Artavanis, N., Morse, A., Tsoutsoura M., 2016, “Measuring Income Tax Evasion Using Bank Credit: Evidence from Greece”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2016) 131 (2): 739–798.
Brondolo, J., 2009, “Collecting Taxes During an Economic Crisis: Challenges and Policy Options” IMF Staff Position Note, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
European Commission, 2016, Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States: 2016 Final Report. European Commission, Brussels.
IOTA, 2013, “Treatment of Revenue Losses: Write-offs, Remissions, and Debt Reliefs,” Meeting of IOTA Area Group on Debt Management, Intra-European Organisation of Tax Administrations.
OECD, 2015, Tax Administration 2015: Comparative Information on OECD and Other Advanced and Emerging Economies, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Sancak, C., Vellosso, R., and Xing, J., 2010, “Tax Revenue Response to the Business Cycle,” Working Paper 10/71, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
Prepared by Ivohasina Razafimahefa (FAD).
A regression analysis based on a panel of European Union countries found a positive and significant relationship between VAT efficiency and the output gap (Brondolo, 2009). Furthermore, Sancak et al. (2010) find that VAT efficiency is hindered by changes in tax evasion during economic downturns.
The figures are related to the four main SSC funds.
Prior to 2014, fines and penalties were regulated by complex legislation under the Code of Books and Records, which lacked proportionality between the penalty size and the seriousness of the violation and, thereby, punished severely minor accounting errors.
In 2008, the share of debt written off in total debt inventory was around 1 percent in Greece compared to a Euro Area average of 22 percent (the country composition of the Euro Area group in these calculations differs between 2008 and 2013 due to data availability).
The Code of Public Revenue Collection has not yet been aligned with the amended Code of Civil Procedures, which streamlined the auction process for foreclosed real estate, allowing the minimum bidding price to be determined by market prices. See also Selected issues paper “Insolvency and Enforcement Issues in Greece.”
The total number of debtors in tax installment schemes is about 1.3 million (relative to a total number of tax debtors of about 4.4 million). However, since tax debtors may participate in several schemes simultaneously, the 1.3 million figure likely overestimates the number of individuals taking advantage of such schemes.
The existing framework does not cover public claims. As a result, banks have no incentive to restructure their debts, as they perceive the public sector to receive preferential treatment. Also see Selected issues paper “Insolvency and Enforcement Issues in Greece.”
“Treatment of Revenue Losses: Write-offs, Remissions, and Debt Reliefs,” Meeting of IOTA Area Group on Debt Management, Intra-European Organization of Tax Administrations.