Bova, Elva, Marta Ruiz-Arranz, Frederik Toscani, and H. Elif Ture, 2016, “The Fiscal Costs of Contingent Liabilities: A New Dataset”, IMF Working Paper 16/14.
Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, Deniz Igan, Luc Laeven, and Hui Tong, 2012, “Policies for Macrofinancial Stability: How to Deal with Credit Booms”, IMF Staff Discussion Note 12/06.
Laeven, Luc and Fabian Valencia, 2010, “Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly”, IMF Working Paper 10/146.
Lam, W.R., Y.Y. Tan, Z.B. Tan, and A. Schipke, 2017, “Tackling Corporate Debt and Achieving Productivity Gains—The Central Role of State-owned Enterprises,” forthcoming IMF Working Paper.
Sahay, R., M. Čihák, P. N’Diaye, A. Barajas, R. Bi, D. Ayala, Y. Gao, A. Kyobe, L. Nguyen, C. Saborowski, K. Svirydzenka, and S.R. Yousefi, 2015, “Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in Emerging Markets”, IMF Staff Discussion Note 15/08.
Prepared by Joong Shik Kang, Sally Chen, and Daniel Law.
The credit boom in New Zealand (1992) was due to a one-off credit expansion in 1988 from a low base. A boom in Hong Kong SAR (1983) should be seen in the context of its role as a global financial center. A boom in Finland (2003) was the result of economic recovery after large deleveraging in late 1990s. Credit booms in Indonesia (1990) and Switzerland (1985) eventually led to crises after futher credit expansion.
In cross-country studies, the average direct fiscal cost has been estimated to be 5–10 percent of GDP (Laeven and Valencia, 2010) and indirect fiscal cost arising from the contingent liabilities realization is estimated to be about 6 percent of GDP during 1990–2014 (Bova, et al., 2016). Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) also estimate the average gross fiscal cost of systemic banking crises to be about 15 percent of GDP.