Peru: Selected Issues
Author: International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept.
Publication Date:
27 May 2015
eISBN:
9781513560410
Language:
English
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; commodity; investment; Peru; trade tax; tax effort; tax non-compliance; tax regulation; tax agency; Value-added tax; Income and capital gains taxes; Income tax systems
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Peru: Selected Issues Paper

Abstract

Peru: Selected Issues Paper

Taxation in Peru: Taxing Times Ahead1

Resolute efforts in the 1990s and 2000s helped to transform the tax system after years of serious difficulties. The instability of taxes and tax regulations, the prevalence of informality and tax non-compliance, and proliferation of exemptions were serious problems. Some of these issues continue to linger in the present and broadly explain the relative low tax pressure in Peru. In light of falling commodity revenues, recent tax rate reductions and large social and infrastructure needs, continuing to increase the tax-to-GDP ratio in the medium term will require compensatory measures, which should aim to improve the equity of the tax system and eliminate remaining distortions.

A. Introduction

1. The evolution of the Peruvian tax system has been beset by serious tribulations over the last thirty years. The tax-to-GDP ratios have been as low 11 percent in 1980s and close to 17 percent in 2014. Resolute administrative efforts in the 1990s and 2000s have paid off as the system was transformed to one of good quality and efficient administration, even if tax collection only improved by 2–3 percentage points of GDP since then. In some evaluations, Peru has been recognized as one of leaders in the region in efficiency in paying taxes. Nonetheless, the tax burden is still low when compared with peers and important challenges remain.

2. This paper assesses Peru’s advances in the tax area and offers insight on further enhancements. In particular, the paper: (i) overviews the tax structure; (ii) evaluates performance in comparison with peers; (iii) takes stock of the 2014 reforms, and (iv) identifies areas for improvement.

B. Peru’s Tax System: Stylized Facts and Performance

Stylized Facts

3. Today Peru has a modern tax system and a relatively efficient tax administration.2 The transition from a regime plagued with various exemptions, small taxes and fees (most of them with cascading effects), and very high customs duties to the current system was led by the tax agency (SUNAT). SUNAT currently boasts highly qualified staff, operates under strategic management principles, and widely applies information technology (IT) in its services (Box 1).

Peru: Progress and Challenges in Tax Administration

SUNAT is now one of the most advanced revenue agencies in the region. After receiving the status of autonomous agency along with defined budgetary resources in 1991, SUNAT embarked on a process of modernization and streamlining of its operational procedures.1 SUNAT’s core functions in audit and control became headquartered in Lima, together with the establishment of the Regional Office. The organizational structure was concentrated around the strengthening of the Large Taxpayers Unit, and state-of-the-art IT systems in support of the key functions of taxpayer registration were introduced in revenue collection, audit and enforcement, and arrears collection.

In 2003, the tax and customs (SUNAD) administrations were merged into a single agency.2 However, the merger diverged from regional examples as it was conceived as the “absorption” of customs by the tax administration, rather than a merger of equal agencies. This created a number of organizational problems, including an uneven distribution of resources and IT systems. It was not until 2011 that the structural problems began to be addressed. With technical assistance from the IMF, SUNAT’s modernization strategy aimed at improving taxpayer services and trade facilitation, enhancing control of taxpayer’s compliance, enforcing strategies to better address compliance risks, and strengthening audit and collection, most of which formed a comprehensive Compliance Improvement Program (CIP). Moreover, in line with the government’s commitment in mid-2012 to increase the tax-to-GDP ratio to 18 percent by 2016, the Ministry of Economy and Finance passed a number of administrative measures to give SUNAT increased powers to enforce taxpayer compliance.

SUNAT has made good progress in its modernization but challenges remain. In 2013–14, SUNAT strengthened its core processes through improved debt recovery, increased audit coverage, and improved quality of taxpayer services. Also, the agency recently produced a strategic plan for 2015–18 that establishes a new model based on facilitating voluntary taxpayer compliance and reducing compliance costs. Going forward, SUNAT’s modernization goals should include: (i) deepening tax and customs compliance actions based on risk; (ii) expediting the implementation of its human resources policies; (iii) reducing the level of informality, and (iv) urgently addressing IT capacity constraints.3

1 The law creating SUNAT earmarked up to 3 percent of revenue collected for the agency’s budget. This was almost twice the average for the region at the time; in 1991, the regional average for the operational cost of the tax administration was about 1.62 percent of total (net) revenue collected, according to the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations.2 In Latin America, similar agencies were created in Mexico (1995), Argentina (1997), Guatemala (1997), and Colombia (1998).3 Till now, however, existing operational systems at domestic taxes and at customs are not integrated and, in fact, were built over the years under non-compatible platforms; as a result, both the quality of critical data in SUNAT’s databases and its timeliness remain compromised.

4. The authority to levy taxes is mainly concentrated at the central government level. The central government levies direct taxes such as income taxes (IR, Impuestos a la Renta), and indirect taxes such a VAT-type sales tax (GST, or Impuesto General a las Ventas). It also collects excises, customs duties, a tax on banking transactions (BTT), and a special tax on small businesses (RUS). Regional and local governments mostly collect property taxes (on immovable property, transfer of immovable property, and vehicles).

5. Although compared to the 1970s tax revenues increased only marginally, reforms brought important changes to the system. Specifically, central government tax revenue increased from 12.6 percent of GDP in 2003 to 16.6 percent in 2014.3 While high economic growth during this period was an important factor, sound tax policy and administration measures such as the reduction of non-compliance, broadening of tax bases, and the development of a fiscal regime for the mining sector were also important reasons behind the increase in collection. During this period, more than 70 small taxes and fees with very low level of revenue were eliminated. The composition of central government tax revenue also changed. The combined share of the GST and IR increased from 35 to 66 percent of total revenue, while trade taxes declined from almost 22 percent to less than 5 percent between 1970 and 2014. The elimination of the tax on company’s assets and the assignment of the property tax to local governments explain the reduction of wealth tax revenues; and the elimination of export taxes and trade liberalization explains the reduction of trade taxes.

Peru: Tax Revenue Composition, 1970-2014

(In percent of GDP)

article image
Source: Central bank.
A04ufig1

Peru: Selected Tax Revenue 1/

(In percent of total revenue)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 134; 10.5089/9781513560410.002.A004

Source: SUNAT.
A04ufig2

Peru: Composition of the Central Government Tax Revenue, 1970 - 2014

(In percent of total)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 134; 10.5089/9781513560410.002.A004

Source: SUNAT

Structure and Performance by Tax Category

  • General Sales tax. The GST has a relatively wide base and a single rate of 18 percent (of which 2 percentage points are allocated to the Regional Promotion Fund). In 2014, this tax (net of tax returns) accounted for 6.8 percent of GDP, or 37 percent of total revenues. The GST productivity and efficiency have notably increased, while GST non-compliance has been significantly reduced from 46 percent of potential revenue to 29 percent during 2001–13. Non-compliance rates are in line with the regional average but double the average for OECD countries (Appendix).4

  • Income taxes. The income tax is the second revenue generating tax. The design of both the Corporate Income Tax (CIT) and Personal Income Tax (PIT), in general, is in line with good principles of taxation. The CIT rate is close to the average for the region and the minimum PIT rate is below it.5,6 In 2014, the CIT yielded 27 percent and the PIT 22 percent of tax revenue due to improvements in control, the elimination of some exemptions, and the introduction of the minimum CIT on net wealth. Coupled with high economic growth, revenue from taxes on income increased significantly over the last decade (from 3.7 of GDP in 2003 to 7 percent of GDP in 2014).

  • Other taxes. Excise revenue decreased from 2.3 percent of GDP in 2003 to less than 1 percent in 2014 mainly because of the reduction of taxation on oil and derivatives in order to mitigate the increase in prices of these goods. The level of revenue reached by the RUS is also not significant; however, the tax fulfills its purpose of simplifying the tax system (both for the private sector and SUNAT). Revenue from customs duties and BTT is low at 0.03–0.05 percent of GDP, respectively.7

  • Property taxes. Taxes on property (at the local level) represented 0.33 percent of GDP in 2012 (latest data available). Two taxes are applied on property: one on wealth from holding the immovable property (rates varies between 0.2 and 1 percent) and another (Alcabala) on sales of immovable property (at a rate of 3 percent).8

  • Mining revenues.9 Fiscal revenue from mining remains important but has been declining in recent years. Between 1999 and 2013, while tax and non-tax revenues in nominal terms quadruped, revenues from the mining sector increased more than seven times. In 2012, the government introduced a more efficient and equitable reform to the mining sector, which was well received by the investment community (Box 2). However, while in 2007 this revenue represented 16 percent of general government revenues, its weight has dropped to 5 percent by 2013 (about 1.5 percent of GDP) reflecting improved collection of other taxes and a reduction in metal prices.

A04ufig3

Peru: VAT Productivity, Efficiency, and Gap

(In percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 134; 10.5089/9781513560410.002.A004

Sources: Ministry of Finance and Fund staff estimates.

Selected Latin American Countries: CIT, PIT and VAT

article image
Sources: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation; Country Authorities, and Fund staff calculations.

The CIT is granted as tax credit.

The CIT rate is 25 percent for companies whose taxable income does not exceed USD 150,000.

The CIT rate is 25 percent; during 2014 there is a surtax of 4 percent (temporally solidarity contribution).

Only 50 percent of the dividends received.

6. Despite good progress, the tax effort is still below potential and somewhat below the simple average of the region. The current Peruvian tax system yields 53 percent of the maximum level of its potential revenue.10 The still low tax effort is not the result of low tax rates, which are near the average of the region, but rather stems from inefficiency in collection (non-compliance) and large tax exemptions (tax expenditure).

Selected Latin American Countries: Tax Effort and Capacity

article image
Sources: Fenochietto y Pessino (2013) and IMF’s World Economic Outlook.

Tax and social contributions as percent of GDP.

Peru: Mineral Taxation

In September 2011, the mining taxation reform was approved aiming at increasing progressiveness and raising public revenues, while preserving competitiveness of the sector. The law included: (i) new royalties based on operating profits of 1 to 12 percent to replace the sales–based royalties for companies with no stability contracts with the government; (ii) a new special mining tax —revenue for the central government—levied on a sliding scale between 2 to 8.4 percent of operating margins applicable to companies with no tax stability contracts; and (iii) a special (voluntary) levy of 4 to 13 percent of profits on the extraction of mineral resources targeting companies holding stability contracts.1

Peru: Mineral Taxation

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Sources: IMF’s Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries (FARI) database.

Changes to the taxation regime were constrained by stability contracts and the regional distribution of mineral revenue. The new special voluntary levy aimed to increase the contribution from companies with stability contract agreements and replaced the voluntary contribution paid in the past. Under the voluntary contribution scheme, introduced for regional development in 2006, the amount transferred could be up to 3.75 percent of profits after tax (2.75 percent for the local fund and 1 percent to the regional government fund). In 2014, the government introduced changes to the stability contract regime by raising the amount of the initial investment and output capacity, and changed some of the conditions for investment to be eligible for these types of contracts.

Peru: Revenues from Mining

(In millions of Nuevo soles)

article image
Source: Ministry of Finance.

The 2011 measures were expected to raise additional revenue. Gains estimated at US$1 billion per year (0.5 percent of GDP at 2011 commodity prices) would have helped fund infrastructure and social gaps. However, as metal prices started to decline in 2012, the actual intake was not a high as expected.

1/ Tax stability contracts were offered to mining companies to ensure a stable legal, tax, and administrative framework to attract multinational mining companies in the mid 1990s.

C. 2014 Tax Measures

7. In mid-2014, the authorities introduced several tax measures. The objective was to spur domestic demand, further streamline regulations, and ease the tax burden in several tax categories. According to the authorities’ estimates, approximately 1.2 million taxpayers are expected to benefit from these measures.

  • Income tax rate cuts. The bottom marginal PIT rate was reduced from 15 to 8 percent for the lowest income segment. The CIT rate will be reduced gradually from 30 to 26 percent by 2019. While the simultaneous increase in the dividend tax was meant to keep the combined rate stable, the increase in dividends for domestic corporations was not approved by congress resulting in a decline in the combined rate. Staff estimates an impact from the cuts of about 0.14 percent of GDP per each percentage point of reduction, with the total cost of the reform at about 2 percent of GDP.

  • Gradual elimination of GST withholding schemes (Box 3). This system is deemed to negatively affect liquidity of small firms. The measure is expected to inject 2 billion nuevos soles into the economy (0.4 percent of 2014 GDP).

  • Gradual reduction in the drawback mechanism. The drawback mechanism was seen as an export subsidy, which allows exporters to claim back 5 percent of their exports’ value as long as import tariffs have been paid on intermediate goods used.11

  • Fuel excise tax cut. The cut is expected to help lower gas prices by around 5 percent. In addition, the fuel stabilization fund will be adjusted to accommodate additional drops in the prices of certain fuels. The authorities are also considering a review of other consumption/excise taxes to reduce negative externalities.

  • Tax benefits for businesses investing in research and development. The new law will allow companies to reduce their taxable income by 175 percent of the amount spent in research and development, with a limit of 40 percent of income. To be eligible for the tax benefit, research projects will need to be approved by the National Council of Technological Innovation (Concytec), a group which includes private and public research institutions and business groups. Research and development expenditures in Peru are estimated at 0.12 percent of GDP, significantly below the regional average (1.75 percent of GDP).

  • Other changes. Modifications were introduced to a special scheme for the depreciation of buildings and construction, the temporary tax on net assets (Impuesto Temporal a los Activos Netos, ITAN), provisions on the GST relating to the use of services associated with the import of tangible goods and improvements to its refund procedures, along with several other amendments to the Tax Code. A tax benefit and the accelerated depreciation benefit for the generation of hydroelectricity will be extended until December 31, 2025, targeting investment totaling almost US$3 billion. Changes to the tax stability contracts applicable to mining companies were also introduced (Box 2).

Peru: Estimates of Impact of Tax Reforms

(In percent of GDP; loss -)

article image
Sources: Ministry of Finance; SUNAT; and Fund staff calculations.

Only for projects initiated in 2015-17.

Peru: CIT and Dividend Tax

(In percent)

article image
Source: Ministry of Finance.

Dividend rate paid to non-residents and residents (natural persons) will increase from 4.1 to 9.3 percent from 2014 through 2019, respectively.

8. While some measures are important for streamlining the tax system, several of them will carry a substantial fiscal cost. While studies suggest that lower CIT rates are good for growth and investment,12 Peru’s exceptionally high growth and investment boom of 2004–12 occurred under the previous tax regime. Given the stated goals to raise tax collection in Peru, and against the progressive decline in mining revenues, it will be essential to introduce compensatory measures to counter the tax cuts over the medium term.

A04ufig4

Selected Latin American Countries

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2015, 134; 10.5089/9781513560410.002.A004

Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook.1/ CIT rates (percent) as of 2013.

Peru: The GST Withholding Schemes

A complex system of withholdings, specific to Peru, exists since 2002. The GST systems have helped to improve GST tax collection: in 2002, the withholding system as a whole represented only 5.3 percent of net VAT proceeds, but in 2014, that figure exceeded 28 percent. These withholding schemes collect about 4 percent of GDP. However, this set-up has also increased compliance costs and generated certain administrative inequities.

There are three different withholding schemes in place. They aim to improve compliance and concentrate revenue collection with large taxpayers: (i) detracciones; (ii) percepciones; and (iii) retenciones. Together, the system is even more complex (includes more than 10 tax rates):

• Retenciones. This regime forces certain designated companies (large and some public institutions) to act as withholding agents for the SUNAT, retaining part of the GST that their suppliers were supposed to pay.

• Detracciones. They are withholdings of GST by large taxpayers on behalf of other taxpayers in the GST chain to ensure compliance. The system of detracciones was widened in 2012 to incorporate other services subject to the GST, exempted goods, public entertainment and non-metallic mining. In 2013, the system was simplified by reducing the number of rates from 13 to 5. The system generates a large number of GST refunds. The main drawback of the scheme is complexity (e.g., payments are fractioned; the rates and timing of payment vary by product; returns are delayed). Furthermore, in cases of wood, sugar, alcohol and rice, the payment has to be made even when these products are not later sold.

• Percepciones. It is a mechanism by which the perception agent charges in advance a fraction of the GST that his/her customers will generate at a later stage in operations related to the GST. It is usually charged on purchases by large taxpayers, mainly, of petroleum based liquid fuels and imports.

Measures approved in 2014 will help simplify these withholding schemes and reduce the cost of compliance but further progress is needed. The number of goods subject to tax will be reduced to 12 in system of percepciones and detracciones, and to 26 in detracciones; the rates in the latter will be kept at 10 and 4 percent. Also the repayment of amounts will be made freely available 4 (rather than 3) times a year. These welcome efforts to simplify the schemes, however, will need to be extended and include further reduction in the number of rates and goods and services; and avoidance of a large number of GST refunds and the increase on the final GST rate that consumers end up paying.

D. The Road Ahead

9. Peru has come a long way in improving the efficiency of the tax system and its administration. However, while buoyancy increased, tax-to GDP ratios are still below the average of countries at the same level of economic development. As mentioned above, Peru still lags its income peer group with respect to tax pressure and effort mostly due to lingering inefficiencies. Moreover, the end of the super commodity cycle, lower potential growth, and the need to cover still large social and infrastructure gaps will require important adjustments on the revenue side in coming years. While the goalpost of raising taxes to 18 percent of GDP by 2016 announced at the start of President Humala’s administration in 2011 has now been moved, Peru could still make good gains through improvements in the following areas:

  • Further rationalizing the tax system. The complex GST withholding schemes should be significantly simplified. The expansion of the number of PIT rates from 3 to 6 is not in line with best practice and consideration should be given to reversing it. Consideration should also be given to eliminating the practice of fiscal stability agreements: in 2014 there were 877 agreements that imply 877 different tax systems, which are very difficult to administer. Elimination of the advanced payments of CIT (introduced in 2012) would also simplify the system without a loss in revenue.

  • Reforming the GST system: An implementation of an integrated control strategy for GST would help overcome the lingering weaknesses and align the efforts of regulatory and operational units. This strategy should be based on: strengthening taxpayer registration and tax documents authorization through risk analysis, focusing GST audits on the validity of input tax, establishing an IT system for checking GST suppliers, using all the information from withholding mechanisms, and addressing the abuse of fake invoices. This would also support the rationalization measures already initiated, lead to maturity of the tax system, and lessen reliance on supplementary schemes such as the GST withholding schemes.

  • Reducing high levels of tax arrears: The level of accumulated tax debt in Peru is higher than a year of revenue.13 Such excessive level of arrears affects the credibility of the entire tax administration since taxpayers anticipate that in the end they will not pay the total amount owed or pay it gradually after many years. While the debt stock should be reduced by separating the very old debt that is not possible to recover (for instance, because the company goes bankrupt or the taxpayer is deceased), it is also necessary to improve collection enforcement by reducing the time and number of procedures. Consideration should be given to creating a new courtroom in the Tax Court specialized in large taxpayers issues (such as, international taxation, rules to deal with transfer pricing, etc.).

  • Streamlining exemptions: In order to compensate for the reduction in CIT rates and the elimination of withholding schemes, it is highly advisable to rationalize tax incentives, which have complicated tax administration, eroded the CIT base, and weakened collection efforts.14 It would also be useful to undertake a comprehensive tax expenditure review, which is an important instrument to identify possible options for revenue mobilization. For instance, some exemptions from the GST have a regressive impact on income distribution, such as those on food and other goods and services consumed by high-income individuals. There is also scope to eliminate regional GST exemptions and channel the increased revenue towards poverty relief programs in these same regions.

  • Increasing collection at the local level: There is also space to increase property tax collections, which have relatively low efficiency costs and a benign effect on growth, improve the fairness of the system, and could bring more revenue to compensate for lower transfers from the canon (a revenue sharing mechanism).

  • Addressing administrative shortcomings: Key priorities for addressing shortcomings in administration include a better integration of core revenue administration functions—collections, audit, arrears management, risk-management, taxpayer services—for both domestic taxes and customs, moving away from the current organizational model that keeps these areas separate, and the implementation of a new corporate IT strategy.

10. All this suggests taxing times ahead. The challenge of tax policy and administration design is to define a fine line between raising the necessary revenue and accomplishing this in the least distorting way for the economy, while making the system fair and legitimate in the view of tax payers. Reducing exemptions and loopholes that forego revenue with little social benefit can simplify taxation and increase its equity and efficiency. Raising revenue through improving compliance and widening the base will provide resources for further economic and social development.

Appendix. VAT Non-Compliance

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Sources: National Authorities; Centro Iteramericano de Administrationes Tributarias; European Commission; IMF.

References

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1

Prepared by Ricardo Fenochietto and Svetlana Vtyurina.

2

The term tax administration refers to both customs and domestic tax administration.

3

Tax revenue includes royalties and other revenue from the mining sector but does not include sub-national government revenue due to the lack of data for most of the period. Sub-national revenues amounted only to 0.47 percent of GDP in 2013.

4

A common measure of VAT performance is the ratio of VAT revenue to GDP or to consumption divided by the VAT rate. This ratio is commonly referred to as the VAT productivity (in terms of GDP) or efficiency ratio (in terms of consumption). This ratio represents the percentage of GDP (consumption) that each percentage point of the VAT rate collects (e.g., the efficiency ratio for the Peruvian GST was 0.47). The ratio is a useful tool in analyzing the performance of the VAT within a country over a period. A low ratio indicates erosion of the base (either through zero-rating or exemptions) and/or evasion.

5

Colombia CIT’s rate is now 25 percent. There is an additional tax of 9 percent (CREE), and no tax on dividends (if the company paid the CIT). CIT in Chile will increase from 20 to 25 percent over the next four years. The CIT in Peru was reduced from 30 to 20 in late 2000; then increased to 27 percent (plus 4.1 percent tax on dividends) in 2002, then scaled back to 30 in 2004.

6

Revenues from PIT amount to about 2 percent of GDP. This level is similar to the average revenue collected in Latin America, but below the level of the collection in middle income countries outside the region and below what would have been expected given Peru’s natural resources, levels of informality, and demographics. The minimum exemption is close to the simple average of the region. At 25,900 nuevos soles, it is equivalent to the level of per-capita income (adjusted by power purchasing parity), although high compared to the OECD average (about 30 percent of GDP per capita). While it eliminates a significant share of the population from the PIT, it is line with the region and appropriate for a developing country. In the same way, the threshold at which the top marginal rate is applied (7.6 times) is somewhat over the average of the region (6 times). The PIT now has six rates (0, 8, 14, 17, 20, and 30). The highest rate is close to the simple average in the region of about 27 percent.

7

BTT’s main objective is to inform SUNAT of bank transactions.

8

Revenue from tax on the immovable property and Alcabala reached only 0.18 and 0.15 percent of GDP in 2012, respectively.

9

Peru’s mining sector (mining and hydrocarbon) represents about 12 percent of GDP; and about 60 percent of total export (of which mineral accounted for 55 percent).

10

By employing a stochastic frontier analysis (see Fenochietto and Pessino, 2013), a maximum level of revenue that is possible (i.e., the frontier), for given economic and social characteristics of a country, is estimated. By comparing the actual revenue with this tax capacty, the so-called tax effort is obtained.

11

Currently, the drawback rate is 5 percent, but will be lowered to 4 and 3 percent in 2015 and 2016, respectively. The government estimated that exporters claim US$280 million per year through this mechanism. A recent measure to eliminate all import tariffs on intermediate goods had rendered the drawback ineffective, but the Finance Ministry’s decree also reinstated tariffs on 732 of the 1817 goods whose tariff was eliminated to ensure the drawback mechanism remains operational.

12

Nicodeme (2009) and Joumard (2002) on OECD countries, and IMF (2015).

13

Arrears collected in 2014 represented only 2.6 percent of total collection.

14

Tax expenditures are defined as the revenue forgone from preferential tax treatments, relative to a reference tax system (or benchmark). Due to different benchmarks and different methodologies, a comparison between studies is not always meaningful. Estimates of expenditures in Peru are included transparently in the budget documentation (since 2003), allowing parliamentarians to discuss the fiscal cost of tax incentives and exemptions. The level of tax expenditures in Peru was estimated at about 2 percent of GDP in 2014 (SUNAT).

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Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
Peru: Selected Issues
Author: International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept.
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2015: Issue 134
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
9781513560410
ISSN:
1934-7685
Pages:
68
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513560410.002
  • View in gallery

    Peru: Selected Tax Revenue 1/

    (In percent of total revenue)

  • View in gallery

    Peru: Composition of the Central Government Tax Revenue, 1970 - 2014

    (In percent of total)

  • View in gallery

    Peru: VAT Productivity, Efficiency, and Gap

    (In percent)

  • View in gallery

    Selected Latin American Countries

    (In percent of GDP)

Peru: Selected Tax Revenue 1/

(In percent of total revenue)

Peru: Composition of the Central Government Tax Revenue, 1970 - 2014

(In percent of total)

Peru: VAT Productivity, Efficiency, and Gap

(In percent)

Selected Latin American Countries

(In percent of GDP)