Abstract
Republic of Poland: Selected Issues
Female Labor Force Participation in Poland1
Poland is facing a rapidly aging population, which is expected to weigh on public finances and economic growth. Yet, there is an important underutilized source of qualified labor—Poland’s women. Women in Poland are on average just as educated as men and have a longer potential working lifespan. Nonetheless, female labor force participation is low relative to that for men and low relative to that in many other European countries. Unlocking this valuable source of growth would require leveling the playing field between men and women in the workplace, including by providing high-quality affordable childcare for young children, removing tax disincentives for the second earner in a family, and allowing the retirement age to increase as envisaged by the 2013 reforms. For Poland to unleash its full economic potential, it needs to embrace the vital contribution that women can make to its economy.
A. Introduction
1. Poland is facing an aging population. By 2030, its working-age population2 of around 27 million people is projected to shrink by about 3 million people or about 11 percent (Figure 1). By 2060, Eurostat projections suggest the working-age population will have shrunk by more than 30 percent. In turn, the old-age dependency ratio would increase dramatically. Today, for every one hundred persons of working age, there are about 20 people aged 65+. By 2060, this number is expected to increase to about 60 people, with adverse repercussions for social spending, as well as potential growth.
Selected Countries: Aging Populations
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Selected Countries: Aging Populations
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Selected Countries: Aging Populations
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
2. Alongside, fertility rates are among the lowest in Europe. While fertility rates have been declining for some time now in Europe, Poland has seen a particularly large decline during the past half century as the number of children per woman more than halved—from an average of close to three in 1960 to 1.3 in 2014. As a result, Poland now ranks among the countries in Europe with the lowest fertility rate.
3. Could increasing women’s engagement in the labor force help? While Polish women obtain as many years of schooling as Polish men, as of 2014, they accounted for only about 45 percent of the civilian labor force. In fact, for every 100 women of working age, only 61 of them were participating in the labor force. At the same time, women’s life expectancy at birth stands at 81 years—well above that of men at 73 years. Hence, the potential for boosting women’s participation in the labor market is notable and could have significant macroeconomic effects. To that effect, closing the gender participation gap in OECD countries by 2030 could increase the level of GDP by 12 percent on average across the OECD (OECD, 2012). A static back-of-the envelope calculation for Poland, assuming a standard production function with a labor share of 0.5, would suggest that increasing women’s labor force participation rate to that of men could be associated with about 5 percent higher output. If the overall participation gap vis-à-vis the EU frontier was also closed, the effect would be notably larger.
4. This chapter discusses the scope for increasing women’s labor force participation in Poland. First, we present the stylized facts in a cross-country perspective. We then discuss potential drivers of female labor force participation as identified by the literature. Subsequently, we discuss the current policy setting in Poland related to women’s participation in the labor market. Finally, we conclude and point to specific policies that may be particularly relevant in the Polish setting, drawing on international experience.
B. Stylized Facts
Women in the labor force
5. Female labor force participation in Poland is low relative to other European countries. Labor force participation among working-age women in Poland declined by 3½ percentage points during 2000–07, while that in other emerging European New EU Member States (NMS73) experienced an increase of about 1 percentage points (Figure 2). However, this trend was reversed as women in the older age groups became increasingly more active participants in the labor market—in particular women between the ages of 55 and 59, who almost doubled their participation rate after early retirement schemes were tightened in 2009 (see below). Nonetheless, in 2014, a female participation gap of more than 6 percentage points remained vis-à-vis NMS7 and EU15, where average participation rates exceeded 67 percent.
Selected Countries: Female Labor Force Participation in Europe
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Selected Countries: Female Labor Force Participation in Europe
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Selected Countries: Female Labor Force Participation in Europe
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
6. In particular, a significant gap vis-à-vis other European countries remains among the younger and older age groups. Labor force participation of prime working-age women (25–54 years old) has generally been on par with that in EU15. However, despite a narrowing gap among the 55–64 year-olds, a significant participation gap of more than 15 percentage points for the youngest and the oldest working-age women vis-à-vis the EU15 has persisted during the past several years. That said, a significant participation gap among young women coincides with a relatively high share of people (men and women) in this age group, which is enrolled in education—in particular tertiary education—which can help support long-term growth (Figure 3). In contrast, the gap in the older age groups appears related to early withdrawal from the labor market. While female labor force participation among the 50–54 year-olds have almost caught up with EU15 levels (even if not with NMS7), women older than 55 continue to participate at significantly lower rates than those in both NMS7 and EU15 (Figure 2). Notably, participation among the 60–64 year-olds has remained broadly unchanged during the 2000s, while women in this age group in NMS7 and EU15 on average have become markedly more active participants.
Selected Countries: Education and Part-time Employment
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Selected Countries: Education and Part-time Employment
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Selected Countries: Education and Part-time Employment
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Female Labor Force Participation by Age, 2014
(Percent of population in given age group)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Source: OECD.Female Labor Force Participation by Age, 2014
(Percent of population in given age group)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Source: OECD.Female Labor Force Participation by Age, 2014
(Percent of population in given age group)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Source: OECD.7. Women are also less active participants in the labor force than men. Relative to men, women’s participation rate is more than 13 percentage points lower—a significantly larger gap than what is observed in the Nordics of less than 5 percentage points on average (Figure 3). Nonetheless, while Poland’s performance on this metric falls short of that in EU15, it compares favorably with the OECD average of close to 17 percentage points.
8. Notably, the younger childbearing and older segments of the female population appear to have the largest gender gaps. While the gender participation gap is positive across most ages, a few age groups stand out. Consistent with a life-cycle perspective, women of prime childbearing ages (here defined as ages 20–39) are markedly less active in the labor market than men, with an average gender participation gap of close to 15 percent. In addition, while the gender gap is narrower for women between the ages of 40 and 54, women tend to withdraw from the labor market well before men do.
9. Those who work, usually do so at full time. While some countries in Europe are characterized by a high degree of part-time employment—in particular the Netherlands where more than half of women are employed at less than full time—the prevalence of part-time employment at 8 percent of employed women in Poland is less than half the share seen on average in the OECD (Figure 3). Hence, any increase in women’s labor force participation in Poland would be most likely associated with an increase in the share of women in the labor force rather than an extension of the length of their usual workweek. In addition, women with tertiary education appear more likely to be active in the labor market than women with lower degrees of education.
Women in the corporate sector
10. Female representation is also well below gender equality in top levels of the career ladder. In fact, in 2013, in a sample of about 10 thousand non-financial corporations in Poland, less than a quarter of senior positions4 were held by women (Figure 4). While this is only slightly below the median country in the sample of more than 2 million companies, it is well below levels in several peer economies such as Hungary and Romania (Christiansen and others, 2016a). This is also consistent with a recent survey by Cribis of 242,000 commercial code companies in Poland where 22 percent report being managed by women, in particular in the areas of education, social assistance, healthcare services, and small retail trade (Cribis, 2016). That said, in 2013, the Polish Ministry of Treasury (MoT) introduced a gender-representation plan for state-controlled companies, aiming at 30 percent female representation at supervisory boards. Accordingly, the MoT has noted that publicly quoted state-controlled firms were close to that target in mid-2015. Nonetheless, it highlights the significant room for further boosting female representation not only in the labor force at large but also in senior positions. To that effect, Christiansen and others (2016a) found a strong positive association between firms’ gender diversity in senior positions and corporate financial performance—in particular in sectors where women comprise a larger share of the labor force and where greater creativity and innovative capacity are in high demand.
Selected Countries: Senior Positions Held by Women, 2013
(Percent of total senior positions)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Sources: Eurostat, Orbis, and Christiansen and others (2016a).Selected Countries: Senior Positions Held by Women, 2013
(Percent of total senior positions)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Sources: Eurostat, Orbis, and Christiansen and others (2016a).Selected Countries: Senior Positions Held by Women, 2013
(Percent of total senior positions)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Sources: Eurostat, Orbis, and Christiansen and others (2016a).C. Drivers of Female Labor Force Participation
11. Both individual characteristics and policies contribute to shaping women’s employment decisions. As shown in Christiansen and others (2016b), individual characteristics, preferences, and attitudes may affect whether or not a woman chooses to work—for pay—outside the home. However, the study also shows that even after accounting for personal characteristics and preferences, policies matter. Below, we briefly list some of the factors that have been highlighted in the literature as correlates with the level of female labor force participation. The subsequent section then describes the current policy setting in Poland.
12. Individual characteristics, preferences, and attitudes:
Individual characteristics. The larger the number of young children in the household, the less likely a women is to be employed. In this context, labor supply varies over the life cycle as personal demands change with age (Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980; Fernández and Wong, 2014). However, more years of education is generally associated with a higher degree of employment (Eckstein and Lifshitz, 2011; Pissarides and others, 2005). In addition, McGinn and others (2015) showed that women are more likely to work if they grew up with a working mother. That is, as women become increasingly engaged in the work force, it has important spillover effects from an intergenerational perspective and would likely help boost women’s participation rates going forward.
Preferences and attitudes. Social norms may also affect how women themselves regard participating in the labor force. Based on data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), it appears that women’s own attitudes in Nordic countries are more favorable towards working than in several emerging European countries (Figure 5). Across most countries, however, attitudes have become more favorable towards women working during the past decade (see also Christiansen and others (2016b)).
Figure 5. Selected Countries: Attitudes Toward Women Working
(Principle component of response to questionnaire)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Sources: ISSP and Christiansen and others (2016b).Figure 5. Selected Countries: Attitudes Toward Women Working
(Principle component of response to questionnaire)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Sources: ISSP and Christiansen and others (2016b).Figure 5. Selected Countries: Attitudes Toward Women Working
(Principle component of response to questionnaire)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Sources: ISSP and Christiansen and others (2016b).
13. Policies:
Tax policy. Fiscal disincentives can discourage women from entering the labor market (Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2014; Dao and others, 2014). In particular, joint taxation, as is the case in Poland, would tend to have higher marginal tax rates on the second earner in a family—usually a woman.
Childcare and family benefits. The availability of high-quality childcare facilitates working outside the home and, hence, can help support female labor force participation (Jaumotte, 2003; Thévenon, 2013). However, family cash allowances would often tend to discourage women from participating in the labor force, owing to their income effect (Jaumotte, 2003; Christiansen and others, 2016c). Leave policy may also help boost female labor force participation as they allow temporary absence from employment to care for children (Jaumotte, 2003; Thévenon, 2013). That said, excessive or too generous leave policy could have the opposite effect (Ondrich and others, 2003; Edin and Gustavasson, 2008). In addition, this could induce employers to perceive women as high-risk workers (Sobocinski, 2014).
D. Policies in Poland
The cross-country and historical perspective
14. Both tax and expenditure policy suggest available room to support women’s decision to work outside the home. With respect to tax policy, the participation tax rate5 for the second earner in a family in Poland is well above that in the median European country as well as the OECD average, suggesting the existence of tax-induced disincentives to work (Figure 6). Moreover, public spending on family policy—including tax breaks, services, and cash transfers—in Poland as of 2011 was low by international standards. As of 2011, public spending on family benefits accounted for 1¾ percent of GDP—only about two-thirds of the OECD average (Figure 7). Such spending was low also when compared to regional peers. That said, the allocation of spending and not only the amount of spending is an important factor in assessing the need for potential new spending. In that respect, international practice can be a helpful guide in identifying policies for Poland that could prove effective in boosting female labor force participation (Box 1).
Selected Countries: Participation Tax Rates for Second Earner, 2013
(Percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Source: OECD Family Database.Note: Participation tax rates for an individual entering employment with gross earnings equal to 67 percent of average earnings where the individual lives in a couple household with two children and a married partner with full-time earnings equal to 67 percent of average earnings.Selected Countries: Participation Tax Rates for Second Earner, 2013
(Percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Source: OECD Family Database.Note: Participation tax rates for an individual entering employment with gross earnings equal to 67 percent of average earnings where the individual lives in a couple household with two children and a married partner with full-time earnings equal to 67 percent of average earnings.Selected Countries: Participation Tax Rates for Second Earner, 2013
(Percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Source: OECD Family Database.Note: Participation tax rates for an individual entering employment with gross earnings equal to 67 percent of average earnings where the individual lives in a couple household with two children and a married partner with full-time earnings equal to 67 percent of average earnings.
Selected Countries: Family Policy
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Selected Countries: Family Policy
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Selected Countries: Family Policy
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
15. The family policy package consist of three main components: tax breaks, services, and cash benefits.
Tax breaks. Tax breaks that relate to personal income tax (PIT) are mainly related to (i) joint filing by married couples6 (family tax credits)—which in 2013 accounted for PLN3.2 billion (0.2 percent of GDP)—and (ii) child tax allowances—PLN5.5 billion (0.3 percent of GDP). With respect to child tax allowances, these are means-tested only for the first child and were increased for the third and any subsequent children in 2014.7 In turn, these changes allowed families to deduct child tax allowances against PIT, social security, and health contributions.
Services. In Poland, spending in this category is mainly related to pre-school education managed by local governments. As of 2011, such spending in percent of GDP corresponded to around two thirds of the OECD average—though was broadly on par with regional peers. While the share of children aged 3–5 that were covered by pre-school education almost doubled during 2004–14, an enrollment gap remains relative to the OECD average. Furthermore, the enrollment gap is particularly large for early childhood education, with the ratio for 2-year olds in Poland corresponding to less than 20 percent of the OECD average. In sum, despite broadened coverage of early childhood facilities,8 availability remains scant by international standards.
Selected Countries: What Have Other Countries Done? The Nordic Perspective
The gender participation gap is small and fertility is high in Sweden. In 2014, at almost 80 percent, labor force participation among women was merely 4¼ percentage points below that of men. At the same time, women had on average about 1.9 children—only surpassed by a handful of other countries in Europe. In addition, close to 90 percent of Swedish women choose to work at full time.
What factors may help explain the prevalence of both high female labor force participation and high fertility? In addition to a general positive attitude toward women working, policies in Sweden are distributed along the lines of what the literature would suggest would have significant positive impact:
Taxation. Following the OECD’s approach, the participation tax on the second earner stands only at around 25 percent and rank among the lowest in Europe.
Public spending. While total public spending on family policy as of 2011 is generally high at more than 3½ percent of GDP, more than half is allocated toward services such as childcare and pre-school facilities.
Leave policy. Paid maternity and parental policy is generally generous, with total paid leave of 38 full-rate equivalent weeks.
Retirement age. The average effective retirement age during 2009–14 among women in Sweden was 64 years.
The experience is not unique to Sweden. While Sweden is close to the European frontier with respect to labor force participation among women between the ages of 15 and 64, other Nordic countries also perform well. Female labor force participation at 84 percent in Iceland coincides with a fertility rate above 2, and fertility rates in Norway, Finland, and Denmark are only slightly below that in Sweden. Alongside, public spending on preschool and childcare in Iceland and Denmark as of 2011 exceeds 1½ percent of GDP, while family cash allowances in Iceland at 1.2 percent of GDP ranks below that in a number of European countries, including Sweden. In contrast, paid leave entitlements available to mothers vary markedly among the Nordic countries—from just above 45 full-rate equivalent weeks in Norway to 27 full-rate equivalent weeks in Denmark. Finally, women tend to have relatively long working careers in several of the Nordic countries, with effective retirement ages of 68 and 64 in Iceland and Norway, respectively, during 2009–14.
Cash benefits. Cash benefits relate largely to means-tested (i) child birth grants and (ii) family allowances (for children aged 0–18 years old). While family-related cash allowances in 2011 in Poland accounted for more than one third of family policy spending, these have traditionally been low by OECD standards—both relative to GDP (about half the OECD average) and as a share of total family policy spending (10 percentage points below the OECD average). While the Ministry of Finance (MoF) has noted that family allowances have been relatively well-targeted (covering some 40 percent of the population in the first quintile of the income distribution and 20 percent in the second quintile), it has also highlighted that improvements could be made to better address the risk of poverty (MoF, 2015). This is particularly relevant as only half of the population below the absolute poverty line received family allowances.
Recent changes
16. Spending on family policy has increased sharply with the new child benefits program. The new ‘Family 500+’ benefits program took effect in April 2016 and resulted in a marked increase in family cash allowances.9 Overall, the program is to cover about 2.7 million families, including 3.6 million children (about 10 percent of Poland’s population). These benefits will amount to about 40 percent of average disposable per-capita income in 2014. In turn, government estimates put the total annual budgetary cost at around 1 percent of GDP during 2017–19, likely raising family policy spending to close to 3 percent of GDP per year—above the OECD average.
17. This follows a move toward more generous leave policy both in terms of length and income coverage. Poland’s maternity leave regulations are generous. In 2013, paid maternity leave was increased from 20 to 26 weeks,10 well above the EU legislative minimum of 14 weeks (of which 2 weeks mandatory) (EPRC, 2014) (Figure 8). More recently, 26 weeks of paid parental leave have been added to allow an extension of the total leave period. In terms of income coverage, maternity benefits amount to 100 percent of the salary when 26 weeks of leave are taken or to 80 percent of the salary when a total of 52 weeks of leave are taken, including 26 weeks of parental leave.11 In addition, Polish parents have the availability of childcare (parental) leave with job protection of up to three years.12
Selected Countries: Leave Policy
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Selected Countries: Leave Policy
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Selected Countries: Leave Policy
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
18. In contrast, retirement regulations for women have been tightened in recent years. Until 2009, early retirement regulations allowed women to retire five years before the statutory age of 60, providing 30 years of social security insurance.13 Additionally, sector-specific early retirement schemes applied, including in the education sector, where women account for the vast majority of employment. In turn, this resulted in widespread uptake of early retirement among women and an effective retirement age of 56 during 2005–08 (Figure 9). However, starting from 2009, the window for early retirement was closed and sector-specific privileges curtailed, yielding a substantial increase in the effective retirement age. The statutory retirement age was later increased to 67 with the 2013 changes to the pension system, equalizing it for men and women.14 That said, as of 2014, the effective female retirement age remained well below the OECD average, and ongoing policy discussions aim at reversing the 2013 increases in the retirement age.15
Poland: Effective Retirement Age for Women, 2005–14
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Sources: Social Security Office (ZUS), OECD, and IMF staff calculations.Poland: Effective Retirement Age for Women, 2005–14
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Sources: Social Security Office (ZUS), OECD, and IMF staff calculations.Poland: Effective Retirement Age for Women, 2005–14
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Sources: Social Security Office (ZUS), OECD, and IMF staff calculations.Potential implications of recent changes
19. Recent policy measures could weaken women’s incentives to work. Both the ‘Family 500+’ benefits program and potential changes to the retirement age under discussion would likely have adverse effects on female labor force participation.
‘Family 500+’. As noted above, lump-sum transfers under this benefits program would be a dominant factor in family policy. However, cash transfers are often found to have limited impact on fertility16 and tend to be associated with lower female employment rates (Christiansen and others, 2016b). In contrast, spending on childcare facilities appears to be more positively associated with fertility (OECD, 2011; Greulich and others, 2013) (Figure 10).
Potential lowering of the retirement age. If the retirement age is lowered to 2013 levels, the envisaged prolonged attachment to the labor market among women would likely not materialize, adversely impacting the effective old-age dependency ratio. The increase in participation rates observed among 55–60 year-old women after early retirement schemes began to be phased out in 2009 highlights the effectiveness of such measures in retaining women in the workforce.
Selected Countries: Fertility and Public Expenditure
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Selected Countries: Fertility and Public Expenditure
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
Selected Countries: Fertility and Public Expenditure
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 211; 10.5089/9781475525632.002.A002
E. Conclusion
20. Female labor force participation in Poland is low, in particular among seniors. While labor force participation among women of prime working age (25–54) does not stand out relative to peers, it is below that of men. Furthermore, women tend to withdraw from the labor market earlier than men, owing to retirement-age regulations, despite an expected longer life span. In turn, the effective retirement age for women in Poland at about 60 is notably below the OECD average of about 63.
21. Polish family-related policies have focused on leave and cash transfers rather than childcare provision. Until recently, family policy in Poland has been largely based on leave policy and tax breaks, alongside relatively low levels of spending on childcare facilities and cash benefits. However, a new policy initiative has now significantly increased spending on family cash transfers. In light of cross-country empirical evidence, which tends to point to a negative association between cash transfers and labor market participation but a positive association with childcare provision, this suggest a development in the wrong direction with respect to increasing female labor force participation.
22. International practice suggests the impact of policies on female labor force participation and fertility could be improved. Nordic countries, which rank among countries worldwide with the highest levels of female labor force participation rates have allocated substantial public funds to childcare and preschool facilities, while encouraging long working-careers but allowing for significant maternity leave. In this respect and given the demographic challenges faced by Poland, a larger impact on female labor force participation would likely result by redirecting resources toward pre-school education. Furthermore, such a change need not come at the expense of fertility. Additional focus on pre-school education is also recommended in the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy, where wide access to pre-school facilities is seen as vital for raising female employment rates (EC, 2015). Promoting flexible work arrangements could also help combining parenting with work, not least in light of the low prevalence of part-time work. Consideration should also be given to addressing potential disincentives to working arising from high participation tax rates on the second earner in a family, as also noted by the OECD (OECD, 2016). Lastly, lowering the retirement age would likely impact female labor force participation in the opposite direction and should be reconsidered.
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Prepared by Lone Christiansen and Robert Sierhej, drawing on Christiansen and others (2016).
For the purposes of this chapter, the working-age population refers to people aged 15–64, unless otherwise noted.
NMS7 comprises Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
Defined as managers and corporate board members.
The participation tax rate for the second earner in a family, as defined by the OECD, measures the extent to which taxes and benefits reduce the financial gain of moving into work. It is defined as the net income for an equal dual-earner couple household as proportion of net income for a single-earner couple household where both have identical household earnings.
Joint filing is also applicable to single parents with children.
After the 2014 changes, the child tax allowance for the third child is 80 percent above that for the first and second children, and it goes up by an additional 35 percent for the fourth and subsequent children.
Specific action included the special ‘Maluch’ program, approved in 2011, to encourage local governments to set up facilities for early childhood education.
The new program envisages non-means-tested benefits of PLN500 per month for the second and each subsequent child. For poorer families with monthly income of less than PLN800 per person, the first child will also be entitled to this benefit.
Of this, 20 weeks are obligatory (14 for the mother and 6 transferable to the father).
As of 2016, maternity benefits are paid also to uninsured women (students, unemployed, farmers) in the amount of PLN 1,000 per month, about ¼ of the economy-wide average wage.
Childcare leave is unpaid but counted in the employment period and covered by social insurance (contributions are paid by the state budget). A person on childcare leave can request part-time work employment from the employer, which must be accepted.
This included non-contributory years (parental leave or education), which could represent up to ⅓ of the total.
The process is gradual, by 3 months per year, with the target retirement age for men to be reached in 2020 and for women in 2040.
The President has submitted to parliament a draft law to restore the previous retirement age of 60 and 65 for men and women, respectively.
A review of the literature is also discussed in Sobocinski (2014).
