Isle of Man
Financial Sector Assessment Program Update—Detailed Assessment of Observance of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision

This paper presents a Detailed Assessment of the Isle of Man’s (IOM) Observance of the Basel Core Principles for the Effective Banking Supervision Report. The recent global financial markets turmoil has had a significant impact on the Manx financial system. The IOM has a deposit protection scheme, which has been amended shortly after the time of the assessment. The Financial Supervision Commission has adequate powers to ensure compliance with its regulations and other orders, and it uses these powers when the occasion demands.

Abstract

This paper presents a Detailed Assessment of the Isle of Man’s (IOM) Observance of the Basel Core Principles for the Effective Banking Supervision Report. The recent global financial markets turmoil has had a significant impact on the Manx financial system. The IOM has a deposit protection scheme, which has been amended shortly after the time of the assessment. The Financial Supervision Commission has adequate powers to ensure compliance with its regulations and other orders, and it uses these powers when the occasion demands.

I. Summary, Key Findings, and Recommendations

A. Introduction

1. This assessment of the implementation the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCPs) was undertaken as part of an IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) Update for the Isle of Man (IOM) in 2008, and in particular was prepared during an IMF mission that visited the IOM during September 2008. This assessment follows up on an earlier BCP assessment performed in the context of the 2002–2003 IMF Offshore Financial Center assessment of the IOM. The assessors were Peter Kruschel (BaFin) and Ronald MacDonald (banking supervision expert).

B. Information and Methodology Used for Assessment

2. The assessment of compliance with the BCPs was made on the basis of a study of the legal and regulatory framework and detailed discussions with relevant authorities and stakeholders. Discussions were held with government representatives, the Board and staff of the Financial Supervision Commission (FSC), the Bankers Association, senior management of banks (both IOM-incorporated and branches of overseas banks), and auditing firms.

3. The assessment team enjoyed very good cooperation from the IOM authorities. This included the comprehensive provision of all the documentation requested and extensive supplementary information and explanations delivered orally during meetings with members of the FSC’s Supervision Division. The FSC also made available to the assessors its self-assessment of compliance with the BCPs. The team would like to express its appreciation to the FSC and the representatives of banks and other institutions for their cooperation with the mission.

4. This assessment was conducted in accordance with the Basel Committee’s revised Core Principles Methodology (October 2006) and involved a qualitative assessment of compliance with each Core Principle (CP). An assessment of compliance with the BCPs is not, and is not intended to be, an exact science. Banking systems differ from one country to the next, as to their domestic circumstances. Furthermore, banking activities are rapidly changing around the world, and theories, policies, and practices of supervision are evolving swiftly. Nevertheless, it is internationally acknowledged that the CPs are seen as minimum standards.

C. Institutional and Macroeconomic Setting and Market Structure—Overview

5. The IOM is a self-governing Crown dependency. However, it is in a monetary and customs union with the United Kingdom (UK). During the past two decades, the government’s economic policy has been aimed at raising living standards through the development of a stable diversified economy. Key elements of this strategy have been sound public finances (budget deficits are legally prohibited), creation of a stable and favorable tax environment (“tax neutral” in the government’s terms), and the maintenance of the IOM’s reputation as a safe and reliable jurisdiction for locating business. This last element has been particularly important for the development of banking and other financial activities.

6. The FSC is the sole supervisory authority for banks operating in the IOM. It operates within a supportive legal framework and is empowered, subject to approval by parliament (Tynwald), to issue legally binding regulations for banks’ operations. The banking law was recently revised. Consequently, the legal basis for banking regulation is now located in the Financial Services Act 2008 (FSA 2008), which consolidates the provisions of the earlier Banking Act 1998 (now repealed) with those of other acts covering the regulation of all other types of financial institution (except insurance and pensions funds). In general, the FSA 2008 made few substantive changes to the FSC’s legal powers, which it has used effectively to issue comprehensive and effective bank regulations. These were contained in the Banking (General Practice) Regulatory Code 2005 (the Code) at the time of the assessment. However, at the beginning of 2009, they will be replaced by new requirements contained in the Financial Services Rule Book 2008 (the Rule Book), which the FSC has already issued under the FSA 2008.1 At the time of the assessment, the FSC was revising its guidance for banks to take account of the revised provisions in the Rule Book.

7. Since the previous BCPs assessment (2002), macroeconomic developments have been generally favorable for the development of the banking system. The Manx economy has performed impressively. Annual GDP growth has averaged over 8 percent over the last 10 years. Unemployment is negligible. Inflation has been moderate. The government is required to budget for a surplus, which has allowed it to build up reserves.2 Average residential house prices rose fairly steadily at about 8 percent per year during 2003–2007.

8. Banking continues to be the largest component of the financial sector, generating almost one-fifth of the IOM’s GDP. With the exception of two Manx banks, all local banks are branches and subsidiaries of parent banks from European Union (EU) countries (mainly the UK and Ireland) and some other countries.3 The FSC follows a policy whereby it licenses only subsidiaries or branches of banks based in what it considers to be well-regulated financial centers.

9. Banks’ business models are diverse. One major component is the collection of retail deposits from overseas (for example, from UK nationals working in third countries, and from non-EU nationals resident in the UK but not domiciled there), or from institutions such as trust services providers which place clients’ funds with banks in the IOM. The important deposit-collecting function of Manx banks is reflected in their relatively simple balance sheet structure, with intra-group claims accounting for over 70 percent of their customer deposits. Besides placements with parents, and limited lending to the local economy, there is some lending to entities incorporated on the IOM with business elsewhere, and residential mortgages in the UK. Banks do not operate trading books and in almost all cases liquidity is managed by parent banks.

10. Bank profitability and capital levels are both high. Since 2003, banks’ annual return on equity has been consistently above 15 percent. During the same period, total assets more than doubled from GBP 33.5 billion to GBP 68.1 billion. During 2007, return on total assets was 0.67 percent and return on equity 16.1 percent. Net interest income accounted for 75 percent of banks’ total income. The average risk weighted capital adequacy ratio at end-2007 was 16.1 percent.

11. The recent global financial markets turmoil has had a significant impact on the Manx financial system. At the time of the assessment, the impact was still small. However, since then a number of UK banks with operations on the IOM have undergone various forms of intervention, and the local subsidiary of a non-EU bank has had its license suspended and possibly will be wound up. The full implications of these events will take time to be determined.

D. Preconditions for Effective Banking Supervision

12. The IOM has its own legal system separate from the UK, with laws being made by Tynwald. In practice, legislation in the commercial and financial fields is very similar to that of the UK. The legal system, which is based on common law, is highly developed and well-regarded, notably in regard to expertise on financial sector matters. When necessary, the courts generally follow decisions of courts in similar jurisdictions in the major British Commonwealth countries. A full range of high-quality legal, accounting, and other business services are available on the IOM. The payment system is integrated into that of the UK.

13. The IOM is not a member state of the EU or the wider European Economic Area. Consequently, the IOM has not been obliged to implement European directives on the regulation of financial services. Instead, it has voluntarily followed a policy of adopting wider international standards such as those of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In practice, there is considerable overlap with EU standards, for example in areas such as banks’ capital adequacy requirements.

14. The IOM has a deposit protection scheme, which was amended shortly after the time of the assessment. Currently, the scheme provides compensation for depositors in the event of a bank becoming insolvent. The coverage extends to the sterling and foreign currency deposits of both resident and non-resident depositors, with a maximum compensation of 100 percent of deposits up to GBP 50,000 per individual depositor and GBP 20,000 for corporate and other depositors. Several classes of deposits are specifically excluded from protection, notably inter-bank deposits and those of the failed bank’s shareholders and directors. Compensation payments by the scheme are funded by compulsory levies on banks that are members of the scheme with a maximum amount payable in any one year. The scheme may also borrow temporarily. The scheme was activated following the closure of BCCI in 1991, and payouts may be needed in the context of the current global financial turmoil. There is no lender-of-last-resort facility.

E. Main Findings

15. The IOM has maintained and improved on the generally very high standard of compliance with the BCP, which was noted in the previous assessment. The FSC is proactive in establishing and enforcing high standards for banking supervision have contributed very substantially to the maintenance of the IOM’s good reputation as an international banking center.

16. A significant change since the previous assessment concerns the enhanced operational autonomy of the FSC. Although there is no tradition in the IOM—and indeed no evidence—of any political or governmental interference in the performance of supervision ever having occurred, the Banking Act 1998 allowed the Treasury to issue directions to the FSC regarding its handling of individual supervision cases. This has now been replaced with a much more narrower mandate for the Treasury to specify broad policies and strategies for the FSC, leaving day-to-day operations and case-specific issues to the FSC. In particular, the Treasury still has the legal power under FSA 2008 “by order [to] specify policies and strategies” to the FSC after consultation.

17. Other elements supporting the FSC’s autonomy have been broadly enhanced. New qualification for Board members (e.g., that they not be members of Tynwald or civil servants) have been introduced, but Tynwald retains a right to remove by resolution Commission members for any reason and without having to make its reasons public (although this would be very difficult in practice given the IOM’s political arrangements). Public accountability requirements for the FSC have also been improved, and the FSC uses a variety of vehicles to explain its actions and policies. However, Tynwald’s approval is still required for new (or amended) regulations made by the FSC.

18. The FSC remains closely integrated in the government’s financial arrangements. The FSC’s expenditure forms part of the government’s budget and requires the FSC to obtain approval for any increase in staff or other expenditure. Although the FSC’s annual need to request for sufficient resources for banking supervision does not appear to have impeded its operational efficiency in practice, it would be preferable if the FSC had greater financial autonomy. At a minimum, the FSC should have the flexibility to respond to unexpected pressures. It was also noted that the FSC’s information systems continue to be part of the government system.

19. The FSC’s present staff levels for banking supervision, although relatively small, appear to be broadly adequate. The supervisory staff are highly trained and respected for their professionalism by commercial bank management and accounting firms.

20. The FSC has substantially strengthened its supervisory techniques, and conducts supervision in the IOM in an efficient and cost-effective way. Its approach is risk-based, and incorporates both desk-based work and on-site visits. A risk profile is assessed for every bank, together with an impact rating based on the bank’s size. These factors are then combined to determine the amount of resources the FSC should apply to its supervision of any one bank. In addition to routine “business meetings” with banks, the FSC uses its risk assessments to prioritize other on-site work. These take the form of “focus visits” in which the FSC examines specific areas (for example, internal controls) of a bank’s risk profile. In addition, the FSA conducts also programs of visits across all banks to assess particular risks (themes) and banks’ ability to mitigate these risks.

21. The FSC has continued to incorporate best international practices into the supervisory function. Since the previous assessment, it has made very substantial progress with Basel II, cooperating closely with the supervisory authorities in Guernsey and Jersey in developing common approaches of implementation. Basel II has now been adopted by all banks, save one which has been allowed to postpone until January 2009.

22. The FSC has adequate powers to ensure compliance with its regulations and other orders, and it uses these powers when the occasion demands. A broad and flexible range of sanctions are available. The FSC now the power to petition the court for the appointment of a person to manage a bank’s business.

23. The major risk factors facing the IOM, which have been given prominence by the global financial crisis, relate to large exposures towards parent banks. Close relationships with parent banks are risk-mitigants in normal times, but operate as powerful risk transmittal mechanisms when the parents come under severe stress. These exposures to related parties generally dominate local banks’ balance sheets, which gives rise to major solvency and liquidity risks. The authorities recognize these concerns and the threats which they represent to overall financial stability. The FSC is commended for its proactive approach in addressing these concerns. Nonetheless, the importance of these risks require that the authorities prioritize the further development of relevant regulations and supervisory practice.

24. Principle-by-principle compliance with the BCP is summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1.

Summary of Compliance with the Basel Core Principles

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F. Recommended Action Plan and Authorities’ Response to the Assessment

Recommended action plan

Table 2.

Recommended Action Plan to Improve Compliance with the Basel Core Principles4

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Authorities’ response to the assessment

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II. Detailed Assessment

25. The methodology makes a distinction between “essential” and “additional” criteria. However, in accordance with the usual standards applied in the case of assessments which are conducted as part of an FSAP, this assessment takes into account the essential criteria only in determining the level of compliance.

26. The methodology provides that supervision of an individual principle is considered compliant when all essential criteria are generally met without any significant deficiencies. A principle is considered largely compliant when only minor shortcomings are observed, which do not raise any concerns about the authority’s ability and intent to achieve full compliance with the principle within a prescribed period of time. A principle is considered materially non-compliant whenever, despite progress, the shortcomings are sufficient to raise doubts about the authority’s ability to achieve compliance. A principle is considered non-compliant when no substantive progress toward compliance has been achieved. A principle is considered not applicable whenever, in the view of the assessors, the principle does not apply given the structural, legal, and institutional features of a country.

Table 3.

Detailed Assessment of Compliance with the Basel Core Principles

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1

The entire Rule Book came into force on August 1, 2008, for new licenses granted after that date. For existing license-holders, the entire Rule Book is not applicable until January 1, 2009, apart from the anti-money laundering part, which came into force on August 1, 2008, for all license-holders.

2

The government has an AAA rating.

3

Most major British banks and building societies have operations on the IOM.

4

Note that several recommendations are included under CPs that are assessed as fully compliant.

Isle of Man: Financial Sector Assessment Program Update—Detailed Assessment of Observance of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
Author: International Monetary Fund