The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid-Access Component of the Exogenous Shocks Facility: Staff Report; Staff Statement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Author:
International Monetary Fund
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Publication Date:
02 Feb 2009
eISBN:
9781451812848
Language:
English
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; staff appraisal; staff of the Ministry of Finance; anchor inflation expectation; policy objective; financing gap; price inflation; inflation expectation; oil import bill; Exports; Debt relief
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Ethiopia’s request for disbursement under the rapid-access component of the Exogenous Shocks Facility is examined. The authorities have embarked upon a tightening of monetary and fiscal policies to facilitate necessary rebuilding of foreign exchange reserves. Wheat has been imported on an emergency basis to dampen domestic inflation expectations and alleviate the impact of high food prices on vulnerable groups. Steep increases in international prices for key imports have exacerbated strains on the Ethiopian economy and pushed foreign exchange reserves to critically low levels.

Abstract

Ethiopia’s request for disbursement under the rapid-access component of the Exogenous Shocks Facility is examined. The authorities have embarked upon a tightening of monetary and fiscal policies to facilitate necessary rebuilding of foreign exchange reserves. Wheat has been imported on an emergency basis to dampen domestic inflation expectations and alleviate the impact of high food prices on vulnerable groups. Steep increases in international prices for key imports have exacerbated strains on the Ethiopian economy and pushed foreign exchange reserves to critically low levels.

I. Background

1. Ethiopia’s ambitious development policies have delivered rapid economic growth, but also contributed to rising inflation and strong import demand. Official statistics suggest that since 2003/04 real GDP growth has averaged 11.5 percent, fueled by public development spending.1 During this period, year-on-year non-food price inflation rose to 28 percent in November 2008, with steep rises in food prices pushing overall CPI inflation to 49 percent. Rising import demand and import prices have steadily eroded a once-comfortable foreign exchange position; by end-November 2008, reserve cover had fallen to just 1 month of imports of goods and services.

uA01fig01

Consumer Price Index

(Annual changes, in percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 034; 10.5089/9781451812848.002.A001

uA01fig02

Gross International Reserves

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 034; 10.5089/9781451812848.002.A001

2. Prices of commodities key to the Ethiopian economy rose steeply from early 2007 to mid-2008. International prices of oil and fertilizers rose by 150 percent and 75 percent, respectively. This contributed to a doubling of the oil and fertilizer import bill in 2007/08 to almost US$2 billion (about 8 percent of GDP). A 28 percent rise in prices of coffee, the largest export item, provided only a partial offset to the trade balance.2 Commodity prices fell sharply in the second half of 2008, fully reversing, in the case of oil, the earlier run up in prices. However, the oil import bill in the third quarter of 2008 remained substantial at US$0.5 billion.

uA01fig03

International Commodity Prices

(2005=100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 034; 10.5089/9781451812848.002.A001

3. Sharply rising global cereal prices have also adversely impacted the economy, albeit less directly as most food imports are in the form of aid. In 2008, the catching-up of Ethiopian food prices to world levels overshot, with inflation expectations and consumer stockpiling perhaps also fanned by growing food security concerns in some regions as the early Belg harvest was affected by poor rains.3 In response, the authorities imported high-priced wheat on an emergency basis in the second half of 2008.

II. The Economic Impact of Commodity Price Shocks

4. The exogenous shocks have been responsible for pushing the balance of payments into a position of immediate and serious vulnerability. Staff estimates that higher prices for oil and fertilizers as well as the emergency wheat imports will cumulatively cost Ethiopia US$550–770 million (about 2–3 percent of 2007/08 GDP) in foreign exchange over 2007/08 and 2008/09, even accounting for the reversal of the oil price shock during 2008/09 and higher coffee prices (see Table below). The lower estimate calculates the effect of higher commodity prices assuming no volume increase from 2006/07 levels, while the higher end of the range reflects the price effect using current year volumes. The lower estimate likely measures the minimum size of the shock: on the one hand, the constant volume assumption does not allow for demand adjustment of volume in response to higher prices, but nor does it allow for increasing volume to satisfy demand for oil and fertilizers in a growing economy.4 However, taking the impact of the shocks in 2007/08 alone, even the low estimate almost fully accounts for the decline in gross international reserves in 2007/08, which reduced import cover to 1.2 months of imports from 1.9 months of imports at end-2006/07.

uA01fig04

Coffee Exports and Oil and Fertilizer Imports

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 034; 10.5089/9781451812848.002.A001

Ethiopia: Estimated Net Effect of Commodity Price Shocks, 2007/08-2008/09 1/

(In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise noted)

article image

The fiscal year runs July 8-July 7.

Reflects price changes since 2006/07, using volumes that are kept constant as indicated.

An average international oil price of US$68.7 per barrel is assumed for 2008/09, in line with WEO assumptions.

Excluding additional emergency cereal imports that the authorities stand ready to effect if necessary.

5. Incomplete pass-through of international oil prices to domestic consumers dampened the impact of high oil prices on inflation but led to significant quasi-fiscal losses. The domestic prices of petroleum products are regulated by the government. Up until October 2008, adjustments were ad-hoc and insufficient to achieve full cost recovery. Consequently, the Oil Stabilization Fund, which was set up to smooth the fluctuations in domestic fuel prices, is estimated to have accumulated losses of about 1½ percent of GDP as of October 2008. The financing of these losses through borrowing from the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia was a significant contributor to a surge in public sector domestic borrowing to 7 percent of GDP in 2007/08.

6. Soaring food prices have adversely impacted low-income households. The price of the consumption bundle that the poor consumes is estimated to have risen by 78 percent in urban areas and by 85 percent in rural areas during the last two years. The welfare impact of these changes has been particularly large for urban households. The impact in rural areas was lower but still negative as nearly half of these households are net food buyers.5

III. Policies to Address the Shocks

7. To mitigate the impact of the exogenous shocks on the balance of payments and address domestic economic imbalances while protecting the most vulnerable, the authorities have adjusted domestic fuel prices, introduced measures to alleviate the adverse impact of high food prices, and are tightening monetary and fiscal policies significantly. The authorities intend to take advantage of the reversal of the commodity price shock to rebuild foreign exchange reserves to 1.8 months of imports by end-2008/09 in line with their medium-term objective of bringing reserve cover to 3 months of imports. Key measures are:

  • Eliminating domestic fuel subsidies: The Government eliminated the fuel subsidy in October 2008 by adjusting regulated domestic prices to the import parity level: prices of gasoline, diesel, fuel oil, and kerosene were raised by 6 percent, 39 percent, 32 percent, and 50 percent, respectively.6 Going forward, the authorities will review domestic fuel prices on a monthly basis, adjusting them as necessary, but keeping a margin above world prices in order to repay the debt of the Oil Stabilization Fund.7

  • Mitigating the impact of high food prices. The government imported wheat for the equivalent of more than 3 percent of domestic crop production and distributed it to low-income families and flour mills at import cost—well below prevailing domestic prices. The government is prepared to carry out additional such operations if necessary. Valued added tax, turnover tax, and surtaxes on some food items have been removed. The government has also raised the cash transfer in its safety net programs from 6 to 8 birr per day and is considering further adjustments.

  • Significantly tightening fiscal policy and eliminating domestic borrowing. The authorities’ revised budget targets general government domestic borrowing of zero in 2008/09—it was 2.7 percent of GDP in 2007/08—by containing expenditure and enhancing revenue mobilization through administrative measures (e.g., the integration of the three revenue agencies).8 The general government deficit is projected to be reduced from 2.9 percent of GDP in 2007/08 to 1.5 percent in 2008/09. Should expected revenue growth disappoint, the authorities stand ready to cut lower priority expenditure particularly those not affecting the poor to ensure the borrowing target is met.9 The authorities indicated that they would likely postpone investment spending. Keeping wage rates for public workers unchanged would also help to bear down on real current spending.

  • Reducing public enterprises domestic borrowing. Public enterprise borrowing will be kept to 4–8 billion birr (1.1–2.2 percent of GDP) in 2008/09, compared to 4.4 percent of GDP in 2007/08, through limiting their investment activities and through repaying the debt of the Oil Stabilization Fund. In addition, the authorities are establishing a committee, comprising officials from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the National Bank of Ethiopia, to monitor on a monthly basis the activities of key public enterprises and public institutions, including Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, the Oil Stabilization Fund, and the City of Addis Ababa.10 The information gathered will feed into high-level policy decision making.

  • Tightening monetary policy. The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) is targeting to reduce broad money growth to below 20 percent in 2008/09 from about 23 percent at end-2007/08. Building on earlier increases in reserve requirements (July 2007 and April 2008) that have helped to reduce banks’ excess reserves, the NBE intends to closely monitor and control reserve money creation arising from its net lending to the government.

8. The staff viewed the policy response as appropriate and urged forceful implementation:

  • The elimination of domestic fuel price subsidies staunches a sizable quasi-fiscal cost. The test would be to maintain the margin of domestic fuel prices above international prices even if world prices begin to rise again.

  • On budget implementation, the staff agreed that investment expenditure might be the place for expenditure restraint because the real value of the budget spending allocation was comparatively generous when taking into account much slower increases for capital goods prices than general inflation. In addition, investment spending has a high import content.

  • Close monitoring of the financing of the public enterprises will be key to fiscal discipline. Public enterprise borrowing in recent years has undermined the overall fiscal stance and crowded out private sector borrowing. In the first five months of 2008/09, public enterprise borrowing amounted to about 1.6 percent of full-year GDP, although the debt of the Oil Stabilization Fund is expected to be gradually repaid from early 2009.

  • Stricter liquidity control will be required to contain broad money growth, which remained high at 22.7 percent in November 2008. Liquidity control would require a more determined effort to eliminate net central bank advances to the government. Staff also recommended that treasury bill sales be stepped up as a monetary management tool, rather than relying on increases in reserve requirements. This would require raising treasury bill rates, which are currently under 1 percent. Guiding interest rates higher would also serve medium-term policy objectives of encouraging saving and financial deepening: highly negative real interest rates are currently fostering a decline in real growth in deposits in the banking system.

  • Stepped-up bank supervision is needed to forestall risks to the financial system. The prospect of a sharp slowdown in real growth and inflation could expose loan quality problems. Failure of private banks would set back progress in developing the financial system.

9. The authorities recognize the need for increased exchange rate flexibility to address growing competitiveness concerns. In the presence of modest nominal adjustment in the exchange rate, high inflation has contributed to a rise in the real effective exchange rate in the past year by over 30 percent. Staff agreed that a sizable step-adjustment of the exchange rate could be counterproductive at a time when the authorities are still trying to get inflation expectations under control. But competitiveness needed to be kept under close review to ensure a sustainable medium-term balance of payments. In the meantime, the authorities agreed with the need for a stepped-up pace of depreciation, while carefully monitoring its implications for inflation expectation.11

uA01fig05

Exchange Rates (Birr per U.S. Dollar) in Official and Parallel Exchange Markets 1

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 034; 10.5089/9781451812848.002.A001

1 Data on paralle markets are only sporadically available in recent months.
uA01fig06

Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates

(2000=100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2009, 034; 10.5089/9781451812848.002.A001

IV. Macroeconomic Outlook and Risks

10. The staff projects that the adjustment to the shocks and domestic imbalances will lead to a significant slowdown in Ethiopia’s economic growth in 2008/09. Tighter economic policies will restrain domestic demand and reduce overall GDP growth to 6.5 percent. Stepped-up donor assistance (see below) will help to soften the impact on the economy by providing financing for capital projects and foreign exchange for essential imports. This, along with lower import prices, would permit the rebuilding of foreign exchange reserves in line with the authorities’ objective. On the assumption that food prices have reached a turning point (prices fell somewhat in October and November 2008 and, with the harvest reported to be good, further declines are expected in the next few months), 12-month inflation would decline to below 20 percent by the end of 2008/09. But given the steep price rises at the beginning of the fiscal year, average CPI inflation will be above 40 percent.

11. The risks to the outlook are decidedly on the downside given the intensifying global economic downturn. Demand for Ethiopia’s exports, remittances, aid, and foreign direct investment could all be significantly lower than assumed in the projection. Should the risks materialize, the objective of rebuilding the foreign exchange reserves would be jeopardized and economic growth would likely be reduced further, setting back Ethiopia’s efforts to reduce widescale poverty.

V. External Financing Needs and Donor Support

12. Ethiopia’s international partners have recognized Ethiopia’s difficult situation and plan to raise their concessional project financing and budget support substantially in 2008/09. The staff estimates external financing could be up to US$750 million higher than loan and grant disbursements in 2007/08 (Table 5). This includes recently approved emergency support for food and fertilizer purchases of US$275 million from the World Bank and US$64 million from the African Development Bank.

Table 1.

Ethiopia: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2004/05–2009/101

article image
Sources: Ethiopian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Except for data on external sector which is based on July 1-June 30, data pertain to the period July 8-July 7.

Excluding aircraft and telecom purchases.

Whole series was revised.

Including debt of major public enterprises.

After enhanced HIPC and MDRI relief.

From 2005/06, data is on end-June basis.

Table 2.

Ethiopia: General Government Operations, 2004/05–2009/10

(Millions of birr)

article image
Sources: Ethiopian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. The Ethiopian fiscal year ends July 7.

Including the disbursements under the PBS operations starting from 2005/06.

Debt relief from the IMF under the MDRI is recorded in 2005/06. Withdrawal from the special account at the NBE is assumed to take place from FY2006/07 and FY2007/08.

Excluding special programs (demobilization and reconstruction).

Poverty-reducing spending is defined to include total spending on health, education, agriculture, roads, and food security.

External interest and amortization are presented before HIPC debt relief from the World Bank and African Development Bank.

Demobilization and reconstruction.

Table 3.

Ethiopia: General Government Operations, 2004/05–2009/10

(In percent of GDP)

article image
Sources: Ethiopian authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections. The Ethiopian fiscal year ends July 7.

Including the disbursements under the PBS operations starting from 2005/06.

Debt relief from the IMF under the MDRI is recorded in 2005/06. Withdrawal from the special account at the NBE is assumed to take place from FY2006/07 and FY2007/08.

Excluding special programs (demobilization and reconstruction).

Poverty-reducing spending is defined to include total spending on health, education, agriculture, roads, and food security.

External interest and amortization are presented before HIPC debt relief from the World Bank and African Development Bank.

Demobilization and reconstruction.

Table 4.

Ethiopia: Monetary Survey, 2004/05–2009/101

article image
Sources: National Bank of Ethiopia; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Year ending July 7. Including commercial bank claims and liabilities to Eritrea.

Claims on general government (federal and regional governments and other public agencies) by the banking system less deposits of the general government with the banking system.

Table 5.

Ethiopia: Balance of Payments, 2005/06–2009/10

(Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)1

article image
Sources: Ethiopian authorities, and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Data pertain to the period July 1-June 30.

Assuming an import content of 50 percent except for ETC (65 percent).

For 2006/07, incorporates MDRI debt relief.

Public enterprises.

5 Includes 1997 and 2001 Paris Club rescheduling agreements (including Russia) on Naples terms, 2002 Paris Club topping up to Cologne terms, and HIPC relief (including interim relief including estimates of relief beyond HIPC and relief on non-Paris Club debt under negotiation).

6 Foreign aid is defined as official transfers and inflows of loans to the government.

Excluding aircraft and telecom purchases

The financing gap is expected to be closed by the projected ESF.

13. The authorities request the Fund’s support under the rapid-access component of the ESF in the amount of SDR 33.425 million (25 percent of quota). The full amount would become available upon Board approval. ESF access would not only close the remaining financing gap in 2008/09, but also strengthen the credibility of Ethiopia’s macroeconomic policy commitment. Several donors have been delaying disbursements because of concerns about Ethiopia’s macroeconomic situation. Approval of the authorities’ request for the rapid-access component of the ESF, based on sound policy commitments from the authorities, would provide them with considerable reassurance.

VI. Capacity to Repay the Fund

14. Ethiopia has adequate capacity to repay the Fund (Table 6). Following HIPC assistance and MDRI debt relief, Ethiopia’s NPV of external debt has declined to less than 7 percent of GDP and under 50 percent of exports. Future repayments to the Fund would be negligible in relation to exports (estimated to peak at only 0.14 percent of exports in 2015). However, the investment plans of the public enterprises are likely to sharply raise the ratio of NPV of debt to exports in coming years.12 Therefore, the mission continued to urge the authorities to strengthen debt management capacity and cautioned against contracting nonconcessional external loans.

Table 6.

Ethiopia: Indicators of Capacity to Repay the Fund, 2007–18

article image
Sources: Fund staff estimates and projections.

Assumes a disbursement of 25 percent of quota under the rapid access component of the ESF in January 2009.

Including IMF repurchases and repayments in total external debt service.

Figures are based on fiscal year (June-July).

15. The authorities have requested a safeguards assessment update. The last assessment was conducted in 2001. Most recommendations of that assessment were implemented.

VII. Staff Appraisal

16. Staff supports the authorities’ request for the rapid access component of the exogenous shocks facility:

  • Unexpectedly sharp increases in commodity prices have pushed Ethiopia’s foreign reserves position into critical territory and contributed to high inflation.

  • In consultation with staff, the authorities have put together an appropriate policy package to address the shocks as well as underlying domestic economic imbalances and stand ready to take additional actions should risks to the balance of payments materialize. Sustained implementation of the package would lay the ground for a durable solution to the current balance of payments difficulties. The package includes appropriate domestic fuel price adjustments and substantial fiscal and monetary policy tightening. The authorities have also committed not to introduce or intensify exchange and trade restrictions.

  • The authorities have already taken significant steps to implement these policy commitments, as demonstrated in their policies to eliminate fuel subsidies and to implement the revised budget.

  • The disbursement from the rapid-access component of the ESF would close the remaining financing gap in 2008/09 and, more importantly, contribute to a broader effort by Ethiopia’s development partners to help Ethiopia adjust to the shocks and limit the impact of adjustment on poverty reduction.

17. At the same time the authorities’ adjustment efforts are subject to significant risks:

  • The commodity price shocks are unwinding rapidly but at the same time the global economic environment has deteriorated considerably. Thus, although improved terms of trade provide an opportunity to rebuild foreign exchange reserves, the balance of payments situation is likely to remain difficult in the coming year.

  • Poor control over the activities of the public enterprises threatens efforts to ensure fiscal discipline and risks crowding out private sector credit.

  • Money growth has yet to be reined in sufficiently. Liquidity control will require discipline in the use of central bank advances to the government.

  • The rapid appreciation of the real effective exchange rate is a concern and requires greater exchange rate flexibility.

18. The authorities are thus urged to implement their policy commitments forcefully.

Appendix: Ethiopia—Letter of Intent

Addis Ababa, December 15, 2008

Mr. Dominique Strauss-Kahn

Managing Director

International Monetary Fund

Washington DC

Dear Managing Director:

The pursuit of growth-oriented policies crucial for poverty reduction, the direction of efforts at maintaining supportive macroeconomic stability, and the advancement of structural reforms have contributed to the Ethiopian economy making significant progress in recent years. Effective implementation of these policies has induced robust real GDP growth averaging 11.5 percent per annum during the last five years. The strong growth, sustained mainly by increased agricultural production, public-private investment in construction, manufacturing, power, tourism, and financial services, has contributed to significant poverty reduction and better prospects for the achievement of the MDGs. Agriculture will continue to be the major contributor to economic growth, given substantial investment in irrigation schemes, with non-agricultural sectors also playing an increasing role.

In the meantime, Ethiopia is facing the challenge of sustaining high growth as the slowing global economy dampens demand for and revenue from commodity exports. This situation is further compounded by increasing inflationary pressure, driven largely by high food and fuel prices. The annual average CPI inflation stood at about 15.8 percent in 2006/07 and increased to 25.3 percent in 2007/08. The inflation rate is expected to slow down during the course of 2008/09 owing to an envisaged good harvest and the prudent fiscal and monetary policies being pursued.

Unexpectedly high oil and fertilizer prices have also undermined the balance of payments. The rapid economic growth witnessed in recent years has been supported by strong exports, which have registered an annual average growth rate of 20.9 percent during the last two years. However, with import costs rising rapidly, the country’s current account as well as the overall balance of payments deficit has widened and the international reserves have come under heavy pressure, dropping to about 6 weeks of imports of goods and services at end -November 2008.

Impact of the Shocks

In addition to the traditional concerns of ensuring fiscal prudence and debt sustainability, containing inflation, and sustaining growth, we thus have to find immediate solutions to the shock to the economy caused by high food, fertilizer and fuel import costs.

Let us elaborate further on the pervasive impact of these shocks and the challenges they pose. The inflationary hike, caused mainly by higher food prices and to a lesser extent by non-food inflation of commodities such as fuel, fertilizer and construction materials, is having a severe negative impact particularly on the urban poor as well as on overall economic performance. In turn, even with the more recent decline in world food, fertilizer and fuel prices, we see that a weak balance of payments will persist in the coming years. In 2008/09, emergency wheat imports of US$182 million are needed to help stabilize domestic prices and reduce the impact on the poor. Imports of oil, even with the decline in price, will remain very high by historical standards at close to US$1.5 billion.

Policies to Address the Shocks

To mitigate the impact of these shocks on Ethiopia’s economy, the Ethiopian government has taken concerted fiscal, monetary and administrative measures and will continue to do so

  • The government has eliminated the entire fuel subsidy in October 2008.

  • In order to provide a more effective subsidy to the poor, we will continue to import grains and distribute them at cost through local markets.

  • In the monetary area, minimum deposit interest rate was increased and reserve and liquidity requirements of banks raised to restrain domestic credit expansion and monetary growth. We intend to contain the broad money growth below 20 percent in the current fiscal year. To achieve this target, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) has committed to maintain net claims of the domestic banking system on the general government at zero over the course of 2008/09.

  • On the fiscal front, the government will continue to focus on maintaining the deficit at a sustainable level, while at the same time, increasing spending in key poverty–oriented sectors. For this current year, we have decided to tighten fiscal policy well beyond original budget intentions. To this end, the government is committed in its revised budget to not borrow domestically from the banking system on net basis in

  • the current fiscal year compared with the originally budgeted level of domestic borrowing of 1.5 percent of GDP and domestic borrowing of 2.7 percent of GDP in 2007/08. To achieve this, considerable efforts are being made to mobilize domestic revenue and reduce lower priority expenditure.

  • Along with lowering the government’s ceiling on domestic borrowing, we will closely follow the activities of public enterprises and reduce their domestic borrowing to between 4–8 billion birr (no more than 2½ percent of GDP) in 2008/09. A committee comprising officials from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the NBE will be established to conduct monthly follow up. It will closely monitor the domestic financing of public enterprises and other public institutions and inform high-level policymakers who will seek corrective actions if necessary.

  • Regarding the external sector, the government has continued to create a conducive environment for enhancing exports and private remittance transfers. The Government is committed to introduce greater flexibility in the foreign exchange market and will continue undertaking structural reforms to improve productivity and external competitiveness.

The government stands ready to implement other policy measures should the shocks turn out to be worse than expected.

Request for Fund Assistance under the ESF

Despite the foregoing efforts, the challenge remains huge in the short run. Cognizant of the difficulties, development partners such as the World Bank and AfDB have come up with mechanisms to help mitigate these problems. So far, agreements have been reached with the World Bank to redeploy US$137 million through restructuring the existing portfolio and to allocate new financing of US$130 million. The AfDB is to redeploy US$64 million in response to the food crisis and with the aim of improving domestic agricultural productivity in a sustainable manner, taking advantage of prevailing price incentives to promote an immediate supply response.

The challenges outlined above require urgent additional support. We therefore request that the IMF allow the Ethiopian government the maximum access of 25 percent of quota through the rapid access component of the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) to help mitigate the problems. We intend to engage strongly with the Fund with respect to policy advice and have no intention of introducing or intensifying exchange and trade restrictions. We also will request an update of the safeguards assessment for the NBE.

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1

The fiscal year runs July 8–July 7.

2

In 2007/08, export prices on average rose slightly more than import prices, contributing to a modest terms-of-trade gain. However, because the value of imports is more than four time that of exports, the impact of the terms of trade on the trade balance was large and negative.

3

See Box 1 of the 2008 Article IV Consultation Staff Report (IMF Country Report No. 08/264) for more discussion of the factors behind Ethiopia’s rapid food price inflation.

4

Trade price elasticities are hard to measure, but are estimated to be small, while import volumes are highly responsive to changes in real GDP (see IMF Country Report No. 08/264).

5

World Bank: Ethiopia—Emergency Food Crisis Response Program (Report No. 46658-ET, November 2008).

6

Fuel subsidies are not necessarily pro-poor. World Bank analysis in 2005 suggested that petroleum product subsidies, including kerosene, are captured disproportionately by the rich. The lowest income quintile receives less than 10 percent of total subsidies, while the top quintile receives about 44 percent.

7

Reflecting the decline in international oil prices, the government reduced domestic fuel prices in November and December. The Oil Stabilization Fund generated sizable surpluses in October and November 2008.

8

The original budget allowed for domestic borrowing of 1.5 percent of GDP. The new zero limit has been agreed at the Cabinet level. Because the spending and borrowing will not exceed the original budget, the revision of the budget would not require parliamentary approval.

9

For the first four months of 2008/09 (July–October 2008), fiscal performance of the federal government was broadly in line with the budget. Domestic revenues increased by 52 percent, compared with the same period in 2007/08, largely owing to significant increase in nontax revenues (including profits transfer from various public enterprises). The pace of increase in expenditures was contained at 25 percent.

10

Financing for low-cost housing projects by the City of Addis Ababa is channeled through a public enterprise.

11

The birr-dollar exchange rate in the inter-bank market depreciated by 5 percent on January 2, 2009.

12

See IMF Country Report No. 08/264 for the latest joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis for Ethiopia. The conclusion that Ethiopia remains at moderate risk of debt distress still holds.

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Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid-Access Component of the Exogenous Shocks Facility: Staff Report; Staff Statement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Author:
International Monetary Fund
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2009: Issue 034
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
9781451812848
ISSN:
1934-7685
Pages:
31
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451812848.002

Consumer Price Index

(Annual changes, in percent)

Gross International Reserves

International Commodity Prices

(2005=100)

Coffee Exports and Oil and Fertilizer Imports

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

Exchange Rates (Birr per U.S. Dollar) in Official and Parallel Exchange Markets 1

Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates

(2000=100)