Côte D’ivoire: Eighth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement

This paper discusses Côte d'Ivoire's Eighth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangement. The macroeconomic outlook remains strong with high projected growth rates supported by sustained improvements in the business climate and rising private investment, including in large private-public infrastructure projects. Risks to the near-term growth outlook are moderately tilted to the downside. Adverse weather owing to El Niño could lower output, and the failure to contain fiscal risks could weaken the fiscal accounts. The IMF staff supports the authorities' request for completion of the eighth ECF review.

Abstract

This paper discusses Côte d'Ivoire's Eighth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangement. The macroeconomic outlook remains strong with high projected growth rates supported by sustained improvements in the business climate and rising private investment, including in large private-public infrastructure projects. Risks to the near-term growth outlook are moderately tilted to the downside. Adverse weather owing to El Niño could lower output, and the failure to contain fiscal risks could weaken the fiscal accounts. The IMF staff supports the authorities' request for completion of the eighth ECF review.

Recent Developments, Program Performance, Outlook and Risks

A. Context

1. The presidential election held on October 25 was peaceful, and considered free and fair by observers. This is in sharp contrast with the violence surrounding the 2010 elections and the post-electoral crisis in 2011. The incumbent President Ouattara, supported by a strong coalition that included his party (RDR) and former President Bédié’s party (PDCI), faced a divided opposition. Mr. Ouattara was re-elected in the first round in a landslide victory (almost 84 percent of votes), with a participation rate of about 53 percent. His main challenger, Mr. Affi N’Guessan from the FPI, the party of former President Gbagbo, came in second place with about 9 percent of the votes.

Initial Objectives of the 2011 Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility

In November 2011, the authorities requested a three-year ECF arrangement, which was later extended by one year, to support their medium-term priorities of achieving high sustained growth, reducing poverty, and restoring a sustainable fiscal and external position. To this end:

  • Fiscal policy would create fiscal space for an increase in pro-poor and public investment spending, while establishing fiscal and debt sustainability. In particular, the overall deficit would be reduced from about 8 percent of GDP projected (at that time) for 2011 to 3 percent over the medium term. The wage bill and energy subsidies would be kept under control, while public financial and debt management would be strengthened.

  • The structural reform agenda focused on: (i) improving the business climate; (ii) strengthening the financial situation of the energy sector and increasing generation capacity; (iii) improving the management of state enterprises and streamlining the government’s portfolio by reducing the number of public enterprises by 25 percent; (iv) reducing vulnerabilities in the banking sector through public bank restructuring, and fostering financial sector development; and (iv) reforming the cocoa/coffee sectors.

2. Implementation of the 2011–15 ECF Arrangement has, by and large, resulted in achieving most of the initial program objectives. Policies under the arrangement supported a return to macroeconomic stability and underpinned strong growth (the 2012–15 average annual growth has been almost 9 percent) and low inflation:

  • Prudent fiscal policy lowered the deficit to under 4 percent of GDP from 5.4 percent of GDP, while opening up space for high growth enhancing public investment and pro-poor spending.

  • Progress in structural reform areas has been mixed. The cocoa sector reform, facilitated by high cocoa prices on global markets, allowed a large share of rural families to earn higher incomes.1 Reforms to the business climate allowed the country to significantly improve its rankings on various international indices, including the World Bank’s Doing Business index. While PFM has improved, serious weaknesses still persist; in particular, the use of exceptional spending procedures remains excessive. Considerable steps have been taken to improve the financial position of the energy sector, but the refinery and the state oil company continue to face strong financial constraints. The public sector banks are being restructured, but overall weak public banks continue to pose a fiscal risk. Implementation of the financial sector development strategy has lagged. Progress in non-financial public enterprise reform has been disappointing and largely lacking.

  • Côte d’Ivoire reached the HIPC Completion point in June 2012, and received substantial debt relief under the HIPC and MDRI initiatives. It has successfully accessed the international Eurobond market in 2014 and 2015. Most recently in early November 2015, Moody’s upgraded Côte d’Ivoire’s risk rating from B1 (positive outlook) given in 2014 to Ba3 (stable outlook). Debt management was also strengthened.

3. Despite decreasing in recent years, the poverty rate has remained elevated. According to the 2015 household survey, poverty incidence, as measured by the proportion of the population living below the national poverty line2, stood at 46.3 percent in 2015 compared to 48.9 percent in 2008 3. Poverty has remained more pronounced in rural areas (56.8 percent) than in urban spaces (35.9 percent). Inequality, as measured by the consumption-based Gini index, declined moderately from 0.420 in 2008 to 0.405 in 2015.

B. Recent Developments and Program Performance

4. The acceleration in growth in early 2015 is expected to be sustained through the end of the year (MEFP ¶13). Economic activity picked up further in the first semester of 2015, driven by the cocoa, mining, construction, and transport sectors, and public investment projects, and by private investment as well.4 This buoyant activity has resulted in an upward revision of projected 2015 growth to 8.4 percent from a 7.9 percent estimate at the time of the seventh ECF review.5 Inflation remains low (1.2 percent both y-o-y in August and on a 12-month average basis).

5. The external environment has remained favorable so far. Higher cocoa prices, lower international oil prices, and the depreciation of the CFA franc vis-à-vis the US dollar have resulted in an improvement in the terms of trade of almost 30 percent. Against this background, imports through June 2015 increased significantly, mainly due to higher imports of consumption goods and construction materials. During the same period, exports rose by almost 14 percent in value, essentially due to higher cocoa exports (excluding cocoa, export value would have remained almost flat).

6. Credit conditions are broadly balanced, and the soundness of the banking system has strengthened (MEFP ¶9). Credit to the economy continued to expand strongly, albeit at slower rates than a year ago (24 percent y-o-y as of end-August, versus 28½ percent for the same period last year.). Credit growth is consistent with the strong rate of growth of the economy and has been fueled by strong agriculture output (crop credit) and by higher investment (medium-term credit). Despite this strong growth, financial intermediation is still low as measured by the total credit-to-GDP ratio (20 percent). As of end-June, the capital adequacy ratio for the banking system strengthened to 9.6 percent (above the minimum regulatory threshold of 8 percent) from 7.7 percent in June 2014, partly due to public bank restructuring. Of the 24 banks operating at this time, seven still fail to meet minimum regulatory capital requirements and have been asked to present a program and timeline for full compliance. During the same period, non-performing loans (NPLs) declined to 10.6 percent of total loans (11.9 percent in June 2014) and have high provisioning (74½ percent).

7. Fiscal performance through end-June was better than programmed (MEFP ¶10, text table below). Revenue collection exceeded the program target owing to higher fuel and cocoa tax revenues, as well as one-off tax and non-tax payments following the settlement of cross arrears in the energy sector.6 At the same time, spending was higher than programmed, reflecting front-loaded payments of subsidies to private schools (partly to clear arrears), an acceleration in the execution of selected investment projects and an overrun in spending on the organization of the election. As a result, the primary basic balance deficit and the overall deficit were both narrower than programmed. Pro-poor spending exceeded the program objective by a large margin.

Text Table.

Côte d’Ivoire: Fiscal Operations of the Central Government End June 2015

(Billions of CFA Francs)

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8. Program performance was strong, but structural reforms were delayed (MEFP ¶10–11).

  • All quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets at end-June 2015 under the program were met (MEFP Table 1).

  • However, only 4 out of 7 structural benchmarks through end-September were met (MEFP Table 2).7 The government is firmly committed to completing the missed structural benchmarks before the end of the program in December 2015. It is also taking steps to implement the end-November 2015 structural benchmark related to a public bank restructuring.

  • Progress was made in strengthening other areas in the authorities’ structural reform agenda: (i) in the business climate with the timely reimbursement of VAT credits; (ii) in the financial sector with the sale of government holdings in one of the public banks, the placement of the savings bank (CNCE) under provisional administration, and the announcement of the privatization of another public bank; and (iii) in the electricity sector with the government’s decision to raise electricity tariffs by about 10 percent in July 2015, which would be followed by increases in January 2016 and January 2017, and an annual review of the need for further increases.8

Table 1.

Côte d’Ivoire: Selected Economic Indicators, 2012–20

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Sources: Ivoirien authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Defined as total revenue minus total expenditure, excluding all interest and foreign-financed investment expenditure.

Central government only.

Currency definition.

C. Outlook and Risks

9. Under the baseline scenario, the macroeconomic outlook remains favorable.

  • Growth in 2016 should remain strong (8.4 percent),9 and is projected to reach about 7.9 percent on average in 2017–18. Economic activity would be supported by higher investment in basic infrastructure, in the agro-business industry (cocoa, rice and cashew processing) and in housing and other services. In addition, major PPP projects are set to scale up or begin in 2016 (including the extension of the Port of Abidjan, the Abidjan metrorail, and the renovation of the Abidjan-Ouagadougou railway).

  • Inflation would remain at about 2 percent, contingent on a sustained increase in agricultural production and stable global food and fuel prices.

  • The current account deficit is set to widen over the medium term to about 3¾ percent due to high imports of capital goods fuelled by large infrastructure projects along with a slight deterioration of the terms of trade;

  • The central government’s public debt would gradually decline to 45 percent of GDP in 2016 and about 44½ percent of GDP in 2017–18, and continue on a downward trend reflecting a reduction of the overall fiscal balance to about 3 percent of GDP by 2020. Debt service would remain high, increasing to 12.4 percent of government revenue in 2016, reaching 13.2 percent in 2017 and declining thereafter to about 11 percent in 2020.

10. The risks to the outlook are moderately tilted to the downside. The positive macroeconomic outlook is dependent on the materialization of stronger private investment and the pursuit of a favorable global environment. Downside risks include adverse weather due to El Niño, which would reduce the output of the agricultural and hydropower sectors; the failure to contain fiscal risks could weaken the fiscal accounts. In addition, tighter and volatile global financial conditions could hinder availability of financing for the investment program on international capital markets, limiting financing options to a shallow and limited regional market. Other risks include a further slowdown in emerging and developing economies, and the spread of terrorist activity from Mali and the Sahel. Upside risks include higher-than-projected private investment, as the peaceful completion of the presidential election and sustained progress in the business climate could further bolster investment sentiment.

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Côte d’Ivoire: Medium-Term Outlook, 2013–18

(Percent of GDP, unless indicated otherwise)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 341; 10.5089/9781513512389.002.A001

Sources: Ivoirien authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projection.

Policy Discussions

Discussions focused on (i) preserving fiscal sustainability in light of recent developments and growing fiscal risks; (ii) structural reform measures to foster private sector development; and (iii) strengthening statistics.

A. Preserving Fiscal Sustainability

11. While the central government’s fiscal stance has improved compared to 2011, potential risks arising in part from the broader public sector are emerging and could weigh on fiscal performance. In these circumstances, staff emphasized that to help preserve fiscal sustainability it would be important to create adequate fiscal buffers and preserve the capacity to address these risks if they were to materialize. Staff pointed to the near-term risks to public finances posed by the cash-strapped energy companies (the oil company Petroci and the refinery company SIR, which is also insolvent) and by a troubled public bank.10 In addition, the mission highlighted the medium-term fiscal risks stemming from: (i) the rapidly growing use of PPPs in the government’s investment strategy going forward;11 (ii) the need to settle extra-budgetary spending liabilities incurred in the previous decade;12 (iii) greater financing constraints on international financial markets in the event of a tightening of monetary policy in the major developed economies, greater risk aversion of investors, and exchange rate volatility; and (iv) costlier and more constrained financing on the regional market given the shallowness of the market and the absence of a secondary market.

12. Against this background, staff and the authorities agreed to maintain the 2015 fiscal program targets in percent of GDP and to initiate a gradual tightening of the fiscal stance from 2016 on (MEFP ¶14, ¶26–29):

  • For 2015, the basic primary and overall deficits would be unchanged, at ½ percent of GDP and 3.7 percent of GDP, respectively. To reach this objective, the projected revenue over-performance (about 0.4 percent of GDP), due in part to higher fuel tax, would offset higher spending arising in particular from an overrun in election spending, a higher energy subsidy,13 and fees and commissions on debt.

  • The draft 2016 budget adopted by the Council of Ministers envisages a small reduction in the overall deficit to 3½ percent of GDP, but the basic primary deficit would remain stable at ½ percent of GDP.

    • - Total revenue and grants would decline by about ½ percent of GDP, mainly reflecting lower oil revenue and grants, as well as conservative fuel and cocoa tax projections.

    • - Spending would be 0.7 percent of GDP lower, with a reduction in current spending (1.2 percent of GDP) due to lower subsidy needs (electricity and schools after the 2015 peak linked to settlement of various liabilities and the increase in electricity tariffs), the end of the demobilization, disarmament and reinsertion program (DDR), and lower spending needed for the planned legislative election than for the 2015 presidential election.

    • - The budgeted drop in current spending would open up fiscal space for an increase in domestically-financed capital spending (+0.6 percent of GDP). The draft budget also includes a significant amount of appropriations for education (about 22 percent of the budget) in line with the government’s universal schooling program, and a small provision to settle part of past extra-budgetary liabilities.

13. While supporting the authorities’ fiscal stance for 2016, staff made the case that a more ambitious fiscal tightening would have been preferable and was needed going forward. Given the various sources of possible fiscal pressure (see paragraph 10), a tighter fiscal stance would help build adequate buffers to avoid a ratcheting up of public debt should these risks materialize, as well as the need for abrupt spending cuts in the face of tighter financing conditions. The authorities, however, argued that a further tightening would dampen economic activity and delay the implementation of much-needed infrastructure and social programs. They, nevertheless, committed to monitoring fiscal risks carefully and indicated that they stood ready to take additional measures if these fiscal risks materialized.

14. Staff regretted the absence of any significant tax policy measures in the 2016 draft budget, in particular the absence of measures to streamline VAT and other tax exemptions. These measures are needed to boost revenues and generate sufficient resources to respond to a growing demand for public services without jeopardizing fiscal sustainability. Staff pointed, more specifically, to existing widespread tax exemptions, and questioned the rationale for maintaining VAT exemptions. The latter were initially introduced to bypass long delays in VAT refunds, but since mid-2015, owing to a new reimbursement procedure, VAT credits are now reimbursed in a timely manner. While recognizing the need to streamline tax exemptions, the authorities expressed concerns regarding the impact of such cuts on Côte d’Ivoire’s investment attractiveness. They indicated, however, their intention of launching a comprehensive review of VAT exemptions in 2016.

Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Côte d’Ivoire: Fiscal Performance, 2012–16

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 341; 10.5089/9781513512389.002.A001

Sources: Ivoirien authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

15. Staff commended the authorities’ efforts to improve the monitoring of fiscal risks (MEFP¶37). It welcomed the establishment of a centralized database on public enterprises’ and government guaranteed debt, but noted that, at this time, the database should be considered preliminary given several remaining weaknesses.14 This is an important step to ensure that public enterprise debt remains at sustainable levels and does not pose risks to the budget. To improve its effectiveness, the mission called on the authorities to strengthen the database by including full documentation of loan terms and debt service schedules; by establishing information sharing between the corresponding departments; and by introducing an early warning system. The mission also welcomed the Ministry of Budget’s clarification of the conditions under which public enterprises are required to request prior authorization for contracting loans, including its applicability above a minimum loan threshold amount.

16. Staff called for a prudent approach to market borrowing (MEFP¶41–42). A new DSA (see Supplement 1) indicates that Côte d’Ivoire continues to face a moderate risk of debt distress. In light of this, the authorities concurred with staff on the need to carefully monitor the accumulation of external debt (in particular of non-concessional debt), to avoid an excessive bunching of maturities in the mid-2020s, and to take adequate consideration of rollover and foreign exchange risks. Furthermore, borrowing plans should take into account potential changes and volatility in international financial market conditions. The mission welcomed Côte d’Ivoire’s ongoing efforts to strengthen debt management and the monitoring of related contingent fiscal risks, but pressed for the early completion of these efforts. To this end, the authorities are committed to stepping up efforts to complete the long-delayed reorganization of the debt department into front-, middle-, and back-offices and to strengthen the National Debt Policy Committee, and expected that these should be largely completed in 2016, following recent TA.

17. Staff was encouraged by the progress made on audits of extra-budgetary liabilities.15 The government expects to complete the audit of extra-budgetary spending incurred prior to 2011 before the end of 2015. It indicated that confirmed claims would most likely be securitized after application of a significant haircut, given that they correspond to spending made through irregular procedures. By end 2015, the government also plans to complete the audit of all the 1993–2012 public procurement contracts that are still recorded with an “open” status in the government’s procurement database. In addition, the government reiterated its determination to enforce the existent regulatory framework for preventing and sanctioning extra-budgetary spending.

18. Efforts to strengthen budget presentation and spending procedures, as well as cash management, need to be intensified (MEFP ¶30, ¶35). Staff welcomed the authorities’ decision to document in the budget a list of key tax expenditures and their estimated cost, and to record all taxes on a gross basis, i.e., including earmarked revenues with a corresponding offset on the spending side. Staff regretted that the updated medium-term debt strategy would not be included in the 2016 budget documentation due to preparation delays. In addition, staff noted that a considerable share of budget appropriations (2–3 percent of GDP) continues to be executed through exceptional procedures (“lettres d’avances” and excessively large “régies d’avances”16). The excessive use of these procedures raises serious transparency and governance issues. The staff urged the authorities to urgently and drastically limit the use of these procedures. Staff called for steady progress in implementing the Treasury Single Account.

B. Structural Reforms to Foster Private Sector Development

19. Côte d’Ivoire has made considerable progress in enhancing its business environment (MEFP ¶2, ¶8). The reforms introduced in recent years have allowed the country to improve its position in several rankings.17 In 2015, Côte d’Ivoire continued to somewhat improve its ranking in the 2016 Doing Business report (to 142nd from 145th in 2015). The 2015–16 Global Competitiveness Report ranked Côte d’Ivoire among the top reformers by moving it to 91st (from 115th in the previous report), and as the eighth most competitive economy in Africa. The 2014 Ibrahim Index of African governance also recognizes Côte d’Ivoire as the country with the strongest improvement over the past 5 years (although it still ranks 40 among 52 countries).

20. Despite significant progress achieved, challenges remain (MEFP¶15, ¶38–39). The mission highlighted two areas of the structural reform agenda where efforts need to be stepped up:

  • Domestic arrears. Staff encouraged the authorities to regularize the remaining arrears on old securitized debt owed to the banking and non-banking sectors (about CFAF 43 billion out of CFAF 142.9 billion). The authorities agreed to exchange existing claims with new marketable securities before the end of 2015.

  • Financial sector. Although progress is being made to restructure public banks, staff urged prompt and decisive action to restructure the remaining most troubled public bank, so as to, among other things, minimize any related fiscal costs.18 The government committed itself to deciding on an action plan before the end of 2015; it requested Fund TA to that end. Implementation of the broader financial sector reform strategy approved in early 2014 has begun following the appointment of a program manager and the drafting of a law on leasing in 2015. Progress has also been made with the selection of a credit bureau company,19 although some banks have expressed concerns about sharing client information. To foster the development of the secondary market, the authorities have adopted the regional regulatory framework and are now in the process of approving a list of primary dealers.20 Staff underscored the importance of accelerating the implementation of the wide-ranging measures under the financial reform strategy. It considers that the focus on addressing weaknesses in the institutional environment (credit information and contract enforcement), developing new financial products and resolving troubled financial institutions is adequate as it would promote financial deepening while strengthening financial stability.

C. Strengthening Statistics

21. The July 2015 IMF Statistics’ diagnostic mission identified the main weaknesses in Côte d’Ivoire’s national accounts statistical system. The National Statistics Institute has staffing and capacity constraints that hinder the preparation of high-quality and timely statistics. The preparation of national accounts statistics is partly based on outdated surveys, and there is a lack of reliable data for several sectors, in particular for subsistence agriculture, construction and services. Moreover, in 2014, staff identified errors in the computation of taxes in the national account series for 2011 and 2012. The TA mission formulated recommendations to address the key weaknesses in the production of national accounts.

22. Staff welcomed the authorities’ commitment to improve statistics, including through higher funding (MEFP¶36, ¶47). The authorities, at the highest level, expressed their strong willingness to implement these recommendations, and have already included the necessary funding in the 2016 budget. They have requested follow-up TA in this area. They also indicated they would move to GFSM 2001 for the fiscal accounts starting in 2016. Staff pressed the authorities to take quick action to complete the correction of errors in the computation of national accounts. Staff highlighted the importance of upgrading the production and dissemination of economic statistics both for policymaking, and for informing the public, as well as credit rating agencies and investment funds.

Program Financing and Risks

23. The program is fully financed. The projected financing gap for the remaining of the program (½ percent of GDP) will be covered by budget support from the World Bank and by the proposed disbursement under the ECF arrangement.

24. Program implementation risks for the remaining period are low. This reflects the government’s strong record in program implementation and the interest expressed at the highest level for a successor program to be discussed in early 2016.

Staff Appraisal

25. Côte d’Ivoire economic performance over the course of the ECF arrangement has been impressive, and significant strides have been made towards the program objectives of robust and sustained growth, and macroeconomic stability. From a political crisis-related recession in 2011, a rapid recovery has led to 4 years of strong growth translating into a more than 20 percent rise in real per capita income. However, poverty and inequality rates, while declining, remain elevated. Substantial fiscal consolidation has been achieved, while increasing public investment and pro-poor outlays. External stability and creditworthiness was restored in 2012 with substantial debt relief under the HIPC and MDRI initiatives following the Completion Point and the regularization of all remaining arrears with external creditors. Only two years later, in 2014, Côte d’Ivoire was able to issue a sovereign bond on the international market at lower yields than other SSA frontier economies. Significant structural reform has been undertaken, notably in the governance of the coffee/cocoa sector, in strengthening the financial situation of the energy sector, as well as in the business climate, and progress is underway as regards the restructuring of public banks.

26. Program implementation continues to be strong. Activity has expanded at a brisk pace in 2015. All end-June performance criteria and indicative targets were met. Structural reform progress, has, however, been mixed in 2015, with four out of the seven structural benchmarks under the eighth ECF review (through September) met.

27. To build upon and sustain the progress achieved, a renewed focus is needed on further strengthening the foundations of growth. To foster growth and make it more inclusive, further reforms are needed to improve the business climate and encourage private investment. The acceleration of the implementation of the financial sector development strategy should be a priority. The government also needs to initiate a reform of the non-profitable nonfinancial public sector companies. While the staff is encouraged by the government’s commitment to restructure the remaining public banks, staff pressed the authorities to promptly and decisively act to resolve the case of the most troubled public bank.

28. Staff supports the government’s commitment to adhere to the 2015 program fiscal targets, and considers that the fiscal stance for 2016 is broadly appropriate, but calls for a somewhat more ambitious fiscal adjustment going forward. To help ensure macroeconomic stability over the medium to long term, fiscal policy should aim to create adequate buffers to address mounting risks from the broader public sector, PPPs, past extra-budgetary spending liabilities, and tighter global and domestic financing conditions and increasing uncertainty in the financing environment. The 2016 fiscal tightening is a good start toward the creation of these buffers. Nevertheless, going forward, more fiscal retrenchment will be needed to build adequate fiscal buffers. In this regard, staff calls on the authorities to enhance revenue collection by streamlining exemptions, starting with VAT exemptions. It takes note of the government’s intention to launch a comprehensive review of these exemptions in 2016.

29. Staff urges the authorities to strengthen the monitoring of debt and fiscal risks. The recent development of a centralized database on public enterprises’ and government guaranteed debt is an important tool to avoid an unsustainable accumulation of debt by public sector entities. Staff encourages the authorities to refine quickly this database in order to improve its effectiveness and allow their inclusion in the DSA. Staff urges the authorities to press ahead with improvements in debt management, in particular to complete the implementation of the long-delayed reorganization of the debt department into front-, middle-, and back-offices, and the strengthening of the National Debt Policy Committee. Going forward, the authorities should step their efforts to identify and monitor contingent liabilities arising from the public sector at large and include in the budget documentation an analysis of risks weighing on the budget as well as the medium-term debt strategy. In addition, the authorities should drastically reduce the recourse to exceptional spending procedures and avoid further delays in the implementation of the Treasury Single Account. While welcoming the near-completion of audits of extra budgetary spending incurred prior to 2011 and of the public procurement contracts, staff encourages the authorities to settle them rapidly.

30. Staff is encouraged by the authorities’ commitment expressed at the highest level to improve the provision of statistics, beginning with national accounts. Staff highlighted the importance of providing timely and high-quality economic data to decision makers, while enhancing its availability to key players in financial markets, such as rating agencies, and to the public at large.

31. Staff recommends completion of the eighth review and the disbursement of an amount equivalent to SDR 48.78 million.

Table 2.

Côte d’Ivoire: Balance of Payments, 2012–20

(Billions of CFA francs; unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Ivoirien authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

In the CFA franc zone, Fund resources are channeled via the regional central bank that provides equivalent domestic currency credit to the relevant government.

Table 3a.

Côte d’Ivoire: Fiscal Operations of the Central Government, 2012–20

(Billions of CFA francs, unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Ivoirien authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

In the CFA franc zone, Fund resources are channeled via the regional central bank that provides equivalent domestic currency credit to the relevant government.

Table 3b.

Côte d’Ivoire: Fiscal Operations of the Central Government, 2012–20

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Ivoirien authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

In the CFA franc zone, Fund resources are channeled via the regional central bank that provides equivalent domestic currency credit to the relevant government.

Table 4.

Côte d’Ivoire: Monetary Survey, 2012–20

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Sources: Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO); and IMF staff estimates and projections.