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The majority of females work in the agricultural and non-agricultural informal sector, with the share of female agricultural workers 16 percent higher than that of males.
According to the OECD Gender Data Portal, routine housework (cooking, cleaning, home maintenance etc.), and care for household members makes up the greatest proportion of India’s unpaid home-work.
Intra-household bargaining power of females is an increasing function of relative female-to-male earnings which captures the feedback effect of females’ labor market outcomes on their bargaining position at home.
For GDP (real output), all figures in this chapter (Figures 2–6) show a percentage deviation from the initial steady state, while for the rest of the variables the levels (%) are shown. Formality is the percentage of formal workers among the employed. Similarly, female (male) formality is the percentage of female (male) workers employed formally among the ones employed. Wage gap is the ratio of male-to-female average wage. Ratio of female-to-male home-work reflects gender gaps in unpaid care work.
Females’ home-work burden also increases, as females substitute out of leisure into market-work and home-work. On the other hand, policy of increasing public provisions directly lowers females’ home-work burden and we instead see a fall in female-to-male home-work ratio.
However, there is a larger short-run increase in unemployment caused by two factors: increase in both male and female participation, and slower creation of jobs in the formal relative to the informal sector.
These results also hold true for the following combination of policies: i) increase in female education and stronger laws against gender discrimination in employment; ii) increase in public provisions and labor market deregulation; iii) increase in public provisions and increase in female education.