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Financial Sector Assessment Program-Detailed Assessment of Observance on the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
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This paper provides assessment of the current state of the implementation of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision in Germany. Since the last Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), German banking supervision has undergone profound changes, with approval of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and Directive (CRD IV), establishment of the European Banking Authority, and creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The last FSAP (2011) found banking system supervision to be generally sound with some areas in need of improvement—although some of these issues have been addressed, others remain. While supervisory landscape in Germany evolves, it is crucial that supervisors communicate their expectations to banks and develop guidelines and regulations that can be used to substantiate enforceable measures.

Abstract

This paper provides assessment of the current state of the implementation of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision in Germany. Since the last Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), German banking supervision has undergone profound changes, with approval of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and Directive (CRD IV), establishment of the European Banking Authority, and creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The last FSAP (2011) found banking system supervision to be generally sound with some areas in need of improvement—although some of these issues have been addressed, others remain. While supervisory landscape in Germany evolves, it is crucial that supervisors communicate their expectations to banks and develop guidelines and regulations that can be used to substantiate enforceable measures.

Summary and Main Findings1

1. Since the last FSAP, German banking supervision has undergone profound changes, with the approval of the CRD IV and CRR framework, the establishment of the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The German legal framework has been amended to transpose CRD IV, and CRR and the regulatory technical standards developed by EBA and issued by the European Commission became directly applicable. Additionally, the ECB took over direct supervision of 21 of Germany’s largest banks, including one G-SIB.

2. The last FSAP (2011) found the banking system supervision to be generally sound with some areas in need of improvement—while some of these issues have been addressed, others remain. Recommendations were made for improvements to the framework for major acquisitions, capital adequacy assessment by the supervisors, risk management processes, capital definition, liquidity risk management, risk oversight, stress testing capabilities, and timely supervisory remedial action. More progress was made regarding strengthened resources and capacity for on- and off-site supervision of risks, more detailed guidance to banks on supervisory expectations regarding risk management, and establishment of internal ladder of actions to foster more timely and consistent supervisory response. Little or no progress was made on recommendations regarding the level of reporting to the MoF, related party exposures, country risk, and topics that depend mainly on the EU-wide framework, such as capital requirements, major acquisitions, and supervisory reporting.

3. The legal and regulatory framework is extensive; however, important gaps exist, which affect effectiveness of corporate governance and controls. While the KWG establishes fit-and-proper standards for supervisory and management board members; defines the oversight function of the supervisory board and the functions of the management board, in practice the focus of governance is placed on the management board. All risk functions report directly to the management board. As a result; the core function of corporate governance, which should be the responsibility of the oversight body (establish a risk culture, risk appetite, code of conduct, business plans) has been assigned to management, whose oversight by the supervisory board is very light. In particular, the independence of the internal audit and compliance is compromised as they report to the management board.

4. The establishment of the SSM has fundamentally changed the supervision of German banks, both large and small. For the SIs, day-to-day supervision is conducted by Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs) led by ECB staff with sub-coordinators from BaFin and Bundesbank (and from countries where the bank has significant subsidiaries). The JSTs are composed by staff from supervisory agencies from all countries where banks have operations, therefore involving supervisors with vastly different backgrounds, supervisory cultures, and languages. The coordination and integration of these multinational teams present many operational and motivational challenges which will need to be addressed by the SSM in the long run. For the smaller German SIs, the shift from local supervision to the ECB supervision seems to have represented a deep change in terms of reporting, minimum level of engagement with supervisors, intrusiveness, and supervisory requirements – including capital add-on resulting from the SREP process. For larger SIs, which were already under intensive supervision before, the supervisory approach seems to benefit from better cross-country views and benchmarking, however on the other hand supervisory response seems to have been reduced given the complex decision making procedures in the ECB.

5. Over 1500 LSIs continue under the direct supervision of BaFin and Bundesbank, under general guidance of the ECB supervision. The ECB has designated some LSIs as High Priority for which enhanced supervisory monitoring and reporting have been adopted. The ECB is currently developing joint standards for different elements of the Supervisory Review Process to ensure elements of the SSM supervisory manual are applied to LSIs. The increased emphasis in reporting and SREP, in particular on assessment of credit risk valuation, is a welcome development. However, the increased reporting and monitoring might increase the need of resources for LSI supervision – authorities will need to balance the supervisory objectives to the resources needed for the supervision of very small entities.

6. LSIs supervision is therefore changing from a more qualitative and relationship-based approach to a more quantitative and SREP-based approach. BaFin and Bundesbank have traditionally put a great emphasis on processes for risk management and controls, counting on the work of external auditors for the verification of compliance with nearly all aspects of the BCP. Auditors present to the supervisors an extensive report that should cover all material risks according to the MaRisk framework,2 and supervision conducts the risk assessment using this and other information available, obtained through on-site inspections, reports, and direct contact with banks. Nevertheless, this approach allows gaps, in particular regarding areas where little guidance exists, such as related party lending, country risk, concentration risk, and operational risk.

7. Two issues affect day-to-day functions of the ECB supervision: the ECB must execute much of its tasks according to national legislation, and all decisions need to be approved by ECB’s Governing Council, which creates a time-consuming and cumbersome supervisory decision making process. Every supervisory decision, after consideration and approval by the Supervisory Board, is submitted to ECB’s Governing Council for approval under a no-objection procedure. In addition, for LSIs and SIs alike, the ECB needs to comply with local legislation to execute many of its tasks. For instance, licensing applications must be filed with national authorities in compliance with national legislation, and then submitted for analysis and decision by the ECB. All fit-and-proper authorizations of SIs are assessed against national fit-and-proper criteria and then submitted to the ECB. Enforcement and sanctioning powers of the ECB are also largely based on what is available under national legislation, and although the ECB has some direct enforcement powers, it mostly needs to act by giving instructions to BaFin on measures to be taken under German legislation. It is crucial that decision making processes in ECB day to day supervision are streamlined to the extent possible so that timely supervisory response isn’t further hindered in this already inescapably complex legal framework.

8. While the supervisory landscape in Germany evolves, it is crucial that supervisors communicate their expectations to banks and develop guidelines and regulations that can be used to substantiate enforceable measures. All aspects that are not harmonized within the EU or on which EU or German regulatory is silent or provide only too general rules need to be developed into guidelines or regulations that can both inform the banks of supervisory expectations and substantiate legal action by the supervisors. In the German framework some of that is done through circulars, ordinances, and guidelines. SSM wide, it is important that the good practices and process engrained in the internal SSM procedures are made public in structured instruments which can help substantiate supervisory measures. This is particularly relevant in the case of guidance related to loan portfolio management (specifically providing bank management with guidance on when setting loan classification parameters and provisioning, collateral valuation considerations, and elements of effective credit risk management), concentration risk, country and transfer risk, related party risk, and operational risk.

A. Main findings

Responsibility, Objectives, Powers, Independence, Accountability (CPs 1–2)

The legal framework for banking supervision is well established by German laws and regulations, directly applicable EU regulation, and SSMR. While the division of responsibilities between BaFin and Bundesbank regarding LSIs supervision is well established, the framework for the SSM is evolving and there are still uncertainties regarding the specific operational roles of each agency in the new environment. These uncertainties reflect the complex legal and operational framework but do not to affect the overall understanding of responsibilities by the market or authorities. The three supervisory agencies enjoy operational independence, in the sense that there is no government or industry interference in individual supervisory decisions. However, there is potential for indirect influence of government and industry in the execution of BaFin’s supervisory objectives through the budget approval process and the mandatory approval of BaFin’s internal organization and structure by the MoF. Decision making process at the ECB is complex and does not foster effectiveness and timeliness of day-to-day supervisory decisions (although there are processes in place for emergency decisions).

Ownership, Licensing, and Structure (CPs 4–7)

9. The ECB is the licensing authority, who makes decisions on the basis of applicable German and EU laws. While criteria and procedures are well established, in general the financial suitability of shareholders is limited to the availability of the initial capital, and the assessment of the supervisory board does not play a relevant role in the licensing process, although assessors noted these elements are gradually being incorporated in the licensing process. In addition, there is no requirement for the bank to notify the supervisor when they become aware of events that may cause a significant shareholder to no longer be fit-and-proper. The review of fit-and-proper qualification would benefit from expanded requirements and standards. In that sense, the team welcomes the new guidelines issued by BaFin in January 2016, which emphasize the prudential importance of the professional qualification of the Board.

10. There is no need for prior supervisor approval of investments below a 10 percent threshold, other than investments in other German institutions (significant holdings regime). This may create situations where acquisitions occur that increase the risk to the banking group beyond management skills and have a negative impact on the group that greatly exceeds the amount of the investment. While the regulator requires higher capital or may be able to force the bank to unwind the investment, it is more prudent to require ex-ante review.

Methods of Ongoing Supervision (CPs 8–10)

11. The transition to the SSM for SIs has had many benefits, although some aspects of the supervision methodology still undergoing implementation. A lot has been achieved in a short space of time and the supervision framework lays the foundation for a risk-based approach with the SREP as the core element. Elements of the framework are still being implemented and will take time to mature and be applied consistently across banks.

12. The supervisory approach for LSIs is established but evolving and scope exists for greater verification of compliance with regulations to complement current activities. On-site examinations verify adherence with MaRisk and are undertaken by BBk and BaFin through testing and interviews of management. The MaRisk Inspection Guide used by LSI supervisors lays the foundation for a consistent examination process and the use of the external auditor is also a key aspect of the supervision architecture to confirm compliance. Annual meetings with the Management Board, analysis of the ICAAP, and the risk profile form core elements of a sound framework. However, much reliance is placed on the external audit long form report and while rich in detail, greater emphasis is needed to verify the reliability, accuracy, and integrity of the information used for risk assessments as inputs into a forward looking view of risk.

13. Supervisory reporting is not sufficiently granular to support off-site supervision. Not all data needs are covered by EBA ITS reporting. To fill the gaps, short-term exercises (STEs) and surveys are used, such as, e.g., concentration, liquidity, and IRRBB. While the data contributes to the risk assessment process, using peer group analysis and benchmarks is not systematic. Currently, supervisors are challenged by differences between reporting based on nGAAP and IFRS data which complicates systematic and consistent comparisons between different account treatments. Technical work is underway to address this issue. Timely and accurate data is fundamental to effective supervision and the issues with data identified by the assessment need to be addressed as a matter of priority.

Corrective and Sanctioning Powers of Supervisors (CP 11)

14. German law and SSMR provide a broad range of actions that can be taken by supervisors in their respective responsibilities. Direct enforcement powers and sanctions of ECB are limited; however, the ECB can make use of the enforcement and sanction powers available to BaFin. Assessors had access to evidence of such indirect actions, however the complex legal framework may make it operationally difficult and time consuming for ECB to impose enforcement actions. The actual use of formal powers by both BaFin and ECB in practice is not intensive.

Cooperation, Consolidated and Cross-Border Banking Supervision (CPs 3 – 12 – 13)

15. Collaboration and coordination framework with domestic and cross-border supervisors is highly developed. The EU has adopted a supervisory coordination process that is based on joint supervision through the SSM, colleges of supervisors led by the home country coordinator and signed MOUs with third country supervisors and nonbanking sector regulators.

16. A consolidated supervisory approach is in place at both the SI and LSI level. A detailed planning approach is in place through supervisory colleges and MOUs that result in a comprehensive review for the consolidated group. Additionally, ring-fencing powers are available to ensure that the group can be insulated from related companies that may adversely impact the group. Banking groups may be required to close reorganize to correct a non-transparent structure.

Corporate Governance (CP 14)

17. Currently, in Germany, the role of supervisory boards is weak and passive with most policy, and risk management duties and responsibilities placed on the management board. In the past few years there has been some evolution on supervisors’ focus on the supervisory board within the SREP process. A thematic review on Risk Governance has been conducted which resulted in recommendations addressed to banks aimed at making the supervisory board involvement more robust. Additionally, MaRisk is being amended and will include code of conduct requirements.

18. Supervisory guidance should clearly delineate that ultimate responsibility for establishing the risk culture, developing business plans and risk appetite statement rests with the supervisory board. The fit-and-proper process is streamlined for supervisory board members as are technical knowledge requirements. As established by KWG, the primary responsibility for internal controls, governance, business strategy, and internal audit is assigned to the management board.

Prudential Requirements, Regulatory Framework, Accounting and Disclosure (CPs 15–29)

19. While risk management standards are generally sound, the reporting line between the internal risk control function and the Supervisory Board should be strengthened. Reporting of risk management is through the Management Board and the CEO which is responsible for setting the business plan and risk taking. The risk function does not report directly to the Supervisory Board but to the Management Board and therefore the CEO. This approach may weaken the independence of the risk management function and the CRO to raise issues, as also highlighted by the SSM methodology. In particular, the reporting line to the management body (with supervisory and management function) was a topic assessed within the thematic review on Risk Governance and Risk Appetite. While banks had in place formal “whistle-blowing” processes, the structure may inhibit the independence of the CRO and the risk function to report weaknesses in the Risk Management Framework (RMF). This is further aggravated by the ex-post notification of removal of the CRO by the management board which is the prescribed minimum of MaRisk.

20. Banks are well capitalized and supervisors have the powers to impose additional requirements. The deviations of the EU capital framework in relation to the Basel standards regarding the definition of capital do not seem to be material for German banks in general, although some may be for specific banks (deduction of participation in insurance, for instance). Regarding the calculation of risk weighted assets, a few elements for which the RCAP found deviations may be significant for Germany, such as sovereign exposures under the permanent and temporary partial use, lower risk weights for covered bonds, and the counterparty credit risk framework. Assessors observed some cases where these deficiencies were being addressed by banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments and supervisory action, it is impossible to determine that that existing framework is not in general resulting in overstated CET1 ratios. Both ECB and BaFin can require banks to hold capital in excess of the minima under Pillar 2; however, the practice was not commonly used by German authorities. ECB as a supervisor has only concluded one SREP cycle, in which some banks were required to implement Pillar 2 add-ons. Leverage is specifically taken into account in the SSM SREP methodology, while for BaFin it is not yet systematically incorporated in the analysis.

21. Supervisors have not provided guidance on their expectations on loan portfolio management. For example, broad guidelines on general characteristics of various loan risk buckets; definitions of non- performing, restructured, forborne, and cured loans. Providing guidance that outlines supervisory expectations would aid managers and improve compatibility between banks. Granularity of data on credit portfolios is limited.

22. The role of the supervisors in loan classification and supervision in Germany primarily involves a review of policy and procedures. The focus of supervision is to provide bank management with considerations when setting loan classification parameters and provisioning such as items to consider for residential mortgages and commercial real estate classification triggers. Important are collateral valuation considerations; such as conservative valuations of realizable net values.

23. Loan classification and provisioning have been viewed as an accounting issue; however, supervisors recently conducted a thematic review of loan valuation and impairment. To implement a supervisory approach that asks supervision staff to review loan files and value loans and determine adequacy of provisions in a market where the practice was not present, ex-ante discussions with bankers and accountants should take place and supervisor expectations on loan valuation and provisioning communicated. It is also important to provide staff with training and support to be able to challenge management valuation of collateral or failure to rate an asset as impaired. The process of developing the capacity of supervisors to challenge bank management valuation of loans has started.

24. Market risk management standards are generally sound and supervisors take an active approach. MaRisk establish the requirements for banks to implement effective risk management frameworks to measure and manage market risk. For the larger more systemic and risk-oriented banks with a trading bias, greater supervisory intensiveness and intrusiveness takes place. Market risk has been a focus of the supervisors during 2014 and 2015. In addition; a targeted review of banks’ internal models will be carried out over several years. Supervisors periodically review banks to assess that their market risk management processes are consistent with the risk bearing capacity and the market risk management framework. Banks with the largest trading books are subject to enhanced focus (mostly SIs) and the remaining banks are on a normal cycle based upon their SREP score and risk profile. Assessors observed supervisory practices for both SIs and LSIs and verified compliance with this principle.

25. IRRBB has received a significant amount of the supervisor’s attention during the last several years and features as a key priority for both SIs and LSIs. Banks are required to measure, calculate, and report their exposure to IRRBB on a quarterly basis. Banks are also required to conduct regular stress testing using both standardized and bespoke scenarios, especially for those banks with more complex business models and optionality in the portfolio. Supervisors make an assessment of IRRBB through the SREP process and it is a key topic in discussions with bank senior management. The German authorities have also conducted short term data collection exercises in the last several years to deepen the understanding of the systems exposure.

26. Concentration risk and country risk are generally considered as part of credit risk. The definition of concentration risk is limited to credit exposures, and not in a broader sense including different types of exposures. The expectations of the supervisors with respect to concentration risk and country risk management are not clearly communicated to the banks. There is no requirement that all material concentrations to be regularly reviewed and reported to the bank’s supervisory board. Reporting and monitoring of country risk and concentrations can be improved, and their inclusion in banks’ stress tests specifically required.

27. The framework for transactions with related parties is weak, although the definition of related parties is wide and detailed. The framework covers loans in a broad definition that includes off-balance sheet exposures and leasing operations, albeit not dealings such as service contracts, asset purchases and sales, and construction contracts. Related party loans must be granted on market terms, but there is no requirement that individuals with conflict of interest are excluded from the whole process of granting and managing such exposures. There is no requirement that related party exposures are monitored and controlled separately and in aggregate. There is no regular reporting of exposures to related parties. Supervision of related party risk is mostly carried out by external auditors, whose analysis of related party risk is very limited. No limits on related party are imposed by laws, regulation, or the supervisor.

28. Supervisors have stepped up the frequency and intensity of interaction with credit institutions regarding their management of liquidity risk, contingency plans, and funding requirements. Supervisors have built-up in-depth understanding of liquidity funding risks at individual institutions. Supervisors periodically meet with treasury staff and receive monthly monitoring of LCR data. Funding plans and results of stress testing are reported and evaluated periodically. The LCR adopted in EU has a number of elements which are less stringent than the Basel agreed rule, most notably a wider definition of HQLA. German banks make use of the wider definition of HQLA mainly in covered bonds included as Level 1 assets. Guidance for assessing ILAAPs will be implemented for 2016 which will help strengthen the assessment of liquidity risk management as part of the SREP, which was under improvement at the time of the mission. To this regard, SSM issued a letter in the beginning of the year on Supervisory Expectations on ILAAP and harmonized information collection on ILAAP to enhance its analysis and integration in the SREP. Benchmarks for liquidity risk indicators will be developed during 2016.

29. While operational risk has undergone several enhancements since the time of the last FSAP, more attention is needed of ongoing monitoring of the effective implementation of operational risk management frameworks. The area of operational risk has undergone several enhancements since the time of the last FSAP, most notably in the strengthening of dedicated IT risk specialists that mainly conduct on-site examinations but also develop supervision approaches for IT risk more generally. This team has been successful at deepening the institutional knowledge of IT risks and vulnerabilities and identify where standards need to be raised. The most recent example is in the area of data centers where IT risk specialists have attended DR testing for several of the larger LSIs.

30. The independence of the internal audit and compliance is undermined as they report to the management board. The internal audit function, as an instrument of the management board, is under its direct control and has to report to management board members. The internal auditor can also be subject to the direct control of one management board member, who could be the chairperson. Additionally, the supervisory board is only informed ex-post of a replacement of the internal auditor, compliance officer, and risk officer.

31. Banking supervisors do not have legal power to access external auditors’ work papers. Although this is not an essential requirement, Germany chose to be assessed against the best international practices, and given the heavy reliance on external auditors for reviewing not only the reliability of financial statements but also reporting on whether the banks comply with all risk management guidelines, this gap should be addressed.

32. Overall, the AML/CFT framework appears strong, but some weaknesses remain, mainly in supervisory practices. BaFin has established a risk-based framework to discriminate banks’ risk profiles and exposure to risks from AML/CFT. The framework is designed to help identify those institutions where enhanced monitoring and attention is required. While the framework should help focus supervisory attention on the highest risk institutions, inputs into the process need to be refined to be fully risk-based. The framework is heavily reliant on the EA report to identify deficiencies or weaknesses in risk management. Ongoing monitoring of banks’ compliance with the regulations needs to be more systematic through the ongoing receipt of a range of inputs. Lastly, coverage of the banking sector through on-site examinations needs to be expanded.

Introduction and Methodology

A. Introduction

33. This assessment of the current state of the implementation of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP) in Germany has been completed as a part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) mission undertaken by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during March of 2016 at the request of the German authorities. It reflects the regulatory and supervisory framework in place as of the date of the completion of the assessment. It is not intended to represent an analysis of the state of the banking sector or crisis management framework, which are addressed in other parts of the FSAP.

34. An assessment of the effectiveness of banking supervision requires a review of the legal framework, and detailed examination of the policies and practices of the institutions responsible for banking regulation and supervision. In line with the BCP methodology, the assessment focused on BaFin, Deutsche Bundesbank (BBk), and the European Central Bank as the joint supervisors of the banking system, and did not cover the specificities of regulation and supervision of other financial intermediaries. It is important to note, however, that to the extent that BaFin is a unified supervisor responsible for other entities of the financial sector, the assessment of banking supervision in Germany may provide a useful picture of current supervisory processes applicable to other financial institutions supervised by it.

B. Information and Methodology Used for Assessment

35. Germany requested to be assessed according to the Revised Core Principles (BCP) Methodology issued by the BCBS (Basel Committee of Banking Supervision) in September 2012. The current assessment was thus performed according to a revised content and methodological basis as compared with the previous BCP assessment carried out in 2011. It is important to note, for completeness’ sake, that the two assessments will not be directly comparable, as the revised BCP have a heightened focus on corporate governance and risk management and its practice by supervised institutions and its assessment by the supervisory authority, raising the bar to measure the effectiveness of a supervisory framework (see box for more information on the Revised BCP).

36. The German authorities chose to be assessed against the highest standards of supervision and regulation, choosing to be assessed and rated against both the Essential Criteria and the Additional Criteria. To assess compliance, the BCP Methodology uses a set of essential and additional assessment criteria for each principle. The essential criteria (EC) were usually the only elements on which to gauge full compliance with a Core Principle (CP). The additional criteria (AC) are recommended best practices against which the authorities of some more complex financial systems may agree to be assessed and rated. The assessment of compliance with each principle is made on a qualitative basis. A four-part grading system is used: compliant; largely compliant; materially noncompliant; and noncompliant. This is explained below in the detailed assessment section. The assessment of compliance with each CP is made on a qualitative basis to allow a judgment on whether the criteria are fulfilled in practice. Effective application of relevant laws and regulations is essential to provide indication that the criteria are met.

37. The assessment team reviewed the framework of laws, rules, and guidance and held extensive meetings with officials of BaFin, Bundesbank, and ECB Supervision, and additional meetings with auditing firms and banking sector participants. The authorities provided a self-assessment of the CPs rich in quality and comprehensiveness, as well as detailed responses to additional questionnaires, and facilitated access to supervisory documents and files, staff, and systems.

38. The team appreciated the very high quality of cooperation received from the authorities. The team extends its thanks to staff of the authorities who provided excellent cooperation, including extensive provision of documentation and access, at a time when staff was burdened by many initiatives related to the European and global regulatory changes, and still adapting to the new European supervisory framework.

39. The standards were evaluated in the context of the German financial system’s structure and complexity. The CPs must be capable of application to a wide range of jurisdictions whose banking sectors will inevitably include a broad spectrum of banks. To accommodate this breadth of application, a proportionate approach is adopted within the CP, both in terms of the expectations on supervisors for the discharge of their own functions and in terms of the standards that supervisors impose on banks. An assessment of a country against the CPs must, therefore, recognize that its supervisory practices should be commensurate with the complexity, interconnectedness, size, and risk profile and cross-border operation of the banks being supervised. In other words, the assessment must consider the context in which the supervisory practices are applied. The concept of proportionality underpins all assessment criteria. For these reasons, an assessment of one jurisdiction will not be directly comparable to that of another.

40. An assessment of compliance with the BCPs is not, and is not intended to be, an exact science. Reaching conclusions required judgments by the assessment team. The team assessed the supervisory and regulatory framework in the midst of great changes, and the assessment should reflect the transition phase in which it took place. Nevertheless, the assessment of the current legal and regulatory framework and supervisory practices against a common, agreed methodology should provide the supervisors of German banks with an internationally consistent measure of the quality of its banking supervision in relation to the CPs, which are internationally acknowledged as minimum standards, and point the way forward.

41. To determine the observation of each principle, the assessment has made use of five categories: compliant, largely compliant, materially noncompliant, noncompliant, and non-applicable. An assessment of “compliant” is given when all ECs and ACs are met without any significant deficiencies, including instances where the principle has been achieved by other means. A “largely compliant” assessment is given when there are only minor shortcomings, which do not raise serious concerns about the authorities’ ability to achieve the objective of the principle and there is clear intent to achieve full compliance with the principle within a prescribed period of time (for instance, the regulatory framework is agreed but has not yet been fully implemented). A principle is considered to be “materially noncompliant” in case of severe shortcomings, despite the existence of formal rules and procedures and there is evidence that supervision has clearly not been effective, the practical implementation is weak or that the shortcomings are sufficient to raise doubts about the authorities’ ability to achieve compliance. A principle is assessed “noncompliant” if it is not substantially implemented, several ECs and ACs are not complied with, or supervision is manifestly ineffective. Finally, a category of “non-applicable” is reserved for those cases that the criteria would not relate the country’s circumstances.

The 2012 Revised Core Principles

The revised BCPs reflect market and regulatory developments since the last revision, taking account of the lessons learned from the financial crisis in 2008/2009. These have also been informed by the experiences gained from FSAP assessments as well as recommendations issued by the G-20 and FSB, and take into account the importance now attached to: (i) greater supervisory intensity and allocation of adequate resources to deal effectively with systemically important banks; (ii) application of a system-wide, macro perspective to the microprudential supervision of banks to assist in identifying, analyzing and taking pre-emptive action to address systemic risk; (iii) the increasing focus on effective crisis preparation and management, recovery and resolution measures for reducing both the probability and impact of a bank failure; and (iv) fostering robust market discipline through sound supervisory practices in the areas of corporate governance, disclosure and transparency.

The revised BCPs strengthen the requirements for supervisors, the approaches to supervision and supervisors’ expectations of banks. The supervisors are now required to assess the risk profile of the banks not only in terms of the risks they run and the efficacy of their risk management, but also the risks they pose to the banking and the financial systems. In addition, supervisors need to consider how the macroeconomic environment, business trends, and the build-up and concentration of risk inside and outside the banking sector may affect the risk to which individual banks are exposed. While the BCP set out the powers that supervisors should have to address safety and soundness concerns, there is a heightened focus on the actual use of the powers, in a forward-looking approach through early intervention.

The number of principles has increased from 25 to 29. The number of essential criteria has expanded from 196 to 231. This includes the amalgamation of previous criteria (which means the contents are the same), and the introduction of 35 new essential criteria. In addition, for countries that may choose to be assessed against the additional criteria, there are 16 additional criteria.

While raising the bar for banking supervision, the Core Principles must be capable of application to a wide range of jurisdictions. The new methodology reinforces the concept of proportionality, both in terms of the expectations on supervisors and in terms of the standards that supervisors impose on banks. The proportionate approach allows assessments of banking supervision that are commensurate with the risk profile and systemic importance of a wide range of banks and banking systems.

Institutional and Market Structure—Overview3

42. The banking sector comprises three main “pillars,” private commercial banks, public savings banks, and cooperative banks. While the three-pillar structure has been fairly stable over the past decade, the German banking system has gone through a sustained period of consolidation.4 The number of banks has declined by about 100 compared with the time of the last FSAP, with consolidation mainly taking place at local savings and cooperative banks level.

43. The first pillar, private commercial banks, is composed of big banks, regional and other commercial banks as well as branches of foreign banks. While comparatively lower in the number of institutions, private commercial banks represent the largest segment of the banking sector by assets, accounting for 39.4 percent of the system in May 2015, slightly above the share in 2010. The “big banks” tend to operate with large branch networks, both domestically and internationally. They typically cover retail, corporate banking as well as investment banking business, and act as the principal banking partners of Germany’s major industrial enterprises.5 The regional and other commercial banks tend to be smaller in size and operate within a particular region, mainly focusing on credit to households and non-financial corporates, with deposits as the primary source of funding (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015).

44. The second pillar, public savings banks, include both Landesbanken and savings banks (Sparkassen), covering about 27 percent of banking system assets. The savings banks operate under a regional principle, providing a range of banking services to households and small- and medium- enterprises (SMEs) in their own region. While competing with commercial banks, savings banks do not tend to compete with each other and they are mandated to provide public good and to support local economic development. Landesbanken, the central institution of the savings banks, have become increasingly involved in wholesale banking and capital market activities in recent years, in direct competition with commercial banks (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015). While local savings banks weathered the 2008 financial crisis fairly well, partly due to their conservative business models and strong deposit base, some Landesbanken endured large losses as a result of their involvement in structured finance and derivative products. As a result, several Landesbanken were consolidated and merged after the crisis, with a resulting number of nine institutions in 2015.6

45. The third pillar, cooperative banks, includes more than 1,000 financial institutions, accounting for about 13.5 percent of the banking assets. Similar to savings banks, credit cooperatives are subject to a regional principle and operate under an extensive network of regional branches, with mutual guarantees. The cooperative banks are owned by their members, who tend to be their depositors and borrowers, and usually offer core banking services to their customers. The two regional institutions of credit cooperatives, DZ-Bank-AG and WGZ-Bank-AG, act as central institutions for cooperative banks, with the former also being a large commercial bank in Germany. The regional institutions of credit cooperatives play a more active role than the Landesbanken in redistributing liquidity among the affiliated institutions, operating chiefly in the interbank and capital markets (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015).

46. The remaining twenty percent of the German banking sector comprises mortgage banks, building and loan associations and special purpose banks. Mortgage banks suffered losses during the financial crisis, and subsequently went through restructuring and resolution. Their asset size has declined to under five percent of the banking system in 2015.

47. Asset and liability structures of the German banking sector have been relatively stable since the last FSAP. On the asset side, banks mainly focus on lending to banks and non-banks, with the role of Landesbanken and mortgage banks decreasing over time. On the liability side, banks mainly obtain funding from three sources: liability to non-banks, liabilities to the MFI sector, and securitized debt, with liabilities to non-banks as the primary source of funding for Germany’s banking sector as a whole (42.5 percent in March 2015).

48. Banking supervision in Germany is conducted by three authorities: BaFin, Bundesbank, and, since 2014, also the ECB. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) – the banking supervision mechanism in place in the Euro Area Member States comprising the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national competent authorities (NCAs) – entered into operation on 4 November 2014. In the SSM, credit institutions are categorized as “significant” or “less significant”. The ECB directly supervises the SIs, which includes 21 banking groups in Germany. Among the SIs directly supervised by the ECB, one German bank (Deutsche Bank) is included in the Financial Stability Board list of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) for 2016. The NCA – in the case of Germany, BaFin and Bundesbank supervise the LSIs, under the general oversight of the ECB. The institutions supervised by BaFin are divided into four groups: commercial banks (182), institutions belonging to the savings bank sector (425), institutions belonging to the cooperative sector (1,052), and other institutions (121). The group comprising commercial banks include major banks, private commercial banks, and subsidiaries of foreign banks. The savings bank sector comprises public-sector and independent savings banks together with the Landesbanken. In addition to the primary credit cooperatives, the cooperative sector also includes DZ Bank and WGZ Bank due to their financial ties. The group of other institutions comprises building societies (Bausparkassen), Pfandbrief banks, securities trading banks, and development banks operated by the federal government and the federal states. At the close of 2014, BaFin was supervising 12 private and 9 public sector building societies.

Preconditions for Effective Banking Supervision7

49. The macroeconomic environment has been favorable with regard to the performance of the German banking industry in recent years. It manifested itself especially in low borrower related credit risk and a low stock of nonperforming loans, particularly when compared to other European countries. Results of the Bank Lending Survey suggest that borrower related risk and the general macroeconomic situation did not alter lending policies in Germany to a large extent in recent years, however these factors had a sizeable impact at the peak of the financial crisis 2008 / 2009. With regard to the low interest rate environment banks active in the traditional banking business managed to keep their interest margins stable so far. At the same time, they have extended their balance sheets and maturity transformation risk. Nevertheless, if the low interest environment prevails the shrinking interest rate margin will force banks to look for alternative business opportunities potentially raising new and unknown risks for the respective banks.

50. The Financial Stability Act provides the legal framework for the Financial Stability Committee (FSC), Germany’s macroprudential institution. The Federal Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and the Bundesbank each have three voting representatives on the FSC, while the Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilization (Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung - FMSA) has one non-voting advisory member. The FSC discusses the factors that are key to financial stability, strengthens cooperation between the institutions represented on it, advises on the handling of warnings and recommendations issued by the ESRB and reports annually to the lower house of Parliament (the Bundestag) on the situation regarding the developments in financial stability as well as on its own activities. In particular, the FSC is able to issue warnings and recommendations to all public bodies in Germany in order to promptly combat any adverse developments which may cause risks to financial stability. As with the ESRB’s recommendations, the addressees of these recommendations must adhere to a “comply or explain” mechanism.

51. As the German credit market is dominated on the supply side by Sparkassen and Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken (co-operative banks) which typically conduct retail business and SMEs on the demand side, the credit culture can be assessed as a more traditional one where collateralization e.g., by mortgages prevails. However, more recently one can see the tendency of larger corporates, the typical clients of the bigger banks, to fund themselves directly on the capital market. This might be driven by an increased willingness of investors to take these risks while funding costs of larger banks went up due to rating downgrades.

52. Germany has a well-developed public infrastructure, including a comprehensive legal system covering in particular areas relevant for the banking system. These laws relate, e.g., to corporate law setting out the requirements regarding the setting up and winding down/liquidating of joint stock companies, limited companies, partnerships, cooperatives, etc., their internal governance structures, detailed accounting provisions as well as rules regarding mergers and acquisitions.

53. The financial sector regulation in Germany covers all relevant areas (banking, insurance, and securities). As a member state of the EU, large parts of the German framework are rooted in the transposition or implementation of EU directives and directly applicable EU regulations. Specific national rules exist where topics considered relevant are not regulated by EU law or where EU law leaves room for additional national rules. Furthermore, BaFin as an integrated supervisory authority is member of the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, ESMA, and EIOPA). In this context, BaFin is obliged to cooperate with and support the work of the ESAs. This also includes the implementation of ESA guidelines and recommendations. The same applies to the cooperation of BaFin and ECB within the SSM.

54. Germany enjoys a system of independent external audits and comprehensive accounting principles and rules, which are contained in the German Commercial Code (HGB). All German public accountants are organized in the Chamber of Public Accountants (WPK), a corporation under public law. The requirements on the profession of a certified public accountant are stringent. The Auditor Oversight Commission (AOC), comprised entirely of persons independent from the profession, carries out public oversight on the Chamber of Public Accountants (WPK), and all auditors associated in the WPK.

55. In Germany terms and conditions of contracts in general are not regulated in supervisory law but in civil law. The Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB) for example sets legal framework for consumer credits including consumer protection regulations and the act on insurance contracts (Versicherungsvertragsgesetz - VVG) also stipulates consumer protection regulations. Recently the German legislator adopted a new law to improve the protection of retail investors (“Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz”). Moreover, BaFin supervises compliance of financial market players with consumer protecting provisions in supervisory laws, e.g., German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz – KWG), Insurance Supervision Act (Versicherungsaufsichts-gesetz – VAG), and Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz - WpHG).

56. On July 3, 2015 the Deposit Insurance Act (Einlagensicherungsgesetz - EinSiG) entered into force. Thus, Germany has transposed the European directive on deposit guarantee schemes (DGSD) into national law. Under the Directive, all credit institutions have to be allocated to a statutory guarantee scheme or an institutional protection scheme that is officially recognized as a deposit guarantee scheme. Customers of all institutions have a legal claim to compensation for their covered deposits up to an amount of € 100,000.

57. The German Act for Recovery and Resolution of Institutions and Financial Groups (SAG) spells out the different responsibilities and tools available in crisis management and for bank resolution which complement the powers and measures granted by the Banking Act (KWG). The Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilization (FMSA) was appointed as resolution authority on a national level. The supervisory authority reviews and assesses the recovery plan in consultation with the Bundesbank. Banks that are deposit taking institutions as defined in section 1 (3d) first sentence KWG also have to be members of a deposit insurance scheme which further bolsters public confidence in the stability of the financial system. For further details, please refer to the Einlagensicherungsgesetz (EinSiG) that went into force on July 3, 2015 and amended the former Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation Act (EAEG).

58. The main legislation aimed at maintaining adequate flows of information to market participants as condition for effective market discipline is the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC). Information on stock option programs and similar securities-based incentive systems of the company must be given either in the Corporate Governance Report, the Annual Financial Statements, the Consolidated Financial Statements or the compensation report. All material new facts made known to financial analysts and similar addressees must also be disclosed to the shareholders. Other disclosure provisions cover remuneration issues. According to Art. 450 CRR, SIs must disclose specific information regarding the remuneration policy and practices of the institution for those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on its risk profile, such as information concerning the governance process, information on link between pay and performance, the most important design characteristics of the remuneration system, the ratios between fixed and variable remuneration, aggregate quantitative information on remuneration, and the number of individuals being remunerated EUR 1 million or more per financial year. This is complemented by HGB provisions which establish the disclosure of the total remuneration of every management board and the supervisory board member in fiscal year (salaries, profit sharing, options and other stock-based compensation, expense allowances, insurance charges, commissions, and fringe benefits of any kind) has to be part of the annex of the profit and loss account and the consolidated profit and loss account respectively.

59. Another tool to maintain effective market discipline is provided by the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz - WpHG). WpHG requires listed companies to disclose immediately—i.e., ad hoc—facts about their company that are not public knowledge if such information has the potential to influence the price of the financial instrument and if it relates directly to the issuer. WpHG requires publicly traded companies to prepare annual financial statements and half-yearly financial reports as well as interim management statements. The annual financial statements and half-yearly financial reports of publicly traded companies must include a compliance statement by the company’s legal representatives.

Detailed Assessment

A. Supervisory Powers, Responsibilities and Functions

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B. Prudential Regulations and Requirements

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Summary Compliance With The Basel Core Principles

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Recommended Actions and Authorities Comments

A. Recommended Actions

Recommended Actions to Improve Compliance with the Basel Core Principles and the Effectiveness of Regulatory and Supervisory Frameworks

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B. Authorities’ Response to the Assessment

a) German Authorities’ Response

The German authorities wish to express their appreciation to the IMF and its assessment teams for this assessment since they strongly support the Financial Sector Assessment Program, which promotes the soundness of financial systems in IMF-member countries and contributes to improving supervisory practices around the world.

The German authorities appreciate the assessment in general. Some clearly unsatisfactory ratings are considered as an encouragement to critically reflect current supervisory practices and to make changes and adjustments where appropriate.

However, there are a number of recommendations where the German authorities believe that the current regime effectively fulfils the IMF’s requirements. These are set out below:

[The following comments are ordered in the sequence of the DAR text (factual corrections)]:

Licensing, qualifying holdings and major acquisitions (CPs 5-7)

Regarding Principle 5 the German authorities want to point out, that although the assessment of the members of the supervisory board is not explicitly a part of the licensing procedure the appointment of any member of the supervisory board undergoes an assessment process by the competent supervisor. According to section 25d (1) of the German Banking Act [Kreditwesengesetz – KWG], the members of the supervisory board of an institution, a financial holding company or a mixed financial holding company must be trustworthy, have the necessary expertise to fulfil their control function as well as to assess and monitor the business of the undertaking, and devote sufficient time to performing their duties. Pursuant to section 36 (3) sentence 1 KWG BaFin is entitled to force a bank to withdraw a member of the supervisory board which does not fulfil these standards. According to section 25d (2) KWG the supervisory board as a whole shall have the necessary knowledge, skills and experience to fulfil its control function as well as to assess and monitor the management board of the institution, group of institutions or financial holding group, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company.

Regarding Principle 5 and 6 the authorities want to point out that BaFin has published Guidelines regarding the licensing procedures, qualifying holding procedures and the assessment of managing directors and members of the supervisory board. The Guidelines regarding the licensing procedures that were published in 2007 and especially the Guidelines regarding the assessment of the managing directors and the members of the supervisory board which were published for the first time in 2012 and 2013 contain passages regarding the term “trustworthiness” and provide an overview of the standards applied by BaFin in so far. The Guidelines regarding the assessment of managing directors and members of the supervisory board which were revised in 2016 will be published in English shortly as well.

Regarding Principle 7 the authorities are convinced that although German legislation does not provide for the authority to ex ante review and (dis)approve such participations the qualification as materially non-compliant is not justified. Firstly, Article 89 Capital Requirements Regulation [CRR] is directly applicable in Germany and in so far Germany does not see the possibility to apply a stricter approach than the one set out in directly applicable Union law. Secondly, in our view the acquisition of participating interests outside the financial sector is a business decision in which the supervisor should not intervene. The potential risks stemming from an institutions’ acquisition and investment policies are sufficiently limited by quantitative limits and by the fact that the institutions’ managers are responsible and accountable for the handling and monitoring of the institutions’ risks which includes acquisitions and investments. The managers’ performance in turn is subject to review by auditors and supervisory interventions in case the requirements are breached. Thirdly, the qualifying holding procedures also apply for significant participations in insurance companies according to section 17 of the German Act on the Supervision of Insurance companies

[Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz - VAG] and other financial services institutions (i.e. investment firms) according to section 1 (1a), (2) KWG. The requirement of a pre-approval by the competent supervisor for any significant participation in one of these regulated entities also applies if the proposed acquirer is a bank.

Supervisory reporting (CP 10)

The authorities cannot agree with the overall assessment. Taking into account their entire supervisory environment, their experience with the information available and their capacity to react if necessary promptly on banks’ situations which are not satisfactory the isolated assessment of Principle 10 is too harsh and should be upgraded. Moreover, we would like to emphasize that the assessment does not take future developments into account. According to the ECB regulation 534/2015 which further elaborates Regulation (EU) 680/2014 the required information will be available next year.

Corporate Governance (CP 14)

On Principle 14, Corporate Governance, on basis of its findings the IMF concludes that the following actions are needed to strengthen the role of the supervisory board:

  • Supervisory guidance should clearly state that ultimate responsibility for establishing the risk culture, developing business plans and risk appetite statement rests with the supervisory board.

  • Supervisory enforcement and sanctioning programs should explicitly address supervisory board member liability.

  • The knowledge/experience requirements for supervisory board members should be commensurate with the complexity of the bank.

  • Reporting to the board should be frequent and with sufficient detail to enable the board members to challenge management.

  • Banking supervisors should continue to increase dialogue and discussions with the supervisory board on results of supervisory activities and concerns.

Reference has been made to BCP standards, requiring increased emphasis on the role of the supervisory board’s oversight of management and the institution. According to paragraph 6, page 2, of the Basel Principles for enhancing corporate governance of October 2010, insufficient board oversight of senior management, inadequate risk management and unduly complex or opaque bank organizational structures and activities failures and lapses were one of the reasons for the financial crisis that began in mid-2007. For this reason, Principle 1 of the Basel Principles for enhancing corporate governance of October 2010 states, that “The board has overall responsibility for the bank, including approving and overseeing the implementation of the bank’s strategic objectives, risk strategy, corporate governance and corporate values. The board is also responsible for providing oversight of senior management”.

Also Principle 1 of the Basel Corporate Governance Principles for banks, published July 2015, requires that “the board has overall responsibility for the bank, including approving and overseeing management’s implementation of the bank’s strategic objectives, governance framework and corporate culture”.

However, neither the above cited guidelines nor the BCP address the “supervisory board” in specific but the “board” in general, which is defined, according to Basel Corporate Governance Principles for banks of July 2015 as

  • “The body that supervises management. The structure of the board differs among countries. The use of “board” throughout this paper encompasses the different national models that exist and should be interpreted in accordance with applicable law within each jurisdiction.”

Footnote 27, page 25 of BCP states that the BCP “[…] refers to a governance structure composed of a board and senior management. The Committee recognizes that there are significant differences in the legislative and regulatory frameworks across countries regarding these functions. Some countries use a two-tier board structure, where the supervisory function of the board is performed by a separate entity known as a supervisory board, which has no executive functions. Other countries, in contrast, use a one-tier board structure in which the board has a broader role. Owing to these differences, this document does not advocate a specific board structure. Consequently, in this document, the terms “board” and “senior management” are only used as a way to refer to the oversight function and the management function in general and should be interpreted throughout the document in accordance with the applicable law within each jurisdiction”.

Also, paragraph 7 of the Basel Principles for enhancing Corporate Governance of October 2010 points out that “the application of corporate governance standards in any jurisdiction is naturally expected to be pursued in a manner consistent with applicable national laws, regulations and codes”. Paragraph 15 of the Basel Corporate Governance Principles for banks of July 2015 states that the Principles are “intended to guide the actions of board members, senior managers, control function heads and supervisors of a diverse range of banks in a number of countries with varying legal and regulatory systems, including both Committee member and non-member jurisdictions. The Committee recognizes that there are significant differences in the legislative and regulatory frameworks across countries which may restrict the application of certain principles or provisions therein. Each jurisdiction should apply the provisions as the national authorities see fit. In some cases, this may involve legal change. In other cases, a principle may require slight modification in order to be implemented.”

Against this background we would like to point out that the German two tier structure differs from the one tier structure. However, the abovementioned Basel principles in general and especially the BCP 14 requirements have been fulfilled.

As regards the responsibilities of both boards, it seems that the interaction between the management board and the supervisory boards and the full range of the supervisory board’s tasks and powers in German banks have not been made sufficiently clear yet.

The German two-tier system allocates the board’s responsibilities in two institutionally independent bodies, the management board, which has the direct responsibility for the management of the company, including the exercise of management control over the lower hierarchical levels, and the supervisory board, which in turn supervises the management activities of the management board. The basic idea is to separate the supervision in an own body, which is staffed and functionally separate from the management board, namely the supervisory board. The aim of this separation of responsibilities is not only to prevent that management responsibilities become so extensive that there is not enough room for the monitoring responsibilities, but also to avoid an involvement of the supervisory board members in management decision-making and accordingly as a final consequence the need to monitor themselves with all resulting potential conflicts of interest. The clear separation of management and supervisory responsibilities as well as the independence of the supervisory board members are major advantages of this system. Requiring an ultimate responsibility for establishing the risk culture, developing business plans and risk appetite statement rests with the supervisory board would contravene this separation.

The role of both, the management board and the supervisory board, is not only governed by supervisory law, i.e. the KWG, but to a large extent subject to the respective company law. In order to facilitate a better understanding of the German two-tier structure and especially the role of the supervisory board, the main responsibilities and powers are outlined below (where governed by company law, using the public limited company (Aktiengesellschaft) as an example).

With respect to the management board, we firstly refer to our explanations in the Preliminary remarks of the German specific part of the Detailed Self-Assessment on BCP 14. Furthermore, we would like to emphasize the fact that due to corporate law it is the management board which has to manage the company on its own responsibility (sec. 76 German Stock Corporation Act [Aktiengesetz – AktG]). This means on the one hand performing the management tasks - or in other words the leadership tasks - and on the other hand bearing the ultimate management responsibility. In its leadership function, the management board is not limited to performing day-to-day management, but also responsible for developing the corporate strategy as well as determining the corporate policy and ensuring their implementation (cf. sec. 4.1 of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC); cf. also sec. 25c KWG). The tasks of the management board also encompass the exercise of management control in the sense of ongoing and subsequent monitoring of the performance and success of delegated management tasks. Concerning the latter, the main responsibility of the supervisory board is normally to assess whether such delegation is appropriately organized, e.g., whether the responsible individuals are properly selected and sufficiently monitored by the management board.

With regard to the qualifications of the supervisory board members, we would like to refer to BCP 14, EC 4, German specific part, and to highlight the fact that, when assessing whether a member of the supervisory board has the necessary expertise, the scope and complexity of the business conducted by the institution, group of institutions or financial holding group, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company has to be taken into account (sec. 25d para. 1 sentence 2 KWG). We also refer once more to BCP 14, EC 9, German specific part, with special regard to corrective measures against supervisory board members.

As already said in the preliminary remarks of the German specific part of the Detailed Self-Assessment on BCP 14, the main responsibility of the supervisory board is the supervision of the management board. For credit institutions, sec. 25d para. 6 KWG specifies that the supervisory board shall oversee the management board, also with regard to its adherence to the applicable prudential supervisory requirements, and shall devote sufficient time to the discussion of strategies, risks and remuneration systems for management board members and employees. Credit institution specific responsibilities also follow from sec. 25d para. 7-12 KWG, where the tasks of the supervisory board’s committees are laid down.

For the purpose of supervising the management board, the supervisory board has quite significant powers:

  • The supervisory board is responsible for the appointment and dismissal of members of the management board (sec. 84 AktG), including the service agreement and its termination, the compensation of each management board member (cf. sec. 25d (12) KWG in accordance with sec. 3 (2) Remuneration Ordinance for Institutions [Institutsvergütungsverordnung – InstitutsvergVO]) as well as the representation of the company vis-à-vis the members of the management board (sec. 112 AktG). Where necessary, the supervisory board has to consider and to pursue claims for damages against members of the management board (cf. sec. 116, 93 AktG). Corresponding to the liability of the members of the management board, supervisory board members can also be held liable personally for damages in case of infringements of their duty of care (sec. 116 AktG).

  • The management board is subject to comprehensive regular and case-specific reporting obligations vis-à-vis the supervisory board (sec. 90 AktG). In addition, the supervisory board may require at any time further reports from the management board on the affairs of the company (sec. 90 para. 3 AktG). It may also inspect and examine the books and records of the company as well as the assets of the company, in particular cash, securities and merchandise (sec. 111 para. 2 AktG). A specificity for all credit institutions is the right of the chairs of the risk committee and the audit committee, or, if such committees have not been established, the chair of the supervisory board, to make direct enquiries to both the head of the internal audit function and the head of the risk control unit (sec. 25d para. 8 and 9 KWG). Correspondingly, the chair of the remuneration committee (or the chair of the supervisory board) may make direct enquiries to both the head of the internal audit function and the heads of the organisational units responsible for the structure of the remuneration systems (sec. 25d para. 12 KWG).

  • Within the scope of its supervising function, the task of the supervisory board is also to advise the management board in the management of the enterprise regularly. The supervisory board must be involved in decisions of fundamental importance to the enterprise. (cf. sec. 5.1.1 GCGC)

  • The supervisory board shall instruct the auditor as to the annual financial statements and consolidated financial statements according to sec. 290 of the Commercial Code (sec. 111 para. 2 sentence 3 AktG). It shall itself examine the annual financial statements, the annual report and the proposal for appropriation of distributable profit and shall report on the results of its examination in writing to the shareholders’ meeting (sec. 171 AktG). The annual financial statements shall be deemed to have been approved, upon approval thereof by the supervisory board, unless the management board and the supervisory board resolve that the annual financial statements are to be approved by the shareholders’ meeting (sec. 172 AktG).

  • While it is explicitly stipulated that management responsibilities may not be conferred on the supervisory board, the articles of association or the supervisory board have to determine that specific types of transactions may be entered into only with the consent of the supervisory board (sec. 111 para. 4 AktG).

  • The supervisory board shall call a shareholders’ meeting whenever the interests of the company so require (sec. 111 para. 3 AktG), e.g. to achieve a vote of no confidence by the shareholders’ meeting in order to revoke the appointment of a member of the management board.

  • The strategies and, where applicable, adjustments to the strategies shall be brought to the attention of and discussed with the institution’s supervisory board (guidance provided by AT 4.2 para. 5 Minimum Requirement for Risk Management [MaRisk], an administrative regulation issued by BaFin).

  • Risk management creates a basis for the proper performance of the supervisory board’s monitoring functions and thus shall also include the adequate involvement of the supervisory board (guidance provided by AT 1 para. 1 MaRisk).

Against this background, we would like to emphasize that the management board is the right body regarding the reporting lines of the control functions. All control functions are instruments of the management board due to its responsibility to manage the company on its own responsibility. Therefore, the control functions report directly to the management board. The management board, then again, is obliged to report to supervisory board. This reporting line does not mean that risk reporting to the supervisory board is influenced in an unduly manner. Firstly, the control functions are clearly (up to and including management board level) segregated from the operational functions (front office) to enable the control functions to monitor and report on risk issues independently from divisions where risks may arise. Secondly, it is not up to the management board members to decide about form and extent of the information provided by the control functions. German supervisors have the clear expectation that reports to the supervisory function are identical or at least coextensive to those that are provided to the management board in order to ensure the same level of information for the supervisory board and the management board (please see also responses to BCP 15).

However, to a certain extent reporting lines of the control functions to the supervisory board are also in place. As already mentioned above, the supervisory board has direct access to the heads of control functions, namely the CRO and the head of internal audit. According to sec, 25d (8) KWG), the chair of the risk committee, and if no risk committee has been established, the chair of the supervisory board, may make direct inquiries to the head of internal audit function and the head of risk control unit. The management board shall be informed thereof. The same applies to the chair of the audit committee and the head of supervisory board if an audit committee has not been established, according to sec. 25d (9) KWG.

Specific guidance regarding reporting requirements to the supervisory board are also laid down in the MaRisk. According to the guidance provided by AT 4.4.2 para. 6 MaRisk, the reports of the compliance function shall (next to the primary reporting line to the management board) additionally be passed to the supervisory board. Additionally, according to the guidance provided by BT 2.4 para. 4 of MaRisk’s amended version, the Internal Audit function has to write an overall report on its performed audits on a quarterly basis and provide them to both, the management board and the supervisory board. Regarding the reporting obligation of the risk management function, please see the comments regarding the preliminary assessment of BCP 15.

Regarding remuneration topics, the chair of remuneration committee or, if a remuneration committee has not been established, the chair of the supervisory board may make direct inquiries to the head of the internal audit function and the heads of the organizational units responsible for the structure of the remuneration systems. The management board shall be informed thereof according to sec. 25d (12) KWG.

In this regard, it is important to point out, that all members of the respective committees are only supervisory board members; no management board member is included.

Regarding the assessment that “Banking supervisors should continue to increase dialogue and discussions with the supervisory board on results of supervisory activities and concerns” we do not understand on which basis this assessment has been made. We believe that the dialogue between the German banking supervisors and the respective institution’s bodies is commensurate with the role of each board.

Consequently, we do not think that the findings made by the IMF are sufficiently justified. Considering the content of the Basel Core Principles, we are convinced that the requirements relating to the “board” are addressed correctly against the background of the German two-tier system.

Therefore, we are convinced that the German system is compliant with the requirements of Principle 14.

Prudential Requirements, Regulatory Framework, Accounting and Disclosure (CPs 15-29)

Comment on the Assessment of BCP 15 Risk management process: We do not share the view of the IMF that the existing dual system of the legal structure in German companies and banks (strict separation of the management board and the supervisory board) and the resulting implications for their tasks in Germany leads to a weakening of independence of the control functions (risk management function, compliance function, internal audit function) within the institutions in general and with regard to the risk management function in particular. The responsibility of the supervisory board according to German company law is clear: it is in the responsibility of the supervisory board to observe and monitor the business management of the management board. Furthermore, the supervisory board must not perform business management tasks. This fact implies some modifications concerning the reporting requirements (reporting lines) and the organisational and operational structure in which the risk management function is embedded. For more details concerning the specific role of the supervisory board and the resulting implications see response to BCP 14.

To begin with, it has to be emphasized that all control functions, including risk management function, are instruments of the management board (due to their responsibility for the business management) and therefore organizationally subordinated to the management board. This is why the risk management function reports initially to the management board. The fact that it is in the responsibility of the management board (not automatically the CEO but usually the CRO—when the CRO is member of the management board, as it is the case in the most largest institutions in Germany—or the management board member where the risk management function is subordinated) to report to the supervisory board (at least quarterly) does not mean (and should not lead to the conclusion) that risk reporting to the supervisory board could be influenced in an unduly manner. Two facts in this context are particularly important: Firstly, the risk management function is clearly (up to and including management board level) segregated from the operational function (front office) to enable this function to monitor and report on risk issues independent from those divisions of the institution where risks arise. Secondly, it is not left to the discretion of the management board members in what form and to what extent risk related information is reported to the supervisory board. German supervisors have the clear expectation (and review if these expectations are met by institutions, especially in the context of onsite inspections) that risk reports to the supervisory function to be identical or at least coextensive to those which are presented to the management board in order to ensure the same level of information for the supervisory board and the management board. The compliance with this requirement are reviewed during ongoing supervision and on-site inspections.

In addition, the chair of the supervisory board (or the chair of the audit committee if such a committee exists, see also section 25d (9) KWG in connection with section 25d (7) KWG) has direct access to the head of the risk management function and can call for further information. The fact that the management board shall be previously informed is a direct implication of the organisational and disciplinary subordination of those staff members and does not imply that the chair of the supervisory board cannot discuss with the head of risk management in confidence (without presence of a management board member). Please note that large institutions are required to implement the head of risk management function exclusively on management board level (“CRO”). In those cases the CRO has always the access to supervisory board (and vice versa) at all times.

For these reasons it is sufficiently ensured that the risk management can act independently and can provide both management board and supervisory board with risk information without any influence of the management board.

With regard to the required notification of the supervisory board in cases where the head of the risk management function is removed (for removals of the head of compliance and head of internal audit there are identical requirements; see guidance provided by AT 4.4.1, AT 4.4.2, AT 4.4.3 MaRisk) we would like to point out that this notification is not only required ex-post but a sufficient time before the removal in order to enable the supervisory board to discuss those issues with the management board. German supervisors have addressed this topic in the draft of a revised version of the MaRisk (consultation process was opened in February 18th 2016) and will amend the respective sections of the MaRisk to make clear that the notification has to be given due in advance and under specification of the reasons of the removal.

Comment on Assessment of Principle 18: Based on the experience and the results of AQR from 2014, BaFin is aware that there has to be a stronger focus on questions in terms of valuation. For that reason, BaFin established a new division, BA 53, Financial Accounting and Valuation Practices, with the task to get a better understanding of the institutions’ valuation practices, the underlying assumptions and the calculation of provisions.

In this way, BaFin aims for a deeper insight into the institutions’ processes and their valuation methods to discuss the institutions’ appraisals in terms of a prudential perspective. Based on the various banking practices, a guidance for the supervisor might be a helpful tool. Nevertheless, a conflict with existing accounting legislation should be avoided. In this regard, the new division will explore a possible balanced way forward. Nevertheless, we expect that challenging the institutions results and comparisons might lead to an increase of quality of valuation methods and its results.

Additionally BaFin and BBK implemented a supervisory approach for LSI in 2015 (PAAR – Prudential Assessment of Adequate Risk-Provisioning) and set up a supervisory training program which was enrolled in 2015. Regarding that it is a completely new inspection approach for BBK there are no public issued guidelines yet, however there are comprehensive internal guidelines for inspectors available. This safeguards to keep room for adjustments in this early stage of this new inspection approach.

On SSM-level there is an on-site methodology for credit risk available and detailed information for loan valuation and provisioning are yet to be finished.

Regarding Principle 19 we would like to point out that the CEBS Guidelines on the management of concentration risk under SREP (GL 31) still are applicable and establish a framework on the EU level which relates to Art. 81 Capital Requirements Directive [CRD]. Without explicit mentioning the definition of these Guidelines, all aspects referred to in the Core Principle as footnote are covered. At the same time, the definition is congruent with the guidance provided by the MaRisk (see AT 2.2, para Annotations).

Furthermore, the MaRisk definition of intra-risk concentrations includes market-risks aspects (market, currencies) as well as funding risk concentrations. The requirement to analyse regularly the access to relevant refinancing - even in the event of tight markets - clearly points in this direction (BTR 3.1. Tz. 4).

Regarding the regular review of all material concentrations by a bank’s supervisory board we cannot agree with the statement that there is no such requirement: MaRisk do require a special reporting about risk concentrations and their potential consequences (see AT 4.3.2., para 4). Besides, according to AT 4.3.3 para 1 stress tests have to be extended on risk concentrations. The results of the stress tests have to be reported as well and shall therefore cover the assumed risk concentrations additionally.

According to the guidance provided by BTR 1 para 7a MaRisk the risk report on credit risk has to contain information regarding the development of the credit portfolio. Risk concentrations as well as large exposures (Para 7b) have to be considered. The risk reports are generally sent via the management board in identical or at least coextensive form to the supervisory board so it is ensured that the supervisory board gets the same information as the management board in a timely manner.

Regarding Principle 20 the statement that there is no regular reporting of exposures to related parties is correct, but it doesn’t mean that German supervisors never obtain information on loans to related parties. According to section 34 (2) No. 4 of the Audit Report Regulation [Prüfungsberichtsverordnung – PrüfbV], stricter (single-loan-based) reporting requirements apply where loans to related parties must be regarded as noteworthy because of their size or the way they are structured or because indications of conflicts of interests occur. Furthermore, in case of reaching or exceeding certain thresholds (large loans according to section 14 KWG and large exposures according to Article 394 CRR), exposures to related parties have to be reported to the supervisor, too.

In addition, granting exposures to related parties is part of the institution’s credit granting and surveillance process. Therefore, not only section 15 of the KWG, which, among other things, defines transactions with related parties and regulates the unanimous decision by all general managers of the institution in advance of the credit granting, but also all the other provisions as section 18 KWG or the guidance provided by the MaRisk have to be respected. Consequently, related party exposures have to be monitored and controlled and there is no need for a separate regulation in this context.

Even if there is no separate legal limit for exposures with related parties, the large exposure limit according to Article 395 of the CRR is applicable. Besides, according to section 15 (2) KWG, BaFin can impose limits on exposures to related parties on a case by case basis.

Finally, regarding the definition of related party transactions or the relevant provision, the supervisor can always decide on a case by case basis if there are some doubts.

Regarding Principle 21 we have difficulties in understanding the basis for your assessment that banks would have little guidance on country risk. Country risk as part of credit risk is subject to the guidance provided by MaRisk standards to credit business like “normal” credit risk. Country risk includes an economical and a political aspect which of course has to be analysed. According to BTO 1.2 para 3 MaRisk all important aspects of a credit engagement have to be fleshed out (not only at the time of the granting of the loan but also during the ongoing monitoring), whereby country risks are to be considered in an appropriate way. The bulk of German banks operate regionally and are usually not engaged in foreign exposures (with the exception of some EU sovereign bonds) so that country risk is rather in exceptional cases an essential risk in the LSI-context. According to the national Guidelines on the supervisory assessment of bank-internal capital adequacy concepts (published in December 2011) unrealised losses in relation to hidden burdens which have occurred with European sovereign bonds in the near past must be considered.

In addition, reporting requirements regarding country risk follow from the guidance provided by BTR 1, para 7 MaRisk: according to lit. a information must be given on the development of the credit portfolio, inter alia broken down by countries. If significant positions with country risk exist, a special presentation of these risks is necessary (see para 7c).

Finally, regarding the verification of internal limits we would like to mention that auditors of Bundesbank also examine the limit system in the context of their audits and whether country risks are appropriately taken into account and limited, of course (the guidance provided by MaRisk emphasizes that country risks as part of the credit risk have to be regarded). However as mentioned above, this is a rather exceptional case with LSIs as most LSIs don’t have significant country risks.

Regarding Principle 25: We disagree with the classification because it is not clear where Germany does not comply with the Basel framework.

We agree that there might be room for improvements, which is always the case. But the benchmark has to be the BCP requirement and not what seems to be desirable.

However, we do not agree that the findings justify a verdict of material non-compliance. The Basel text is fully covered by the CRR and the guidance provided by the MaRisk. OpRisk management, disaster recovery and BCP are regular topics of bank examinations, in dedicated operational risk audits as well as in examinations with a broader or different scope where it is implicitly covered. As a material risk, operational risk is covered by the guidance provided by MaRisk examinations by default. It is also touched upon in market and credit risk examinations where boundary issues are concerned. Moreover, in our opinion some of the requests of the IMF assessors went beyond what the Basel text asks for. We would therefore like to ask for clarification on the conclusion of the assessors. For any details with respect to the individual ECs, please refer to our statements below.

Concerning the findings of EC1, Bundesbank has both supervisors dedicated exclusively to operational risk as well as quantitative and qualitative experts with a lot of experience on operational risk examinations. Bundesbank furthermore offers in-house trainings for supervisors on operational risk that covers both regulation and presentations from bank practitioners.

Concerning the findings of EC3, we disagree that the use test does not receive sufficient attention during AMA examinations. AMA banks are thoroughly examined before given accreditation and the monitoring of KRIs and other risk management instruments is part of our ongoing supervision. The four elements of an AMA and their use are also an explicit part of AMA first-time inspections and a common part of follow-up inspections. In the past, AMA examinations have rendered 12 findings with respect to the integration of the AMA into day-to-day management and an additional 36 findings with respect to the four data elements.

While a benchmarking of losses is currently not performed by Bundesbank, such an exercise is in progress by ECB (DG IV). Please be mindful that the (desirable) supervisory collection of loss data for BIA-banks would exceed BCBS requirements. We agree that a cross-sector analysis of operational risks is not performed; however this is not envisaged by the Basel text either. We also see no basis for such an analysis as the Basel text does not require small banks to systematically collect loss data and we consider the BIA capital requirement to be not risk sensitive enough to allow for comparisons.

The assessors criticize that the frequency, scope and depth of operational risk examinations could be enhanced. In the past we have had dedicated operational risk exams for large banks, which have each lasted several weeks with teams of more than 6 people. While the frequency of follow-up AMA assessments varies from bank to bank, our largest bank is examined on at least a yearly basis. All other banks that do not have an approved AMA are regularly examined for compliance with BTR 4 MaRisk, which regularly results in findings with regard to the banks’ operational risk management. In total, MaRisk examinations have yielded more than 90 operational risk findings since 2013. We are hoping for a statement from the assessors what is considered an adequate frequency, scope and depth for operational risk examinations.

Concerning EC4, the assessors state that there are “no provisions within the regulations to establish minimum expectations with respect to testing, review and approval by board of DR and BCP plans.”. However, the German banking act clearly states in section 25a that “risk management shall comprise, in particular, (…) the definition of an adequate contingency plan, especially for IT systems”. Further in section 25c, the banking act states that “As part of its overall responsibility to ensure a proper business organization of the institution pursuant to section 25a (1) sentence 2, the management board of an institution shall ensure that the institution has in place the following strategies, processes, procedures, functions and frameworks:

  • adequate contingency plans pursuant to section 25a (1) sentence 3 number 5 for contingencies affecting time-critical activities and processes; as a minimum, the management board shall ensure that regular contingency tests are carried out in order to verify the suitability and effectiveness of the contingency plan and the results are communicated to the respective responsible staff;”. Between 2012 and 2014, Bundesbank has conducted more than 50 audits with a focus on DR and BCP (MaRisk AT 7.3) that have resulted in 71 findings.

The assessors also criticize that in relation to DR and BCP, the MaRisk contains high level guidance and does not prescribe minimum standards for the frequency, scope or nature of DR and BCP testing and that banks are obliged to follow industry standards instead. In addition, the assessors criticize that there is scope for the JST to pay greater attention to the assessment of DR and BCP planning and the results of DR tests. In addition to the banking act and the MaRisk which are more principle based, it should be mentioned that all Bundesbank supervisors are given guidelines on how to examine DR and BCP and that we have done roadshows and in-house training to create awareness for this topic. Furthermore, industry standards are not only defined by regulators but also by independent bodies such as the federal office for information security (BSI) which sets ISO norms among others.

Regarding EC6, the assessors criticize that loss data from AMA SI banks should be collected and compared. Once again, we reference to the on-going SSM exercise. It should also be noted that large loss events are discussed with JSTs on a regular basis and that management awareness is created through the regular reporting of operational risk losses and scenarios. While a cross-sector comparison for Germany might seem desirable, we still see no legal basis to ask this from the supervisors.

It is also not correct that MaRisk does not contain a level of specificity for the collection and classification of operational risk data. MaRisk specifically states in its BTR 4 that “It shall be ensured that any material operational risk is identified and assessed at least once a year.”. The upcoming revisions of the MaRisk guidance will also include the requirement to use loss databases.

In total, further clarification where exactly Basel rules are violated would be useful so we can further improve our supervisory approach.

Regarding the assessment of BCP 26, we would like to refer to the comments regarding the assessment of BCP 14 and 15.

In addition, we would like to point out, that in contrary to the statements in the assessment, the internal audit function and the compliance function have alternative reporting lines to the supervisory board.

According to sec. 25d (8) and (9) KWG, the chair of the risk committee and internal audit committee respectively or, if the respective committee has not been established, the chair of the supervisory board may make direct inquiries to the heads of the both control functions. Additionally, according to the guidance provided by BT 2.4 para. 4 of MaRisk’s amended version, the Internal Audit function has to write an overall report on its performed audits on a quarterly basis and provide them to both, the management board and the supervisory board.

Since the internal audit function is an instrument of the management board, the function is obliged to report directly to this body in the first instance (BT 2.4 MaRisk). However, if management board members might be involved, the internal audit function has to report directly to the supervisory board. According to BT 2.4 para. 5 MaRisk, in case the audit reveals serious findings concerning members of the management board, the internal audit function shall inform the chair of the supervisory board if the management board fails to meet its reporting obligation or if it fails to adopt appropriate remedial measures.

As already pointed out in the comments to BCP 14, the compliance function is also an instrument of the management board regarding the specific responsibility of this body. For this reason, the compliance function has to report to the management board directly. But in addition, according to the guidance provided by AT 4.4.2 para. 6 MaRisk, the reports of the compliance function shall additionally be passed to the supervisory board (and the internal audit function).

Finally, we do not share the view that the supervisory board is informed of a replacement of the internal auditor, compliance officer and risk officer ex-post only. According to the guidance provided by MaRisk, the supervisory board shall be notified, if the head of the risk control function (AT 4.4.1 para. 5) and the compliance officer (AT 4.4.2 para. 7 MaRisk) and the head of internal audit function (AT 4.4.3 para. 6 MaRisk) respectively is replaced. It is clearly not required to provide any of this information ex-post but instead in a sufficient time before the removal so that the supervisory board is able to discuss these issues with the management board. The draft of the revised version of the MaRisk (consultation process was opened in February 18th 2016) will be clearer in this regard. In future, if the head of the risk control function (AT 4.4.1 para. 6 revised version) and the compliance officer (AT 4.4.2 para. 7 revised version) and the head of internal audit function (AT 4.4.3 para. 6 revised version) respectively is replaced, the supervisory board shall be notified in advance in a timely manner, stating the reasons for the replacement.

Therefore, we are convinced that Germany is compliant with the BCP 26 guidelines.

b) ECB’s Response

The ECB welcomes the assessment prepared by the IMF based on the “Basel Core Principles (BCP) for Effective Banking Supervision” in the context of the Germany FSAP. In general, the ECB concurs with the views expressed in the report, as they generally reflect in a very balanced and thoughtful manner the reality of the SSM and take due account of the complexity of the matter. The ECB highlights the excellent cooperation with the IMF mission team and the German authorities all throughout the process.

The ECB strongly supports the IMF in its objective to promote globally best supervisory practices via FSAPs, as this is fully in line with the SSM’s objective of ensuring that banks across the euro area are supervised according to the same high standards. More specifically, SSM banking supervision does not have a national focus, but takes a European perspective, allowing the ECB to compare and benchmark banks across institutions and identify problems at an early stage. In addition, it combines the experience and expertise of 19 national supervisors, enabling the ECB to draw on the best national practices. Finally, SSM banking supervision is shielded against undue influence from different stakeholders.

The ECB also welcomes that the report acknowledges that in 2015 the European banking supervision took a great step towards harmonised and unbiased supervision by conducting a euro area-wide Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) according to a common methodology. For the first time, all significant institutions in the euro area were assessed against a common yardstick. Quantitative and qualitative elements were combined through a constrained expert judgment approach, which ensured consistency, avoided supervisory forbearance and accounted for institutions’ specificities.

Notwithstanding the general positive view on the report, the ECB considers that the assessment of BCP 25 on operational risk does not fully take into consideration the initiatives undertaken by the SSM, by means of the actions of the Joint Supervisory Teams, to measure and assess these risks in significant institutions. The ECB is of the view that, while recognizing that of course there is still room for improvement, the progress made so far and the initiatives that are still ongoing to improve the supervision of operational risk were not fully recognised in the assessment. Most notably, the SSM supervisory assessment guidance, which, while tailored to more advanced risk management practices as applicable under AMA, in practise also provides BIA banks with guidance on this matter. In addition, operational risk issues are addressed in the specific risk control assessments that are part of the regular supervisory activity of the JSTs. In this regard, for example, questions relating to adequate risk management processes, potential data weaknesses or risks resulting from technical or human errors are covered in JSTs’ assessments not only for operational risk itself but also when analysing credit, liquidity or market risk, as well as in governance risk control assessments.

Regarding the remarks included in the report that there should be more supervisory focus on ensuring reported data quality, including the verification that risk management policies exist and are effectively implemented, the ECB indicates that the JSTs – following the SSM Supervisory manual – undertake quantitative and qualitative assessments to determine respectively the actual level of exposure to this risk and the internal risk controls established by the banks. These assessments are included in the RAS assessment and in the monitoring reports that are produced at least once per year, which are complemented with additional supervisory assessments for AMA banks. In addition, JSTs perform specific assessments, the so-called ‘deep dives’, and cover these issues through on-site inspections.

Finally, it is also worth to be noted that the SSM undertook a number of reviews – notably on CyberCrime, BCBS 239 and cybercrime incident reports – and is currently in close contact with key service providers to assess preparedness to risks related to systemic threats.

The ECB will duly consider the observations and recommendations included in the report to further improve the quality of the SSM banking supervision.

1

This Detailed Assessment Report has been prepared by Fabiana Melo and Christopher Wilson, (both Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF), and Jose Tuya (IMF External Expert).

2

Minimum requirements for risk management (Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement - MaRisk).

3

This part of the assessment draws from other FSAP documents.

4

Compared with 1995, the number of banking institutions has declined by about 50 percent.

5

The “big bank” group includes Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Postbank, and UniCredit.

6

The savings banks and the Landesbanken were backed by mutual guarantees in the past; however, the guarantees were phased out in 2005.

7

This section draws from other documents produced for the FSAP, some of which at the time of this assessment were not yet finalized. A complete analysis of the macroeconomic framework is contained in Article IV reports.

8

In this document, “banking group” includes the holding company, the bank and its offices, subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures, both domestic and foreign. Risks from other entities in the wider group, for example non-bank (including non-financial) entities, may also be relevant. This group-wide approach to supervision goes beyond accounting consolidation.

9

The activities of authorising banks, ongoing supervision and corrective actions are elaborated in the subsequent Principles.

10

Such authority is called “the supervisor” throughout this paper, except where the longer form “the banking supervisor” has been necessary for clarification.

11

In this document, “risk profile” refers to the nature and scale of the risk exposures undertaken by a bank.

12

In this document, “systemic importance” is determined by the size, interconnectedness, substitutability, global or cross-jurisdictional activity (if any), and complexity of the bank, as set out in the BCBS paper on Global systemically important banks: assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement, November 2011.

13

Please refer to Principle 1, Essential Criterion 1.

14

Principle 3 is developed further in the Principles dealing with “Consolidated supervision” (12), “Home-host relationships” (13) and “Abuse of financial services” (29).

15

The Committee recognizes the presence in some countries of non-banking financial institutions that take deposits but may be regulated differently from banks. These institutions should be subject to a form of regulation commensurate to the type and size of their business and, collectively, should not hold a significant proportion of deposits in the financial system.

16

This document refers to a governance structure composed of a board and senior management. The Committee recognizes that there are significant differences in the legislative and regulatory frameworks across countries regarding these functions. Some countries use a two-tier board structure, where the supervisory function of the board is performed by a separate entity known as a supervisory board, which has no executive functions. Other countries, in contrast, use a one-tier board structure in which the board has a broader role. Owing to these differences, this document does not advocate a specific board structure. Consequently, in this document, the terms “board” and “senior management” are only used as a way to refer to the oversight function and the management function in general and should be interpreted throughout the document in accordance with the applicable law within each jurisdiction.

17

Therefore, shell banks shall not be licensed. (Reference document: BCBS paper on shell banks, January 2003.)

18

Please refer to Principle 14, Essential Criterion 8.

19

Please refer to Principle 29.

20

While the term “supervisor” is used throughout Principle 6, the Committee recognizes that in a few countries these issues might be addressed by a separate licensing authority.

21

In the case of major acquisitions, this determination may take into account whether the acquisition or investment creates obstacles to the orderly resolution of the bank.

22

Please refer to Footnote 33 under Principle 7, Essential Criterion 3.

23

The MEL matrix is reviewed at least annually and can thus be subject to updates.

24

On-site work is used as a tool to provide independent verification that adequate policies, procedures and controls exist at banks, determine that information reported by banks is reliable, obtain additional information on the bank and its related companies needed for the assessment of the condition of the bank, monitor the bank’s follow-up on supervisory concerns, etc.

25

Off-site work is used as a tool to regularly review and analyze the financial condition of banks, follow up on matters requiring further attention, identify and evaluate developing risks and help identify the priorities, scope of further off-site and on-site work, etc.

26

Please refer to Principle 10.

27

In the context of this Principle, “prudential reports and statistical returns” are distinct from and in addition to required accounting reports. The former are addressed by this Principle, and the latter are addressed in Principle 27.

28

Please refer to Principle 2.

29

Please refer to Principle 1, Essential Criterion 5.

30

Maybe external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions.

31

Maybe external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions. External experts may conduct reviews used by the supervisor, yet it is ultimately the supervisor that must be satisfied with the results of the reviews conducted by such external experts.

32

Please refer to Principle 1.

33

Please refer to footnote 19 under Principle 1.

34

Please refer to Principle 16, Additional Criterion 2.

35

See Illustrative example of information exchange in colleges of the October 2010 BCBS Good practice principles on supervisory colleges for further information on the extent of information sharing expected.

36

Please refer to footnote 27 under Principle 5.

37

The OECD (OECD glossary of corporate governance-related terms in “Experiences from the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables”, 2003, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/26/23742340.pdf.) defines “duty of care” as “The duty of a board member to act on an informed and prudent basis in decisions with respect to the company. Often interpreted as requiring the board member to approach the affairs of the company in the same way that a ‘prudent man’ would approach their own affairs. Liability under the duty of care is frequently mitigated by the business judgment rule.” The OECD defines “duty of loyalty” as “The duty of the board member to act in the interest of the company and shareholders. The duty of loyalty should prevent individual board members from acting in their own interest, or the interest of another individual or group, at the expense of the company and all shareholders.”

38

“Risk appetite” reflects the level of aggregate risk that the bank’s Board is willing to assume and manage in the pursuit of the bank’s business objectives. Risk appetite may include both quantitative and qualitative elements, as appropriate, and encompass a range of measures. For the purposes of this document, the terms “risk appetite” and “risk tolerance” are treated synonymously.

39

For the purposes of assessing risk management by banks in the context of Principles 15 to 25, a bank’s risk management framework should take an integrated “bank-wide” perspective of the bank’s risk exposure, encompassing the bank’s individual business lines and business units. Where a bank is a member of a group of companies, the risk management framework should in addition cover the risk exposure across and within the “banking group” (see footnote 19 under Principle 1) and should also take account of risks posed to the bank or members of the banking group through other entities in the wider group.

40

To some extent the precise requirements may vary from risk type to risk type (Principles 15 to 25) as reflected by the underlying reference documents.

41

It should be noted that while, in this and other Principles, the supervisor is required to determine that banks’ risk management policies and processes are being adhered to, the responsibility for ensuring adherence remains with a bank’s Board and senior management.

42

New products include those developed by the bank or by a third party and purchased or distributed by the bank.

43

The Core Principles do not require a jurisdiction to comply with the capital adequacy regimes of Basel I, Basel II and/or Basel III. The Committee does not consider implementation of the Basel-based framework a prerequisite for compliance with the Core Principles, and compliance with one of the regimes is only required of those jurisdictions that have declared that they have voluntarily implemented it.

44

The Basel Capital Accord was designed to apply to internationally active banks, which must calculate and apply capital adequacy ratios on a consolidated basis, including subsidiaries undertaking banking and financial business. Jurisdictions adopting the Basel II and Basel III capital adequacy frameworks would apply such ratios on a fully consolidated basis to all internationally active banks and their holding companies; in addition, supervisors must test that banks are adequately capitalized on a stand-alone basis.

45

Reference documents: Enhancements to the Basel II framework, July 2009 and: International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: a revised framework, comprehensive version, June 2006.

46

In assessing the adequacy of a bank’s capital levels in light of its risk profile, the supervisor critically focuses, among other things, on (a) the potential loss absorbency of the instruments included in the bank’s capital base, (b) the appropriateness of risk weights as a proxy for the risk profile of its exposures, (c) the adequacy of provisions and reserves to cover loss expected on its exposures and (d) the quality of its risk management and controls. Consequently, capital requirements may vary from bank to bank to ensure that each bank is operating with the appropriate level of capital to support the risks it is running and the risks it poses.

47

At least 80 percent of exposures (before and after risk weighting) for which the use of internal rating systems is allowed under the CRR have to be covered by using internal ratings.

48

At least 50 percent of exposures (before and after risk weighting) for which the use of internal rating systems is allowed under the CRR have to be covered by using internal ratings.

49

At least 92 percent of exposures (before and after risk weighting) for which the use of internal rating systems is allowed under the CRR have to be covered by using internal ratings.

50

“Stress testing” comprises a range of activities from simple sensitivity analysis to more complex scenario analyses and reverses stress testing.

51

Please refer to Principle 12, Essential Criterion 7.

52

Principle 17 covers the evaluation of assets in greater detail; Principle 18 covers the management of problem assets.

53

Credit risk may result from the following: on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet exposures, including loans and advances, investments, inter-bank lending, derivative transactions, securities financing transactions and trading activities.

54

Counterparty credit risk includes credit risk exposures arising from OTC derivative and other financial instruments.

55

“Assuming” includes the assumption of all types of risk that give rise to credit risk, including credit risk or counterparty risk associated with various financial instruments.

56

Principle 17 covers the evaluation of assets in greater detail; Principle 18 covers the management of problem assets.

57

Reserves for the purposes of this Principle are “below the line” non-distributable appropriations of profit required by a supervisor in addition to provisions (“above the line” charges to profit).

58

Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement von Banken und Finanzdienstleistungsinstituten (Minimum Requirements for Risk Management for Banks and Financial Services Institutions)

59

It is recognized that there are two different types of off-balance sheet exposures: those that can be unilaterally cancelled by the bank (based on contractual arrangements and therefore may not be subject to provisioning), and those that cannot be unilaterally cancelled.

60

BTO 1.2.1., item 2 reads: “As a general rule, the value and legal validity of collateral shall be reviewed prior to granting the loan”. When reviewing the value of collateral, available collateral values may be relied on if there are no indications of any change in value.”

61

Connected counterparties may include natural persons as well as a group of companies related financially or by common ownership, management or any combination thereof.

62

This includes credit concentrations through exposure to: single counterparties and groups of connected counterparties both direct and indirect (such as through exposure to collateral or to credit protection provided by a single counterparty), counterparties in the same industry, economic sector or geographic region and counterparties whose financial performance is dependent on the same activity or commodity as well as off-balance sheet exposures (including guarantees and other commitments) and also market and other risk concentrations where a bank is overly exposed to particular asset classes, products, collateral, or currencies.

63

The measure of credit exposure, in the context of large exposures to single counterparties and groups of connected counterparties, should reflect the maximum possible loss from their failure (i.e. it should encompass actual claims and potential claims as well as contingent liabilities). The risk weighting concept adopted in the Basel capital standards should not be used in measuring credit exposure for this purpose as the relevant risk weights were devised as a measure of credit risk on a basket basis and their use for measuring credit concentrations could significantly underestimate potential losses (see “Measuring and controlling large credit exposures, January 1991).

64

Such requirements should, at least for internationally active banks, reflect the applicable Basel standards. As of September 2012, a new Basel standard on large exposures is still under consideration.

65

Related parties can include, among other things, the bank’s subsidiaries, affiliates, and any party (including their subsidiaries, affiliates and special purpose entities) that the bank exerts control over or that exerts control over the bank, the bank’s major shareholders, Board members, senior management and key staff, their direct and related interests, and their close family members as well as corresponding persons in affiliated companies.

66

Related party transactions include on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet credit exposures and claims, as well as, dealings such as service contracts, asset purchases and sales, construction contracts, lease agreements, derivative transactions, borrowings, and write-offs. The term transaction should be interpreted broadly to incorporate not only transactions that are entered into with related parties but also situations in which an unrelated party (with whom a bank has an existing exposure) subsequently becomes a related party.

67

An exception may be appropriate for beneficial terms that are part of overall remuneration packages (e.g., staff receiving credit at favorable rates).

68

Country risk is the risk of exposure to loss caused by events in a foreign country. The concept is broader than sovereign risk as all forms of lending or investment activity whether to/with individuals, corporates, banks or governments are covered.

69

Transfer risk is the risk that a borrower will not be able to convert local currency into foreign exchange and so will be unable to make debt service payments in foreign currency. The risk normally arises from exchange restrictions imposed by the government in the borrower’s country. (Reference document: IMF paper on External Debt Statistics – Guide for compilers and users, 2003.)

70

Wherever “interest rate risk” is used in this Principle the term refers to interest rate risk in the banking book. Interest rate risk in the trading book is covered under Principle 22.

71

The Committee has defined operational risk as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. The definition includes legal risk but excludes strategic and reputational risk.

72

In assessing independence, supervisors give due regard to the control systems designed to avoid conflicts of interest in the performance measurement of staff in the compliance, control and internal audit functions. For example, the remuneration of such staff should be determined independently of the business lines that they oversee.

73

The term “compliance function” does not necessarily denote an organizational unit. Compliance staff may reside in operating business units or local subsidiaries and report up to operating business line management or local management, provided such staff also have a reporting line through to the head of compliance who should be independent from business lines.

74

The term “internal audit function” does not necessarily denote an organizational unit. Some countries allow small banks to implement a system of independent reviews, e.g., conducted by external experts, of key internal controls as an alternative.

75

In this Essential Criterion, the supervisor is not necessarily limited to the banking supervisor. The responsibility for ensuring that financial statements are prepared in accordance with accounting policies and practices may also be vested with securities and market supervisors.

76

For the purposes of this Essential Criterion, the disclosure requirement may be found in applicable accounting, stock exchange listing, or other similar rules, instead of or in addition to directives issued by the supervisor.

77

The Committee is aware that, in some jurisdictions, other authorities, such as a financial intelligence unit (FIU), rather than a banking supervisor, may have primary responsibility for assessing compliance with laws and regulations regarding criminal activities in banks, such as fraud, money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Thus, in the context of this Principle, “the supervisor” might refer to such other authorities, in particular in Essential Criteria 7, 8 and 10. In such jurisdictions, the banking supervisor cooperates with such authorities to achieve adherence with the criteria mentioned in this Principle.

78

DK stands for „Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft”; it is the name of the union of the main German Banking Associations that represents the majority of the German banking sector. DK is the official issuer of the so-called “DK-Auslegungs- und Anwendungshinweise” (DK interpretation and implementation guidelines), which is the centerpiece of the German AML/CFT Guidelines; these Guidelines are drafted by DK, i.e. the private sector, but discussed with and officially endorsed by BaFin and the Federal Ministry of Finance. They therefore comply with the existing administrative practice of BaFin, which is bound to the guidelines in this regard.

79

Consistent with international standards, banks are to report suspicious activities involving cases of potential money laundering and the financing of terrorism to the relevant national centre, established either as an independent governmental authority or within an existing authority or authorities that serves as an FIU.

80

These could be external auditors or other qualified parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions.

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