San Marino
Financial Sector Assessment Program-Detailed Assessment of Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
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Based on the request of the Central Bank of San Marino (CBSM), an assessment of San Marino’s compliance with the Basel Core Principles was undertaken in November 2009 in the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). The mission followed the 2006 Core Principles methodology. The banking sector dominates the financial sector. San Marino’s macroeconomic policy is generally sustainable. San Marino has engaged in a substantial economic reform effort since 2005 to increase market discipline. The CBSM should address governance issues in banks.

Abstract

Based on the request of the Central Bank of San Marino (CBSM), an assessment of San Marino’s compliance with the Basel Core Principles was undertaken in November 2009 in the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). The mission followed the 2006 Core Principles methodology. The banking sector dominates the financial sector. San Marino’s macroeconomic policy is generally sustainable. San Marino has engaged in a substantial economic reform effort since 2005 to increase market discipline. The CBSM should address governance issues in banks.

I. Summary, Key Findings, and Recommendations

1. The Central Bank of San Marino (CBSM), as the supervisory authority, is developing the bank supervisory regime from a very low base and will need enhanced independence, resources and support over many years if it is to complete the task of rebuilding San Marino’s reputation as a financial center. Prior to 2005, regulation in San Marino was in an extremely underdeveloped state. The CBSM has assisted the authorities in drafting laws, has issued regulations, and recruited more human staff. It has also had to deal with a series of difficult issues1. The staff is professional and committed and is starting to conduct on-site and off-site supervision to enforce their regime. The progress has been good, but there is a very long way to go and it will take a substantial period of effective enforcement before San Marino can rebuild its reputation, hit by the revelation of limited regulation, the consequent weakness of banks and apparent malpractice in certain institutions. The CBSM needs greater independence, resources, and support to fulfill the role it needs to undertake for San Marino.

A. Introduction

2. At the request of the CBSM, an assessment of San Marino’s compliance with the Basel Core Principles was undertaken in November 2009 in the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). The assessment was conducted by Maria Alessandra Freni of the Banca d’ltalia and Richard Pratt, an independent consultant.

B. Information and Methodology Used for Assessment

3. The mission followed the 2006 Core Principles methodology (Essential Criteria). The mission reviewed the self assessment prepared for the mission and other CBSM data. The CBSM web site, CBSM statute, Law 165 (the supervisory law), the anti-money laundering law and key regulations, Instructions and Circulars issued by the CBSM and the Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA) were all reviewed. The mission met representatives of the government, the CBSM, the FIA, and of banks, fiduciary companies, securities, and accountancy firms. All interlocutors responded freely to the mission.

C. Institutional and Macroprudential Setting, Market Structure—Overview

4. The CBSM is the sole regulatory body. The CBSM was created in its present form by Law 96 of 2005and its supervisory powers (which are comprehensive) over the entire financial sector were granted by Law 165 of 2005. The FIA, is responsible for setting and monitoring compliance with detailed anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations for the financial sector. The CBSM Governing Council, appointed by the parliament, publishes annual reports and further data on the banking system on its web site. The CBSM is staffed by professional, competent, and diligent supervisory staff.

5. San Marino’s banking supervision regime is only recently in place. Before the current law and regulations were introduced, supervision was underdeveloped with a minimum capital requirement on banks but no minimum capital adequacy ratio (although since 2003-2004 CBSM required banks to calculate regulatory capital and risk weighted assets). There were only two staff in the supervision department of the predecessor to the CBSM (one of whom was part time). Little supervisory reporting took place and no on-site inspections were undertaken. Regulations issued in 2007 and brought into force in 2008 place obligations on the banking sector. This regulation included transitional provisions up to 2013 for a number of key requirements, such as the minimum capital asset ratio and the concentration and connected lending limits. Banks accounting for up to a third of banking assets have adopted these transition provisions although many of them have minimum ratios above the 7 percent minimum required by these measures (and some meet the 11 percent minimum required for banks not on transitional measures). There is insufficient CBSM staff, and the CBSM has not yet completed the implementation of its supervisory methodology, with incomplete supervisory model or manuals and few full inspections of banks. The CBSM’s full independence is compromised to some extent by the extent of influence of government bodies over its budget and certain core functions such as licensing.

6. The banking sector dominates the financial sector. There are 12 banks, all in the private sector, with total banking assets of €11.7 billion (9 times GDP). The three largest banks hold almost three-quarters of banking assets between them. Six banks are foreign-owned, but only two banks are members of foreign banking groups (the other four are owned by non-bank companies registered outside San Marino and not subject to consolidated supervision by a foreign supervisor). Net profit in 2008 was €47million with the nonbank sector contributing €8.3million.2

7. San Marino’s banks attract deposits from Italy and lend them domestically and in Italy. San Marino relies largely on its fiscal and secrecy regime to attract deposits from abroad, overwhelmingly Italy. Just under half of the banking system’s total assets are lent to customers and half of these are lent to nonresidents (almost exclusively in Euros). The rest of the assets are mostly in the form of debt securities (mostly bank securities) and loans to banks. San Marino is vulnerable to policy changes in Italy that may affect the propensity of Italian depositors to use San Marino banks. These risks have crystallized with the Italian tax amnesty in 2009 3 that resulted in a substantial outflow of deposits and a developing liquidity problem.

8. The nonbank financial sector consists of about 56 firms, including 52 finance and fiduciary companies, 2 asset management companies, and 2 insurance companies. Asset management and insurance companies have only recently been licensed and hold very few assets at present. Fiduciary and finance companies, most of which are owned by banks, hold more of the assets of the finance sector and a employ a third of total staff, having experienced high growth during the past few years.4 Financial companies provide leasing and factoring services; fiduciary companies hold customers assets in their own name.

D. Preconditions for Effective Supervision

9. San Marino’s macroeconomic policy is generally sustainable. San Marino does not have an independent monetary policy, being in a monetary agreement with the Eurosystem.5 It has little public debt and has had fiscal surpluses in recent years, although the budget is heavily reliant on the financial sector, which could face a contraction.

10. The public infrastructure is reasonably well developed. Communications are good. Skilled labor has been in short supply, given the policy of the authorities to limit residency and require employers to seek permission to employ non resident staff. San Marino is almost totally dependent on foreign infrastructures for its own operations (such as payment systems, fund transfers, processing of checks, financial instrument, deposits, commercial receipts, credit cards, and cash). This adds to the vulnerability of the banking system.

11. San Marino has engaged in a substantial economic reform effort since 2005 to increase market discipline. New laws have been introduced to reform the commercial sector. Companies’ legislation has been updated and governance requirements strengthened. Tax reform has been undertaken to enhance collection and reduce bureaucracy and new labor laws designed to increase flexibility. Reform of the pension sector reduced liabilities and raised contributions. The financial sector is faced with competition from abroad, particularly Italy.6

12. There is no deposit insurance, and the CBSM is not a lender of last resort. Although the law provides for a deposit insurance system, no such system has yet been developed in San Marino. The CBSM does not issue Euros (except for commemorative coins issued on rare occasions). The CBSM is not a monetary authority capable of engaging in substantial operations to finance the banking system. and has not had permanent arrangements to provide liquidity assistance7 Nevertheless, it has a modest lending facility in place, which has been used to provide a €100 million loan to the largest bank. However, given the large size of bank assets relative to the size of the economy, there is limited scope for liquidity assistance. 8 9

E. Main Findings

Principle 1: Objectives, independence, powers, transparency, and cooperation

13. The CBSM is established by Law no 96 of 2005, which sets out its overall objectives and functions. The CBSM is responsible for the supervision of the entire financial sector. The supervisory powers and functions of the CBSM are clearly spelt out in Law No. 165 of 2005. The CBSM also has a general responsibility for promoting financial stability. The Governing Council of the CBSM (GCCB) is appointed by the Grand and General Council (GGCSM) on the basis of a proposal from the Committee for Credit and Savings (CCS)10. The statute also gives specific responsibility for supervision matters to the Supervision Committee of the Central Bank (SCCB), appointed by the GCCB, with the approval of the CCS. The Director General of the CBSM (DGCB) is the chief executive of the CBSM and is appointed by the GCCB with the approval of the GGCSM. The GGCSM and the State Congress have roles in the appointment and dismissal of senior management. These complex arrangements undermine full accountability and should be simplified to make the GCCB fully responsible and accountable for the CBSM. This should be subject to changing the GCCB appointment process on the lines of that adopted by other small jurisdictions so that it becomes more open and transparent and addresses conflicts of interest-particularly by encouraging more members from outside San Marino.

14. The independence of the CBSM does not meet international standards. The independence of the CBSM is compromised to a considerable degree by the requirement that decisions on licensing and certain other matters are all subject to the ultimate approval of the State Congress. The CCS is given some powers to influence the CBSM in Article 45 of the CBSM statute and Article 101 of the Law No. 165. The DGCB does not have protection against arbitrary dismissal by the government. The CBSM relies for over half its income on profits from trading and for most of the rest, on a contract with the government for certain services that expired in 2008 and have not been renewed. Budgetary uncertainty is increased further because the CBSM funds the activities of the FIA but has no control over its budget. These matters undermine the independence of the CBSM.11

Principles 2-5: Licensing and structure

15. The law provides the appropriate licensing powers. The authorization criteria applied by the CBSM are reasonably comprehensive, covering fitness and properness, governance and prudential requirements. They are consistent with the ongoing requirements placed on banks. The CBSM has the necessary powers to enforce these requirements. The CBSM has appropriate powers over the acquisitions of banks and their non banking activities. The main weakness in this area is the influence of the State Congress over licensing decisions, as already noted.

Principles 6-16: Prudential regulations and requirements

16. The CBSM imposes a minimum risk weighted capital ratio of 11 percent—higher than the Basel minimum of 8 percent and supplemented by a rule that limits total deposits to 200 times free capital. There is no capital requirement for market risk or interest rate risk in the banking book. Regulations covering large exposures and related party lending are broadly in line with the BCPs. However, banks are permitted to apply for a transitional arrangement that will allow them to phase in requirements for capital, related party lending and large exposures over five years and up to a third of banking system assets are in banks that have been granted this permission.

17. There are appropriate provisions for risk management, large exposures, and related parties, but there are no specific requirements on country and transfer risk and requirements on operational risk are at a high level of generality. Bank directors are given specific responsibilities in the regulations for risk management. However, the regulations do not address country and transfer risk. Although the CBSM may regard such risks as limited in the current circumstances, it needs to ensure that there is a sufficient risk monitoring system in place. Operational risk is covered by the requirement to have a risk management policy and by the specific requirement to examine certain kinds of operational risk, such as fraud and conflicts of interest.

18. Provisions for liquidity risk have only recently been introduced and provisions for operational risk are at a high level of generality. A recent circular on liquidity risk has introduced frequent reporting requirements for banks’ liquidity position, analyzed by maturity categories specified by the CBSM. This requirement was introduced in 2009, and its effectiveness cannot yet be assessed, although the requirements appear to be appropriate.

Principle 18: Abuse of Financial Services

19. The authorities have introduced a substantial body of law and regulations governing the defeat of money laundering and terrorist financing. Prior to 2008, AML/CFT requirements were not effectively enforced. The current law and regulations governing the obligations on banks are broadly appropriate. The law and subsequent instructions are clearly written with a view to matching the international standard. Banks, in some cases at least, have begun to put effective internal programs in place. The risks arise from the legacy of customers taken on before the current regime was in place. The CBSM and FIA are addressing this by requiring risk assessments of existing customers but it is not easy to acquire the relevant information to make such assessments retrospectively. A particular problem arises as a result of the activities of fiduciaries under the old regulations whose activities involved providing nominee facilities for customers who sometimes deposited their funds in cash or in other ways that made tracing the provenance difficult. Fiduciaries place their funds with banks and this can transfer some of the risks to banks.

20. The CBSM and FIA should coordinate their enforcement. Both FIA and CBSM have responsibilities for enforcing compliance with AML/CFT obligations and they have signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU). There is some sharing of information, but their effectiveness could be enhanced by coordinating their enforcement efforts through a jointly planned risk-based approach. There is also a need for additional resources for monitoring compliance with AML/CFT obligations.

Principles 17 and 19-23: Supervisory Methods and Approach

21. The CBSM has most of the supervisory tools at its disposal but does not have sufficient resources fully to undertake its supervisory role. The CBSM has broad and sufficient powers to set, monitor and enforce standards. They have implemented a reporting regime from banks which gives information on which to analyze banks’ performance. The CBSM, however, was only able to conduct two full scope inspections of a bank since 2006, although it conducts other more specific inspections, primarily related to credit risk and has conducted 11 inspections of non bank financial institutions. The CBSM does not have a formal supervisory model (such as CAMEL) and has not completed its supervisory manuals. It has been distracted from its task by ad hoc requests for judicial investigations and by the pressing need to deal with the difficulties facing the banking system in 2009. 12

22. The CBSM should address governance issues in banks. The regulations require that the Board of Directors must ensure that there are proper internal controls. However, the CBSM have noted that there is a weakness in corporate governance in Sammarinese 13 banks arising from over delegation. The CBSM can increase its efforts to educate Boards of Directors but should have the power to remove Boards of Directors as one of its sanctions (albeit subject to appeal).

Principles 24 and 25: Consolidation and cross border issues

23. The CBSM does not undertake consolidated supervision and the law could inhibit consolidated supervision by foreign supervisors. The CBSM is proposing to introduce comprehensive rules on consolidated supervision in due course but points out that the risks arising from the absence of consolidated supervision are relatively small as only one Sammarinese bank has a foreign subsidiaries and domestic subsidiaries are under the direct supervisory responsibility of the CBSM. For foreign owned banks, the CBSM, properly ensures that the foreign supervisor includes the San Marino bank in its consolidated supervision. However, Article 42 (which gives only the CBSM the right of on-site inspection) and the secrecy provisions in Article 36 of Law No. 165 (which prevent disclosure of confidential information by a bank to anyone except judicial criminal authorities and the CBSM), appear to prevent on-site inspections by foreign supervisors. Moreover, the foreign-owned banks report that they do not report confidential customer information to their parent companies and do not permit their head office internal audit or compliance staff access to their files and this is also consistent with the prohibition on disclosure in Article 36 of Law165.14

24. The scope for cooperation with foreign authorities is too constrained. The combination of the secrecy and international cooperation provisions in the law will place unnecessary barriers in the way of effective and rapid international cooperation. These barriers include the need for prior agreements to be in place (which can be time consuming) and an assessment of the equivalence of the foreign confidentiality regime. Written permission prior to any onward disclosure would prevent many foreign supervisors from accepting information because of compulsory domestic disclosure requirements. These provisions need to be simplified to allow full and rapid cooperation that the CBSM wishes to offer.

Table 1.

Summary Compliance with the Basel Core Principles

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C: Compliant.

LC: Largely compliant.

MNC: Materially noncompliant.

NC: Noncompliant.

NA: Not applicable.

F. Recommended Action Plan and Authorities’ Response

Table 2.

Recommended Action Plan to Improve Compliance with the Basel Core Principles

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G. Authorities’ Response to the Assessment

25. The authorities commented particularly on the question of cooperation and on AML/CFT defenses. On cooperation, the authorities consider that Law 165 permits foreign on-site visits of foreign-owned banks in San Marino, where there is a cooperation agreement in place, especially when the foreign supervisor was accompanied by the CBSM. They thought it right that the CBSM should sign more MoUs with foreign supervisors and considered that the agreement between the Sammarinese and Italian government should pave the way for a MoU between CBSM and Banca d’Italia.

26. Moreover, the authorities considered that, in the context of an MoU the time taken to make an assessment of equivalent confidentiality protection was not unduly burdensome. The authorities further considered that the Regulation allowing foreign owned banks to provide information to their parent banks was fully compliant with the prohibition on disclosure of confidential information in Article 36. In respect of the defenses against money laundering and terrorist financing, the authorities referred to the MONEYVAL report and stated that bearer passbooks did not hide identity but simply the transferability between persons. They questioned whether the mission had demonstrated that the current AML/CFT regulatory regime was less than fully enforced. The authorities pointed out that fiduciary companies were expected to know the beneficial owner of assets deposited with them.

27. The CBSM emphasized the disruptive effect of judicially inspired investigations. Such investigations have taken up a third of on-site inspection resources in 2009 and this may rise to 50 percent in 2010.

28. Current regulations limiting total deposits to a multiple of free capital and plans to meet the EU acquis by 2013 were considered by the authorities sufficient to justify a more favorable rating for Principle 6 on capital adequacy. The authorities drew attention to the rule that limits total direct and indirect deposits to 200 times free capital (the surplus of actual over minimum capital) and considered that this mitigated the effect of the weaknesses to which the assessment drew attention, especially when plans to meet the EU acquis on prudential matters by 2013 were taken into account.

29. The authorities drew attention to current developments. They noted that they were currently negotiating a monetary agreement with the EU that would involve their adopting the EU acquis relevant to the financial sector in full by 2015 and the prudential directives by 2013 (which would include the extension of the Basel II framework to their banks). They also noted that they had introduced a new provision designed to strengthen liquidity management in banks. This introduced a reserve requirement for all banks equal to 8 percent of direct deposits.

II. Detailed Findings

Table 3.

Detailed Assessment of Compliance with the Basel Core Principles

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Table 4.

Balance Sheet of the Banking System

In millions of euro

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Source: Central Bank of the Republic of San Marino, provisional data with reference to December 31, 2008.
Table 5.

Income Statement

In millions of euro

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Source: Central Bank of the Republic of San Marino (bank balance sheets, provisional data with reference to December 31, 2008).
1

For more details see the FSSA report which includes descriptions of the substantial outflow of deposits as a result of a tax amnesty in Italy, the effect on one bank of difficulties with a major Italian investment, together with the outcome of a report from MONEYVAL on the standard of AML/CFT compliance.

2

Source: CBSM.

3

The tax amnesty law (“scudo fiscale”)—which was adopted by the Italian government in September 2009—allows Italian individuals and businesses to avoid administrative and criminal sanctions if their off-shore assets are disclosed and at repatriated to Italy before December 15, 2009. On December 16, 2009, the deadline was extended to April 2010.

4

Source: CBSM.

5

Following the introduction of the euro in 1999 the European Community initiated the negotiation of a monetary arrangement with San Marino where the Italian lira was the official currency on the basis pre-existing arrangements with Italy. Italy took care of the negotiation; the ECB also participated on issues falling within its field of competence. The Monetary agreement was concluded in 2001; it allows San Marino to use the euro as its official currency, obliging the country to grant legal tender status to euro banknotes and coins from 1 January 2002. San Marino is not allowed to issue any banknotes; however it is entitled to issue a specified amount of euro coins each year. San Marino can also issue collector coins on the occasion of national events. Collector coins are denominated in values which are different from circulation coins and have no legal tender outside the Republic of San Marino. San Marino is also permitted to continue issuing gold coins denominated in “scudi”, without this having an impact on the amount of euro that it is allowed to issue annually. Coins denominated in scudi do not have legal tender status outside San Marino. To underline the common responsibility for euro banknotes and coins, it has been agreed San Marino will cooperate closely with the European Community to combat counterfeiting of euro banknotes and coins and suppress and punish such counterfeiting occurring within their territories. The Monetary agreement with San Marino does not provides that the sammarinese credit institutions have access to the Eurosystem monetary policy; however the agreement leaves open the possibility that such institutions might have, in the future, access to euro area payment systems, but, so far, no such access has been established. (source: “Monetary and Exchange Rate Arrangements of the Euro Area with Selected Third Countries and Territories”, European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, April 2006).

6

Source: IMF Article IV Report 2007.

7

The question of liquidity provision is discussed in the FSSA

8

Source: CBSM.

9

In 2006 the CBSM provided liquidity assistance equivalent to 1.7 percent of GDP to a small bank eventually placed under special administration; the government assumed repayment of the loan. On November 25, 2009, a Decree-Law was adopted allowing the government to guarantee the repayment of CBSM borrowing from domestic or foreign financial institutions (Article 1); proceeds would be used for LOLR operations to financial institutions confronted with a temporary liquidity need (Article 4).

10

The Committee is an arm of Government. Article 48 of Law no 96 of 2005 (BCSM Statute) provides that the Committee is composed of the Secretary of the State for Finance—who chairs the Committee—and a minimum of two to a maximum of four persons appointed by the Congress of State among its members.

11

In February 2010, the Committee for Credit and Savings withdrew approval for the Director of Bank Supervision, thereby forcing the Governing Council to dismiss him; the decision was taken with the contrary vote of the Chairman of the BCSM. The Chairman and the Director General of the CBSM subsequently resigned.

12

As previously note, these difficulties included the substantial outflow of deposits as a result of the Italian tax amnesty and one bank had difficulties with a major Italian investment.

13

“Sammarinese” banks refers to banks in San Marino

14

In January 2010, the Grand and General Council enacted and the Captains Regent approved an amendment to Article 36 of Law 165. However, the amendment does not address the two issues discussed here. Information can be passed to foreign parent banks but only according to the provisions relating to consolidated supervision in Law 165. Furthermore, the new provisions on bank secrecy do not expressly address the issue concerning the access of head office internal audit or compliance staff access to Sammarinese subsidiaries’ files.

15

In February 2010, the Committee for Credit and Savings withdrew the approval for the Director of Bank Supervision, thereby forcing the Governing Council to dismiss him; the decision was taken with the contrary vote of the Chairman of the BCSM. The Chairman and the Director General of the CBSM subsequently resigned.

16

In January 2010, the Grand and General Council enacted and the Captains Regent approved an amendment to Article 36 of Law 165. However, the amendment does not address the two issues discussed here. Information can be passed to foreign parent banks but only according to the provisions relating to consolidated supervision in Law 165. Furthermore, the new provisions on bank secrecy do not expressly address the issue concerning the access of head office internal audit or compliance staff access to Sammarinese subsidiaries’ files.

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