Kingdom of Swaziland
Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation.
Author:
International Monetary Fund
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Publication Date:
08 Feb 2012
eISBN:
9781463940386
ISBN:
9781463940386
Language:
English
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; IMF economist; government cash situation; consumer price inflation; budget financing; SACU receipt; regulatory agency; wage bill; GDP deflator
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The fiscal crisis in the Kingdom of Swaziland emanating from a decline in revenue from the Southern African Customs Union and one of the largest public wage bills in sub-Saharan Africa has reached a critical stage. Faced with revenue shortfalls associated with slowing economic activity, uncontrolled public spending, and lack of financing, the authorities continued to deplete central bank reserves and accumulate domestic arrears. The authorities have been able to finance only a minimal amount of expenditure, including wages, utilities, and essential transfers.

Abstract

The fiscal crisis in the Kingdom of Swaziland emanating from a decline in revenue from the Southern African Customs Union and one of the largest public wage bills in sub-Saharan Africa has reached a critical stage. Faced with revenue shortfalls associated with slowing economic activity, uncontrolled public spending, and lack of financing, the authorities continued to deplete central bank reserves and accumulate domestic arrears. The authorities have been able to finance only a minimal amount of expenditure, including wages, utilities, and essential transfers.

RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK

A. The Fiscal Crisis Has Reached a Critical Stage

1. Since the last Article IV Consultation, the fiscal crisis has worsened (Figures 1 and 2). Real GDP growth slowed to an estimated 0.3 percent in 2011, compared with 2.0 percent in 2010, while inflation picked up.1 Faced with revenue shortfalls associated with slowing economic activity, uncontrolled public spending, and lack of financing, the authorities continued to deplete central bank reserves and accumulate domestic arrears. At end-September 2011, domestic arrears reached an estimated E 1.5 billion (5.3 percent of GDP), while gross official reserves declined from E 7.3 billion at end-January 2010 to E 4.4 billion at end-November 2011 (2.5 months of import cover). In FY 2011/12, the authorities have been able to finance only a minimal amount of expenditure, including wages, utilities, and essential transfers. As a result, key social programs, like the fight against HIV/AIDS, free primary education, support for orphaned and vulnerable children, and elderly grants, have been negatively affected.

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Swaziland: Recent Economic Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2012, 037; 10.5089/9781463940386.002.A001

Sources: Country authorities and IMF staff estimates.
Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Swaziland: Cross-Country Comparison

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2012, 037; 10.5089/9781463940386.002.A001

Sources: Country authorities, IMF staff estimates, and World Bank Doing Business Indicators 2011.

2. Policy advice provided during the 2010 Article IV Consultation has only partly been implemented. The authorities adopted a 10 percent wage cut for political appointees and parliamentarians in April 2011 and a supplementary budget cutting expenditure by E 556 million (1.9 percent of GDP) in November 2011. However, these measures will not restore fiscal sustainability because the fiscal deficit is now expected to reach close to 10 percent of GDP in the fiscal year ending March 31, 2012 (FY 2011/12). Initial steps were taken to improve the business environment, including the preparation for the privatization of the last state-owned bank. Although a new regulatory body for the supervision of nonbank financial institutions was created by law in 2010, it is not yet operational.

3. A Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), approved by Fund Management in April 2011, quickly went off track (Box 1). The authorities did not implement key spending cuts they committed to under the SMP, including the E 240 million (0.8 percent of GDP) cut in the wage bill. Expenditure overruns, notably on defense, travel allowances, and public investment led to a significant accumulation of domestic arrears and worsened the quality of spending.

Performance Under the Staff-Monitored Program

The first-ever Staff-Monitored Program, approved by Fund Management on April 4, 2011, went quickly off-track. Most quantitative targets under the SMP at end-March and end-June 2011 were missed, as a result of lack of expenditure controls. The targets on total financing of the budget and on net international reserves were missed both at end-March and end-June. The targets on net domestic assets of the central bank and on the government social expenditure were met at end-March, but missed at end-June.

On the structural side, most structural benchmarks were met, albeit with a delay. The notable exception was the implementation of a wage bill cut for E 240 million envisaged for end-May 2011.

Staff-Monitored Program Indicative Targets, 2011

article image
Sources: Swazi authorities and IMF staff estimates.

Values are cumulative from April 1 (beginning of the fiscal year).

Definitions and program adjusters are specified in the TMU.

Includes spending on school feeding program, old age pension, and HIV/AIDS.

Continuous indicative target.

Despite significant development needs, Swaziland has one of the highest defense spending budgets in the region (Figure 3). Most indicative targets at end-March and end-June 2011 were missed.

Figure 3.
Figure 3.

Swaziland Defense Spending

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2012, 037; 10.5089/9781463940386.002.A001

Source: US Central Intelligence Agency.

4. Access to domestic and foreign financing dried up in 2011. Commercial banks reduced their exposure to the government, leading to net redemptions of government paper in the second half of 2011. With the SMP off track, the African Development Bank and the World Bank were not in a position to disburse their budget support. The proposed R 2.4 billion (about $350 million) loan from the South African authorities, announced in August 2011, has not been signed yet, pending an agreement on the associated conditionality.

5. The fiscal crisis is spilling over to the corporate and the financial sectors. The accumulation of arrears by the government has created financial constraints on private businesses, which consequently have reduced their activity. In parallel, the exposure of the financial sector to the government is significant (between 10 and 30 percent of commercial banks’ assets), both in direct exposure to government securities and indirectly through loans given to government suppliers and civil servants. Furthermore, according to commercial banks, about E 1 billion (3¼ percent of GDP) in deposits were converted into rand deposits or transferred to South Africa in the second and third quarters of 2011. At the same time, the central bank increased the reserve requirement and the liquidity ratio in June 2011. As a result, banks are now facing liquidity pressures. In addition, savings and credit cooperatives are highly exposed to civil servants, have low liquidity ratios, and are without adequate supervision and regulation, because the new regulatory agency for nonbank financial institutions (NBFI), created by law in 2010, is not yet functional.

6. The fiscal crisis is affecting external stability. The current account deficit is estimated to have narrowed to 10.7 percent of GDP in 2011, reflecting higher sugar exports more than offsetting a decline in tourism receipts. Portfolio outflows and continued government borrowing—including an emergency credit line of E 660 million (2.4 percent of GDP) provided by the central bank in February 2011—have put pressure on the gross official reserves of the central bank. The real effective exchange rate depreciated by 6.7 percent in the 12 months to October 2011.

7. Swaziland continues to maintain one exchange restriction subject to Fund approval under Article VIII. This arises from a limit on the provision of foreign exchange for advance payments for the import of certain capital goods. In November 2011, the central bank increased the limit from 33.33 percent to 50 percent.

8. Social and political tensions have increased. Periodic demonstrations have taken place during the year. The latest demonstrations in September 2011, calling for democratic reforms and fair burden-sharing of the adjustment, turned violent.

B. Outlook and Risks: A Significant Contraction in 2012

9. The outlook for the medium term is predicated on an initial contraction in 2012, followed by a gradual recovery. Under the baseline scenario with an up-front fiscal adjustment in 2012 triggering a renewed access to external financing, real GDP growth is projected to contract by 2 percent in 2012 (Table 2). It would then gradually increase to 2½ percent over the medium term, largely driven by private sector activity. In contrast, unchanged policies are likely to result in a stronger contraction in 2012, with a weaker growth recovery over the medium term, because the fiscal position remains unsustainable (Table 1). The contraction would result from much larger accumulation of arrears, and the medium-term path would suffer from an adjustment based on capital expenditure cuts and a loss of confidence by the private sector.

Table 1.

Swaziland: Selected Economic Indicators, 2009–16 1

Projections (unchanged policies scenario)

article image
Sources: Swazi authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Projections are based on the adjustment envisaged under the proposed SMP.

IMF Information Notice System trade-weighted; end of period. For 2011, numbers for end-October.

Percent of beginning of period M2, unless otherwise indicated.

Twelve-month time deposits rate. For 2011, numbers for October.

Fiscal year data (fiscal years run from April 1 to March 31).

Table 2.

Swaziland: Selected Economic Indicators, 2009–16 1

Projections (baseline scenario)

article image
Sources: Swazi authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Projections are based on the adjustment envisaged under the proposed SMP.

IMF Information Notice System trade-weighted; end of period. For 2011, numbers for end-October.

Percent of beginning of period M2, unless otherwise indicated.

Twelve-month time deposits rate. For 2011, numbers for October.

Fiscal year data (fiscal years run from April 1 to March 31).

10. The medium-term outlook reflects significant macroeconomic risks (Figure 4):2

Figure 4.
Figure 4.
Figure 4.
Figure 4.

Swaziland: Risks to the Outlook

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2012, 037; 10.5089/9781463940386.002.A001

Sources: Country authorities and IMF staff estimates.

  • Under unchanged policies, Swaziland would face a significant risk of debt distress in the short to medium term, with the debt-to-GDP ratio increasing rapidly to more than 80 percent of GDP by 2016 (Figure 4). This is notwithstanding the expected windfall in SACU revenue in 2012/13 of E 7.1 billion (23.4 percent of GDP),3 and optimistic authorities’ projections of SACU revenue in the subsequent years, given the protracted difficulties in the world economy. Under the baseline scenario, the debt-to-GDP ratio would stabilize around 30 percent of GDP over the medium term, whereas domestic arrears would be paid fully in 2012.

  • The real exchange rate is significantly overvalued, largely because of the large fiscal imbalances. Staff estimates suggest an overvaluation of the real exchange rate of 19–33 percent at end-October 2011. The overvaluation also reflects low productivity, underscored by a weak business climate, widespread poverty, and the negative impact of HIV/AIDS on productivity. With the implementation of the fiscal adjustment predicated in the baseline scenario, the overvaluation could be reduced to 3–16 percent over the medium term.

  • At 2.5 months of import cover, the reserves of the central bank currently seem inadequate to sustain parity with the rand by traditional or model-based metrics. The traditional metric of three months of import cover indicates a gap from an adequate level of reserves of about E 1.0 billion. Model-based estimations, based on a new methodology for emerging markets developed by IMF staff, show a similar gap of E 0.7 billion.4

POLICY DISCUSSIONS

Discussions focused on (i) restoring fiscal sustainability, in line with available financing; (ii) preserving external stability and improving competitiveness; and (iii) addressing emerging pressures in the financial sector. The discussions were anchored on the baseline scenario, where the overall fiscal deficit would be reduced gradually to below 3 percent of GDP by 2013/14, while debt would remain below 30 percent of GDP (Figure 5). The external current account deficit would decline in line with the fiscal adjustment path from about 10 percent in 2011 to about 4 percent over the medium term. Accordingly, the gross official reserve position would strengthen to about 4 months of import cover.

Figure 5.
Figure 5.

Swaziland: Medium-Term Outlook Under the Baseline Scenario

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2012, 037; 10.5089/9781463940386.002.A001

Sources: Country authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

A. Policy Theme 1: Restoring Fiscal Sustainability

Staff Recommendations

11. Restoring fiscal sustainability—in the face of a permanent decline in revenues—will require a cut in the wage bill, while safeguarding priority spending. Following passage of the supplementary budget in November 2011, the financing gap for the remainder of FY 2011/12 is estimated at E 2.9 billion (9.9 percent of GDP), including the repayment of the stock of outstanding domestic arrears. The scope for additional revenue measures is small and unlikely to yield additional collections, given the slowdown in economic activity. Further cuts in other recurrent expenditure and/or capital spending would further affect priority spending in education and health. This leaves only the wage bill as the largest expenditure, accounting for 50 percent of total expenditure and 63 percent of total revenue in FY 2010/11. An initial wage bill cut of E 300 million (1.2 percent of GDP) would start bringing the wage bill down to more moderate levels. Several options could be considered, including a graduated wage cut and/or the implementation of the authorities’ voluntary early retirement scheme.

12. The 2012/13 budget should aim at a fiscal surplus, while using the windfall SACU revenue to pay the stock of domestic arrears. The implementation of the VAT in FY 2012/13 is likely to boost domestic revenue by about 1 percent of GDP. Further cuts in the wage bill, an additional E 300 million, would be needed to continue making progress on fiscal sustainability. Domestic arrears are projected to reach E 2.5 billion (8.6 percent of GDP) at end-March 2012 and can be covered by the windfall increase in SACU revenue (E 4.2 billion). The need to restore fiscal sustainability and the lack of external financing will leave little room to expand other recurrent spending or capital investment. Accordingly, staff recommended targeting an overall surplus of 3.1 percent of GDP on a commitment basis, which would translate into a cash deficit of 6.0 percent of GDP, to pay off domestic arrears.

13. Staff strongly advised against the use of the windfall SACU revenue to postpone the adjustment or to increase spending. Postponing the adjustment would increase fiscal risks because SACU receipts remain highly volatile and are still expected to decline over the medium term as a result of weakening global economic growth, trade liberalization, and a possible change in the SACU revenue-sharing formula.5 Staff encouraged the authorities to continue to work with other SACU members at a regional level to reduce the volatility of SACU revenue.

14. To ensure that fiscal objectives can be achieved, it is critical to strengthen the role of the Ministry of Finance and the Swaziland Revenue Authority (SRA). Currently, budgetary functions are divided among the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Development and Planning, and the budget functions of the Ministry of Public Service. To bolster the capacity of the government to deliver the approved budget, staff recommended merging all budgetary functions into one ministry, which would be solely accountable for all aspects of elaborating and implementing the budget. Furthermore, strengthening the capacity of the SRA remains essential to mobilizing additional domestic revenue.

15. Staff discussed a comprehensive medium-term public financial management (PFM) action plan with the authorities, based on inputs from staff of the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Union (EU), the IMF, and the World Bank (WB). The AfDB and the EU have also offered significant financial resources to implement the proposed action plan. Staff encouraged the authorities to continue working on a revised PFM bill, with technical assistance from AFRITAC South, and to develop a medium-term fiscal framework, that would link spending to key fiscal indicators (debt and available financing).

16. Greater transparency of public finances would also strengthen the quality of spending. Staff encouraged the Ministry of Finance to undertake an assessment of the transparency of its practices against international best standards through a fiscal Report on the Standards and Codes (ROSC), which could provide helpful guidance on the way forward.

Authorities’ Views

17. The authorities agreed on the magnitude of the adjustment but disagreed with an up-front cut in the wage bill. They preferred a more gradual approach, based on reducing the civil service through an audit of the civil service roster (expected to be undertaken in 2012 with assistance from the World Bank), attrition, a reduction in the retirement age, and possibly a revised voluntary retirement scheme. They conceded, though, that it will be difficult to finance government operations during the coming months.

18. The authorities agreed that all budgetary functions should be centralized in one ministry. They plan to do so after the legislative elections in March 2013.

19. For the 2012/13 budget, the authorities are targeting a deficit of 5 percent of GDP in their medium-term budget outlook paper. They acknowledged, however, that the budget may not be financed unless additional external budget financing becomes available.

20. The authorities shared the need to strengthen their PFM system. They have requested technical assistance to revise the PFM bill and the tax system; and to strengthen the budget process, expenditure controls, and internal and external audit functions. However, the authorities are still reviewing the PFM action plan proposed by staff.

21. The authorities agreed that greater transparency in the budgetary process would strengthen the quality of spending. However, they were not ready to undertake a fiscal ROSC.

B. Policy Theme 2: Preserving External Stability and Improving Competitiveness

22. Swaziland’s external stability is heavily dependent on ensuring an adequate level of reserves of the central bank. As part of the Common Monetary Area, the lilangeni is fixed at par with the South African rand, which is also legal tender. Therefore, there is no independent monetary or exchange rate policy. The real exchange rate overvaluation and the depletion of gross official reserves since January 2011 pose serious risks to the peg. Staff projects that, under unchanged policies, the gross official reserves of the central bank would be depleted in the medium term.

Staff Recommendations

23. The parity against the rand needs to be preserved to avoid a severe recession driven by balance sheet effects. In view of the large liabilities of the corporate sector to the rest of the world, a change in exchange rate policies would have a severe impact on private sector activity. Staff therefore urged the government to stop borrowing from the central bank and repay the emergency credit line the central bank extended to the government in February 2011. In addition, the implementation of the proposed fiscal adjustment would not only reduce the current account deficit over the medium term, but also create more favorable conditions for the resumption of capital inflows.

24. Competitiveness could be enhanced through a public sector wage cut and improvements in the business climate. The fiscal adjustment is not only needed to restore fiscal sustainability, but is also the most effective policy tool available to reduce the external current account deficit and thus protect the reserves of the central bank and the peg. Given the weight of the public sector in the economy (estimated at about 50 percent of GDP) and the links between public and private wages, a public wage cut would strengthen private sector competitiveness and lead to the needed depreciation of the real exchange rate. Staff encouraged the authorities to work with the World Bank and other donors on a strategy for private sector–led growth, which would increase and diversify the export base and attract foreign investment. In addition, staff emphasized the importance of privatizing public enterprises and liberalizing markets to allow greater competition.

Authorities’ Views

25. The authorities agreed that preserving the parity of the peg is a priority. In line with the staff’s recommendation, the government decided in September 2011 to stop borrowing from the central bank or using its frozen deposits at the central bank.

26. The authorities also broadly agreed that private growth could be a driving force for Swaziland’s economy. Consultants have already been approached to finalize the privatization process of the last state-owned bank. However, the authorities are not yet ready to liberalize the domestic mobile telecommunications market or other sectors of the economy.

C. Policy Theme 3: Addressing Emerging Pressures in the Financial Sector

27. The financial sector is starting to feel the spillover effects of the fiscal crisis. With the outflow of deposits to South Africa and delays in government payment of civil servants’ loans to commercial banks, liquidity pressures in the banking sector have been mounting.6 Liquid assets in the banking system only covered 24 percent of liquid liabilities at end-June 2011. In addition, credit cooperatives are highly exposed to civil servants, have low liquidity ratios, and are not adequately supervised and regulated. Furthermore, asset management companies have recently introduced new products to allow depositors to place resources in South Africa.

Staff Recommendations

28. The emerging liquidity problems in the financial sector need to be addressed up front. At present, commercial banks are liquidity constrained but are still solvent. This requires liquidity injection by their parent companies.7

29. The new regulatory agency for the supervision of NBFIs should be made operational as soon as possible. The lack of a functioning supervisory and regulatory agency for NBFIs has led to a regulatory vacuum, which may lead to a significant concentration of systemic risk in savings and credit cooperatives and other NBFIs.

30. In the interim, the supervision of NBFIs could be moved to the central bank to fill the regulatory vacuum. The central bank is knowledgeable and experienced in the regulation and supervision of the financial sector. It could therefore easily accommodate the supervision of NBFIs on a temporary basis. Once the new regulatory agency is operational, the central bank could shift some of its resources to the new agency.

Authorities’ Views

31. The authorities are aware of the need for liquidity injections. Although the central bank does not have sufficient resources to provide extensive liquidity, it will call on parent companies to provide lines of credit to their subsidiaries in Swaziland.

32. The authorities agree that adequate regulation and supervision of NBFIs is imperative. The government recognizes the vulnerabilities stemming from lack of supervision and regulation of unit trusts and savings and credit cooperatives. The central bank stands ready to provide the necessary expertise once the new regulator becomes operational. Meanwhile, the regulation and supervision of savings and credit cooperatives will be transferred (on a temporary basis) from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Trade to the Central Bank of Swaziland.

STAFF APPRAISAL

33. Swaziland’s fiscal crisis has reached a critical stage. Budget financing has dried up, domestic arrears continue to mount, and the risk of not being able to pay civil servants’ wages over the next few months is high. More importantly, economic activity, the financial sector, and key priority programs on education, health, and social protection are being negatively affected.

34. The macroeconomic outlook is bleak, notwithstanding the windfall SACU revenue in 2012. Under unchanged policies, the economy is likely to contract significantly as a result of the projected global economic slowdown and the continued negative impact of the fiscal crisis. As a result, the current account deficit could widen further over the medium term, and external stability could ultimately be jeopardized.

35. Staff therefore urges the authorities to take up-front measures, including cutting the wage bill, embedded in a medium-term strategy to restore fiscal sustainability and access to budget financing. Although steps taken so far to cut wages of political appointees and parliamentarians in April 2011 and to pass the supplementary budget in November 2011 are welcome, they are insufficient to restore fiscal sustainability. A significant cut is needed to start restoring fiscal sustainability. Time is of the essence; otherwise, the permanent impact of the crisis on the economy and poverty indicators will be much larger.

36. The 2012/13 budget will be essential in the strategy to restore fiscal sustainability. The budget should aim at a significant surplus to use the windfall from SACU revenue to pay off domestic arrears. The wage bill will need to be cut further. In addition, the quality of spending needs to be improved, with a significant reorientation toward education, health, and vulnerable segments of society. The public investment program should be refocused on key national priorities, with projects clearly ranked according to their development impact. The authorities are also encouraged to work with other SACU members to reduce the volatility of SACU revenue.

37. Staff strongly supports the authorities’ objective of preserving the exchange rate parity with the rand. It provides the key anchor for macroeconomic stability and for trade and financial integration. A change in exchange rate policy would have a severe negative impact on the economy and the financial system. It is therefore essential for the government to stop borrowing from the central bank or drawing down its deposits at the central bank, so as to restore an adequate level of reserves. The authorities are urged to eliminate the remaining exchange restriction subject to approval under Article VIII.

38. Restoring competitiveness is critical for higher sustainable growth. Staff encourages the authorities to move forward with the privatization of the last remaining state-owned bank and with the liberalization of other markets. It is also imperative to redouble efforts at improving the business climate and making Swaziland an attractive environment for private sector–led growth.

39. The financial sector requires intensive supervision. The emerging signs of liquidity pressures could quickly turn into systemic solvency problems if not addressed up front. In addition, the central bank should take over, on a temporary basis, the supervision of savings and credit cooperatives to ensure adequate liquidity and appropriate regulation. The new regulatory agency for NBFIs should be made operational at the earliest possible opportunity.

40. It is recommended that the Kingdom of Swaziland remains on the standard 12-month Article IV Consultation cycle.

Table 3.

Swaziland: Fiscal Operations of the Central Government, 2009/10–16/17 1

(Emalangeni millions)

article image
Sources: Swazi authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

The fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31.

Includes one-off spending of 2.5 percent of GDP to finance the early-retirement program EVERS.

Unidentified financing assumed to be covered through foreign financing, which is included in the calculations of the stock of debt.

Table 4.

Swaziland: Fiscal Operations of the Central Government, 2009/10–16/17 1

(Percent of GDP)

article image
Sources: Swazi authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

The fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31.

Includes one-off spending of 2.5 percent of GDP to finance the early-retirement program EVERS.

Unidentified financing assumed to be covered through foreign financing, which is included in the calculations of the stock of debt.

Table 5.

Swaziland: Monetary Accounts, 2009–16 1

(Emalangeni millions; unless otherwise indicated)

article image
Sources: Swazi authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

End of period.

Excludes rand in circulation.

Including valuation changes.

Table 6.

Swaziland: Balance of Payments, 2009–16

(US$ millions; unless otherwise indicated)

article image
Sources: Swazi authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.
Table 7.

Swaziland: Financial Sector Indicators, 2005–10

article image
Sources: Central Bank of Swaziland and IMF staff estimates.
Table 8.

Swaziland: Millennium Development Goals, 1995–2011

article image
Source: World Bank.
1

The authorities have a higher estimate of real GDP growth of 1.3 percent for 2011.

3

The 2012/13 SACU revenue is significantly higher than expected, reflecting optimistic assumptions on SACU imports and an adjustment of E 1.0 billion related to higher-than-projected imports in fiscal year 2010/11.

4

Roaf, J., and others (2011), “Assessing Reserve Adequacy,” IMF Policy Paper.

5

See Basdevant O. and others, “The Design of Fiscal Adjustment Strategies in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland”, IMF Working Paper 11/266 (November 2011).

6

Debt service payments for civil servants’ loans are deducted at source from their government salaries.

7

Swaziland’s banking sector is composed of one state-owned bank and three subsidiaries of South African banks.

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Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
Kingdom of Swaziland: Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation.
Author:
International Monetary Fund
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2012: Issue 037
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
9781463940386
ISSN:
1934-7685
Pages:
39
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781463940386.002
Figure 1.

Swaziland: Recent Economic Developments
Figure 2.

Swaziland: Cross-Country Comparison
Figure 3.

Swaziland Defense Spending
Figure 4.

Swaziland: Risks to the Outlook
Figure 4.

Swaziland: Risks to the Outlook
Figure 4.

Swaziland: Risks to the Outlook
Figure 5.

Swaziland: Medium-Term Outlook Under the Baseline Scenario