Georgia
Seventh and Eighth Reviews Under the Stand-By Arrangement, and Requests for Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria and Rephasing of Purchases—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Georgia

Real GDP growth for 2010 has been revised upward to 6.3 percent, and annual CPI inflation has increased to about 10 percent. End-December performance criteria (PC) are expected to be met, with the exception of the fiscal deficit and general government expenditure targets owing to the late disbursement of budget grants and disbursements under a project loan on-lent by the government, which came in earlier than the authorities anticipated. Policies are on track and have broadly delivered on program objectives.

Abstract

Real GDP growth for 2010 has been revised upward to 6.3 percent, and annual CPI inflation has increased to about 10 percent. End-December performance criteria (PC) are expected to be met, with the exception of the fiscal deficit and general government expenditure targets owing to the late disbursement of budget grants and disbursements under a project loan on-lent by the government, which came in earlier than the authorities anticipated. Policies are on track and have broadly delivered on program objectives.

I. Program Performance

Georgia: Quantitative Performance Criteria (PC) and Indicative Targets, 2010

article image
Sources: Georgian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Actual figures and quantitative targets are based on program exchange rates.

The continuous performance criterion for external arrears is defined in paragraph 21 of the TMU.

1. All end-September PCs were met and end-December PCs are expected to be met, with the exception of the fiscal deficit and general government expenditure targets:

  • The end-December PCs on NIR and NDA are expected to be observed by wide margins, owing to lower-than-programmed foreign exchange intervention since June, and lower reserve money growth in the case of NDA; their status will be reported separately by January 6.

  • The end-December PCs on the government deficit and general government expenditures are expected to be missed, owing to a delay (from 2010 to 2011) in the disbursement of budget grants amounting to GEL 56 million (0.3 percent of GDP) and disbursements by KfW-EBRD-EIB of a GEL100 million loan (0.5 percent of GDP), which came in earlier than the authorities anticipated.1 These disbursements relate to a power project loan, which is on-lent by the government to a state enterprise. Waivers of nonobservance are requested (LOI ¶ 29) on account of these two developments, although the authorities consider that higher other revenues might compensate for the shortfall in grant disbursements.

  • No offsetting action is deemed necessary to offset the increase in net lending in 2010, since the lending operation simply rephases disbursements under an existing loan agreement, which benefits a state enterprise under commercial terms. Furthermore, the timing of disbursements is not controlled by the government. In essence, government on-lending is equivalent to guaranteeing the external loan to the state enterprise, but, because it is channeled through the budget, it affects the deficit as measured under the program. The power project involves the construction of a high-voltage power transmission line that would enable Georgia to sell electricity to Turkey, and the commercial return from the project is expected to enable full repayment by the state enterprise.

  • The end-December indicative target on the contracting and guaranteeing of external debt is expected to be met.

2. Structural benchmarks under the program have been completed.

Georgia: Structural Benchmarks for 2010

article image

II. Recent Developments

3. Parliament approved a change in the constitution that redistributes powers from the presidency to parliament and the prime minister, effective in 2013. Parliamentary and presidential elections are scheduled for 2012 and 2013, respectively.

4. Real GDP growth for 2010 has been revised up to 6.3 percent, on the back of very strong growth in the first half of the year, moderating somewhat in the second half. While there are no reliable measures of capacity utilization, the authorities consider that the economy may be operating near capacity in some sectors, when taking into account the lack of new investment during the last two years.

uA01fig01

Georgia: Seasonally-adjusted Real GDP, 2004-15

(In millions of 2003 lari)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

1/ Trend is calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter applied to 2004-2015 data.
uA01fig02

Georgia: Indicators of Economic Activity, 2008-10

(3-month moving average, y-o-y change in percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

Sources: Georgian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

5. Annual CPI inflation has surged to around 10 percent, owing to rising food prices. This large increase in inflation reflects the heavy weight of food in the CPI basket (43 percent). Evidence of inflation in other sectors is mixed: nonfood price inflation remains very low, consistent with regional trends, while the industrial PPI has risen sharply. There is no reliable information on wages to gauge labor market pressures, but unemployment remains high (15 percent).

6. Deposit and lending rates have declined further, but the growth of monetary and credit aggregates has slowed. The authorities have continued to tighten monetary policy in response to higher inflation—the policy (refinancing) rate has been raised by 250 bps since June. The disconnect between the (rising) policy rate and the (declining) deposit and lending rates has reflected the lack of traction of the policy rate in a context of ample liquidity and high dollarization.

7. The overall deficit in the 2010 balance of payments has been revised down (by $159 million) relative to the Sixth Review. The trade deficit is wider than expected, but the current account deficit is projected to be marginally lower on the heels of buoyant tourism receipts (up 18 percent since 2009). Foreign exchange market developments since June (see below) point to a strong rebound of private capital inflows in the second half of the year, following a disappointing first half. The rebound of private capital inflows includes a $250 million Georgian Railway Eurobond issue in July, but is also likely to reflect a recovery of FDI inflows—projected at around $600 million for the year. These inflows should more than offset banking sector net flows, which are now estimated to be strongly negative in 2010, owing to substantial debt prepayments and the impact of central bank liquidity injections in the first half of the year.

uA01fig03

Georgia: CPI and PPI Inflation, 2005 - 10

(Year-on-year change, in percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

uA01fig04

Georgia: External Flows, 2007-10

(3-month moving average, y-o-y growth in percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

uA01fig05

Georgia: Real and Nominal Effective Exchange Rates, 2006-10

(Index, 2000 = 100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

Sources: Georgian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

8. The lari has appreciated relative to the U.S. dollar by 6.5 percent since mid-June. Since the turnaround in foreign exchange market conditions after June, the central bank has only intervened to purchase dollars in the face of occasionally strong appreciation pressures vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, linked in part to the weakness of the latter vis-à-vis other currencies. The projected overperformance of NIR relative to the end-December target reflects this change in the direction of intervention.

9. Banks’ balance sheets continue to strengthen, but high NPLs and exposure to currency-induced credit risk remain as vulnerabilities. Banks’ reliance on wholesale external funding has declined significantly since mid-2009, but the decline has been offset in part by increases of nonresident deposits, which now account for about 10 percent of total deposits. Although still high, NPLs have been declining since May owing to an improved environment, write-offs, and repossessed assets.

uA01fig06

Georgia: Foreign Exchange Intervention and Exchange Rate, 2008-10

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

uA01fig07

Georgia: Sources of Bank Funding, 2006-10

(In percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

Sources: Georgian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Georgia: Selected Monetary and Financial Soundness Indicators, 2008-10

article image
Sources: National Bank of Georgia; and Fund staff estimates.

National definition. Risk weight to forex loans was reduced from 200 to 175 percent in September 2008, and to 150 percent in August 2009.

Basel I definition.

Ratio of liquid assets to 6-month and shorter maturity liabilities.

National definition: NPLs are defined as loans in substandard, doubtful, and loss loan categories.

IMF definition.

Pre tax.

uA01fig08
Sources: National Bank of Georgia; and Fund staff estimates.
uA01fig09
Sources: National Bank of Georgia; and Fund staff estimates.

III. Policies for 2011 and the Exit Strategy

Based on the strength of the economic recovery, discussions focused on:

  • The pace of fiscal adjustment;

  • the stance of monetary policy, following its recent tightening;

  • NIR buildup and exchange rate policy; and

  • financial regulation in the post-crisis environment.

A. Outlook for 2011

10. Real GDP is projected to grow by 4.5 percent in 2011, based on the expectation that private sector demand will strengthen as the fiscal stimulus is withdrawn. The transition from public to private-led growth is not yet firmly established, however, and the recovery of private investment in particular will depend on continued credit growth and private capital inflows, including FDI.

11. Risks to short-term growth, which were previously perceived to lie mostly on the downside, are now more evenly balanced around the central scenario. A failure of private capital inflows to pick up as projected, or inadequate credit growth, could still cause growth to falter. On the upside, growth could exceed 5 percent, particularly if fueled by stronger capital inflows.

12. Inflation is projected to decline (to around 6 percent) by end-2011, with risks mostly on the upside. The projected decline in inflation is based on monetary and fiscal policies remaining sufficiently restrained. The upside risk reflects the narrowing of the output gap and the possible emergence of capacity constraints. The projection is subject to considerable uncertainty given observed volatility in inflation and the unknown impact of recent price hikes on expected inflation and wages.

uA01fig10

Georgia: Current Account Balance and its Financing, 2006-15

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

uA01fig11

Georgia: Saving-Investment Balances, 2003-15

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

Source: Georgian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

13. The balance of payments is projected to improve in 2011 (from an overall deficit of $113 million in 2010 to an overall surplus of $213 million), owing essentially to the expected recovery of private capital inflows, which also remains the main risk factor. The current account deficit (in percent of GDP) is projected to widen temporarily owing to a worsening transfer and income balance, but would still be lower than expected at the time of the Sixth Review. On current trends, the deficit should decline steadily over the medium term, reflecting parallel improvements in the fiscal balance and in the private saving-investment balance.

B. Fiscal Policy

14. Riding on higher-than-expected economic growth, the authorities target a lower 2011 fiscal deficit (4.3 percent of GDP) than projected at the time of the Sixth Review. However, the structural adjustment from 2009 to 2011 would be somewhat lower, owing to tax revenue shortfalls. Still, two-thirds of the structural adjustment envisioned from 2009 to 2013 will be achieved in the first two years of the consolidation period.

uA01fig12

Georgia: Fiscal Balances, 2006-11

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

Sources: Georgian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Georgia: Overall and Structural Deficits, 2009-11

(In percent of GDP)

article image
Sources: Ministry of Finance; and Fund staff estimates.

Based on identical potential GDPs for the sixth and seventh reviews.

15. Adjustment in 2011 is based essentially on expenditure containment. The authorities are committed to capping expenditure in order to allocate possible gains on the revenue front toward deficit reduction. Staff discussed with the authorities various revenue and expenditure measures consistent with the envisaged fiscal consolidation. The authorities consider that focusing their consolidation efforts on curbing current spending is more growth-enhancing and thereby ultimately more favorable to improving social conditions. Expenditure containment will reduce social spending in real terms, but the authorities argued that the impact was mitigated by the economic recovery and that social coverage of the most vulnerable was already quite extensive and has been improved through efficiency gains in the health insurance sector. The revenue measures that were supposed to be introduced in 2010 were taken as expected. However, the tax-to-GDP ratio (for both 2010 and 2011) is lower than anticipated at the time of the Sixth Review. In large part, this reflects a lower yield of all taxes (including new ones),1 one-off factors, but also the withdrawal of the VAT measures on private health and private education that were to be introduced in 2011—VAT on public health services will, however, come into effect in 2011. In light of the already significant adjustment being targeted, the authorities considered that taking additional compensatory revenue measures would threaten the recovery. They also stressed that the tax-to-GDP ratio, corrected for one-offs,2 is still expected to increase by 0.3 percent in 2010 and 0.5 percent in 2011.

uA01fig13

Georgia: Government Revenues and Expenditures, 2003-15

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

Sources: Georgian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Georgia: 2011 Budget

article image
Sources: Ministry of Finance; and Fund staff estimates.

16. The medium-term fiscal framework adopted by the government in July 2010 targets a reduction of the deficit to 2-3 percent of GDP by 2013. The debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to peak at 43.6 percent of GDP in 2011, declining to 35.9 percent of GDP by 2015. The mission questioned the sustainability of expenditure containment over the medium term, noting in particular that the spending cuts implemented in 2010 and envisaged in 2011 entail a significant real revenue reduction for public wage-earners and social system beneficiaries. The authorities deemed that, if pressures to reverse these cuts were to emerge, there would be sufficient room to decrease the capital budget further. The World Bank has begun exploring ways in which social spending, half of which is accounted for by pensions, could be better targeted to enhance the effectiveness of social safety nets through the consolidation process. The constitutional amendment requiring that tax increases be subject to referendums was adopted on December 15, 2010. Recognizing the need to preserve adequate policy flexibility in the event of adverse economic developments, the authorities have introduced an escape clause in the referendum requirement. The specific circumstances under which the referendum requirement would be suspended will be specified separately in the Economic Freedom Act, which will also set deficit and debt limits.

uA01fig14

Georgia: Government Net External Financing, Grants, and Privatization Receipts, 2003-15

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

uA01fig15

Georgia: Public Debt, 2004-15

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

Sources: Georgian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Georgia: Social Expenditures (General Government), 2008-11

article image
Sources: Ministry of Finance; and Fund staff estimates.

Includes assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs).

17. The authorities plan to move to program budgeting by 2012. Next steps include conducting training for the ministry of finance and pilot ministries and designing measurable indicators.

C. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy

18. Monetary policy in 2011 will be guided by three objectives:

  • Supporting gradual disinflation back toward 6 percent by end-2011;

  • increasing the level of NIR to reinforce the exit strategy; and

  • raising the credibility of the local currency to promote dedollarization.

19. Calibrating monetary policy in pursuit of these objectives is difficult owing to weaknesses in the transmission mechanism, stemming from:

  • The high degree of dollarization, and the limited leverage the authorities have over the on-shore dollar interest rate. The authorities are concerned that an excessive increase in local currency interest rates would cause banks to shift to cheaper dollar lending, sourced from abroad.

  • The uncertain transmission of policy interest rate changes. The policy rate is expected to regain traction on market rates (including longer-term rates) following the normalization of liquidity and credit conditions, and the April reforms of the central bank refinancing window and standing facilities. Evidence of that can be seen in the parallel movements of the policy rate and the lari deposit rate in the last few months. The extension of the yield curve should also facilitate stronger transmission of policy rates to lending rates.

  • Uncertainty about the inflation process and the impact of monetary policy on economic activity. With technical assistance from the Fund, the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) is building up its modeling capacity with a view to better inform policy decisions.

20. Subject to these constraints, the authorities stand ready to tighten monetary policy further to meet their objectives. They indicated that they are considering complementing the recent increase in the policy rate, which contributed to a significant increase in CD and T-bill rates, with an increase in reserve requirements on foreign exchange deposits. Prudential measures recently adopted and planned (see next section) are also effectively tightening the monetary stance. The NBG’s current inflation forecast model suggests that the monetary program is consistent with the projected disinflation. Monetary policy decisions will continue to be informed by changes in projected inflation, and developments in monetary aggregates and the exchange rate. The authorities will in particular monitor closely price developments to avoid the emergence of second round effects.

21. The 2011 monetary program’s credit and deposit growth projections are in line with projected economic growth and resumption of financial deepening. The authorities and staff agreed that credit growth in the 15–20 percent range, which would raise the credit-to-GDP ratio to the pre-crisis level of 30 percent, would not be inflationary.

22. Consistent with the exit strategy, the authorities are targeting an increase in NIRin 2011. This increase would begin to reverse the decline observed since 2007, which financed part of the balance of payments gap opened by the war and subsequent financial crisis.

D. Financial Sector Policies

23. Stability concerns have abated, and the authorities are in the process of adjusting the regulatory framework following the normalization of credit market conditions. The central bank has raised the liquidity ratio back to 30 percent (pre-crisis level) from 20 percent, effective October 1. It is also considering raising the risk weights on foreign exchange loans to unhedged borrowers, which were lowered in the wake of the crisis.3 Some bankers consider that the combination of monetary and regulatory tightening is premature and could thwart the desired growth in credit, but the NBG projects that the recapitalization needs created by an increase in the capital risk weight of foreign exchange loans would be limited.4 The relatively large intermediation margins of the Georgian banking sector reflect, in part, the cost of carrying high capital and liquidity buffers. To address this problem, the authorities are preparing for a gradual move to differentiated risk-based prudential requirements, which would make supervision more efficient and less costly.

24. The authorities are considering alternative schemes for distressed asset management (DAM), but lack of demand and urgency from banks to sell assets at depressed prices are major impediments. The authorities consider that specialized firms would manage distressed assets more efficiently than banks, and are evaluating, jointly with IFIs, alternative DAM schemes and regulatory changes. Apart from the lack of interest from banks, however, this initiative is constrained by limited domestic capacity to absorb these assets, and limited interest from foreign investors owing to the small size of the distressed assets pool.

E. The Exit Strategy and Risks

25. Balance of payments risks remain elevated over the medium term. The program was built on the expectation that a steady recovery of private capital inflows (mainly FDI) would enable Georgia to return to a path of privately financed high economic growth, and that, as of 2012, external financing needs would be covered entirely by private sector inflows and regular official financing. While the improvement in the overall balance of payments since June 2010 is consistent with this scenario, there are risks that balance of payments gaps could reemerge, in which case the adjustment process may have to be prolonged. Such an outcome could be triggered by:

  • A failure of FDI to rebound as projected. The strength of the balance of payments since the summer would be consistent with increased private capital inflows. However, these flows have proven to be volatile. A shortfall in FDI would not only open a balance of payments gap, but could also adversely affect GDP growth and widen the fiscal deficit, as illustrated in the downside scenario (Box 1).

  • An inadequate supply response to the recovery of demand growth. The resulting overheating and loss of competitiveness would create new external imbalances down the road.

  • Debt rollover. The Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) points to low solvency risks, but high rollover risks in 2013 linked to high Fund and Eurobond repayment obligations. Recent rating upgrades should facilitate market rollover, but the amounts involved still pose risks. Although the resilience of the Georgian sovereign bond yield to the recent turbulence in the European markets is encouraging, contagion risks remain.

Georgia: Alternative Scenario with Lower FDI

The scenario illustrates the risks associated with a failure of FDI to rebound as projected. The alternative scenario assumes a stabilization of FDI at 5 percent of GDP, slightly below the 2010 level. Assuming an unchanged productivity of capital, but a loss of export competitiveness, real GDP growth would decline to about 3½ percent on average over the next 5 years. The current account deficit would narrow quite sizably, but the balance of payments would deteriorate (relative to the baseline scenario) by the equivalent of 0.9 percent of GDP on average over the period 2011–15, and to 1.1 percent of GDP in 2015; the associated loss of international reserves would come to US$625 million by 2015.

An imbalance would also appear in the fiscal accounts. Based on the same fiscal policy of the baseline scenario (same level of real expenditure and same tax-to-GDP ratio), the deficit would begin to rise again and reach 3.8 percent of GDP by 2015. The primary fiscal balance would exceed the debt-stabilizing level by 1.1 percentage point of GDP.

Georgia: Alternative Medium-Term Scenarios

(2011–15)

article image
Sources: Georgian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Investment is measured on a net basis (acquisitions minus disposals of nonfinancial assets).

Cumulative 2011–15.

uA01fig16
Sources: Georgian authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

26. To mitigate these risks, the authorities have expressed interest in a successor Fund arrangement. Discussions could begin in April, based on the conclusions of the Article IV consultation (scheduled for March) and the Ex-Post Assessment Update (under preparation).

uA01fig17

Georgia and Comparator Countries: Sovereign Eurobond Spreads, 2010

(In basis points, over comparable U.S. treasuries)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2011, 031; 10.5089/9781455213887.002.A001

Sources: Bloomberg; and Fund staff estimates.

27. Meanwhile, the authorities stand ready to tighten policies should foreign exchange depreciation pressures reemerge, beyond seasonal factors. While continuing to rely on exchange rate adjustment, the authorities also indicated that they could aim for a lower fiscal deficit.

IV. Program Issues

28. Rephasing of purchases by combining the final two purchases into one purchase upon completion of the Ninth and final Review is requested owing to the delay in completing the Seventh and Eighth Reviews. The delay stems from the additional time needed to assess exchange rate developments in November-December prior to setting NIR targets for 2011. The rephasing would combine the last two purchases under the program into a single purchase of SDR 70 million, which would become available upon completion of the last review scheduled for early June.

V. Staff Appraisal

29. Policies are on track and have broadly delivered on program objectives. The economic recovery appears to be on a relatively solid footing, substantial progress has been made toward reestablishing fiscal sustainability, and banking sector indicators have improved markedly. However, net international reserves are still relatively low, which, together with remaining external risks, creates vulnerabilities for the exit strategy.

30. Fiscal adjustment is largely in line with program objectives, but could have been accelerated in 2011 in view of the favorable cyclical conditions and remaining risks. The commitment to cap expenditure in 2011 is welcome and provides reassurances that fiscal policy will be countercyclical, and that the deficit would decline further under an upside growth scenario. Faster fiscal adjustment in 2011, ahead of two election years, could have strengthened the exit strategy against external risks without undermining the recovery. Over the medium term, the relatively high share of capital spending in total government spending creates room for additional expenditure compression. However, revenue measures should also be considered if necessary to achieve the medium-term deficit objectives. In this regard, the introduction of an escape clause in the constitutional amendment subjecting tax increases to a referendum is welcome as it increases policy flexibility.

31. While a pause in monetary tightening through the policy rate is appropriate at this juncture, the authorities should remain ready to tighten monetary policy should inflationary pressures persist. The gap between the policy rate and the deposit rate has narrowed significantly. This should contribute to strengthen the traction of monetary policy going forward, as evidenced by the recent increase in local currency deposit rates in response to the earlier hikes in the policy rate. Given the uncertain lags in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, further rate increases should be conditioned on evidence that inflation is not abating as expected. At the same time, reserve requirements on dollar deposits and foreign loans should be increased to complement the increase in domestic interest rates.

32. Exchange rate flexibility should remain an essential instrument of adjustment in the event of less favorable external developments; moreover, the need to rebuild international reserves will limit considerably the room for intervention. The program’s international reserve target for 2011 also calls for more aggressive purchases of foreign exchange in the market, as those recently conducted by the NBG, when opportunities present themselves. Looking ahead, and consistent with preserving exchange rate flexibility, foreign exchange purchases could be undertaken on a pre-established calendar.

33. An adjustment in financial regulations, which were loosened during the crisis, is warranted. Given the impact of higher capital buffers on intermediation margins, ongoing capacity building toward risk-based supervision is welcome, as it will increase the efficiency of the banking system.

34. In light of the authorities’ commitment to reduce the 2011 fiscal deficit by more than envisaged at the time of the Sixth Review, staff supports the authorities’ requests for completing the Seventh and Eighth Reviews, for waivers of nonobservance of performance criteria, the establishment of end-March 2011 PCs, and rephasing of purchases as specified in the LOI (¶ 29).

Table 1.

Georgia: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 2008–15

article image
Sources: Georgian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Excludes Abkhazia residents.

Investment is measured on a net basis (acquisitions minus disposals of nonfinancial assets).

Includes grants.

The proceeds of the Georgian Railway eurobond issuance from July 2010, which were deposited in accounts with Georgian commercial banks that placed them abroad are not included in broad money.

Table 2.

Georgia: Annual General Government Operations, 2009-15 1/

article image
Sources: Ministry of Finance; and Fund staff estimates.

General government includes central and local governments and the Sovereign Wealth Funds.

Excluding arrears clearance, provisions and T-bill repayment.

Including net lending.

Table 3.

Georgia: Quarterly General Government Operations, 2009-11 1/

article image
Sources: Ministry of Finance; and Fund staff estimates.

General government includes central and local governments and the Sovereign Wealth Funds.

Excluding arrears clearance, provisions and T-bill repayment.

Including net lending.