Abstract
The economy has fared well in a difficult environment. A large exchange rate depreciation fueled inflation prospects and prompted sharp monetary tightening. Credit deceleration and weakened confidence linked to the proximity of the election slowed private activity, but growth was supported by dynamic public investment. International reserves remained comfortable. Program performance under the PSI was generally positive. All end-June and continuous quantitative assessment criteria (QAC) were observed, with one exception, and so were most indicative targets (ITs). Inflation remained within the bands of the consultation clause. An unprecedented increase in tax revenue was a key achievement. However, further progress on structural reforms is needed
Recent Developments
1. A large shilling depreciation and a downgrade in Uganda’s CPIA rating from strong to medium performer have raised the external debt burden and lowered its sustainability thresholds. A real exchange rate depreciation of about 10 percent (y/y) resulted in an increase in the ratio of public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt-to-GDP to 19 percent at end-FY2014/15 (18 percent in the previous DSA). At the same time, the change in the CPIA rating—mainly due to slow improvement in the index that measures transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector since 2012—lowered the thresholds for external debt indicators, leading to reduced borrowing capacity (Box 1).
2. Weak export performance, relatively low tax revenues, and the short-term nature of domestic debt add to the debt burden. While medium-term gains from the real depreciation could be expected, the value of exports of goods has not recovered, owing to weak demand from trading partners and falling commodity prices. Government revenues have significantly improved and are expected to further benefit from planned administration gains, but remain low by regional standards. The average maturity of domestic debt remains short, reflecting structural market inefficiencies and an increased preference for short-term financial investments in the run-up to elections.
3. In response to these developments, the authorities have decided to adjust their medium-term borrowing plan to keep the risk of debt distress low. To this end, they have committed to postpone some externally-financed investments (amounting on average to about ½ percent of GDP annually) between FY2016/17 and FY2019/20 while protecting high priority projects and those that have already started, including the hydropower plant projects (HPPs).
Uganda CPIA Rating
The CPIA downgrade took place in July 2015 because average ratings over 2012–2014, compiled by the World Bank, remained below the threshold. The Staff Guidance Note on the Application of the Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries (www.imf.org) sets a three-year CPIA average to determine the threshold used for the DSA. In the case of Uganda, the improvement in the 2014 CPIA rating was not enough to bring the average for 2012–2014 above the threshold, prompting the use of more stringent thresholds for the external debt indicators (Box Table 1).
PPG External Debt Thresholds
PPG External Debt Thresholds
| Strong performer | Medium performer | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| PV of debt in percent of | Exports | 200 | 150 |
| GDP | 50 | 40 | |
| Revenue | 300 | 250 | |
| Debt service in percent of | Exports | 25 | 20 |
| Revenue | 22 | 20 | |
PPG External Debt Thresholds
| Strong performer | Medium performer | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| PV of debt in percent of | Exports | 200 | 150 |
| GDP | 50 | 40 | |
| Revenue | 300 | 250 | |
| Debt service in percent of | Exports | 25 | 20 |
| Revenue | 22 | 20 | |
The CPIA downgrade highlights the importance of reinforcing ongoing efforts to address governance issues. The deterioration of the overall CPIA index was triggered by declines in 2012 in (1) the quality of budgetary and financial management; and (2) the level of transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector. Although the former index improved in 2014, the latter stayed constant since its decline in 2012. Improvements in governance, transparency, and financial management, notably when the government implements large investment projects, are essential.
Changes in the Underlying Macroeconomic Assumptions
4. The macroeconomic assumptions used in this DSA are aligned to those corresponding to the authorities’ framework supported by the PSI. The baseline scenario assumes implementation of the authorities’ economic policies and structural reforms. Compared to the previous DSA, the main changes are (1) a decline over the projection period in nominal GDP measured in U.S. dollars reflecting the base effect of the recent depreciation; (2) the planned adjustment in the authorities’ fiscal investment plan; and (3) lower estimates for oil-related revenue following a downward revision in oil price assumptions from 74 to 63 dollars per barrel in FY2020/21, in line with the latest WEO projections (Text Table 1).
Selected Macroeconomic Indicators – Compared to the Previous DSA
Selected Macroeconomic Indicators – Compared to the Previous DSA
| FY2016 | FY2017–21 Average | FY2022–26 Average | FY2027–31 Average | FY2032–36 Average | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP growth (percent) | |||||||
| Baseline | 5.0 | 6.6 | 8.0 | 5.4 | 4.9 | ||
| excl. oil production | 5.0 | 6.3 | 7.2 | 5.7 | 5.3 | ||
| Previous DSA | 5.8 | 7.0 | 8.1 | 5.3 | 4.8 | ||
| Inflation (GDP deflator, national currency, percent) | |||||||
| Baseline | 8.2 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 3.9 | 3.9 | ||
| excl. oil production | 8.2 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 4.0 | ||
| Previous DSA | 5.1 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 3.9 | 3.9 | ||
| Nominal GDP (US$ billion) | |||||||
| Baseline | 22.8 | 32.2 | 57.5 | 95.6 | 145.0 | ||
| excl. oil production | 22.8 | 32.0 | 54.0 | 89.4 | 138.9 | ||
| Previous DSA | 27.0 | 34.5 | 62.8 | 104.2 | 149.3 | ||
| Current account balance (percent of GDP) | |||||||
| Baseline | −9.6 | −11.0 | −5.7 | −4.9 | −4.4 | ||
| excl. oil production | −9.6 | −5.7 | −8.0 | −7.3 | −5.8 | ||
| Previous DSA | −11.0 | −12.0 | −5.0 | −3.8 | −4.2 | ||
| Overall fiscal balance (percent of GDP) | |||||||
| Baseline | −6.6 | −5.3 | −2.0 | −1.1 | −1.3 | ||
| excl. oil production | −6.6 | −5.4 | −3.5 | −3.0 | −2.8 | ||
| Previous DSA | −7.0 | −5.5 | −1.8 | −0.8 | −1.2 | ||
| Oil-related Revenue (percent of GDP) | |||||||
| Baseline | 0.0 | 0.4 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 2.6 | ||
| excl. oil production | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||
| Previous DSA | 0.0 | 0.4 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 3.2 | ||
Selected Macroeconomic Indicators – Compared to the Previous DSA
| FY2016 | FY2017–21 Average | FY2022–26 Average | FY2027–31 Average | FY2032–36 Average | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP growth (percent) | |||||||
| Baseline | 5.0 | 6.6 | 8.0 | 5.4 | 4.9 | ||
| excl. oil production | 5.0 | 6.3 | 7.2 | 5.7 | 5.3 | ||
| Previous DSA | 5.8 | 7.0 | 8.1 | 5.3 | 4.8 | ||
| Inflation (GDP deflator, national currency, percent) | |||||||
| Baseline | 8.2 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 3.9 | 3.9 | ||
| excl. oil production | 8.2 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 4.0 | ||
| Previous DSA | 5.1 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 3.9 | 3.9 | ||
| Nominal GDP (US$ billion) | |||||||
| Baseline | 22.8 | 32.2 | 57.5 | 95.6 | 145.0 | ||
| excl. oil production | 22.8 | 32.0 | 54.0 | 89.4 | 138.9 | ||
| Previous DSA | 27.0 | 34.5 | 62.8 | 104.2 | 149.3 | ||
| Current account balance (percent of GDP) | |||||||
| Baseline | −9.6 | −11.0 | −5.7 | −4.9 | −4.4 | ||
| excl. oil production | −9.6 | −5.7 | −8.0 | −7.3 | −5.8 | ||
| Previous DSA | −11.0 | −12.0 | −5.0 | −3.8 | −4.2 | ||
| Overall fiscal balance (percent of GDP) | |||||||
| Baseline | −6.6 | −5.3 | −2.0 | −1.1 | −1.3 | ||
| excl. oil production | −6.6 | −5.4 | −3.5 | −3.0 | −2.8 | ||
| Previous DSA | −7.0 | −5.5 | −1.8 | −0.8 | −1.2 | ||
| Oil-related Revenue (percent of GDP) | |||||||
| Baseline | 0.0 | 0.4 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 2.6 | ||
| excl. oil production | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||
| Previous DSA | 0.0 | 0.4 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 3.2 | ||
Growth is projected at 6½ percent, on average, over the medium term (½ percentage point lower than in the previous DSA) reflecting the re-phasing of investment projects. Oil production is projected to raise real GDP growth by 0.8 percentage points, on average, during FY2022–2026 (compared to 0.9 percent in the previous DSA). Oil production would now account for 7 percent of Uganda’s GDP during the peak extraction period (previously, 10 percent).
The GDP deflator is projected at 4 percent over the medium term. It is lower than in the last DSA because the higher-than-projected depreciation is offset by improvements in terms-of-trade projections stemming from weaker commodity prices. The deflator is projected to pick up as growth recovers over the medium term, while converging to 4 percent in the long run.
The external current account deficit is estimated at 11 percent of GDP, on average, over the medium term (1 percent of GDP lower than in the last DSA). This reflects the combined impact of the real effective exchange rate depreciation and the planned reductions in investment. Oil exports are projected to narrow the current account balance by 2 percent of GDP, on average, in the next 20 years, compared to 2½ percent in the last DSA.
The fiscal deficit is estimated to average 5½ percent of GDP a year over the long run—a decline of ¼ percentage point compared to the last DSA. The re-phasing of the public investment projects is projected to push the deficit down through FY2019/20 (by ½ percent of GDP) and raise it afterwards. In addition, over the long term, the deficit is set to increase by ¼ percent of GDP to account for the oil price decline. Conservatively, oil revenue projections have been revised down by ¾ percentage point to 3 percent of GDP, on average, once oil production reaches full capacity.
Nonconcessional borrowing is projected to remain unchanged at about $8 billion over the medium term (cumulative from June 28, 2013), but disbursements before FY2019/20 are now anticipated to be lower due to the re-phasing of some non-essential projects (Text Table 2). Debt to be contracted by end-December 2015 ($3 billion) will finance the construction of the Karuma and Isimba dams, industrial substations, the Entebbe Airport rehabilitation, and road construction projects.
Summary Table on External Borrowing Program
Contracting and guaranteeing of new debt, defined as debt approval by a resolution of Parliament as required in Section 36 (5) and 39 (1) of the Public Finance and Management Act, 2015. The present value of debt is calculated using the terms of individual loans and applying the 5 percent program discount rate.
Debt with a grant element that exceeds a minimum threshold (35 percent).
Debt with a positive grant element which does not meet the minimum threshold.
Debt without a positive grant element. For commercial debt, the present value would be defined as the nominal/face value.
Summary Table on External Borrowing Program
| PPG external debt contracted or guaranteed | Volume of new debt1 | Present value of new debt1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1: FY2015/16 | (Millions of U.S. dollars) | |||
| Source of debt financing | 2,684 | 1,862 | ||
| Concessional debt, of which2 | 1,845 | 1,107 | ||
| Multilateral debt | 1,414 | 848 | ||
| Bilateral debt | 432 | 259 | ||
| Non-concessional debt, of which2 | 839 | 755 | ||
| Semi-concessional debt3 | 839 | 755 | ||
| Commercial-term debt4 | − | − | ||
| Use of debt financing | 2,684 | 1,862 | ||
| Infrastructure | 2,684 | 1,862 | ||
| Budget financing | − | − | ||
| Memorandum items | ||||
| Indicative projections | ||||
| Year 2: FY2016/17 | 821 | 723 | ||
| Year 3: FY2017/18 | 2,371 | 2,134 | ||
Contracting and guaranteeing of new debt, defined as debt approval by a resolution of Parliament as required in Section 36 (5) and 39 (1) of the Public Finance and Management Act, 2015. The present value of debt is calculated using the terms of individual loans and applying the 5 percent program discount rate.
Debt with a grant element that exceeds a minimum threshold (35 percent).
Debt with a positive grant element which does not meet the minimum threshold.
Debt without a positive grant element. For commercial debt, the present value would be defined as the nominal/face value.
Summary Table on External Borrowing Program
| PPG external debt contracted or guaranteed | Volume of new debt1 | Present value of new debt1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1: FY2015/16 | (Millions of U.S. dollars) | |||
| Source of debt financing | 2,684 | 1,862 | ||
| Concessional debt, of which2 | 1,845 | 1,107 | ||
| Multilateral debt | 1,414 | 848 | ||
| Bilateral debt | 432 | 259 | ||
| Non-concessional debt, of which2 | 839 | 755 | ||
| Semi-concessional debt3 | 839 | 755 | ||
| Commercial-term debt4 | − | − | ||
| Use of debt financing | 2,684 | 1,862 | ||
| Infrastructure | 2,684 | 1,862 | ||
| Budget financing | − | − | ||
| Memorandum items | ||||
| Indicative projections | ||||
| Year 2: FY2016/17 | 821 | 723 | ||
| Year 3: FY2017/18 | 2,371 | 2,134 | ||
Contracting and guaranteeing of new debt, defined as debt approval by a resolution of Parliament as required in Section 36 (5) and 39 (1) of the Public Finance and Management Act, 2015. The present value of debt is calculated using the terms of individual loans and applying the 5 percent program discount rate.
Debt with a grant element that exceeds a minimum threshold (35 percent).
Debt with a positive grant element which does not meet the minimum threshold.
Debt without a positive grant element. For commercial debt, the present value would be defined as the nominal/face value.
External Debt Sustainability
5. Public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt is assessed to be sustainable over the projection period. The PV of PPG external debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to peak at 27 percent in FY2020/21, while nominal PPG external debt would stay below 36 percent of GDP in the projection period. All debt burden indicators—under the baseline scenario and the standardized stress tests—are projected to remain below Uganda’s country-specific debt burden thresholds (Figure 1, Tables 1, and 3). Compared to the last full DSA, the debt burden indicators remain at similar levels, after taking into account the authorities’ policy response to the increased risks.
Uganda: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt under Alternatives Scenarios, 2016–2036 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 321; 10.5089/9781513508702.002.A003
Sources: Ugandan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2026. In figure b. it corresponds to a One-time depreciation shock; in c. to a Exports shock; in d. to a One-time depreciation shock; in e. to a Exports shock; and in figure f. to a One-time depreciation shock.
Uganda: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt under Alternatives Scenarios, 2016–2036 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 321; 10.5089/9781513508702.002.A003
Sources: Ugandan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2026. In figure b. it corresponds to a One-time depreciation shock; in c. to a Exports shock; in d. to a One-time depreciation shock; in e. to a Exports shock; and in figure f. to a One-time depreciation shock.Uganda: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt under Alternatives Scenarios, 2016–2036 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 321; 10.5089/9781513508702.002.A003
Sources: Ugandan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2026. In figure b. it corresponds to a One-time depreciation shock; in c. to a Exports shock; in d. to a One-time depreciation shock; in e. to a Exports shock; and in figure f. to a One-time depreciation shock.Uganda: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2012–2036 1/
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
Includes both public and private sector external debt.
Derived as [r - g - ρ(1+g)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, and ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms.
Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes.
Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.
Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.
Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability.
Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.
Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).
Uganda: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2012–2036 1/
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
| Actual | Historical6/ Average | Standard 6/ Deviation | Projections | ||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2016–2021 Average | 2026 | 2036 | 2022–2036 Average | ||||||
| External debt (nominal) 1/ | 26.6 | 29.3 | 30.8 | 36.8 | 45.6 | 43.9 | 47.0 | 50.6 | 53.1 | 51.4 | 32.3 | 25.0 | |||||||
| of which: public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) | 13.2 | 15.2 | 16.1 | 19.3 | 25.8 | 25.5 | 29.3 | 32.4 | 34.0 | 35.5 | 27.2 | 20.8 | |||||||
| Change in external debt | −1.3 | 2.8 | 1.4 | 6.0 | 8.9 | −1.8 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 2.6 | −1.7 | −0.9 | −0.1 | |||||||
| Identified net debt-creating flows | 2.2 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 6.5 | 4.8 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 4.0 | 3.4 | −1.9 | −0.3 | 0.2 | |||||||
| Non-interest current account deficit | 8.1 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 6.9 | 5.7 | 2.5 | 7.4 | 8.2 | 8.0 | 9.6 | 10.7 | 6.0 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 3.7 | ||||
| Deficit in balance of goods and services | 12.9 | 10.2 | 9.9 | 11.3 | 12.2 | 12.3 | 11.6 | 12.9 | 13.9 | 8.7 | 3.8 | 5.6 | |||||||
| Exports | 20.2 | 20.5 | 18.8 | 18.8 | 23.1 | 21.8 | 20.8 | 21.5 | 21.7 | 25.3 | 27.7 | 25.6 | |||||||
| Imports | 33.1 | 30.7 | 28.8 | 30.1 | 35.4 | 34.2 | 32.4 | 34.4 | 35.7 | 34.0 | 31.5 | 31.2 | |||||||
| Net current transfers (negative = inflow) | −5.3 | −4.9 | −4.0 | −5.0 | −6.2 | 1.7 | −5.6 | −5.0 | −4.6 | −4.4 | −4.2 | −4.0 | −3.4 | −3.1 | −3.3 | ||||
| of which: official | −1.7 | −0.3 | −0.3 | −0.5 | −0.5 | −0.4 | −0.3 | −0.3 | −0.2 | −0.2 | −0.2 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Other current account flows (negative = net inflow) | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 3.8 | 1.0 | |||||||
| Net FDI (negative = inflow) | −3.9 | −2.9 | −3.8 | −3.3 | −3.7 | 1.1 | −2.8 | −4.0 | −3.3 | −5.3 | −6.9 | −6.4 | −4.1 | −3.2 | −4.1 | ||||
| Endogenous debt dynamics 2/ | −2.1 | −0.3 | −0.4 | 2.9 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | −0.2 | −0.4 | −1.5 | −0.5 | −0.1 | |||||||
| Contribution from nominal interest rate | 1.5 | 1.2 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 1.3 | 1.0 | |||||||
| Contribution from real GDP growth | −1.1 | −0.8 | −1.2 | −1.6 | −2.1 | −2.3 | −2.4 | −2.7 | −3.0 | −4.1 | −1.8 | −1.1 | |||||||
| Contribution from price and exchange rate changes | −2.5 | −0.7 | −1.2 | 2.1 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | |||||||
| Residual (3–4) 3/ | −3.5 | −0.3 | −1.1 | −0.5 | 4.0 | −6.1 | −1.6 | −0.4 | −0.9 | 0.2 | −0.6 | −0.3 | |||||||
| of which: exceptional financing | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| PV of external debt 4/ | … | … | … | 28.4 | 36.4 | 35.5 | 38.6 | 41.9 | 44.5 | 42.8 | 25.8 | 19.8 | |||||||
| In percent of exports | … | … | … | 150.9 | 157.1 | 162.3 | 185.6 | 194.8 | 204.6 | 169.5 | 93.1 | 77.2 | |||||||
| PV of PPG external debt | … | … | … | 10.9 | 16.5 | 17.1 | 20.9 | 23.7 | 25.3 | 26.9 | 20.6 | 15.6 | |||||||
| In percent of exports | … | … | … | 58.1 | 71.2 | 78.1 | 100.7 | 110.2 | 116.5 | 106.3 | 74.5 | 60.7 | |||||||
| In percent of government revenues | … | … | … | 80.7 | 120.1 | 119.5 | 141.4 | 154.8 | 160.1 | 154.7 | 114.7 | 86.8 | |||||||
| Debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) | 9.7 | 9.0 | 15.1 | 15.8 | 17.2 | 18.5 | 16.2 | 18.2 | 17.3 | 14.9 | 11.8 | 11.8 | |||||||
| PPG debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 4.0 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 5.3 | 6.7 | 6.5 | |||||||
| PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 3.5 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 6.9 | 7.8 | 8.8 | 7.7 | 10.4 | 9.2 | |||||||
| Total gross financing need (billions of U.S. dollars) | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 2.9 | 6.7 | |||||||
| Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio | 9.5 | 3.5 | 5.3 | 0.9 | −1.5 | 10.0 | 4.9 | 6.0 | 8.2 | 7.7 | 5.2 | 3.6 | |||||||
| Key macroeconomic assumptions | |||||||||||||||||||
| Real GDP growth (in percent) | 4.4 | 3.3 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 6.7 | 2.6 | 5.0 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 6.5 | 8.5 | 6.4 | 5.8 | 4.8 | 6.1 | |||
| GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent) | 9.8 | 2.8 | 4.4 | −6.5 | 4.5 | 9.7 | −17.9 | 8.2 | 6.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 0.4 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 4.1 | |||
| Effective interest rate (percent) 5/ | 6.2 | 5.0 | 7.7 | 7.3 | 7.1 | 2.3 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 5.8 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.7 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.3 | |||
| Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) | 22.7 | 7.5 | 0.3 | −1.9 | 14.8 | 11.9 | 6.1 | 8.1 | 8.0 | 12.1 | 9.4 | 28.2 | 12.0 | 12.5 | 6.8 | 10.6 | |||
| Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) | 12.3 | −1.4 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 14.8 | 12.8 | 1.2 | 10.7 | 7.4 | 15.2 | 12.3 | 5.0 | 8.7 | 10.3 | 8.4 | 9.8 | |||
| Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent) | … | … | … | … | … | … | 14.7 | 22.9 | 12.1 | 18.7 | 19.2 | 17.7 | 17.6 | 22.3 | 16.8 | 20.1 | |||
| Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP) | 11.2 | 11.4 | 11.9 | 13.5 | 13.7 | 14.3 | 14.8 | 15.3 | 15.8 | 17.4 | 18.0 | 17.9 | 18.3 | ||||||
| Aid flows (in billions of US dollars) 7/ | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.1 | |||||||
| of which: Grants | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | |||||||
| of which: Concessional loans | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.1 | |||||||
| Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 8/ | … | … | … | … | 2.8 | 2.8 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.7 | ||||||
| Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 8/ | … | … | … | … | 36.0 | 39.9 | 24.2 | 27.8 | 29.2 | 26.0 | 27.2 | 16.8 | 23.0 | ||||||
| Memorandum items: | |||||||||||||||||||
| Nominal GDP (Billions of US dollars) | 23.2 | 24.7 | 26.9 | 26.4 | 22.8 | 26.1 | 29.6 | 32.1 | 34.8 | 38.3 | 71.6 | 169.7 | |||||||
| Nominal dollar GDP growth | 14.7 | 6.1 | 9.2 | −1.8 | −13.8 | 14.5 | 13.4 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 10.2 | 6.9 | 10.4 | 8.4 | 10.4 | |||||
| PV of PPG external debt (in billions of US dollars) | 2.5 | 3.6 | 4.6 | 6.2 | 7.5 | 8.7 | 10.1 | 14.8 | 26.4 | ||||||||||
| (PVt-PVt-1)/GDPt-1 (in percent) | 4.2 | 4.7 | 5.8 | 4.7 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.3 | |||||||||
| Gross workers’ remittances (billions of US dollars) | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.8 | 6.0 | |||||||
| PV of PPG external debt (in percent of GDP + remittances) | … | … | 10.5 | 15.7 | 16.3 | 20.1 | 22.8 | 24.4 | 25.9 | 19.8 | 15.0 | ||||||||
| PV of PPG external debt (in percent of exports + remittances) | … | … | 47.0 | 58.3 | 64.3 | 83.5 | 92.6 | 98.5 | 92.6 | 65.2 | 53.3 | ||||||||
| Debt service of PPG external debt (in percent of exports + remittances) | … | … | 2.1 | 2.6 | 3.3 | 4.1 | 4.7 | 5.4 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 5.7 | ||||||||
Includes both public and private sector external debt.
Derived as [r - g - ρ(1+g)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, and ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms.
Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes.
Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.
Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.
Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability.
Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.
Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).
Uganda: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2012–2036 1/
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
| Actual | Historical6/ Average | Standard 6/ Deviation | Projections | ||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2016–2021 Average | 2026 | 2036 | 2022–2036 Average | ||||||
| External debt (nominal) 1/ | 26.6 | 29.3 | 30.8 | 36.8 | 45.6 | 43.9 | 47.0 | 50.6 | 53.1 | 51.4 | 32.3 | 25.0 | |||||||
| of which: public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) | 13.2 | 15.2 | 16.1 | 19.3 | 25.8 | 25.5 | 29.3 | 32.4 | 34.0 | 35.5 | 27.2 | 20.8 | |||||||
| Change in external debt | −1.3 | 2.8 | 1.4 | 6.0 | 8.9 | −1.8 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 2.6 | −1.7 | −0.9 | −0.1 | |||||||
| Identified net debt-creating flows | 2.2 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 6.5 | 4.8 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 4.0 | 3.4 | −1.9 | −0.3 | 0.2 | |||||||
| Non-interest current account deficit | 8.1 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 6.9 | 5.7 | 2.5 | 7.4 | 8.2 | 8.0 | 9.6 | 10.7 | 6.0 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 3.7 | ||||
| Deficit in balance of goods and services | 12.9 | 10.2 | 9.9 | 11.3 | 12.2 | 12.3 | 11.6 | 12.9 | 13.9 | 8.7 | 3.8 | 5.6 | |||||||
| Exports | 20.2 | 20.5 | 18.8 | 18.8 | 23.1 | 21.8 | 20.8 | 21.5 | 21.7 | 25.3 | 27.7 | 25.6 | |||||||
| Imports | 33.1 | 30.7 | 28.8 | 30.1 | 35.4 | 34.2 | 32.4 | 34.4 | 35.7 | 34.0 | 31.5 | 31.2 | |||||||
| Net current transfers (negative = inflow) | −5.3 | −4.9 | −4.0 | −5.0 | −6.2 | 1.7 | −5.6 | −5.0 | −4.6 | −4.4 | −4.2 | −4.0 | −3.4 | −3.1 | −3.3 | ||||
| of which: official | −1.7 | −0.3 | −0.3 | −0.5 | −0.5 | −0.4 | −0.3 | −0.3 | −0.2 | −0.2 | −0.2 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Other current account flows (negative = net inflow) | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 3.8 | 1.0 | |||||||
| Net FDI (negative = inflow) | −3.9 | −2.9 | −3.8 | −3.3 | −3.7 | 1.1 | −2.8 | −4.0 | −3.3 | −5.3 | −6.9 | −6.4 | −4.1 | −3.2 | −4.1 | ||||
| Endogenous debt dynamics 2/ | −2.1 | −0.3 | −0.4 | 2.9 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | −0.2 | −0.4 | −1.5 | −0.5 | −0.1 | |||||||
| Contribution from nominal interest rate | 1.5 | 1.2 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 1.3 | 1.0 | |||||||
| Contribution from real GDP growth | −1.1 | −0.8 | −1.2 | −1.6 | −2.1 | −2.3 | −2.4 | −2.7 | −3.0 | −4.1 | −1.8 | −1.1 | |||||||
| Contribution from price and exchange rate changes | −2.5 | −0.7 | −1.2 | 2.1 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | |||||||
| Residual (3–4) 3/ | −3.5 | −0.3 | −1.1 | −0.5 | 4.0 | −6.1 | −1.6 | −0.4 | −0.9 | 0.2 | −0.6 | −0.3 | |||||||
| of which: exceptional financing | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| PV of external debt 4/ | … | … | … | 28.4 | 36.4 | 35.5 | 38.6 | 41.9 | 44.5 | 42.8 | 25.8 | 19.8 | |||||||
| In percent of exports | … | … | … | 150.9 | 157.1 | 162.3 | 185.6 | 194.8 | 204.6 | 169.5 | 93.1 | 77.2 | |||||||
| PV of PPG external debt | … | … | … | 10.9 | 16.5 | 17.1 | 20.9 | 23.7 | 25.3 | 26.9 | 20.6 | 15.6 | |||||||
| In percent of exports | … | … | … | 58.1 | 71.2 | 78.1 | 100.7 | 110.2 | 116.5 | 106.3 | 74.5 | 60.7 | |||||||
| In percent of government revenues | … | … | … | 80.7 | 120.1 | 119.5 | 141.4 | 154.8 | 160.1 | 154.7 | 114.7 | 86.8 | |||||||
| Debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) | 9.7 | 9.0 | 15.1 | 15.8 | 17.2 | 18.5 | 16.2 | 18.2 | 17.3 | 14.9 | 11.8 | 11.8 | |||||||
| PPG debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 4.0 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 5.3 | 6.7 | 6.5 | |||||||
| PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 3.5 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 6.9 | 7.8 | 8.8 | 7.7 | 10.4 | 9.2 | |||||||
| Total gross financing need (billions of U.S. dollars) | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 2.9 | 6.7 | |||||||
| Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio | 9.5 | 3.5 | 5.3 | 0.9 | −1.5 | 10.0 | 4.9 | 6.0 | 8.2 | 7.7 | 5.2 | 3.6 | |||||||
| Key macroeconomic assumptions | |||||||||||||||||||
| Real GDP growth (in percent) | 4.4 | 3.3 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 6.7 | 2.6 | 5.0 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 6.5 | 8.5 | 6.4 | 5.8 | 4.8 | 6.1 | |||
| GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent) | 9.8 | 2.8 | 4.4 | −6.5 | 4.5 | 9.7 | −17.9 | 8.2 | 6.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 0.4 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 4.1 | |||
| Effective interest rate (percent) 5/ | 6.2 | 5.0 | 7.7 | 7.3 | 7.1 | 2.3 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 5.8 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.7 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.3 | |||
| Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) | 22.7 | 7.5 | 0.3 | −1.9 | 14.8 | 11.9 | 6.1 | 8.1 | 8.0 | 12.1 | 9.4 | 28.2 | 12.0 | 12.5 | 6.8 | 10.6 | |||
| Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) | 12.3 | −1.4 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 14.8 | 12.8 | 1.2 | 10.7 | 7.4 | 15.2 | 12.3 | 5.0 | 8.7 | 10.3 | 8.4 | 9.8 | |||
| Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent) | … | … | … | … | … | … | 14.7 | 22.9 | 12.1 | 18.7 | 19.2 | 17.7 | 17.6 | 22.3 | 16.8 | 20.1 | |||
| Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP) | 11.2 | 11.4 | 11.9 | 13.5 | 13.7 | 14.3 | 14.8 | 15.3 | 15.8 | 17.4 | 18.0 | 17.9 | 18.3 | ||||||
| Aid flows (in billions of US dollars) 7/ | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.1 | |||||||
| of which: Grants | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | |||||||
| of which: Concessional loans | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.1 | |||||||
| Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 8/ | … | … | … | … | 2.8 | 2.8 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.7 | ||||||
| Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 8/ | … | … | … | … | 36.0 | 39.9 | 24.2 | 27.8 | 29.2 | 26.0 | 27.2 | 16.8 | 23.0 | ||||||
| Memorandum items: | |||||||||||||||||||
| Nominal GDP (Billions of US dollars) | 23.2 | 24.7 | 26.9 | 26.4 | 22.8 | 26.1 | 29.6 | 32.1 | 34.8 | 38.3 | 71.6 | 169.7 | |||||||
| Nominal dollar GDP growth | 14.7 | 6.1 | 9.2 | −1.8 | −13.8 | 14.5 | 13.4 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 10.2 | 6.9 | 10.4 | 8.4 | 10.4 | |||||
| PV of PPG external debt (in billions of US dollars) | 2.5 | 3.6 | 4.6 | 6.2 | 7.5 | 8.7 | 10.1 | 14.8 | 26.4 | ||||||||||
| (PVt-PVt-1)/GDPt-1 (in percent) | 4.2 | 4.7 | 5.8 | 4.7 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.3 | |||||||||
| Gross workers’ remittances (billions of US dollars) | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.8 | 6.0 | |||||||
| PV of PPG external debt (in percent of GDP + remittances) | … | … | 10.5 | 15.7 | 16.3 | 20.1 | 22.8 | 24.4 | 25.9 | 19.8 | 15.0 | ||||||||
| PV of PPG external debt (in percent of exports + remittances) | … | … | 47.0 | 58.3 | 64.3 | 83.5 | 92.6 | 98.5 | 92.6 | 65.2 | 53.3 | ||||||||
| Debt service of PPG external debt (in percent of exports + remittances) | … | … | 2.1 | 2.6 | 3.3 | 4.1 | 4.7 | 5.4 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 5.7 | ||||||||
Includes both public and private sector external debt.
Derived as [r - g - ρ(1+g)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, and ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms.
Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes.
Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.
Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.
Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability.
Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.
Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).
Uganda: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2013–2036
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
The public sector includes the central government only and gross debt is used for all presentations.
Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period.
Revenues excluding grants.
Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term debt.
Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability.
Uganda: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2013–2036
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
| Actual | Average 5/ | Standard 5/ Deviation | Estimate | Projections | ||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2016–21 Average | 2026 | 2036 | 2022–36 Average | ||||||
| Public sector debt 1/ | 23.3 | 26.4 | 31.1 | 37.9 | 37.3 | 42.0 | 44.9 | 47.6 | 50.0 | 36.7 | 26.5 | |||||||
| of which: foreign-currency denominated | 15.2 | 16.1 | 19.3 | 25.8 | 25.5 | 29.3 | 32.4 | 34.0 | 35.5 | 27.2 | 20.8 | |||||||
| Change in public sector debt | 1.1 | 3.0 | 4.7 | 6.8 | −0.6 | 4.7 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.4 | −1.5 | −0.4 | |||||||
| Identified debt-creating flows | 2.6 | 2.6 | 6.7 | 6.3 | 1.2 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 3.3 | −0.3 | −2.0 | −0.6 | |||||||
| Primary deficit | 2.2 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 3.4 | −0.3 | 0.3 | −0.3 | |||
| Revenue and grants | 12.9 | 13.0 | 14.8 | 15.7 | 15.8 | 15.8 | 16.0 | 16.5 | 17.9 | 18.2 | 17.9 | |||||||
| of which: grants | 1.5 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Primary (noninterest) expenditure | 15.1 | 15.7 | 17.8 | 20.2 | 20.3 | 19.7 | 19.6 | 18.8 | 19.4 | 17.9 | 18.2 | |||||||
| Automatic debt dynamics | 0.4 | −0.1 | 3.3 | 1.4 | −4.2 | −0.6 | −1.1 | −1.4 | −2.3 | −1.7 | −0.9 | |||||||
| Contribution from interest rate/growth differential | 0.1 | 0.0 | −0.3 | −0.5 | −0.7 | −0.7 | −1.2 | −1.5 | −2.7 | −1.2 | −0.6 | |||||||
| of which: contribution from average real interest rate | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.6 | |||||||
| of which: contribution from real GDP growth | −0.7 | −1.0 | −1.3 | −1.5 | −2.1 | −2.2 | −2.5 | −2.7 | −3.7 | −2.1 | −1.2 | |||||||
| Contribution from real exchange rate depreciation | 0.3 | −0.1 | 3.6 | 2.0 | −3.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | … | … | |||||||
| Other identified debt-creating flows | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Privatization receipts (negative) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Debt relief (HIPC and other) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Other (e.g., bank recapitalization) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Residual, including asset changes | −1.5 | 0.4 | −1.9 | 0.5 | −1.9 | 0.7 | −1.6 | −0.5 | 2.6 | 0.4 | 0.3 | |||||||
| Other Sustainability Indicators | ||||||||||||||||||
| PV of public sector debt | … | … | 22.7 | 28.6 | 28.9 | 33.6 | 36.3 | 39.0 | 41.4 | 30.1 | 21.2 | |||||||
| of which: foreign-currency denominated | … | … | 10.9 | 16.5 | 17.1 | 20.9 | 23.7 | 25.3 | 26.9 | 20.6 | 15.6 | |||||||
| of which: external | … | … | 10.9 | 16.5 | 17.1 | 20.9 | 23.7 | 25.3 | 26.9 | 20.6 | 15.6 | |||||||
| PV of contingent liabilities (not included in public sector debt) | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | |||||||
| Gross financing need 2/ | 6.5 | 10.3 | 11.7 | 14.1 | 14.4 | 13.9 | 14.1 | 13.2 | 12.1 | 8.2 | 5.7 | |||||||
| PV of public sector debt-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) | … | … | 153.6 | 182.8 | 182.2 | 212.9 | 226.0 | 236.8 | 231.5 | 166.0 | 118.4 | |||||||
| PV of public sector debt-to-revenue ratio (in percent) | … | … | 167.7 | 208.6 | 202.3 | 226.9 | 236.5 | 246.5 | 238.4 | 167.7 | 118.4 | |||||||
| of which: external 3/ | … | … | 80.7 | 120.1 | 119.5 | 141.4 | 154.8 | 160.1 | 154.7 | 114.7 | 86.8 | |||||||
| Debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) 4/ | 31.6 | 35.3 | 33.4 | 34.3 | 35.7 | 36.6 | 38.1 | 39.7 | 33.5 | 28.3 | 21.0 | |||||||
| Debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 4/ | 35.7 | 38.3 | 36.5 | 39.1 | 39.6 | 39.0 | 39.9 | 41.3 | 34.5 | 28.6 | 21.0 | |||||||
| Primary deficit that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio | 1.1 | −0.3 | −1.7 | −2.2 | 5.0 | −0.8 | 0.7 | −0.4 | −0.8 | 1.2 | 0.6 | |||||||
| Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions | ||||||||||||||||||
| Real GDP growth (in percent) | 3.3 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 6.7 | 2.6 | 5.0 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 6.5 | 8.5 | 6.4 | 5.8 | 4.8 | 6.1 | |||
| Average nominal interest rate on forex debt (in percent) | 1.2 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.2 | |||
| Average real interest rate on domestic debt (in percent) | 10.1 | 13.8 | 10.7 | 5.3 | 6.3 | 8.1 | 11.0 | 11.8 | 9.1 | 8.1 | 5.4 | 8.9 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 7.0 | |||
| Real exchange rate depreciation (in percent, + indicates depreciation | 2.5 | −0.4 | 23.5 | −1.4 | 16.8 | 10.6 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | |||
| Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) | 4.1 | 2.3 | 4.2 | 9.5 | 6.9 | 8.2 | 4.0 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 4.1 | |||
| Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percen | 6.6 | 8.6 | 19.4 | 3.5 | 6.4 | 19.5 | 5.8 | 3.3 | 5.8 | 2.1 | 12.0 | 8.1 | 7.6 | 3.9 | 5.7 | |||
| Grant element of new external borrowing (in percent) | … | … | … | … | … | 14.7 | 22.9 | 12.1 | 18.7 | 19.2 | 17.7 | 17.6 | 22.3 | 16.8 | … | |||
The public sector includes the central government only and gross debt is used for all presentations.
Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period.
Revenues excluding grants.
Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term debt.
Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability.
Uganda: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2013–2036
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
| Actual | Average 5/ | Standard 5/ Deviation | Estimate | Projections | ||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2016–21 Average | 2026 | 2036 | 2022–36 Average | ||||||
| Public sector debt 1/ | 23.3 | 26.4 | 31.1 | 37.9 | 37.3 | 42.0 | 44.9 | 47.6 | 50.0 | 36.7 | 26.5 | |||||||
| of which: foreign-currency denominated | 15.2 | 16.1 | 19.3 | 25.8 | 25.5 | 29.3 | 32.4 | 34.0 | 35.5 | 27.2 | 20.8 | |||||||
| Change in public sector debt | 1.1 | 3.0 | 4.7 | 6.8 | −0.6 | 4.7 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.4 | −1.5 | −0.4 | |||||||
| Identified debt-creating flows | 2.6 | 2.6 | 6.7 | 6.3 | 1.2 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 3.3 | −0.3 | −2.0 | −0.6 | |||||||
| Primary deficit | 2.2 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 3.4 | −0.3 | 0.3 | −0.3 | |||
| Revenue and grants | 12.9 | 13.0 | 14.8 | 15.7 | 15.8 | 15.8 | 16.0 | 16.5 | 17.9 | 18.2 | 17.9 | |||||||
| of which: grants | 1.5 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Primary (noninterest) expenditure | 15.1 | 15.7 | 17.8 | 20.2 | 20.3 | 19.7 | 19.6 | 18.8 | 19.4 | 17.9 | 18.2 | |||||||
| Automatic debt dynamics | 0.4 | −0.1 | 3.3 | 1.4 | −4.2 | −0.6 | −1.1 | −1.4 | −2.3 | −1.7 | −0.9 | |||||||
| Contribution from interest rate/growth differential | 0.1 | 0.0 | −0.3 | −0.5 | −0.7 | −0.7 | −1.2 | −1.5 | −2.7 | −1.2 | −0.6 | |||||||
| of which: contribution from average real interest rate | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.6 | |||||||
| of which: contribution from real GDP growth | −0.7 | −1.0 | −1.3 | −1.5 | −2.1 | −2.2 | −2.5 | −2.7 | −3.7 | −2.1 | −1.2 | |||||||
| Contribution from real exchange rate depreciation | 0.3 | −0.1 | 3.6 | 2.0 | −3.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | … | … | |||||||
| Other identified debt-creating flows | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Privatization receipts (negative) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Debt relief (HIPC and other) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Other (e.g., bank recapitalization) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| Residual, including asset changes | −1.5 | 0.4 | −1.9 | 0.5 | −1.9 | 0.7 | −1.6 | −0.5 | 2.6 | 0.4 | 0.3 | |||||||
| Other Sustainability Indicators | ||||||||||||||||||
| PV of public sector debt | … | … | 22.7 | 28.6 | 28.9 | 33.6 | 36.3 | 39.0 | 41.4 | 30.1 | 21.2 | |||||||
| of which: foreign-currency denominated | … | … | 10.9 | 16.5 | 17.1 | 20.9 | 23.7 | 25.3 | 26.9 | 20.6 | 15.6 | |||||||
| of which: external | … | … | 10.9 | 16.5 | 17.1 | 20.9 | 23.7 | 25.3 | 26.9 | 20.6 | 15.6 | |||||||
| PV of contingent liabilities (not included in public sector debt) | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | |||||||
| Gross financing need 2/ | 6.5 | 10.3 | 11.7 | 14.1 | 14.4 | 13.9 | 14.1 | 13.2 | 12.1 | 8.2 | 5.7 | |||||||
| PV of public sector debt-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) | … | … | 153.6 | 182.8 | 182.2 | 212.9 | 226.0 | 236.8 | 231.5 | 166.0 | 118.4 | |||||||
| PV of public sector debt-to-revenue ratio (in percent) | … | … | 167.7 | 208.6 | 202.3 | 226.9 | 236.5 | 246.5 | 238.4 | 167.7 | 118.4 | |||||||
| of which: external 3/ | … | … | 80.7 | 120.1 | 119.5 | 141.4 | 154.8 | 160.1 | 154.7 | 114.7 | 86.8 | |||||||
| Debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) 4/ | 31.6 | 35.3 | 33.4 | 34.3 | 35.7 | 36.6 | 38.1 | 39.7 | 33.5 | 28.3 | 21.0 | |||||||
| Debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 4/ | 35.7 | 38.3 | 36.5 | 39.1 | 39.6 | 39.0 | 39.9 | 41.3 | 34.5 | 28.6 | 21.0 | |||||||
| Primary deficit that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio | 1.1 | −0.3 | −1.7 | −2.2 | 5.0 | −0.8 | 0.7 | −0.4 | −0.8 | 1.2 | 0.6 | |||||||
| Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions | ||||||||||||||||||
| Real GDP growth (in percent) | 3.3 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 6.7 | 2.6 | 5.0 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 6.5 | 8.5 | 6.4 | 5.8 | 4.8 | 6.1 | |||
| Average nominal interest rate on forex debt (in percent) | 1.2 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.2 | |||
| Average real interest rate on domestic debt (in percent) | 10.1 | 13.8 | 10.7 | 5.3 | 6.3 | 8.1 | 11.0 | 11.8 | 9.1 | 8.1 | 5.4 | 8.9 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 7.0 | |||
| Real exchange rate depreciation (in percent, + indicates depreciation | 2.5 | −0.4 | 23.5 | −1.4 | 16.8 | 10.6 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | |||
| Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) | 4.1 | 2.3 | 4.2 | 9.5 | 6.9 | 8.2 | 4.0 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 4.1 | |||
| Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percen | 6.6 | 8.6 | 19.4 | 3.5 | 6.4 | 19.5 | 5.8 | 3.3 | 5.8 | 2.1 | 12.0 | 8.1 | 7.6 | 3.9 | 5.7 | |||
| Grant element of new external borrowing (in percent) | … | … | … | … | … | 14.7 | 22.9 | 12.1 | 18.7 | 19.2 | 17.7 | 17.6 | 22.3 | 16.8 | … | |||
The public sector includes the central government only and gross debt is used for all presentations.
Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period.
Revenues excluding grants.
Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term debt.
Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability.
Uganda: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2016–2036
(In percent)
Variables include real GDP growth, growth of GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.
Assumes that the interest rate on new borrowing is by 2 percentage points higher than in the baseline., while grace and maturity periods are the same as in the baseline.
Exports values are assumed to remain permanently at the lower level, but the current account as a share of GDP is assumed to return to its baseline level after the shock (implicitly assumingan offsetting adjustment in import levels).
Includes official and private transfers and FDI.
Depreciation is defined as percentage decline in dollar/local currency rate, such that it never exceeds 100 percent.
Applies to all stress scenarios except for A2 (less favorable financing) in which the terms on all new financing are as specified in footnote 2.
Uganda: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2016–2036
(In percent)
| Projections | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2026 | 2036 | |
| PV of debt-to GDP ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 16 | 17 | 21 | 24 | 25 | 27 | 21 | 16 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2016–2036 1/ | 16 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 21 | 31 | 30 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2016–2036 2/ | 16 | 19 | 23 | 27 | 30 | 32 | 28 | 26 |
| A3. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 16 | 18 | 21 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 25 | 24 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 16 | 18 | 22 | 24 | 26 | 27 | 21 | 16 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 3/ | 16 | 19 | 23 | 26 | 27 | 29 | 22 | 16 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 16 | 20 | 27 | 30 | 32 | 34 | 26 | 20 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 4/ | 16 | 19 | 23 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 22 | 16 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 16 | 20 | 26 | 29 | 31 | 32 | 25 | 18 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2017 5/ | 16 | 25 | 29 | 32 | 35 | 36 | 28 | 21 |
| PV of debt-to-exports ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 71 | 78 | 101 | 110 | 117 | 106 | 75 | 61 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2016–2036 1/ | 71 | 71 | 84 | 83 | 81 | 85 | 112 | 115 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2016–2036 2/ | 71 | 88 | 113 | 128 | 138 | 128 | 102 | 102 |
| A3. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 71 | 81 | 99 | 108 | 113 | 118 | 112 | 99 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 71 | 81 | 100 | 109 | 115 | 104 | 74 | 61 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 3/ | 71 | 90 | 124 | 133 | 139 | 124 | 87 | 68 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 71 | 81 | 100 | 109 | 115 | 104 | 74 | 61 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 4/ | 71 | 89 | 111 | 119 | 125 | 112 | 78 | 62 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 71 | 85 | 104 | 113 | 119 | 107 | 75 | 60 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2017 5/ | 71 | 81 | 100 | 109 | 115 | 104 | 74 | 61 |
| PV of debt-to-revenue ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 120 | 119 | 141 | 155 | 160 | 155 | 115 | 87 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2016–2036 1/ | 120 | 109 | 118 | 117 | 112 | 124 | 172 | 165 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2016–2036 2/ | 120 | 135 | 158 | 179 | 190 | 186 | 157 | 146 |
| A3. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 120 | 124 | 139 | 151 | 156 | 150 | 139 | 134 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 120 | 126 | 145 | 159 | 164 | 157 | 119 | 90 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 3/ | 120 | 131 | 157 | 169 | 173 | 164 | 121 | 88 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 120 | 142 | 180 | 197 | 204 | 195 | 147 | 111 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 4/ | 120 | 136 | 156 | 168 | 172 | 163 | 121 | 88 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 120 | 143 | 175 | 189 | 195 | 186 | 139 | 103 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2017 5/ | 120 | 172 | 194 | 212 | 219 | 210 | 159 | 120 |
| Debt service-to-exports ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 6 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2016–2036 1/ | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 10 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2016–2036 2/ | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 9 |
| A3. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 10 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 6 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 3/ | 3 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 8 | 7 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 6 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 4/ | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 6 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2017 5/ | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 6 |
| Debt service-to-revenue ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 9 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2016–2036 1/ | 5 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 11 | 14 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2016–2036 2/ | 5 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 13 |
| A3. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 12 | 14 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 10 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 3/ | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 10 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 12 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 4/ | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 10 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 5 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 11 | 9 | 13 | 11 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2017 5/ | 5 | 8 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 14 | 13 |
| Memorandum item: | ||||||||
| Grant element assumed on residual financing (i.e., financing required above baseline) 6/ | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 |
Variables include real GDP growth, growth of GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.
Assumes that the interest rate on new borrowing is by 2 percentage points higher than in the baseline., while grace and maturity periods are the same as in the baseline.
Exports values are assumed to remain permanently at the lower level, but the current account as a share of GDP is assumed to return to its baseline level after the shock (implicitly assumingan offsetting adjustment in import levels).
Includes official and private transfers and FDI.
Depreciation is defined as percentage decline in dollar/local currency rate, such that it never exceeds 100 percent.
Applies to all stress scenarios except for A2 (less favorable financing) in which the terms on all new financing are as specified in footnote 2.
Uganda: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2016–2036
(In percent)
| Projections | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2026 | 2036 | |
| PV of debt-to GDP ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 16 | 17 | 21 | 24 | 25 | 27 | 21 | 16 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2016–2036 1/ | 16 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 21 | 31 | 30 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2016–2036 2/ | 16 | 19 | 23 | 27 | 30 | 32 | 28 | 26 |
| A3. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 16 | 18 | 21 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 25 | 24 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 16 | 18 | 22 | 24 | 26 | 27 | 21 | 16 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 3/ | 16 | 19 | 23 | 26 | 27 | 29 | 22 | 16 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 16 | 20 | 27 | 30 | 32 | 34 | 26 | 20 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 4/ | 16 | 19 | 23 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 22 | 16 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 16 | 20 | 26 | 29 | 31 | 32 | 25 | 18 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2017 5/ | 16 | 25 | 29 | 32 | 35 | 36 | 28 | 21 |
| PV of debt-to-exports ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 71 | 78 | 101 | 110 | 117 | 106 | 75 | 61 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2016–2036 1/ | 71 | 71 | 84 | 83 | 81 | 85 | 112 | 115 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2016–2036 2/ | 71 | 88 | 113 | 128 | 138 | 128 | 102 | 102 |
| A3. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 71 | 81 | 99 | 108 | 113 | 118 | 112 | 99 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 71 | 81 | 100 | 109 | 115 | 104 | 74 | 61 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 3/ | 71 | 90 | 124 | 133 | 139 | 124 | 87 | 68 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 71 | 81 | 100 | 109 | 115 | 104 | 74 | 61 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 4/ | 71 | 89 | 111 | 119 | 125 | 112 | 78 | 62 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 71 | 85 | 104 | 113 | 119 | 107 | 75 | 60 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2017 5/ | 71 | 81 | 100 | 109 | 115 | 104 | 74 | 61 |
| PV of debt-to-revenue ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 120 | 119 | 141 | 155 | 160 | 155 | 115 | 87 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2016–2036 1/ | 120 | 109 | 118 | 117 | 112 | 124 | 172 | 165 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2016–2036 2/ | 120 | 135 | 158 | 179 | 190 | 186 | 157 | 146 |
| A3. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 120 | 124 | 139 | 151 | 156 | 150 | 139 | 134 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 120 | 126 | 145 | 159 | 164 | 157 | 119 | 90 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 3/ | 120 | 131 | 157 | 169 | 173 | 164 | 121 | 88 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 120 | 142 | 180 | 197 | 204 | 195 | 147 | 111 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 4/ | 120 | 136 | 156 | 168 | 172 | 163 | 121 | 88 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 120 | 143 | 175 | 189 | 195 | 186 | 139 | 103 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2017 5/ | 120 | 172 | 194 | 212 | 219 | 210 | 159 | 120 |
| Debt service-to-exports ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 6 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2016–2036 1/ | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 10 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2016–2036 2/ | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 9 |
| A3. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 10 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 6 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 3/ | 3 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 8 | 7 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 6 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 4/ | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 6 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2017 5/ | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 6 |
| Debt service-to-revenue ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 9 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2016–2036 1/ | 5 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 11 | 14 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2016–2036 2/ | 5 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 13 |
| A3. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 12 | 14 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 10 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 3/ | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 10 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 12 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2017–2018 4/ | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 10 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 5 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 11 | 9 | 13 | 11 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2017 5/ | 5 | 8 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 14 | 13 |
| Memorandum item: | ||||||||
| Grant element assumed on residual financing (i.e., financing required above baseline) 6/ | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 |
Variables include real GDP growth, growth of GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.
Assumes that the interest rate on new borrowing is by 2 percentage points higher than in the baseline., while grace and maturity periods are the same as in the baseline.
Exports values are assumed to remain permanently at the lower level, but the current account as a share of GDP is assumed to return to its baseline level after the shock (implicitly assumingan offsetting adjustment in import levels).
Includes official and private transfers and FDI.
Depreciation is defined as percentage decline in dollar/local currency rate, such that it never exceeds 100 percent.
Applies to all stress scenarios except for A2 (less favorable financing) in which the terms on all new financing are as specified in footnote 2.
6. Nonetheless, more stringent thresholds limit the capacity for additional external borrowing. Extreme stress tests—mainly the 30 percent one-time depreciation scenario—now show that debt burden indicators peak close to the threshold. To increase the space for external borrowing while maintaining debt sustainability, it is important to strengthen the quality of reforms and institution building, in particular by making progress in governance, transparency, and public financial management issues.
7. Risks stemming from the uncertainty about oil production remain limited. A customized alternative scenario, where no oil revenues or oil exports materialize, shows a limited increase in the debt burden indicators, reflecting the authorities’ prudent debt accumulation plan. Given the high uncertainty, especially regarding oil prices, keeping a prudent fiscal plan that does not rely on oil proceeds is warranted.
Public Debt Sustainability
8. Total public debt (external and domestic) is assessed to be sustainable over the projection period. The PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to peak at about 41 percent in FY2020/21, well below the benchmark level of 56 percent associated with heightened public debt vulnerabilities for medium performers. However, the relatively short average maturity of domestic debt combined with a low revenue base continue to be a matter of concern, leading to a debt service-to-revenue ratio of about 41 percent in FY2019/20, among the highest in countries of Uganda’s level of income, and increasing rollover and interest rate risks. These risks need to be mitigated by a combination of stronger revenue mobilization and determined efforts to extend average maturities over the medium term.
9. Stress tests indicate the importance of fiscal consolidation over time. An illustrative scenario with a fixed primary deficit over the projection period indicates a significantly high PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio, breaching the benchmark level of 56 percent of GDP in FY2024/25 (Figure 2, Tables 2 and 4). This highlights the importance of reducing fiscal deficits immediately after the planned scaling up of public investment has been completed. The customized alternative scenario without oil flows indicate higher but limited risks stemming from uncertainty about oil revenues, as in the case for the external debt analysis.
Uganda: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2016–2036 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 321; 10.5089/9781513508702.002.A003
Sources: Ugandan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2025.2/ Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.
Uganda: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2016–2036 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 321; 10.5089/9781513508702.002.A003
Sources: Ugandan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2025.2/ Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.Uganda: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2016–2036 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 321; 10.5089/9781513508702.002.A003
Sources: Ugandan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2025.2/ Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.Uganda: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt 2016–2036
(In percent)
Assumes that real GDP growth is at baseline minus one standard deviation divided by the square root of the length of the projection period.
Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.
Uganda: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt 2016–2036
(In percent)
| Projections | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2026 | 2036 | |
| PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 29 | 29 | 34 | 36 | 39 | 41 | 30 | 21 |
| A. Alternative scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages | 29 | 26 | 29 | 30 | 32 | 36 | 37 | 35 |
| A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2016 | 29 | 29 | 34 | 38 | 42 | 47 | 53 | 70 |
| A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ | 29 | 29 | 34 | 37 | 41 | 44 | 35 | 38 |
| A4. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 29 | 29 | 33 | 35 | 38 | 42 | 34 | 27 |
| B. Bound tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2017–2018 | 29 | 30 | 35 | 39 | 42 | 45 | 35 | 29 |
| B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2017–2018 | 29 | 28 | 31 | 34 | 37 | 39 | 29 | 21 |
| B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks | 29 | 27 | 31 | 34 | 37 | 39 | 30 | 22 |
| B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2017 | 29 | 33 | 38 | 40 | 43 | 45 | 33 | 24 |
| B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2017 | 29 | 38 | 42 | 44 | 47 | 49 | 35 | 24 |
| PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ | ||||||||
| Baseline | 183 | 182 | 213 | 226 | 237 | 231 | 166 | 118 |
| A. Alternative scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages | 183 | 166 | 184 | 188 | 197 | 200 | 201 | 193 |
| A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2016 | 183 | 183 | 217 | 236 | 258 | 265 | 291 | 390 |
| A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ | 183 | 184 | 216 | 232 | 246 | 243 | 195 | 212 |
| A4. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 184 | 181 | 210 | 221 | 230 | 253 | 209 | 165 |
| B. Bound tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2017–2018 | 183 | 186 | 224 | 240 | 254 | 250 | 192 | 162 |
| B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2017–2018 | 183 | 174 | 199 | 213 | 225 | 221 | 159 | 114 |
| B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks | 183 | 171 | 194 | 210 | 223 | 220 | 163 | 124 |
| B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2017 | 183 | 211 | 240 | 250 | 260 | 253 | 179 | 134 |
| B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2017 | 183 | 237 | 266 | 276 | 284 | 273 | 192 | 134 |
| Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ | ||||||||
| Baseline | 34 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 40 | 34 | 28 | 21 |
| A. Alternative scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages | 34 | 35 | 36 | 36 | 38 | 32 | 30 | 24 |
| A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2016 | 34 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 40 | 34 | 33 | 38 |
| A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ | 34 | 36 | 37 | 39 | 41 | 35 | 31 | 28 |
| A4. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 34 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 40 | 37 | 34 | 26 |
| B. Bound tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2017–2018 | 34 | 36 | 38 | 40 | 41 | 35 | 30 | 24 |
| B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2017–2018 | 34 | 36 | 36 | 38 | 39 | 33 | 28 | 21 |
| B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks | 34 | 36 | 36 | 38 | 39 | 33 | 28 | 21 |
| B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2017 | 34 | 37 | 39 | 41 | 43 | 36 | 33 | 27 |
| B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2017 | 34 | 36 | 39 | 41 | 42 | 35 | 31 | 23 |
Assumes that real GDP growth is at baseline minus one standard deviation divided by the square root of the length of the projection period.
Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.
Uganda: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt 2016–2036
(In percent)
| Projections | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2026 | 2036 | |
| PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 29 | 29 | 34 | 36 | 39 | 41 | 30 | 21 |
| A. Alternative scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages | 29 | 26 | 29 | 30 | 32 | 36 | 37 | 35 |
| A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2016 | 29 | 29 | 34 | 38 | 42 | 47 | 53 | 70 |
| A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ | 29 | 29 | 34 | 37 | 41 | 44 | 35 | 38 |
| A4. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 29 | 29 | 33 | 35 | 38 | 42 | 34 | 27 |
| B. Bound tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2017–2018 | 29 | 30 | 35 | 39 | 42 | 45 | 35 | 29 |
| B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2017–2018 | 29 | 28 | 31 | 34 | 37 | 39 | 29 | 21 |
| B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks | 29 | 27 | 31 | 34 | 37 | 39 | 30 | 22 |
| B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2017 | 29 | 33 | 38 | 40 | 43 | 45 | 33 | 24 |
| B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2017 | 29 | 38 | 42 | 44 | 47 | 49 | 35 | 24 |
| PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ | ||||||||
| Baseline | 183 | 182 | 213 | 226 | 237 | 231 | 166 | 118 |
| A. Alternative scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages | 183 | 166 | 184 | 188 | 197 | 200 | 201 | 193 |
| A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2016 | 183 | 183 | 217 | 236 | 258 | 265 | 291 | 390 |
| A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ | 183 | 184 | 216 | 232 | 246 | 243 | 195 | 212 |
| A4. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 184 | 181 | 210 | 221 | 230 | 253 | 209 | 165 |
| B. Bound tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2017–2018 | 183 | 186 | 224 | 240 | 254 | 250 | 192 | 162 |
| B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2017–2018 | 183 | 174 | 199 | 213 | 225 | 221 | 159 | 114 |
| B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks | 183 | 171 | 194 | 210 | 223 | 220 | 163 | 124 |
| B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2017 | 183 | 211 | 240 | 250 | 260 | 253 | 179 | 134 |
| B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2017 | 183 | 237 | 266 | 276 | 284 | 273 | 192 | 134 |
| Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ | ||||||||
| Baseline | 34 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 40 | 34 | 28 | 21 |
| A. Alternative scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages | 34 | 35 | 36 | 36 | 38 | 32 | 30 | 24 |
| A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2016 | 34 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 40 | 34 | 33 | 38 |
| A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ | 34 | 36 | 37 | 39 | 41 | 35 | 31 | 28 |
| A4. Alternative Scenario: No Oil Scenario | 34 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 40 | 37 | 34 | 26 |
| B. Bound tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2017–2018 | 34 | 36 | 38 | 40 | 41 | 35 | 30 | 24 |
| B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2017–2018 | 34 | 36 | 36 | 38 | 39 | 33 | 28 | 21 |
| B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks | 34 | 36 | 36 | 38 | 39 | 33 | 28 | 21 |
| B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2017 | 34 | 37 | 39 | 41 | 43 | 36 | 33 | 27 |
| B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2017 | 34 | 36 | 39 | 41 | 42 | 35 | 31 | 23 |
Assumes that real GDP growth is at baseline minus one standard deviation divided by the square root of the length of the projection period.
Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.
10. The authorities have made efforts to strengthen public debt management in recent years. With assistance from the World Bank, the authorities have developed a medium term debt management strategy and an assessment of debt management performance (Debt Management Performance Assessment, DeMPA). They are also establishing a Debt and Cash Management Directorate in the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, with a plan to transfer debt management functions from the Bank of Uganda. Currently, the World Bank is providing technical assistance in drafting a debt management reform action plan, focusing on the internal organization of debt management and the establishment of a framework for managing contingent liabilities. Further technical assistance is planned by the end of CY2015 to update Uganda’s debt management strategy.
Conclusion
11. Uganda’s risk of external debt distress remains low. Although the recent large depreciation of the shilling raises the external debt burden, the planned reduction in the pace of public investment mitigates the increased risks. Adhering to this revised plan; carefully assessing projects’ financial and economic viability; selecting the best possible borrowing terms; and avoiding reliance on uncertain oil flows remain essential preconditions for debt sustainability. Making progress in governance issues is also critical considering that large public investments are coming on stream.
12. The authorities concurred with staff’s views. They remain committed to ensuring debt sustainability through long-term prudent debt management, as outlined in their Medium Term Debt Management Framework, which aims at minimizing costs and risks associated with public investment project financing. The authorities acknowledged the increased risks stemming from the exchange rate depreciation and weak exports as well as the challenges highlighted by the CPIA downgrading, and intend to stick to the revised investment plan, and closely monitor developments to assess if further policy adjustments are needed to ensure maintenance of debt sustainability. They also agreed to make progress in governance and transparency issues, and intend to continue to engage with IDA/IMF staff on debt management issues. The authorities continue to address the short maturity of domestic debt by building policy credibility, deepening the markets, and reforming auction modalities.
The last full Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) was conducted at the time of the 2015 Article IV Consultation and Fourth PSI Review in June 2015 (IMF Country Report No. 15/175). Under the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), Uganda was shifted from strong to medium performer in July 2015. All data refer to fiscal years running from July to June (e.g., FY2015/16 covers July 2015 to June 2016). External debt is defined as foreign-currency denominated debt.