Abstract
Republic of Slovenia: Selected Issues
Financial Sector Development Issues and Prospects1
A. Introduction
1. The global financial crisis has raised legitimate questions about the possibility that stability and growth could be hurt by too much finance. Recent research on financial development has advanced the discussion, including analyses by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (EOCD), and in academia.
2. In Slovenia, the global crisis and the more recent domestic banking crisis exposed weaknesses in the banking sector. The ongoing balance sheet deleveraging process that followed the remarkable boom-bust cycle since the country’s EU accession (2004), and the nonperforming asset overhang has led to a sustained contraction in credit to the economy, and in particular to SMEs, since the third quarter of 2011. To this can be added the reduced demand for credit by corporates reflecting impaired balance sheets and the economic contraction. Despite the considerable deleveraging process, Slovenia still compares relatively well to other peer countries in terms of credit-to-GDP ratio, the main traditional indicator of financial development. However, the latter is only one metric to assess financial development.
3. Using a new broad measure of financial development developed by IMF staff, this note assesses the implications of Slovenia’s financial development for economic activity and financial stability.2 The analysis suggests potential ways the financial sector could advance while minimizing the negative effects that financial deepening had in Slovenia. That is, the lower quality of financing led to a build-up of risks and resulted in high NPLs and a misallocation of resources. Key elements to reduce financial sector vulnerabilities would include better regulation and supervision (including ensuring adequate governance), further development of financial markets, and improved efficiency of financial institutions.
4. This note is structured as follows. Section II discusses the structure of the financial system and the developments since the 2012–13 banking crisis. Section III presents some features of the regulatory and supervisory framework. Section IV introduces a broad indicator of financial development that take into account the depth, access, and efficiency of financial institutions and markets. On this basis, it assesses Slovenia’s standing in a cross-country context. Finally, section V concludes with some potential avenues for future financial sector development.
B. Financial System Structure and Recent Developments
System Structure
5. Slovenia’s financial system has assets of about 150 percent of GDP and is bank centered. Banks account for about 70 percent of assets with the remaining roughly equally split between insurers and a group comprising pension companies and funds, investment funds, and leasing companies. Bank ownership is concentrated in the state (63 percent of the total sector’s equity) while other domestic entities control about 7 percent of the sector, and non-residents about 30 percent. Market share is also concentrated with the largest domestic banks controlling about 57 percent of the sector’s assets, small domestic banks 8 percent, and banks under majority foreign ownership 35 percent.3
Developments in Recent Years
6. The global financial crisis brought a sudden stop of capital inflows and associated credit boom. Reflecting lost access to external funding, the foreign to total liabilities ratio of Slovenian banks fell to 13 percent by September 2015 down from a 40 percent peak in June 2008. The squeeze in funding sources forced banks into a pronounced deleveraging with a dramatic cut in lending that reinforced the recession. As a result, NPLs (mainly from corporates) increased sharply peaking at 14.4 percent in 2012 from 3.8 percent in 2008, impairing the balance sheets of banks and corporates in a protracted process. The difficulties faced by corporates led to a rapid deterioration in the quality of banks’ portfolios imposing operating losses that reduced banks’ capital and increased solvency risks. In 2013 a comprehensive asset quality review of eight banks determined that foreign banks had a capital shortfall of 78 percent relative to the capital levels reported in September 2013 while banks under domestic ownership showed a shortfall of 244 percent.4
7. State banks were recapitalized at a total cost of 10 percent of GDP. As part of the measures to stabilize the banking sector, six banks received capital injections in 2013–14. In addition, the establishment of the Bank Asset Management Company (BAMC) in late 2012 allowed the transfer of 53 percent of the EUR 9.4 billion in NPLs from five of the recapitalized government banks by end-2014, primarily involving loans to large state-owned corporates.5 The remaining NPLs are concentrated (over 70 percent) at small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The crisis exposed inadequate bank governance and risk management practices that allowed endemic connected lending and lax risk controls, especially for state-owned banks. Likewise, significant weaknesses in corporate management and governance (including through state ownership) were also exposed.
8. In addition, other measures were adopted to support the effort of stabilizing the banking sector. Besides the recapitalization and transfers of NPLs to BAMC, the authorities implemented: (i) Corporate Insolvency Framework: the 2013 reform opened more options to help address corporate debt overhang, including voluntary multilateral restructuring agreements (MRAs). Besides banks, BAMC also implements MRAs. (ii) Supervisory Actions: to monitor and support restructuring of NPLs the BOS established reporting requirements, including 3-year management plan and restructuring strategy, asset reclassification, release of impairment provisions. Despite all these actions, most MRAs involve debt re-profiling, but not debt reduction, new financing, nor recapitalization.
9. Balance sheets of both banks and corporates remain impaired with the repair process proceeding very slowly. System wide NPLs were at 10.3 percent (EUR 3.7 billion, of which corporates represent 60 percent) in November 2015 and overall capital ratios were at 20.5 percent (CAR) and 19.8 percent (core tier 1) by September 2015. However, credit to the private sector is still contracting by 5.7 percent total and 10.2 percent to nonfinancial corporates (yoy) in December 2015 and the income generation capacity of banks is limited. Bank profitability is still low, with ROE at 6.1 percent in September, after highly negative readings since 2010 and net interest margin of 2.2 percent. It is thus important to accelerate the process of balance sheet repair and NPL resolution.
C. Regulatory and Supervisory Framework
10. The last assessment of Slovenia’s regulatory and supervisory frameworks was in 2012. It was conducted by the IMF and the World Bank in the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).6 The assessment noted that state-controlled banks should be privatized, which “would help address the long-standing governance weaknesses of these banks, which were put into the spotlight by the crisis. Reducing government influence on the day-to-day operations and lending decisions of banks will help improve the risk management practices and the efficiency and stability of the banking system over the longer term.”
11. In addition, the assessment of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision noted weaknesses in banking supervision. In particular, it found that the BOS powers should be strengthened in several areas, including: (i) the licensing or removal of bank supervisory board members; (ii) the requirement for banks to obtain authorization for acquiring non-bank financial companies; (iii) the power to direct banks to increase capital (without shareholders’ discretion to impede BOS’s requirement); (iv) the lack of granularity in the reporting of problem assets; and (v) the relatively low provisioning of NPLs.
12. The BOS legal framework was strengthened with the approval of amendments to the Banking Law, in line with the FSAP recommendations. The most significant changes in the 2012 amendment provided the BOS with: (i) increased powers in relation to banks’ supervisory board members; (ii) broader powers towards effective implementation of financial stability measures over banks and the banking system (extraordinary measures include the appointment of extraordinary administration, compulsory disposal of shares of existing shareholders, capital increase, and transfer of assets and liabilities of the bank); (iii) power to authorize qualifying investment of banks in other financial undertakings; (iv) increased powers over the execution of the supervisory measures, especially in relation to requirements for recapitalization of banks; and (v) legal protection of supervisors.
13. The revised Banking law transposes to national legislation the European directives on capital requirements (CRD IV). It was approved in March 2015 and includes the frameworks for capital buffers and for early intervention, besides the recovery of credit institutions and investment firms (part of BRRD).7 The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) framework will strengthen supervision, aligning standards with European best practices. In particular, it seeks to ensure equal supervisory quality and treatment between the group of “important banks” (direct ECB supervision) and that of “less important banks” (indirect ECB supervision, direct supervision by national competent authorities), including by applying common rules and procedures from the single supervision manual. Improved supervision should also address weak bank risk management and governance, and monitor connected lending. Other European initiatives, such as the establishment of a macroprudential framework and of a credit register, once fully operational will reinforce Slovenia’s regulatory and supervisory frameworks.
D. Indicators of Financial Development
14. The most traditional indicator of financial development is size. It is traditionally measured by the ratio of non-financial private sector credit (usually from banks) to GDP. However, in light of its simplicity, it does not capture other important aspects of financial development. These include the liquidity of markets, other sources of credit (from nonbanks), access to financial services, and efficiency in the delivery of such services.
15. A new and broad measure (Financial Development Index or FD index) was developed by IMF staff. To better capture the different characteristics of financial development the FD index covers both institutions and markets and includes metrics for depth (size and liquidity of markets), access (access to financial services by individuals and companies), and efficiency (provision of financial services at low cost and sustainable revenues, and the level of activity of capital markets) (Box 1).
16. The IMF analysis confirms a number of important financial development features. Based on data for 176 countries, not only does it demonstrate the non-monotonic effect (marginal return) of financial development on growth and stability, but it also shows that, as economies evolve and the process of financial development advances, the relative benefits from institutions decline and those from markets increase. The intuition behind this result is that too much finance (larger financial systems) and/or fast financial deepening tend to contribute to real output losses through more frequent booms and busts and greater financial instability. These potential trade-offs, with costs outweighing benefits at some stage, are the underlying factors behind the bell-shaped relationship between financial development and growth (Box 2).
17. The cross-country evidence highlights the importance of strong regulatory and supervisory frameworks in promoting financial stability and financial development. It shows that the same subset of regulatory principles is critical for both, and that there are concrete regulatory actions that would promote financial development and stability simultaneously.8 That said, good regulation must be complemented by adequate and efficient supervision and oversight so as to produce the expected results. Relatedly, it also suggests that the faster the pace of financial development the higher the risks to economic and financial instability, likely due to the fact that regulation and, particularly, supervision would only follow with a lag.
Financial development in Slovenia compared to the international experience
18. Credit in Slovenia grew at a rapid pace doubling in 2004–10. So, based on the private sector credit-to-GDP metric, Slovenia was ahead of most CEE countries and some other emerging market economies (EMEs) in 2013 (Figure 1).9
Slovenia: Private Sector Credit
(In percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Slovenia: Private Sector Credit
(In percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Slovenia: Private Sector Credit
(In percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
19. A more complete picture, however, emerges through the use of the broad FD index.
The annual evolution of the financial development index in the period 2004–2013 (since Slovenia’s EU entry), shows Slovenia below the average for the EA, but above CEE and EME (Figure 2). It also shows that the narrowing gap between Slovenia and the EA was reversed from 2009. This pattern also coincides with the index for Slovenia moving towards the average for the CEE and EME.
However, the sub-indices, financial institutions (FI) and financial markets (FM), point to a stronger position of institutions, comparable to that of the average EA, and a weaker position in markets (Figure 2). The latter puts Slovenia closer to the average CEE and EME. More developed institutions than markets is a feature shared by the three comparator groups.
The components of the sub-indices, depth, access, and efficiency for each institutions and markets suggest that Slovenia’s position is driven by relatively strong access levels of both institutions and markets, and weaker depth and efficiency (Figure 3). And the latter is much lower for markets than for institutions.
The variables underlying the sub-indices, particularly those related to market depth (FMD) and efficiency (FME), reveal that the deficiencies are driven by very low relative levels of nonbank market development, such as stock market capitalization and trading volumes (both measured as shares to GDP), number of debt securities issuers, and stock market turnover ratio (Figure 4). Regarding institutions, the components of depth, such as assets of pension and mutual funds, for Slovenia lag behind those for the EA (for both) and EME/CEE (for pension fund assets), while mutual fund assets are well below the EA and similar to the average in EME/CEE.
The evolution of Slovenia’s financial development in 1995–2013 has been skewed towards increased relevance of financial institutions along with a decrease in the role of markets. This contrasts with a more balanced process in the EA and even for EME, with the importance of both markets and institutions increasing over time, albeit relatively more for the latter (Figure 5).
Based on the estimations presented in the Sahay and others (2015), Slovenia would lie close to the turning point at which the positive effects of financial development on growth and on growth volatility begin to decline (Figure 6; see next paragraph for specifics on Slovenia).10 And past the point at which the effect of continued financial deepening of institutions on financial stability is increasingly more negative.11
Slovenia: Financial Development Index, Sub-Indices
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: IMF staffSlovenia: Financial Development Index, Sub-Indices
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: IMF staffSlovenia: Financial Development Index, Sub-Indices
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: IMF staff
Slovenia: Financial Development Sub-Indices Components
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: IMF staffSlovenia: Financial Development Sub-Indices Components
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: IMF staffSlovenia: Financial Development Sub-Indices Components
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: IMF staff
Slovenia: Components of Financial Development Index, 2013 Normalized Variables
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: IMF staffSlovenia: Components of Financial Development Index, 2013 Normalized Variables
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: IMF staffSlovenia: Components of Financial Development Index, 2013 Normalized Variables
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: IMF staff
Slovenia: Comparative Evolution of Institutions and Markets
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: IMF staffSlovenia: Comparative Evolution of Institutions and Markets
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: IMF staffSlovenia: Comparative Evolution of Institutions and Markets
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: IMF staff
Slovenia: Financial Development Impact
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source:IMF staffSlovenia: Financial Development Impact
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source:IMF staffSlovenia: Financial Development Impact
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source:IMF staffE. Future Prospects
20. The results suggest some potential ways the financial sector could advance in Slovenia while minimizing the negative effects of too much finance. The analysis indicates that financial deepening has led to low-quality financing, with the build-up of risks, vulnerabilities, and declining efficiency of investment. As a consequence, the current bank assets are not productive enough, with significant misallocation of loans and high NPLs. Expanded credit would only help support higher sustainable growth if applied efficiently to productive activities by viable corporates. Conversely, and as the recent experience in Slovenia demonstrates, higher/faster credit could lead to increased vulnerabilities, a boom and bust cycle, and ultimately lower output.
Better regulation and supervision
21. Adequate regulation and supervision are key elements in a balanced process of financial development preserving economic and financial stability. As demonstrated by Slovenia’s own recent experience, when institutional deepening advances too fast it tends to lead to economic and financial instability. Reasons often associated with this result are incentives towards risk-taking and over-leveraging, particularly when institutional governance is lagging and regulation and supervision are not adequately developed and/or enforced. Importantly, the empirical results suggest that effective implementation of key regulatory principles could help shift the turning point region for which the positive effects of financial development on growth, and growth and financial volatility begin to decline. The experience in Slovenia, and elsewhere, points to the large output loss stemming from less-than-desirable financial regulation and/or supervision. The excessive credit growth before the crisis is now reflected in impaired sectoral balance sheets and high NPLs with consequent low credit provision to the economy. This is fully in line with the argument that too much finance increases the frequency of booms and busts and leaves countries ultimately worse off and with lower real GDP growth.
Further financial market development
22. Relative to the international experience, Slovenia is in the middle range in terms of the financial development. It fares particularly well in terms of financial institutions while market development lags behind, showing much room for improvement. This suggests that a process more geared towards markets than institutions and focusing on increased access and efficiency could allow greater benefits from further financial development in terms of economic and financial stability.
23. Given the size of Slovenia’s domestic market and its increasing integration with the European market, developing a vibrant local capital market is likely to be difficult. However, corporates, and in particular SMEs, would benefit from more options for equity financing rather than just bank debt funding. In this context, further development of local nonbank financial institutions and/or the capital market could facilitate new investments by the sector. A shift in the structure of corporate financing towards a higher proportion of equity would also increase corporate resilience to shocks. For instance, incentives towards equity could be supported by easier foreign investment and ownership and a more dynamic privatization process.
More efficient financial institutions
24. Although Slovenia’s financial system is bank centered, it could benefit from stronger and efficient nonbank institutions, such as pension and mutual funds. These could be an additional source of corporate finance as they currently play a very small role in the financial sector. However, challenges to this end remain, given: (i) the small size and low turnover ratio of the domestic stock market; (ii) the apparent lack of interest to create new mutual funds with focus on domestic investments; (iii) the trend in last few years towards consolidation of mutual funds with a wider global/regional investment strategy; and (iv) the strategy of pension funds to invest abroad.
Potential Implications for the Banking Sector
25. Banks face limitations to the traditional role of credit providers. The process of balance sheet repair is still unfolding while high NPLs reduce profitability and keep lending standards tight (not necessarily a bad outcome). From the asset side, credit to the private sector continues to contract and the loan-to-deposit ratio to fall. On the liability side funding is restricted, including the fall on deposits with agreed maturity since early 2013 (by over 25 percent). Moreover, as deleveraging continues, the share of foreign in total liabilities have been reduced to below 13 percent from the 40 percent peak in mid-2008 without an offsetting increase in other sources of funds.
26. Given these factors and the relatively undeveloped capital market, a migration of the demand for credit to nonbanks would be a possibility. The higher competition, in turn, would tend to reduce the space for bank activities and profits. For instance, the net value of commercial paper by companies (a short-term funding instrument) issued in the domestic market has been increasing continuously since 2011, albeit from a very low level, to EUR 230 million in 2014 from EUR 9 million in 2011. In the same period the net value of outstanding corporate bonds increased to EUR 140 million from EUR 65 million, recovering from a sharp decline in 2012–13. Despite these increases, commercial paper and bonds represented 1.0 percent and 14 percent, respectively, of the Ljubljana Stock Exchange market turnover in 2015 (chart). This suggests the potential for the expansion of these financial instruments in the local market.
LJSE2015 Turnover
(In percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
LJSE2015 Turnover
(In percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
LJSE2015 Turnover
(In percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
27. Banks need to improve efficiency and reduce costs. Banks’ low efficiency and profitability suggest that some consolidation in the sector could be beneficial. Of the 16 commercial banks operating in Slovenia, the top five control close to 70 percent of the assets while the assets of the 10 smallest banks represent 25 percent of the total.12 Privatization of public banks could also generate efficiency gains if followed by active supervision and regulation. To resume their lending function banks need to accelerate the process of balance sheet repair and NPL resolution. Without higher efficiency and with it competitive lending rates, banks will tend to lose share in credit provision, particularly to corporates. And small banks, with less opportunity for economies of scale and diversification, are more likely to be vulnerable to various shocks.13
Bank Profitability
(In percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: BankscopeBank Profitability
(In percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: BankscopeBank Profitability
(In percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: Bankscope
Bank Profitability and Efficiency
(In percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: BankscopeBank Profitability and Efficiency
(In percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: BankscopeBank Profitability and Efficiency
(In percent)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Source: Bankscope28. Banks need to offer flexible conditions to borrowers with access to external funding. A process of market segmentation could result with the best corporate credits potentially moving to borrow from abroad or even from nonbanks, while banks would tend to keep the lower-tier credit risks. In fact, there is evidence that some process of disintermediation of banks is underway. For instance, domestic loans to corporates continued to shrink in 2015 (yoy), albeit at a lower rate.14 In contrast, the international net financial position of corporates doubled to 28 percent of GDP in the period 2008–14 and increased by 10 percentage points in 2011–14.15 Cross-border financing to corporates increased in 2014 with the issuance of equity and debt securities, mostly to the EU. Moreover, nonbank financing to corporates, including SMEs, is on the rise in Europe, although from a relatively low level. Initiatives to improve funding to SMEs have taken various forms such as publicly tradable debt (mini bonds), equity, private-debt funds, private placements (placing securities privately with institutional investors), and direct borrowing from nonbanks.
Credit to Private Sector
(y-o-y percentage change)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Sources: BOSCredit to Private Sector
(y-o-y percentage change)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Sources: BOSCredit to Private Sector
(y-o-y percentage change)
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 122; 10.5089/9781475556070.002.A004
Sources: BOS29. Banks also face some limits to expand credit from the asset side. State-aid rules in the context of the bank recapitalization process impose some limitations on sectoral lending and on minimum required rates of return (return on equity) for project lending.16 In addition, the higher European regulatory capital requirement with additional capital buffers to mitigate cyclical or structural systemic risks represent an increase to banks’ cost of funding, as more and better quality equity is required.
Financial Development Index
The financial development index (FD index) is constructed to capture indicators of financial institutions (FI) and financial markets (FM) across three dimensions: access, depth, and efficiency (see table). The FI and FM are based on six sub-indices: financial institutions access (FIA), financial institutions depth (FID), financial institutions efficiency (FIE); the financial markets access (FMA), financial markets depth (FMD), and financial markets efficiency (FME). These sub-indices in turn are based on the indicators listed in the table.
The dataset comprises annual data for the period 1980-2013 for 176 countries (25 advanced, 85 emerging, and 66 low-income developing countries).1/
The data for the indicators are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles to avoid extreme values driving the results. Each indicator is normalized between zero and one, using a global mini-max procedure that relates country performance to global minima and maxima across all countries and years. For all indicators higher values mean greater financial development.
Sub-indices are constructed as weighted averages of the underlying indicators, where the weights are obtained from principal component analysis, reflecting the contribution of each underlying indicator to the variation in the specific sub-index. Sub-indices are combined into higher indices also using principal component analysis.
The result is a relative ranking of countries on depth, access, and efficiency of financial institutions and financial markets, on the development of financial institutions and markets, and on the overall level of financial development. The minimum and maximum values of all indices are zero and one, respectively. More details can be found in “Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in Emerging Markets”.
Construction of the Financial Development Index
Construction of the Financial Development Index
| FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS | FINANCIAL MARKETS | |
|---|---|---|
| DEPTH | 1. Private-sector credit (% of GDP) 2. Pension fund assets (% of GDP) 3. Mutual fund assets (% of GDP) 4. Insurance premiums, life and non-life (% of GDP) | 1. Stock market capitalization to GDP 2. Stocks traded to GDP 3. International debt securities of governments (% of GDP) 4. Total debt securities of nonfinancial corporations (% of GDP) 5. Total debt securities of financial corporations (% of GDP) |
| ACCESS | 1. Branches (commercial banks) per 100,000 adults 2. ATMs per 100,000 adults | 1. Percent of market capitalization outside of top 10 largest companies 2. Total number of issuers of debt (domestic and external, nonfinancial corporations, and financial corporations) |
| EFFICIENCY | 1. Net interest margin 2. Lending-deposits spread 3. Non-interest income to total income 4. Overhead costs to total assets 5. Return on assets 6. Return on equity | 1. Stock market turnover ratio (stocks traded/capitalization) |
Construction of the Financial Development Index
| FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS | FINANCIAL MARKETS | |
|---|---|---|
| DEPTH | 1. Private-sector credit (% of GDP) 2. Pension fund assets (% of GDP) 3. Mutual fund assets (% of GDP) 4. Insurance premiums, life and non-life (% of GDP) | 1. Stock market capitalization to GDP 2. Stocks traded to GDP 3. International debt securities of governments (% of GDP) 4. Total debt securities of nonfinancial corporations (% of GDP) 5. Total debt securities of financial corporations (% of GDP) |
| ACCESS | 1. Branches (commercial banks) per 100,000 adults 2. ATMs per 100,000 adults | 1. Percent of market capitalization outside of top 10 largest companies 2. Total number of issuers of debt (domestic and external, nonfinancial corporations, and financial corporations) |
| EFFICIENCY | 1. Net interest margin 2. Lending-deposits spread 3. Non-interest income to total income 4. Overhead costs to total assets 5. Return on assets 6. Return on equity | 1. Stock market turnover ratio (stocks traded/capitalization) |
Financial Development, Growth and Stability
The analysis in the IMF paper suggests that financial development increases growth and stability, but the effects weaken at higher levels of financial development, and eventually become negative. And that financial deepening drives the weakening effect. Fast deepening of financial institutions can lead to economic and financial instability, as it encourages greater risk-taking and high leverage (including through reduced capital buffers in banks), if not countered by adequate regulation and supervision.
The relation between finance and economic growth (as well as economic volatility and financial stability) is estimated using the form
where y is the per capita real GDP growth, FD is the financial development index (or sub-component), and its square, Interact accounts for additional interactions, and X for a set of controls variables (initial income per capita, education (secondary school enrollment), trade-to-GDP, consumer price index inflation, government consumption-to-GDP ratio (as proxy for macroeconomic stance), and foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio). Using a dynamic system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator the equation is estimated over non-overlapping five-year periods in the 1980-2010 range, based on a 128-country sample.
The same method is applied for economic volatility and financial stability as dependent variables, rather than economic growth. In that case, economic volatility was measured by the rolling five-year standard deviation of growth, and financial stability was approximated by distance to distress, defined as [capital to assets + return on assets / standard deviation of return on assets].
References
Bank of Slovenia, 2015, “Report on the Causes of the Capital Shortfalls of Banks”, March.
Cecchetti, Stephen G and Enisse Kharroubi, 2015, “Why does financial sector growth crowd out real economic growth?”, Bank for International Settlements, Working Paper No. 490.
Čihák, Martin, Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt, Erik Feyen, Ross Levine, 2012, “Benchmarking Financial Systems around the World”, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 6175.
Cournède, Boris, Oliver Denk, Peter Hoeller, 2015, “Finance and Inclusive Growth”, OECD, Economic Policy Paper No. 14.
Impavido, Gregorio, Heinz Rudolph, and Luigi Ruggerone, 2013, “Bank Funding in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe Post Lehman: a “New Normal”?” IMF, Working Paper No. 13/148.
International Monetary Fund, 2015, “Advancing Financial Development in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Regional Economic Outlook: Western Hemisphere.
International Monetary Fund, 2015, “Vulnerabilities, Legacies, and Policy Challenges”, Global Financial Stability Report.
International Monetary Fund, 2013, “Financing Future Growth: the Evolving Role of Banking Systems in CESEE”, Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Regional Economic Issues.
International Monetary Fund, 2012, “Republic of Slovenia: Financial System Stability Assessment, IMF Country Report No. 12/325.
Luigi Zingales, “Does Finance Benefit Society?”, 2015, Harvard University.
Sahay, Ratna, Martin Čihák, Papa N’Diaye, Adolfo Barajas, Ran Bi, Diana Ayala, Yuan Gao, Annette Kyobe, Lam Nguyen, Christian Saborowski, Katsiaryna Svirydzenka, and Seyed Reza Yousefi, 2015, “Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in Emerging Markets,” IMF, Staff Discussion Note No. 15/8.
The Journal for Money and Banking, 2015, “Banking Sector at the Crossroads: Challenges for the Future”, The Bank Association of Slovenia, No. 11.
The Journal for Money and Banking, 2010, “Corporate Governance of Banks”, The Bank Association of Slovenia, No. 11.
Prepared by Claudio Visconti (MCM).
Sahay, Ratna and others, 2015, “Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in Emerging Markets,” IMF, Staff Discussion Note No. 15/8.
The sale of NKBM to a U.S. equity fund was announced in June 2015. It is the second largest bank with a 12 percent share in total bank assets and deposits and a 9 percent share in total loans. In comparison, NLB, the largest bank, has shares of 32, 34 and 30 percent, respectively.
Report of the Bank of Slovenia on the Causes of the Capital Shortfalls of Banks, March 2015.
Over 70 percent of claims against large corporates were transferred to BAMC. Some claims less than 90 days in arrears were also transferred.
Republic of Slovenia: Financial System Stability Assessment, IMF Country Report No. 12/325.
The remaining BRRD provisions are planned to be transposed into national legislation by April 2016, in the context of the Law on Banking Resolution.
These principles capture: (1) the ability of regulators to set and demand adjustments to capital, loan loss provisioning, and employee compensation; (2) regulatory definitions, such as definitions of capital, nonperforming loans, and loan losses; and (3) financial reporting and disclosures.
CEE countries comprise, besides Slovenia: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovak Republic.
This result has to be taken with caution since, as explained in IMF 2015, “there is no one particular point of “too much finance” that holds for all countries at all times. The shape and the location of the bell may differ across countries depending on country characteristics including income levels, institutions, and regulatory and supervisory quality”. The estimated turning point for which the positive effects of financial development on growth begin to decline is on average in the 0.4 and 0.7 range with a confidence level of 95 percent. This wide band around the turning point reflects differences in fundamentals and institutional settings for the countries in the sample. As such, a country to the right of the range may still be at its optimum if it has above average quality of regulations and supervision while a country to the left of the range with weak institutions may have reached its maximum already.
Financial stability is measured here by distance to distress, which in turn is defined as the sum of the capital-to-assets ratio and the return-on-assets (ROA) ratio, divided by the standard deviation of the ROA.
These numbers reflect the merger of Abanka Vipa and Banka Celje.
On the other hand, the authorities should be careful not to create too big to fail institutions.
The yoy growth rate has been negative since early 2011.
Nominal GDP is estimated as flat in 2008–14 and to have grown by 1 percent in 2011–14.
The bank restructuring plans of the major state-owned banks approved by the European Commission determined a minimum return on equity of 7-10 percent.
