Abstract
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A transition government has been put in place to lead the country to elections in October 2015 and wishes to continue the existing ECF arrangement. The authorities feel the program provides continuity for the transition, and helps safeguard macroeconomic stability, while supporting reforms to address long-standing structural problems. Program performance has been satisfactory, with all performance criteria and most quantitative targets and structural benchmarks met. Staff’s assessment is that the transition authorities have the technical capacity and political will to implement the agreed measures. Growth has been revised downwards following multiple shocks. Reductions in commodity prices for the country’s two leading exports, the impact of Ebola in the region on tourism and services, and political uncertainty leading up to resignation of Compaoré’s government in late October 2014 all contributed to a marked slowdown in growth. Real growth is estimated to have been 4 percent in 2014 and is projected at 5 percent for 2015. Lower fiscal revenues forced large spending reduction/import compression. To eliminate large external and fiscal imbalances implied by the shocks and recent depreciation of the CFAF against the US dollar, through the CFAF peg to the euro, the transition government has reduced spending sharply. Even with spending adjustment, revenue measures, and additional budget support commitments from donors, large reserves drawdown will be required meet balance of payment needs. Together with approval of the delayed 2nd review and the 3rd review, the authorities request 40 percent of quota augmentation of access to help meet immediate balance of payments needs. Forward-looking program commitments encompass wide-ranging measures that have both immediate and longer term impacts. Revenue measures aim to reduce fraud and increase revenue intake, along with passage of the long-awaited revised mining code. Spending measures aim to safeguard priority social spending and contain the public wage bill. Extensive reforms are underway to improve budget transparency and cash management, after cash rationing in 2014 gave rise to domestic arrears. Finally, the authorities will implement recommendations of recent audits of state-owned energy companies, including performance contracts to regularize financial obligations and reduce costs, providing scope for better cost recovery, including through more flexible price-setting, in the future.
Background and Underlying Dsa Assumptions
A. Burkina Faso’s Public Debt Profile and Evolution
1. Despite a slight increase in nominal terms, Burkina Faso’s stock of public debt remained broadly constant as a share of GDP (at around 29 percent), based on preliminary end-2014 data1. Consistent with the government’s tightening fiscal policy, debt accumulation has significantly slowed down in 2014 (Figure 1), with the nominal stock of debt growing only by 2 percent (versus 4 percent projected in the previous DSA projection and 7 percent in 2013). The nominal increase was exclusively driven by external debt, which grew by 4 percent, as opposed to domestic debt which contracted by 4 percent due to tightening liquidity conditions in the regional market.
Growth Rate of Nominal Public Debt in CFAF, 2011-2014
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
Growth Rate of Nominal Public Debt in CFAF, 2011-2014
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
Growth Rate of Nominal Public Debt in CFAF, 2011-2014
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
2. Domestic debt remains quite low at 7 percent of GDP, but accounts for a gradually increasing overall share of debt (Table 1). Burkina Faso has made significant progress in tapping the domestic debt market for its financing needs. Since 2007 the share of domestic borrowing in the overall debt stock has increased to around 25 percent. Such progress is the result of consistent efforts to develop the sovereign bond market both at the national and WAEMU levels, in line with the country’s medium term debt strategy.
Public Debt, 2007-2014
Public Debt, 2007-2014
| 2007 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 Prel. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (US$ billions) | ||||||
| Public debt | 1.7 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.6 | |
| External | 1.5 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | |
| Domestic | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.8 | |
| (CFAF billions) | ||||||
| Public debt | 832 | 1508 | 1616 | 1729 | 1760 | |
| External | 710 | 1216 | 1290 | 1291 | 1341 | |
| Domestic | 122 | 292 | 326 | 438 | 419 | |
| (percent of GDP) | ||||||
| Public debt | 25.6 | 29.7 | 28.3 | 28.7 | 28.5 | |
| External | 21.9 | 24.0 | 22.6 | 21.4 | 21.7 | |
| Domestic | 3.8 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 7.3 | 6.8 | |
| (percent of total debt) | ||||||
| External | 85 | 81 | 80 | 75 | 76 | |
| Domestic | 15 | 19 | 20 | 25 | 24 | |
Public Debt, 2007-2014
| 2007 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 Prel. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (US$ billions) | ||||||
| Public debt | 1.7 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.6 | |
| External | 1.5 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | |
| Domestic | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.8 | |
| (CFAF billions) | ||||||
| Public debt | 832 | 1508 | 1616 | 1729 | 1760 | |
| External | 710 | 1216 | 1290 | 1291 | 1341 | |
| Domestic | 122 | 292 | 326 | 438 | 419 | |
| (percent of GDP) | ||||||
| Public debt | 25.6 | 29.7 | 28.3 | 28.7 | 28.5 | |
| External | 21.9 | 24.0 | 22.6 | 21.4 | 21.7 | |
| Domestic | 3.8 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 7.3 | 6.8 | |
| (percent of total debt) | ||||||
| External | 85 | 81 | 80 | 75 | 76 | |
| Domestic | 15 | 19 | 20 | 25 | 24 | |
3. Most of this debt is concessional and is held by multilateral institutions, with IDA and AFDB accounting for the lion’s share. The IDA and the AFDB account for the largest shares with 29 and 15 percent, respectively, while other multilaterals (excluding the IMF) and bilateral donors respectively combine for 8 and 10 percent. The IMF holds 6 percent of Burkina Faso’s total public debt stock and 8 percent of its external debt.
Public Debt by Creditor
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
Public Debt by Creditor
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
Public Debt by Creditor
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
4. Recent appreciation of the US dollar reduces slightly the dollar value of Burkina Faso’s external debt. About one-quarter of external debt is directly or indirectly linked to the dollar, including through its influence on SDR debts (Figure 3). For the remaining non-US dollar denominated debt, the recorded value in dollar terms will decrease with the dollar appreciation. This reduces slightly the dollar value of total external debt.
Public Debt by Currency Denomination
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
Public Debt by Currency Denomination
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
Public Debt by Currency Denomination
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
B. DSA Assumptions
5. Macroeconomic projections are, on the whole, less favorable relative to the 2014 DSA, as reflected in Table 2. Gold price projections have dropped by roughly $200/ounce over the long run, while projected prices of cotton decreased by 26% over the same period, leading to lower average exports. Gold production is projected to start declining in 2022, with an impact on exports and mining-related fiscal revenues. This, plus near term impacts on services of Ebola in the region and a much stronger US$ over the medium term (which intensifies the trade deficit) lead to higher current account deficits over the projection period. In the near term, fiscal deficits and debt accrual are much lower than assumed in 2014 as a result of already-observed expenditure adjustment. They are somewhat higher in the medium term as fiscal revenues are impacted, but fiscal revenues recover over the longer term and some spending adjustment is assumed.
Changes in assumptions relative to the previous DSA
Changes in assumptions relative to the previous DSA
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gold (USD/ounce) | Current DSA (WEO) | 1266 | 1180 | 1172 | 1187 | 1206 | 1284 | 1284 | 1284 |
| 2014 DSA | 1327 | 1343 | 1370 | 1398 | 1438 | 1487 | 1487 | 1487 | |
| Cotton prices (cts/lb) | Current DSA (WEO) | 83 | 63 | 65 | 65 | 59 | 44 | 44 | 44 |
| 2014 DSA | 85 | 79 | 78 | 72 | 68 | 58 | 58 | 58 | |
| Real GDP growth (y/y) | Current DSA | 4.0 | 5.0 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 |
| 2014 DSA | 6.7 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | |
| Current account (% of GDP) | Current DSA | −6.1 | −7.6 | −7.8 | −7.9 | −8.0 | −8.3 | −8.3 | −8.3 |
| 2014 DSA | −7.2 | −7.0 | −7.0 | −7.0 | −7.1 | −7.3 | −7.3 | −7.3 | |
| Overall fiscal balance | Current DSA | −1.8 | −2.5 | −3.0 | −3.7 | −4.1 | −6.1 | −6.1 | −6.1 |
| (% of GDP) | 2014 DSA | −3.1 | −3.1 | −3.0 | −3.6 | −3.8 | −5.9 | −5.9 | −5.9 |
Changes in assumptions relative to the previous DSA
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gold (USD/ounce) | Current DSA (WEO) | 1266 | 1180 | 1172 | 1187 | 1206 | 1284 | 1284 | 1284 |
| 2014 DSA | 1327 | 1343 | 1370 | 1398 | 1438 | 1487 | 1487 | 1487 | |
| Cotton prices (cts/lb) | Current DSA (WEO) | 83 | 63 | 65 | 65 | 59 | 44 | 44 | 44 |
| 2014 DSA | 85 | 79 | 78 | 72 | 68 | 58 | 58 | 58 | |
| Real GDP growth (y/y) | Current DSA | 4.0 | 5.0 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 |
| 2014 DSA | 6.7 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | |
| Current account (% of GDP) | Current DSA | −6.1 | −7.6 | −7.8 | −7.9 | −8.0 | −8.3 | −8.3 | −8.3 |
| 2014 DSA | −7.2 | −7.0 | −7.0 | −7.0 | −7.1 | −7.3 | −7.3 | −7.3 | |
| Overall fiscal balance | Current DSA | −1.8 | −2.5 | −3.0 | −3.7 | −4.1 | −6.1 | −6.1 | −6.1 |
| (% of GDP) | 2014 DSA | −3.1 | −3.1 | −3.0 | −3.6 | −3.8 | −5.9 | −5.9 | −5.9 |
6. The baseline scenario assumes lower growth prospects relative to the 2014 DSA over the medium run, reflecting the investment spending reductions over 2014-16 due to the combined effects of shocks. Over the long run, growth is assumed to revert to the same trends as in the 2014 DSA (which was already conservative relative to recent historical averages which are closer over 6.5 percent).
7. Relative to the 2014 DSA, more non-concessional financing is assumed in the outer years. The authorities are still strongly committed to seeking concessional financing to the largest extent possible, but it is clear that the supply of such financing will be more constrained. As for the program limit on non-concessional borrowing, about 80 percent of the program limit (CFA 150 billion, or about US$70 million or 2.2 percent of GDP) has been used, mainly to finance a solar plant in Zagtouli and a national road connecting three cities in the northwest, Didyr, Toma and Tougan. Based on similar projects in the planning stages, the authorities are requesting an increase in the program ceiling to CFAF 200 billion (about US$90 million, or 3.0 percent of GDP).
Dsa Results
A. External Debt
8. The basic analysis remains unchanged from the 2014 DSA, with indicators suggesting a moderate risk of debt distress. As in the 2014 DSA, the ratio of debt-to-exports is projected to breach under the most extreme standardized stress test scenario corresponding to a one-standard-deviation drop in exports growth relative to historical levels. All other debt indicator ratios remain comfortably below corresponding thresholds.
9. The strength of the US dollar and changes in macro developments have a mixed impact on debt sustainability. As discussed above, the dollar value of external debt is somewhat reduced as a result of the recent and projected strength of the US dollar. This reduces external debt and debt service ratios in relation to exports, as the dollar value of the latter is less affected by dollar strength (Figure 5). Against this, external debt and debt service indicators deteriorate slightly in relation to GDP and revenues, as the latter decline in dollar terms by proportionately more than external debt as a result of dollar strength (Figure 4). In terms of macro developments, a lower-than-anticipated starting point for nominal external debt in 2014 and lower deficits in the near term due to expenditure compression help strengthen the debt metrics, though this is set against weaker prospects for GDP and export growth and more reliance on non concessional borrowing (see below). Overall, the DSA points to an unchanged moderate risk of external debt distress.
PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio Under Alternative Exchange Rate Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio Under Alternative Exchange Rate Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio Under Alternative Exchange Rate Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
PV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio Under Alternative Exchange Rate Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
PV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio Under Alternative Exchange Rate Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
PV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio Under Alternative Exchange Rate Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
10. The authorities’ requests to increase the level of access under the ECF arrangement and increase the program ceiling on non concessional external borrowing (NCB) have no impact on these conclusions. To ensure that the proposed augmentation of access (by CFAF 19.7) and increase of NCB ceiling to CFAF 200 billion (from CFAF 150 billion currently) will not put the sustainability of the country’s debt into jeopardy, staff constructed an alternative baseline scenario integrating both of these changes. The results are visually and substantively similar to our baseline, as summarized for the debt-to-GDP and exports-to-GDP ratios in Figures 4 and 5 below.
PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio Under Alternative Borrowing Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio Under Alternative Borrowing Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio Under Alternative Borrowing Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
PV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio Under Alternative Borrowing Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
PV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio Under Alternative Borrowing Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
PV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio Under Alternative Borrowing Scenario
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
B. Total Public Debt
11. Burkina Faso’s total public debt is expected to remain below indicative thresholds by ample margins. Under the baseline scenario, Burkina Faso’s total public debt stock over GDP is projected to rise steadily to 53 percent by 2035, leaving ample room below the 74 percent benchmark, both under the baseline and stress test scenarios. This profile accommodates an increased tapping of the domestic debt market, with the size of net domestic borrowing projected to increase from an average of 1 percent in recent years to 2.6 percent in 2035.
C. Debt Management
12. Ongoing technical assistance should help strengthen debt management capacity. Although Burkina Faso’s CPIA and PEFA scores reflect a capacity broadly adequate for a low income country, the most recent DEMPA assessment shows that debt management capacity should be strengthened going forward. In particular, given the projected gradual transition from highly concessional financing to more market-based borrowing, the authorities have requested World Bank and IMF TA to strengthen capacity. A Reform Plan under discussion aims at modernizing the structure of DGTCP by consolidating functions spread across several units; improving the quality of the debt management strategy by linking it more closely to the macro program; and making a more efficient use of the regional debt market by reviewing the issuance program and improving the management of the government cash balances. Reforms have not yet been put into place, since these recommendations are still being discussed under ongoing TA.
Conclusion
13. The DSA results indicate that Burkina Faso’s risk of external debt distress remains “moderate.” All relevant ratios remain below indicative thresholds under the baseline scenario. The stress test analysis indentifies risks to the projection only in the case of the debt-to-export ratio, which breaches the 200 percent threshold under a scenario of significant slowdown of exports. The proposed requests for augmentation of access of the ECF arrangement and an increase in the program ceiling on NCB would not change the assessment.
Authorities’ Views
The conclusions of the DSA were shared with the authorities who broadly concurred with the assessment and with maintaining a “moderate” debt risk rating. They stressed that Burkina Faso’s debt management capacity is broadly appropriate for a low income country mostly borrowing in highly concessional terms, but reiterated the need for reinforcement of capacity in anticipation of the country’s gradual transition to market sources.
Burkina Faso: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2015-2035 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2025. In figure b. it corresponds to a One-time depreciation shock; in c. to a Exports shock; in d. to a One-time depreciation shock; in e. to a Exports shock and in figure f. to a One-time depreciation shock
Burkina Faso: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2015-2035 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2025. In figure b. it corresponds to a One-time depreciation shock; in c. to a Exports shock; in d. to a One-time depreciation shock; in e. to a Exports shock and in figure f. to a One-time depreciation shockBurkina Faso: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2015-2035 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2025. In figure b. it corresponds to a One-time depreciation shock; in c. to a Exports shock; in d. to a One-time depreciation shock; in e. to a Exports shock and in figure f. to a One-time depreciation shock
Burkina Faso: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2015-2035 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2025.2/ Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.
Burkina Faso: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2015-2035 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2025.2/ Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.Burkina Faso: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2015-2035 1/
Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 202; 10.5089/9781513531410.002.A002
Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2025.2/ Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.Burkina Faso: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2014-2035 1/
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
Includes both public and private sector external debt.
Derived as [r - g - ρ(1+g)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, and ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms.
Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate change
Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.
Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.
Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability.
Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.
Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).
Burkina Faso: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2014-2035 1/
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
| Actual | Hist. 6/ | Std. 6/ | Projections | |||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aver. | Dev. | 2015-2020 | ||||||||||||||||
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Average | 2021 | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | |||||||
| External debt (nominal) 1/ | 21.7 | 23.6 | 23.8 | 24.5 | 25.5 | 25.8 | 26.1 | 27.1 | 30.7 | 35.8 | 39.8 | |||||||
| of which: public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) | 21.7 | 23.6 | 23.8 | 24.5 | 25.5 | 25.8 | 26.1 | 27.1 | 30.7 | 35.8 | 39.8 | |||||||
| Change in external debt | 0.3 | 1.9 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.7 | |||||||
| Identified net debt-creating flows | 4.3 | 5.1 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 3.9 | |||||||
| Non-interest current account deficit | 5.9 | 6.4 | 3.6 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 7.6 | 7.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 6.9 | 7.4 | 7.3 | |||||
| Deficit in balance of goods and services | 9.0 | 11.2 | 10.6 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 9.7 | 9.8 | 10.5 | 9.7 | 9.9 | 9.5 | |||||||
| Exports | 21.9 | 21.2 | 20.7 | 20.3 | 20.4 | 20.6 | 20.6 | 20.7 | 19.2 | 17.2 | 17.3 | |||||||
| Imports | 30.9 | 32.4 | 31.3 | 31.1 | 31.2 | 30.3 | 30.4 | 31.3 | 28.9 | 27.1 | 26.8 | |||||||
| Net current transfers (negative = inflow) | −3.4 | −4.8 | 0.9 | −3.9 | −3.4 | −3.4 | −3.3 | −3.2 | −3.1 | −3.1 | −2.7 | −2.4 | −1.8 | |||||
| of which: official | −2.1 | −2.7 | −2.3 | −2.3 | −2.2 | −2.1 | −2.1 | −2.1 | −1.7 | −1.4 | −1.0 | |||||||
| Other current account flows (negative = net inflow) | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | −0.1 | −0.3 | |||||||
| Net FDI (negative = inflow) | −1.3 | −1.4 | 1.4 | −1.7 | −1.8 | −1.9 | −1.9 | −1.9 | −1.9 | −1.9 | −2.0 | −2.1 | −2.2 | |||||
| Endogenous debt dynamics 2/ | −0.3 | −0.9 | −1.0 | −1.1 | −1.1 | −1.1 | −1.1 | −1.1 | −1.1 | −1.2 | −1.2 | |||||||
| Contribution from nominal interest rate | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.0 | |||||||
| Contribution from real GDP growth | −0.8 | −1.2 | −1.3 | −1.4 | −1.5 | −1.5 | −1.5 | −1.6 | −1.8 | −2.0 | −2.2 | |||||||
| Contribution from price and exchange rate changes | 0.3 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | |||||||
| Residual (3-4) 3/ with changes in project grants | −1.5 | −0.4 | −1.7 | −1.2 | −1.1 | −0.9 | −0.9 | −0.9 | −0.9 | −0.9 | −0.9 | |||||||
| of which: exceptional financing | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| PV of external debt 4/ | 14.3 | 15.5 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 17.2 | 17.5 | 17.8 | 18.7 | 21.9 | 26.6 | 30.4 | |||||||
| In percent of exports | 65.2 | 73.3 | 76.3 | 81.1 | 84.3 | 85.0 | 86.5 | 90.2 | 114.1 | 155.0 | 175.2 | |||||||
| PV of PPG external debt | 14.3 | 15.5 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 17.2 | 17.5 | 17.8 | 18.7 | 21.9 | 26.6 | 30.4 | |||||||
| In percent of exports | 65.2 | 73.3 | 76.3 | 81.1 | 84.3 | 85.0 | 86.5 | 90.2 | 114.1 | 155.0 | 175.2 | |||||||
| In percent of government revenues | 82.6 | 89.7 | 88.1 | 88.8 | 91.8 | 92.5 | 94.3 | 98.8 | 122.7 | 156.8 | 173.2 | |||||||
| Debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) | 3.7 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 9.1 | 12.1 | |||||||
| PPG debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) | 3.7 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 9.1 | 12.1 | |||||||
| PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) | 4.7 | 6.1 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 6.1 | 9.2 | 11.9 | |||||||
| Total gross financing need (Billions of U.S. dollars) | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 2.8 | 4.3 | |||||||
| Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio | 5.6 | 5.8 | 7.3 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 6.6 | |||||||
| Key macroeconomic assumptions | ||||||||||||||||||
| Real GDP growth (in percent) | 4.0 | 6.0 | 1.9 | 5.0 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.2 | 6.6 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.0 | ||||
| GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent) | −1.5 | 3.9 | 6.9 | −13.7 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.8 | 0.3 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.3 | ||||
| Effective interest rate (percent) 5/ | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.8 | ||||
| Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) | −7.8 | 19.8 | 27.2 | −12.1 | 5.5 | 7.5 | 10.6 | 11.1 | 10.8 | 5.6 | 9.3 | 6.8 | 8.3 | 8.4 | ||||
| Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) | −7.6 | 13.1 | 16.4 | −4.9 | 4.4 | 8.8 | 10.4 | 7.0 | 10.9 | 6.1 | 11.8 | 7.4 | 7.5 | 8.4 | ||||
| Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent) | … | … | … | 41.4 | 35.7 | 33.3 | 33.7 | 33.6 | 32.7 | 35.1 | 32.3 | 29.5 | 26.6 | 22.6 | ||||
| Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP) | 17.3 | 17.3 | 17.9 | 18.5 | 18.7 | 18.9 | 18.9 | 18.9 | 17.9 | 17.0 | 17.6 | |||||||
| Aid flows (in Billions of US dollars) 7/ | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 2.1 | |||||||
| of which: Grants | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.9 | |||||||
| of which: Concessional loans | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | |||||||
| Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 8/ | … | 5.8 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.3 | |||||||
| Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 8/ | … | 82.7 | 75.9 | 70.4 | 68.2 | 69.9 | 69.5 | 67.9 | 65.5 | 57.9 | 52.9 | |||||||
| Memorandum items: | ||||||||||||||||||
| Nominal GDP (Billions of US dollars) | 12.5 | 11.3 | 12.2 | 13.4 | 14.8 | 16.3 | 18.0 | 19.6 | 27.2 | 40.6 | 60.3 | |||||||
| Nominal dollar GDP growth | 2.5 | −9.4 | 8.1 | 9.8 | 10.0 | 10.1 | 10.7 | 6.5 | 8.7 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 8.5 | ||||||
| PV of PPG external debt (in Billions of US dollars) | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 6.0 | 10.9 | 18.5 | |||||||
| (PVt-PVt-1)/GDPt-1 (in percent) | 0.8 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 3.3 | |||||||
| Gross workers’ remittances (Billions of US dollars) | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | |||||||
| PV of PPG external debt (in percent of GDP + remittances) | 14.0 | 15.3 | 15.6 | 16.2 | 17.0 | 17.3 | 17.6 | 18.5 | 21.7 | 26.3 | 30.1 | |||||||
| PV of PPG external debt (in percent of exports + remittances) | 61.1 | 68.7 | 71.7 | 76.2 | 79.3 | 80.1 | 81.7 | 85.2 | 107.9 | 146.4 | 166.7 | |||||||
| Debt service of PPG external debt (in percent of exports + remittances) | 3.5 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 5.4 | 8.6 | 11.5 | |||||||
Includes both public and private sector external debt.
Derived as [r - g - ρ(1+g)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, and ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms.
Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate change
Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.
Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.
Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability.
Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.
Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).
Burkina Faso: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2014-2035 1/
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
| Actual | Hist. 6/ | Std. 6/ | Projections | |||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aver. | Dev. | 2015-2020 | ||||||||||||||||
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Average | 2021 | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | |||||||
| External debt (nominal) 1/ | 21.7 | 23.6 | 23.8 | 24.5 | 25.5 | 25.8 | 26.1 | 27.1 | 30.7 | 35.8 | 39.8 | |||||||
| of which: public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) | 21.7 | 23.6 | 23.8 | 24.5 | 25.5 | 25.8 | 26.1 | 27.1 | 30.7 | 35.8 | 39.8 | |||||||
| Change in external debt | 0.3 | 1.9 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.7 | |||||||
| Identified net debt-creating flows | 4.3 | 5.1 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 3.9 | |||||||
| Non-interest current account deficit | 5.9 | 6.4 | 3.6 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 7.6 | 7.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 6.9 | 7.4 | 7.3 | |||||
| Deficit in balance of goods and services | 9.0 | 11.2 | 10.6 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 9.7 | 9.8 | 10.5 | 9.7 | 9.9 | 9.5 | |||||||
| Exports | 21.9 | 21.2 | 20.7 | 20.3 | 20.4 | 20.6 | 20.6 | 20.7 | 19.2 | 17.2 | 17.3 | |||||||
| Imports | 30.9 | 32.4 | 31.3 | 31.1 | 31.2 | 30.3 | 30.4 | 31.3 | 28.9 | 27.1 | 26.8 | |||||||
| Net current transfers (negative = inflow) | −3.4 | −4.8 | 0.9 | −3.9 | −3.4 | −3.4 | −3.3 | −3.2 | −3.1 | −3.1 | −2.7 | −2.4 | −1.8 | |||||
| of which: official | −2.1 | −2.7 | −2.3 | −2.3 | −2.2 | −2.1 | −2.1 | −2.1 | −1.7 | −1.4 | −1.0 | |||||||
| Other current account flows (negative = net inflow) | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | −0.1 | −0.3 | |||||||
| Net FDI (negative = inflow) | −1.3 | −1.4 | 1.4 | −1.7 | −1.8 | −1.9 | −1.9 | −1.9 | −1.9 | −1.9 | −2.0 | −2.1 | −2.2 | |||||
| Endogenous debt dynamics 2/ | −0.3 | −0.9 | −1.0 | −1.1 | −1.1 | −1.1 | −1.1 | −1.1 | −1.1 | −1.2 | −1.2 | |||||||
| Contribution from nominal interest rate | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.0 | |||||||
| Contribution from real GDP growth | −0.8 | −1.2 | −1.3 | −1.4 | −1.5 | −1.5 | −1.5 | −1.6 | −1.8 | −2.0 | −2.2 | |||||||
| Contribution from price and exchange rate changes | 0.3 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | |||||||
| Residual (3-4) 3/ with changes in project grants | −1.5 | −0.4 | −1.7 | −1.2 | −1.1 | −0.9 | −0.9 | −0.9 | −0.9 | −0.9 | −0.9 | |||||||
| of which: exceptional financing | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |||||||
| PV of external debt 4/ | 14.3 | 15.5 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 17.2 | 17.5 | 17.8 | 18.7 | 21.9 | 26.6 | 30.4 | |||||||
| In percent of exports | 65.2 | 73.3 | 76.3 | 81.1 | 84.3 | 85.0 | 86.5 | 90.2 | 114.1 | 155.0 | 175.2 | |||||||
| PV of PPG external debt | 14.3 | 15.5 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 17.2 | 17.5 | 17.8 | 18.7 | 21.9 | 26.6 | 30.4 | |||||||
| In percent of exports | 65.2 | 73.3 | 76.3 | 81.1 | 84.3 | 85.0 | 86.5 | 90.2 | 114.1 | 155.0 | 175.2 | |||||||
| In percent of government revenues | 82.6 | 89.7 | 88.1 | 88.8 | 91.8 | 92.5 | 94.3 | 98.8 | 122.7 | 156.8 | 173.2 | |||||||
| Debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) | 3.7 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 9.1 | 12.1 | |||||||
| PPG debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) | 3.7 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 9.1 | 12.1 | |||||||
| PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) | 4.7 | 6.1 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 6.1 | 9.2 | 11.9 | |||||||
| Total gross financing need (Billions of U.S. dollars) | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 2.8 | 4.3 | |||||||
| Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio | 5.6 | 5.8 | 7.3 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 6.6 | |||||||
| Key macroeconomic assumptions | ||||||||||||||||||
| Real GDP growth (in percent) | 4.0 | 6.0 | 1.9 | 5.0 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.2 | 6.6 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.0 | ||||
| GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent) | −1.5 | 3.9 | 6.9 | −13.7 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.8 | 0.3 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.3 | ||||
| Effective interest rate (percent) 5/ | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.8 | ||||
| Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) | −7.8 | 19.8 | 27.2 | −12.1 | 5.5 | 7.5 | 10.6 | 11.1 | 10.8 | 5.6 | 9.3 | 6.8 | 8.3 | 8.4 | ||||
| Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) | −7.6 | 13.1 | 16.4 | −4.9 | 4.4 | 8.8 | 10.4 | 7.0 | 10.9 | 6.1 | 11.8 | 7.4 | 7.5 | 8.4 | ||||
| Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent) | … | … | … | 41.4 | 35.7 | 33.3 | 33.7 | 33.6 | 32.7 | 35.1 | 32.3 | 29.5 | 26.6 | 22.6 | ||||
| Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP) | 17.3 | 17.3 | 17.9 | 18.5 | 18.7 | 18.9 | 18.9 | 18.9 | 17.9 | 17.0 | 17.6 | |||||||
| Aid flows (in Billions of US dollars) 7/ | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 2.1 | |||||||
| of which: Grants | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.9 | |||||||
| of which: Concessional loans | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | |||||||
| Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 8/ | … | 5.8 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.3 | |||||||
| Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 8/ | … | 82.7 | 75.9 | 70.4 | 68.2 | 69.9 | 69.5 | 67.9 | 65.5 | 57.9 | 52.9 | |||||||
| Memorandum items: | ||||||||||||||||||
| Nominal GDP (Billions of US dollars) | 12.5 | 11.3 | 12.2 | 13.4 | 14.8 | 16.3 | 18.0 | 19.6 | 27.2 | 40.6 | 60.3 | |||||||
| Nominal dollar GDP growth | 2.5 | −9.4 | 8.1 | 9.8 | 10.0 | 10.1 | 10.7 | 6.5 | 8.7 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 8.5 | ||||||
| PV of PPG external debt (in Billions of US dollars) | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 6.0 | 10.9 | 18.5 | |||||||
| (PVt-PVt-1)/GDPt-1 (in percent) | 0.8 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 3.3 | |||||||
| Gross workers’ remittances (Billions of US dollars) | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | |||||||
| PV of PPG external debt (in percent of GDP + remittances) | 14.0 | 15.3 | 15.6 | 16.2 | 17.0 | 17.3 | 17.6 | 18.5 | 21.7 | 26.3 | 30.1 | |||||||
| PV of PPG external debt (in percent of exports + remittances) | 61.1 | 68.7 | 71.7 | 76.2 | 79.3 | 80.1 | 81.7 | 85.2 | 107.9 | 146.4 | 166.7 | |||||||
| Debt service of PPG external debt (in percent of exports + remittances) | 3.5 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 5.4 | 8.6 | 11.5 | |||||||
Includes both public and private sector external debt.
Derived as [r - g - ρ(1+g)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, and ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms.
Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate change
Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.
Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.
Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability.
Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.
Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).
Burkina Faso: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2014-2035 1/
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
[Indicate coverage of public sector, e.g., general government or nonfinancial public sector. Also whether net or gross debt is used.]
Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period.
Revenues excluding grants.
Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term debt.
Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability.
Burkina Faso: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2014-2035 1/
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
| Actual | Estimate | Projections | ||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015-20 | ||||||||||||||||
| 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Average | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | ||||
| Public sector debt 1/ | 28.3 | 28.7 | 28.5 | 33.5 | 32.3 | 33.3 | 34.2 | 35.4 | 36.0 | 42.9 | 51.9 | 62.4 | ||||
| of which: foreign-currency denominated | 22.6 | 21.4 | 21.7 | 23.6 | 23.8 | 24.5 | 25.5 | 25.8 | 26.1 | 30.7 | 35.8 | 39.8 | ||||
| Change in public sector debt | −1.5 | 0.3 | −0.2 | 4.9 | −1.2 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 1.8 | ||||
| Identified debt-creating flows | −0.2 | 1.0 | 3.5 | 2.6 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.4 | ||||
| Primary deficit | 2.6 | 3.0 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 4.9 | |||
| Revenue and grants | 22.4 | 23.9 | 21.4 | 22.3 | 22.6 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 21.4 | 20.2 | 20.7 | ||||
| of which: grants | 4.9 | 5.4 | 4.2 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.2 | ||||
| Primary (noninterest) expenditure | 25.0 | 26.9 | 22.6 | 24.0 | 25.0 | 26.2 | 26.6 | 26.5 | 26.5 | 25.3 | 24.9 | 25.6 | ||||
| Automatic debt dynamics | −2.7 | −2.0 | 2.3 | 0.9 | −2.0 | −2.3 | −2.4 | −2.5 | −2.7 | −2.5 | −2.9 | −3.6 | ||||
| Contribution from interest rate/growth differential | −2.8 | −1.0 | −0.1 | −1.0 | −1.9 | −2.0 | −2.2 | −2.2 | −2.3 | −2.5 | −2.9 | −3.6 | ||||
| of which: contribution from average real interest rate | −1.0 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | −0.1 | −0.1 | −0.1 | −0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | −0.1 | ||||
| of which: contribution from real GDP growth | −1.8 | −1.8 | −1.1 | −1.4 | −1.9 | −2.0 | −2.1 | −2.1 | −2.2 | −2.5 | −2.9 | −3.4 | ||||
| Contribution from real exchange rate depreciation | 0.1 | −0.9 | 2.4 | 1.9 | −0.2 | −0.2 | −0.3 | −0.3 | −0.4 | … | … | … | ||||
| Other identified debt-creating flows | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||
| Privatization receipts (negative) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||
| Recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||
| Debt relief (HIPC and other) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||
| Other (specify, e.g. bank recapitalization) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||
| Residual, including asset changes | −1.3 | −0.7 | −3.7 | 2.3 | −1.5 | 0.1 | −0.3 | 0.3 | −0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | ||||
| Other Sustainability Indicators | ||||||||||||||||
| PV of public sector debt | … | … | 21.0 | 25.4 | 24.3 | 25.2 | 25.9 | 27.1 | 27.8 | 34.1 | 42.6 | 53.0 | ||||
| of which: foreign-currency denominated | … | … | 14.3 | 15.5 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 17.2 | 17.5 | 17.8 | 21.9 | 26.6 | 30.4 | ||||
| of which: external | … | … | 14.3 | 15.5 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 17.2 | 17.5 | 17.8 | 21.9 | 26.6 | 30.4 | ||||
| PV of contingent liabilities (not included in public sector debt) | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | ||||
| Gross financing need 2/ | 4.0 | 4.8 | 3.6 | 4.5 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 4.9 | 5.1 | 6.3 | 7.2 | ||||
| PV of public sector debt-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) | … | … | 98.3 | 113.9 | 107.4 | 109.6 | 112.5 | 117.7 | 120.7 | 159.5 | 210.9 | 256.1 | ||||
| PV of public sector debt-to-revenue ratio (in percent) | … | … | 122.0 | 146.6 | 135.6 | 136.2 | 138.4 | 143.2 | 146.8 | 191.3 | 251.6 | 302.0 | ||||
| of which: external 3/ | … | … | 82.6 | 89.7 | 88.1 | 88.8 | 91.8 | 92.5 | 94.3 | 122.7 | 156.8 | 173.2 | ||||
| Debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) 4/ | 6.6 | 7.5 | 11.1 | 12.3 | 12.5 | 10.0 | 8.2 | 7.8 | 6.4 | 5.6 | 8.4 | 10.9 | ||||
| Debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 4/ | 8.5 | 9.6 | 13.7 | 15.8 | 15.8 | 12.4 | 10.1 | 9.5 | 7.8 | 6.7 | 10.0 | 12.9 | ||||
| Primary deficit that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio | 4.0 | 2.7 | 1.4 | −3.2 | 3.5 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 3.1 | ||||
| Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions | ||||||||||||||||
| Real GDP growth (in percent) | 6.5 | 6.6 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.0 | |||
| Average nominal interest rate on forex debt (in percent) | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.8 | |||
| Average real interest rate on domestic debt (in percent) | −0.8 | 6.0 | 7.3 | 6.0 | 1.3 | 0.6 | −0.3 | −0.4 | −1.0 | 1.0 | −1.0 | −1.1 | −1.4 | |||
| Real exchange rate depreciation (in percent, + indicates depreciation) | 0.5 | −4.3 | 11.2 | 9.0 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | |||
| Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) | 5.8 | −0.8 | −1.6 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.3 | |||
| Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent) | 17.5 | 15.1 | −12.6 | 11.5 | 10.2 | 11.6 | 8.3 | 6.1 | 6.6 | 9.0 | 4.1 | 6.4 | 6.3 | |||
| Grant element of new external borrowing (in percent) | … | … | … | 41.4 | 35.7 | 33.3 | 33.7 | 33.6 | 32.7 | 35.1 | 29.5 | 26.6 | 22.6 | |||
[Indicate coverage of public sector, e.g., general government or nonfinancial public sector. Also whether net or gross debt is used.]
Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period.
Revenues excluding grants.
Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term debt.
Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability.
Burkina Faso: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2014-2035 1/
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
| Actual | Estimate | Projections | ||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015-20 | ||||||||||||||||
| 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Average | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | ||||
| Public sector debt 1/ | 28.3 | 28.7 | 28.5 | 33.5 | 32.3 | 33.3 | 34.2 | 35.4 | 36.0 | 42.9 | 51.9 | 62.4 | ||||
| of which: foreign-currency denominated | 22.6 | 21.4 | 21.7 | 23.6 | 23.8 | 24.5 | 25.5 | 25.8 | 26.1 | 30.7 | 35.8 | 39.8 | ||||
| Change in public sector debt | −1.5 | 0.3 | −0.2 | 4.9 | −1.2 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 1.8 | ||||
| Identified debt-creating flows | −0.2 | 1.0 | 3.5 | 2.6 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.4 | ||||
| Primary deficit | 2.6 | 3.0 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 4.9 | |||
| Revenue and grants | 22.4 | 23.9 | 21.4 | 22.3 | 22.6 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 21.4 | 20.2 | 20.7 | ||||
| of which: grants | 4.9 | 5.4 | 4.2 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.2 | ||||
| Primary (noninterest) expenditure | 25.0 | 26.9 | 22.6 | 24.0 | 25.0 | 26.2 | 26.6 | 26.5 | 26.5 | 25.3 | 24.9 | 25.6 | ||||
| Automatic debt dynamics | −2.7 | −2.0 | 2.3 | 0.9 | −2.0 | −2.3 | −2.4 | −2.5 | −2.7 | −2.5 | −2.9 | −3.6 | ||||
| Contribution from interest rate/growth differential | −2.8 | −1.0 | −0.1 | −1.0 | −1.9 | −2.0 | −2.2 | −2.2 | −2.3 | −2.5 | −2.9 | −3.6 | ||||
| of which: contribution from average real interest rate | −1.0 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | −0.1 | −0.1 | −0.1 | −0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | −0.1 | ||||
| of which: contribution from real GDP growth | −1.8 | −1.8 | −1.1 | −1.4 | −1.9 | −2.0 | −2.1 | −2.1 | −2.2 | −2.5 | −2.9 | −3.4 | ||||
| Contribution from real exchange rate depreciation | 0.1 | −0.9 | 2.4 | 1.9 | −0.2 | −0.2 | −0.3 | −0.3 | −0.4 | … | … | … | ||||
| Other identified debt-creating flows | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||
| Privatization receipts (negative) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||
| Recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||
| Debt relief (HIPC and other) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||
| Other (specify, e.g. bank recapitalization) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||
| Residual, including asset changes | −1.3 | −0.7 | −3.7 | 2.3 | −1.5 | 0.1 | −0.3 | 0.3 | −0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | ||||
| Other Sustainability Indicators | ||||||||||||||||
| PV of public sector debt | … | … | 21.0 | 25.4 | 24.3 | 25.2 | 25.9 | 27.1 | 27.8 | 34.1 | 42.6 | 53.0 | ||||
| of which: foreign-currency denominated | … | … | 14.3 | 15.5 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 17.2 | 17.5 | 17.8 | 21.9 | 26.6 | 30.4 | ||||
| of which: external | … | … | 14.3 | 15.5 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 17.2 | 17.5 | 17.8 | 21.9 | 26.6 | 30.4 | ||||
| PV of contingent liabilities (not included in public sector debt) | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | ||||
| Gross financing need 2/ | 4.0 | 4.8 | 3.6 | 4.5 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 4.9 | 5.1 | 6.3 | 7.2 | ||||
| PV of public sector debt-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) | … | … | 98.3 | 113.9 | 107.4 | 109.6 | 112.5 | 117.7 | 120.7 | 159.5 | 210.9 | 256.1 | ||||
| PV of public sector debt-to-revenue ratio (in percent) | … | … | 122.0 | 146.6 | 135.6 | 136.2 | 138.4 | 143.2 | 146.8 | 191.3 | 251.6 | 302.0 | ||||
| of which: external 3/ | … | … | 82.6 | 89.7 | 88.1 | 88.8 | 91.8 | 92.5 | 94.3 | 122.7 | 156.8 | 173.2 | ||||
| Debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) 4/ | 6.6 | 7.5 | 11.1 | 12.3 | 12.5 | 10.0 | 8.2 | 7.8 | 6.4 | 5.6 | 8.4 | 10.9 | ||||
| Debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 4/ | 8.5 | 9.6 | 13.7 | 15.8 | 15.8 | 12.4 | 10.1 | 9.5 | 7.8 | 6.7 | 10.0 | 12.9 | ||||
| Primary deficit that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio | 4.0 | 2.7 | 1.4 | −3.2 | 3.5 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 3.1 | ||||
| Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions | ||||||||||||||||
| Real GDP growth (in percent) | 6.5 | 6.6 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.0 | |||
| Average nominal interest rate on forex debt (in percent) | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.8 | |||
| Average real interest rate on domestic debt (in percent) | −0.8 | 6.0 | 7.3 | 6.0 | 1.3 | 0.6 | −0.3 | −0.4 | −1.0 | 1.0 | −1.0 | −1.1 | −1.4 | |||
| Real exchange rate depreciation (in percent, + indicates depreciation) | 0.5 | −4.3 | 11.2 | 9.0 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | |||
| Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) | 5.8 | −0.8 | −1.6 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.3 | |||
| Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent) | 17.5 | 15.1 | −12.6 | 11.5 | 10.2 | 11.6 | 8.3 | 6.1 | 6.6 | 9.0 | 4.1 | 6.4 | 6.3 | |||
| Grant element of new external borrowing (in percent) | … | … | … | 41.4 | 35.7 | 33.3 | 33.7 | 33.6 | 32.7 | 35.1 | 29.5 | 26.6 | 22.6 | |||
[Indicate coverage of public sector, e.g., general government or nonfinancial public sector. Also whether net or gross debt is used.]
Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period.
Revenues excluding grants.
Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term debt.
Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability.
Burkina Faso: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2015-35
(In percent)
Variables include real GDP growth, growth of GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.
Assumes that the interest rate on new borrowing is by 2 percentage points higher than in the baseline., while grace and maturity periods are the same as in the baseline.
Exports values are assumed to remain permanently at the lower level, but the current account as a share of GDP is assumed to return to its baseline level after the shock (implicitly a an offsetting adjustment in import levels).
Includes official and private transfers and FDI.
Depreciation is defined as percentage decline in dollar/local currency rate, such that it never exceeds 100 percent.
Applies to all stress scenarios except for A2 (less favorable financing) in which the terms on all new financing are as specified in footnote 2.
Burkina Faso: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2015-35
(In percent)
| Projections | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2025 | 2035 | |
| PV of debt-to GDP ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 16 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 22 | 30 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2015-2035 1/ | 16 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 24 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2015-2035 2 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 30 | 45 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 23 | 32 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 3/ | 16 | 18 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 26 | 32 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 20 | 25 | 34 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 4/ | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 23 | 31 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 16 | 16 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 24 | 33 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2016 5/ | 16 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 25 | 31 | 43 |
| PV of debt-to-exports ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 73 | 76 | 81 | 84 | 85 | 87 | 114 | 175 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2015-2035 1/ | 73 | 73 | 75 | 75 | 77 | 80 | 99 | 140 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2015-2035 2 | 73 | 80 | 89 | 97 | 101 | 106 | 154 | 261 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 73 | 77 | 81 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 115 | 177 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 3/ | 73 | 97 | 142 | 145 | 144 | 144 | 176 | 242 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 73 | 77 | 81 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 115 | 177 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 4/ | 73 | 81 | 90 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 121 | 179 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 73 | 76 | 84 | 87 | 88 | 90 | 117 | 178 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2016 5/ | 73 | 77 | 81 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 115 | 177 |
| PV of debt-to-revenue ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 90 | 88 | 89 | 92 | 92 | 94 | 123 | 173 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2015-2035 1/ | 90 | 84 | 82 | 82 | 84 | 88 | 106 | 139 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2015-2035 2 | 90 | 92 | 98 | 106 | 110 | 116 | 165 | 258 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 90 | 90 | 93 | 96 | 97 | 99 | 129 | 182 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 3/ | 90 | 99 | 118 | 119 | 118 | 119 | 144 | 181 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 90 | 93 | 100 | 103 | 104 | 106 | 138 | 195 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 4/ | 90 | 94 | 99 | 102 | 102 | 103 | 131 | 177 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 90 | 91 | 98 | 101 | 102 | 103 | 134 | 187 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2016 5/ | 90 | 125 | 126 | 131 | 132 | 135 | 175 | 248 |
| Debt service-to-exports ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2015-2035 1/ | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 9 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2015-2035 2 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 18 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 3/ | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 17 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 4/ | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2016 5/ | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| Debt service-to-revenue ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2015-2035 1/ | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 9 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2015-2035 2 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 17 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 12 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 3/ | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 13 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 13 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 4/ | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 12 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 13 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2016 5/ | 6 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 17 |
| Memorandum item: | ||||||||
| Grant element assumed on residual financing (i.e., financing required above baseline) 6/ | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 |
Variables include real GDP growth, growth of GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.
Assumes that the interest rate on new borrowing is by 2 percentage points higher than in the baseline., while grace and maturity periods are the same as in the baseline.
Exports values are assumed to remain permanently at the lower level, but the current account as a share of GDP is assumed to return to its baseline level after the shock (implicitly a an offsetting adjustment in import levels).
Includes official and private transfers and FDI.
Depreciation is defined as percentage decline in dollar/local currency rate, such that it never exceeds 100 percent.
Applies to all stress scenarios except for A2 (less favorable financing) in which the terms on all new financing are as specified in footnote 2.
Burkina Faso: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2015-35
(In percent)
| Projections | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2025 | 2035 | |
| PV of debt-to GDP ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 16 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 22 | 30 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2015-2035 1/ | 16 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 24 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2015-2035 2 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 30 | 45 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 23 | 32 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 3/ | 16 | 18 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 26 | 32 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 20 | 25 | 34 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 4/ | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 23 | 31 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 16 | 16 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 24 | 33 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2016 5/ | 16 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 25 | 31 | 43 |
| PV of debt-to-exports ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 73 | 76 | 81 | 84 | 85 | 87 | 114 | 175 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2015-2035 1/ | 73 | 73 | 75 | 75 | 77 | 80 | 99 | 140 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2015-2035 2 | 73 | 80 | 89 | 97 | 101 | 106 | 154 | 261 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 73 | 77 | 81 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 115 | 177 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 3/ | 73 | 97 | 142 | 145 | 144 | 144 | 176 | 242 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 73 | 77 | 81 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 115 | 177 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 4/ | 73 | 81 | 90 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 121 | 179 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 73 | 76 | 84 | 87 | 88 | 90 | 117 | 178 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2016 5/ | 73 | 77 | 81 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 115 | 177 |
| PV of debt-to-revenue ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 90 | 88 | 89 | 92 | 92 | 94 | 123 | 173 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2015-2035 1/ | 90 | 84 | 82 | 82 | 84 | 88 | 106 | 139 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2015-2035 2 | 90 | 92 | 98 | 106 | 110 | 116 | 165 | 258 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 90 | 90 | 93 | 96 | 97 | 99 | 129 | 182 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 3/ | 90 | 99 | 118 | 119 | 118 | 119 | 144 | 181 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 90 | 93 | 100 | 103 | 104 | 106 | 138 | 195 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 4/ | 90 | 94 | 99 | 102 | 102 | 103 | 131 | 177 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 90 | 91 | 98 | 101 | 102 | 103 | 134 | 187 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2016 5/ | 90 | 125 | 126 | 131 | 132 | 135 | 175 | 248 |
| Debt service-to-exports ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2015-2035 1/ | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 9 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2015-2035 2 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 18 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 3/ | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 17 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 4/ | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2016 5/ | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| Debt service-to-revenue ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| A. Alternative Scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2015-2035 1/ | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 9 |
| A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2015-2035 2 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 17 |
| B. Bound Tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 12 |
| B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 3/ | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 13 |
| B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 13 |
| B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2016-2017 4/ | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 12 |
| B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 13 |
| B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2016 5/ | 6 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 17 |
| Memorandum item: | ||||||||
| Grant element assumed on residual financing (i.e., financing required above baseline) 6/ | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 |
Variables include real GDP growth, growth of GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.
Assumes that the interest rate on new borrowing is by 2 percentage points higher than in the baseline., while grace and maturity periods are the same as in the baseline.
Exports values are assumed to remain permanently at the lower level, but the current account as a share of GDP is assumed to return to its baseline level after the shock (implicitly a an offsetting adjustment in import levels).
Includes official and private transfers and FDI.
Depreciation is defined as percentage decline in dollar/local currency rate, such that it never exceeds 100 percent.
Applies to all stress scenarios except for A2 (less favorable financing) in which the terms on all new financing are as specified in footnote 2.
Burkina Faso: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt, 2015-35
(In percent)
Assumes that real GDP growth is at baseline minus one standard deviation divided by the square root of the length of the projection period.
Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.
Burkina Faso: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt, 2015-35
(In percent)
| Projections | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2025 | 2035 | |
| PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 25 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 34 | 53 |
| A. Alternative scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages | 25 | 24 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 22 | 26 |
| A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2015 | 25 | 24 | 24 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 24 | 28 |
| A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ | 25 | 24 | 26 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 38 | 66 |
| B. Bound tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2016-2017 | 25 | 25 | 27 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 40 | 62 |
| B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2016-2017 | 25 | 29 | 33 | 33 | 34 | 34 | 39 | 56 |
| B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks | 25 | 26 | 29 | 29 | 31 | 32 | 39 | 59 |
| B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2016 | 25 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 31 | 31 | 35 | 54 |
| B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2016 | 25 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 39 | 56 |
| PV of Debt to Revenue Ratio 2/ | ||||||||
| Baseline | 114 | 107 | 110 | 113 | 118 | 121 | 160 | 256 |
| A. Alternative scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages | 114 | 104 | 101 | 98 | 98 | 96 | 103 | 123 |
| A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2015 | 114 | 105 | 103 | 100 | 101 | 99 | 111 | 137 |
| A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ | 114 | 108 | 111 | 115 | 121 | 126 | 177 | 313 |
| B. Bound tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2016-2017 | 114 | 110 | 117 | 122 | 129 | 135 | 185 | 299 |
| B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2016-2017 | 114 | 126 | 143 | 144 | 147 | 148 | 183 | 270 |
| B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks | 114 | 116 | 123 | 127 | 133 | 137 | 181 | 284 |
| B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2016 | 114 | 134 | 132 | 131 | 133 | 133 | 166 | 259 |
| B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2016 | 114 | 140 | 141 | 141 | 145 | 146 | 182 | 269 |
| Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ | ||||||||
| Baseline | 12 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 11 |
| A. Alternative scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages | 12 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2015 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 4 |
| A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ | 12 | 13 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 14 |
| B. Bound tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2016-2017 | 12 | 13 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 14 |
| B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2016-2017 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 8 | 6 | 12 |
| B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks | 12 | 13 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 13 |
| B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2016 | 12 | 13 | 12 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 17 |
| B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2016 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 13 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 12 |
Assumes that real GDP growth is at baseline minus one standard deviation divided by the square root of the length of the projection period.
Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.
Burkina Faso: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt, 2015-35
(In percent)
| Projections | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2025 | 2035 | |
| PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio | ||||||||
| Baseline | 25 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 34 | 53 |
| A. Alternative scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages | 25 | 24 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 22 | 26 |
| A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2015 | 25 | 24 | 24 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 24 | 28 |
| A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ | 25 | 24 | 26 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 38 | 66 |
| B. Bound tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2016-2017 | 25 | 25 | 27 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 40 | 62 |
| B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2016-2017 | 25 | 29 | 33 | 33 | 34 | 34 | 39 | 56 |
| B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks | 25 | 26 | 29 | 29 | 31 | 32 | 39 | 59 |
| B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2016 | 25 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 31 | 31 | 35 | 54 |
| B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2016 | 25 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 39 | 56 |
| PV of Debt to Revenue Ratio 2/ | ||||||||
| Baseline | 114 | 107 | 110 | 113 | 118 | 121 | 160 | 256 |
| A. Alternative scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages | 114 | 104 | 101 | 98 | 98 | 96 | 103 | 123 |
| A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2015 | 114 | 105 | 103 | 100 | 101 | 99 | 111 | 137 |
| A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ | 114 | 108 | 111 | 115 | 121 | 126 | 177 | 313 |
| B. Bound tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2016-2017 | 114 | 110 | 117 | 122 | 129 | 135 | 185 | 299 |
| B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2016-2017 | 114 | 126 | 143 | 144 | 147 | 148 | 183 | 270 |
| B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks | 114 | 116 | 123 | 127 | 133 | 137 | 181 | 284 |
| B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2016 | 114 | 134 | 132 | 131 | 133 | 133 | 166 | 259 |
| B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2016 | 114 | 140 | 141 | 141 | 145 | 146 | 182 | 269 |
| Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ | ||||||||
| Baseline | 12 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 11 |
| A. Alternative scenarios | ||||||||
| A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages | 12 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2015 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 4 |
| A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ | 12 | 13 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 14 |
| B. Bound tests | ||||||||
| B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2016-2017 | 12 | 13 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 14 |
| B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2016-2017 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 8 | 6 | 12 |
| B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks | 12 | 13 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 13 |
| B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2016 | 12 | 13 | 12 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 17 |
| B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2016 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 13 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 12 |
Assumes that real GDP growth is at baseline minus one standard deviation divided by the square root of the length of the projection period.
Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.
Burkina Faso’s public debt statistics cover external debt issued by the general government (including fully stateowned enterprises) and domestic debt contracted by the central government. External debt is defined on a currency basis, except for liabilities to the BOAD which register as external debt despite being denominated in CFA given the international standing of the institution. Burkina Faso’s policy performance is ranked “strong” by the CPIA with a score of 3.8, stable over the last 5 available rankings (2009-2013).