all policy makers to amend the NBR Statute in order to “Introduce a legal provision protecting the NBR as an institution against lawsuits for actions taken and/or omissions made while discharging its duties in good faith.”

65. The NBR is a powerful advocate of increased transparency and welcomes the recommendation to “Introduce a legal provision that the reason(s) for removal of a Board member have to be publicly disclosed”. Nevertheless, given the NBR Statute and the two Chambers of the Romanian Parliament’s Internal Regulation on joint activities which stipulates that the meetings of the joint parliamentary standing committees are generally open to the public, the causes for dismissal are supposed to be publicly-available, although this is not explicitly stated in the law.

66. The NBR has recently implemented a Code of Ethics, applicable to its staff and Board Members. Its enactment expressly regulates conflicts of interests and other cases of misconduct. The detection of conflict of interests is also promoted by an updated whistleblowing framework, in line with international best practices, aimed at encouraging staff to file reports. In order to “Adopt and implement a post-employment or cooling-off period framework covering situations where a staff or Board member intends to take (or takes) a position in a bank supervised by NBR (or that it has directly supervised)”, the NBR will implement policies in line with this recommendation.

Supervisory approach, techniques, tools (CP 8 and 9)

67. We appreciate the specific recommendations on supervisory practices as an opportunity for improvement as the FSAP mission brought forward essential value added to the effectiveness of the supervisory process. The NBR will adjust its supervisory practices in order to become as fully compliant as possible with the Basel Core Principles for effective banking supervision.

68. We agree that further development of the NBR’s supervisory approach will make supervision more effective and broadly in line with the requirements of the 2012 BCP. However, the NBR would like to note that, regardless of some internal processes not exhaustively formalized, all banks are adequately supervised within the current supervision framework, and that the NBR has a good understanding of both individual banks and banking industry as a whole. Accordingly, some of the key indicators have been maintained well above the EU banking system average. Furthermore, the NBR took important decisions, with good results, in order to decrease NPLs stock and strengthen the supervision of NPL.

69. The supervisory manuals and processes have been revised with a view to aligning them to international best practices as part of an established ongoing improvement framework. As a result of these actions, the following will be enhanced:

  • the consistency and objectivity in SREP score, findings and supervisory measures/sanctions, e.g., through an independent unit in charge with the quality review of SREP assessment outcomes and management of findings, measures, and follow-ups data base);

  • the forward-looking components of supervisory framework and more risk focused based approach (e.g., bottom up stress-testing tools, performing thematic reviews etc.);

  • the dialogue between supervisors and nonexecutive/independent banks board members through regular meetings after on-site examinations.

Home-host relationships (CP 13)

70. The FSAP evaluation also contributes to our efforts to strengthen the bank resolution function and further develop our internal preparedness for dealing with failing banks. The NBR acknowledges the importance of continuous tests and has planned a simulation exercise for 2018, in order to test the resolution operational readiness/preparedness.

Country and transfer risks (CP 21)

71. In regards to the statement according to which “There are no specific regulatory provisioning standards for country risk and transfer risk in Romania.”, the NBR reiterates that starting in 2018, EU Member States will no longer be allowed to impose additional deductions from banks’ capital (according to Article 481 paragraph 1 of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012). The prudential provisioning would have the effect of affecting the capital so that EC4 could not be implemented without harming the observance of the above-mentioned EU Regulation.

Operational risk (CP 25)

72. In regards to building up supervisory capacity and improving current employees’ supervisory skills, the NBR acknowledges the necessity to enhance IT risk supervisory capacities as well as expertise in the area of internal risk models assessment and review, in a very fast-changing, high-demanding and competitive environment, either by recruitment process or by identifying proper training for the staff in charge with these tasks.

Abuse of financial services (CP 29)

73. The legal shortcomings mentioned in the report for this CP are mainly due to the regime accepted and applicable at the EU level and are derived from the former EU Directives. The NBR would like to mention that the new Directive (EU) 2015/849 addresses these problems, and consequently its mandatory transposition in the national law, will solve the deficiencies revealed.

1

This Detailed Assessment Report has been prepared by Hee Kyong Chon, IMF and Cedric Mousset, World Bank.

2

EBA/GL/2014/13.

3

Law No. 151/2015 on insolvency of natural persons was adopted by the Romanian Parliament in June 2015.

4

Before the BRRD, the FGDB already had the following prerogatives: (i) act as special administrator; (ii) name delegated administrators of a credit institution in distress; and (iii) be the sole shareholder of a bridge-bank stated by Romanian regulatory framework.

5

Government Emergency Ordinance No. 99/2006 on credit institutions and capital adequacy.

6

The off-site activities of line supervisors include in-depth interviews and approval of persons nominated to exercise administration and/or management responsibilities, key function holders, and financial auditors, etc. For example, the NBR have interviewed around 1,700 board members, executives, and middle managers (key function holders) from 2009–2017. More than half of the interviewees were middle managers.

7

The NBR mentioned that it would revise the following internal rule to address the deficiencies: “Procedure on the operational flow of the process of assessment and evaluation of the management framework, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by credit institutions, Romanian legal persons, as well as credit institutions from other Member States, respectively from third countries.”

8

The term “Banking Law” is used throughout to refer to Government Emergency Ordinance No. 99/2006 on credit institutions and capital adequacy.

9

This could be an EU-wide common issue by implementing the BRRD, but CP 11 mentions this tool (“facilitating a takeover by or merger with a healthier institution, providing for the interim management of the bank”) as a preventive measure for supervisory authorities.

10

The draft should be sent to banks within 60 working days according to NBR internal procedure, but many examination reports were issued to banks more than six months later with the issuance of written orders taking even longer.

12

See the comment section of CP 20.

13

The authorities informed the assessors that a thematic review on large exposure limits and concentration across banks will be performed during the first quarter of 2018.

14

For example, the regulation is silent in the essential areas to be developed by banks and examined by supervisors to manage country and transfer risks (e.g., procedures for dealing with country risk in times of crisis, oversight mechanism, a periodic review requirement by the board, etc.)

15

In this document, “banking group” includes the holding company, the bank and its offices, subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures, both domestic and foreign. Risks from other entities in the wider group, for example nonbank (including nonfinancial) entities, may also be relevant. This group-wide approach to supervision goes beyond accounting consolidation.

16

The activities of authorising banks, ongoing supervision and corrective actions are elaborated in the subsequent Principles.

17

Such authority is called “the supervisor” throughout this paper, except where the longer form “the banking supervisor” has been necessary for clarification.

18

Law 312, Statute of the National Bank of Romania, June 28, 2004.

19

In this document, “risk profile” refers to the nature and scale of the risk exposures undertaken by a bank.

20

In this document, “systemic importance” is determined by the size, interconnectedness, substitutability, global or cross-jurisdictional activity (if any), and complexity of the bank, as set out in the BCBS paper on Global systemically important banks: assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement, November 2011.

21

In 2016, NBR participated to Board of Supervisors and the Resolution Committee of EBA as well as in other structures and substructures, such including the Standing Committee on Oversight and Practices, the Standing Committee on Regulation and Policy, the Standing Committee on Accounting, Reporting and Auditing, the Subcommittee on Anti-Money Laundering of the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities, the Subgroup on Own Funds, the Subgroup on Securitization and Covered Bonds, the Subgroup on Governance and Remuneration, the Subgroup on Liquidity, the special Working Group on Stress Testing, the special Working Group on Impact Study, and the special Working Group on Information Technology Risk Supervision.

22

The resignation was prompted by public allegations of corruption related to a position held before joining NBR.

23

“During the debates on Law No. 77/2016 on the discharge of mortgage-backed debts through transfer of title over immovable property, the NBR highlighted the negative consequences that the enforcement of this law in the proposed form might have on lending conditions, financial stability, economy as well as on the decline in foreign investor confidence amid the increase in legal uncertainty. Moreover, the central bank underscored that the retroactive enactment of the law may generate moral hazard and may have a significant negative impact on financial stability and the smooth functioning of credit institutions.” NBR, 2016 annual report

24

Please refer to Principle 1, Essential Criterion 1.

25

The NBR mentions that there is a fist deputy governor’s counselor, who makes consistency checks of materials which are subject to approval/notice/signature by the first deputy governor.

26

Principle 3 is developed further in the Principles dealing with “Consolidated supervision” (12), “Home-host relationships” (13) and “Abuse of financial services” (29).

27

The Committee recognizes the presence in some countries of nonbanking financial institutions that take deposits but may be regulated differently from banks. These institutions should be subject to a form of regulation commensurate to the type and size of their business and, collectively, should not hold a significant proportion of deposits in the financial system.

28

This document refers to a governance structure composed of a board and senior management. The Committee recognizes that there are significant differences in the legislative and regulatory frameworks across countries regarding these functions. Some countries use a two-tier board structure, where the supervisory function of the board is performed by a separate entity known as a supervisory board, which has no executive functions. Other countries, in contrast, use a one-tier board structure in which the board has a broader role. Owing to these differences, this document does not advocate a specific board structure. Consequently, in this document, the terms “board” and “senior management” are only used as a way to refer to the oversight function and the management function in general and should be interpreted throughout the document in accordance with the applicable law within each jurisdiction.

29

Therefore, shell banks shall not be licensed. (Reference document: BCBS paper on shell banks, January 2003.)

30

Please refer to Principle 14, Essential Criterion 8.

31

Please refer to Principle 29.

32

While the term “supervisor” is used throughout Principle 6, the Committee recognizes that in a few countries these issues might be addressed by a separate licensing authority.

33

In the case of major acquisitions, this determination may take into account whether the acquisition or investment creates obstacles to the orderly resolution of the bank.

34

Please refer to Footnote 33 under Principle 7, Essential Criterion 3.

35

NBR Regulation 5/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions.

36

The NBR performed AQRs, based on the methodology developed by the EBA for three large domestic banks in 2014, and in 2017 there was IFRS9 data collection exercise in preparation of IFRS9 implementation.

37

On-site work is used as a tool to provide independent verification that adequate policies, procedures and controls exist at banks, determine that information reported by banks is reliable, obtain additional information on the bank and its related companies needed for the assessment of the condition of the bank, monitor the bank’s follow-up on supervisory concerns, etc.

38

Off-site work is used as a tool to regularly review and analyze the financial condition of banks, follow up on matters requiring further attention, identify and evaluate developing risks and help identify the priorities, scope of further off-site and on-site work, etc.

39

Please refer to Principle 10.

40

In the context of this Principle, “prudential reports and statistical returns” are distinct from and in addition to required accounting reports. The former are addressed by this Principle, and the latter are addressed in Principle 27.

41

Please refer to Principle 2.

42

FINREP also covers templates on asset quality.

43

Please refer to Principle 1, Essential Criterion 5.

44

Maybe external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions.

45

Maybe external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions. External experts may conduct reviews used by the supervisor, yet it is ultimately the supervisor that must be satisfied with the results of the reviews conducted by such external experts.

46

Then NBR mentions that all additional prudential returns were required by SD based on the need to know basis. When the information required was not anymore needed, letters have been submitted to banks in order to stop the reporting obligation.

47

Please refer to Principle 1.

48

The NBR mentions that a wrap up meeting after on-site will be formalized to reflect the FSAP recommendations.

49

Please refer to footnote 19 under Principle 1.

50

Please refer to Principle 16, Additional Criterion 2.

51

This fact does not weigh on grading as it is related with AC.

52

See Illustrative example of information exchange in colleges of the October 2010 BCBS Good practice principles on supervisory colleges for further information on the extent of information sharing expected.

53

Please refer to footnote 27 under Principle 5.

54

Article 138^2 of the company law mentions that: (1) the constitutive act or the decision of the general assembly of shareholders may provide that one or more members of the board of directors must be independent, (2) In the appointment of independent administrator, the general assembly of shareholders will take into account the following criteria: a) not to be a manager of the company or of a company controlled by it or not to fill such a position over the last 5 years; b) not to be an employee of the company or of a company controlled by it or not to have such a labor relation over the last 5 years; c) not to receive or have not received or from the company or from a company controlled by it an additional remuneration or other advantages, others than those corresponding to its capacity of non-executive administrator; m) not to represent a significant shareholder of the company; d) not to have or did not have over the last year business relations with the company or with a company controlled, either in person, or as associated, shareholder, administrator, manager or employee of a company that has such relations with the company, if, by virtue of their substantial character, they are likely to affect their objectivity; e) not to be or have been over the last 3 years financial auditor or an associate employee of the present financial auditor of the company or 9of a controlled company; f) not to be a manager in another company where a manager of the company is a non-executive administrator; g) not to have been a non-executive administrator of the company for more than 3 terms of office; h) not to have family relationships with a person that finds itself in one of the situations provided in letter a) and d).

55

The OECD (OECD glossary of corporate governance-related terms in “Experiences from the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables”, 2003, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/26/23742340.pdf.) defines “duty of care” as “The duty of a board member to act on an informed and prudent basis in decisions with respect to the company. Often interpreted as requiring the board member to approach the affairs of the company in the same way that a ‘prudent man’ would approach their own affairs. Liability under the duty of care is frequently mitigated by the business judgment rule.” The OECD defines “duty of loyalty” as “The duty of the board member to act in the interest of the company and shareholders. The duty of loyalty should prevent individual board members from acting in their own interest, or the interest of another individual or group, at the expense of the company and all shareholders.”

56

“Risk appetite” reflects the level of aggregate risk that the bank’s Board is willing to assume and manage in the pursuit of the bank’s business objectives. Risk appetite may include both quantitative and qualitative elements, as appropriate, and encompass a range of measures. For the purposes of this document, the terms “risk appetite” and “risk tolerance” are treated synonymously.

57

For the avoidance of doubt, the grading of this CP is not based on the 2007–2008 episode. This reference is only provided as context.

58

For the purposes of assessing risk management by banks in the context of Principles 15 to 25, a bank’s risk management framework should take an integrated “bank-wide” perspective of the bank’s risk exposure, encompassing the bank’s individual business lines and business units. Where a bank is a member of a group of companies, the risk management framework should in addition cover the risk exposure across and within the “banking group” (see footnote 19 under Principle 1) and should also take account of risks posed to the bank or members of the banking group through other entities in the wider group.

59

To some extent the precise requirements may vary from risk type to risk type (Principles 15 to 25) as reflected by the underlying reference documents.

60

It should be noted that while, in this and other Principles, the supervisor is required to determine that banks’ risk management policies and processes are being adhered to, the responsibility for ensuring adherence remains with a bank’s Board and senior management.

61

New products include those developed by the bank or by a third party and purchased or distributed by the bank.

62

The Core Principles do not require a jurisdiction to comply with the capital adequacy regimes of Basel I, Basel II, and/or Basel III. The Committee does not consider implementation of the Basel-based framework a prerequisite for compliance with the Core Principles, and compliance with one of the regimes is only required of those jurisdictions that have declared that they have voluntarily implemented it.

64

The Basel Capital Accord was designed to apply to internationally active banks, which must calculate and apply capital adequacy ratios on a consolidated basis, including subsidiaries undertaking banking and financial business. Jurisdictions adopting the Basel II and Basel III capital adequacy frameworks would apply such ratios on a fully consolidated basis to all internationally active banks and their holding companies; in addition, supervisors must test that banks are adequately capitalized on a stand-alone basis.

66

Reference documents: Enhancements to the Basel II framework, July 2009 and: International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: a revised framework, comprehensive version, June 2006.

67

In assessing the adequacy of a bank’s capital levels in light of its risk profile, the supervisor critically focuses, among other things, on (a) the potential loss absorbency of the instruments included in the bank’s capital base, (b) the appropriateness of risk weights as a proxy for the risk profile of its exposures, (c) the adequacy of provisions and reserves to cover loss expected on its exposures, and (d) the quality of its risk management and controls. Consequently, capital requirements may vary from bank to bank to ensure that each bank is operating with the appropriate level of capital to support the risks it is running and the risks it poses.

69

“Stress testing” comprises a range of activities from simple sensitivity analysis to more complex scenario analyses and reverses stress testing.

70

Please refer to Principle 12, Essential Criterion 7.

71

Principle 17 covers the evaluation of assets in greater detail; Principle 18 covers the management of problem assets.

72

Credit risk may result from the following: on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet exposures, including loans and advances, investments, inter-bank lending, derivative transactions, securities financing transactions and trading activities.

73

Counterparty credit risk includes credit risk exposures arising from OTC derivative and other financial instruments.

74

“Assuming” includes the assumption of all types of risk that give rise to credit risk, including credit risk or counterparty risk associated with various financial instruments.

75

Regulation No. 16/ 2012 on classification of loans and investments, as well as the establishment and use of prudential value adjustments was repealed by Regulation 1/2018 starting with February 14, 2018.

76

See NBR, Implementing loan-to-value and debt service-to-income measures: a decade of Romanian experience, Occasional paper, June 2015

77

Principle 17 covers the evaluation of assets in greater detail; Principle 18 covers the management of problem assets.

78

Reserves for the purposes of this Principle are “below the line” non-distributable appropriations of profit required by a supervisor in addition to provisions (“above the line” charges to profit).

79

It is recognized that there are two different types of off-balance sheet exposures: those that can be unilaterally cancelled by the bank (based on contractual arrangements and therefore may not be subject to provisioning), and those that cannot be unilaterally cancelled.

80

Not all of the off-balance sheet exposures are included within the scope of IAS 39. According to IAS 39, a scope exclusion has been made for loan commitments that are not designated as financial liabilities at fair value through profit or loss, cannot be settled net in cash or by delivering or issuing another financial instrument, and do not involve a loan at a below-market interest rate (see the provisions of IAS 39.2 (h) and IAS 39.4). As regards the financial guarantees, the scope of IAS 39 includes only financial guarantee contracts issued, except for those accounted for as insurance contracts, according to IFRS 4.

81

NBR Order 6/2014 was repealed and replaced by Order 9/2017, as of November 14, 2017.

82

Connected counterparties may include natural persons as well as a group of companies related financially or by common ownership, management or any combination thereof.

83

This includes credit concentrations through exposure to: single counterparties and groups of connected counterparties both direct and indirect (such as through exposure to collateral or to credit protection provided by a single counterparty), counterparties in the same industry, economic sector or geographic region and counterparties whose financial performance is dependent on the same activity or commodity as well as off-balance sheet exposures (including guarantees and other commitments) and also market and other risk concentrations where a bank is overly exposed to particular asset classes, products, collateral, or currencies.

84

The measure of credit exposure, in the context of large exposures to single counterparties and groups of connected counterparties, should reflect the maximum possible loss from their failure (i.e., it should encompass actual claims and potential claims as well as contingent liabilities). The risk weighting concept adopted in the Basel capital standards should not be used in measuring credit exposure for this purpose as the relevant risk weights were devised as a measure of credit risk on a basket basis and their use for measuring credit concentrations could significantly underestimate potential losses (see “Measuring and controlling large credit exposures, January 1991).

85

The NBR mentioned that before the entering into force of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, there was such a provision where NBR could determine differently than the credit institutions the composition of the group of connected clients (Article 7 para 2 of NBR Regulation No 16/2006 which is currently repealed). After Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 became applicable, the large exposures regulatory framework is uniformly set at the EU level.

86

Such requirements should, at least for internationally active banks, reflect the applicable Basel standards. As of September 2012, a new Basel standard on large exposures is still under consideration.

87

EBA guidelines for the SREP include the following: when assessing credit concentrations, competent authorities should consider the possibility of overlaps (e.g., a high concentration to a specific government will probably lead to a country concentration and single-name concentration)

88

Related parties can include, among other things, the bank’s subsidiaries, affiliates, and any party (including their subsidiaries, affiliates and special purpose entities) that the bank exerts control over or that exerts control over the bank, the bank’s major shareholders, Board members, senior management and key staff, their direct and related interests, and their close family members as well as corresponding persons in affiliated companies.

89

Related party transactions include on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet credit exposures and claims, as well as, dealings such as service contracts, asset purchases and sales, construction contracts, lease agreements, derivative transactions, borrowings, and write-offs. The term transaction should be interpreted broadly to incorporate not only transactions that are entered into with related parties but also situations in which an unrelated party (with whom a bank has an existing exposure) subsequently becomes a related party.

90

The NBR mentions that although there is no explicit power in regulation for the supervisor to exercise discretion, the wording of “at least” was intended to confer the supervisory power of deciding differently than banks regarding the affiliated parties.

91

An exception may be appropriate for beneficial terms that are part of overall remuneration packages (e.g., staff receiving credit at favorable rates).

92

The NBR mentions that the write-off is included in the term “modification” of an exposure.

93

The NBR mentions that the finding in relation to SPEs should not weigh on grading as SPEs are one of the examples of definition of related parties in EC1, and assessors took it into consideration.

94

The NBR mentions that this finding should not weigh on grading as the NBR’s choice in EC5 was to set limits for exposures to related parties, and assessors took it into consideration.

95

Country risk is the risk of exposure to loss caused by events in a foreign country. The concept is broader than sovereign risk as all forms of lending or investment activity whether to/with individuals, corporate, banks or governments are covered.

96

Transfer risk is the risk that a borrower will not be able to convert local currency into foreign exchange and so will be unable to make debt service payments in foreign currency. The risk normally arises from exchange restrictions imposed by the government in the borrower’s country. (Reference document: IMF paper on External Debt Statistics – Guide for compilers and users, 2003.)

97

The NBR mentioned that according to Article 481 para 1 of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013, starting with 2018, EU Member States will no longer be allowed to impose additional deductions from banks’ capital, and the prudential provisioning would have the effect of affecting the capital.

98

The NBR mentioned that all significant risks articulated in Article 182 include country risk and transfer risk.

99

In the NBR regulation applicable for solo FINREP (NBR Ord No. 6/2014), the threshold is let down to one percent, and no reporting threshold for the templates F20.1 to F20.3.

100

Commission delegated regulation (EU) 2016/101 supplementing Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for prudent valuation under Article 105(14)

101

Wherever “interest rate risk” is used in this Principle the term refers to interest rate risk in the banking book. Interest rate risk in the trading book is covered under Principle 22.

103

EBA has recently issued a consultation paper on the new guidelines on the management of IRRBB (EBA/CP/2017/19 – 31/10/2017) which takes account also of the existing supervisory expectations and practices including the standards on interest rate risk in the banking book published by the BCBS in April 2016.

104

The Committee has defined operational risk as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. The definition includes legal risk but excludes strategic and reputational risk.

109

In assessing independence, supervisors give due regard to the control systems designed to avoid conflicts of interest in the performance measurement of staff in the compliance, control and internal audit functions. For example, the remuneration of such staff should be determined independently of the business lines that they oversee.

110

The term “compliance function” does not necessarily denote an organizational unit. Compliance staff may reside in operating business units or local subsidiaries and report up to operating business line management or local management, provided such staff also have a reporting line through to the head of compliance who should be independent from business lines.

111

The term “internal audit function” does not necessarily denote an organizational unit. Some countries allow small banks to implement a system of independent reviews, e.g., conducted by external experts, of key internal controls as an alternative.

112

In this Essential Criterion, the supervisor is not necessarily limited to the banking supervisor. The responsibility for ensuring that financial statements are prepared in accordance with accounting policies and practices may also be vested with securities and market supervisors.

113

For the purposes of this Essential Criterion, the disclosure requirement may be found in applicable accounting, stock exchange listing, or other similar rules, instead of or in addition to directives issued by the supervisor.

114

Key amendments made in 2015 are: (i) the rebalancing the disclosures required quarterly, semi-annually and annually; (ii) streamlining the requirements related to disclosure of credit risk exposures and credit risk mitigation techniques and (ii) clarifying and streamlining the disclosure requirements for securitization exposures. Key amendments made in 2017 are: (i) a consolidation of all existing BCBS disclosure requirements into the Pillar 3 framework; (ii) introduction of a “dashboard” of banks’ key prudential metrics and new requirement for banks which record prudent valuation adjustments to provide users with a granular breakdown of its calculation; and (iii) updates to reflect ongoing reforms (total loss-absorbing capacity -TLAC- regime for G-SIB and revised market risk framework).

115

The Committee is aware that, in some jurisdictions, other authorities, such as a financial intelligence unit, rather than a banking supervisor, may have primary responsibility for assessing compliance with laws and regulations regarding criminal activities in banks, such as fraud, money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Thus, in the context of this Principle, “the supervisor” might refer to such other authorities, in particular in Essential Criteria 7, 8, and 10. In such jurisdictions, the banking supervisor cooperates with such authorities to achieve adherence with the criteria mentioned in this Principle.

117

Consistent with international standards, banks are to report suspicious activities involving cases of potential money laundering and the financing of terrorism to the relevant national center, established either as an independent governmental authority or within an existing authority or authorities that serves as an FIU.

118

These could be external auditors or other qualified parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions.

119

The NBR mentions that the Romanian approach to correspondent banking relationships and simplified due diligence is due to the regime accepted and applicable at EU level and derives from EU Directives.

120

Approximately 45 cases were submitted to the board within a five-year period with 18 cases being contested in court. Some of the issues were about clarification of findings.

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Romania: Financial Sector Assessment Program-Detailed Assessment of Observance of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
Author:
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department