Liberia: Fifth and Sixth Reviews Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Request for Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria, Augmentation of Access, and Extension of the Arrangement

Recovery from the Ebola epidemic is delayed by the persistent impact of the commodity price decline and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) withdrawal. Weak economic activity-particularly in the natural resource sector-is affecting government revenues, while spending is under pressure from the cost of elections and security handover from UNMIL.

Abstract

Recovery from the Ebola epidemic is delayed by the persistent impact of the commodity price decline and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) withdrawal. Weak economic activity-particularly in the natural resource sector-is affecting government revenues, while spending is under pressure from the cost of elections and security handover from UNMIL.

Background

1. Liberia is preparing for the upcoming October 2017 presidential and general elections. As the re-election of the current president is barred by term limits, Liberia will have a new president from January 2018. Security was transferred from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the national authorities in June 2016. In September 2016 the UN Security Council extended UNMIL by three months for up to some 1,800 military and police personnel in Monrovia to support the security transition.

2. The fallout from a corruption case affected parliamentary activity. The Sable Mining corruption case implicated several senior political figures, including the House Speaker. The Speaker’s resignation in September 2016 capped a long struggle between parliamentary factions supporting or opposing his tenure, culminating in split sessions for most of the month and delayed parliamentary proceedings. Thus, the FY2017 budget was only approved at the end of September.

3. The two key economic policy institutions went through a leadership transition. Minister Kamara, previously Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL) took the leadership of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) after Minister Konneh resigned in the spring. Governor Weeks was appointed in May following the expiration of Governor Mills Jones’ second term. Several other high-level officials at both institutions also changed position.

4. The Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) has been contained. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared Liberia Ebola-Free for the third time on June 9, 2016, following a few isolated cases which took place after two similar declarations in May and September 2015.

5. Concerns about the resolution of a troubled bank delayed the completion of the fifth review. The CBL resolved First International Bank of Liberia Ltd (FIBLL), to which it had extended an emergency credit of over US$19 million, through a Purchase and Assumption (P&A) operation involving the sale of most of FIBLL’s balance sheet to a foreign private equity group, as opposed to outright liquidation as recommended by staff. The modality of the resolution of FIBLL raised concerns over possible risks of further CBL exposure to the successor commercial bank. The delay in the completion of the fifth review allowed the CBL and staff to design and implement measures that would allay these concerns.

6. The authorities are requesting the extension of the ECF arrangement to November 2017 and access augmentation of 10.7 percent of quota. The extension of the ECF, now scheduled to expire at end-December 2016, would help the authorities maintain macroeconomic stability, fill a balance of payment gap in 2017, and advance structural reform in the run up to the election. A first installment of the augmentation for 5 percent of quota (about US$18 million) would be disbursed at completion of the fifth and sixth reviews and fill the balance of payments financing gap in 2016 stemming from a government budget financing gap largely caused by the commodity price shock. This installment will be directed to the government budget. The remainder of the augmentation for 5.7 percent of quota would be disbursed to fill a balance of payment gap in 2017 through two additional reviews with test dates of end-December 2016 and end-June 2017. The authorities’ requests are justified by the exogenous nature of the commodity price shock and the implementation of strong corrective actions in the fiscal, monetary, and financial sector areas.

An Economy Still Under Stress

7. After Ebola, the economy is still not recovering. The impact of the commodity price shock is turning out to be stronger than originally anticipated, with the concession companies retrenching activity beyond their initially planned downsizing. In addition, the UNMIL withdrawal is dragging down the economy, especially services, and a heavy rain season has affected logging and hampered the expansion of gold production. As a result, real GDP is projected to contract by 0.5 percent in 2016. In line with anemic economic activity, private sector credit is projected to contract in real terms in 2016, hampering banks’ risk aversion amid still high levels of NPLs.

8. Inflation is picking up. Inflation rose to 9.9 percent in August, and average inflation for 2016 is projected at 8.7 percent, reflecting depreciation of the Liberian dollar and, to a lesser extent, the impact of higher indirect taxation in the telecommunication and transport sectors.

9. The current account deficit is relatively stable. Exports are projected to fall by 3.6 percent in 2016 relative to 2015, and Ebola and UNMIL-related grants are also declining. However, imports are also expected to decline steeply mainly because of lower grant-financed imports. As a result, the current account deficit is projected to remain stable at 32 percent of GDP in 2016.

10. Gross official reserves are projected to increase from US$446 million at end-2015 (2.6 months of imports) to US$469 million at end-2016 (2.9 months of imports). The CBL’s net foreign exchange position is also set to pick up this year, from US$164 million to US$181 million. The improvement is made possible by the implementation of the three-year financial plan adopted at end-2015 and the CBL’s moderate interventions in the foreign exchange market, despite the increase in CBL exposure to FIBLL.

11. The Liberian dollar depreciation accelerated. The exchange rate to US dollar depreciated by 11.2 percent in the first 10 months of 2016 compared to 4.2 percent in the same period in 2015. The depreciation is largely due to lower CBL interventions in the first half of the year, as the government reduced its sales of foreign exchange to the central bank on the back of lower dollar revenues, particularly from trade, and donor financing. The real effective exchange rate (REER) remained broadly stable in the first nine months of 2016 (Text Chart 1), reflecting higher inflation differential and faster depreciation. As a result, as of end-September, the REER remained overvalued by about 20 percent in line with the 2016 Article IV assessment. To absorb Liberian dollar liquidity, the MFDP issued a L$6 billion (about US$64 million) two-year T-bond in the first quarter of FY2017 (third quarter of 2016).

Text Chart 1:
Text Chart 1:

Effective Exchange Rate

(Index, 2011=100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 392; 10.5089/9781475562620.002.A001

12. Program performance is mixed. The stronger-than-expected impact of the commodity price shock, but also policy slippages underlie the deviation from program targets:

  • End-December 2015 quantitative targets: The performance criterion (PC) on government revenue was missed by US$7 million (0.4 percent of GDP), reflecting lower revenues from the natural resources sector. The PC on the net foreign exchange position was breached by US$20 million (1 percent of GDP) because of lower-than-expected external inflows, but also higher foreign exchange interventions and the increase in CBL exposure to FIBLL.

  • End-June 2016 quantitative targets: Reflecting continued weakness in natural resource revenue, the PC on government revenue was missed by US$21 million (1 percent of GDP). The net foreign exchange position PC was missed by US$14 million (0.7 percent of GDP). The lower deviation compared to end-2015 reflects improved performance of the CBL budget. In parallel to the net foreign exchange position deviation, the PC on the CBL’s gross direct credit to central government was missed by US$0.5 million.

  • Structural reform: Only two out of the nine structural benchmarks (SBs) for the fifth review were met (extension of IFMIS coverage and submission of project analyses), while additional three were completed with delay. Three out of five SBs for the sixth review were met (extension of IFMIS coverage, publication of quarterly SOE reports, and submission of quarterly financial statements of the CBL).

13. The authorities put in place strong corrective actions. The government has implemented a revenue package comprising measures for the FY2017 budget and additional measures introduced in November 2016, and has advanced revenue administration reform to improve tax compliance and capacity of the Liberia Revenue Authorities (LRA), with close support by the Fund and other donors. The CBL has strengthened international reserves through the implementation of the three-year financial plan, while limiting market interventions in the first half of 2016. The CBL also agreed on measures to strengthen the resolution of FIBLL and put the successor bank on a stronger footing.

Policy Discussions

Discussions focused on: (i) finalizing fiscal plans for FY2017, including revenue and expenditure measures to address the shortfall in government revenues triggered by the commodity price shock and weak economic growth, and fiscal reform, particularly in PFM; (ii) improving external buffers of the CBL, notably through the implementation of the three-year plan; (iii) addressing financial sector vulnerabilities, particularly the closure of FIBLL and measures to strengthen its resolution; and (iv) tightening debt limits to adapt to reduced borrowing space.

A. Outlook and Risks

14. The medium-term macroeconomic outlook is still favorable. Growth is projected to rebound to 3.2 percent in 2017, thanks to a further expansion in commercial gold production and continued growth in the agricultural sector supported by the Liberian Agricultural Transformation Agenda (LATA), even though rubber production is expected to remain stagnant. Medium-term growth of about 6 percent, still below the pre-Ebola 10-year average of over 7 percent, will be driven by a rebound in mining activity, particularly gold production, and sustained growth in all other non-mining sectors of the economy, notably thanks to improved electricity availability including from the finalization of the Mount Coffee hydropower plant which remains on track to come on stream by end-2016.

15. But, risks to the outlook remain high (Annex 1). The most immediate risk is the worsening of security post-UNMIL withdrawal, particularly in the run-up to the elections. More cases of Ebola—even on a small, contained scale as in the last year—would undermine confidence and activity. Weaker-than-expected market conditions for commodities could undermine government revenues and force the government to cut expenditure to unsustainable levels, which could crowd out priority social spending. The worsened macroeconomic outlook and high investment needs and borrowing pressures increase debt risks. Increasing financial sector vulnerabilities including a further loss of correspondent banking relationships could undermine the sector’s contribution to the economic recovery.

Text Table 1.

Liberia: Selected Economic Indicators, 2014–21

article image
Sources: Liberian authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Including selected off-budget items, such as Mt. Coffee project and Ebola-related activities. Fiscal data and projections refer to fiscal year (July - June).

In months of next year’s imports excluding imports related to UNMIL operations and FDI projects such as iron-ore concessions.

Net foreign exchange position is evaluated at the program exchange rates, instead of the current market exchange rates, and therefore, valuation adjustments are shown separately.

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Liberia: Recent Economic Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 392; 10.5089/9781475562620.002.A001

Source: Liberian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

B. Fiscal Policy

16. The government under executed the FY2016 budget. Reflecting stronger-than-expected impact of commodity shock on the government revenue, domestic revenue was US$453 million (22 percent of GDP), about 4 percent lower than the approved budget. Based on an austerity draft revised budget (never approved by the Legislature), the government reduced spending by about 10 percent compared with FY2015 spending. The under execution of the budget allowed the government to achieve a budget deficit of US$23 million (1 percent of GDP) and an overall fiscal deficit of US$87 million (4.2 percent of GDP), including off-budget project spending.

17. Fiscal pressures are higher in FY2017. First, revenues from the natural resource sector continue to be weak and growth is not recovering as expected, reducing projected FY2017 government revenues on unchanged policies by about US$85 million (4 percent of GDP) compared to revenue projections at the time of the completion of the fourth review. Second, the government in FY2017 will need to finance US$30 million one-off exceptional spending related to the elections (US$22 million) and the security handover from UNMIL (US$8 million). Third, because of the frontloading related to the Ebola epidemic, expected donor budget support (excluding Fund augmentation and World Bank support) would decrease from US$96 million (4.6 percent of GDP) in FY2016 to US$50 million (2.3 percent of GDP) in FY2017, a drop of $46 million compared to the average of the last four fiscal years.

Text Table 2.

Liberia: Budget, FY2016 and FY2017

(Millions of U.S. dollars)

article image
Source: Liberian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.Note: This table aggregates all the measures that the government introduced to the FY2017 budget while Text Table 1 in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (Appendix I) separately shows measures depending on the timing of their introduction. Therefore, these tables have different presentations although both summarize the FY2017 budget, but underlying projections are the same.

18. The approved FY2017 budget—despite strong revenue and expenditure measures—proved soon unrealistic. In September 2016, the Legislature approved an FY2017 budget of US$600 million, with US$532 million in domestic tax, non-tax revenues, and deposit financing sources and US$68 million in external budget support (including the expected Fund augmentation). However, the downward revision of economic growth in 2016-17 and the delay in approval of the budget are now expected to reduce FY2017 revenues by US$37 million compared to the budget. On this basis, in consultation with staff, the authorities adopted further revenue and spending measures in November 2016. The revised fiscal plans, envisaging a government deficit of US$27 million (1.2 percent of GDP) will be reflected in a supplementary budget that the government plans to submit to the January 2017 parliamentary session. The overall fiscal deficit (including domestically-and externally-financed off-budget items) would increase from 4.2 percent of GDP in FY2016 to 8.5 percent of GDP in FY2017 as the government executes steps up the execution of delayed Ebola-related and infrastructural spending, which are financed in FY2017 through the drawdown of yet unused external grants and domestic loans.

19. The comprehensive package of fiscal measures for FY2017 reflects the authorities’ commitment to address fiscal pressures. The adjustment, estimated as the revenue effort plus the expenditure cuts from inflation-adjusted FY2016 original budget levels, would be about US$93 million or 4.2 percent of GDP for FY2017. This policy effort compares to a fiscal shock from revenue shortfall and exceptional spending estimated at US$115 million.

  • Revenue measures for a total of US$63 million (3 percent of GDP) on an annual basis. Measures approved by the Legislature as amendments to the Liberia Revenue Code (LRC), for a total of US$33 million include: (i) increase in the General Sales Tax (GST, US$20 million); (ii) additional excises on tobacco, alcohol and non-alcohol beverages, and introduction of an international outbound call excise and GSM excise (for a total of US$12 million); and (iii) increase in real estate tax (US$0.5 million). In addition to these measures, the government applied a 30 US cent per gallon increase in administrative fuel storage surcharges collected by the Liberian Petroleum Refining Company (LPRC) starting in January 2016 (US$30 million). Taking into account the timing of the implementation of the various measures, the yield of all these measures in FY2017 would amount to for US$51 million or 2.3 percentage points of GDP.

  • Spending measures. Cabinet approved austerity measures in June 2016 including: reducing consultant services; freezing new hiring (except in education, health, and security); limiting official travel, printing and publication; and reducing purchases and maintenance of vehicles. Investment under the domestically-financed Public Sector Investment Plan (PSIP) was limited to existing projects. Additional November 2016 measures include additional cuts by about 4 percent from the budget expenditure ceiling (about US$11 million) of goods and services purchases, subsidy and transfers, and capital spending. Total spending adjustment compared with expenditure plan under the original FY2016 budget would be US$38 million.

20. IMF and World Bank exceptional budget support would fill the remaining financing gap of US$38 million in FY2017. The first installment of the access augmentation under the ECF arrangement requested by the authorities (US$18 million) and World Bank’s additional budget support grant (US$20 million), including US$8 million from the Crisis Response Window, delivered through Development Policy Operation would fill the balance of payments gap. The Fund disbursement would be channeled to budget support, which will help avoid unsustainable expenditure cuts. Even with exceptional assistance, total FY2017 budget support of US$86 million would still fall short of FY2016 levels of US$96 million.

21. The authorities plan to maintain a tight fiscal stance in FY2018. External budget support is expected to remain limited while the government will still have to finance some of the exceptional spending for the elections and security. The authorities intend to maintain the overall spending envelope constant in nominal terms. Higher revenues from the rebound in economic activity and ongoing revenue administration reform should compensate the expected decline in external assistance.

C. Fiscal Reform

22. The authorities intend to push ahead with fiscal reform:

  • Tax policy and administration: With support from the IMF and other donors, the LRA has widened the tax base, improved tax compliance, and built capacity. The achievements include introducing desk audit system for large tax-payers, completing sectorial audit manuals, providing workshop to taxpayers, and signing Memorandum of Understanding with other government agencies, such as Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission. The government is reviewing the LRC for further amendments, including natural resource taxation, consistency between tax code and non-tax revenue, regional tariff harmonization, and simplification and avoidance of ambiguity in the tax code. Key changes (reflected above) were approved by the Legislature together with the FY2017 budget, but shortcomings remain. In addition, the government has been preparing for VAT implementation in 2018. A draft VAT bill is under preparation.

  • Natural resource taxation: The government is formalizing the deferral of social contributions by the concessions, which would replace the informal agreement not to collect the contributions and allow the government to collect 50 percent of the dues and to receive the deferred contributions starting in FY2019 (structural benchmark).

  • Procurement: The Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (PPCC) has modernized and stepped up the enforcement of public procurement processes, helping to avoid unfunded expenditure commitments. The PPCC has rolled out the pre-qualification of potential bidders, and has recently launched the standardization of procurement contracts and pre-approval framework. The PPCC aims at improving the rate of timely submission of draft procurement plans for the FY2018 budget to 50 percent of ministries and agencies receiving budget allocations (structural benchmark).

  • Public investment management: The establishment of the domestically-financed public investment database and the expansion of the externally-financed database (structural benchmarks for the fifth review) have been lagging because of capacity constraints, technical difficulties, and poor coordination among MFDP and line ministries and agencies. With assistance from the Fund, the authorities have stepped up efforts to develop these tools crucial to improving their capacity to manage and increase the impact of investment spending. The completion of the domestically-financed project database is a prior action and the expansion of externally-financed project database is a structural benchmark for December. The MFPD is also preparing an action plan to implement the recommendations of the recent 2016 Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA) conducted by FAD (Box 1).

  • Treasury Single Account (TSA): The MFDP is preparing a strategy paper for the extension of the TSA which has still a relatively limited coverage. The strategy envisages a technical working group composed by MFDP, CBL, and commercial banks which should agree on a memorandum of understanding on the operations of the TSA.

  • SOEs: Loss-making SOEs draw resources from the budget and may also create contingent liabilities. The authorities are committed to improve transparency of SOEs activities and financial control. To this end, the MFDP is now regularly publishing a quarterly report of 13 largest SOEs, which will be expanded to include below-the-line information by end-FY2017 (ongoing structural benchmark).

  • PFM strategy: The MFDP is updating PFM reform strategy to cover FY2017–19. The new strategy will reflect the findings of 2016 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment and the 2016 PIMA. In addition, the PFM Act is being amended based on the Fund recommendations.

Technical Assistance Report: Public Investment Management Assessment1

A Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) Public Investment Management (PIM) Assessment took place in July 2016. The assessment concludes that the overall performance of PIM in Liberia is in line with that of comparable low-income countries, reflecting the country’s post-conflict status, which severely damaged its infrastructure, and heavy dependence on external loans and grants.

PIM suffers from a number of weaknesses. These include: (i) the absence of an integrated pipeline of projects for domestic or external funding that have passed tests of economic and social viability; (ii) poor communication the execution of projects between ministries and agencies and the MFDP; (iii) the absence of an integrated database of planned and ongoing public investment projects; and (iv) a recently established but still largely ineffective oversight role for the MFDP.

The assessment makes seven high-priority recommendations for 2016–17:

  • Prepare a framework paper on the PIM cycle which develops a pipeline of sector projects;

  • Strengthen the legal framework for PIM;

  • Improve the presentation of development projects in the annual budget documents;

  • Establish and enforce rules for prioritizing PSIP projects and the payment of counterparty funds in issuing allotments for budget execution;

  • Establish a comprehensive database of externally and domestically financed projects;

  • Improve the organizational structure of the MFDP; and

  • Prepare an inventory of all documents and reports relating to the preparation, appraisal, evaluation, and execution of public investment projects which are submitted to the MFDP or generated within it.

1 September 2016

D. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy

23. The CBL succeeded in improving its foreign exchange position. Despite lower foreign exchange sales from the government in the first half of 2016, the CBL managed to strengthen its international reserve position. Going forward, the authorities are committed to increase external buffers to above three months of imports to strengthen credibility and resilience to shocks, particularly in the run-up to the elections. To this end, the CBL intends to:

  • Implement the three-year financial plan: The CBL has broadly adhered to the plan launched in December 2015 (prior action for the fourth review). The deficit in 2016 is projected to be US$2.1 million (13 percent) higher than planned, mainly because of a previously unbudgeted portion of the cost of printing banknotes, for an amount of $3.9 million out of a total of US$5.2 million. The CBL undertook the much-delayed printing following an unexpected green light by the Legislature, which has veto power over issuance of banknotes. The CBL absorbed about 60 percent of the cost through a reduction of US dollar operational expenses. A similar approach may be needed to absorb the cost of further issuance of banknotes in 2017.

  • Moderate its foreign exchange interventions: In order to achieve its reserve targets, the CBL has limited its interventions and allowed increased exchange rate flexibility, with the Liberian dollar projected to depreciate by 12 percent to the US dollar in 2016 compared to 7 percent in 2015.

  • Institute an Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO): In light of the need to actively manage balance sheets and expenses, the CBL intends to establish an ALCO to oversee risk management, balance sheet, and financial performance (structural benchmark for the eighth review).

24. Liquidity management coordination has resumed after a slowdown caused by the transition at the CBL and MFDP. Coordination between MFDP, CBL, and LRA is crucial in light of high dollarization (including in government operations) and large lump-sum external assistance inflows. Meetings of the Liquidity Working Group (LWG) have been irregular over the summer, contributing to sharp fluctuations in Liberian dollar liquidity conditions. Submission of key inputs to the liquidity framework has been hampered by the transition of high-level officials at the CBL and MFDP and upgrading of the CBL’s core banking application to Temenos 24. However, coordination has recently resumed, also in reaction to high liquidity volatility, resulting in the September 2016 issuance of a two-year, L$6 billion bond by the CBL on behalf of the MFDP with a yield of about

15 percent, well-above the average of 3 percent for Treasury bills.

E. Financial Sector Vulnerabilities

25. In the course of 2014–16, the CBL extended financial support to FIBLL, an insolvent bank. FIBLL was a medium-sized bank with a market share of 4.7 percent of total deposits (about 1 percent of GDP) in 2015, majority owned by the FIB group of Gambia. As a result of prolonged mismanagement and deteriorating performance since 2013, the bank slid into insolvency in 2014 with NPLs rising to 70 percent of total loans. To prop up the bank, the CBL extended an uncollateralized line of credit of US$12 million with a one-year maturity in 2014, which was fully used by January 2016, and an additional US$7.3 million in the course of 2016 for a total exposure of US$19.3 million (about 1 percent of GDP).

26. As its exposure mounted, the CBL decided to resolve FIBLL with support from the Fund. The CBL support was motivated initially by risks to systemic liquidity and, later, by the impact of possible failure of the bank on the financial system, access to finance, and employment. However, the effectiveness of CBL’s support to FIBLL was undermined by lack of collateral and the poor prospects to restore the bank’s solvency, in the absence of an emergency liquidity assistance framework which would have clarified the scope, objectives, and limitations of liquidity support. With options limited by the absence of a bank resolution scheme and an increasing drain on its international reserves, incompatible with the objectives of the ECF, the CBL agreed with Fund staff to resolve the bank with technical assistance from the Fund.

27. However, the CBL pursued an A&P resolution scheme as opposed to the outright liquidation recommended by staff. The CBL closed FIBLL in June 2016 as agreed with staff, but sold most of its assets and liabilities to a Ghanaian private equity group through a P&A transaction, as opposed to an outright liquidation as recommended by staff. The deal envisaged the injection by the buyer of US$18.4 million in the successor bank, GN Bank. The CBL had to absorb all its exposure which was excluded from the P&A arrangement.

28. Concerns over the modality of resolution of FIBLL delayed the completion of the fifth review. The CBL argued that a P&A transaction would avoid losses for depositors in the absence of a deposit insurance scheme, minimize the cost to the public sector, achieve continuity in banking services, and maintain public confidence in the financial system. In contrast, staff’s recommendation for an outright liquidation stemmed from concerns about risks for future open bank assistance to the successor bank in light of the large losses of FIBLL operations, the ambitious business plan of the new buyers, their limited track record in banking, and the challenging economic environment in the country.

29. Over the summer and fall, CBL and staff agreed on measures to mitigate concerns over the resolution of FIBLL and minimize risks to the CBL. Measures include:

  1. Forensic audit of FIBLL covering the causes of FIBLL losses and the CBL supervision of the bank that will be conducted by an internationally reputable firm, with an interim report to be shared with staff (prior action for the fifth and sixth ECF review); the authorities will share the final report of the audit with Fund staff and transmit the results to the relevant judicial authorities (structural benchmark), and committed to publishing the audit’s findings;

  2. Commitment by the buyers to promptly correct any capital shortcoming, as outlined in the P&A agreement; and

  3. Special monitoring of the bank with monthly reporting of GN Bank Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) and quarterly financial statements to the Fund.

30. The CBL is also moving to address the gaps in the safety net architecture exposed by the FIBLL episode. With technical assistance from the Fund, the CBL is working on: (i) procedures for an emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) framework (structural benchmark) in addition to recently issued revised regulations for a standing credit facility and minimum reserve requirements; (ii) a special resolution regime to take over and transfer, without shareholders’ approval or involvement of the courts, assets and liabilities of a failing bank to an authorized institution; and (iii) a deposit insurance scheme, designed in accordance with international good practices, to offer depositors more meaningful protection against potential banking system distress.

31. The CBL is implementing a strategy to reduce NPLs. NPLs to total loans have declined substantially to 13.5 percent in August 2016 from 19.2 percent in August 2015. The decline is largely due to write-off of FIBLL NPLs, the recovery of lending post-Ebola, and the restructuring of some loans. The CBL has renewed efforts to reduce NPLs mainly to facilitate credit to the private sector. The CBL has resumed the “name and shame” initiative in October 2016 that involves publishing names of noncompliant delinquent borrowers in the press. The measure is being complemented by enforcement of the regulation on mandatory write-offs of fully provisioned recoverable legacy NPLs.

32. The CBL is enhancing supervision and Anti-Money Laundering/Combatting the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations. Mindful that withdrawal of correspondent banks is impacting trade finance, flow of remittances, humanitarian aid, and financial inclusion, the CBL has established a dedicated AML/CFT supervision unit. The CBL is also working closely with the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to address gaps in financing of terrorist activities and criminalization of illicit trafficking of goods.

F. External Sector Issues

33. Mainly due to weak export prospects, Liberia’s borrowing space has tightened. Liberia’s risk of debt distress moved from low to moderate in 2015 as contracting of new debt accelerated and the economic outlook worsened following the Ebola and commodity price shocks. With continued economic weakness, particularly in exports, the DSA shows that the current risk rating of debt distress remains moderate, but is close to high, especially because of debt-to-export ratios close to the threshold.

34. In response, the authorities committed to limit the pace of external borrowing. In FY2016 the government signed US$150 million in new loans, but as no loan was ratified the PC on the debt limit was met. In FY2017 the Legislature ratified new loans for US$155 million, or US$91 million in PV terms, of which US$103 million signed in FY2016. The program envisages the ratification of about additional US$95 million in new loans for FY2017 (including the remainder of the loans signed in FY2016) for a total US$250 million or US$136 million in PV terms. The total ratification envelope for FY2016-FY2017 of US$136 million in PV terms is thus lower than projected at the time of the fourth review, consistent with the smaller borrowing envelope needed to keep the risk of debt distress at moderate. Text Table 3 shows the summary of the external borrowing program. Text Table 4 shows new external debts by type of interest and by currency.

Text Table 3.

Summary Table of Projected External Borrowing Program

(July 1, 2016 to June 30, 2017)

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Source: Liberian authorities; and IMF staff calculation.
Text Table 4.

Type of New External Debt

(July 1, 2016 to June 30, 2017, Millions of U.S. dollars)

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Source: Liberian authorities; and IMF staff calculation.

35. Liberia is making progress with regional and multilateral trade agreements. Liberia became a WTO member in July 2016. As part of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS), the government is working on implementing the Common External Tariff (CET), which was approved by the legislature in September, 2016. Migration to the CET is to take place starting in January 2017.

Program Issues, Monitoring, and Risks

36. Completing the fifth and sixth reviews is conditional on two prior actions. The

authorities committed to (i) complete the development of a database to cover all domestically financed projects and (ii) provide an interim report of the forensic audit conducted by KPMG.

37. The authorities are requesting waivers for the nonobservance of program targets:

  • Missed PC on government revenue for end-December 2015 and end-June 2016: the revenue shortfall was mainly driven by the commodity price shock, particularly the fall of iron ore price. The authorities put in place strong corrective actions: (i) a package of revenue measure for the FY2017 budget and additional measures introduced in November 2016 for an annualized total of US$63 million, and (ii) ongoing revenue administration reforms to improve tax compliance and capacity of the LRA, with close support by the Fund and other donors.

  • Missed PC on the CBL’s net foreign exchange position for end-December 2015 and end-June 2016: the deviation from program targets were due to policy weaknesses, notably the support to FIBLL, but also the impact of the external shock. The CBL has taken corrective actions consisting in: (i) implementation of the three-year financial plan; (ii) limited market interventions in the first half of 2016 to achieve a net foreign exchange position target agreed with staff; and (iii) closure of FIBLL in June 2016.

  • Missed PC on the CBL’s gross credit to the government for end-June 2016: the waiver would be justified by the minor deviation from the program target.

38. The requested augmentation of access would contribute to fill the balance of payments financing needs in 2016–17. In 2016, the first installment of the augmentation of US$18 million, directed to budget support, together with the additional budget financing, including from the Crisis Response Window of the World Bank, would help close the US$38 million balance of payment gap. The Fund’s disbursement would be channeled to budget support, alleviating the burden of fiscal consolidation. Supporting the government could catalyze other donor support, especially for the elections. A Memorandum of Understanding between the MFDP and the CBL would structure the on-lending of this installment to the budget. In 2017, the remaining two installments of the augmentation for US$21 million, together with additional election assistance from other donors for US$7 million, would close the balance of payments gap created by the worsening of export performance.

39. The extension would allow the completion and deepening of the economic program supported by the ECF and provide an anchor to maintain macroeconomic stability in the pre-election period.

  • Fiscal policies: the main focus would be on the execution of the FY2017 budget and the preparation of the FY2018 budget, to be submitted to the Legislature in April 2017. The extension further allows the completion of PFM reform envisaged under the program, including the missed SB on spending and procurement plans for FY2017, the formalization of social contribution deferral agreements with the concession companies, and the monitoring of SOEs.

  • Monetary and exchange rate: the program would help the CBL continue accumulating foreign exchange buffers to stabilize the exchange rate, if needed, support the improvement of the net foreign exchange position through the continued implementation of the three-year budget, and advance the MFDP-CBL coordination on liquidity management and foreign exchange interventions. In addition, the extension accommodates strengthening of CBL financial performance and governance reform through a new structural benchmark on the establishment of an ALCO.

  • Financial sector: the extension would allow staff to continue monitoring the implementation of the measures related to the resolution of FIBLL, including the conclusion and publication of the forensic audit, and give the CBL time to push ahead with the regulations on ELA, the Special Resolution Regime (SRR), and deposit insurance.

  • Performance during the period up to November 2017 would be monitored by performance criteria and indicative targets and structural benchmarks.

40. The November 2015 update safeguards assessment confirmed a weak governance and control environment at the CBL. The assessment’s key concerns are being addressed by program measures. In addition to the forensic audit, these include strengthening the CBL’s investment policies, the approval of its financial plan (prior action for the fourth review), and the establishment of an ELA framework (structural benchmark). Remaining recommendations include legal amendments to align the CBL Act with best practices, strengthening the internal audit function, and enhancing audit and control oversight.

41. Liberia’s capacity to repay the Fund is adequate. Total outstanding Fund credit currently amounts to 44.8 percent of quota. Although the risk of debt distress has increased from low to moderate, the debt level remains relatively low. Grants under the CCR Trust have allowed prepayment of Liberia’s debt service obligations to the Fund until late 2018.

42. Program risks are high:

  • Economy: Further deterioration of the economy and slow recovery of commodity prices could directly affect government revenues.

  • Fiscal: Spending pressures from the upcoming elections combined with revenue shortfall could lead to unsustainable external borrowing (pushing the risk of debt distress to high) or to an accumulation of arrears. Slow progress of PFM reforms could negatively affect fiscal and development policies and discourage support from the international community.

  • Monetary, exchange rate, and financial system: Higher-than-programmed CBL foreign interventions to mitigate depreciation pressure could undermine reserve accumulation. Delay in the resolution of FIBLL, including the forensic audit, would hamper efforts to strengthen the CBL’s capacity to supervise the financial system.

Staff Appraisal

43. The authorities should be commended for maintaining macroeconomic stability in a difficult economic situation. The economy has not yet recovered after the Ebola epidemic. It is becoming apparent that the impact of the commodity price shock and, to a lesser extent, the UNMIL withdrawal is deeper than anticipated, with negative implications for government revenues which exacerbate the developmental trade-offs faced by the authorities.

44. The authorities’ request for an extension sends a strong positive signal. The intention to complete the economic program under the ECF and maintain sound policies, including fiscal discipline, is particularly welcome given that the country is entering the thick of the pre-electoral period.

45. Program performance is mixed. In part, this reflects the challenging economic situation. However, deviations from the program targets are also a result of policy choices, notably with regard to the impact of bail-out of FIBLL on the CBL’s foreign exchange position. Delays in structural reform are attributable to limited capacity but also to weak prioritization of reform efforts, partly caused by the transitions at the helm of the MFDP and CBL.

46. Risks are high. While medium-term prospects are still favorable, the economy is vulnerable to a possible re-emergence of the EVD, a worsening of security in the run-up to the elections, and persistence of adverse economic effects of the commodity price shock.

47. The policy reaction to the shocks is appropriate. The authorities took prompt action to address fiscal pressures from the commodity price shock and the increase in election-related spending, on top of existing needs for health spending and the handover of security from UNMIL. Revenue and spending measures in the fiscal package for the FY2017 fiscal year are overall well-balanced.

48. Consolidation efforts should continue in the coming years. In the future, the government should further rationalize spending, particularly current items such as the wage bill and transfers, and deepen the domestic revenue mobilization effort, notably with the launch of the VAT, to compensate for the volatility and likely decrease of external assistance.

49. The government should also accelerate structural fiscal reform. While the authorities have made good progress on tax policy and administration, public financial management reform has lagged. The authorities should particularly focus on the TSA, investment management, SOE monitoring, and procurement and budgetary processes.

50. Rebuilding external buffers must remain a priority, particularly in the run-up to the elections. Adequate CBL reserves are key to preserving its capacity to intervene in the foreign exchange market and act as lender of last resort. To this end, the central bank should rigorously implement the three-year financial plan and limit interventions to smoothing excessive exchange rate volatility, while allowing the exchange rate to adjust to economic fundamentals. The CBL should also refrain from resuming past practices of direct interventions in the economy.

51. MFDP-CBL-LRA coordination is essential to manage liquidity volatility and contain inflation. The exercise should be supported by stronger analysis, including of government revenue and spending currency composition and external inflows, particularly foreign aid. The tightening of liquidity through the issuance of Liberian dollar bond is appropriate in light of the acceleration of inflation.

52. The FIBLL episode drained CBL’s reserves and weakened its credibility. The financial support to FIBLL went well beyond the extension of liquidity to a commercial bank in temporary difficulty, in effect morphing into a full blown bail-out in the absence of an ELA framework, an SRR mechanism, or deposit insurance scheme. The exposure to FIBLL also weakened the CBL’s international reserve position. Furthermore, the lack of transparency in the CBL’s financial support to FIBLL and its initial resolution attempts have weakened its credibility.

53. The closure of FIBLL and the implementation of related measures are welcome. The authorities’ decision to commission a forensic audit of FIBLL and its supervision by the CBL, and publish its findings are an important sign of their renewed commitment to improve transparency, accountability, and governance of the central bank. The CBL should also work to put in place the frameworks for emergency liquidity, bank resolution, and deposit insurance. An ALCO would be an effective instrument to maintain the CBL’s balance sheet under control.

54. Reducing NPLs would support the recovery of credit to the private sector. The CBL’s renewed efforts to reduce the stock of legacy NPLs are welcome. While the name-and-shame approach may bring fruit, NPL write-offs should be more appropriately achieved through the enforcement of existing prudential regulations.

55. Tighter borrowing space requires prioritization of investment. The authorities are respecting the debt limits under the new debt limit policy, and are committed to continue pursuing a prudent borrowing strategy. Improvement of project assessment and monitoring, and stronger debt management along the lines laid out in the 2016 Article IV would strengthen Liberia’s debt strategy and management, facilitate the prioritization of debt-financed investment projects, and improve their effectiveness.

56. On the basis of the strength of the authorities’ policy commitments and corrective measures, staff supports the completion of the fifth and sixth reviews and the authorities’ requests for waivers of non-observance of performance criteria, augmentation of ECF access, and extension of the ECF arrangement.

Table 1.

Liberia: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2014–21

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Sources: Liberian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Including selected off-budget items, such as Mt. Coffee project and Ebola-related activities. Fiscal data and projections refer to fiscal year (July - June).

In months of next year’s imports excluding imports related to UNMIL operations and FDI projects such as iron-ore concessions.

Net foreign exchange position is evaluated at the program exchange rates, instead of the current market exchange rates, and therefore, valuation adjustments are shown separately

Table 2.

Liberia: Balance of Payments, 2014–18

(Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Liberian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

The central bank is currently revising BOP statistics using the custom-based trade data, which would have better data coverage, especially on imports.

“Private financing” may reflect current transfers that are not captured by the official statistics.

Includes SDR holdings.

Recorded in fiscal years.

In months of next year’s imports excluding imports related to UNMIL operations and FDI projects such as iron-ore concessions.

Table 3a.

Liberia: Fiscal Operations of the Central Government, 2014–181/

(Millions of U.S. dollars)

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Sources: Liberian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Fiscal table is shown on a cash basis (i.e., debt service payments are shown after all debt relief) and refers to the central government budget and selected off-budget items, such as Mt. Coffee hydro project and Ebola-related activities.

FY2017 goods and service spending includes election costs (one-off), security handover costs (partly one-off), and Mt Coffee hydro project, which ends in FY2017.

Non-tax iron sector revenue, including social contribution by the iron companies.

Includes debt to IMF.

Includes central government debt to the Central Bank of Liberia (which is excluded from domestic debt in the debt sustainability analysis).

Basic balance is defined as (total revenue and grants minus project grants) minus (total expenditure minus foreign and domestically financed investment spending).

Including end-FY2016 expenditure float.

Total aid disbursement includes all the official grants and loans based on the new Aid Management Database. Since “Grants” covers only selected items, this item exceeds sum of “Grants” and “External loans”.

Table 3b.

Liberia: Fiscal Operations of the Central Government, 2014–181/

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Liberian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Fiscal table is shown on a cash basis (i.e., debt service payments are shown after all debt relief) and refers to the central government budget and elected off-budget items, such as Mt. Coffee hydro project and Ebola-related activities.

FY2017 goods and service spending includes election costs (one-off), security handover costs (partly one-off), and Mt Coffee hydro project, which ends in FY2017.

Non-tax iron sector revenue, including social contribution by the iron companies.

Includes debt to IMF.

Includes central government debt to the Central Bank of Liberia (which is excluded from domestic debt in the debt sustainability analysis).

Basic balance is defined as (total revenue and grants minus project grants) minus (total expenditure minus foreign and domestically financed investment spending).

Including end-FY2016 expenditure float.

Total aid disbursement includes all the official grants and loans based on the new Aid Management Database. Since “Grants” covers only selected items, this item exceeds sum of “Grants” and “External loans”.