A. Introduction

1. This is an update of the IOSCO assessment that was performed in 2000 as part of the FSAP of South Africa. The update was performed by Mr. Jonathan Katz, a technical consultant to the IMF/World Bank FSAP mission. Mr. Katz was the Secretary of the US Securities and Exchange Commission for 20 years, until his retirement in 2006. Mr. Katz has performed nine other IOSCO assessments or assessment updates.

B. Information and Methodology Used for Assessment

2. The assessment was prepared on the basis of a self-assessment prepared by the FSB, public information contained on the FSB website and the websites of other entities in South Africa, and a review of relevant South African laws and regulations and interviews. Mr. Katz interviewed numerous staff of the FSB, as well as other governmental officials, representatives of South African self-regulatory organizations and private sector professionals working in the capital markets in South Africa. These interviews were conducted over a two week period in May, 2008. In March, 2010 this assessment was updated to reflect legal and regulatory changes made in the past two years. Additional interviews were conducted with FSB staff, staff of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), Strate, DTI, and professionals in the financial services sector. Compliance with each principle as of 2010 was assessed using the four level methodology adopted by IOSCO—fully implemented, broadly implemented, partly implemented, and not implemented. In preparing the detailed assessment, Mr. Katz relied upon the IOSCO Assessment Methodology for guidance on the subjects to be examined for each principle, which provides key questions to help ensure consistency and the criteria for assessing implementation.

3. The timely completion of this assessment was greatly facilitated by the cooperation provided by numerous members of the staff of the FSB. The FSB staff was extremely generous with their time, their willingness to provide detailed answers to questions, and their assistance in arranging interviews with persons in the private sector. Staff of the JSE, Strate, and other organizations interviewed were similarly helpful with their explanations and commentary and equally generous with their time.

C. Institutional and Market Structure—Overview

4. The Financial Services Board (FSB) was established in 1990 with the enactment of the Financial Services Board Act (FSB Act). It regulates and supervises the non-bank part of the financial services industry, advises the Minister of Finance on matters concerning financial institutions and financial services, and informs and educates users and potential users of financial products and services. The FSB is subject to the general authority of the Minister of Finance who appoints the members of the Board and selects the senior officers, after consultation with the Board. The responsibilities of the FSB are clearly articulated in the FSB Act and in a series of related laws that have expanded the duties and powers of the FSB.

5. The FSB has broad regulatory authority over the JSE, (including SAFCOM, its clearance and settlement subsidiary), Strate, financial advisors and intermediaries (FAIS), collective investment scheme (CIS) operators, pension funds and insurance companies. It has clear authority to perform on-site examinations, to require reports and to investigate misconduct and to impose sanctions for violations of applicable laws.

6. Other governmental agencies in South Africa have responsibility for discrete regulatory functions that are included in the IOSCO principles. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is responsible for the registration of all companies in South Africa, including public companies listed for trading in the secondary market. In 2007 the Corporate Laws Amendments Act established a Financial Reporting Standards Committee, to serve as the accounting standard setting body in South Africa and a Financial Reporting Investigation Panel to investigate non-compliance with financial reporting standards. Responsibility for creating the two groups was assigned to the DTI. As of March 2010, the two committees had not been formed. In the interim, in 2009, the Companies Act was again amended and the two panels were eliminated. These new amendments directed the DTI to create a Financial Reporting Standards Council, to set national accounting policy. A revamped Companies and Intellectual Property Commission has been authorized to perform the duties assigned to the Financial Reporting Investigation Panel. As of March 2010, neither entity has been established.

7. Authority to enforce South African laws concerning mergers, acquisitions and changes in corporate control resides with the Takeover Regulation Panel (TRP, formerly Securities Regulation Panel), an entity created by the Companies Act of 1973 (this law was amended in 2007 and in 2009). As currently structured, the TRP is appointed by the Minister of DTI, but functions independently.

8. The Financial Intelligence Centre is a separate unit in the National Treasury responsible for anti-money laundering regulation.

9. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB), the nation’s central bank, has certain relevant regulatory duties. While the FSB has responsibility for licensing bank subsidiaries engaged in brokerage or other non-bank financial services, the underwriting of securities in South Africa typically is performed directly by the merchant/investment banking department of a bank, or a specialized merchant/investment bank. As such, SARB has regulatory responsibility for this function. Also, SARB, through its foreign exchange control authority, has responsibility for approving cross-border dual listings and foreign securities offerings as part of its currency exchange control responsibilities.

10. The South African regulatory scheme also includes several statutory advisory boards that provide input to the Minister of Finance or FSB on strategic and policy objectives. These include the Policy Board for Financial Services Regulation (Policy Board), the Financial Markets Advisory Board, the Collective Investment Scheme Advisory Committee, the Advisory Committee on Financial Services Providers, and several other committees concerned with other segments of the financial services sector, but not pertinent to the areas covered by the IOSCO principles. Also a Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law advises the Minister of Trade and Industry on company law matters. In total there are ten advisory committees and four standing committees that play a role in regulating the financial sector in South Africa.

11. As noted previously, the authority of the FSB has grown significantly since the 2000 FSAP. The Securities Services Act of 2004 (SSA) expanded the FSB’s enforcement authority. FSB enforcement authority was enhanced again in 2008 by an amendment of the Financial Institution (Protection of Funds) Act of 2001. This Act expanded the jurisdiction of the Enforcement Committee to adjudicate any violation of a law administered by the FSB. The Collective Investment Schemes Control Act of 2002 (CISCA) and the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act of 2002 (FAIS) expanded the authority of the FSB to register, regulate, and inspect asset managers, financial advisors (excluding stockbrokers and authorized users already regulated by the JSE), and collective investment schemes. The Corporate Laws Amendment Act of 2007 addressed several recommendations of the 2002 Accounting and Auditing ROSC.

12. Self-regulatory organizations (SRO) are critical components of the regulatory system. The JSE is the primary and secondary market for listed equity securities, financial derivatives, agricultural commodities and a recently developed bond market. In 2009, the Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA), which had been the principal bond exchange, merged with the JSE. The JSE now operates YieldX as the trading platform and trade reporting service for listed South African debt securities. The JSE is a licensed self-regulatory organization (SRO) and has primary regulatory responsibility for licensing members (authorized users) and employees and setting listing standards and disclosure obligations for listed companies. It also has lead responsibility for market surveillance and has the authority to take disciplinary action against member firms and their employees and listed companies and company directors. Firms and employees registered with the JSE are exempt from registration with the FSB under FAIS with regard to activities directly regulated by the JSE. However a firm that provides other financial services not regulated by the JSE must also register with the FSB under FAIS and comply with FAIS.

13. The JSE acts as the primary regulatory body for setting and monitoring disclosure requirements for its public listed companies. While the DTI has broad legal authority in this area, traditionally it has focused its resources on its function as company registrar of all companies in South Africa (public and private) and deferred to the JSE to regulate disclosure of its listed companies. However, in South Africa a company may directly offer its shares to the public and have public shareholders without being listed on a stock exchange. The company may subsequently buy back its shares and directly resell them. However it is illegal for a broker or other intermediary to act as a market-maker and effect secondary market trading in these public, unlisted companies.

14. Strate is a licensed SRO that functions as the central securities depository (CSD) for both listed equity securities and debt (government and corporate) and some unlisted securities, primarily commercial paper. It also acts as a clearinghouse for some debt trading. SAFCOM, a wholly owned subsidiary of the JSE, is a licensed clearinghouse for derivatives listed on the JSE.

15. Mutual funds are called collective investment schemes (formerly referred to as unit trusts) in South Africa. The industry has grown significantly with total assets under management valued at R786.1billion as of the end of 2009. This represents 19 percent growth from the previous year. Of the R786.1 billion at December 2009, money market funds represent 30.3 percent. There were 936 funds, down from 939 in December 2008. CIS are directly regulated by the FSB, which has an extensive regulatory scheme focused on initial registration, capital adequacy and operating compliance. Broad CIS investor disclosure and marketing obligations are contained in section 3 of CISCA. Industry implementation and compliance with this principle rests largely on non-binding industry codes of conduct. These codes were initially drafted by the Association of Collective Investments (ACI), a voluntary industry organization that declined to apply and be licensed as an SRO. In 2009, the ACI merged into a new broader industry trade group the Association for Savings and Investment in South Africa (ASISA). FSB staff believe that these standards are advisory and do not constitute legally binding requirements. However, in the absence of other regulatory standards, these codes are the de facto standard.

16. The JSE is the 19^th largest equity market in the world, with a market capitalization equivalent to 200 percent of GDP. As of 2009, there were 54 equity member firms of the JSE and 419 companies had listed shares. The average number of equity trades per day was more than 83,800.¹ The JSE also operates as the national derivatives exchange and, following the merger with BESA, a bond trading exchange. It has a well-developed trading market in single stock futures. The equity market is readily accessible to nonresidents, in particular following the “head of terms” agreement between the Johannesburg and the London Stock Exchange of 2002. The JSE uses the LSE trading system.

17. The JSE remains highly concentrated, with just 70 stocks accounting for 85 percent of its market capitalization. There is also considerable sectoral concentration: mining stocks account for around 40 percent of the JSE’s market value, with financial services stocks accounting for a further 20 percent. In October 2003 the JSE launched a new equity market for smaller, emerging public companies called AltX. This market caters to small and medium-sized companies, and listing requirements are less stringent. Between 2007 and 2010, the number of listed companies grew from 57 to 76. During the same period, the AltX total market grew from R 17 billion to 21.4 billion. The JSE has also created two more new trading boards. One board will list companies incorporated in neighboring African countries. One such company has listed and another is planning to list. The second new board lists single stock futures in foreign companies, enabling South African investors to invest in foreign companies easily. Recently the JSE announced that it is considering creation of a third new board to permit companies that have issued so-called “black economic empowerment” (BEE) shares to list these securities separately and facilitate better transparency in secondary market trading in these shares.

18. The initial offering process for equity securities is under the regulation of the DTI and the JSE exercises primary responsibility through its listing requirements. As banks are the principal underwriter of securities in Africa, SARB could also play a role in regulating this activity. It is estimated that over half of all public offerings are self-underwritten by the company issuing the securities, with marketing and distribution occurring by stockbrokers or financial intermediaries. The JSE requires listed companies to retain the services of a company sponsor (main board stocks) or a company designated advisor (Altx) who is responsible for conducting due diligence in the offering and ongoing advice to the company on regulatory responsibilities. The sponsor or advisor also must advise the JSE in appropriate circumstances.

19. There is little regulatory oversight of the over the counter market. A very large OTC market exists for derivatives and a small but growing market exists for interest rate swap/derivatives. There is very little available information on the size or extent of trading activity in the OTC equities market for unlisted companies. In 2010, the FSB determined to initiate a study of OTC trading in derivatives to determine which OTC instruments should be regulated, and if so, how they should be regulated. A private consultant has been retained to lead the study.

20. The domestic bond market has been growing. The JSE bond platform is the trading market for government, local government and domestic corporation ZAR-denominated debt. In fact, while the JSE provides some small amount of indicative bids and offers for listed securities, secondary market trading in debt securities is largely an OTC market dominated by the leading South African banks. All trading must be reported to the JSE for publication. As of 2009 1,087 bond issues were listed by 104 issuers with a total nominal value of R 827.7 billion. Sovereign government debt represented 53 percent of nominal value and corporate issues accounted for 33 percent of nominal value.

21. While securitization was a slowly growing market segment through 2007, the international financial crisis has temporarily stalled this growth. The market overall remains limited (US$6.2 billion at the beginning of 2008) and represents a very small share of banks’ balance sheets (less than 2 percent of bank assets). Banks also use asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits to fund origination of corporate loans. As is the case in other markets, the largest banks are the main players in securitization and ABCP markets.

22. In 2010, an electronic money market program began operation. This project has been led by Strate and is designed to facilitate trade reporting and the bilateral clearance and settlement of short-term debt instruments. At present, the system does not provide any facilities for order exposure.

23. The foreign exchange (forex) markets are comparatively well developed as measured by turnover to GDP ratio. While the spot market is middle-of-the-range the forex derivatives market is one of the largest. The spot market is served by 26 authorized dealers including all major commercial and investment banks plus the foreign banks. The derivatives market is dominated by one-week forex swap transactions. At least two thirds of forex market transactions are with nonresident dealers.

24. There is a developing hedge fund industry in South Africa, with assets under management estimated at approximately R 30 billion with approximately R 14 billion additional under management by funds of hedge funds. Under South African law there is no concept of a “sophisticated” or “qualified high net worth” investor. Because CISCA does not provide the FSB with the authority to exempt entities from specific requirements of the law, these pools of assets cannot be structured as collective investment schemes (although the asset managers must be licensed under FAIS). Because South African law does not prescribe a particular structure for the hedge fund management entity, hedge funds may be structured in different ways, such as a pooled investment in limited partnerships or as a company that issues interests that are termed debentures or promissory notes. An investment in a hedge fund may also be made via an insurance company product that invests in the hedge fund. These policies (minimum five years) provide a return pegged to the total return of the hedge fund pool of assets identified in the policy.

D. Preconditions for Effective Securities Regulation

25. The South African capital markets have benefited from a strong legal infrastructure. It has a well-established judiciary that is perceived to be competent and independent. Its commercial laws and debtor-creditor laws are believed to be sound. South Africa was one of the first countries to adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards promulgated by the International Accounting Standards Board.

Table 1.

South Africa: Summary Implementation of the IOSCO Principles

Aggregate: Fully implemented (FI) – 16, broadly implemented (BI) – 11, partly implemented (PI) – 2, not implemented (NI) – 0, not applicable (N/A) – 0.

Table 1.

South Africa: Summary Implementation of the IOSCO Principles

Principle	Rating	Findings
Principle 1. The responsibilities of the regulator should be clearly and objectively stated	FI	The South African system of financial services regulation is complex, involving multiple government agencies, several advisory or oversight committees, and several self-regulatory organizations.
Principle 2. The regulator should be operationally independent and accountable in the exercise of its functions and powers	BI	The FSB has full control over its budget and daily operations. However the Minister of Finance has the legal authority to hire and fire Board members and FSB executive staff.
Principle 3. The regulator should have adequate powers, proper resources and the capacity to perform its functions and exercise its powers	BI	Since the 2000 assessment the FSB has obtained greatly expanded legal authority and has succeeded in building its capacity to exercise these responsibilities. The FSB lacks regulatory authority to set disclosure requirements for public companies. This responsibility is assigned the DTI for all companies and to the JSE, which includes disclosure requirements for listed companies in its listing standards. The DTI subsidiaries charged with these responsibilities in 2007 were never operational and have been replaced by new entities, which are not yet operating.
Principle 4. The regulator should adopt clear and consistent regulatory processes	FI	The FSB has sound internal operating processes. Its internal processes have received ISO 9000 certification.
Principle 5. The staff of the regulator should observe the highest professional standards	FI	The FSB has a code of conduct, that is in the process of being revised, for its employees that addresses confidentiality of information, receipt of gifts from licensed entities and ownership of securities.
Principle 6 The regulatory regime should make appropriate use of self-regulatory organizations (SROs) that exercise some direct oversight responsibility for their respective areas of competence and to the extent appropriate to the size and complexity of the markets	No Rating	The JSE and Strate perform several core regulatory functions. The ASISA, an industry trade group performs certain regulatory functions, but is not an SRO, subject to FSB oversight.
Principle 7. SROs should be subject to the oversight of the regulator and should observe standards of fairness and confidentiality when exercising powers and delegated responsibilities	BI	The FSB has broad authority to license, subject to annual renewal, its SRO’s. Only the JSE and Strate are currently licensed. The FSB does not have, but is seeking to obtain, review and approval authority over JSE listing requirements.
Principle 8. The regulator should have comprehensive inspection, investigation and surveillance powers	FI	The FSB has strong inspection and investigation powers and the JSE provides it with surveillance capacity over the listed market.
Principle 9. The regulator should have comprehensive enforcement powers	FI	The FSB has expanded its ability to bring enforcement actions administratively and it may now use the Enforcement Committee process to impose substantial sanctions for any violation of the acts administered by the FSB. In recent years, the FSB has built a robust investigation and enforcement program, with many notable accomplishments.
Principle 10. The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use of inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and implementation of an effective compliance program.	FI	The FSB has greatly expanded its inspection and investigation program since the 2000 assessment. It has also developed a strong enforcement program based upon the expanded authority of its Enforcement Committee system to adjudicate and sanction violations. There is limited surveillance capacity over OTC activities of registered intermediaries. This will be examined as part of an FSB study on the operation and regulation of the OTC market. The DTI agencies empowered to investigate financial reporting violations have not begun operations.
Principle 11 The regulator should have the authority to share both public and non-public information with domestic and foreign counterparts	FI	The FSB has full legal authority to share information with domestic and foreign regulators.
Principle 12. Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that set out when and how they will share both public and non-public information with their domestic and foreign counterparts	FI	The FSB has written agreements to share information with the SARB and the Revenue Authority. The FSB also has entered into 50 bilateral MOUs with foreign regulatory authorities and is a signatory to the IOSCO MMOU.
Principle 13. The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided to foreign regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of their functions and exercise of their powers	FI	The FSB is a signatory to the IOSCO multi-lateral memorandum of understanding on information sharing.
Principle 14. There should be full, timely and accurate disclosure of financial results and other information that is material to investors’ decisions	PI	Current disclosure standards provide investors with necessary information on public companies. Responsibility for setting disclosure requirements is assigned to the DTI for all companies and to the JSE, through its listing requirements, for listed companies. While DTI and JSE review initial offering documents, such as prospectuses, and documents relating to acquisitions and special transactions, neither entity routinely reviews periodic disclosure reports, such as annual reports. These documents may be reviewed when a complaint is received. Regulatory systems for proactively reviewing periodic company disclosures could be improved.
Principle 15. Holders of securities in a company should be treated in a fair and equitable manner	BI	The King Commission reports have contributed to an improved system of corporate governance and accountability. While proxy solicitation is provided for in the 2009 Companies Act amendments, there are no procedures in placing governing a proxy solicitation.
Principle 16. Accounting and auditing standards should be of a high and internationally acceptable quality	BI	South Africa was an early adopter of IFRS. There is a national system for oversight of the accounting and auditing profession. DTI has not yet created the governmental body to set national accounting policy.
Principle 17. The regulatory system should set standards for the eligibility and the regulation of those who wish to market or operate a collective investment scheme	FI	CISCA and FAIS provide the FSB with broad regulatory authority and the FSB has successfully addressed its responsibilities. Consideration should be given to issues raised by white label funds.
Principle 18. The regulatory system should provide for rules governing the legal form and structure of collective investment schemes and the segregation and protection of client assets	BI	CISCA established a strong regulatory framework for CIS. The FSB has used its licensing authority to address issues concerning segregation of investor assets in LISPs. Legal gaps complicate the development of a legal form for hedge funds.
Principle 19. Regulation should require disclosure, as set forth under the principles for issuers, which is necessary to evaluate the suitability of a collective investment scheme for a particular investor and the value of the investor’s interest in the scheme	PI	While FAIS establishes a legal standard requiring CIS to provide investors with necessary information, the only specific disclosure requirements are non-binding industry codes.
Principle 20. Regulation should ensure that there is a proper and disclosed basis for assets valuation and the pricing and the redemption of units in a collective investment scheme	FI	Regulation of CIS valuation and pricing is sound.
Principle 21. Regulation should provide for minimum entry standards for market intermediaries	FI	The FSB has developed a comprehensive licensing system implementing its authority under FAIS and CISCA.
Principle 22. There should be initial and ongoing capital and other prudential requirements for market intermediaries that reflect the risks that the intermediaries undertake	BI	The JSE capital adequacy standards for its licensed members appear to be sound and the JSE BDA system provides daily information on member firm open positions and exposure. In 2009, the FSB adopted capital adequacy standards for FAIS registrants. An early warning system under FAIS has not been created.
Principle 23. Market intermediaries should be required to comply with standards for internal organization and operational conduct that aim to protect the interests of clients, ensure proper management of risk, and under which management of the intermediary accepts primary responsibility for these matters	BI	FSB requires licensees to have internal control processes and compliance officers. Firms may contract out this responsibility to compliance companies approved by the FSB. All client funds must be held in segregated accounts and licensees must apply “know your customer” principles in providing financial advice.
Principle 24. There should be a procedure for dealing with the failure of a market intermediary in order to minimize damage and loss to investors and to contain systemic risk	FI	The FSB and JSE have authority to order licensees to suspend or terminate operations and the FSB may seek a court order to appoint a curator.
Principle 25. The establishment of trading systems including securities exchanges should be subject to regulatory authorization and oversight	FI	The SSA provides comprehensive requirements for registration of an exchange. The FSB effectively oversees the operations of the JSE.
Principle 26. There should be ongoing regulatory supervision of exchanges and trading systems, which should aim to ensure that the integrity of trading is maintained through fair and equitable rules that strike an appropriate balance between the demands of different market participants	FI	The JSE license must be renewed annually. As part of the renewal process the JSE must submit a written self-assessment form and the FSB annually performs an on-site examination. On-going market surveillance is performed by JSE, with FSB staff oversight through weekly meetings and reports and regular informal contact.
Principle 27. Regulation should promote transparency of trading	BI	The systems in South Africa for trading in listed securities are robust and comparable to international best practices. Trading in the OTC market, which is substantial in certain derivative products, is unsupervised. In 2010 the FSB initiated a study of the OTC market.
Principle 28. Regulation should be designed to detect and deter manipulation and other unfair trading practices	FI	Relying upon JSE listed market surveillance, the FSB has developed a strong investigative program covering insider trading, market manipulation and corporate disclosure. Consideration should be given to the need for market surveillance in the OTC market and expansion of its investigation and enforcement program into OTC market misconduct.
Principle 29. Regulation should aim to ensure the proper management of large exposures, default risk and market disruption	BI	The JSE BDA system provides it with robust data on member firm exposures. Both the JSE and FSB have the power to take action in the event of a firm failure to avoid systemic failures.
Principle 30. Systems for clearing and settlement of securities transactions should be subject to regulatory oversight, and designed to ensure that they are fair, effective and efficient and that they reduce systemic risk	Not rated as a full CPSS/ IOSCO review not performed	While the JSE is not legally designated a central counterparty, it performs a comparable function by acting as guarantor of all trading on its market. Its system for clearance and settlement has a strong record, largely because the JSE may call in replacement securities to cover a delivery failure. At present it operates on a T+5 standard for equities and a T+3 for debt. Conversion to a T+3 standard for equities is a priority, but cannot be implemented until the JSE completes a large IT system replacement program, which has been delayed.

Aggregate: Fully implemented (FI) – 16, broadly implemented (BI) – 11, partly implemented (PI) – 2, not implemented (NI) – 0, not applicable (N/A) – 0.

View Table

Table 1.

South Africa: Summary Implementation of the IOSCO Principles

Principle	Rating	Findings
Principle 1. The responsibilities of the regulator should be clearly and objectively stated	FI	The South African system of financial services regulation is complex, involving multiple government agencies, several advisory or oversight committees, and several self-regulatory organizations.
Principle 2. The regulator should be operationally independent and accountable in the exercise of its functions and powers	BI	The FSB has full control over its budget and daily operations. However the Minister of Finance has the legal authority to hire and fire Board members and FSB executive staff.
Principle 3. The regulator should have adequate powers, proper resources and the capacity to perform its functions and exercise its powers	BI	Since the 2000 assessment the FSB has obtained greatly expanded legal authority and has succeeded in building its capacity to exercise these responsibilities. The FSB lacks regulatory authority to set disclosure requirements for public companies. This responsibility is assigned the DTI for all companies and to the JSE, which includes disclosure requirements for listed companies in its listing standards. The DTI subsidiaries charged with these responsibilities in 2007 were never operational and have been replaced by new entities, which are not yet operating.
Principle 4. The regulator should adopt clear and consistent regulatory processes	FI	The FSB has sound internal operating processes. Its internal processes have received ISO 9000 certification.
Principle 5. The staff of the regulator should observe the highest professional standards	FI	The FSB has a code of conduct, that is in the process of being revised, for its employees that addresses confidentiality of information, receipt of gifts from licensed entities and ownership of securities.
Principle 6 The regulatory regime should make appropriate use of self-regulatory organizations (SROs) that exercise some direct oversight responsibility for their respective areas of competence and to the extent appropriate to the size and complexity of the markets	No Rating	The JSE and Strate perform several core regulatory functions. The ASISA, an industry trade group performs certain regulatory functions, but is not an SRO, subject to FSB oversight.
Principle 7. SROs should be subject to the oversight of the regulator and should observe standards of fairness and confidentiality when exercising powers and delegated responsibilities	BI	The FSB has broad authority to license, subject to annual renewal, its SRO’s. Only the JSE and Strate are currently licensed. The FSB does not have, but is seeking to obtain, review and approval authority over JSE listing requirements.
Principle 8. The regulator should have comprehensive inspection, investigation and surveillance powers	FI	The FSB has strong inspection and investigation powers and the JSE provides it with surveillance capacity over the listed market.
Principle 9. The regulator should have comprehensive enforcement powers	FI	The FSB has expanded its ability to bring enforcement actions administratively and it may now use the Enforcement Committee process to impose substantial sanctions for any violation of the acts administered by the FSB. In recent years, the FSB has built a robust investigation and enforcement program, with many notable accomplishments.
Principle 10. The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use of inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and implementation of an effective compliance program.	FI	The FSB has greatly expanded its inspection and investigation program since the 2000 assessment. It has also developed a strong enforcement program based upon the expanded authority of its Enforcement Committee system to adjudicate and sanction violations. There is limited surveillance capacity over OTC activities of registered intermediaries. This will be examined as part of an FSB study on the operation and regulation of the OTC market. The DTI agencies empowered to investigate financial reporting violations have not begun operations.
Principle 11 The regulator should have the authority to share both public and non-public information with domestic and foreign counterparts	FI	The FSB has full legal authority to share information with domestic and foreign regulators.
Principle 12. Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that set out when and how they will share both public and non-public information with their domestic and foreign counterparts	FI	The FSB has written agreements to share information with the SARB and the Revenue Authority. The FSB also has entered into 50 bilateral MOUs with foreign regulatory authorities and is a signatory to the IOSCO MMOU.
Principle 13. The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided to foreign regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of their functions and exercise of their powers	FI	The FSB is a signatory to the IOSCO multi-lateral memorandum of understanding on information sharing.
Principle 14. There should be full, timely and accurate disclosure of financial results and other information that is material to investors’ decisions	PI	Current disclosure standards provide investors with necessary information on public companies. Responsibility for setting disclosure requirements is assigned to the DTI for all companies and to the JSE, through its listing requirements, for listed companies. While DTI and JSE review initial offering documents, such as prospectuses, and documents relating to acquisitions and special transactions, neither entity routinely reviews periodic disclosure reports, such as annual reports. These documents may be reviewed when a complaint is received. Regulatory systems for proactively reviewing periodic company disclosures could be improved.
Principle 15. Holders of securities in a company should be treated in a fair and equitable manner	BI	The King Commission reports have contributed to an improved system of corporate governance and accountability. While proxy solicitation is provided for in the 2009 Companies Act amendments, there are no procedures in placing governing a proxy solicitation.
Principle 16. Accounting and auditing standards should be of a high and internationally acceptable quality	BI	South Africa was an early adopter of IFRS. There is a national system for oversight of the accounting and auditing profession. DTI has not yet created the governmental body to set national accounting policy.
Principle 17. The regulatory system should set standards for the eligibility and the regulation of those who wish to market or operate a collective investment scheme	FI	CISCA and FAIS provide the FSB with broad regulatory authority and the FSB has successfully addressed its responsibilities. Consideration should be given to issues raised by white label funds.
Principle 18. The regulatory system should provide for rules governing the legal form and structure of collective investment schemes and the segregation and protection of client assets	BI	CISCA established a strong regulatory framework for CIS. The FSB has used its licensing authority to address issues concerning segregation of investor assets in LISPs. Legal gaps complicate the development of a legal form for hedge funds.
Principle 19. Regulation should require disclosure, as set forth under the principles for issuers, which is necessary to evaluate the suitability of a collective investment scheme for a particular investor and the value of the investor’s interest in the scheme	PI	While FAIS establishes a legal standard requiring CIS to provide investors with necessary information, the only specific disclosure requirements are non-binding industry codes.
Principle 20. Regulation should ensure that there is a proper and disclosed basis for assets valuation and the pricing and the redemption of units in a collective investment scheme	FI	Regulation of CIS valuation and pricing is sound.
Principle 21. Regulation should provide for minimum entry standards for market intermediaries	FI	The FSB has developed a comprehensive licensing system implementing its authority under FAIS and CISCA.
Principle 22. There should be initial and ongoing capital and other prudential requirements for market intermediaries that reflect the risks that the intermediaries undertake	BI	The JSE capital adequacy standards for its licensed members appear to be sound and the JSE BDA system provides daily information on member firm open positions and exposure. In 2009, the FSB adopted capital adequacy standards for FAIS registrants. An early warning system under FAIS has not been created.
Principle 23. Market intermediaries should be required to comply with standards for internal organization and operational conduct that aim to protect the interests of clients, ensure proper management of risk, and under which management of the intermediary accepts primary responsibility for these matters	BI	FSB requires licensees to have internal control processes and compliance officers. Firms may contract out this responsibility to compliance companies approved by the FSB. All client funds must be held in segregated accounts and licensees must apply “know your customer” principles in providing financial advice.
Principle 24. There should be a procedure for dealing with the failure of a market intermediary in order to minimize damage and loss to investors and to contain systemic risk	FI	The FSB and JSE have authority to order licensees to suspend or terminate operations and the FSB may seek a court order to appoint a curator.
Principle 25. The establishment of trading systems including securities exchanges should be subject to regulatory authorization and oversight	FI	The SSA provides comprehensive requirements for registration of an exchange. The FSB effectively oversees the operations of the JSE.
Principle 26. There should be ongoing regulatory supervision of exchanges and trading systems, which should aim to ensure that the integrity of trading is maintained through fair and equitable rules that strike an appropriate balance between the demands of different market participants	FI	The JSE license must be renewed annually. As part of the renewal process the JSE must submit a written self-assessment form and the FSB annually performs an on-site examination. On-going market surveillance is performed by JSE, with FSB staff oversight through weekly meetings and reports and regular informal contact.
Principle 27. Regulation should promote transparency of trading	BI	The systems in South Africa for trading in listed securities are robust and comparable to international best practices. Trading in the OTC market, which is substantial in certain derivative products, is unsupervised. In 2010 the FSB initiated a study of the OTC market.
Principle 28. Regulation should be designed to detect and deter manipulation and other unfair trading practices	FI	Relying upon JSE listed market surveillance, the FSB has developed a strong investigative program covering insider trading, market manipulation and corporate disclosure. Consideration should be given to the need for market surveillance in the OTC market and expansion of its investigation and enforcement program into OTC market misconduct.
Principle 29. Regulation should aim to ensure the proper management of large exposures, default risk and market disruption	BI	The JSE BDA system provides it with robust data on member firm exposures. Both the JSE and FSB have the power to take action in the event of a firm failure to avoid systemic failures.
Principle 30. Systems for clearing and settlement of securities transactions should be subject to regulatory oversight, and designed to ensure that they are fair, effective and efficient and that they reduce systemic risk	Not rated as a full CPSS/ IOSCO review not performed	While the JSE is not legally designated a central counterparty, it performs a comparable function by acting as guarantor of all trading on its market. Its system for clearance and settlement has a strong record, largely because the JSE may call in replacement securities to cover a delivery failure. At present it operates on a T+5 standard for equities and a T+3 for debt. Conversion to a T+3 standard for equities is a priority, but cannot be implemented until the JSE completes a large IT system replacement program, which has been delayed.

Aggregate: Fully implemented (FI) – 16, broadly implemented (BI) – 11, partly implemented (PI) – 2, not implemented (NI) – 0, not applicable (N/A) – 0.

E. Recommended Action Plan and Authorities’ Response

Table 2.

South Africa: Recommended Action Plan to Improve Implementation of the IOSCO Principles

Table 2.

South Africa: Recommended Action Plan to Improve Implementation of the IOSCO Principles

Principle	Recommended Action
Principle 2	The unlimited discretion of the Minister of Finance to terminate senior FSB staff and members of the FSB Board should be defined and limited to circumstances where there is “good cause.”
Principle 5	The FSB should complete the proposed revisions to its rules for employees to report securities trading, the receipt of gifts from the industry, and negotiations for employment with regulated entities.
Principle 7	The FSB should obtain legal authority to formally review and approve JSE listing standards. This authority is included in a package of proposed amendments to the SSA to be submitted to Parliament in 2010. The status of ASISA should be clarified. If ASISA intends to monitor and police industry compliance with its codes, then ASISA should apply for an SRO license.
Principle 10	The CTI must empanel the Companies Tribunal. DTI/CIPRO must establish a credible program to enforce the Companies Act.
Principle 14	The JSE should pro-actively monitor ongoing periodic company disclosure reports. If the DTI does not implement its legal responsibility to monitor compliance by public companies with the Companies Act, this authority should be legally transferred to the FSB.
Principle 15	While the Companies Act permits shareholders to provide proxies to third parties, there is no regulatory scheme governing the process for soliciting proxies by third parties. Company officers should be required to disclose transactions in the company’s securities.
Principle 16	Public companies should be required to publicly disclose any IRBA notice of accounting irregularities. DTI should quickly create the Financial Reporting Standards Council and provide it with sufficient resources to perform its responsibilities.
Principle 18	The FSB should complete action on its initiative to develop a clear legal form for hedge funds, and, as appropriate, an effective regulatory environment for hedge funds.
Principle 19	The FSB should examine the ASISA codes for marketing and disclosure by CIS. If the FSB determines them to be appropriate these codes should be formally adopted as an FSB directive.
Principle 21	Consideration should be given to creating a new subcategory under FAIS for CIS portfolio managers.
Principle 22	The capital adequacy requirements under FAIS should require more frequent calculation of capital and an early warning notification obligation.
Principle 23	The FSB should consider creating minimum service level requirements for FSPs who rely upon contract compliance companies. Consideration should also be given to establishing minimum resource requirements for compliance companies on a per client basis. The FAIS division of FSB should obtain the authority to perform on-site visits of third party compliance companies. A bill amending the FAIS to provide this authority has been submitted to Parliament.
Principle 30	A priority goal should be conversion to a T+3 equity settlement cycle. While the JSE role as guarantor of all trading appears to be effective, legal action to establish a central counterparty system warrants careful consideration as it represents the consensus international best practice.

View Table

Table 2.

South Africa: Recommended Action Plan to Improve Implementation of the IOSCO Principles

Principle	Recommended Action
Principle 2	The unlimited discretion of the Minister of Finance to terminate senior FSB staff and members of the FSB Board should be defined and limited to circumstances where there is “good cause.”
Principle 5	The FSB should complete the proposed revisions to its rules for employees to report securities trading, the receipt of gifts from the industry, and negotiations for employment with regulated entities.
Principle 7	The FSB should obtain legal authority to formally review and approve JSE listing standards. This authority is included in a package of proposed amendments to the SSA to be submitted to Parliament in 2010. The status of ASISA should be clarified. If ASISA intends to monitor and police industry compliance with its codes, then ASISA should apply for an SRO license.
Principle 10	The CTI must empanel the Companies Tribunal. DTI/CIPRO must establish a credible program to enforce the Companies Act.
Principle 14	The JSE should pro-actively monitor ongoing periodic company disclosure reports. If the DTI does not implement its legal responsibility to monitor compliance by public companies with the Companies Act, this authority should be legally transferred to the FSB.
Principle 15	While the Companies Act permits shareholders to provide proxies to third parties, there is no regulatory scheme governing the process for soliciting proxies by third parties. Company officers should be required to disclose transactions in the company’s securities.
Principle 16	Public companies should be required to publicly disclose any IRBA notice of accounting irregularities. DTI should quickly create the Financial Reporting Standards Council and provide it with sufficient resources to perform its responsibilities.
Principle 18	The FSB should complete action on its initiative to develop a clear legal form for hedge funds, and, as appropriate, an effective regulatory environment for hedge funds.
Principle 19	The FSB should examine the ASISA codes for marketing and disclosure by CIS. If the FSB determines them to be appropriate these codes should be formally adopted as an FSB directive.
Principle 21	Consideration should be given to creating a new subcategory under FAIS for CIS portfolio managers.
Principle 22	The capital adequacy requirements under FAIS should require more frequent calculation of capital and an early warning notification obligation.
Principle 23	The FSB should consider creating minimum service level requirements for FSPs who rely upon contract compliance companies. Consideration should also be given to establishing minimum resource requirements for compliance companies on a per client basis. The FAIS division of FSB should obtain the authority to perform on-site visits of third party compliance companies. A bill amending the FAIS to provide this authority has been submitted to Parliament.
Principle 30	A priority goal should be conversion to a T+3 equity settlement cycle. While the JSE role as guarantor of all trading appears to be effective, legal action to establish a central counterparty system warrants careful consideration as it represents the consensus international best practice.

F. Authorities’ Response to the Assessment

26. National Treasury welcomes the report and the recommendations of the assessment team on compliance with IOSCO principles. We aim to take these recommendations into account when determining the direction of future reform efforts in this area.

27. South Africa was given 16 “Fully Implemented (FI)”, 11 “Broadly Implemented (BI),” and 2 “Partly Implemented (PI)” ratings. We, however, support the Financial Services Board (FSB) in its view that some of the ratings given are too low because the explanation of these ratings took factors like hedge fund and OTC derivative regulation into account, which are not mentioned in the corresponding principles. Moreover, in certain instances the ratings are applied inconsistently. Principles achieving a rating below FI may not have been supported by recommendations for improvement while in other cases a rating of FI is awarded even though the assessor appears not fully satisfied and indicates areas for improvement.