The mission comprised Messrs. Atilla Arda (MCM, mission chief) and Arne Berggren (short-term expert).
Preferably, an AMC is not set-up as a unit within a central bank or a subsidiary thereof (Ingves, et al., “
The authorities could also consider clarifying with Eurostat—the EU’s statistical office—whether MARK qualifies as ‘general government.’
Liquidity (i.e., improve the chances to sell an asset) could be improved by a number of actions: (a) buying assets from several banks and creating portfolios of a critical size; (b) addressing legal issues and uncertainty; (c) taking legal action and reaching agreement with borrowers; (d) restructuring companies to make these more viable; (e) negotiating for immediate repayments or amortizations for payments that seem impossible prior to negotiations.
Currently, the Executive Board comprises three external members of the MNB’s Monetary Council. While the members may be ‘external’ from the MNB perspective, they cannot be considered ‘independent’ for MARK’s purposes. The mission argued that the authorities’ claim that, in Hungary, independent members are uncommon for single-ownership corporations does not hold because, in this particular case, the parent and the subsidiary operate with different objectives (that is, nonprofit vs. profit), and that MARK should aim to attract multiple equity partners.
While a majority of independent members would diminish the need to separate the positions of CEO and Chair of the Board of Directors, the mission maintained that these two positions be separated to ensure that the Board’s oversight over the CEO’s executive team is not controlled or directly influenced by the CEO.
The mission was informed that criminal liability for public officials would not apply to MARK’s officers and staff, but they would be subject to civil liability without the protection that the MNB Act provides to MNB officers and staff.