Context. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world, despite enormous progress over the past decade. Security and political uncertainties and the drawdown of international troops, together with weak governance and institutions, have held back growth and employment, and recently contributed to increased emigration. In May 2015, IMF management approved a nine-month Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), aimed at addressing fiscal and banking vulnerabilities, preserving macroeconomic stability, improving prospects for inclusive growth, and building a track record for a possible future IMF financial arrangement. Outlook and risks. On account of the sustained headwinds the economy faces, projections for real GDP growth in 2016 and beyond have been scaled back compared to those in the November 2015 Article IV staff report. The outlook remains highly challenging given political and security uncertainties and the related risks to reform implementation. Shortfalls in donor aid and continued emigration also pose important downside risks, and the banking system remains a key source of vulnerability.

Abstract

Context. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world, despite enormous progress over the past decade. Security and political uncertainties and the drawdown of international troops, together with weak governance and institutions, have held back growth and employment, and recently contributed to increased emigration. In May 2015, IMF management approved a nine-month Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), aimed at addressing fiscal and banking vulnerabilities, preserving macroeconomic stability, improving prospects for inclusive growth, and building a track record for a possible future IMF financial arrangement. Outlook and risks. On account of the sustained headwinds the economy faces, projections for real GDP growth in 2016 and beyond have been scaled back compared to those in the November 2015 Article IV staff report. The outlook remains highly challenging given political and security uncertainties and the related risks to reform implementation. Shortfalls in donor aid and continued emigration also pose important downside risks, and the banking system remains a key source of vulnerability.

Context

1. The Afghan economy has faced strong headwinds in recent years. Deepening uncertainty about the political transition following the 2014 presidential election, corruption and weak governance, and a weakening security environment, together with the continued drag from the drawdown of international troops, have complicated the implementation of reforms, undermined confidence and economic activity, and contributed to increased emigration.1 The recently launched quadrilateral (Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and the U.S.) peace talks hold promise but are yet to produce tangible results, and insurgent attacks have continued. The national unity government, formed to resolve the impasse following the 2014 presidential election, is determined to tackle the various challenges, and although its cohesion is continuously put to the test, there have been important successes. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for October, but some observers expect a delay given ongoing discussions about electoral reform. This year is marked by two major donor conferences: in July in Warsaw, on the sidelines of a NATO summit with a focus on security assistance, and in October in Brussels, with a focus on development assistance.

2. In May 2015, IMF management approved an SMP. The SMP aimed at addressing fiscal and banking vulnerabilities, preserving macroeconomic stability, improving prospects for inclusive growth, and building a track record for a future IMF financial arrangement. The first review was completed by IMF management in November and the authorities were urged to avoid delays in policy implementation.

Economic Developments, Outlook, and Risks

A. Recent Developments

3. Economic activity remains weak. GDP growth in 2015 is estimated at about 1.5 percent given the deterioration in security conditions, which undermined private investment, delays in budget execution, and unfavorable weather lowering agricultural output. Inflation turned negative in March 2015 on account of low global food prices, subdued demand, and a depressed housing market, but has recently returned to positive territory mainly on account of the Afghani’s earlier depreciation. Reflecting low growth and inflation, reserve and broad money grew by only 3 percent, while private sector credit growth remained negative through most of the year.

A01ufig1

Composition of Reserve Money Growth

(Y-o-y change; in percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 120; 10.5089/9781484350843.002.A001

Sources: Afghan authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

4. The overall budget had a deficit in 2015 as a shortfall in grants more than offset higher-than-projected revenue and lower spending. Domestic revenues rose and exceeded the target, on account of measures introduced earlier this year, repayments of tax and non-tax arrears, and, more importantly, increased collection efficiency. Operating budget execution fell short of projections owing to delays in budget approval and procurement. Delays in disbursement of security and development grants more than offset higher revenue and lower spending. Thus, while the operating deficit before grants was 2.3 percentage points below the target of 12 percent of GDP, the overall budget including grants was in deficit of 1.4 percent of GDP, rather than in balance as projected at the time of the first review. The deficit was financed through the drawdown of the Treasury’s nondiscretionary cash balances.2 Meanwhile, the year-end discretionary cash balances were well above the indicative floor of Af5 billion.

A01ufig2

The Treasury’s Discretionary Cash Balances 1/

(In billions of Afghanis)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 120; 10.5089/9781484350843.002.A001

Sources: Afghan Authorities.1/ Total discretionary cash balances at the Treasury account in DAB, including balance in the main Treasury Single Account in Kabul, funds in provincial expenditure accounts (unexecuted allotments), and unrealized foreign exchange gain using the current exchange rate.

Domestic Budget Revenues, 2014–15

(Billions of Afghanis (top) and percent of GDP (bottom)

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Source: Afghan authorities and IMF staff calculations.

Base revenue is total tax and nontax revenue excluding those from 2015 measures, arrears, and one-offs.

In the November 2015 staff report the telecom fee was reported as a tax, and tax revenue target accordingly was Af 90.3 billion or 7.6 percent of GDP.

5. The trade deficit remained large, but substantial inflows of foreign aid kept the current account in surplus. Data discrepancies complicate the analysis of the external sector, but trading partners’ data suggest a reduction in imports on account of declining presence of foreign troops and donor activity as well as weak domestic demand.3 Exports of goods (excluding opium and internal sales to nonresidents), consisting mainly of agricultural products, declined. Overall, the trade deficit shrank slightly, but remained nearly 40 percent of GDP. This deficit was financed by official grants, resulting in a current account surplus of 4.5 percent of GDP.4

6. The acceleration of emigration, and the related capital outflows, has put pressure on the foreign exchange market, leading to a year-on-year depreciation of the Afghani by 17 percent in December 2015. Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) supplied foreign exchange to mitigate pressures, yet maintained a comfortable reserve buffer of more than 8 months of imports.

A01ufig3

Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMP) 1/

(6 rolling months)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 120; 10.5089/9781484350843.002.A001

Sources: Afghan authorities; and IMF staff calculations.1/ Positive EMP denotes pressure to appreciate.
A01ufig4

Reserve Adequacy, 2015

(In billions of U.S.dollars)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2016, 120; 10.5089/9781484350843.002.A001

7. The financial sector remains fragile and plays a limited intermediation role. Asset quality remains a concern, with nonperforming loans increasing from 7.8 percent of gross loans in December 2014 to 12.3 percent in December 2015, although shrinking loan books contributed somewhat. Profitability is under pressure, as evidenced by negative returns on assets and equity during most of 2015. Given the volatile operating environment, banks have tended to be very liquid, with liquid assets constituting 71 percent of total assets, and highly capitalized, with a regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratio of 28 percent, compared to 13 percent in India and 17 percent in Pakistan. However, the strong liquidity and capital indicators reflect subdued lending to the private sector.

Financial Soundness Indicators

(In percent)

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Source: Da Afghanistan Bank.

8. Efforts at regional and international integration are intensifying, but the benefits will likely come with a long lag.

  • Afghanistan’s application to the WTO was approved in December, and the country could accede this summer. Over time, WTO accession could act as a catalyst for domestic reform.

  • Construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline (TAPI) began in December. It is expected to become operational in 2019, resulting in some US$400 million of annual transit fees for Afghanistan, but its financing package is incomplete.

  • Bilateral and multilateral agreements are being finalized for the Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000), which will enable sustainable electricity trade between the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan by 2020. The World Bank is the lead financier of the project, covering 100 percent of Afghanistan’s financing needs (US$316 million) via a grant.

B. Outlook and Risks

9. The outlook for 2016 and beyond remains very difficult. The perilous security situation and political uncertainties persist as the key constraints to improved economic outcomes, crowding out development spending, undermining private investment, and complicating the implementation of reforms. In addition, endemic corruption reduces economic efficiency, undermines institutions, and fosters inequality. Hence, sustainable growth will depend on improvements in these areas. Compared to the scenario sketched in the November 2015 Article IV staff report, the near- and medium-term baseline outlook is weaker:

  • With the continued deterioration in the security situation and persistent drag from the drawdown in coalition forces, the growth projection for 2016 has been revised down to 2 percent. Over the medium term, given the protracted headwinds, we project growth to rise to 4 percent by 2019.

  • Inflation is to pick up to 3 percent on average in 2016 and then to 6 percent over the medium term, reflecting a modest recovery in growth.

  • Grant projections for 2016 have been revised up partly reflecting delayed disbursements from last year. Over time, as official transfers decline and growth picks up, the current account will turn into deficit, though international reserves will remain at comfortable levels.

10. The medium-term revenue and expenditure paths were revised down relative to projections in the 2015 Article IV report.

  • The revised, more cautious baseline no longer assumes increases in tax revenues driven by the introduction of a VAT (capacity constraints) or development of the natural resource sector over the medium term (potential remains but investment climate will take time to improve). Revenue improvements stem only from strengthened enforcement and compliance, driven by already initiated reforms at the revenue and customs administration, as well as CASA transit fees from 2018 onwards.

  • On the expenditure side, staff assumes an increase of almost 1 percent of GDP in development spending in 2016 and no further pick-up afterward, as well as a slower-than-previously-projected pick-up in operating expenditures due to a more gradual transfer to the budget of donor-funded off-budget security spending.5

  • Total on- and off-budget donor aid is assumed to remain broadly unchanged in percent of GDP over the medium term, pending the Warsaw and Brussels conferences later this year.

11. The risks to the baseline are tilted to the downside. If security conditions continue to worsen, aid falls short, or migrant outflows accelerate, exchange rate pressures could re-emerge, and growth would decelerate further with attendant effects on unemployment. On the other hand, a lasting political agreement with insurgents and increased regional integration will provide upsides to the current medium-term trajectory.

12. The most recent safeguards assessment of DAB was finalized in 2011 against the background of the Kabul Bank fraud, which had impacted DAB’s financial position. The recommendation related to the recapitalization of DAB through a government promissory note has been implemented. DAB continues to publish on its website the Kabul Bank’s annual financial statements audited by an international audit firm. Controls in some safeguards areas have also improved, but capacity constraints remain an issue. Amending the DAB law has proven a challenge, and the recommendation concerning the DAB’s legal structure remains outstanding.

Program Performance

13. Program performance has been satisfactory. Overall performance under the SMP is deemed satisfactory taking into account the authorities’ efforts to undertake reforms in challenging circumstances. All end-December quantitative targets have been met after adjusting targets for net credit to the government (upward) and net international reserves (downward) in light of lower external funding and higher development spending (Table 7). In the first SMP review, four structural benchmarks were either not met or were in progress. With regard to the two benchmarks that were not met (currency reporting and asset classification and provisioning), staff now considers the requirements under those benchmarks to have been completed (Text Table and Attachment I). The remaining two structural benchmarks (risk-based audits and related party lending) have now been met.

Table 1.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Selected Economic Indicators, 2012–16

(Quota: SDR 323.8 million)

(Population: approx. 30.6 million)

(Per capita GDP: approx. US$654; 2014)

(Poverty rate: 35.8 percent; 2011)

(Main exports: opium, US$2.7 billion; carpets, US$83.4 million; 2014)

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Sources: Afghan authorities; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; WITS database; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

Excluding the narcotics economy.

Revised with improved coverage.

For comparison, 2012 is recalculated from data reported on the solar fiscal year basis (March 21–March 20). Since 2013, the fiscal year runs December 22–December 21 (in most years), which is more aligned with the Gregorian calendar year.

Comprising mainly current spending.

Defined as domestic revenues minus operating expenditures.

Public sector only. Incorporates committed but not yet delivered debt relief. Debt relief recorded fully at time of commitment.

In months of next year’s import of goods and services.

CPI-based, vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar.

Table 2.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework, 2013–21

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Sources: Afghan authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

Excluding the narcotics economy.

Revised with improved coverage.

For comparison, 2012 is recalculated from data reported on the solar fiscal year basis.

Comprising mainly current spending. It is assumed that donors’ recurrent expenditure off-budget, mostly in the security sector, is being moved onto the budget by 2021.

Defined as domestic revenues minus operating expenditures.

In months of next year’s import of goods and services.

Public sector only. Incorporates committed but not yet delivered debt relief. Debt relief recorded fully at time of commitment.

Incorporates the 2012 revision to the UN World Population Prospects.

Table 3a.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Central Government Budget, 2013–16

(In billions of Afghanis)

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Sources: Afghan authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

Figures as of updated in the first review of the SMP and published in the November 2015 Staff Report.

Details of financing to be firmed with the Treasury.

(Proj) Adjusted to include assessment of revenue, operating budget execution rates, restraint of discretionary development spending, and expected donor disbursements.

ARTF: Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund; LOTFA: Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan;

CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (now NTM-A: NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan)

2015 figure includes about Af 2.85 billion arrears, which are repaid.

2015 figure includes about Af 7 billion discretionary development arrears, which are repaid.

Positive number indicates that expenditures have been recorded, but not yet executed.

Includes signature bonus payments for the Aynak copper mine.

Propoor spending covers ministries of education, labor and social affairs, martyrs and disabled, public health.

Table 3b.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Central Government Budget, 2013–16

(In percent of GDP)

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Sources: Afghan authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

Figures as of updated in the first review of the SMP and published in the November 2015 Staff Report.

Details of financing to be firmed with the Treasury.

(Proj) Adjusted to include assessment of revenue, operating budget execution rates, restraint of discretionary development spending, and expected donor disbursements.

ARTF: Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund; LOTFA: Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan;

CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (now NTM-A: NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan)

2015 figure includes about Af 2.85 billion arrears, which are repaid.

2015 figure includes about Af 7 billion discretionary development arrears, which are repaid.

Positive number indicates that expenditures have been recorded, but not yet executed.

Includes signature bonus payments for the Aynak copper mine.

Propoor spending covers ministries of education, labor and social affairs, martyrs and disabled, public health.

Table 4a.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Central Bank Balance Sheet, 2013–16

(At current exchange rates)

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Sources: Afghan authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

A nonmarketable security issued to DAB by the ministry of finance for the cost of a lender of last resort assistance to Kabul Bank.

Includes Afghanistan’s SDR holdings (MoF is the fiscal agent for the IMF).

Table 4b.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Central Bank Balance Sheet, 2013–16

(At program exchange rates)1/

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Sources: Afghan authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

Program exchange rates as of Dec. 21, 2014 are applied to value foreign currency-denominated components.

A nonmarketable security issued to DAB by the ministry of finance for the cost of a lender of last resort assistance to Kabul Bank.

Includes Afghanistan’s SDR holdings (MoF is the fiscal agent for the IMF).

Table 5.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Monetary Survey, 2013–161/

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Sources: Afghan authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

End of period. Data underlying the survey are not fully consistent because the central bank and the public banks use the solar calendar, while commercial banks use the Gregorian calendar.

At program rates, (i.e., excluding valuation changes of the foreign exchange component). The decline in 2011 reflects a write-down of bad loans at Kabul Bank.