United States: Selected Issues
Author: International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept.
Publication Date:
26 Jul 2013
eISBN:
9781484376553
Language:
English
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; price; house price; GDP; cost; price effect; U.S. dollar; GDP level; energy trade balance; energy deficit; Natural gas sector; Energy sector; Energy prices; Consumption; consumer demand
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This Selected Issues paper on United States 2012 Article IV Consultation discusses rebound of manufacturing production. The U.S. share in global manufacturing production declined through most of the past three decades, but it has stabilized since the Great Recession. It currently represents about 20 percent of global manufacturing value added. Interestingly, after a sharp increase during most of the previous decade, China’s share in global manufacturing has also stabilized since the Great Recession, at a level similar to that of the United States. The notion of a manufacturing renaissance has been fuelled partly by the rebound in production since the end of the Great Recession.

Abstract

This Selected Issues paper on United States 2012 Article IV Consultation discusses rebound of manufacturing production. The U.S. share in global manufacturing production declined through most of the past three decades, but it has stabilized since the Great Recession. It currently represents about 20 percent of global manufacturing value added. Interestingly, after a sharp increase during most of the previous decade, China’s share in global manufacturing has also stabilized since the Great Recession, at a level similar to that of the United States. The notion of a manufacturing renaissance has been fuelled partly by the rebound in production since the end of the Great Recession.

Macroeconomic Implications of the U.S. Energy Boom1

Technological advances have stimulated rapid growth in the domestic production of oil and gas. The energy boom is likely to continue going forward, but uncertainty about the possible outcomes is high. The positive GDP effects could be modest in the United States, not least due to the small share of mining and energy-intensive industries in the economy, although implications for the international energy markets could still be significant. The energy boom could put some appreciation pressure on the U.S. dollar. The energy trade balance should continue improving going forward, but the current account implications appear ambiguous.

A. Background

1. The United States is currently experiencing rapid growth in oil and gas production. Technological advances (especially horizontal fracturing and drilling) have helped to unlock unconventional oil and gas from tight-rock formations including shale, reversing a long period of production declines (Box 1). Production of crude oil and other petroleum products has increased by 30 percent over the past 5 years, helping to halve the net imports of crude oil and related liquids. Natural gas output has been up by about 25 percent over the same period.

uA02fig01

Domestic Crude Oil Production by source

(Million barrels per day)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2013, 237; 10.5089/9781484376553.002.A002

Source: EIA
uA02fig02

Natural Gas Production by Source

(Trillion Cubic Feet)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2013, 237; 10.5089/9781484376553.002.A002

Source: EIA

What are Shale Gas and Tight Oil?

Shale is a fine-grained sedimentary rock which can be rich in oil and natural gas. However, due to its low permeability, the oil and natural gas contained in these rocks will not easily flow to wells without assistance from advanced drilling techniques such as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. Hydraulic fracturing involves pressurized injection fluids commonly made up of water, sand and chemical fluids. This mix is injected under high pressure, down and across into horizontally drilled wells as far as 10,000 feet below the surface. The pressurized mixture causes the rock layer to crack. The fissures are held open by the sand particles so that “tight oil” or “shale gas” flow back to the well.

  • The largest U.S. oil shale formation is the Monterey/Santos play in Southern California, which is thought to hold roughly 2/3 of U.S. shale oil resources. The next largest shale oil formations are the Bakken in western part of North Dakota and eastern Montana, and Eagle Ford in southern Texas. Based on data in EIA (2013b), technically recoverable crude oil resources, including conventional oil, are estimated at about 60 years of current crude production (this figure also includes oil whose production may not be economically viable).

  • Most unconventional natural gas resources are located in the North East, Gulf Coast, and Southwestern regions. The Marcellus field in the North East holds an estimated 55 percent of total U.S. shale gas supply. Total technically recoverable resources including conventional gas may amount to about 100 years of current natural gas production.

Source: Energy Information Agency.

2. The energy boom has already had positive effects on the U.S. economy. Besides the direct benefits from higher oil and gas output, there has been a flurry of activity in the supporting industries (e.g., rigs, pipelines, services). However, reflecting the small share of oil- and gas-related sectors in the U.S. economy (around 1½ percent of GDP), all mining contributed only 0.1 percentage point to real GDP growth last year. Employment in the oil and gas sectors increased by around 50,000 employees in both 2011 and 2012—a small share of the net 2.2 million jobs created in the U.S. economy just last year. That said, technological constraints on gas exports have helped to push the domestic price of natural gas well below prices in other major markets, providing a competitive advantage to domestic industries and helping to support consumer demand through lower utility prices.

uA02fig04

Natural Gas Prices

($MMBtu)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2013, 237; 10.5089/9781484376553.002.A002

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook.

3. These positive supply developments have been accompanied by continued improvements in energy efficiency. Sustained high oil prices around $100 a barrel have stimulated lower use of oil in the transport sector—a development also supported by the introduction of more stringent corporate average fuel economy standards as well as demographic and economic changes. According to data by the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA), the energy intensity of GDP has fallen by about 15 percent over the past decade, and this pace is expected to pick up gradually to about 20 percent per decade.

4. The rapid growth in natural gas production and the segmented nature of the global gas market has unleashed a wave of rebalancing within the U.S. energy sector. Natural gas has been displacing coal in electricity generation—in turn, coal exports have increased substantially, especially to Europe. Meanwhile, low natural gas prices has incentivized producers to explore fields with a high content of crude oil or natural gas liquids, helping to further cut oil imports. The United States has traditionally been a net importer of natural gas, thus lacking liquefaction facilities for export. However, the administration has granted LNG export approvals to two companies this year and is expected to make decisions on additional export applications in the near future.

5. Most forecasters expect substantial increases in the unconventional production of oil and gas, although forecasts differ substantially (Figure 1). In the EIA’s central scenario, production of crude oil and natural gas could increase by some 15 percent over the next decade, but forecasts by some analysts are substantially more optimistic. The differences reflect a variety of uncertainties related to both technology and policy:2

  • Scalability. The shale fields typically exhibit rapid declines of production over time (in some cases, output can drop 70–80 percent without further investment after the first year). At the same time, production will at some point need to move from “sweet spots” to less-productive or less-profitable areas.

  • Environmental concerns. Hydraulic fracturing is a process involving injections of large quantities of water, sand, and chemicals into wells. Opponents of “fracking” point to limited water resources in some areas, the environmental risks from toxic chemicals, including drinking water pollution, and more frequent earthquakes. Several U.S. states (California, New York, New Jersey, and parts of Colorado) have placed moratoria on hydraulic fracturing. Overseas, several countries including Bulgaria, France, and the Netherlands do not permit fracking at present (The Economist, 2013), although the United Kingdom recently lifted its moratorium, choosing to focus on strong regulations rather than an outright ban. On the positive side, the continued displacement of coal in electricity generation has helped to reduce U.S. carbon emissions to a 20-year low in 2012 (but the net global effect was diminished by greater exports of U.S. coal).

  • Infrastructural bottlenecks and regulatory issues. The lack of liquefaction facilities prevents natural gas exports overseas. Exports of domestically produced crude oil are legally prohibited except to Canada and Mexico.3 Transportation of U.S. crude oil among U.S. ports is allowed only on the (more expensive) U.S.-flagged vessels. U.S. oil refineries are not well suited to process light tight oil, although bartering with Mexico helps mitigate this problem.

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Oil and Gas Production Forecasts

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2013, 237; 10.5089/9781484376553.002.A002

Sources: Citi, Credit Suisse, EIA, ICF International (ICF), IEA, Evatane (EVA), IHS Global Insight (IHSGI), Interindustry Forecasting Project at the University of Maryland (INFORUM); and IMF staff estimates.1/ Includes NGL and unconventional oil.2/ Includes unconventional oil and excludes NGL.

B. Impact on the Energy Balance—Partial Equilibrium Analysis4

6. The combination of higher energy output and greater efficiency has led to a significant narrowing of the U.S. energy trade deficit. In nominal terms, the energy deficit (comprising of the oil, gas, and coal trade) shrank from 2.7 percent of GDP in 2008 to 1.9 percent of GDP in 2012. At the same time, the net volume of imported oil liquids has fallen from over 13 mbd in 2005 to 6–7 mbd at present, and the net volume of imported natural gas has halved as well.

7. This section assesses the likely path of future energy balances under alternative assumptions about production, consumption, and prices. The calculations are prepared in a “partial equilibrium” framework, i.e., without taking into account the second-round effects of higher energy output on the economy such as exchange rate appreciation and higher consumer demand. The analysis rests on the production and consumption forecasts prepared by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2013a) supplemented by price assumptions from the EIA, IMF’s World Economic Outlook, and the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2012). The specifications of baseline and alternative scenarios are as follows:

  • Baseline Scenario. Energy production, consumption (including its composition), exports, and efficiency are assumed to evolve as in the EIA’s Reference Case. GDP and energy price projections are those of the April 2013 World Economic Outlook (WEO).5

  • Constant Energy Prices. Assumptions are as in the baseline, but energy prices are assumed to remain constant in nominal terms at their 2012 level.

  • High Price Scenario (EIA Reference Case). Assumptions are as those in the baseline, but energy prices are assumed to follow the EIA’s Reference Case.

  • Low Production Scenario. Energy production, demand, exports, efficiency, and prices evolve according to the EIA’s Low Oil and Gas Resource Case. U.S. GDP projections are as in the baseline.

  • High Production Scenario. Energy production, demand, exports, efficiency, and prices follow the EIA’s High Oil and Gas Resource Case. U.S. GDP projections are as in the baseline.

8. In all scenarios, the U.S. energy balance is projected to continue improving as a share of GDP thanks to higher domestic production and expected efficiency gains.

uA02fig05

Energy Trade Balance

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2013, 237; 10.5089/9781484376553.002.A002

Source: EIA, IMF staff estimates.

  • Under the baseline, the energy balance improves by 0.7 percentage points of GDP by 2018, 0.9 percentage points of GDP by 2025 and 1.2 percentage points of GDP by 2040 (compared with the 1.9 percent of GDP energy deficit in 2012). Growing unconventional energy production will be an important driver of the improving energy balance over the next decade (contributing 0.3–0.4 percentage points of GDP), but its effect greatly diminishes by the end of the projection period because the EIA expects the domestic production of “tight oil” to peak in the early 2020s. Subsequently, much of the long-run improvement in the energy balance in this scenario is due to higher efficiency. An expected substitution in the composition of energy consumption from oil and coal into gas also explains some of the improvement in the energy balance. The results are broadly similar in the Constant Energy Price scenario.

    Change in Energy Trade Balance by 2018

    (with respect to 2012, in percent of GDP)

    article image
    Sources: EIA; IMF staff estimates.

    An increase in real energy demand holding constant efficiency.

    A mechanical improvement in the energy balance-to-GDP ratio due to higher nominal GDP.

  • In the High Price Scenario, improvement in the energy balance is about 0.4 percentage points of GDP in 2018 and 0.7 percentage points of GDP by 2040. This is because the EIA oil price is rising rapidly over the long term (to $110 a barrel in 2018, $145 a barrel in 2025, and $264 in 2040), while the WEO price initially follows the futures markets (and thus is falling during the first five years) and is then assumed for the purposes of this chapter to grow at the pace of consumer price inflation.

  • In the High Production Scenario, the energy balance would improve by 1 percentage point of GDP in 2018, and the United States would achieve net energy self-sufficiency by 2040. Higher unconventional energy production would contribute about 1.2 percentage points of GDP to the improvement in energy balance by 2018 and about 0.7 percentage points of GDP by the end of the projection period.

  • In the Low Production Scenario, the improvement in the oil trade balance would be modest, but still tangible. It would be mostly driven by improvements in energy efficiency and changes in the composition of energy consumption.

    Change in Energy Trade Balance by 2025

    (with respect to 2012, in percent of GDP)

    article image
    Sources: EIA; IMF staff estimates.

    An increase in real energy demand assuming constant efficiency.

    A mechanical improvement in the energy balance-to-GDP ratio due to higher nominal GDP.

    Change to Oil Trade Balance by 2040

    (with respect to 2012, in percent of GDP)

    article image
    Sources: EIA; IMF staff estimates.

    An increase in real energy demand assuming constant efficiency.

    A mechanical improvement in the energy balance-to-GDP ratio due to higher nominal GDP.

C. Macroeconomic Impact—General Equilibrium Analysis6

9. This section attempts to tackle the difficult question of broader macroeconomic implications of the unconventional energy boom. In addition to the direct effects of higher energy-related production on output and trade balance, the U.S. economy could be affected through a number of other indirect channels:

  • Corporations may take advantage of lower input costs to employ more labor and capital in both tradable and nontradable sectors. In the tradable sector, U.S. corporations would enjoy a permanent advantage over their international competitors because natural gas prices may not fully catch up to prices in other major markets even in the long run given the liquefaction and transport costs. Over time, corporations could choose to relocate some production to the United States, especially in the energy-intensive sectors such as chemical industry, aluminum, steel, and paper.7 Higher capital accumulation would help boost productivity and potential output. U.S. companies could also benefit from exporting their technology for extracting unconventional oil and gas, although expansion of overseas unconventional energy production would in turn reduce the relative cost advantage of U.S. manufacturers. There is also the risk that should U.S. natural gas prices remain low and global oil prices fall, investment in the unconventional energy sector would falter and expected production growth would not materialize.

    uA02fig06

    Energy Costs in Non-Transport Industries

    (Percent of gross output)

    Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2013, 237; 10.5089/9781484376553.002.A002

    Source: KLEMS database.

  • Consumers will benefit from lower energy prices and higher value of their equity wealth holdings, thus boosting domestic demand.

  • Higher domestic production could lower sensitivity of GDP to oil shocks, because any given increase in prices would generate higher profits in the energy sector.

10. Analysis in this section rests on the IMF’s Global Economy Model (GEM), a six-region general equilibrium model of the world economy. The model includes a simple energy sector which combines oil, gas, coal, and other energy sources. Energy is produced by combining labor and capital inputs with a fixed factor that proxies the discovery of unconventional energy and related extraction technologies. For simplicity, each country’s household sector is represented by a representative agent. As a result, countries are neither net creditors nor net debtors in the long-run. Given the stylized nature of the model, simulation results should be considered only as illustrative.

11. Model simulations are calibrated using a simplified baseline scenario from the previous section. Specifically, higher energy production and efficiency improvements are assumed to reduce the net energy trade deficit before any second-round effects by 0.9 percentage points of GDP during 2012–2025. It is also assumed that this improvement in the energy balance is attained linearly over the next 12 years, and is evenly split between the contributions of higher production and efficiency (each factor, therefore, contributes 0.45 percentage points of GDP).

12. Several modeling scenarios are considered to highlight the range of possible macroeconomic outcomes from the energy boom and efficiency gains. The key modeling assumptions are related to:

  • The degree of forward-looking behavior among households and firms with respect to the future path of energy production and efficiency;

  • The degree of initial economic slack and short-run monetary policy response;

  • Private-sector saving behavior;

  • The technological feasibility of energy exports.

13. The simulation results suggest that the macroeconomic benefits for the United States are positive, but may be modest. In a scenario with only production gains (and no efficiency improvements), the U.S. real GDP level gradually increases by about 0.3 percent over the next 10 years. In a scenario with both production increases and efficiency gains, the GDP level increases by ½–1 percent during the next decade. In the short run, the impact on GDP is largest when the boom in energy production and efficiency are fully anticipated and the economy exhibits economic slack (and thus monetary policy does not need to lean against the resulting increase in aggregate demand). The real exchange rate tends to appreciate and energy prices fall in all scenarios, helping to boost private consumption and investment. In the medium run, the U.S. current account balance as a share of GDP deteriorates slightly, but the adjustment path is highly sensitive to assumptions about expectations and private saving behavior—the current account can either improve or deteriorate. Specifically:

  • Fully-anticipated production boom without efficiency gains (Figure 2). When the future increases in energy production are fully anticipated, firms understand that the cost of energy will remain low or be declining for an extended period of time and be permanently lower in the long run. Given the decline in the cost of production, firms will move along their supply curve, employing more capital and labor to increase output. Adjustment costs encourage firms to start investing before all the declines in energy prices materialize. Private consumption increases as well since real incomes rise due to lower energy prices, higher employment, and appreciation of the dollar which reduces import prices, and consumers benefit from the higher value of equity holdings in the energy sector. The U.S. current account balance initially deteriorates as U.S. households and corporations temporarily increase borrowing from abroad to support higher consumption and investment. However, owing to the representative household structure of the GEM, the net foreign assets (NFA) and the current account will return to the baseline in the long run.8 The U.S. dollar appreciates reflecting the improved competitive position of the U.S. economy.

    Figure 2.
    Figure 2.

    GEM Simulation Results: Global Market

    Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2013, 237; 10.5089/9781484376553.002.A002

    Source: IMF staff simulations using the GEM.Note: “Oil” stands for the entire energy sector.

  • Unanticipated production boom without efficiency gains (Figure 2). When firms and households do not anticipate future production increases (or, similarly, when they consider the uncertainties about future energy production as very high), the initial increase in GDP is smaller. Firms do not envisage the future declines in energy prices and households do not anticipate the magnitude of the increase in their wealth and real income. Since domestic demand responds much more gradually, the increase in non-energy imports is also smaller. The current account balance improves slightly relative to the baseline even as the U.S. dollar appreciates.

  • Segmented energy markets without efficiency gains (Figure 3). Should export constraints keep U.S. gas prices substantially lower than overseas, the increase in non-energy investment would be larger than under the baseline. However, consumption would not respond as strongly as in the base case. This is because the dollar would appreciate by less (and thus consumers would benefit less from lower import prices), and the value of household equity holdings in the energy sector would also be lower. The market segmentation would lead to slightly higher U.S. GDP than under the baseline, but welfare measured in terms of consumer utility would be lower since consumption is weaker and labor input is higher (working more brings disutility in the model). The global economy would be worse off compared with scenario with full trade.

    Figure 3.
    Figure 3.

    GEM Simulation Results: Segmented Market

    Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2013, 237; 10.5089/9781484376553.002.A002

    Source: IMF staff simulations using the GEM.Note: “Oil” stands for the entire energy sector.

  • Economic slack and role of monetary policy (Figure 4). In the baseline scenario, monetary policy leans against the short-term demand boom and its inflationary consequences. In practice, however, monetary policy may not need to respond if there was substantial slack in the economy. In a scenario with full anticipation, the initial increases in consumption and investment are much more pronounced, as higher inflation reduces the real interest rate and the dollar temporarily depreciates. In the unanticipated case, however, the extent of economic slack plays little role since demand expands roughly in line with supply and there are essentially no inflation consequences that require a monetary policy response.

    Figure 4.
    Figure 4.

    GEM Simulation Results: Monetary Accommodation

    Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2013, 237; 10.5089/9781484376553.002.A002

    Source: IMF staff simulations using the GEM.Note: “Oil” stands for the entire energy sector.

  • Higher private saving (Figure 5). This scenario assumes that higher profits from unconventional energy production are largely saved, for example, because households who own the equity in the energy sector may have lower-than-average marginal propensities to consumer out of wealth. With households now opting to increase savings, real consumption remains close to the baseline for several years before gradually rising. This results in a more modest acceleration in GDP relative to the baseline scenario, lower demand pressures, and less tightening of monetary policy.

    Figure 5.
    Figure 5.

    GEM Simulation Results: Increased Private Savings

    Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2013, 237; 10.5089/9781484376553.002.A002

    Source: IMF staff simulations using the GEM.Note: “Oil” stands for the entire energy sector.

  • Higher efficiency (Figure 6). Higher energy efficiency combined with the production boom help raise the cumulative positive GDP effect to about ½–1 percent after 10 years.9 In a stylized (and unrealistic) scenario in which only the United States benefits from higher energy efficiency, capital flows attracted by higher domestic productivity boost domestic investment and consumption, and the current account deteriorates. In a scenario with global efficiency gains, the U.S. benefits from a sharper drop in global energy prices.

    Figure 6.
    Figure 6.

    GEM Simulation Results: Higher Efficiency

    Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2013, 237; 10.5089/9781484376553.002.A002

    Source: IMF staff simulations using the GEM.Note: “Oil” stands for the entire energy sector.

D. Conclusions

14. This chapter explored potential implications of the U.S. unconventional energy boom. Most analysts agree that U.S. energy output will continue rising going forward, although there is a wide range of views about the possible outcomes. For plausible parameter values, model simulations suggest that the macroeconomic effects will be positive for the United States but may be modest. Under the baseline, the increase in real GDP level attributable to higher domestic energy production could be less than 1 percent after 10 years, although energy production growth has tended to surprise on the upside, and the official production forecasts could prove too pessimistic. The energy boom could put some appreciation pressure on the U.S. dollar, while the current account implications appear ambiguous. Although the U.S. macroeconomic effects appear modest due to the small share of mining and energy-intensive industries in the economy, the energy boom could yet have important implications for the rest of the world, including the major energy exporters especially if accompanied by a more aggressive pursuit of unconventional energy sources in other economies.

References

  • Barclays, 2013, “US shale energy: Modest economic and equity market effects set to grow over time”, May.

  • British Petroleum (BP), 2013, “BP Energy Outlook 2030”.

  • Citigroup, 2012, “Energy 2020: North America, the new Middle East?”, March.

  • The Economist, 2013, “Unconventional Gas in Europe: Frack to the Future”, February 2.

  • Energy Information Agency (EIA), 2013a, “Annual Energy Outlook 2013”.

  • Energy Information Agency, 2013b, “Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States”, June 2013.

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  • Goldman Sachs, 2012, “The US Energy Revolution: How Shale Energy Could Ignite the US Growth Engine”, September.

  • International Energy Agency (IEA), 2012, “World Economic Outlook”.

  • NERA Economic Consulting, 2012, “Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG Exports from the United States”, December.

1

This chapter was prepared by Ben Hunt, Martin Sommer, Gabriel Di Bella, Madelyn Estrada, Akito Matsumoto, and Dirk Muir. The authors have benefited from useful discussions with Samya Beidas-Strom, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Shane Streifel, and several staff members from the Congressional Budget Office, the Federal Reserve, and the Treasury. The opinions expressed in the chapter are those of the authors, and should not be associated with any of the institutions above.

3

Refined products such as gasoline can be exported. The United States has become a net exporter of refined petroleum products in recent years. Due to this integration with the world market, the U.S. and global gasoline prices have co-moved, despite the large wedge between the U.S. (WTI) and global crude oil benchmarks (Brent).

4

Calculations in this section were prepared by Gabriel Di Bella.

5

The WEO includes energy price projections through 2018. For the period after 2018, energy prices are assumed for the purposes of this chapter to grow at 2 percent per year (the oil price is assumed at $84 a barrel in 2018, $97 a barrel in 2025, and $130 in 2040), and GDP is assumed to grow at its trend rate.

6

Simulations in this section were prepared by Dirk Muir.

7

However, the savings from lower energy costs would be tangible only in a handful of industries, which make up a small fraction of U.S. GDP. For example, the four non-transport industries with the energy cost share greater than 5 percent of output account for just 1¼ of GDP. The entire durable manufacturing sector (including low energy-intensity industries) accounts for 6½ percent of GDP. Certain industries also use natural gas as feedstock and could in principle benefit from low U.S. natural gas prices to a greater degree than suggested by the data on energy shares—however, sufficiently detailed input-output tables are not readily available.

8

In a representative agent model, the steady states for the current account and net foreign asset position are indeterminate. A number of approaches have been applied to ensure that these types of models have a stable steady state. In GEM, a term is added to the exchange rate equity to force NFA and the current account to return to baseline in the long run in the absence of any change in any country or region’s ration of public debt to GDP.

9

For simplicity, the simulation assumes that the long-standing trend toward higher production efficiency is not yet reflect in the behavior of households and corporations—this assumption would tend to exaggerate the positive GDP effects in the scenario.

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Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
United States: Selected Issues
Author: International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept.
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2013: Issue 237
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
9781484376553
ISSN:
1934-7685
Pages:
82
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484376553.002

Domestic Crude Oil Production by source

(Million barrels per day)

Natural Gas Production by Source

(Trillion Cubic Feet)

Natural Gas Prices

($MMBtu)

Oil and Gas Production Forecasts

Energy Trade Balance

(Percent of GDP)

Energy Costs in Non-Transport Industries

(Percent of gross output)

GEM Simulation Results: Global Market

GEM Simulation Results: Segmented Market

GEM Simulation Results: Monetary Accommodation

GEM Simulation Results: Increased Private Savings

GEM Simulation Results: Higher Efficiency