Jordan: Selected Issues
Author: International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept.
Publication Date:
24 Jul 2017
eISBN:
9781484312063
Language:
English
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; Jordan; cost; price; GDP; tax; resilience to shock; deposit dollarization; Jordan's resilience; household debt; commercial bank's assets; Commercial banks; Currencies; Public sector; liabilities to the rest
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Selected Issues

Abstract

Selected Issues

Jordan: A Balance Sheet Analysis1

  • This is a first attempt at conducting a Balance Sheet Analysis of the Jordanian economy.2 Through a closer look at the balance sheets of the main sectors, it aims at identifying potential financial vulnerabilities. While limited by significant data constraints, the analysis suggests a number of issues that would need to be addressed to reduce potential vulnerabilities over the medium term.

A. Introduction and Motivation

1. Jordan’s external and fiscal vulnerabilities remain substantial. While significant progress has been made since 2012 in reducing the fiscal and current account deficits, they remain elevated. Gross public debt has increased from 67 percent of GDP at end-2010 to 95 percent of GDP at end-2016 and Jordan’s net external position has also gradually worsened over this period, from −70 to −97 percent of GDP, with liabilities to the rest of the world amounting to about 165 percent of GDP at end-2016 (see text table), well in excess of its claims on the rest of the world (68 percent of GDP). Public debt and external liabilities could continue increasing substantially and reach unsustainable levels over the medium term if the authorities do not implement fiscal, financial, and structural reforms.

Jordan: External Liabilities, 2005–16

(In percent of GDP)

article image
Sources: Central Bank of Jordan; and Fund staff estimates.

2. This paper takes a closer look at these vulnerabilities through a Balance Sheet Analysis. While data availability is an important limitation, the analysis helps to identify a number of sectoral vulnerabilities and policies that could help strengthen Jordan’s resilience to shocks.

B. Overview of Jordan’s Inter-Sectoral Financial Relations

3. Jordan inter-sectoral financial relations gravitate around the sovereign-banking sector nexus (Figure 1 and Table 1).

Table 1.

Jordan: Sectoral Balance Sheet, End-2015

article image
Sources: Jordanian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

Including debt guaranteed by the government.

  • By the sheer size of their balance sheet (with total assets amounting to 176 percent of GDP at end-2016), commercial banks play the most significant role in Jordan’s complex web of financial relations. They are also the main source of funding for both the public and private sectors. The sector is highly capitalized (with a capital adequacy ratio of 19 percent at end-2016), has comfortable liquidity (with an average liquidity ratio of 138.1 percent at end-2016, well in excess of the regulatory minimum of 100 percent), and limited non-performing loans (4.4 percent of total loans at end-2016, and 3.5 percent net of provisions), and is profitable (with a return on equity of 8.8 percent in 2016).

  • The public sector is Jordan’s largest debtor, with public debt increasing from 67 percent of GDP at end-2010 to 95 percent of GDP at end-2015. While much progress has been made over the last few years to reduce the budget deficits and public utility losses that fueled this increase, much remains to be done to ensure that this trend reverse in the coming years.

  • While small in comparison with the banking sector, the non-banking financial sector, and particularly the Social Security Investment Fund (SSIF), has played an increasing role in financing the economy, and particularly the government, in recent years. The SSIF’s domestic assets increased from JD 6.1 billion at end-2013 to JD 7.6 billion (28.6 percent of GDP) at end-2015.

    A02ufig1

    Jordan: Inter-Sectoral Financial Relations, 2015

    Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

    Sources: Jordanian authorities; and Fund estimates.Note: The width of the arrows is proportional to the size of the exposures at end-2015 (see Table 1).

  • Since end-2012, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) has rebuilt an adequate level of gross usable reserves, from only 66 percent of the reserve adequacy matric (RAM) to 122 percent at end-2016, while gradually reducing its financing of the public sector.3

  • As data on the non-financial private sector are very limited, any analysis of its balance sheet has to be inferred from the other sectors’ balance sheets. The sector, which includes nonfinancial corporations and households, is the main provider of bank deposits and the main debtor to the banking system.

  • The external sector is a major source of financing for the government and for the banking sector, while the CBJ’s gross international reserves constitute most of its liabilities to Jordan.

C. Sectoral Balance Sheets

The Economy’s Overall Position

4. Jordan is a net debtor, whose net external position has worsened over the last few years. At end-2016, Jordan’s liabilities to the rest of the world amounted to about 165 percent of GDP, well in excess of its claims on the rest of the world (68 percent of GDP). While Jordan’s net external position has gradually worsened over the last few years (from −70 percent of GDP at end-2010 to −97 percent of GDP at end-2016), it remains significantly stronger than a decade ago (when it was close to −160 percent of GDP at end-2005). The worsening over the last six years mainly reflected a decline in foreign assets, notably commercial banks’ loans and deposits abroad, while foreign liabilities increased only slightly relative to GDP.

A02ufig2

Jordan: External Position, 2000-16

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

A02ufig3

Jordan: Foreign Assets, 2000-16

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

Jordan: External Liabilities, 2005–16

(In percent of GDP)

article image
Sources: Central Bank of Jordan; and Fund staff estimates.

5. While increasing slightly over the last few years, external debt remains well below the levels observed in the early 2000s. The recent increase, from about 65 percent of GDP at end-2010 to 70 percent at end-2016 reflected increases in the government’s and CBJ’s external debt, which were only partly offset by a decline in commercial banks’ liabilities (essentially currency and deposits). The non-financial private sector’s external debt remained broadly unchanged over that period, at a low level of less than 10 percent of GDP. Debt duration progressively increased, with medium- to long-term debt representing 58 percent of external debt at end-2016, compared with 43 percent at end-2010.

A02ufig4

Jordan: External Debt, 2000-16

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

A02ufig5

Jordan: External Debt, 2000-16

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

The Public Sector (Government and CBJ)

6. The public sector’s overall financial position is negative, largely reflecting its large public debt. On the asset side, the government essentially holds deposits with the central bank and the commercial banks. These deposits, which amounted to 6.6 percent of GDP at end-2016, were mostly used for budgetary cash management purposes or were earmarked for specific expenditures (such as investment projects financed from budgetary grants by GCC countries), and therefore are not considered as claims/assets. The CBJ’s net financial position is more balanced, with its substantial net foreign assets essentially financed from government and bank deposits and currency in circulation.

7. The non-banking and external sectors have played increasing roles in financing the government. After increasing gradually until 2012, the financing provided by the banking sector to the government has since slightly declined, from 41.3 to 37.6 percent of GDP at end-2016, with a decline in central government bill and bonds holdings only partly compensated by an increase in loans and advances to NEPCO and WAJ. Over the same period, the financing provided by the CBJ to the government declined from 6½ percent of GDP at end-2012 to 1¾ percent of GDP at end 2016, as the CBJ gradually reduced its holdings of treasury bills and bonds and as the government continued to reimburse the CBJ bonds for overdraft settlement issued in 2008. In this context, over the last 4 years, the increase in public debt was essentially financed from external sources (with external debt increasing from 22½ to 37½ percent of GDP) and from non-bank financial institutions (whose financing increased from 10 to 18¼ percent of GDP). Over that period, the SSIF more than doubled its claims on the government, contributing more than three quarters of the government’s net domestic financing, including the essential of its financing at longer maturities (7- and 10- year domestic bonds).

A02ufig6

Jordan: Public Debt at Original Maturity, 2006-16

(In billions of Jordanian dinars)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

A02ufig7

Jordan: Public Sector Financing by Banks, 2006-16

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

8. The average maturity of public debt remains relatively low. After declining in 2010–11, the average maturity increased from 3.1 years at end-2011 to 4.2 years at end-2016, reflecting primarily the increase in the maturity of domestic debt from 1.6 to 3.0 years and the increase in the share of external borrowing (with longer maturities than domestic debt) even if the latter’s average maturity was essentially unchanged. This increase in domestic debt maturity reflected in turn the authorities’ gradual introduction of longer-term bonds (in the 4-, 5- 7-, and 10-year tenure), which contributed to a decline in the share of short-term borrowing (at original maturity) from 13.5 percent of domestic debt at end-2010 to 3 percent at end-2016. The average maturity, especially for domestic debt, remains, however, relatively low, contributing to the government substantial roll-over needs.

Jordan: Public Debt’s Average Maturity, 2009–16

(In years)

article image
Source: Ministry of Finance.

Preliminary.

A02ufig8

Jordan: Public Debt at Original Maturity, 2006-16

(In billions of Jordanian dinars)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

A02ufig9

Jordan: Public Debt at Remaining Maturity, 2006-16

(In billions of Jordanian dinars)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

1/ Maturity of up to 1 year.2/ Maturity of more than 1 year and up to 5 years.

9. The CBJ has rebuilt an adequate reserve buffer in recent years. Gross usable reserves have increased from three months of imports of goods and non-financial services and 66 percent of the IMF’s RAM at end −2012 to 7¾ months of imports and 122 percent of the RAM at end-2016. This accumulation of usable reserves, from $6.1 to $14.5 billion over a three-year period, relied only to a small extent on the accumulation of external liabilities. Over that period, the CBJ’s foreign liabilities increased from $1.3 to 2.8 billion, essentially reflecting the increase in its net position with the Fund ($1.3 billion) in the context of the Stand-By Arrangement and the Extended Fund Facility and an increase in deposits by GCC countries ($0.2 billion).

A02ufig10

Jordan: CBJ’s Reserves and Foreign Liabilities, 2010-16

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

The Banking Sector

10. The banking sector remains well capitalized. The sector’s capital adequacy ratio increased from 18.4 percent in 2014 to 19 percent in 2016, and was well above the prudential requirement of 12 percent, both for commercial banks and for Islamic banks. The stress tests conducted by the CBJ last year, indicate that banks would preserve adequate capital levels under most scenarios.4

A02ufig11

Jordan: Liquidity Ratio, 2010-16

(In percent of weighted liabilities)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

A02ufig12

Jordan: Capital Adequacy Ratio, 2010-15

(In percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

11. While the banks’ net short-term position is negative, they remain highly liquid. While deposits have mostly short-term maturities, they have been increasing at a remarkably steady pace over the last ten years, with little sign of withdrawals during periods of stress.5 On the asset side, the shares of their claims on the public and private sectors have stabilized over the last few years, at, respectively, about 25 and 40 percent of total assets.

A02ufig13

Jordan: Commercial Bank’s Assets, 2005-16

(In percent of total assets)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

12. Consistent with the CBJ’s prudential regulations, commercial banks have kept their net open foreign currency position close to balance.6 Over the last ten years, this position has fluctuated between -¾ and +3¼ percent of the banks’ foreign currency assets, and amounted to 1.6 percent at end-2016. It is worth noting that in 2012, when deposit dollarization amounted to close to 25 percent, the net position excluding forwards amounted to −9.1 percent of the banks’ foreign currency assets and was only closed/balanced through the signing of forward contracts equivalent to about 10.6 percent of these assets. With confidence restored and deposit dollarization lower despite the recent rebound (18.9 percent at end-2015), the commercial banks were able to unwind their forward contract position (from JD 1.1 billion at end-2012 to JD 33 million at end-2016) while keeping a broadly balanced net open foreign currency position.

13. While the credit-to-GDP ratio remains below its long-term trend, the CBJ should continue to monitor closely the credit to households. Credit to private sector amounted to 74 percent of GDP at end-2016, slightly higher than at end-2010 (72½ percent of GDP), with the credit gap (i.e., the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend) amounting to −4.8 percent of GDP at that time. Credit to households (mostly mortgage loans) has increased particularly briskly over the last few years, growing at an average of 12.7 percent a year in 2014–16, compared with 4.1 percent for credit to corporates. The CBJ should monitor this trend closely, and, if it were to persist, consider adopting additional macroprudential measures (Annex).

A02ufig14

Jordan: Credit-to-GDP Ratio, 1992-2022

(In percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

Sources: Central Bank of Jordan; and Fund staff estimates.
A02ufig15

Credit to the private sector

(y-o-y change, in percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

The Non-Banking Financial Sector

14. The share of government financing in the SSIF asset portfolio has increased steadily over the last 5 years. This financing has increased from JD 1.1 billion at end-2010 to close to JD 4 billion at end-August 2016, equivalent to about 90 percent of the increase in SSIF’s assets over that period. It now represents close to 50 percent of its assets, compared with only 21 percent at end-2010, and exceeds the upper end of the SSIF’s target range for government financing.7 This increasing share reflects to a large extent the constraints imposed on its capacity to invest abroad (its foreign assets amounted to JD 28 million at end-2015, or 0.4 percent of its total assets, compared with a targeted range of 5–15 percent), and the limitations of other domestic investment opportunities. In particular, the SSIF’s poor investment performance over the last five years (with an average annual rate of return of 2.1 percent over 2011–15) reflects the weak performance of the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) index, which declined by 9 percent over that period.8 While the share of the SSIF’s investments in real estate has been broadly stable at around 7 percent (within the 5–12 percent targeted range), the share of investment in tourism has declined to 3.7 percent (just under the targeted range of 4–8 percent).

A02ufig16

Jordan: Social Security Investment Fund’s Assets, 2010-15

(In millions of Jordanian dinars)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

A02ufig17

Jordan: Social Security Investment Fund’s Assets, 2010-15

(In percent of total assets)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

15. Other non-banking financial institutions play a limited role in the financing of the Jordanian economy. The insurance sector’s assets grew by 21 percent from 2010 to 2015, to JD 870 million (3.3 percent of GDP), including about JD 534 million (2 percent of GDP) in financial investments. While growing quickly (annual average growth of 20 percent from 2011–14), the microfinance industry remains relatively small, with about 340,000 borrowers and a credit portfolio of JD 158 million (0.6 percent of GDP) at end-2014.

The Non-Financial Private Sector (NFPS)

16. The NFPS appears to be a net creditor, with the sector’s bank deposits, currency holdings, and claims on the SSIF well exceeding its domestic and foreign borrowing. Publicly available data for this sector are very limited, as data for the nonfinancial corporate sector cover mostly the companies listed on the Amman stock exchange. These data indicate that the assets and liabilities of the listed nonfinancial companies have moved in parallel over the last few years, while their capital has not changed significantly, representing about 50 percent of their assets at end-2015. From 2011 to 2015, and as a result of the rapid increase in bank borrowing, household debt increased from 29 to 37 percent of GDP.

A02ufig18

Jordan: Listed Non-Financial Corporates, 2008-15

(In billions of Jordanian dinars)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

Sources: Datastream data; and IMF staff estimates.

D. Conclusions

17. While limited by data constraints, the balance sheet analysis of the Jordanian economy points to a number of issues that the authorities will have to address to reduce potential vulnerabilities over the medium term:

  • The still low average maturity of public debt. Consistent with the new medium-term debt management strategy, this would help to reduce the government gross financing needs and roll-over risks;

  • The increasing reliance of the government on financing from the SSIF. While it has helped the government finance itself at relatively low rates over the last few years, this trend may not continue without affecting the SSIF’s investment policy objective, including the goal of diversifying its asset portfolio. In addition to reducing the government net financing needs through fiscal consolidation, the authorities should consider letting the SSIF more leeway in investing abroad.

  • The limited size of the nonbank financial sector (excluding the SSIF). Continued efforts by the CBJ to strengthen the supervision of the sector should help support its contribution to the financing of the Jordanian economy and promote financial inclusion.

  • The rapid increase in banks’ credit to households. If it were to continue and tensions start to emerge, the authorities should consider adopting additional macroprudential measures, including limits on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios for mortgages and serviceability ratios for mortgages and retail loans.

  • The need to improve balance sheet data. In particular, the collection of a broader set of data on the non-financial private sector will help better assess the sector’s potential vulnerabilities.

Annex I. Is the Increase in Credit to Households Sustainable?

1. Credit to households has increased briskly over the last few years. Credit to households has increased by an average of 13.1 percent a year in 2014–15, including by 11.6 percent for mortgages and 14.1 percent for other loans. This compares with an average nominal growth of 5.7 percent and an average annual increase in credit to corporates of 1.8 percent over that period.

A02ufig19

Credit to the private sector

(y-o-y change, in percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

2. As a result, household debt has increased to 36.6 percent of GDP in 2015 from 20.5 percent of GDP in 2008. It has also increased relative to households’ income (from about 40 percent in 2008 to close to 70 percent in 2015) and to their net wealth (to close to 60 percent in 2015). This increase reflected to a large extent the dynamism of the both mortgages and consumer credits, which amounted to 21.8 and 13.3 percent of GDP, respectively at end-2015.

A02ufig20

Household Debt

(in percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
A02ufig21

Household Debt-to-Income Ratio

(In percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

3. Even if real estate trading volumes and residential land prices have increased significantly, the rapid increase in mortgage lending does not appear to have contributed to an undue increase in housing prices. After dropping during the global financial crisis, real estate transactions have increased steadily, amounting to JD 7.8 billion in 2014. With regard to prices, the ratios of residential housing prices to core prices and to rents are slightly higher than their average over the last ten years. They have, however, slightly declined over the last three years, as residential housing prices increased by 10.4 percent compared with 11.9 percent for core prices and 16.8 percent of rents. Over the same period, residential land prices increased much faster, gaining 34 percent, bring their ratios to core prices and to rents to 122 and 118 percent, respectively of their 10-year averages. The increase in real estate prices has, however, been significantly higher in the Northern parts of the country, however, which could point to housing demand from Syrian refugees as the main driver behind real estate inflation.

A02ufig22

Real Estate Prices, 2005-15

(100 = 2010)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

A02ufig23

Real Estate Transactions, 2005-14E

(In JD billions)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

4. Since the start of the global financing crisis, the CBJ has taken some prudential measures with regard to credit with households. These measures include:

  • a risk weight of 100 percent for mortgage loans with a LTV ratio exceeding 80 percent, compared with 35 percent for mortgage loans with a lower LTV;

  • a risk weight is 100 percent for retail consumer loans with a debt service-to-income (DSTI) ratio exceeding 50 percent, compared with 75 percent for consumer loans with a lower DSTI; and

  • a ceiling on direct credit to the real estate sector (construction and mortgages) of 20 percent of a bank’s customer deposits in local currency.

5. Notwithstanding these measures, the average LTV ratio has gradually increased over time, from less than 60 percent in 2005 to 73 percent in 2014. This increase appears to partly reflect the loosening of LTV limits by commercial banks, with an increasing number of them allowing for ratios in excess of 80 percent.

A02ufig24

Average LTV of Mortages, 2005-14

(in percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

A02ufig25

Maximum LTV for Mortgages, 2004-15

(Number of Banks)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2017, 232; 10.5089/9781484312063.002.A002

6. Overall, and with interest rates expected to increase, the CBJ should continue to monitor closely credit to households. As the increase in credit to households has not so far fueled an undue increase in housing prices or in NPLs, there does not appear to be an immediate need to tighten credit at this stage. If household credit were to continue to increase at a fast pace and tensions start to emerge, however, the authorities should consider adopting additional prudential measures, including higher limits on loan-to-value and serviceability ratios.

1

Prepared by Edouard Martin (MCD).

2

See “Balance Sheet Analysis in Fund Surveillance,” IMF, June 2015.

3

Gross usable reserves are defined as gross international reserves minus commercial banks’ foreign exchange deposits at the CBJ and forward contracts.

4

Out of 25 banks, one bank would see its capital decline under 8 percent if their largest six borrowers were to default; it would be the case for two banks under a credit risk scenario (i.e., doubling of default rates) and of one bank under an interest rate shock of 100 bps.

5

From 1997-2016, the smallest observed y-o-y increase in total deposits was 2.3 percent in January 2013. Even at that time, economic tensions led to deposit dollarization (which increased from 16.6 to 24.8 percent during 2012) rather than deposit withdrawals. The y-o-y decline in deposits in early 2016 mainly reflected one-of operations, including the one-off purchase by Jordanian investors of foreign participations in Arab Bank and Dubai Islamic Bank.

6

Under CBJ’s regulation, banks’ net open position should not exceed 15 percent of their capital. Also, their net open position in any given currency other than the U.S. dollar should not exceed 5 percent of their capital.

7

The SSIF’s investment policy as of August 2016 set the following asset allocation targeted ranges (in percent of total assets): equity: 46–56 percent; bonds: 22–35 percent; foreign assets: 5–15 percent; real estate: 5–12 percent; tourism: 4–8 percent; money market instruments: 2–8 percent; and loans: 2–5 percent.

8

Reflecting in part the importance of the banking sector on the ASE, SSIF’s equity portfolio was highly concentrated in this sector, which represented 57 percent of the total portfolio at end-2105.

Same Series

Other IMF Content

Other Publishers

Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
Jordan: Selected Issues
Author: International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept.
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2017: Issue 232
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
9781484312063
ISSN:
1934-7685
Pages:
63
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484312063.002

Jordan: Inter-Sectoral Financial Relations, 2015

Jordan: External Position, 2000-16

(In percent of GDP)

Jordan: Foreign Assets, 2000-16

(In percent of GDP)

Jordan: External Debt, 2000-16

(In percent of GDP)

Jordan: External Debt, 2000-16

(In percent of GDP)

Jordan: Public Debt at Original Maturity, 2006-16

(In billions of Jordanian dinars)

Jordan: Public Sector Financing by Banks, 2006-16

(In percent of GDP)

Jordan: Public Debt at Original Maturity, 2006-16

(In billions of Jordanian dinars)

Jordan: Public Debt at Remaining Maturity, 2006-16

(In billions of Jordanian dinars)

Jordan: CBJ’s Reserves and Foreign Liabilities, 2010-16

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

Jordan: Liquidity Ratio, 2010-16

(In percent of weighted liabilities)

Jordan: Capital Adequacy Ratio, 2010-15

(In percent)

Jordan: Commercial Bank’s Assets, 2005-16

(In percent of total assets)

Jordan: Credit-to-GDP Ratio, 1992-2022

(In percent)

Credit to the private sector

(y-o-y change, in percent)

Jordan: Social Security Investment Fund’s Assets, 2010-15

(In millions of Jordanian dinars)

Jordan: Social Security Investment Fund’s Assets, 2010-15

(In percent of total assets)

Jordan: Listed Non-Financial Corporates, 2008-15

(In billions of Jordanian dinars)

Credit to the private sector

(y-o-y change, in percent)

Household Debt

(in percent of GDP)

Household Debt-to-Income Ratio

(In percent)

Real Estate Prices, 2005-15

(100 = 2010)

Real Estate Transactions, 2005-14E

(In JD billions)

Average LTV of Mortages, 2005-14

(in percent)

Maximum LTV for Mortgages, 2004-15

(Number of Banks)